Notes

1 Know Thyself! 1. Aristotle, Ars Rhetorica, ed. W. D. Ross, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 1395a19. 2. Simone Weil, Lectures on Philosophy, trans. Hugh Price (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 190. 3. This idea is expressed again and again by Hegel: The Delphic Apollo, the Pythia have declared Socrates to be the wisest man of the Greeks, and this reference to him is remarkable. In the Delphic oracle, Apollo presided as knowing god, – Phoibos the knowing; his highest commandment was: Know thyself. This is not knowledge of one’s own particularity as a human being, on the contrary ‘Know thyself’ is the commandment of the spirit. This commandment Socrates has fulfilled, has made γνῶθι σαυτόν the motto of the Greeks; he is the hero who in place of the Delphic god has put the principle that man knows in himself what the truth is, he need to look into himself. The Pythia now made that utterance; and this is the revolution that in place of the oracle puts one’s own selfconsciousness, the self-consciousness of the thinking of each and every one. (G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie I, Werke, ed., Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, vol. 18 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 502–3 (my translation)) It is in this sense that the sphinx in the Greek myth, which we can interpret symbolically, appears as the monster posing riddles. The sphinx asked the well-known puzzling question: who is it that walks on four legs in the morning, at noon on two and in the evening on three? Oedipus found the simple deciphering word, that it is man, and precipitated the sphinx from the cliff. The explanation of the symbol lies in the meaning existing in and for itself, in spirit, as the famous Greek inscription exhorts man: Know thyself! (G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I, Werke, ed., Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, vol. 13 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 465–6 (my translation)) Knowing its concept belongs however to the nature of the spirit. The call to self-knowledge, issuing from the Delphic Apollo to the Greeks, consequently has not the import of a commandment externally directed to the human spirit by an alien power. (G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Werke, ed., Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, vols 8–10 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), § 377 Z (my translation)) 4. In what sense the oracular mission is to be understood Socrates is unclear about in the Apology. At first Socrates’s questioning examination is described as a way of ‘investigating’ (21b) what the oracle meant when it said that

182

Notes 183 nobody is wiser than Socrates; at bottom the examination is about Socrates himself, even though each specific question concerns some specific topic and is directed to others. Other ways in which Socrates in this context describes what he is doing are ‘examining the meaning of the oracle’ (21e) – a description closely related to the former one – and two almost contradictory ones: ‘refute the oracle’ (21c) and ‘prove the oracle irrefutable’ (22a). In any case Socrates’s business of questioning others here seems to be something he has invented on his own. Later on (28e) Socrates says that ‘the god ordered me, as I thought and believed, to live the life of a philosopher, to examine myself and others’ (italics mine). Here a divine order is mentioned, but it is not as clear as the oracle itself, more of a guess on Socrates’s part. After that Socrates does not express himself so cautiously, however. He simply talks about obeying the orders of the god (29d, 30a). Finally he even says that what he does ‘has been enjoined upon me by the god, by means of oracles and dreams, and in every other way that a divine manifestation has ever ordered a man to do anything’ (33c). (What he refers to here is not his δαίμων, which only dissuades, never prescribes (31d).) (Here and in what follows I use the translations in Plato, Complete Works, ed., John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), without indicating when I have modified them. Furthermore, my use of the name Socrates does not refer exclusively to the ‘historical Socrates’, but to Plato’s Socrates in general.) As to Socrates’s relation to the oracle, compare the discussion in the beginning of Phaedrus (229d–30a). There Socrates says that there is no point in explaining the traditional myths rationalistically, that doing so takes time and that he rather devotes his time to getting to know himself. For that reason, Socrates accepts the traditional myths. This means that the question about the truth of the myths does not belong to the kind of questions you must examine in order to become self-knowingly wise. Why not? One might be inclined to answer that this is a moral point, that the important question does not concern the literal truths of the traditional myths but their moral import. But the example discussed in the beginning of Phaedrus is not of that kind. This myth is rather a pointless anecdote; even if the myth was true, it would still be pointless knowledge. And therefore you should not delve into the question but accept the tradition as it is. But what the sophists talk about, on the other hand, are important topics; concepts such as courage and piety are important ones. Here thought is needed. As to the relation of oracular messages and selfknowledge, compare what Timaeus says (Plato, Timaeus 71e–2a): It takes such a man to thoroughly analyze any and all visions that are seen, to determine how and for whom they signify some future, past or present good or evil. But as long as the fit remains on him, the man is incompetent to render judgment on his own visions and voices. As the ancient proverb well puts it, ‘Only a man of sound mind may know himself and conduct his own affairs’. 5. See Plato, Apology 21d, and further Charmides 164d–5b, Philebus 48c. 6. Plato, Phaedrus 278d: ‘To call him wise, Phaedrus, seems to me too much, and proper only for a god. To call him wisdom’s lover – a philosopher – or something similar would fit him better and be more seemly.’ Compare Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols, Loeb Classical Library 184–5 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 1.12: ‘But the

184 Notes

7.

8.

9.

10.

11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

first to use the term, and to call himself a philosopher or lover of wisdom, was Pythagoras; for, said he, no man is wise, but God alone’. Compare Gorgias in Plato, Gorgias 456b–c: And I maintain too that if an orator and a doctor came to any city anywhere you like and had to compete in speaking in the assembly or some other gathering over which of them should be appointed doctor, the doctor wouldn’t make any showing at all, but the one who had the ability to speak would be appointed, if he so wished. And if he were to compete with any other craftsman whatever, the orator more than anyone else would persuade them that they should appoint him, for there isn’t anything that the orator couldn’t speak more persuasively about to a gathering than could any other craftsman whatever. The word ‘sophist’ already indicates an unambiguous relation to wisdom (σοφία). (Here and in what follows I disregard the difference between the sophist and the orator, a difference Socrates too disregards (465c, 520a).) Furthermore, in Charmides Socrates is at a more general loss about how selfknowledge – knowing what one knows and what one does not know – is to be understood and whether it is possible. For Socrates’s association of selfknowledge, knowing what one knows and what one does not know, and σωφροσύνη, see 167a; for his expressions of confusion, see 167c and onwards (Socrates seems here – and also in other places (cf. Republic 333) – to have difficulties of grasping any concept that is to be found on a meta-level, signifying the spirit in which something is done or an aspect of something). Compare what Socrates says about ‘the craft of turning around’ (τέχνη τῆς περιαγωγῆς) (Republic 518d), something which is, however, not immediately identical to what I talk about above. For this paragraph, see e.g. Plato, Apology 20a–b, 21d, 22d–e, 23a–b, 24d–5b; Laches 187e–8b, 200e; Meno 70b–c, 80c–d; Theaetetus 149a–50d, 157c–d, 161b, 210c. Plato, Phaedo 64a. Cf. Plato, Phaedo 114e. See above all Gorgias, in which the physician is the standard example of someone who really has expert knowledge. But this example is to be found almost everywhere in the Platonic corpus, see e.g. Theaetetus 178c. This paragraph is inspired by Statesman 297e–305d. There are two problems concerning expert knowledge there described: what should I, who as a nonexpert cannot claim to know what the expert should do, do when the expert abuses his knowledge (297e–8e), and how should I, who am not an expert, distinguish the real expert from the purported expert (300d–e). As an answer to these problems, ‘the visitor’ and ‘young Socrates’ refer to a higher form of knowledge, concerning when some lower knowledge should be used and when not (304b–5d). But what is not said is that this is only a solution to the problems if this higher knowledge is a kind of knowledge it is not possible to be an expert in. Compare Republic 601c–d: in the end it is the user, not the maker or the imitator, who knows how something has to be. For ‘ideal perfection in the light of the good’, see e.g. Cratylus 388d–90a. Compare Callicles’s irritation when Socrates brings the discussion down to earth (Gorgias 497b–c, 490c–1a; see also Symposium 221e–2a).

Notes 185 16. This description of Socrates and of recollection is deliberately one-sided. Socrates’s point is not only that we actually do know that we do not know, a knowledge we have to recollect, but that we also know that we do know. But it is telling that the process of getting the slave boy in Meno to realize that he does not know what he took himself to be knowing – Socrates acting as a stingray up to 84a – is a much more convincing example of how it is possible to make someone recollect something by asking him questions than what follows is, when Socrates leads the slave boy to the correct answer to the geometrical question. It is the latter half that is ‘like a dream’ (85c), not the former one. Moreover, the questions Socrates asks concerning suggested definitions are not at all always about pointing to a concrete case but are often about getting his interlocutor to agree on some strange demand the definition must, but cannot, meet. A telling example is Charmides 165c–6c. 17. For very different forms of this idea, see the following five examples: Who thinks abstractly? The uneducated one, not the educated. [ ... ] For my claim I need only to give examples of which everyone will admit that they contain it. A murderer is then brought to court. To the common people he is nothing but a murderer. [ ... ] That is, to see nothing but this abstract quality, that he is a murderer, in the murder (using this abstract term), to annihilate all remaining humanity in him by means of this simple quality. (G. W. F. Hegel, ‘Wer denkt abstrakt?’, in Jenaer Schriften, 1801–1807, Werke, ed., Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 2: 577–8 (my translation)) Our problems are not abstract, but perhaps the most concrete that there are. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), § 5.5563) Dasein has [ ... ] the tendency, in accordance with a kind of Being belonging to it, of understanding its own Being from that entity to which it essentially constantly and proximally comports itself [ ... ] Dasein is ontically ‘closest’ to itself, ontologically most distant, but pre-ontologically not alien. (Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 18th ed., (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2001), 15–16 (my translation)) Contrary to what is commonly believed, one moves from the general to the particular, from the abstract to the concrete. [ ... ] A work of art is something which is unlike anything else. It is art which, best of all, gives us the idea of what is particular. For example Notre Dame de Paris is Notre Dame, not just a church. A fine picture does not give us the idea of a picture in general. [ ... ] To label, classify someone one loves, that is impious. [ ... ] So, contrary to what is commonly believed, the contemplation of particular things is what elevates a man, and distinguishes him from animals. Animals never distinguish between an object and its utility. That is the reason why nothing individual and concrete exists for them; nothing particular exists as far as their bodies are concerned. (Weil, Lectures on Philosophy, 59) The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one’s eyes.) (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen; Philosophical Investigations, 4th ed., trans.

186 Notes

18.

19.

20.

21. 22.

G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), § 129) Plato, Apology 32a, 36b–c; Republic 492b–d, 494a, 496c; Theaetetus 172c–7b. That Socrates says that he is the only one who carries on the true political craft (Gorgias 521d) is hence remarkable: he tries to make the citizens as good as possible (513e) by having discussions with each one on his or her own and not with the masses (474a–b, 475e–6a). The clearest explanation of why definitions are needed is to be found in Republic. Socrates says (331c) that giving back what you have borrowed is not generally just, since if that were so you would have to give back a weapon you had borrowed from a friend who meanwhile has gone mad. The example is taken to show that having an erroneous definition of justice might have grave consequences. But this example does not work on a personal level; it works only on the presupposition that when really being confronted with a case like this, I would not act according to the definition but discard it. (For a discussion of this, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1a IIae q.94 a.4.) However, in a juridical, in contrast to a personal, case, there is a need for definitions. A law which is badly formulated gives rise to unwanted loopholes. This topic is taken up for discussion in Statesman, in which it is said that there is a problem to all laws: they are too unspecific (294a–6a). This means that the pursuit of definitions could be criticized in the same way: a definition is always too unspecific. Since all laws are affected by this problem, they are only what is second-best (300b–c); definitions could then be of practical use in specific contexts, but would never be of general and unconditional validity. What gives rise to the example is Meno’s question about how to look for the meaning of ἀρετή when you do not know what it is that you are looking for (80d), and Socrates concludes the discussion of the geometrical example by expressing some doubts about it and saying (86b–c): I do not insist that my argument is right in all other respects, but I would contend at all costs both in word and deed as far as I could that we will be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not know and that we must not look for it. On the other hand, one should not overemphasize the moral nature of ἀρετή, a concept which obviously does not only cover what we call ‘virtue’. Plato, Protagoras 361a–b. There is a confusion of that kind in Phaedo. After having showed that conceptual knowledge is not something you acquire empirically (65d–e; see also 74a–5d, in particular 75c–d), Socrates says that we have acquired it in a former life (72e–3a, 75d–6c). Thereby he makes the distinction between empirical and conceptual knowledge too small, or (in the light of 66d–7a, applied to the former life) sees this former life as so different from this life that the same difficulty concerning the possibility of acquiring this knowledge empirically does not arise there too, but not so different that it is no longer meaningful to use the word ‘acquire’. See also Meno, e.g. 81c–d but also 82b–6b. In other words, this is the weakness of the concept of recollection in its Platonic form.

Notes 187 23. The Socratic point may seem to be another one: nobody does what is unjust wilfully, and anyone who does what is unjust does so against his will (Plato, Gorgias 509c; see also Protagoras 352e–7e and Sophist 228c). But this must be understood against the background of another Socratic point: the one who does what is unjust does something he only thinks is good for himself, something which in fact is bad for him (Gorgias 466e), for ‘doing what’s unjust is worse than suffering it’ (473a and elsewhere), a ‘worse’ which does not refer to some unknown consequence of doing what is unjust, however, but to this very doing, which means that the ignorance is not a simple mistake. In other words, will and knowledge are in this context not two completely different things, but are here intimately connected to a blindness to what it is I am doing, a blindness which can be described as both wanted and unwanted (or neither nor) and thereby pointing both in the direction of knowledge and in the direction of ignorance. What to emphasize depends on one’s position: describing someone who does what is unjust, I may pity her, describing myself remorsefully, I may criticize myself. 24. See Plato, Protagoras 329a–b, 347e–8a; Phaedrus 275d; Gorgias 474a–b, 475e–6a. 25. See Plato, Phaedrus 275a–d. Socrates’s rejection of the public sphere (Apology 32a, 36b–c) should therefore not be understood as if he were only concerned about himself. On the contrary, he says that he ‘went to each of you privately and conferred upon him what I say is the greatest benefit’ (Apology 36c). The rejection of the public sphere is a way of putting the city itself above the belongings of the city, just as Socrates puts the concern of becoming as good and as wise as possible above the concern for one’s own belongings (Apology 36c–d). (See also Gorgias 474a–b, 475e–6a, 500c, 513e, 521d.) In other words, this is a way of understanding the distinction between the inner and the outer, between the essential and the inessential, between the soul and the body; I will return to this question in what follows. 26. Cf. Plato, Republic 518b–c. 27. Plato, Laches 187e–8c. 28. Compare how the orator / sophist loses himself by speaking non-dialogically (Gorgias, 513a–c). 29. Plato, Phaedrus 230d. Socrates says: ‘landscapes and trees have nothing to teach me – only the people in the city can do that.’ This shows what ‘teach’ (διδάσκειν) means for him: it has to do with self-knowledge, not with, say, botanical knowledge. 30. See above all Plato, Theaetetus 185b–7a. 31. Cf. Plato, Republic 490b, 585c–d, 611b–e. 32. Compare how the question about what Gorgias is (Plato, Gorgias 447d) and the question about what Gorgias’s craft is like (448e and onwards) are treated as almost the same question. 33. Plato, Phaedo 66c–d. See also 64d–5a. 34. Plato, Phaedo 64d. 35. Plato, Phaedo 82c. See also Apology 29d–e, 36b–c, 41e; Phaedo 68b–c, 114e; Gorgias 523c. (Note the recurring contrast between money and the soul, as well as the connection between money, on the one hand, and reputation and honor, on the other hand.) All this means that it is with the soul you turn to

188 Notes

36. 37. 38.

39.

40. 41. 42.

43.

others in a personal way, in dialogue, me to you and you to me, whereas it is with the body you turn to the public sphere. Cf. Republic 492b–6c. Plato, Gorgias 477b. In this context, ‘soul’ is nearly related to ‘character’. See also 504c–d, 505a–b, 524d–5a. Plato, Phaedo 80b. See also 65b–c, 65e–6e, 74a–5d, 78d–9a. See also Republic 490b, 585c–d, 611b–e. Plato, Phaedo 105c. Strictly speaking, what Socrates (or rather Cebes, who is the one who answers Socrates’s questions) is here saying is that the soul ‘brings’ life (105d), that is it is not life, in accordance with the following (103e): ‘there is something else that is not the form but has its character whenever it exists.’ (The possibility that is here hinted at – that this is so only as long as the soul exists – is rejected in 106c–e, where it is said that what has the character of life for that very reason does not admit inexistence.) See also Republic 353d: ‘What of living? Isn’t that the function of the soul?’ And 445a–b: ‘the soul, the very thing by which one lives’. Plato, Phaedrus 245e. Compare the different understandings of earlier philosophers Aristotle presents in De Anima, all of them connecting the soul to movement. About Thales he writes (Aristotle, De Anima 405a19–21): ‘Thales, too, to judge from what is recorded about him, seems to have held soul to be a motive force, since he said that the magnet has a soul in it because it moves the iron.’ Plato, Statesman 259c–d. Plato, Republic 441e. See also Republic 431d–2a, Phaedo 94b–e. In the picture of the soul as a pair of horses with a charioteer (Phaedrus 246a–b), the charioteer corresponds to the mind (νόος). The relation between mind and intelligence is certainly not clear (247c–d), but intelligence nevertheless tends to designate the soul in its entirety (256a, 256c). The same goes for the last distinction (between my wishes, desires, and needs, on the one hand, and the attempt at weighing these against each other, giving them their right place, on the other hand), where the term was ‘the rational part’ (τὸ λογιστικὸν) and not intelligence: the rational part is one part of the soul, just as the philosopher / the guardian is one part of the city. But the rational part is nonetheless closely connected to the soul in its entirety, as seen in the quote (see also Republic 428c–d, 439d, 441d–2d). Another side to this issue – that the part represents the whole – is that the rational part is concerned with the pleasures of the soul itself (learning (485d–e)), whereas the appetitive part is concerned with things sometimes called of the soul (437d–e), sometimes of the body (Phaedo 64d, 81b, 94b–c; see also Republic 518d–e), which shows their unclear position. (As the soul corresponds to the city, the rational part corresponds to the philosopher (581b), and the philosopher is characterized as ‘just’ (486b), that is closely connected to the totality and harmony of the soul; see also 586e–7a.) And for that reason it is possible to say (611b–12a): to see the soul as it is in truth, we must [ ... ] study it [ ... ] as it is in its pure state [ ... ] What we’ve said about the soul is true of it as it appears at present. But [ ... ] we have to look somewhere else in order to discover its true nature. [ ... ] To its love of wisdom [εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς]. Then we’d see what its true nature is. Plato, Phaedrus 265b–c. Phaedo 114d: ‘It would not be fitting for a sensible man to insist that these things are as I have described them.’

Notes 189

2 What Kind of Self-Knowledge? 1. Quassim Cassam, ed., Self-Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 2. Basil of Caesarea, Hexaemeron, in vol. 29 of Patrologia Graeca (Paris: Migne, 1857), IX.6 (my translation). 3. Compare Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Edmund Hill (Hyde Park: New City Press, 1991), X.viii.11 (see also X.iii.5–iv.6): ‘where does it [the mind] go to look for, and where does it come in order to come upon itself? What after all can be as much in the mind as mind?’ This means, according to Augustine (X.viii.11), that self-knowledge is not an epistemological problem but a problem of the will. I will come back to this (in, above all, Chapter 4). 4. When the exhortation to know oneself is understood epistemologically, the result is pretty shallow: ‘Preceptor of wanton love’, said he [Apollo] to me, ‘come, lead thy pupils to my shrine, where there is a saying renowned in fame o’er all the world, which bids each be known to himself. Only he who knows himself will love with wisdom, and perform all his task according to his powers. Let him to whom nature has given beauty be looked at for that; he who has a fair skin, let him oft lie with shoulder visible; let him who pleases by his talk break the still silence; who sings well, let him sing, who drinks well, let him drink. But neither let the eloquent declaim in the midst of talk, nor the frenzied poet recite his verses.’ (Ovid, Ars Amatoria; The Art of Love, trans. J. H. Mozley, in The Art of Love, and Other Poems, Loeb Classical Library 232, 2nd ed. (London: William Heinemann, 1979), II.497–508) 5. Collingwood writes: If that which we come to understand better is something other than ourselves, for example the chemical properties of matter our improved understanding of it in no way improves the thing itself. If, on the other hand, that which we understand better is our own understanding, an improvement in that science is an improvement not only in its subject but in its object also. By coming to think more truly about the human understanding we are coming to improve our own understanding. Hence the historical development of the science of human nature entails an historical development in human nature itself. (R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 83–4) This is not normally the case: I change when acquiring knowledge about something (I pass from being someone who did not know this to someone who knows), whereas that which the knowledge is about remains the same, a stability without which knowledge is often thought not to be possible. 6. Here the possibility of an infinite regress obviously arises. Whether this is a problem or not remains to be seen. 7. Aristotle, Ars Rhetorica 1395a23–4. 8. Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 167 (note 120). 9. For thoughts about the third example, see Massimo De Carolis, ‘Toward a Phenomenology of Opportunism’, in Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, ed. Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 37–8.

190 Notes 10. ‘Past time [ ... ] is the schema of mind’s self-knowledge. [ ... ] To know oneself is simply to know one’s past and vice versa’ (R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of History, and Other Writings in Philosophy of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 220). 11. Cf. Hugo Strandberg, Love of a God of Love: Towards a Transformation of the Philosophy of Religion (London: Continuum, 2011), Chapter 4, section 3b. 12. Compare Freud about the reading of psychology books: He promises to follow this rule [that he should not exclude any ideas from the report], and you will then be irritated at how badly he keeps his promise when the occasion arises. Of this you will first give the explanation that the justification for free association has not dawned upon him, in spite of the authoritative assurance, and you will perhaps get the idea of first trying to win him theoretically by giving him books to read or by sending him to lectures, by means of which he can be turned into a supporter of our views on free association. Such mistakes you will however avoid by the observation that the same critical objections to certain ideas arise in yourself, whose conviction you can be sure of, objections that are not set aside until later, as it were in second instance. [ ... ] This resistance is independent of the dreamer’s theoretical conviction. (Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, in Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, und Neue Folge, 14th ed., Studienausgabe, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2003), 1:130 (my translation)) (See also ‘Über “wilde” Psychoanalyse’, in Schriften zur Behandlungstechnik, 5th ed., Studienausgabe, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1997), 11:139, and ‘Ratschläge für den Arzt bei der psychoanalytischen Behandlung’, in Schriften zur Behandlungstechnik, 5th ed., Studienausgabe, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1997), 11:180.) But Freud underestimates the problem. Reading books is not only pointless, but could just as well be harmful. The theory could be used in repression, even if true. This is not unique to books or theories; the one who is looking for something to use repressingly will find it. As Heidegger says (Sein und Zeit, 36 (my translation)): ‘Every phenomenological concept and proposition, drawn from primordial sources, risks, as a communicated statement, to degenerate. It is passed on in an empty understanding, loses contact with the ground and becomes a free-floating thesis.’ Freud could here talk about ‘isolation’ (Hemmung, Symptom und Angst, in Hysterie und Angst, 9th ed., Studienausgabe, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1997), 6:264–6). The problem can therefore only be solved in the interpersonal sphere, that is in this case in the analysis, that is in the sphere of transference (‘Zur Dynamik der Übertragung’, in Schriften zur Behandlungstechnik, 5th ed., Studienausgabe, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1997), 11:164). 13. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 129. Wittgenstein wants us to move in that direction I mentioned in Chapter 1, from the traditional philosophical preoccupation with the abstract – Thales falling into a well when studying the stars (Plato, Theaetetus 174a) – to attention to the concrete.

Notes 191

14.

15. 16. 17.

18.

19.

20. 21.

(What Socrates says about Thales is noteworthy also because of its ambiguity. On the one hand, he pictures the philosopher as totally uninterested in the affairs of public life, centered around fame and fortune. On the other hand, Socrates obviously says this in order to defend himself against the scorn the philosopher is met with in public life. So his reputation seems after all to be an important issue for him: a good example of insufficient self-knowledge!) See Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, § 16. As Heidegger says (p. 69), this does not mean that the everyday object of use is normally unknown; the kind of knowledge I have when I use it with my eyes upon what I try to accomplish is simply another kind of knowledge. As Heidegger also says (p. 61), it is against the background of this everyday use that theoretical attention is possible. This is in line with what I just said: to ask a question about the character of an interest of mine (which certainly is not a theoretical question) is not as such meaningful or intelligible, but has a point and a sense when it is important, for some reason or other, to pay attention to the character of the interest. In other cases this kind of self-knowledge withdraws in favor of that kind of self-knowledge which is inherent in one’s everyday being. See also Martin Heidegger, Was ist das – die Philosophie?, 12th ed. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008), 6 (my translation): ‘The way [ ... ] is directly before us. And only due to its being the closest one is it hard for us to find it.’ And Martin Heidegger, Brief über den »Humanismus«, in Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe 9, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004), 331 (my translation): ‘Being is what is closest. What is close is however most distant to human beings.’ Compare Karl Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Vol. 1, Der Produktionsprozeβ des Kapitals, in vol. 23 of Marx Engels Werke, 23rd ed. (Berlin: Dietz, 2008), 197 (my translation): ‘If means of production, in the labor process, manifest their character as products of past labor, then by their deficiencies. [ ... ] In the successful product the mediation of its use qualities by past labor is blotted out.’ Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), X.xxxiii.50. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), 395. In Chapter 5 I will come back to this – how the goal of self-knowledge is to be understood, that the goal is something else than answers to questions – in more detail. Someone who claims that all problems of this kind are at bottom moral problems is Hannes Nykänen. See his Samvetet och det dolda: Om kärlek och kollektivitet (Ludvika: Dualis, 2009). That the question is difficult means however also, in this context, that it is an easy one; it is due to the very fact that I go astray morally that the question is difficult, which means that I cannot blame this difficulty for having led me astray. In other words, when I am free from the question, the question will no longer appear as a difficult one, and designating the question as either difficult or easy is hence in the end misleading. This is a question nearly related to the one I will discuss in Chapter 3. Basil of Caesarea, Hexaemeron IX.6 (my translation). I will come back to the connection between self-knowledge, emotions, and morality in Chapter 10, Section 2.

192 Notes 22. Seneca, Selected Letters, trans. Elaine Fantham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 6.7.

3 The Concept of Self-Deception as Morally Central 1. That there is self-deception, in the sense of lack of self-knowledge, in all moral badness, is however hinted at, albeit most often in an obscure way, in many popular sayings, such as the advice Polonius gives Laertes (William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, ed. Phillip Edwards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1.3.78–80): ‘to thine own self be true [ ... ] Thou canst not then be false to any man.’ 2. I will come back to the emotional character of understanding in Chapter 10, Section 2. 3. G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, § 472 Z (my translation). 4. See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 155–6. 5. Or does the one who says this claim that this is impossible, that it is not at all conceivable? This is a question I will touch upon in Chapter 6. 6. Sigmund Freud, ‘Über die Psychogenese eines Falles von weiblicher Homosexualität’, in Zwang, Paranoia und Perversion, 7th ed., Studienausgabe, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1997), 7:259 (my translation). The case is more complicated than the way I describe it (I have simplified it and disregarded some elements), but for my purposes that is not important. 7. Lk 23.34 (NRSV). 8. ‘For remorse is the expression of the fact that evil belongs to me essentially, and at the same time the expression of the fact that it does not belong to me essentially’ (Søren Kierkegaard, Enten – Eller, 2 vols, Samlede Værker 2–3 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1962), 2:208 (my translation)). 9. Søren Kierkegaard, Sygdommen til Døden, in Tvende ethisk-religieuse SmaaAfhandlinger; Sygdommen til Døden, Samlede Værker 15 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1963), 161–2. 10. That these two, seemingly contradictory, phrases are both used – she knows and she does not know – accounts for many (more or less strange, or not at all strange) ways of describing self-knowledge and moral understanding. Compare these two quotes from Goethe: Since we mostly practice our virtues willingly and consciously, but are unconsciously surprised by our faults, the former ones seldom give us any pleasure, whereas the latter ones always give us distress and agony. This is the most difficult point of self-knowledge, making it almost impossible. (Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit, ed. Klaus-Detlef Müller (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 2007), 630 (my translation)) No one knows what he does when he does what is right, but wrongdoing we are always conscious of. (Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, ed. Ehrhard Bahr (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1982), 519–20 (my translation))

Notes 193 11. Augustine, Confessions II.iv.9. 12. See e.g. René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 145. 13. Arendt’s ‘banality of evil’ is not constructed and thus full of tensions, which shows that in spite of what she sometimes intimates – ‘Is evildoing [ ... ] possible in the absence of not merely “base motives” (as the law calls it) but of any motives at all, any particular prompting of interest or volition?’ (Responsibility and Judgment (New York: Schocken, 2003), 160) – this banality is not unrelated to awareness and will (p. 160): ‘Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of expression and conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking attention which all events and facts arouse by virtue of their existence.’ ‘Thinking’, which she sees as the counterforce, is for her something quite different than what it otherwise is often taken to be (see pp. 164–6, 188–9). In that sense what she says is not at all distant to what I say. 14. Defective self-knowledge is, however, not necessarily a moral phenomenon. See the end of the last chapter. 15. Compare Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 116: ‘When philosophers use a word [ ... ] one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home? – What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.’ 16. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 79. 17. Compare Alfred Mele’s (Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 121) formulation of the paradox of self-deception: For any A and B, when A deceives B into believing that p, A knows or truly believes that not-p while causing B to believe that p. So when A deceives A (i.e., himself) into believing that p, he knows or truly believes that not-p while causing himself to believe that p. Thus, A must simultaneously believe that not-p and believe that p. But how is this possible? 18. G. W. F. Hegel, Fragmente über Volksreligion und Christentum, in Frühe Schriften, Werke, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 1:21 (my translation). 19. Mt 5.41 (NRSV).

4 Self-Deception 1. R. G. Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment: Studies in Folktale, Cultural Criticism, and Anthropology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 307–8. 2. In this respect, this example is similar to the above (‘We buy ourselves lots of thing, believing that this will make us happier. But we deceive ourselves: we do not become any happier.’). The difference is that in Collingwood’s example, the one who points out the self-deception points out a split between deed and words by describing this deed in terms which is not accepted by the self-deceiver, whereas in the first example, the one who points out the self-deception points out the real reason for buying these things, a reason the self-deceiver would probably not accept: the belief that this is the road to happiness.

194 Notes 3. For examples, although very different ones, of what ‘greater context’ here means, see Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), 45: A drunkard at the chessboard makes the one move which upsets his opponent’s plan of campaign. The spectators are satisfied that this was due not to cleverness but to luck, if they are satisfied that most of his moves made in this state break the rules of chess, or have no tactical connexion with the position of the game, that he would not be likely to repeat this move if the tactical situation were to recur, that he would not applaud such a move made by another player in a similar situation, that he would not explain why he had done it or even describe the threat under which his King had been. 4. This way of phrasing it is inspired by Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, § II:2): ‘“Grief” describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations, in the tapestry of life.’ See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie: Band II; Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology: Volume II, trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), § 672. 5. René Descartes, Discourse on the Method, trans. Robert Stoothoff, in vol. 1 of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 120 (AT VI:18). 6. Here we come back to that problem of the will I mentioned in Chapter 2. Much of the rest of this chapter will concern this question. 7. That Collingwood’s example is not similar to this one means that Freud’s concept of illusion is not helpful in this context. Sigmund Freud, Die Zukunft einer Illusion, in Fragen der Gesellschft, Ursprünge der Religion, 10th ed., Studienausgabe, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2009), 9:164–5 (my translation): ‘An illusion is not the same thing as a mistake, it is not even necessarily a mistake. [ ... ] A distinctive feature of illusions is that they are derived from human wishes.’ But wishing for something to drink is normally an aspect of being thirsty. As we will see in a moment, adding something to Freud’s account is not enough, as if there were different kinds of wishes, wishes we, in some sense or other, deceive ourselves in relation to, and wishes we do not deceive ourselves in relation to. In other words, self-deception is not to be understood in terms of wishes. 8. Compare Donald Davidson, Problems of Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 211: ‘we must accept the idea that there can be boundaries between parts of the mind; I postulate such a boundary somewhere between any (obviously) conflicting beliefs’, and p. 221: ‘a brain suffering from a perhaps temporary self-inflicted lobotomy’. 9. Davidson, Problems of Rationality, 199. Also compare Mele, Irrationality, 121: ‘when A deceives A (i.e., himself) [ ... ] A must simultaneously believe that not-p and believe that p’. 10. Davidson, Problems of Rationality, 181, 211, 221. 11. I will come back to this in Chapter 6, Section 6. For a related example, see R. G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan; or, Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 421–2.

Notes 195 12. Ovid, Remedia Amoris; The Remedies for Love, trans. J. H. Mozley, in The Art of Love, and Other Poems, Loeb Classical Library 232, 2nd ed. (London: William Heinemann, 1979), 211–12. 13. Ovid, Remedia Amoris 139, 145, 149, 559, 587. 14. Ovid, Remedia Amoris 205. 15. Ovid, Remedia Amoris 213, 626. 16. Ovid, Remedia Amoris 299, 307–8, 315, 325–30, 417, 709–10. 17. Ovid, Remedia Amoris 331–2. For examples, see 333–43. 18. Ovid, Remedia Amoris 717–19, 725–6. 19. Ovid, Remedia Amoris 497–8, 503. 20. Ovid, Remedia Amoris 511, 680–1. 21. Having ‘idealist’ reasons for becoming a physician, understood in contrast to, say, wanting to help people in need, could also be said to be self-deceptive, but I will not discuss that question here. 22. The example, and its surroundings, is taken from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanisme et terreur: Essai sur le problème communiste (Paris: Gallimard, 1980), 275–6, even though the point he makes is rather different than mine. (A similar example could be made in relation to cases of envy, as when I say – to myself! – ‘what is all the fuss about? that wasn’t remarkable!’ when someone has done a good thing. Also think of cases of cynicism: if the cynic really believed what she is saying, she would be deeply distressed, but if she were deeply distressed, she would not be a cynic, for a cynic is fond of unmasking what she sees as the naivety of other people and is in that regard pleased with her situation.) 23. D. W. Hamlyn, Perception, Learning and the Self: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 207. Slavoj Žižek gives expression to a different, but nearly related, confusion (‘Neighbors and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence’, in The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 138): ‘To fully account for oneself in a symbolic narrative is a priori impossible; the Socratic injunction, “know thyself,” is impossible to fulfill for a priori structural reasons.’ 24. For two similar – even though there are also differences – accounts of selfdeception to the one I have given here, see Herbert Fingarette, Self-Deception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), e.g. pp. 39–51, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, ch. III.1. See also Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 186–7. 25. Compare Davidson, Problems of Rationality, 211: ‘we must accept the idea that there can be boundaries between parts of the mind; I postulate such a boundary somewhere between any (obviously) conflicting beliefs’, and p. 221: ‘a brain suffering from a perhaps temporary self-inflicted lobotomy’. 26. A fully good part could possibly be conceivable. 27. Ludwig Binswanger, Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins, 4th ed. (München: Ernst Reinhardt, 1964), 29–30. 28. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 329. 29. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 117–18. 30. I will come back to this issue in Chapter 10. 31. This means that there is something to Fingarette’s description of the selfdeceiver as lacking courage (Self-Deception, 143), but only in some situations,

196 Notes and even then this description is not the only or the most central one. For an emphasis on courage could just as well be self-deceptive. Mind the difference between protesting against someone out of love for that person and out of a courage distinct from such a love!

5 The True Self 1. As Ryle says (The Concept of Mind, 311): ‘even doctrinal homeopathy involves the recognition of disorders’. 2. See Chapter 2. 3. See Chapter 2. 4. See Chapter 4, where one of the main points was that being free from selfdeception does not consist in giving a correct account of oneself, for the deception might lie in what I do when giving that account. 5. Jean-Paul Sartre, Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr, trans. Bernard Frechtman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 22. 6. Karl Löwith, Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1928), 20 (my translation). For an earlier example of this idea, see Ferdinand Ebner, Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten: Pneumatologische Fragmente, in Fragmente Aufsätze Aphorismen: Zu einer Pneumatologie des Wortes, Schriften, ed. Franz Seyr (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1963), 1:187, 254. 7. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 181. And Arendt continues (181–2): the impossibility, as it were, to solidify in words the living essence of the person as it shows itself in the flux of action and speech, has great bearing upon the whole realm of human affairs, where we exist primarily as acting and speaking beings. It excludes in principle our ever being able to handle these affairs as we handle things whose nature is at our disposal because we can name them. But there is a tension between this and what Arendt writes on pp. 241–2. There she begins by saying that it is love that makes us see ‘the who’ in contrast to ‘the what’. But then she goes on by claiming that love for this very reason is an antipolitical force. Whether there is something to that claim depends of course on how one uses the word ‘politics’, a topic I will not go into here, but whatever exactly one labels in that way will not unambiguously be about ‘the what’. For if it were, politics would not be a ‘human affair’ but, say, a technical task, a task not about coming to an agreement with others on problems we confront together. I will discuss related questions in Chapter 7. 8. Or between ‘subject’, ‘person’, and ‘individual’ (see Manfred Frank, Die Unhintergehbarkeit von Individualität: Reflexionen über Subjekt, Person und Individuum aus Anlaß ihrer ›postmodernen‹ Toterklärung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 25). 9. It might perhaps seem as if the roots of this picture are the ways in which we normally answer questions such as ‘who are you?’: by stating some facts about ourselves (age, occupation, and so on). But such answers are not supposed to be exhaustive, so the roots are to be found elsewhere, in, for example, Descartes’s distinction between res cogitans and res extensa. When

Notes 197 this distinction has been made, any denial of the need of that transcendental function res cogitans is supposed to perform means reducing the self to a set of empirical facts. The result of such a reduction certainly takes various forms. Feuerbach’s claim (Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1969), 61) that the denial of the predicates is the denial of the subject is one example. Hume’s claim (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 165) that we ‘are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions’ is another one: The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance [ ... ] The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos’d. Hume’s claim might seem obviously defective, in that he only takes passivity into account: what about the self as a center of decision? In other words, we must also notice Hume’s claim (A Treatise of Human Nature, 266) that ‘[r]eason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions’. As to the latter claim, it is, I would say, a very strange claim. That reason ought to be the slave of the passions is one thing, and an issue I will not discuss here. But if reason is the slave of the passions, the ought-question is not at all meaningful. But is there not a distinction between curbing one’s anger and not doing so? Such a distinction must then be possible to make in Hume’s terms, which means that curbing one’s anger is just as much to be a slave of one’s passions, only of different passions than the passions of anger. In other words, passion, as Hume uses the word, includes what we usually contrast passion to. This means that Hume, in a sense, depreciates the importance of the passions, for he empties that category of its meaning: the ascetic is just as much a slave of her passions as anyone else. Possibly one could see a point in Hume’s claim by interpreting it as questioning the general relevance of categories such as ‘reason’ and ‘passion’, but that would be a far-fetched interpretation. A third example comes from Deleuze and Guattari (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 65 (see also p. 211)): ‘“Who is ‘I’?” It is always a third person.’ This answer to the question is deliberately ambiguous; it could in fact be interpreted as more in line with the second picture below. 10. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 62, 476. Compare Fichte: The intelligent being is originally, i.e. without its own contribution, simply nothing: what it should become, it must make itself into by means of its own action. (Johann Gottlieb Fichte, System der Sittenlehre nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre, in vol. 4 of Fichtes Werke, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), 50 (my translation)) I am from that moment on in which I gain consciousness the one into whom I make myself in freedom, and I am that one since I make myself into that one. (Fichte, System der Sittenlehre, 222 (my translation)) 11. Compare the quote from Deleuze and Guattari in a note to the previous section.

198 Notes 12. Ebner, Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten, 87, 188 (my translation). See also Ebner, Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten, 264, and Ferdinand Ebner, Versuch eines Ausblicks in die Zukunft, in Fragmente Aufsätze Aphorismen: Zu einer Pneumatologie des Wortes, Schriften, ed. Franz Seyr (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1963), 1:756, 773. 13. Compare how J. L. Austin, in How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), first presents performative utterances as just one kind of sentences, interesting primarily only because they tend to be overlooked theoretically, but then, after his ‘fresh start on the problem’ (p. 91), sees saying something in general as irreducibly a doing. 14. G. E. M. Anscombe, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Philosophical Papers Volume Two (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 21–36. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”’, in Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951, ed. James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 228. 15. G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, § 408 Z (my translation). 16. René Descartes, Discourse on the Method, 127 (AT VI:33). Other examples, with their respective differences, can be found in Immanuel Kant (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel, vol. 3–4 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 136–8 (B 131–5)); Johann Gottlieb Fichte (the first part of Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (in vol. 1 of Fichtes Werke, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971))); Arthur Schopenhauer (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, ed. Ludger Lütkehaus, 4th ed. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2008), vol. 1: § 2); Max Stirner (Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, ed. Ahlrich Meyer (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1981), 5, 167, 395, 412); Edmund Husserl (Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, bk. 1, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana 3 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), § 46); Sartre (Being and Nothingness, 22–5); Simone de Beauvoir (Pyrrhus et Cinéas, in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, suivi de Pyrrhus et Cinéas (Paris: Gallimard, 2008), 261–2); Žižek (The Parallax View (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 6, 17, 242). 17. See e.g. Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 280; Axel Honneth, Das Andere der Gerechtigkeit: Aufsätze zur praktischen Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 237–8. See also Freud, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, 284; Sigmund Freud, ‘Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse’, in Abriss der Psychoanalyse: Einführende Darstellungen, 11th ed. Werke im Taschenbuch, ed. Ilse Grubrich-Simitis (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2009), 191–4. 18. As Kant points out; see Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 344 (B 404 / A 346). 19. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 47: ‘Consciousness is a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its being.’ 20. Slavoj Žižek, The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Women and Causality (London: Verso, 1994), 170: ‘In a sense, this is what psychoanalysis is about: the psychoanalytic cure is effectively over when the subject loses his fear and freely assumes his own non-existence. [ ... ] the problem [ ... ] is that I myself do not exist.’

Notes 199 21. Sartre is perfectly aware of this. He writes (Being and Nothingness, 66): ‘what is the goal of bad faith? To cause me to be what I am, in the mode of “not being what one is,” or not to be what I am in the mode of “being what one is.”’ A better description of what he is trying to say than his own would then be that the question about who I am arises in different ways in different contexts, and that the answers to it are therefore different. When I am tempted to see myself as a thing, it is important to say that I am not, when I am tempted to shut my eyes to what I have done by saying that I am not my history, it is important to say that I am my history. In other words, the subtitle of Being and Nothingness is mistaken: the very problem is the ontological emphasis of some particular answer. 22. Chapter 11. 23. This problem is obvious in Husserl: in the epoché and in the pure gaze at the functioning I-pole and from there at the concrete totality of life and of its intentional intermediary and end formations, nothing human eo ipso shows itself, no soul and psychic life, no real psychophysical human beings – all this belongs to the ‘phenomenon’, to the world as the constituted pole. [ ... ] I am not an I [ ... ] The I that I reach in the epoché [ ... ] is in fact called ‘I’ only by equivocation. (Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana 6 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), 187–8 (my translation)) In other words, a distinct form of self-knowledge does not exist according to Husserl. The transcendental I is not a personal I; the rest is empirical knowledge of familiar kinds. 24. One way of getting hold of both the point and the problem of the transcendental I is this. When forming knowledge, my attention is directed to that which I try to understand, not to myself, and the knowledge I claim to have is not some private property but something that can potentially be shared with others (one central aspect of Kant’s criticism of the philosophical tradition is his characterization of knowledge as not individual; see Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können, in Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 5–6:163–5 (Ak. 4:298–9)). If someone points out my particularity – what is empirically true of me but not of others – this is often a way of throwing suspicion on my claims to knowledge. But that the knowledge I have goes beyond myself as an empirically particular being does not mean that we have to understand knowledge claims as made from some transcendental vantage point; rather, this observation could be understood as drawing my attention to the fact that I share a world with others and am, as it were, a direction and an openness to that which is not me (which of course means that it is as misleading to emphatically stress that it is not me). 25. Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), 198. 26. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 206. 27. Marya Schechtman (The Constitution of Selves (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 1–2) may thus be right in saying that it is when seen as a question

200 Notes

28. 29. 30.

31.

32.

33.

of characterization (‘which beliefs, values, desires, and other psychological features make someone the person she is’), and not as a question of reidentification (‘what makes a person at time t2 the same person as a person at time t1’), that the question of identity matters, but this does not mean that it always matters (nor that its mattering should necessarily be phrased in those terms). MacIntyre, After Virtue, 217. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 218. Paul Ricoeur (Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 114) notices these questions, but does still not discuss them: It therefore seems plausible to take the following chain of assertions as valid: self-understanding is interpretation; interpretation of the self, in turn, finds in the narrative, among other signs and symbols, a privileged form of mediation; the latter borrows from history as well as from fiction, making a life story a fictional history or, if one prefers, a historical fiction, interweaving the historiographic style of biographies with the novelistic style of imaginary autobiographies. Lacking in this intuitive apprehension of the problem of narrative identity was a clear comprehension of what is at stake in the very question of identity applied to persons or communities. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 217. It is somewhat exaggerated to use words like ‘forever’, ‘whatever’, and ‘any time’ in this way: moral responsibility is not a concept with universal applicability, just as little as any other concept. Another example of the same mistake is found in Charles Taylor (Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 57–8). In the context of a discussion of the good Samaritan he claims that the notion of personal identity is central, for the crucial reference to the subject is [ ... ] to the addressee of this felt obligation. [ ... ] I feel called upon to help him. And I feel called upon qua rational being, or moral being, or creature made by God in his image, in other words capable of responding to this like God, that is, out of agape. The obligation does not lie on an animal nor, in another way, on an idiot, nor on an infant. [ ... ] The situation bears this import for me, in virtue of the kind of being I am [ ... ] we are called upon in virtue of being a certain kind of creature. The kind of being we are enters into the definition of this import. But it is hard to see the point of bringing in the concept of identity here: why should I say to myself such a thing as ‘I am not an infant, so I must help him’, but as an answer to an attempt at silencing the call? Is it not better to say that the call is primary, that is, and if one wants to use the phrase ‘kind of being’, that I feel called upon qua the kind of being which is called upon to help him? In other words, the call creates that kind and does not presuppose it. But even this risks drawing our attention in the wrong direction, away from the relation between the wounded man and me to some kind I belong to and in which I can hide in order to tone down the personal nature of our encounter. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 219.

Notes 201 34. This exclusion of other moral possibilities can be found also in other philosophers who connect identity and narrativity. Ricoeur connects identity and values (Oneself as Another, 121): ‘To a large extent, in fact, the identity of a person or a community is made up of these identifications with values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes, in which the person or the community recognizes itself.’ And Charles Taylor does the same (Human Agency and Language, 34): ‘our identity is defined by our fundamental evaluations. [ ... ] Our identity is [ ... ] defined by certain evaluations which are inseparable from ourselves as agents.’ See also the quote from Taylor in the above note. 35. Furthermore, compare Simone Weil, ‘Human Personality’, in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas (Wakefield: Moyer Bell, 1999), 313: ‘“You do not interest me.” No man can say these words to another without committing a cruelty and offending against justice. “Your person does not interest me.” These words can be used in an affectionate conversation between close friends, without jarring upon even the tenderest nerve of their friendship.’ And John Holloway, Change the World without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today, 3rd ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2010), 68: ‘Identity is the antithesis of [ ... ] friendship and love.’ 36. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 205. 37. Compare the form of Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre – the exemplary Bildungsroman – which is to a great extent individually and narratively focused, with the form of Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, which deviates from that focus considerably and thus is much harder to follow. 38. In fact, MacIntyre points this out (After Virtue, 213–14). 39. Nietzsche says that my I is my opinion about myself (Morgenröthe: Gedanken über die moralischen Vorurtheile, in vol. 3 of Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 108 (§ 115)). What I have said here can be read as a criticism of this (or as showing that if one defines ‘the I’ in that way that only shows that the question ‘who am I?’ is not (only) about ‘the I’). 40. Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writings of Philosophy and Literature, ed. Peter Conradi (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1997), 75. 41. Compare Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, § 379 Z: Selfrealization is to be true, but as far as spirit is concerned, this truth is not about corresponding to some content. For its truth is its consciousness of its concept, and this concept is consciousness of its concept, and so on. In other words, its truth is the process of realization. See also § 378 Z, 383, 383 Z. 42. Søren Kierkegaard, Opbyggelige Taler i forskjellig Aand, Samlede Værker 11 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1963), 29–30, 40–61, 112. 43. Søren Kierkegaard, Til Selvprøvelse, Samtiden anbefalet, in En opbyggelig Tale; To Taler ved Altergangen om Fredagen; Til Selvprøvelse, Samtiden anbefalet; Dømmer selv! Samlede Værker Bind 17 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1964), above all pp. 69, 78–82. 44. This point will be further explicated in Chapter 11; here the point is merely hinted at. 45. Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being; or, Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 13–14. See also Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 245;

202 Notes

46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Meaning and Sense’, in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 97. Cf. Kierkegaard, Opbyggelige Taler i forskjellig Aand, 117–21. Section 1 above. This openness is another way of phrasing that directedness which I pointed to at the end of Chapter 4. Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, 309 (my translation). Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Erster Band, 7th ed. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008), 49 (my translation).

6 The Individual and Society 1. The word ‘individual’ is somewhat misleading. It is hard to find a good English translation of Kierkegaard’s ‘hin Enkelte’. And also for my own part, I am not that happy with that word. Nevertheless I will sometimes use it, lacking a better one. (One reason for its being misleading is that emphasizing it might be understood as giving support to individualism. But as Kierkegaard sees it individualism is just one collective ideology of many (cf. Søren Kierkegaard, Synspunktet for min Forfatter-Virksomhed: En ligefrem Meddelelse, Rapport til Historien, in Bladartikler, der staar i Forhold til „Forfatterskabet“; Om min Forfatter-Virksomhed; Synspunktet for min Forfatter-Virksomhed (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1964), 18:153).) 2. See Frederick Beiser, Hegel (New York: Routledge, 2005), 281. See also Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben, in vol. 4 of Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), § 99; Karl-Otto Apel, Transformation der Philosophie, vol. 2, Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft, 6th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999), 177; Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 153. However, my objective is not to defend Kierkegaard. It is evident that his understanding of the self is deeply shaped by a problematic, traditionally philosophical one (see e.g. Kierkegaard, Sygdommen til Døden, 74). 3. Slavoj Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters (London: Verso, 1996), 93. As is to be expected Žižek turns this around in the following discussion but he never questions this line of thought as such. 4. However, this interlocutor is not made up, but mainly based on a paper by John Christman (‘Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom’, Ethics 101 (1991): 343–59). Since I am not interested in him in particular but in a train of thought you can find in many places, I prefer to discuss the issue in this way. 5. Later on (Section 7), I will come to the issue whether the concepts of autonomy and self-government are (or should be) central in our understandings of ourselves or not. 6. That I do not have to agree with what she is saying is important to point out, for one thing because something I agree with can be said in an absurd way. Shortly put, what is sensible cannot be captured by criteria, since criteria can be applied in sensible as well as absurd ways (and that includes the

Notes 203

7.

8. 9. 10.

11.

12.

13.

criterion that she should agree with me). Kierkegaard (Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift, 2 vols, Samlede Værker 9–10 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1963), 1:162–3) makes fun of the idea of such criteria by telling a story about a man saying ‘the earth is round’ every time a ball he has put in the tail of his coat bumps him. The point is not that we should replace some criterion of truth with a more complicated one (say, truth + relevance), but that whatever the criterion, it would be possible to satisfy it in an absurd way, as the man in Kierkegaard’s story. (In practice however, criteria are more or less vague, which means that a criterion of relevance could reject what the man did post rem; but that is another question.) Christman (‘Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom’, 349): ‘I assume that we can evaluate the factors by virtue of which we developed the preferences we did apart from the particular preferences these processes produced.’ But this is the very problem: can this really be assumed? Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 241–2; Peter Winch, Trying to Make Sense (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 195–6. The above discussion is obviously deeply inspired by Wittgenstein; see the last note and e.g. Philosophical Investigations, §§ 256–70. ‘For is not everything that you do towards children violence?’ (See Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Nathan der Weise: Ein dramatisches Gedicht in fünf Aufzügen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000), 101 (my translation)) The ironical meaning of this saying, when read in the context of the play, should however be noted. For this issue, see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Über Gewissheit; On Certainty, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), above all §§ 27, 52, 81, 94, 105, 138, 143, 160, 476. Compare Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, § 386 Z (my translation): ‘Already that we know of a barrier is evidence of our seeing beyond it, our unboundedness.’ Someone might perhaps say that it is quite natural that I do not see any clear alternatives: this is an indication that I have been manipulated! The manipulation is so far-reaching that I am unable to imagine what living another life would mean! However, the answer to this is a simple one. If I should try to fight the ‘manipulation’ I must imagine an alternative – in practice, not just as an intellectual game – and if I have done that, then I was, after all, able to see an alternative. (Compare Holloway, Change the World without Taking Power, 4–5: ‘We cannot start anywhere other than with our own thoughts and our own reactions. The fact that “we” and our conception of “we” are the product of a whole history of the subjection of the subject changes nothing. [ ... ] we can only try to free ourselves by hacking at the strands that imprison us.’) This is important to point out, for it might be tempting to say that the belief that the earth is more than 100 years old has clear alternatives: a mythological idea about the age of the earth, say. But to what extent is this a clear alternative? To what extent does it contradict the belief that the earth is more than 100 years old? Might it not be possible to say that they are so different that they cannot be seen as two alternative answers to the same question, that they should be seen as answers to very different questions and therefore not as contradictory? To answer these questions one must enter into that life in which this mythological idea really exists; they cannot be answered from the outside. But this means that only to the extent

204 Notes

14.

15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23.

24.

25. 26.

27.

it is possible for me to actually imagine living another life is it possible to be clear about to what extent it is an alternative. For this reason, the word ‘agreement’ is misleading, as Winch points out on the pages referred to in a previous note to this section: if agreement is intelligible, disagreement is too, and the ‘agreement’ I talk about above is the condition of the possibility of both agreement and disagreement. See also Chapter 7. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Wie weit schreibt Sprache das Denken vor?’, in Hermeneutik II, Gesammelte Werke 2 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1986), 206 (my translation). Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 112. Axel Honneth, Das Andere der Gerechtigkeit, 238 (my translation). Slavoj Žižek, Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso, 2012), 197. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 18. Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 15. This is explicitly evident in Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 16. Robert Kurz, Blutige Vernunft: Essays zur emanzipatorischen Kritik der kapitalistischen Moderne und ihrer westlichen Werte (Bad Honnef: Horlemann, 2004), 221 (my translation). Compare Henri Bergson, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, 13th ed. (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1914), 7 (my translation): ‘The idea of the future, full of an infinity of possibilities, is thus more fertile than the future itself, and it is therefore one finds more charm in hope than in possession, in dream than in reality.’ Bertolt Brecht, Die Mutter (1933), in vol. 3 of Große kommentierte Berliner und Frankfurter Ausgabe, ed. Werner Hecht, Jan Knopf, Werner Mittenzwei, and Klaus-Detlef Müller (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), 265 (my translation). Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 235–6. The reason why I started Section 3 with examples of things that might appear to be purely physical is then not the one that immediately suggests itself. The point is that there are historical and social aspects also to these. One could say, for example, ‘this is not fit for human consumption’. (Marx, whom I will discuss in the next section, clearly points this out. See Karl Marx, ‘Lohn, Preis und Profit’, in vol. 16 of Marx Engels Werke (Berlin: Dietz, 1962), 148; and Marx, Das Kapital, 185, 246–7.) Although I starve to death whether I want to or not if I do not eat, this does not mean that this is a level which is completely independent of all understanding; what is physical is fundamental from some perspectives – perspectives which are of great importance for some purposes and in many cases – but should not be given a metaphysical role. (For important points concerning this issue, see Collingwood, The Principles of History, 96, 100.) Jacques Derrida, On the Name, ed. Thomas Dutoit, trans. David Wood, John P. Leavey, and Ian McLeod (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 14.

Notes 205 28. Martin Buber, Das Problem des Menschen, 7th ed. (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2007), 167 (my translation). See also Martin Buber, Das dialogische Prinzip, 12th ed. (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2012), e.g. pp. 18–19, 41, 121, 276. 29. Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, vol. 1, Theory of Practical Ensembles, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith (London: Verso, 2004), 127. Compare Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 436, 439: Even what are called obstacles to freedom are in reality deployed by it. An unclimbable rock face, a large or small, vertical or slanting rock, are things which have no meaning for anyone who is not intending to surmount them [ ... ] There is, then, ultimately nothing that can set limits to freedom, except those limits that freedom itself has set [ ... ] When I say that this rock is unclimbable, it is certain that this attribute, like that of being big or little, straight and oblique, and indeed like all attributes in general, can be conferred upon it only by the project of climbing it [ ... ] It is, therefore, freedom which brings into being the obstacles to freedom, so that the latter can be set over against it as its bounds. However, using the word ‘freedom’ in this way is misleading (as Merleau-Ponty himself points out (p. 440)). An obstacle presupposes an understanding – of, among other things, what should be counted as having climbed it (is making a drawing of oneself climbing it having climbed it?) – but this understanding, although it is mine, is not generally chosen; ‘set limits’ and ‘conferred upon it’, especially when used together with ‘freedom’, sound too active. 30. I will use this term now and then in what follows in order to be able to implicitly criticize some understandings of what this must mean. But notice that saying that this life is ‘material’ is a very theoretical way of looking at it. Philosophers often claim that matter is something concrete (Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, 19–20), but it is clear that it is not. Seeing the table I have in front of me as ‘matter’ requires a good deal of effort and a theoretical framework as a background for it to be intelligible. 31. Karl Marx, Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie, in vol. 13 of Marx Engels Werke (Berlin: Dietz, 1961), 9 (my translation). 32. Which, of course, does not mean that what meaning it has for us is a matter of course. Slavoj Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes (London: Verso, 2008), 157–8: ‘Nowhere is the dictum that “every history is a history of the present” more true than in the case of the French Revolution: its historiographical reception has always closely mirrored the twists and turns of political struggles.’ 33. Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, in vol. 42 of Marx Engels Werke, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Dietz, 2005), 127 (my translation). This makes it possible for Marx to describe value as a subject; see Marx, Grundrisse, 231, and Marx, Das Kapital, 169. As can be seen from the above quote the problem is not that a false consciousness is produced, as if there were things we for some reason were unable to fathom. The alien social power is really alien. For this, see also Marx, Das Kapital, 87. 34. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie, in vol. 3 of Marx Engels Werke, 4th ed. (Berlin: Dietz, 1969), 26–7 (my translation). 35. Marx and Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie, 30 (my translation). 36. Marx and Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie, 38 (my translation). Compare Karl Marx, Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, in vol. 8 of Marx Engels

206 Notes

37.

38.

39. 40.

41.

42.

43. 44. 45.

Werke (Berlin: Dietz, 1960), 115 (my translation): ‘Human beings make their own history, but they do not make it out of free parts, not under circumstances that they have chosen themselves but under circumstances that are immediately found, given and handed down.’ Maurice Cornforth explains the relation in this way. See Dialectical Materialism: An Introduction, vol. 2, Historical Materialism, 3rd ed. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976), 87. Anselm Jappe, Die Abenteuer der Ware: Für eine neue Wertkritik (Münster: Unrast, 2005), 181 (my translation). For ideas in the same direction, see Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, 15–40; Max Weber, ‘Die “Objektivität” sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis’, in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 7th ed. ed. Johannes Winckelmann (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1988), 167; and Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, Werkausgabe 5 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1959), 176. For this distinction, see Sören Stenlund, Language and Philosophical Problems (London: Routledge, 1990), e.g. pp. 67–8. For an interesting discussion of this and of what it takes to come to understand what they are talking about, see Jakob Meløe, ‘Words and Object’, in Wittgenstein and Contemporary Theories of Language, ed. Paul Henry and Arild Utaker (Bergen: The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, 1992), 109–41. If I have treated someone badly, and the theoretician ties this definitely and exclusively to, say, my childhood, that would in fact mean, if we accept it, that there exists evil which is unwanted and hence does not involve selfdeception. And that would only mean that the question I discuss – how should the question ‘who am I?’ be understood, especially in its relation to morality – has a restricted scope. In other words, there would then, if we accept this suggestion, exist some moral questions which are unrelated to that question and there would possibly exist some moral questions the relation of which to that question is unclear, but my question would still be topical. Only if moral responsibility tout court would be discarded would the question I discuss be seriously affected. Consequentialism could be said to be the position which sees things in this way. Notice that according to its most common form – utilitarianism – moral action is always partly a failure. For it is fundamentally unclear, as long as one understands happiness quantitatively, what it would mean to produce the greatest possible amount of happiness, no matter whether in a specific situation or in general. Aristotelianism could here come to mind. See Hugo Strandberg, Escaping My Responsibility: Investigations into the Nature of Morality (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009), in particular Chapter 2. An example of this is to be found in Theodor Fontane, Effi Briest, ed. Helmuth Nürnberger (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995). Baron von Innstetten discusses whether he must fight a duel with Major von Crampas, with whom his wife has been unfaithful. He comes to the conclusion that he must, but not due to any feelings of hatred or vindictiveness, for he has no such feelings, but due to the fact that society demands this of him (pp. 236–7 (my translation)): ‘in the communal life with human beings a something has developed which is now simply there and according to the paragraphs

Notes 207

46.

47. 48.

49. 50.

of which we have accustomed ourselves to judge everything, others and ourselves. And to transgress it is not possible. [ ... ] our cult of honor is idolatry, but we have to submit ourselves to it as long as the idol is in force.’ Morality is here pushed to the side in the name of sociality; the self-deception is unusually gross for he does not only tell himself that he has no choice but also keeps a false inner distance to it. For this paragraph, see Elizabeth Wolgast, Ethics of an Artificial Person: Lost Responsibility in Professions and Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). See H. C. Andersen, ‘Kejserens nye klæder’, in Samlede Eventyr og Historier (Copenhagen: Høst & Søn, 2012), 81. Brecht’s famous line – ‘Food comes first, after that morality’ (Die Dreigroschenoper (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 69 (my translation)) – is often understood too literally, and remorse for what I have done during times of distress would then make no sense. But Brecht’s line is far more ambiguous than might at first appear. The literal reading of it is undoubtedly part of the message, but only a part. Notice that it is Mackie Messer who first says it, which means that there is also a self-deceptive aspect to it. This reading is underlined by the fact that Brecht’s plays are full of people who do not act in accordance with these lines. On the contrary, an important part is often played by characters who do not give in to the cynicism they are ‘entitled’ to: Kattrin in Mutter Courage und ihre Kinder is an obvious example (Bertolt Brecht, Mutter Courage und ihre Kinder: Eine Chronik aus dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1963), scene 11). The point here could then be said to be that the meaning of the above line greatly varies depending on who says it and to whom it is directed. As members of the audience we should realize that we are implicated, in various ways, in the creation of the situations in which other people do each other wrong. In that sense, the message is not a cynical but a moral one. Furthermore, even though Brecht focuses on lack and its destructive effects, one should however not take this to mean that if only everyone were given enough to eat all problems would be solved; the other side is the morally helpful nature of love and friendship, which are also needed and have moral effects. Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, 486. See Hugo Strandberg, Love of a God of Love, Chapter 5, section 6.

7 Kant’s Political Philosophy 1. Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf, in Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 11–12:243 (Ak. 8:380) (my translation). See also pp. 228–30, 239–41 (Ak. 8:370, 377–9). 2. For this way of illustrating the tension, see John Locke, Two Treatises of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. Ian Shapiro (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 103; Max Weber, ‘Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen’, in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I, 4th ed. (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1947), 547; and Max Weber, ‘Politik als Beruf’, in Gesammelte politische Schriften (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag,

208 Notes

3.

4.

5.

6. 7. 8.

9. 10.

11.

1921), 447. Hannah Arendt sometimes expresses herself in this way (The Origins of Totalitarianism, new ed. (Orlando: Harcourt, 1968), 299–300), but ‘power’ should then be substituted for ‘violence’ (Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt, 1972), 139–40). Friedrich Schiller, ‘Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen’, in Theoretische Schriften, ed. Rolf-Peter Janz (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 2008), 561 (my translation). Hegel’s philosophy in its entirety is often presented as an attempt at sublating that cleft. Hegel writes for example: Division is the source of the need of philosophy [ ... ] The opposites, which were formerly important in the form of spirit and matter, soul and body, faith and understanding, freedom and necessity, etc., and still are important in limited spheres and in many ways, and which attached all weight of human interests to themselves, have in the further progress of culture become the opposites of reason and sensibility, intelligence and nature, and, for the general concept, the opposites of absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity. To sublate such fixed opposites is the only interest of reason; this its interest has not the meaning as if it opposes opposition and limitation on the whole, for necessary division is one factor of life, which eternally forms itself by opposition, and totality is, in the highest liveliness, only possible through restoration out of the highest division. But reason opposes the absolute fixation of the division by understanding, and all the more when what are absolutely opposed have sprung out of reason itself. When the unifying power has disappeared from human life and the opposites have lost their living relation and interplay and obtained independence, then the need of philosophy arises (G. W. F. Hegel, Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie, in Jenaer kritische Schriften, ed. Hartmut Buchner and Otto Pöggeler, Gesammelte Werke 4 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968), 12–14 (my translation)) This is an important theme also in Kant; see in particular Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel, vol. 10 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), 106–9 (Ak. 5:195–7). Schiller, ‘Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen’, 560 (my translation). Schiller, ‘Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen’, 673–4 (my translation). See also pp. 600–1. See Immanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, in Schriften zur Ethik und Religionsphilosophie, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 7–8:755–6 (Ak. 6:96–7); Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 203 (Ak. 8:348–9). See Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 213–14 (Ak. 8:358). See Immanuel Kant, ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’, in Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 11–12:39–40 (Ak. 8:22). See Immanuel Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, in Schriften zur Ethik und Religionsphilosophie, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 7–8:318, 323–5, 338 (Ak. 6:214, 218–20, 231).

Notes 209 12. Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in Schriften zur Ethik und Religionsphilosophie, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 7–8:28 (Ak. 4:402) (my translation): Since I have deprived the will of all impulses which could have sprung for it from following some law, only the general conformity of actions with laws is left at all, which alone should serve as a principle for the will, i.e. I should never act in any other way than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a general law. In other words: What we try to understand is what it means to do things for the sake of duty, what it means to follow the moral law simply because it is the moral law. But what is the formal property of a law – what is left of a law when we have abstracted from all ends it could be there for – but its generality and universality? Doing things for the sake of duty is hence the same as not acting inconsistently. See also Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 41–51, 55–6, 70–1 (Ak. 4:412–21, 424–5, 437). 13. See Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 430–1 (Ak. 6:312); Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, 756 (Ak. 6:97); Kant, ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’, 39 (Ak. 8:22); Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 211–2 (Ak. 8:355–7). 14. See Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 337 (Ak. 6:230); Immanuel Kant, ‘Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis’, in Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 11–12:144–5 (Ak. 8:289–90). 15. See Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 337–9 (Ak. 6:230–2); Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 204 (Ak. 8:350). 16. See Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 474–5 (Ak. 6:350–2); Kant, ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’, 41–2, 44–5 (Ak. 8:24, 26); Kant, ‘Über den Gemeinspruch’, 169–70 (Ak. 8:310–1); Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 208–9, 212–13 (Ak. 8:354, 356–7). 17. See Immanuel Kant, ‘Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?’, in Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 11–12:58–9 (Ak. 39–40). 18. See Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 207–8 (Ak. 8:352–3); Immanuel Kant, Der Streit der Fakultäten, in Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 11–12:364–5 (Ak. 7:91). 19. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 432–4 (Ak. 6:314–15). 20. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 207 (Ak. 8:352–3). 21. Cf. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 338–40 (Ak. 6:231–2); Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 204–5 (Ak. 8:350–1). 22. See above all Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 70–1 (Ak. 4:436–7). 23. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 54 (Ak. 4:423). 24. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 518, 524–5 (Ak. 6:388, 393–4). 25. Kant, ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’, 33–5, 37 (Ak. 8:17–18, 20); Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 217, 222–6 (Ak. 8:360–1, 365–8); Immanuel Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, in Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik, Werkausgabe,

210 Notes

26. 27. 28.

29.

30.

31. 32. 33. 34.

35.

36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 11–12:684–6 (Ak. 7:329–30); Immanuel Kant, ‘Rezension zu Johann Gottfried Herder: Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit’, in Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 11–12:805–6 (Ak. 8:65). Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 223–4 (Ak. 8:365–6). This is an important theme in Kant. See e.g. Kritik der Urteilskraft, 88–9, 92–6, 107–8, 394–5, 410–11 (Ak. 5:180–1, 183–6, 195–7, 435–6, 448). Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 479 (Ak. 6:355); Kant, ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’, 39, 41–2, 45–7 (Ak. 8:21–2, 24, 27–8); Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, 681, 686–8 (Ak. 7:327, 331); Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 391–2 (Ak. 5:432–3). Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 478 (Ak. 6:354); Kant, ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’, 47–8 (Ak. 8:28–9); Kant, ‘Über den Gemeinspruch’, 167–8 (Ak. 8:309); Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 217–18, 226–7, 243 (Ak. 8:360–2, 368, 380); Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, 683 (Ak. 7:328–9). See Kant, ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’, 35–6, 45–6 (Ak. 8:18–19, 27); Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 217–18 (Ak. 8:360–2); Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, 684–5 (Ak. 7:329–30); Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 94–6, 391–2 (Ak. 5:184–6, 432–3). Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 210–11, 238–9 (Ak. 8:355–6, 376–7). Kant, Der Streit der Fakultäten, 356–8, 361 (Ak. 7:84–5, 88). Kant, Der Streit der Fakultäten, 351–2 (Ak. 7:79–80). Kant, ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’, 40 (Ak. 8:22) (my translation); see also Kant, ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’, 37–9, 41–2 (Ak. 8:20–2, 24); Kant, ‘Über den Gemeinspruch’, 169–70 (Ak. 8:310–1); Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 222–4 (Ak. 8:365–6); Kant, ‘Rezension zu Herder’, 804–6 (Ak. 8:64–6). The same thing can however make man unsociable (Kritik der Urteilskraft, 203–4 (Ak. 5:275–6)): in order not to hate human beings for their unrighteousness one leaves them and lives by oneself. Immanuel Kant, ‘Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte’, in Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 11–12:99–100 (Ak. 8:121). Kant’s description of war as sublime is also to be remembered here, even though it is found in another context (Kritik der Urteilskraft, 187 (Ak. 5:262–3)). See Kant, ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’, 37–9 (Ak. 8:20–2); Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, 673–4 (Ak. 7:322). See Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 217, 223–6 (Ak. 8:360–1). Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 223 (Ak. 8:365) (my translation). Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 225 (Ak. 8:367) (my translation). Kant, ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’, 37–8 (Ak. 8:20–1) (my translation). Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 61 (Ak. 4:429) (my translation). Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 59–60 (Ak. 4:427–8).

Notes 211 43. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 31–2 (B xxvii–xxviii), 157–8 (B 165–7), 231–2 (A 195–6 / B 240–1), 490–4 (A 536–41 / B 564–9), 501 (A 551 / B 579). 44. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 60 (Ak. 4:428). 45. This omission is not something unique to Kant. On the contrary, this is a decisive defect in moral philosophy as a whole as long as it sees rules as morally central; it starts too late and does not give room for that which makes what it investigates into a moral issue. In Kant this problem is simply less hidden than it usually is. (In the case of Kant, this could possibly be connected to the fact that his moral philosophy is not about giving us a new morality but about clarifying the morality we already know (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 31–2 (Ak. 4:404)). This means that the philosophical description can tacitly presuppose much moral understanding which it never makes explicit; on the surface level it rejects something, but at bottom it is still dependent on it.) 46. In some early writings, Hegel criticizes Kant’s moral philosophy starting out from love as morally central and with the power of overcoming the problems in Kant’s moral philosophy (see above all G. W. F. Hegel, Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal, in Frühe Schriften, Werke, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 1:324–38, 362–3). His criticism is not identical to mine, however. (Soon Hegel tones down the importance of love considerably (see G. W. F. Hegel, System der Sittlichkeit [Critik des Fichteschen Naturrechts], in Schriften und Entwürfe (1799– 1808), ed. Manfred Baum and Kurt Rainer Meist, Gesammelte Werke 5 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1998), 289); in Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Hegel claims that the place of love is the family and that it has no wider moral bearing (G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts; oder, Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Werke, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, vol. 7 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), § 158).) 47. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 25–6 (Ak. 4:399); Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, in Schriften zur Ethik und Religionsphilosophie, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 7–8:205 (Ak. 5:83); Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 532–4, 585 (Ak. 6:401–2, 449). 48. Love can on the contrary be said to be antithetical to power of will; see Chapter 10. 49. The same thing can be said about another concept which plays an ambiguous role in Kant’s moral philosophy: happiness. On the one hand Kant stresses its importance (see e.g. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 63 (Ak. 4:430)), on the other hand he understands it as something purely psychological (see e.g. Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, 649 (Ak. 6:3)). But what he then fails to notice is that understanding is internal to happiness: if you do not understand yourself as happy there is something missing from your happiness. And this understanding is not morally neutral. The question about whether I am happy or not is consequently not simply a psychological-empirical one. Deceiving oneself about one’s own happiness is on the contrary a typical example of self-deception. (Hence, it is not possible to inquire into whether people are happy or not simply by asking them.)

212 Notes 50. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 608 (Ak. 6:469). See also Immanuel Kant, Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie, ed. Werner Stark (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 292–6. 51. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 585, 609 (Ak. 6:449, 470). 52. Another way of explaining its ‘transcendental’ nature is to point out that what differs from love still could be said to presuppose it in being a reaction to it. As Ferdinand Ebner writes (Versuch eines Ausblicks in die Zukunft, 763): ‘Its [the I’s] “solitude” is never an absolute one but always only a relative one. Solitude is never what is primordial and essential in the I but the result of a spiritual act in it, of the act of its withdrawal from the you.’ 53. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 531 (Ak. 6:400). 54. What I have said in this paragraph can partly be understood as an answer to G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede, Gesammelte Werke 9 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1980), 230–1. See also Strandberg, Escaping My Responsibility, Chapters 1–2. 55. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Die griechische Philosophie und das Moderne Denken’, in Griechische Philosophie II, Gesammelte Werke 6 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1985), 6 (my translation). 56. Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, 8th ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009), 25 (my translation). 57. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, 27–8. 58. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 10: ‘Wellington is not in this café, Paul Valéry is no longer here, etc.’ – these [judgments] have a purely abstract meaning; they are pure applications of the principle of negation without real or efficacious foundation, and they never succeed in establishing a real relation between the cafe and Wellington or Valéry. Here the relation ‘is not’ is merely thought. 59. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, 26, 46. 60. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, 36 (my translation). See also Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, 26, 40. 61. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 79. 62. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 501 (A 551 / B 579); Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 34–5 (Ak. 4:407–8); Kant, ‘Über den Gemeinspruch’, 138 (Ak. 8:284–5); Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 523 (Ak. 6:392–3). 63. See Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 40–51 (Ak. 4:412–21). 64. Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, 667–8, 671–2, 678–9, 691–4 (Ak. 6:21–2, 24–5, 30–2, 41–4). 65. Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, 702 (Ak. 6:50–1); see also Kant, Der Streit der Fakultäten, 365 (Ak. 7:91). 66. Kant, ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’, 38 (Ak. 8:21). 67. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 224 (Ak. 8:366). 68. See Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 40–51 (Ak. 4:412–21). 69. Immanuel Kant, Über Pädagogik, in Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 11–12:711–12, 722–3 (Ak. 9:453–4, 464–5). 70. Kant, Über Pädagogik, 740–1 (Ak. 9:480–1).

Notes 213 71. Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, 862–3 (Ak. 6:188). 72. Immanuel Kant, ‘Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?’, in Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 5–6:282–3 (Ak. 8:146–7); Kant, ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’, 54, 61 (Ak. 8:36, 41). Freedom of speech should not be unrestricted, however; see ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’, 55–7 (Ak. 8:37–8). 73. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 618, 620–3 (Ak. 6:478, 480–2). 74. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 288 (Ak. 5:152); Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 623–4 (Ak. 6:482–3); see also Kant, Über Pädagogik, 707 (Ak. 9:450). 75. Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, 442–4 (Ak. 7:151–2). 76. Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, 751–3 (Ak. 6:93–5). 77. Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, 753–60 (Ak. 6:95–101). 78. See in particular Immanuel Kant, ‘Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie’, in Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik, Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 5–6:391–3 (Ak. 8:401–3). 79. See e.g. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 34–5 (Ak. 4:407). 80. See Kant, ‘Über den Gemeinspruch’, 137–8 (Ak. 8:284). 81. See Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 185–6 (Ak. 5:261–2). 82. See e.g. Lars Hertzberg, ‘On Being Trusted’, in Trust, Sociality, Selfhood, ed. Arne Grøn and Claudia Welz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 193–204. 83. A claim the intricacies of which Hegel gives a description of (Phänomenologie des Geistes, 211). 84. See e.g. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 228–44 (Ak. 8:370–80). 85. Kant, Prolegomena, 163–5 (Ak. 4:298–9).

8 The Freedom of the Will 1. Sigmund Freud, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, 52 (my translation). 2. For a related way of phrasing it, see Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), 61: determinism is not falsifiable and hence a metaphysical theory and not a scientific one, but you could say that science is guided by the rule that you should not give up searching for causal explanations just because you have not yet succeeded. 3. See Benjamin Libet, ‘Do We Have Free Will?’, in The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will, ed. Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland (Thorverton: Imprint Academic, 1999), 47–50. For a supplementary discussion to mine, see Lars Hertzberg, ‘The Psychology of Volition: “Problem and Method Pass One Another By”’, in Philosophical Anthropology: Wittgenstein’s Perspective, ed. Jesús Padilla Gálvez (Frankfurt am Main: Ontos, 2010), 139–52. 4. Libet, ‘Do We Have Free Will?’, 47. 5. Libet, ‘Do We Have Free Will?’, 52. 6. Libet, ‘Do We Have Free Will?’, 52.

214 Notes 7. Compare Collingwood, The Principles of History, 186: unless the sequence in itself, as a single and unrepeated sequence of events, were already intelligible, it could not be made intelligible by showing it to be an example of a general law. For in that case the general law would merely be a statement that events of this unintelligible kind frequently happen, or might happen, elsewhere in space and time; and what is intrinsically unintelligible does not become any more intelligible for being repeated. And Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, 75: ‘Necessity as succession in exteriority [ ... ] is only the mind [ ... ] producing and discovering the impossibility of thinking in exteriority.’ 8. Here a complication enters. To the extent the explanation of the action is supposed to be a good reason for carrying it out, what I will and will not see as an explanation depends on who I am. It is possible that for me nothing is a good reason for invading Russia, since I do not see anything as a good reason for waging war. However, it is not enough that this is the way I see things for there to be no such good reason for me, I must not even be tempted to see things differently. 9. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Über die Macht der Vernunft’, in Lob der Theorie: Reden und Ausätze, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 65 (my translation). 10. René Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, trans. Robert Stoothoff, in vol. 1 of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 343 (AT XI:359–60). Descartes is however not unambiguous on this point and also says more insightful things. See the following two quotes: how can the soul move the body if it is in no way material, and how can it receive the forms of corporeal objects? These questions simply give me the opportunity to point out that the author of the Counter-Objections was being quite unfair when, under the pretext of objecting to my views, he put to me a large numbers of such questions which do not require to be answered in order to prove what I asserted in my writings. The most ignorant people could, in a quarter of an hour, raise more questions of this kind than the wisest men could deal with in a lifetime; and this is why I have not bothered to answer any of them. These questions presuppose amongst other things an explanation of the union between the soul and the body, which I have not yet dealt with at all. (René Descartes, Objections and Replies, trans. John Cottingham, in vol. 2 of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 275 (AT VII:213)) It does not seem to me that the human mind is capable of forming a very distinct conception of both the distinction between the soul and the body and their union; for to do this it is necessary to conceive them as a single thing and at the same time to conceive them as two things; and this is absurd. (René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 3, The Correspondence, trans. John Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 227 (AT III:693)) 11. Therefore it is misleading to say what even the strictest opponents of the freedom of the will say – ‘Considered either theoretically or practically, “Free Will” is, in short, a mere lingering chimera. Certainly no writer, who respects himself, can be called on any longer to treat it seriously’ (F. H.

Notes 215

12.

13. 14. 15.

16.

17.

Bradley, Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay, 2nd ed. (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1908), 435) – for this is still to grant a too great possibility to the freedom of the will traditionally understood. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, ‘Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre’, in vol. 1 of Fichtes Werke, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), 425–6 (my translation). Fichte, ‘Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre’, 429–31 (my translation). Fichte, ‘Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre’, 433–4 (my translation). Fichte, ‘Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre’, 430 (my translation): According to him [the dogmatist], everything that occurs within our consciousness is a product of a thing in itself, consequently also our alleged decisions by freedom, as well as the opinion itself that we are free. This opinion is produced by the influence within us of the thing and the decisions that we derive from our freedom are also produced by it: only we do not know it, therefore we do not attribute a cause, but freedom, to it. Fichte is on the verge of realizing this. See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Die Bestimmung des Menschen, in vol. 2 of Fichtes Werke, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), esp. pp. 258–9. That he says ‘what kind of philosophy one chooses’ in one of the above quotes suggests as much: the dogmatist would certainly not use that word, and even if the idealist would use it, it would be far from clear how such a choice could be understood if it is made in complete isolation. Plato, Laches 187e–8c.

9 The World as Resistance 1. Just a few examples, not all of them unambiguous. Ludwig Feuerbach (Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft, in vol. 3 of Werke, ed. Erich Thies (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975), 298 (my translation)): ‘An object, a real object, is [ ... ] only then given to me, [ ... ] when my self-activity [ ... ] meets with resistance.’ (But see pp. 300–1: only the one who loves can distinguish between being and non-being, for to the one who does not love that distinction is indifferent.) Simone de Beauvoir (Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté , suivi de Pyrrhus et Cinéas (Paris: Gallimard, 2008), 37 (my translation)): ‘man [ ... ] succeeds in uncovering it only through the resistances the world opposes to him’ Hannah Arendt (Origins of Totalitarianism, 458): ‘it is [ ... ] contempt for reality which makes possible changing the world.’ Hans-Georg Gadamer (Wahrheit und Metode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, Gesammelte Werke 1, 7th ed. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2010), 359–62 (my translation): ‘authentic experience is always a negative one. [ ... ] experience is primarily always experience of nothingness. Things are not as we expected them to be. [ ... ] experience in this sense necessarily presupposes numerous frustrated expectations and only thereby experience is acquired. That experience is primarily the painful and unpleasant one [ ... ] is to be understood from its nature. Only through negative instances one comes [ ... ] to new experience.’ Paul Ricoeur (Oneself as Another, 322): ‘existing is resisting.’ 2. Plato, Sophist 246a–b, 247c.

216 Notes 3. See e.g. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 147 (but cf. e.g. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Zweiter Band, 7th ed. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008), 199–200), and Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 38–9. 4. Locke’s criticism of the sense of sight (John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Roger Woolhouse (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 135–6) is that sight gives the impression of giving us the qualities of an object at a distance when what is really at stake is a direct effect of particles on the cornea; the sense of touch, by contrast, does not deceive us in that way. The sense of sight is hence dependent on a medium, that which lies between us and the perceived object, which means that objects look different depending on conditions of light whereas no such different conditions exist when it comes to touch (Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 138). 5. Plato, Sophist 247d–e, 248b–c. 6. G. W. Leibniz, ‘The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology’, in Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), §§ 14–15. 7. Sigmund Freud, ‘Triebe und Triebschicksale’, in Psychologie des Unbewußten, 10th ed., Studienausgabe, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2010), 3:99 (my translation). 8. Sigmund Freud, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, 105–6 (my translation). 9. Freud, ‘Triebe und Triebschicksale’, 99 (my translation). It should be noted that this way of thinking, expressed in these three quotes, is never rejected by Freud but only modified, and as modified it is central for what he takes himself to be doing. The reality principle is central to scientific (Sigmund Freud, Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, in Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, und Neue Folge, 14th ed., Studienausgabe, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2003), 1:597; Sigmund Freud, Die Zukunft einer Illusion, 165–6) and analytic (Sigmund Freud, ‘Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse’, in Schriften zur Behandlungstechnik, 5th ed., Studienausgabe, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1997), 11:387–8) work, and is about a more secure way to the above goal, the difference being that the intensity aimed at is moderated and the attainment of it postponed (Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, 349; Sigmund Freud, ‘Formulierungen über die zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens’, in Psychologie des Unbewußten, 10th ed., Studienausgabe, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2010), 3:21–2). 10. Simone Weil, ‘Science and Perception in Descartes’, in Formative Writings, 1929–1941, ed. and trans. Dorothy Tuck McFarland and Wilhelmina Van Ness (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1987), 55. 11. Descartes, Discourse on the Method, 142–3 (AT VI:62). See also René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham, in vol. 2 of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 33 (AT VII:48). 12. Aristotle, Metaphysica, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 980a21–3. (A discussion

Notes 217

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

follows this in which the sense of sight (980a23–7) is given priority – an example of the fact that there is something to that way of telling the history of philosophy which I criticized above.) See e.g. Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 54. Aristotle, Metaphysica 980a21–3. For this point, see Lars Hertzberg, ‘On Being Moved by Desire’, Philosophical Investigations 18 (1995): 260–1. Plato, Sophist 247d–e, 248b–c. Several aspects of this have been discussed in Chapter 7 and will be discussed again in Chapter 11. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 533–5 (A 598–601 / B 626–9).

10 The Will 1. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Erster Band, 49 (my translation). 2. K. E. Løgstrup, Etiske begreber og problemer (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1996), 67 (my translation). 3. Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, 114. See also Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, 281. 4. Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind: Willing (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 6. 5. Arendt, The Life of the Mind: Willing, 6–7, 121. Arendt is however by no means unambiguous on this point. Action, the capacity to do something radically new, is rooted in our natality (that is, in the fact that something completely new entered the world with each one of us), not in some specific capability (Arendt, The Life of the Mind: Willing, 216–17). In fact, birth is for her in the end the only example of something radically new, not political action (Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 203, 272). 6. A. W. Price, ‘Aristotle, the Stoics and the Will’, in The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day, ed. Thomas Pink and M. W. F. Stone (London: Routledge, 2004), 29. 7. Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 18 (Ak. 4:393). 8. Freud, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, 284 (my translation). See also Freud, ‘Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse’, 191–4. 9. Honneth, Das Andere der Gerechtigkeit, 238 (my translation). See also Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, 280; Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock, 1972), 13. 10. See, e.g., D. Z. Phillips, Philosophy’s Cool Place (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 100; D. Z. Phillips, Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 325. 11. See e.g. Phillips, Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation, 5. 12. Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, trans. Emma Craufurd (London: ARK Paperbacks, 1987), 107. 13. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 25–6 (Ak. 4:399); Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 205 (Ak. 5:83); Immanuel Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 532–4, 585 (Ak. 6:401–2, 449). 14. Immanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, 667–8, 671–2 (Ak. 6:21–2, 25).

218 Notes 15. Thomas Pink and M. W. F. Stone, ‘Introduction’, in The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day, ed. Thomas Pink and M. W. F. Stone (London: Routledge, 2004), 1. 16. Carlos Steel, ‘The Effect of the Will on Judgement: Thomas Aquinas on Faith and Prudence’, in The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day, ed. Thomas Pink and M. W. F. Stone (London: Routledge, 2004), 79. 17. Robert Barclay, An Apology for the True Christian Divinity, 4th ed. (London: T. Sowle, 1701), 343–4. See also pp. 367–8. 18. Michael Thompson, Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 105. 19. Kierkegaard, Opbyggelige Taler i forskjellig Aand, 30. 20. Kierkegaard, Opbyggelige Taler i forskjellig Aand, 30. 21. One way of defending Kierkegaard would be to claim that his concept of the will is not mine; if that is so, we would not contradict each other. But that would be to simplify matters a great deal. Above all, it would fail to notice the deep ambiguities in Kierkegaard’s discussion of the will, ambiguities that are especially prevalent in Sygdommen til Døden. That book contains both traditional metaphysics of the will (e.g. p. 87) and important and fundamental criticism of such an understanding of morality (e.g. pp. 74, 123). 22. For all this, see Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 28, 41–51, 55–6, 70–1 (Ak. 4:402, 412–21, 424–5, 437). 23. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 18 (Ak. 4:393) (my translation). 24. See e.g. Friedrich Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, in vol. 3 of Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 540 (§ 301); Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft, in vol. 5 of Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 18, 34–5, 53–4, 119–20 (§§ 4, 20, 34, 199); Friedrich Nietzsche, Der Antichrist: Fluch auf das Christenthum, in vol. 6 of Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 177 (§ 11). 25. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 59–60 (Ak. 4:427–8). 26. See e.g. Friedrich Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen, Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari, vol. 4 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 146–9. 27. See e.g. Nietzsche, Der Antichrist, 177 (§ 11) 28. See Chapter 7. 29. Martin Heidegger, Feldweg-Gespräche, Gesamtausgabe 77, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007), 56 (my translation). 30. Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 14.6. 31. Another possible interpretation, depending on how you understand the distinction between perversus and rectus, is that Augustine claims that the will is good at bottom. 32. Heidegger, Feldweg-Gespräche, 208 (my translation). 33. Martin Heidegger, ‘Nietzsches Wort »Gott ist tot«’, in Holzwege. Gesamtausgabe 5, 8th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2003), 234 (my translation). Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1887–1889, Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari, vol. 13 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 54 (§ W II 3 [114]).

Notes 219 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47.

Heidegger, Nietzsche: Erster Band, 37 (my translation). Augustine, Confessions 8.ix.21. Augustine, Confessions 8.ix.21. Augustine, Confessions 8.x.24. Augustine, Confessions 8.xi.27. Compare Heidegger, Feldweg-Gespräche, 75: the more you make an effort to keep to the theme of the conversation, the less you keep to it, by not letting the conversation take its free course. Heidegger, Feldweg-Gespräche, 25 (my translation). Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, 14th ed. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2007), 175 (my translation). Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, 100 (my translation). For this problem, see Martin Heidegger, Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit: Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken, in Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, Gesamtausgabe 13, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002), 38ff.; Heidegger, Feldweg-Gespräche, 51ff. Heidegger, Feldweg-Gespräche, 208 (my translation). Simone Weil, Oppression and Liberty, trans. Arthur Wills and John Petrie (London: Routledge, 2001), 65–6. Simone Weil, Waiting for God, trans. Emma Craufurd (New York: Perennial Classics, 2001), 126–7. Seneca, Selected Letters 80.4.

11 The Good 1. For more about this understanding of morality and goodness, see Joel Backström, The Fear of Openness: An Essay on Friendship and the Roots of Morality (Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2007); Hannes Nykänen, The “I”, the “You” and the Soul: An Ethics of Conscience (Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2002); Strandberg, Escaping My Responsibility; Strandberg, Love of a God of Love. 2. Karl Marx, ‘Kritik des Gothaer Programms’, in vol. 19 of Marx Engels Werke, 9th ed. (Berlin: Dietz, 1987), 20–1 (my translation). 3. According to R. M. Hare, what distinguishes moral commands from other kinds of commands is justice in the sense of impartiality (see Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), above all p. 123, and Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 129, 154). So Marx criticizes that understanding of morality, and to the extent Marx’s point is a moral one, he could be understood as saying that morality is in the end not about being impartial. 4. One might want to explain this in terms of the ‘bipolarity’ of justice (see Michael Thompson, ‘What Is It to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle about Justice’, in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, ed. R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), esp. sec. 1–2). But Thompson seems to want to claim that there are also ‘monadic’ moral categories that are not about the relation to other people (p. 339): ‘If, for example, you are making an unjustly intrusive enquiry, and I tell you a lie in response, it certainly doesn’t seem that

220 Notes

5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12.

I wrong you.’ Now there are differences to be made between different cases, but two things should be noted. First, both the term ‘monadic’ and the term ‘bipolar’ restrict the numbers of victims in a too definite way. Even when the direct victim of what I do may be easily pointed out, this does not mean that this is the only person I wrong or am unjust to in doing this. Second, the example Thompson gives does not show what he takes it to be showing. If the enquiry is intrusive, why doesn’t he say so instead of telling me a lie? Is that not indicative of a problem in our relation? See e.g. René Descartes, Discourse on the Method, 111 (AT VI:1–2); Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 59–60 (Ak. 4:427–8). A related problem – a problem I will not discuss here – is that with a criterion it is possible to see to it that the concept is inapplicable, which seemingly makes the most horrendous cases of cruelty not possible to condemn. It is for this reason that Giorgio Agamben criticizes the use, in moral philosophy, of concepts such as ‘human’ (Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 2002), 63–4, 134–5); ‘humanitarian organizations [fighting for human rights ... ] maintain a secret solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight’ (Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 133), for in focusing on criteria these organizations make it possible for ‘the very powers they ought to fight’ to see to it that these criteria become inapplicable. See Slavoj Žižek, ‘Neighbors and Other Monsters’, e.g. p. 185. Žižek, ‘Neighbors and Other Monsters’, 182. Žižek, ‘Neighbors and Other Monsters’, 182. Žižek, ‘Neighbors and Other Monsters’, 184. For this discussion of Žižek, see also Slavoj Žižek, ‘The Animal Gaze of the Other’, in God in Pain: Inversions of Apocalypse (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2012), 225–6. This is the reason for saying ‘to care for everyone the issue is about’ and not ‘to care just as much for everyone the issue is about’. If we said the latter a comparison would still be central. This is important to point out, not the least in order better to understand the quote from Marx that opened this chapter. Freud writes, objecting to the communist criticism of private property (Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, in Fragen der Gesellschaft, Ursprünge der Religion, 10th ed., Studienausgabe, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2009), 9:242 (my translation): if this fight wants to adduce the abstract demand of justice for equality of all human beings, the objection is too obvious that nature, by endowing individuals with very different physical and intellectual capacities, has inserted injustices against which there is no remedy. But this is exactly what Marx in the above quote goes against: what the ‘higher phase of the communist society’ is about is that different people are treated in different ways (or, better expressed, that people will not be thinking in terms of ‘alike’ or ‘different’, for both presuppose comparisons). Moreover, and in relation to this, to criticize someone simply because she relates to those she is acquainted with in a different way than to those she is not acquainted with is stupid, for being acquainted with someone means

Notes 221

13.

14.

15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

that one does not relate to that person as one relates to others. In order for it to be possible to characterize what I am doing as unjust a question about justice and injustice, that is, a question about the specific ways I relate to people, must first have an application in this particular situation. The simple fact that I could be said to relate differently to different people is not such a reason. The following example is inspired by Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival, ed. Gottfried Weber, 2nd ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), 517–19 (XII.612,23–614,17). Compare Nietzsche (Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 91 (§ 102) (my translation)): ‘The discovery that his love is requited should strictly speaking make the lover sober as concerns the loved being. “What? she is unassuming enough to love even you? Or stupid enough? Or – or –”’ Compare Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 2: Love is never directed toward this or that property of the loved one (being blond, being small, being tender, being lame), but neither does it neglect the properties in favor of an insipid generality (universal love): The lover wants the loved one with all of its predicates, its being such as it is. One should not forget, however, that the lover wants the loved one to be a lover too, so in this respect (and in others relating to it), the phrase ‘such as it is’ is more complicated than Agamben seems to be aware of. See Chapter 5. For more about the topic of this paragraph, see Strandberg, Love of a God of Love, Chapter 10. Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind: Thinking (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 175, 192. Arendt, The Life of the Mind: Thinking, 175–6. Arendt, The Life of the Mind: Thinking, 179.

Bibliography Adorno, Theodor W. Minima Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. In vol. 4 of Gesammelte Schriften, edited by Rolf Tiedemann, 11–300. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980. Agamben, Giorgio. The Coming Community. Translated by Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993. ———. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated by Daniel HellerRoazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. ———. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. New York: Zone Books, 2002. Andersen, H. C. ‘Kejserens nye klæder’. In Samlede Eventyr og Historier, 78–81. Copenhagen: Høst & Søn, 2012. Anscombe, G. E. M. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Philosophical Papers Volume Two. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981. Apel, Karl-Otto. Transformation der Philosophie. Vol. 2, Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft. 6th ed. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999. Arendt, Hannah. Crises of the Republic. New York: Harcourt, 1972. ———. The Human Condition. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. ———. The Life of the Mind: Thinking. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978. ———. The Life of the Mind: Willing. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978. ———. On Revolution. London: Penguin Books, 2006. ———. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New ed. Orlando: Harcourt, 1968. ———. Responsibility and Judgment. New York: Schocken, 2003. Aristotle. Ars Rhetorica. Edited by W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959. ———. De Anima. Translated by J. A. Smith. In The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, 533–603. New York: Random House, 1941. ———. Metaphysica. Translated by W. D. Ross. In The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, 681–926. New York: Random House, 1941. ———. On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. Translated by George A. Kennedy. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Saint Augustine. The City of God against the Pagans. Translated by R. W. Dyson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. ———. Confessions. Translated by Henry Chadwick. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. ———. De civitate Dei. In vol. 41 of Patrologia Latina, 13–804. Paris: Migne, 1864. ———. The Trinity. Translated by Edmund Hill. Hyde Park: New City Press, 1991. Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975. Backström, Joel. The Fear of Openness: An Essay on Friendship and the Roots of Morality. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2007.

222

Bibliography 223 Barclay, Robert. An Apology for the True Christian Divinity. 4th ed. London: T. Sowle, 1701. Basil of Caesarea. Hexaemeron. In vol. 29 of Patrologia Graeca, 3–208. Paris: Migne, 1857. Beauvoir, Simone de. Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté. In Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, suivi de Pyrrhus et Cinéas, 7–197. Paris: Gallimard, 2008. ———. Pyrrhus et Cinéas. In Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, suivi de Pyrrhus et Cinéas, 199–316. Paris: Gallimard, 2008. Beiser, Frederick. Hegel. New York: Routledge, 2005. Benhabib, Seyla. Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. Cambridge: Polity, 1992. Bergson, Henri. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. 13th ed. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1914. Binswanger, Ludwig. Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins. 4th ed. München: Ernst Reinhardt, 1964. Bloch, Ernst. Das Prinzip Hoffnung. Werkausgabe 5. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1959. Bradley, F. H. Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay. 2nd ed. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1908. Brecht, Bertolt. Die Dreigroschenoper. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. Die Mutter (1933). In vol. 3 of Große kommentierte Berliner und Frankfurter Ausgabe, edited by Werner Hecht, Jan Knopf, Werner Mittenzwei, and KlausDetlef Müller, 261–324. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988. ———. Mutter Courage und ihre Kinder: Eine Chronik aus dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1963. Buber, Martin. Das dialogische Prinzip. 12th ed. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2012. ———. Das Problem des Menschen. 7th ed. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2007. Cassam, Quassim, ed. Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. Castoriadis, Cornelius. The Imaginary Institution of Society. Translated by Kathleen Blamey. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987. Christman, John. ‘Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom’. Ethics 101 (1991): 343–59. Collingwood, R. G. The Idea of History. Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. ———. The New Leviathan; or, Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism. Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. ———. The Philosophy of Enchantment: Studies in Folktale, Cultural Criticism, and Anthropology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. ———. The Principles of History, and Other Writings in Philosophy of History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Cornforth, Maurice. Dialectical Materialism: An Introduction. Vol. 2, Historical Materialism. 3rd ed. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976. Davidson, Donald. Problems of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. De Carolis, Massimo. ‘Toward a Phenomenology of Opportunism’. In Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, edited by Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt, 37–51. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

224 Bibliography Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. Translated by Dana Polan. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. ———. What Is Philosophy? Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Derrida, Jacques. Margins of Philosophy. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. ———. On the Name. Edited by Thomas Dutoit. Translated by David Wood, John P. Leavey, and Ian McLeod. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. ———. Writing and Difference. Translated by Alan Bass. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. Descartes, René. Discourse on the Method. Translated by Robert Stoothoff. In vol. 1 of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 111–51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. ———. Meditations on First Philosophy. Translated by John Cottingham. In vol. 2 of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3–62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. ———. Objections and Replies. Translated by John Cottingham. In vol. 2 of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 66–397. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. ———. The Passions of the Soul. Translated by Robert Stoothoff. In vol. 1 of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 326–404. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. ———. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Vol. 3, The Correspondence. Translated by John Cottingham et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Translated by R. D. Hicks. 2 vols Loeb Classical Library, 184–5. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. Ebner, Ferdinand. Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten: Pneumatologische Fragmente. In Fragmente Aufsätze Aphorismen: Zu einer Pneumatologie des Wortes. Schriften, edited by Franz Seyr, 1:75–342. Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1963. ———. Versuch eines Ausblicks in die Zukunft. In Fragmente Aufsätze Aphorismen: Zu einer Pneumatologie des Wortes. Schriften, edited by Franz Seyr, 1:719–908. Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1963. Feuerbach, Ludwig. Das Wesen des Christentums. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1969. ———. Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft. In vol. 3 of Werke, edited by Erich Thies, 247–322. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975. Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. Die Bestimmung des Menschen. In vol. 2 of Fichtes Werke, edited by Immanuel Hermann Fichte, 165–319. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971. ———. ‘Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre’. In vol. 1 of Fichtes Werke, edited by Immanuel Hermann Fichte, 417–49. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971. ———. Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. In vol. 1 of Fichtes Werke, edited by Immanuel Hermann Fichte, 83–328. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971. ———. System der Sittenlehre nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre. In vol. 4 of Fichtes Werke, edited by Immanuel Hermann Fichte, 1–365. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971. Fingarette, Herbert. Self-Deception. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969. Fontane, Theodor. Effi Briest. Edited by Helmuth Nürnberger. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995.

Bibliography 225 Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge. Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. London: Tavistock, 1972. Frank, Manfred. Die Unhintergehbarkeit von Individualität: Reflexionen über Subjekt, Person und Individuum aus Anlaß ihrer ›postmodernen‹ Toterklärung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986. Freud, Sigmund. Das Unbehagen in der Kultur. In Fragen der Gesellschaft, Ursprünge der Religion. 10th ed. Studienausgabe, edited by Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey, 9:191–270. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2009. ———. ‘Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse’. In Schriften zur Behandlungstechnik. 5th ed. Studienausgabe, edited by Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey, 11:357–92. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1997. ———. Die Zukunft einer Illusion. In Fragen der Gesellschft, Ursprünge der Religion. 10th ed. Studienausgabe, edited by Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey, 9:139–89. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2009. ———. ‘Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse’. In Abriss der Psychoanalyse: Einführende Darstellungen. 11th ed. Werke im Taschenbuch, edited by Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, 187–94. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2009. ———. ‘Formulierungen über die zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens’. In Psychologie des Unbewußten. 10th ed. Studienausgabe, edited by Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey, 3:17–24. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2010. ———. Hemmung, Symptom und Angst. In Hysterie und Angst. 9th ed. Studienausgabe, edited by Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey, 6:227–308. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1997. ———. Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse. In Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, und Neue Folge. 14th ed. Studienausgabe, edited by Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey, 1:447–608. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2003. ———. ‘Ratschläge für den Arzt bei der psychoanalytischen Behandlung’. In Schriften zur Behandlungstechnik. 5th ed. Studienausgabe, edited by Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey, 11:169–80. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1997. ———. ‘Triebe und Triebschicksale’. In Psychologie des Unbewußten. 10th ed. Studienausgabe, edited by Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey, 3:81–102. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2010. ———. ‘Über die Psychogenese eines Falles von weiblicher Homosexualität’. In Zwang, Paranoia und Perversion. 7th ed. Studienausgabe, edited by Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey, 7:257–81. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1997. ———. ‘Über “wilde” Psychoanalyse’. In Schriften zur Behandlungstechnik. 5th ed. Studienausgabe, edited by Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey, 11:133–41. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1997. ———. Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse. In Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, und Neue Folge. 14th ed. Studienausgabe, edited by Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey, 1:33–445. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2003.

226 Bibliography ———. ‘Zur Dynamik der Übertragung’. In Schriften zur Behandlungstechnik. 5th ed. Studienausgabe, edited by Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey, 11:157–68. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1997. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. ‘Die griechische Philosophie und das Moderne Denken’. In Griechische Philosophie II, 3–8. Gesammelte Werke 6. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1985. ———. ‘Über die Macht der Vernunft’. In Lob der Theorie: Reden und Ausätze, 3rd ed., 51–66. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991. ———. Wahrheit und Metode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik. Gesammelte Werke 1, 7th ed. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2010. ———. ‘Wie weit schreibt Sprache das Denken vor?’. In Hermeneutik II, 199–206. Gesammelte Werke 2. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1986. Girard, René. Violence and the Sacred. Translated by Patrick Gregory. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit. Edited by Klaus-Detlef Müller. Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 2007. ———. Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre. Edited by Ehrhard Bahr. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1982. ———. Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre; oder, Die Entsagenden. Edited by Ehrhard Bahr. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1982. Hacking, Ian. Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. Hamlyn, D. W. Perception, Learning and the Self: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Hare, R. M. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963. ———. Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981. Hegel, G. W. F. Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal. In Frühe Schriften. Werke, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 1:274–418. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986. ———. Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie. In Jenaer kritische Schriften, edited by Hartmut Buchner and Otto Pöggeler, 5–92. Gesammelte Werke 4. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968. ———. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. Werke, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, vol. 8–10. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986. ———. Fragmente über Volksreligion und Christentum. In Frühe Schriften. Werke, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 1:9–103. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986. ———. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts; oder, Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Werke, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, vol. 7. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986. ———. Phänomenologie des Geistes. Edited by Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede. Gesammelte Werke 9. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1980. ———. System der Sittlichkeit [Critik des Fichteschen Naturrechts]. In Schriften und Entwürfe (1799–1808), edited by Manfred Baum and Kurt Rainer Meist, 279–361. Gesammelte Werke 5. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1998. ———. Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I. Werke, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, vol. 13. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986.

Bibliography 227 ———. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie I. Werke, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, vol. 18. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986. ———. ‘Wer denkt abstrakt?’. In Jenaer Schriften, 1801–1807. Werke, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 2:575–81. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986. Heidegger, Martin. Brief über den ‘Humanismus’. In Wegmarken. Gesamtausgabe 9, 3rd ed., 313–64. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004. ———. Feldweg-Gespräche. Gesamtausgabe 77, 2nd ed. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007. ———. Nietzsche: Erster Band. 7th ed. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008. ———. Nietzsche: Zweiter Band. 7th ed. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008. ———. ‘Nietzsches Wort “Gott ist tot”’. In Holzwege. Gesamtausgabe 5, 8th ed., 209–67. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2003. ———. Sein und Zeit. 18th ed. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2001. ———. Unterwegs zur Sprache. 14th ed. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2007. ———. Was ist das – die Philosophie? 12th ed. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008. ———. Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit: Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken. In Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. Gesamtausgabe 13, 2nd ed., 37–74. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. Hertzberg, Lars. ‘On Being Moved by Desire’. Philosophical Investigations 18 (1995): 250–63. ———. ‘On Being Trusted’. In Trust, Sociality, Selfhood, edited by Arne Grøn and Claudia Welz, 193–204. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010. ———. ‘The Psychology of Volition: “Problem and Method Pass One Another By”’. In Philosophical Anthropology: Wittgenstein’s Perspective, edited by Jesús Padilla Gálvez, 139–52. Frankfurt am Main: Ontos, 2010. Holloway, John. Change the World without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today. 3rd ed. London: Pluto Press, 2010. Honneth, Axel. Das Andere der Gerechtigkeit: Aufsätze zur praktischen Philosophie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000. Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. ———. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Husserl, Edmund. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Edited by Walter Biemel. Husserliana 6. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. ———. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Bk. 1, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. Edited by Walter Biemel. Husserliana 3. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950. Jappe, Anselm. Die Abenteuer der Ware: Für eine neue Wertkritik. Münster: Unrast, 2005. Kant, Immanuel. Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. In Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 11–12:399–690. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. ‘Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?’. In Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 11–12:51–61. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968.

228 Bibliography ———. Der Streit der Fakultäten. In Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 11–12:261–393. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. Die Metaphysik der Sitten. In Schriften zur Ethik und Religionsphilosophie. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 7–8:303–634. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. In Schriften zur Ethik und Religionsphilosophie. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 7–8:645–879. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. In Schriften zur Ethik und Religionsphilosophie. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 7–8:11–102. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’. In Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 11–12:31–50. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. In Schriften zur Ethik und Religionsphilosophie. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 7–8:107–302. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, vol. 3–4. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. Kritik der Urteilskraft. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, vol. 10. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974. ———. ‘Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte’. In Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 11–12:83–102. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können. In Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 5–6:109–264. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. ‘Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis’. In Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 11–12:125–72. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. Über Pädagogik. In Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 11–12:691–761. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. ‘Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie’. In Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 5–6:375–97. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie. Edited by Werner Stark. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004. ———. ‘Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?’. In Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 5–6:265–83. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. ———. ‘Rezension zu Johann Gottfried Herder: Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit’. In Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 11–12:779–806. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968.

Bibliography 229 ———. Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf. In Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik. Werkausgabe, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 11–12:191–251. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968. Kierkegaard, Søren. Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift. 2 vols Samlede Værker 9–10. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1963. ———. Enten – Eller. 2 vols Samlede Værker 2–3. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1962. ———. Opbyggelige Taler i forskjellig Aand. Samlede Værker 11. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1963. ———. Sygdommen til Døden. In Tvende ethisk-religieuse Smaa-Afhandlinger; Sygdommen til Døden. Samlede Værker 15:65–180. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1963. ———. Synspunktet for min Forfatter-Virksomhed: En ligefrem Meddelelse, Rapport til Historien. In Bladartikler, der staar i Forhold til „Forfatterskabet“; Om min ForfatterVirksomhed; Synspunktet for min Forfatter-Virksomhed. Samlede Værker 18:79–169. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1964. ———. Til Selvprøvelse, Samtiden anbefalet. In En opbyggelig Tale; To Taler ved Altergangen om Fredagen; Til Selvprøvelse, Samtiden anbefalet; Dømmer selv! Samlede Værker 17:49–123. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1964. Kurz, Robert. Blutige Vernunft: Essays zur emanzipatorischen Kritik der kapitalistischen Moderne und ihrer westlichen Werte. Bad Honnef: Horlemann, 2004. Leibniz, G. W. ‘The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology’. In Philosophical Essays, edited and translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, 213–25. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989. Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Nathan der Weise: Ein dramatisches Gedicht in fünf Aufzügen. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000. Levinas, Emmanuel. ‘Meaning and Sense’. In Collected Philosophical Papers, translated by Alphonso Lingis, 75–107. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998. ———. Otherwise Than Being; or, Beyond Essence. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998. ———. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969. Libet, Benjamin. ‘Do We Have Free Will?’. In The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will, edited by Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland, 47–57. Thorverton: Imprint Academic, 1999. Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Roger Woolhouse. London: Penguin Books, 1997. ———. Two Treatises of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration. Edited by Ian Shapiro. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. Løgstrup, K. E. Etiske begreber og problemer. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1996. Löwith, Karl. Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen. Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1928. MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 3rd ed. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007. Marx, Karl. Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte. In vol. 8 of Marx Engels Werke, 111–207. Berlin: Dietz, 1960. ———. Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Vol. 1, Der Produktionsprozeβ des Kapitals. In vol. 23 of Marx Engels Werke, 23rd ed., 3–802. Berlin: Dietz, 2008.

230 Bibliography ———. Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. In vol. 42 of Marx Engels Werke, 2nd ed., 47–768. Berlin: Dietz, 2005. ———. ‘Kritik des Gothaer Programms’. In vol. 19 of Marx Engels Werke, 9th ed., 11–32. Berlin: Dietz, 1987. ———. ‘Lohn, Preis und Profit’. In vol. 16 of Marx Engels Werke, 101–52. Berlin: Dietz, 1962. ———. Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie. In vol. 13 of Marx Engels Werke, 3–160. Berlin: Dietz, 1961. Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. Die deutsche Ideologie. In vol. 3 of Marx Engels Werke, 4th ed., 9–530. Berlin: Dietz, 1969. Mele, Alfred. Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Meløe, Jakob. ‘Words and Objects’. In Wittgenstein and Contemporary Theories of Language, edited by Paul Henry and Arild Utaker, 109–41. Bergen: The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, 1992. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Humanisme et terreur: Essai sur le problème communiste. Paris: Gallimard, 1980. ———. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin Smith. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962. Murdoch, Iris. Existentialists and Mystics: Writings of Philosophy and Literature. Edited by Peter Conradi. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1997. Nietzsche, Friedrich. Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen. Kritische Studienausgabe, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, vol. 4. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999. ———. Der Antichrist: Fluch auf das Christenthum. In vol. 6 of Kritische Studienausgabe, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 165–254. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999. ———. Die fröhliche Wissenschaft. In vol. 3 of Kritische Studienausgabe, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 343–651. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999. ———. Jenseits von Gut und Böse: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft. In vol. 5 of Kritische Studienausgabe, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 9–243. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999. ———. Morgenröthe: Gedanken über die moralischen Vorurtheile. In vol. 3 of Kritische Studienausgabe, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 9–331. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999. ———. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1887–1889. Kritische Studienausgabe, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, vol. 13. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999. Nykänen, Hannes. The “I”, the “You” and the Soul: An Ethics of Conscience. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2002. ———. Samvetet och det dolda: Om kärlek och kollektivitet. Ludvika: Dualis, 2009. Ovid. Ars Amatoria; The Art of Love. Translated by J. H. Mozley. In The Art of Love, and Other Poems. Loeb Classical Library 232, 2nd ed., 12–175. London: William Heinemann, 1979. ———. Remedia Amoris; The Remedies for Love. Translated by J. H. Mozley. In The Art of Love, and Other Poems. Loeb Classical Library 232, 2nd ed., 177–233. London: William Heinemann, 1979. Phillips, D. Z. Philosophy’s Cool Place. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.

Bibliography 231 ———. Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pink, Thomas, and M. W. F. Stone. ‘Introduction’. In The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day, edited by Thomas Pink and M. W. F. Stone, 1–5. London: Routledge, 2004. Plato. Apology. Translated by G. M. A. Grube. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 17–36. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Charmides. Translated by Rosamund Kent Sprague. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 639–63. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Cratylus. Translated by C. D. C. Reeve. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 101–56. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Gorgias. Translated by Donald J. Zeyl. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 791–869. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Laches. Translated by Rosamund Kent Sprague. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 664–86. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Meno. Translated by G. M. A. Grube. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 870–97. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Phaedo. Translated by G. M. A. Grube. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 49–100. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Phaedrus. Translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 506–56. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Philebus. Translated by Dorothea Frede. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 398–456. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Platonis opera. Edited by John Burnet. 5 vols Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1900–7. ———. Protagoras. Translated by Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 746–90. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Republic. Translated by G. M. A. Grube, revised by C. D. C. Reeve. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 971–1223. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Sophist. Translated by Nicholas P. White. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 235–93. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Statesman. Translated by C. J. Rowe. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 294–358. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Symposium. Translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 457–505. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Theaetetus. Translated by M. J. Levett, revised by Myles Burnyeat. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 157–234. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. ———. Timaeus. Translated by Donald J. Zeyl. In Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 1224–91. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. Popper, Karl R. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965. Price, A. W. ‘Aristotle, the Stoics and the Will’. In The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day, edited by Thomas Pink and M. W. F. Stone, 29–52. London: Routledge, 2004.

232 Bibliography Putnam, Hilary. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Ricoeur, Paul. Oneself as Another. Translated by Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963. Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. ———. Critique of Dialectical Reason. Vol. 1, Theory of Practical Ensembles. Translated by Alan Sheridan-Smith. London: Verso, 2004. ———. Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr. Translated by Bernard Frechtman. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012. Schechtman, Marya. The Constitution of Selves. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Schiller, Friedrich. ‘Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen’. In Theoretische Schriften, edited by Rolf-Peter Janz, 556–676. Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 2008. Schmitt, Carl. Der Begriff des Politischen. 8th ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009. Schopenhauer, Arthur. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Edited by Ludger Lütkehaus. 4th ed. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2008. Seneca. Selected Letters. Translated by Elaine Fantham. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Shakespeare, William. Hamlet, Prince of Denmark. Edited by Philip Edwards. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Steel, Carlos. ‘The Effect of the Will on Judgement: Thomas Aquinas on Faith and Prudence’. In The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day, edited by Thomas Pink and M. W. F. Stone, 78–98. London: Routledge, 2004. Stenlund, Sören. Language and Philosophical Problems. London: Routledge, 1990. Stirner, Max. Der Einzige und sein Eigentum. Edited by Ahlrich Meyer. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1981. Strandberg, Hugo. Escaping My Responsibility: Investigations into the Nature of Morality. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009. ———. Love of a God of Love: Towards a Transformation of the Philosophy of Religion. London: Continuum, 2011. Taylor, Charles. Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, 1981. Thompson, Michael. Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. ———. ‘What Is It to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle about Justice’. In Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, edited by R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, 333–84. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Weber, Max. ‘Die “Objektivität” sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis’. In Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 7th ed., edited by

Bibliography 233 Johannes Winckelmann, 146–214. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1988. ———. ‘Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen’. In Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I, 4th ed., 237–573. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1947. ———. ‘Politik als Beruf’. In Gesammelte politische Schriften, 396–450. Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1921. Weil, Simone. Gravity and Grace. Translated by Emma Craufurd. London: ARK Paperbacks, 1987. ———. ‘Human Personality’. In The Simone Weil Reader, edited by George A. Panichas, 313–39. Wakefield: Moyer Bell, 1999. ———. Lectures on Philosophy. Translated by Hugh Price. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978. ———. Oppression and Liberty. Translated by Arthur Wills and John Petrie. London: Routledge, 2001. ———. ‘Science and Perception in Descartes’. In Formative Writings, 1929–1941, edited and translated by Dorothy Tuck McFarland and Wilhelmina Van Ness, 31–88. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1987. ———. Waiting for God. Translated by Emma Craufurd. New York: Perennial Classics, 2001. Winch, Peter. Trying to Make Sense. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie: Band II; Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology: Volume II. Translated by C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. ———. Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961. ———. ‘Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”’. In Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951, edited by James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann, 200–88. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993. ———. Philosophische Untersuchungen; Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. ———. Über Gewissheit; On Certainty. Translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1974. Wolfram von Eschenbach. Parzival. Edited by Gottfried Weber. 2nd ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963. Wolgast, Elizabeth. Ethics of an Artificial Person: Lost Responsibility in Professions and Organizations. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992. Wood, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Žižek, Slavoj. ‘The Animal Gaze of the Other’. In God in Pain: Inversions of Apocalypse, 221–40. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2012. ———. In Defense of Lost Causes. London: Verso, 2008. ———. The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters. London: Verso, 1996. ———. Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. London: Verso, 2012.

234 Bibliography ———. The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Women and Causality. London: Verso, 1994. ———. ‘Neighbors and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence’. In The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology, 134–90. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. ———. The Parallax View. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006.

Index aesthetics, 99, 114 Agamben, Giorgio, 220, 221 ambivalence, 49 Andersen, H. C., 99 Anscombe, Elizabeth, 58 Arendt, Hannah, 54, 148, 177, 193, 196, 208, 215, 217 Aristotle, 4, 16–17, 138–9, 141, 188, 216–17 Augustine, 19, 32, 159–63, 189, 218 Austin, J. L., 198 autonomy, 50, 74–6, 102, 156–7

Davidson, Donald, 44, 194, 195 Deleuze, Gilles, 80, 197 democracy, 113, 120 Democritus, 136 Derrida, Jacques, 80, 88–9 Descartes, René, 41, 59, 130–1, 137, 197, 214 determinism, 123, 133, 213 dialogue, 3, 8–10, 117, 132, 144, 158–9, 187–8, 219 Diogenes Laertius, 183–4 dualism, 130, 133

Barclay, Robert, 154 Basil of Caesarea, 14, 23 Beauvoir, Simone de, 215 Benhabib, Seyla, 62–3 Bergson, Henri, 204 Binswanger, Ludwig, 51 Bradley, F. H., 214–15 Brecht, Bertolt, 84, 207 Buber, Martin, 89

Ebner, Ferdinand, 58, 212 education, 96, 100, 116–18, 207 emotion, 17, 24, 27–31, 35, 42, 51, 61, 68, 97, 100, 109, 111, 130, 149–53, 158, 159, 176, 180, 197 Engels, Friedrich, 92–3 envy, 195 evasion, 41, 44 evil, 30, 32–3, 50, 70, 117, 153, 160, 165, 166, 173, 175, 177–80 exculpation, 55–7, 61 existential, 122, 133–4, 154, 161–3 expectation, 138–42, 146, 164 expertise, 6–7, 9, 187 explanation, 60, 63–4, 94, 96, 123, 128–9, 213, 214

calculation, 44, 119, 125–6, 170, 177 care, 30, 43, 106, 111–12, 121, 145, 173–4, 220 Castoriadis, Cornelius, 79 causality, 45, 102, 119–20, 123–4, 128–32, 213 Christman, John, 74–8, 202, 203 collectivity, 11, 15, 23, 29–30, 37, 43, 50, 71, 98–9, 105, 202, 207 Collingwood, R. G., 39–42, 44, 189, 190, 193, 194, 214 comparison, 10, 42–4, 170, 174, 178, 220 conscience, 110, 152, 162, 172, 176, 178, 180 contempt, 37, 46, 101, 173, 175, 180 criteriological, 84, 119, 163, 173–5, 179, 220 culture, 99–100, 113 cynicism, 43, 55, 120, 195, 207

Feuerbach, Ludwig, 197, 205, 215 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 131–3, 197, 215 Fingarette, Herbert, 195–6 first person, 53, 58, 132 Fontane, Herbert, 206–7 forgiveness, 56, 61, 64, 68, 151 freedom, 53, 54, 72, 89, 102, 110, 119–20, 122–4, 127–33, 135, 205, 214–15 Freud, Sigmund, 29, 59, 122–3, 137, 149, 190, 194, 216, 220 235

236 Index friendship, 24, 43, 102, 111–12, 114, 119, 120, 175–6, 179–80, 201, 207 Gadamer, Hans–Georg, 79, 114, 129, 215 Girard, René, 32 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang, 71–2, 192 good, 6–7, 30, 68, 69–70, 72–3, 96–7, 102, 107, 118–19, 158–9, 162, 168, 174–80, 195 Gorgias, 184, 187 Guattari, Félix, 80, 197 guilt, 30, 55–6, 97, 101 habit, 47 Hacking, Ian, 85 Hamlyn, D. W., 49 happiness, 206, 211 Hare, R. M., 219 hate, 48–9, 152 heart, 18, 61, 153, 159, 161–3, 177–9 Hegel, G. W. F., 28, 36, 59, 112–13, 182, 185, 201, 203, 208, 211, 213 Heidegger, Martin, 19, 51, 71–2, 147, 159–60, 163–5, 185, 190, 191, 219 history, 18, 27, 61, 78–9, 87, 91, 94, 108–9, 129 Holloway, John, 201, 203 Honneth, Axel, 79, 149 Hume, David, 28, 197 Husserl, Edmund, 199 identity, 58–9, 63–6, 87–8, 97, 114, 148, 178, 180, 200–1 impartiality, 110, 169–71, 173–4 individuality, 54, 73–5, 80, 84, 102–3, 113–14, 169–71, 179, 202 internalization, 29–30 Jappe, Anselm, 95 Jesus, 30, 37 justice, 82, 169–73, 177, 186, 187, 219–21 Kant, Immanuel, 104–12, 116–21, 146, 148–9, 152–3, 156–8, 199, 209, 210, 211, 213 Kennedy, George A., 16–17

Kierkegaard, Søren, 30, 69–70, 73, 156, 159, 192, 202, 203, 218 Kurz, Robert, 80 legality, 8, 50, 97, 106–8, 111–12, 116–18, 152, 186 Leibniz, G. W., 136–7 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 203 Levinas, Emmanuel, 70 Libet, Benjamin, 124, 126–7 Locke, John, 216 Løgstrup, K. E., 148 love, 1, 3, 30, 49, 51, 64, 102, 111–16, 119, 121, 138, 145, 150, 152, 158–9, 163, 173–80, 196, 207, 211, 212, 215, 221 Löwith, Karl, 53 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 63–5, 200 manipulation, 42, 74–82, 100, 102, 119, 163, 203 manners, 99 Marx, Karl, 90–4, 168–70, 191, 204, 205, 219, 220 materiality, 3, 90–2, 94, 136, 145, 205 Mele, Alfred, 193, 194 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 19, 195, 205 monism, 103 moral address, 1, 44, 50–1, 56, 180, 200 Murdoch, Iris, 67 narrativity, 62–6, 201 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 157–8, 201, 221 Occam, William of, 133 other-directedness, 30, 51, 71, 102, 104, 115, 116, 132, 134, 139, 146, 173, 175, 177, 179–80, 199, 202 Ovid, 46–7, 189 particularity, 54, 179, 199 Phillips, D. Z., 150 philosophy, 2–4, 13, 14, 19, 28, 35–6, 53, 84, 116, 133–4, 176–7, 179–81 planning, 44, 119–20, 138–9, 141–2, 165 Plato, 5–12, 134, 136, 144–5, 182–8, 190–1

Index 237 politics, 80, 82, 104–5, 112–16, 119–21, 196 Popper, Karl R., 213 practical, 12, 20–1, 81, 104–5, 108, 110, 116, 120, 138 Pythagoras, 184 rationality, 36–7, 60–1, 66, 69–70, 98, 110, 125–7, 129–30, 132, 149, 151, 152–3, 155, 163, 170–1, 176, 197, 214 religious belief, 118, 154, 161–3, 183 remorse, 2, 27–31, 33, 35–7, 42, 51, 61–2, 68, 96–7, 100–1, 110, 130, 150–3, 176–7, 180, 187, 207 repression, 28, 67, 178, 190 resistance, 98, 135–45 responsibility, 30, 64, 70–1, 73–4, 76, 78, 97–8, 111, 113, 117, 119, 130, 148, 152–3, 155, 200, 206 Ricoeur, Paul, 200, 201, 215 Ryle, Gilbert, 194, 196 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 53, 57, 90, 101–2, 114, 198, 199, 212, 214 Schechtman, Marya, 200 Schiller, Friedrich, 105–6 Schmitt, Carl, 114–15 science, 120, 122–4, 127–30, 133, 213 second person, 58, 132 self-centeredness, 15–16, 22, 50, 67, 71, 139, 155, 172 Seneca, 24, 166 Shakespeare, William, 100, 192 singularity, 64, 179 skepticism, 19, 138 social pressure, 29–30, 43, 50, 71 society, 15, 29–30, 73–5, 78, 80, 83–4, 87, 91–2, 96–103, 106–10, 116–20, 204, 206–7 Socrates, 5–10, 12, 14, 134, 177, 182–8, 190–1 spontaneity, 158

stratification of the human mind, 44, 46, 50 subject, 62, 70, 79–80, 149 surprise, 88, 139–40, 164 taste, 23–4, 29, 99 Taylor, Charles, 200, 201 technology, 104–5, 119–20 teleology, 108, 116, 118 Thales of Miletus, 188, 190–1 theoretical, 12, 95, 104–5, 108, 110, 116, 120, 138 third person, 58, 131–2, 197 Thompson, Michael, 155, 219–20 togetherness, 21, 27, 68, 104, 106–16, 120–1, 150, 152, 159, 162–3 transcendental, 59–60, 62, 66, 79, 112, 116, 121, 149, 173, 176, 197, 199, 212 trust, 32, 119, 161 utilitarianism, 206 utopia, 113, 119 value, 43, 110, 113–14, 155, 157, 175, 201 war, 39–40, 42, 97–8, 106, 108–10, 114–15, 210, 214 Weil, Simone, 4, 137, 150, 165–8, 185, 201 will, 2, 9, 32–3, 41–4, 51, 69, 72, 87, 111, 122–4, 128–31, 133, 142, 147–67, 187, 189, 211, 214–15, 218 Winch, Peter, 204 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 19, 36, 77–8, 116, 185, 190, 193, 194 Wolgast, Elizabeth, 98 world, 5, 10, 93, 96, 135–46, 148, 164 Žižek, Slavoj, 73, 80, 173–4, 195, 198–9, 202, 205