UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SABRA SANZOTTA, JEROME HUEZ, PHILIP RISTENBATT, ERICA GORDON, KAREN FREEDLAND, PAUL ...
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SABRA SANZOTTA, JEROME HUEZ, PHILIP RISTENBATT, ERICA GORDON, KAREN FREEDLAND, PAUL EDWARDS, GABRIELLE HECHT, JAY STEICHMANN, LISA STEICHMANN, CELESTE BRUSATI, JENNIFER ROBERTSON, SHEILA EDSALL, SUSAN BLAKE, SUNDAY HARVIE, ANN ARBOR RESIDENTS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY, a Michigan unincorporated association, and JOHN DOES and JANE DOES 1-4,000, Plaintiffs, vs. THE CITY OF ANN ARBOR, a Michigan public body corporate, CHRISTOPHER TAYLOR, in his official capacity as Ann Arbor Mayor, STEVEN D. POWERS, in his official capacity as Ann Arbor Administrator, TOM CRAWFORD, in his official capacity as Ann Arbor Interim Administrator, SUMEDH BAHL, P.E., in his official capacity as Ann Arbor Community Services Area Administrator, LARRY COLLINS, in his capacity as Ann Arbor Interim Community Services Area Administrator, DAVE BORNEMAN, in his official capacity as Ann Arbor Manager of Natural Area Preservation, JIM BAIRD in his official capacity as Ann Arbor Interim Chief of Police,

C.A. No. _________________

and RICK SNYDER, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Michigan, JOHN MATONICH, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Michigan Natural Resources Commission, CHRISTINE CRUMBAUGH, in her official capacity as member of the Michigan Natural Resources Commission, LOUISE KLARR, in her official capacity as member of the Michigan Natural Resources Commission, TIM NICHOLS, in his official capacity as member of the Michigan Natural Resources Commission, VICKI J. PONTZ, in her official capacity as member of the Michigan Natural Resources Commission, J.R. RICHARDSON, in his official capacity as member of the Michigan Natural Resources Commission, REX SCHLAYBAUGH, in his official capacity as member of the Michigan Natural Resources Commission, KEITH CREAGH, in his official capacities as Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources an Interim Director of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, GARY HAGLER, in his official capacity as Chief of the D.N.R. Law Enforcement Division, LT. ANDREW TURNER, in his official capacity as D.N.R. Law Enforcement Division Supervisor, RUSS MASON, in his official capacity as Chief, D.N.R. Wildlife Division, VICTORIA LISCHALK, in her official capacity as Executive Secretary, D.N.R. Wildlife Division, TIMOTHY 2

PAYNE, in his official capacity as D.N.R. Wildlife Division South Eastern Lower Peninsula Regional Manager, JOSEPH ROBISON, in his official capacity as D.N.R. Wildlife Division South Eastern Lower Peninsula Field Operations Manager, KRISTIN M. BISSELL, in her official capacity as D.N.R. Wildlife Biologist, and COL. KRISTE KIBBEY ETUE, in her official capacity as Michigan State Police Director, and THOMAS J. VILSACK, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Agriculture of the government of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CHARLES S. BROWN, in his official capacity as Director, Eastern Region of the United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Wildlife Services, and ANTHONY DUFFINEY, in his official capacity as State of Michigan Director of the United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Wildlife Services, Defendants. __________________________________/

COMPLAINT AND DECLARATION OF SABRA SANZOTTA IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT

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Introduction Plaintiffs live next door to Ann Arbor parks. The City Council has just announced the United States Department of Agriculture will send, at the Council’s invitation, a cadre of federal riflemen to Ann Arbor. They will trawl city parks at night, riding in vehicles carrying loaded rifles with silencers and laser beam scopes, spotlights and bait piles to kill deer by shooting from January – March, 2016. State safety laws and regulations on the discharge of firearms and hunting outlaw the taking of game in city parks, They also outlaw methods the federal agents intend to use. However, the police are directed to ignore the criminal activity because it is ostensibly government-sanctioned. Only the Michigan Legislature may nullify its own laws, not the local and federal government. The City and the United States government cannot suspend Michigan law in Ann Arbor parks. And, because the hunt is an ultrahazardous and abnormally dangerous – indeed a deadly -- activity, no matter how carefully it may be carried out, any injury a person may suffer from the shooting will be grave. Plaintiffs are most at risk because the shooting is taking place literally in their backyards. And they have no choice other than to resort to the judicial process for the protection of their own safety, the public safety, and the necessary and evenhanded enforcement of the rule of law, even over local and federal officials.

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Statement of Jurisdiction and Venue 1.

This action arises under the United States Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cl.

3, U.S. CONST. amend I, U.S. CONST. amend. IV, U.S. CONST. amend. V, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1, and United States statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§1985 and 1986, 5 U.S.C. §701, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §4332 et seq. 2.

Plaintiffs bring this action against officials of the government of the

United States acting in their official capacities for equitable relief and damages not exceeding $10,000 in amount and other defendants for equitable relief and damages. 3.

This Court has original jurisdiction over all claims against all

defendants arising under the United States Constitution and laws under 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1343 and 1358. 4.

This Court has original jurisdiction over all claims against officials of

the government of the United States acting in their official capacities under 28 U.S.C. §1346. 5.

This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims asserted

herein under 28 U.S.C. §1367 as such are so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 6.

This Court has jurisdiction over all parties. 5

7.

Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§1391, 1402, and 1403. Factual Averments About Parties Plaintiff Common to All Counts

8.

Plaintiff SABRA SANZOTTA is a person who resides in the City of

Ann Arbor, Michigan, Ward No. 1, within 150 yards of Ann Arbor parkland, at 3087 Glazier Way. 9.

Plaintiff JEROME HUEZ is a person who resides in the City of Ann

Arbor, Michigan, Ward No. 1, within 150 yards of Ann Arbor parkland, at 3087 Glazier Way. 10.

Plaintiff PHILIP RISTENBATT is a person who resides in the City of

Ann Arbor, Michigan, Ward No. 1, within 150 yards of Ann Arbor parkland, at 610 Huronview Boulevard. 11.

Plaintiff ERICA GORDON is a person who resides in the City of Ann

Arbor, Michigan, Ward No. 1, within 150 yards of Ann Arbor parkland, at 610 Huronview Boulevard. 12.

Plaintiff KAREN FREEDLAND is a person who resides in the City of

Ann Arbor, Michigan, Ward No. 2, within 150 yards of Ann Arbor parkland, at 3087 Glazier Way. 13.

Plaintiff PAUL EDWARDS is a person who resides in the City of Ann

Arbor, Michigan, Ward No. 2, at 1120 Heather Way.

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14.

Plaintiff GABRIELLE HECHT is a person who resides in the City of

Ann Arbor, Michigan, Ward No. 2, at 1120 Heather Way. 15.

Plaintiff JAY STEICHMANN is a person who resides in the City of

Ann Arbor, Michigan, Ward No. 1, within 150 yards of Ann Arbor parkland, at 2767 Arrowwood Trail. 16.

Plaintiff LISA STEICHMANN is a person who resides in the City of

Ann Arbor, Michigan, Ward No. 1, within 150 yards of Ann Arbor parkland, at 2767 Arrowwood Trail. 17.

Plaintiff CELESTE BRUSATI is a person who resides in the City of

Ann Arbor, Michigan, Ward No. 2, at 1310 Glendaloch Circle. 18.

Plaintiff JENNIFER ROBERTSON is a person who resides in the City

of Ann Arbor, Michigan, Ward No. 2, at 1310 Glendaloch Circle. 19.

Plaintiff SHEILA EDSALL is a person who resides in the City of Ann

Arbor, Michigan, Ward No. 5, within 150 yards of Ann Arbor parkland, at 611 Spring Street. 20.

Plaintiff SUSAN BLAKE is a person who resides in the City of Ann

Arbor, Michigan, Ward No. 5, within 150 yards of Ann Arbor parkland, at 1213 Morningside Drive. 21.

Plaintiff SUNDAY HARVIE is a person who resides in Milford,

Michigan. 7

22.

Plaintiff ANN ARBOR RESIDENTS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY is an

unincorporated association of persons formed and existing under the laws of the State of Michigan. 23.

ANN ARBOR RESIDENTS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY is comprised of

residents of Ann Arbor and others who visit Ann Arbor and support residents of Ann Arbor to protect their rights against governmental intrusion, including the special rights to be safe and secure and the special rights not to be deprived of the State’s natural resources. 24.

The principal office of ANN ARBOR RESIDENTS FOR PUBLIC

SAFETY is in Ann Arbor. 25.

The directors and officers of ANN ARBOR RESIDENTS FOR

PUBLIC SAFETY reside in Ann Arbor and in Ann Arbor Township, Michigan. 26.

Members of ANN ARBOR RESIDENTS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY

include persons who have a special and unique relationship to Defendants on the subject of this action, as they reside within or otherwise visit or transact their business and other affairs, and wish to continue to do so, within 150 yards of Ann Arbor parkland, without fear of harm or reprisal. 27.

Members also include other persons who reside within 150 yards of

Ann Arbor parkland in Ward No. 1 and Ward No. 2.

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28.

Members also include other persons who reside within 150 yards of

Ann Arbor parkland in the remaining wards into which Ann Arbor is divided, Ward Nos. 3 - 5. 29.

Members also include other persons who have a similar direct interest

in the subject of this action and to protect themselves against loss Defendants threaten to cause them to suffer if the relief requested herein is not granted and such members include persons who frequently visit, and intend frequently to visit, Ann Arbor. 30.

All members of ANN ARBOR RESIDENTS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY

have standing to sue in their own right. 31.

The purpose of ANN ARBOR RESIDENTS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY

is to seek to ensure compliance by all levels of government with the constitutions and laws guaranteeing to Plaintiffs and all others similarly-situated the benefits of the limits on excessive governmental power taking, or imminently threatening to take, from them their rights, privileges, and immunities as detailed herein, as well as advocacy and education in the public interest, including the right to be safe and secure in their homes and the right not to be deprived of precious natural resources. 32.

Neither the claims asserted herein nor the relief requested requires the

participation of individual members of ANN ARBOR RESIDENTS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY in this action. 9

33.

In addition to the relationships and interests of Plaintiffs detailed herein,

members otherwise have a palpable relationship to those who reside near or frequent Ann Arbor parkland, and their safety and the safety of their property and liberty have been called into direct and grave question by the announced intentions of the City of Ann Arbor to cause the use of rifles on a shoot-to-kill basis in or near their real property or within the penumbra of their property and the circles of their daily or periodic travels and movements. 34.

The subject areas of the City affected are precisely the places where

Plaintiffs live, frequent, and where they wish in the future to live and frequent freely without placing themselves at risk of loss of life or limb or of fear of such loss from the conduct or threatened conduct of Defendants. 35.

The parkland is where Defendants threaten immediately to engage in

their unlawful and injurious conduct detailed herein, thus subjecting such members and all others similarly situated to imminent and real risk of loss, irreparable injury, including the infringement of their rights: a) to liberty; b) to remain freely or to move freely in their homes, yards, parkland, neighborhoods and other environs; c) to be free from harm an increased risk of harm to them in their persons and property; d) to protect their children from harm and increased risk of harm; e) to quietude, privacy and security in their homes, yards, parkland, neighborhoods and other environs; f)

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to be free of disturbance of the peace and the commission by the state of disorderly conduct; g) to enjoy, share in, and not to be deprived of our state’s natural resources. 36.

Plaintiffs JOHN DOES and JANE DOES 1-4,000, are persons who

reside in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Ward No. 1, within 150 yards of Ann Arbor parkland. 37.

Plaintiffs JOHN DOES and JANE DOES 1-4,000 and others similarly

situated cannot possibly be identified by name presently because of the acts and omissions of Defendants, working independently of each other or jointly in any number of combinations pursuant to a common plan or strategy, which has concealed the locations and times at which Defendants plan to carry out their shootto-kill campaign throughout Ward No. 1 and Ward No. 2 beginning as early as January 1, 2016 at 4:00 p.m. and at which Defendants plan to carry out their shootto-kill campaign throughout Ward Nos. 1 – 5 during the period January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2020. 38.

There are 89,594 registered voters in the City of Ann Arbor, 16,331of

whom are in Ward No. 1, and 16,650 of whom are in Ward No. 2, making 40,000 a reasonable estimate of the total number of those most immediately and acutely affected and at risk, residents in Ward Nos. 1 and 2, which is where the subject conduct of Defendants is set to start as early as January 1, 2016. The remaining Ann Arbor residents will be as acutely affected upon the announcement by the City of 11

Ann Arbor of an intention to expand its conduct and that of the other Defendants into and across the other wards of the City, Ward Nos. 3-5, most acutely affecting some additional 70,000 Ann Arbor residents. 39.

The class of JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, therefore, includes the

expansive number of interested parties of some 70,000 residents of, or travelers through, Ann Arbor, and, specifically, the areas that are the subject of this action. 40.

Immediately upon Defendants’ compliance with the constitutions and

laws under compulsion of order, decree, or process, the remaining Plaintiffs will be able to name and join as Plaintiffs or Intervenor-Plaintiffs in this action in order that their rights to notice and to be heard and their other rights to procedural and substantive due process be honored, contrary to the present intentions of Defendants and their conduct in furtherance of such intentions. 41.

Ann Arbor, Plaintiffs’ home, is a large city with highly concentrated

business, residential, and university buildings, streets, with an extraordinarily high rate of pedestrian and vehicular traffic both on city and campus streets and walkways as well as through green belts, parkland, and some small wooded areas. 42.

Ann Arbor has no wooded or meadowland areas of any significant size

that does not constitute wetlands or the Nichols Arboretum on the lands of the University of Michigan. 43.

It is densely populated and contains within it no rural areas. 12

44.

According to Michigan D.N.R., “[u]rban development is concentrated

in the City of Ann Arbor. 45.

Michigan D.N.R. does not have a recommended urban area density

measurements for white-tailed deer (Odocoileus Virginianus). 46.

According to the 2014 census, Ann Arbor has a population of 1117,770,

14.4% of whom are Asian, 4.1% of whom are Hispanic or Latino, 17.4% of whom are foreign born persons, 21.15 of whom speak a language other than English at home (compared to the State of Michigan, with 9.1% who speak other than English at home), and with 22.1% at below poverty level (compared to the State of Michigan, with 16.8%). 47.

The land area of Ann Arbor is 27.83 square miles.

48.

In Ann Arbor, there are 4,094 persons per square mile (compared to the

state average of 175). 49.

The average number of white-tailed deer per square mile in in Ann

Arbor is estimated at approximately 15-20. 50.

Some reports conclude 30 is the ideal number.

51.

Delaware state officials are reported to have targeted a ratio of 40 deer

per square mile of habitat in 2013. 52.

The deer-human ratio in Ann Arbor is .0004, about one deer per every

2,500 people. 13

53.

Defendant THE CITY OF ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN has announced

an intention immediately to combine with unidentified agents of the government of the United States to engage in an urban assault for three months per year for the next four years within its own neighborhoods contrary to the constitutions and laws of the State of Michigan and of the United States. 54.

Specifically, federal agents, at undisclosed times and places,

employing the use of high-powered rifles, other firearms and weapons, specialized machinery, specialized equipment, structures, moving vehicles, contrary to the constitutions and laws of the State of Michigan and of the United States, usual and specialized bullets and other ammunition, scopes, lasers, structures, blinds, flashlights, spotlights, other lighting devices, and bait on a shoot-to-kill basis from concealed and camouflaged hiding places, with the intent to discharge the firearms or other weapons, unlawfully and in gross breach of the peace in the dark during the nighttime firearms into wildlife and their in utero offspring so as to cause death or grave injury to the wildlife in or near parkland, rights of way in or near the real property or residences or within the penumbra of their property where they have frequented, do frequent, and wish in the future to frequent freely and without placing themselves at undue increase of risk of loss of life or limb or the suffering of the fear of such loss.

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55.

Despite numerous requests, all levels of government have refused to

disclose the time and place of the shootings; nor has there been any disclosure as to the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security, the Michigan State Police, or other law enforcement officials intend not to enforce the criminal laws or grant immunities to the federal agents and those state agents assisting or acquiescing in such violation of the criminal law 56.

The subject areas for the unlawful conduct are also locations where the

homeless reside and where bicyclists frequent and travel through daily on their treks to and from work. 57.

The proposed conduct presents a special threat of death or other harm

to the homeless because of their permanency in the parkland. 58.

The proposed conduct presents a special threat to the bicyclists, whose

paths will be diverted onto the public streets and highways, placing them a significantly greater risk of car-bike collisions and bike-pedestrian collisions during rush hour. 59.

The proposed conduct also presents or may tend to increase the risk of

harm from “copycat” shooters, terrorist activities, and other threats to homeland security and inject uncertainty, vagueness, confusion, contradictions, and inconsistencies into notions of law enforcement by peace officers, police officers,

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conservation officers, and other law enforcement officers at the local, state, and federal levels. 60.

Plaintiffs feel less safe because of the course of conduct on which

Defendants threaten immediately to take. 61.

Plaintiffs visit and enjoy the Ann Arbor parkland within Ward No. 1

and Ward No. 2. 62.

Plaintiffs visit and enjoy the Ann Arbor parkland within the City of Ann

Arbor. 63.

Plaintiffs visit the parkland on a frequent basis.

64.

Plaintiffs benefit from the aesthetics of experiencing deer and other

wildlife and derive substantial wellbeing and other significant emotional, physical and health benefits from visiting with and observing deer and from the knowledge they are near them. 65.

Plaintiffs intend to visit the parkland on a frequent basis now and for

all time, including during the periods December through April of each year. 66.

As a direct result of the conduct and threatened conduct of Defendants,

Plaintiffs fear for their personal safety while they are within the parkland or on rights of way or other areas adjacent or near to the parkland.

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67.

As a direct result of the conduct and threatened conduct of

Defendants, Plaintiffs fear for their personal safety while they are within the parkland or on rights of way or other areas adjacent or near to the parkland. 68.

As a direct result of the conduct and threatened conduct of Defendants,

Plaintiffs fear for their personal safety while they are in their homes, in their yards, in their neighbors’ homes, and in their neighbors’ yards, and on public ways giving egress to and from their residences, as well as for the personal safety of their children, their guests, their pets, and other persons and animals. 69.

Plaintiffs fear for their personal safety at all times because of the

conduct and threatened conduct. 70.

Plaintiffs are not and cannot be at peace in their homes unless the relief

requested herein is granted. 71.

Plaintiffs feel less safe.

72.

The conduct and threatened conduct of Defendants has reduced the

abilities, freedoms, and opportunities of Plaintiffs to pursue activities in the parklands. 73.

The conduct and threatened conduct of Defendants has reduced the

abilities, freedoms, and opportunities of Plaintiffs to pursue outdoor activities in their yards and in the environs surrounding their homes and yards.

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74.

The conduct and threatened conduct of Defendants has eliminated or

reduced the abilities, freedoms, and opportunities of Plaintiffs to conduct necessary and desirable activities within their homes and activities in their yards and in the environs surrounding their homes and yards. 75.

The conduct and threatened conduct of Defendants has caused and will

cause Plaintiffs to absent themselves from both the parkland and from their own homes, yards, and from the environs surrounding their homes and yards in order that they may regain safety and lose or lessen fear for themselves, children, pets, and others, at great expense and trouble. 76.

The conduct and threatened conduct of Defendants has eliminated or

reduced the abilities, freedoms, and opportunities of Plaintiffs to pursue recreational, aesthetic, leisure, social, religious, academic, cultural, and other activities in the parkland and surrounding environs, in their homes and surrounding environs, and in their neighborhoods and surrounding environs, including but not limited to schools, churches, synagogues, temples, cemeteries, monuments, and day care centers near their homes and neighborhoods. 77.

The fear of Plaintiffs is exponentially expanded by the fear of their

adolescent, prepubescent, and infant children and children entrusted into their care and supervision.

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78.

Plaintiffs also fear loss of enjoyment and comfort of natural resources

to which they are unquestionably entitled without impairment. 79.

Plaintiffs enjoy and intend to continue to enjoy observing deer and other

wildlife, visiting with deer and other wildlife, being in the presence of deer and other wildlife, photographing deer and other wildlife, and enjoying the positive effects on their physical and psychological health and that of their families and those with whom they consort, with whom they share such benefits. 80.

Plaintiffs use and intend to continue to use their homes, their parklands,

and the surrounding environs and they and their children and guests are the persons for whom the health, recreational, aesthetic, and other values of such areas will be most directly lessened if Defendants’ conduct is not restrained. 81.

Plaintiffs will also be injured by the diminution of natural resources not

necessarily tied to any arbitrary number of deer in a given herd but also because of the complex and reciprocal nature of the ecosystem enveloping the natural resources and the effect on those natural resources at risk if they are diminished in the ways in which Defendants propose to destroy and diminish not only an arbitrary number of deer but the complex and reciprocal interweaving of the pertinent ecosystem at risk. 82.

Plaintiffs’ interests are ones regulated or protected by the constitutions

and laws described herein.

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83.

It is likely, if not certain, that Plaintiffs’ injuries will be redressed by a

favorable decision in this action. 84.

Upon information and belief, at least half of the residents of Ann

Arbor live within 150 yards of Ann Arbor parkland, area uniquely the subject of this action. Factual Averments About Parties Defendant - City of Ann Arbor - Common to All Counts 85.

Defendant THE CITY OF ANN ARBOR a public body corporate

formed and existing under its Charter adopted April 9, 1956, as amended, and under MICH. CONST. of 1963, Art. VII, §22. 86.

Defendant CHRISTOPHER TAYLOR serves as Ann Arbor Mayor

and resides in or conducts business in person in Ann Arbor, Michigan; he is designated under the Charter as having the public status as the “ceremonial head of the City,” and he is charged under the Charter with duties including the duty to act as the presiding member of the City Council, with the privilege and duty to exercise certain veto powers. 87.

The City Council under Charter is vested with all of the powers of the

City and charged with the duty to exercise those powers. 88.

There are ten members of the Ann Arbor City Council, in addition to

Taylor: Sabra Briere, Sumi Kailasapathy, Jane Lumm, Kirk Westphal, Zachary

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Ackerman, Julie Grand, Jack Eaton, Graydon Krapohl, Chip Smith, and Chuck Warpehoski. 89.

Defendant STEVEN D. POWERS serves or at times relevant served as

Ann Arbor Administrator and resides in or conducts business in person in Ann Arbor, Michigan; he is, or has been at relevant times, designated under the Charter as the administrative agent of the Council to perform the duties of office under the authority of the Council and to account to the Council for the performance of those duties. 90.

Defendant SUMEDH BAHL, P.E. serves or at times relevant served as

Ann Arbor Community Services Area Administrator and resides in or conducts business in person in Ann Arbor, Michigan; he is, or has been at relevant times, vested with the power, and charged with the duties of Community Services Area Administrator. 91.

Defendant DAVE BORNEMAN serves as Ann Arbor Manager of

Natural Area Preservation and resides in or conducts business in person in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 92.

Defendant JAQUELINE BEAUDRY serves as Clerk of the City of Ann

Arbor and resides in or conducts business in person in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 93.

Defendant JIM BAIRD serves as Interim Chief of Police of the City of

Ann Arbor and resides in or conducts business in person in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 21

Factual Averments About Parties Defendant - State of Michigan - Common to All Counts 94.

Defendant RICK SNYDER serves as Governor of the State of

Michigan and, therefore, vested with all executive power of the State of Michigan under MICH. CONST. of 1963, Art. V, §1.V(1). 95.

RICK SNYDER under MICH. CONST. of 1963, Art. V, §8 is charged

with the duty to supervise each principal department of state government. 96.

RICK SNYDER resides in Ann Arbor.

97.

Defendant JOHN MATONICH serves as Chairman of the Michigan

Natural Resources Commission under M.C.L. §16.351. 98.

Defendant CHRISTINE CRUMBAUGH serves as member of the

Michigan Natural Resources Commission under M.C.L. §16.351. 99.

Defendant LOUISE KLARR serves as member of the Michigan

Natural Resources Commission under M.C.L. §16.351. 100. Defendant TIM NICHOLS serves as member of the Michigan Natural Resources Commission under M.C.L. §16.351. 101. Defendant VICKI J. PONTZ serves as member of the Michigan Natural Resources Commission under M.C.L. §16.351. 102. Defendant J.R. RICHARDSON serves as member of the Michigan Natural Resources Commission under M.C.L. §16.351.

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103. Defendant REX SCHLAYBAUGH serves as member of the Michigan Natural Resources Commission under M.C.L. §16.351. 104. The Commission of Natural Resources is the “head of the department of natural resources” under M.C.L. §16.351. 105. The Commission of Natural Resources, under M.C.L. 16.354, was created as provided in the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, M.C.L. §324.101 et seq. 106. KEITH CREAGH serves as Director of the Department of Natural Resources of the State of Michigan charged with performing all duties as principal executive officer of the Department under M.C.L. §16.355. 107. GARY HAGLER serves as Chief of the D.N.R. Law Enforcement Division. 108. LT. ANDREW TURNER serves as D.N.R. Law Enforcement Division Supervisor. 109. RUSS MASON serves as Chief, D.N.R. Wildlife Division. 110. VICTORIA LISCHALK serves as Executive Secretary, D.N.R. Wildlife Division. 111. TIMOTHY PAYNE serves as D.N.R. Wildlife Division South Eastern Lower Peninsula Regional Manager.

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112. JOSEPH ROBISON serves as D.N.R. Wildlife Division South Eastern Lower Peninsula Field Operations Manager. 113. KRISTIN M. BISSELL serves as D.N.R. Wildlife Biologist, South Eastern Peninsula Region. 114. COL. KRISTE KIBBEY ETUE serves as Director of the Michigan State Police charged with performing all duties executive head of the Department under M.C.L. §28.2. 115. JAMIE CLOVER ADAMS serves as Director of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development under M.C.L. §285.1. Factual Averments About Parties Defendant - United States of America - Common to All Counts 116. THOMAS J. VILSACK serves as Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture under U.S. CONST art. 2, §2, and, as such, is the principal officer of the Department. 117. CHARLES S. BROWN serves as Director, Eastern Region of the United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Wildlife Services, who resides in or transacts business in person in Raleigh, North Carolina. 118. ANTHONY DUFFINEY serves as State of Michigan Director of the United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection

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Service Wildlife Services, who resides in or transacts business in person in Okemos, Michigan. Background Facts Common to All Counts 119. As early as 2013, certain members of the Council, including Briere, Warpehoski, Westphal, and Lumm had private communications among each other about deer. 120. According to Briere, the “deer became an issue” in August, 2013. 121. At that time, the “intent to kill the deer” was a “foregone conclusion,” said Briere. 122. The genesis of the campaign to eliminate deer was “some residents experienced significant deer damage to their landscaping,” according to Briere. 123. Certain residents began pressuring certain members of City government privately independently and under the name of “WC4EB” also known as “Washtenaw Citizens for Ecological Balance.” 124. Members of that group had special and unfettered access to council members. 125. Briere noted in her letter of August 15, 2015 that the Council decided to look into the reported deer problem in 2013 “as a regional issue” given the supposition that there were “problems with the growth of the deer population outside Ann Arbor.” 25

The deer became an issue two years ago – with the intent to kill deer a foregone conclusion – first because some residents experienced significant deer damage to their landscaping. . . . When the Council decided to look into what to do, it asked the City staff to work on this as a regional issue – if there are problems with the growth of the deer population outside Ann Arbor, it didn’t make sense to decide that we would address the population issues here, in isolation. But – once it seemed that the City would take on the burden of managing the deer population, the number of people who saw this as a binary problem (kill deer / don’t kill deer) grew. And the City staff listened, finding no effective deer management options, but not looking very hard. .... . . . One Council member drove the discussion. In her mind, killing is the only option. But she sees things in a more binary way than I do. 126. The “foregone conclusion” was either knowingly or negligently wrong in 2013 and has been through today, as, in fact, the deer population in Washtenaw County was decreasing. 127. After the winter of 2013-2014, Bissell published a “Status Overview” for Deer Management Unit 081.

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128. Deer Management Unit 081 is the Washtenaw Deer Management Unit, which lies in the southern Lower Peninsula, and it covers Washtenaw County. 129. According to Bissell, agriculture is “the dominant land cover type” for the DMU, and forty per cent of the DMU is in agriculture, such as the harvesting of crops of corn, wheat, other grains, and soybeans, as well as grass-legume and hay. 130. Bissell further reported “Urban development is concentrated in the City of Ann Arbor; however this DMU supports other largely developed areas and suburban and ex-urban communities; this is a populous county and development is ubiquitous throughout the DMU.” 131. She also reported: “[t]he liberalization of antlerless permits was intended to limit the productivity of the deer herd and may have contributed to an overall slight population decline (indicated in population models) in this DMU.” 132. Bissell also observed, from Michigan State Police studies, there has been a decline in deer-vehicle collisions commensurate with the decline in the deer population in the unit, noting “[t]he displayed decline in DVCs is an additional indicator that the Washtenaw DMU deer density has decreased over the past decade . . . this decreasing trend corroborates the trend seen in our population models.” 133. Bissell further noted that, although the deer population has been declining for a decade, the rate of complaints about “negative deer interactions” and of requests for crop damage permits to address agricultural damage was increasing. 27

134. Bissell, thus, dispelled any correlation between the rate of complaints and the rate of increase in deer population, at least in the most relevant geographic unit. 135.

In conclusion, Bissell stated “the population is still over goal” and

recommended D.N.R. reduce the population by making antlerless licenses available for public and private land and for “a late antlerless season,” to “help to address some crop damage, car/deer crashes and nuisance issues in the area, as well.” . . . The maximum number of antlerless licenses purchased for DMU 081 is 9,665. We feel that the quota should remain at 15,000 to continue to bring the population closer to goal. Based on this information, I recommend that the Public Land Quota remain at 1,500 and that the Private Land Quota be set to 15,000. Also, we recommend that this DMU is open for Early and Late Antlerless Firearm seasons. 136. On May 5, 2014, the Council passed a resolution, which Briere and others sponsored, to direct Powers to evaluate deer management options for Council consideration, on the stated premise that “deer populations are elevated and increasing” requiring “a regional approach to deer management” stating the foregone conclusion that “the desired outcome . . . is a community-endorsed deer management plan.”

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137. On August 14, 2014, Powers submitted his report on deer management options to Taylor, Bahl, and the Council, in which he concluded “[i]f a communityendorsed deer management plan is to proceed, City Council approval and appropriation of $20,000 for plan development is requested.” 138. In his report, Powers ruled out Lyme disease as a factor as “Washtenaw County is not identified, at this time, as a county with potential risk of Lyme disease.” 139. He also ruled out that City parks, including City golf courses, had any vegetation damage by deer. 140. Powers also reported that state law prohibits the discharge of firearms within 150 yards of occupied structures, which militated against lethal options. 141. Further, Powers noted, the City ordinances prohibit hunting and firearms within City limits. 142. Powers called for specificity on “how to accomplish the public policy goal of deer management.” 143. He also called for specificity in methods to ensure public safety if lethal methods were chosen. 144. He further noted that Michigan Natural Feature Inventory biologists “recommend deer densities of 15-20 deer per sq. mi. to promote the ecological health and function of natural communities.” 29

145. There was no finding of any increase in the rate of deer-vehicle crashes in the City for the prior decade. 146. On August 18, 2014, the City Council passed a resolution, sponsored by Briere and one other, by which the City appropriated $20,000 to develop a “community-endorsed” management plan. 147. In September, the City contracted with Project Innovations to produce an online survey, in which the City included the preamble to survey questions that stated “[r]esearch concludes that lethal removal measures are most effective for managing a deer population.” 148. The City repeated that preamble three times in the survey questionnaire. 149. In fact, the City had no such research and can point to no research with any such conclusion. 150. The Humane Society of Huron Valley lodged an objection with the City on the basis that the online survey was slanted toward engendering an appearance of public approval of lethal methods. 151. In response, Bahl issued a written statement, simultaneously published, that the City decided not to use the data from the survey questions that contained the preamble that research concluded lethal measures are the most effective means to address the stated problem of deer overpopulation.

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152.

On January 28, 2015, Bahl invited WC4EB to develop a managed deer

cull plan. 153. Christopher Graham of WC4EB interviewed Bissell and others in preparation for publishing the WC4EB plan for the City. 154. Graham wrote to Bissell on April 9, 2015 that he was assured there is “no setback requirement for shooting operations during permitted culls” but still wanted an authoritative statement from D.N.R. that no setback applies to culls allowed by D.N.R. permit. 155. Specifically, Graham wrote to Bissell, “[t]here will be a problem in succeeding with culling in the way we need to do so – without being able to work in the small spaces.” 156. In her letter to Graham of April 9, 2015 in reply, Bissell wrote: . . . . The 450 ft. safety zone rule that applies to dwellings is a hunting rule. It is illegal for a hunter to have a loaded firearm in one of these areas during the pursuit of game. As for the cull permits; we don’t incorporate language about safety zones. It is the responsibility of the permittee to set up shooting locations in a safe manner. The plan must be shared with LED. This is where a community has to set something up that they are comfortable with and works for them; in the end, the permittee is responsible for the safe execution of the permit.

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157. On April 15, 2015, WC4EB, published the City of Ann Arbor Deer Management Plan, in which it stated, citing advice from Bissell and Margaret Leary, Librarian Emerita, University of Michigan Law School, in support, that: There is no 450 ft. setback requirement for culls. . . The permit specifies all details, including the names of the sharpshooters . . . using guns with silencers . . . shooting down from a stand over bait. 158. On April 18, 2015, WC4B’s Bernie Banet forwarded to Bahl, Lumm, Westphal, Eaton, Graham, and others, an April 18, 2015 letter from attorney Bruce Laidlaw to him in which Laidlaw said he found no exceptions in the Michigan statutes to the 450-foot “safety zone” under M.C.L. §324.40111 but that he, likewise, had dealt with Bissell regarding a cull that Barton Hills Village did under a D.N.R. permit in 2009 regarding the D.N.R.- approved sharpshooters shooting deer close to dwellings and people standing outside their dwellings and that it was “up to the village to tell the sharpshooters where they could take the deer.” 159. On May 6, 2015, Bahl wrote to Bissell and Payne, asking: There is a requirement of maintaining a safety zone of 450 ft for hunting. Does this 450 ft safety zone apply for a cull also or it can be [sic] less than 450 ft? 160. On May 7, 2015, the City published its 1763-page “Recommendations for Deer Management in Ann Arbor,” attached to which is the WC4EB Plan for Deer 32

Management as “Appendix E” at p. 5 of which it provides the citation to Bissell’s advice and the statement “[t]here is no 450 ft. setback requirement for culls.” 161. The City also accepted the lethal method contained within the City Deer Management Plan WC4EB recommended. 162. The “Recommendations for Deer Management in Ann Arbor” did not include other reference to the state law prohibiting the discharge of firearms near occupied dwellings or to the Laidlaw letter that there is no “cull vs. hunt” exception to that statute. 163. On May 17, 2015, Graham wrote to Hagler stating that “culling will have to occur on safe shooting zones in relatively small areas . . . . It would have to happen on Parks and other areas within 450’ of occupied buildings.” 164. Graham further advised of the “specific problem” that M.C.L. §324.40111(6) outlaws the discharge of a firearm “within 150 yards of an occupied building . . .” 165. Graham also said “we are informed by Wildlife Division permitting staff that this law applies to hunting, not to Nuisance Animal Control permitting undertakings – where stipulations . . . and well defined manner of taking . . . take the place of the ‘safety zone’ provision applied to open hunting and hunters.”

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166. Additionally, Graham said “[b]ut, we have a quite well informed Attorney here . . . who says . . . there would need to be some provision in State law that allows for that exception . . . to be done legally.” We can’t find it such [sic] an exception in [sic] statute. Can you please help, point out to us the language in law which gives the MNDR [sic], and us under proper permit, the room to do this? 167. Graham again wrote to Hagler on May 19, 2015, two days later, asking him to advise on the intent behind the 150-yard occupied building hunting prohibition of the statute. 168. On June 18, 2015 Warpehoski, and Briere had numerous non-public communications with Banet and other members of WC4EB about deer management. 169. On June 20, 2015, Bissell forwarded to Lischalk the letter Bahl sent to Bissell and Payne on May 6, 2015. 170. On August 17, 2015, the City Council adopted a resolution (R-15-277) to establish the Deer Management Program and to begin conducting a deer cull within Ann Arbor in Winter 2016, authorizing the setting aside of $90,000 in the 2016 annual budget for the cost of implementing the Program. 171. On September 8, 2015, the City Council passed an amendment to Code of the City of Ann Arbor, Title IX, Chpt. 107, §9:54 outlawing the feeding of deer.

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172. On November 3, 2015, Banet wrote to Bissell and D.N.R. Deer, Elk, and Moose Management Specialist Chad Stewart asking whether D.N.R. “recommends” or “considers a reasonable density” 15-20 deer per square mile for the City, given “the aerial counts prove we have a much lower density and whether the aerial surveys are an “accurate deer census.” 173. On November 5, 2015, the City Council adopted a resolution (R-15361) to impose a “temporary moratorium on enforcement of the prohibition regarding the possession and discharge of weapons in public places” to pave the way for the 2016 cull under the Deer Management Program, which Bahl reviewed and Powers approved. 174. On November 5, 2015, the City Council passed a resolution (R-15-362) authorizing the City to enter into a “Cooperative Service Agreement” with the United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Wildlife Services for deer culling whereby the City would obligate itself to pay U.S.D.A. not more than $35,000. 175. The premise for the moratorium was that the “approved” Deer Management Program will begin in winter 2016, at night with noise-suppressed firearms in an “urban setting.” 176. The moratorium was, by its terms, to be “for a specific timeline” and “as brief as possible to achieve the underlying objective.” 35

177. There is nothing in the public record describing at all, specifically or general, the “specific timeline” or the period “as brief as possible to achieve the underlying objective” to define the duration of the “moratorium.” 178. At the November 5, 2015 meeting of the City Council, Council Member Stephen Kunselman publicly stated the City Council would keep secret the location of the cull sessions and would not disclose that information to the public to stifle dissent and possible disruption of, or interference with, the cull sessions. 179. On November 10, 2015, Stewart wrote to Banet, stating “MDNR does not have a recommended deer density in urban areas” and that the aerial survey “should not be considered a census or indicator of herd density.” 180. On November 18, 2015, the City and the U.S.D.A. made the Cooperative Services Agreement, effective December 1, 2015, by which the U.S.D.A. undertakes to conduct a program of wildlife services involving animal species that are injurious and/or a nuisance to horticulture, and human health and safety, among other things. 181. Under the Agreement, U.S.D.A. is to “conduct direct control activities to reduce human health and safety risks and property damage associated with the urban deer population on City-owned parkland within the geographic boundaries of Wards 1 and 2 of the City of Ann Arbor.”

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182. U.S.D.A. “shall be responsible for administration and supervision of the program.” 183. The Agreement further provides that U.S.D.A. will not make a final decision to conduct the program until it has determined its actions are in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act “and any other applicable federal statutes” and that the City must obtain a permit from M.D.N.R. naming U.S.D.A. as “subpermitee.” 184. The Agreement also provides that the “removal activities” could start as early as January 1, 2016 and could run as late as March 31, 2016. 185. Persons authorized to meet “to discuss mutual program interests” under the Agreement are: Bahl or his designee; Borneman or his designee; Creagh or his designee; and “those additional persons authorized and approved by” Bahl and Creagh, 186. On December 14, 2015, Borneman wrote to Bissell, requesting a deer cull permit to execute the “May 2015, Ann Arbor Deer Management Plan/Recommendations for Deer Management in Ann Arbor Report.” 187. Specifically, Borneman said the City is requesting: [A] damage and nuisance animal control permit to shoot whitetail deer a nonhunting purpose under MDNR regulations. It is the City’s understanding that the safety zone requirements of MLC [sic] §324.4011(7) apply to hunting only (i.e. 37

pursuit and kill for sport) and written permission from the owner/renter of any occupied dwelling within 150 yards is not required for issuance of the requested permit. Such a shot would not be considered to be a regular activity for this cull, but may be desirable in certain instances where safety can be ensured. The City is requesting confirmation that MDNR classifies this permit as a non-hunting activity and that no safety zone is required as part of any permit conditions imposed by the MDNR if this permit application is granted. 188. Borneman, in the permit request, stated that the U.S.D.A. would be conducting the cull with “firearms equipped with suppressors, night vision, and FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared).” 189. Borneman further said the shooting will occur: a) from deer stands or deer blinds at bait piles within identified parks or nature areas; and b) from vehicles in parking lots or on trails within identified parks or nature areas or in rights of way immediately adjacent to parks or nature areas. 190. On December 17, 2015, before any D.N.R. action on Borneman’s December 14, 2015 request for D.N.R. permit, the City’s Communications Director, Lisa Wondrash, issued a press release stating: a) some of Ann Arbor Parks and Nature Areas will be closed after 4:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m. the following day for “deer control efforts” Jan. 1 – March 31, 2016; b) all parks will remain open on Saturdays and Sundays; c) “[v]iolations of park rules are evaluated on a case by case 38

basis”; d) “Ann Arbor Police will respond accordingly to individuals who violate park closures [sic]”; e) Bahl authorized “designated parks” to be closed “to ensure safety during deer management activities”; f) all walking and biking trails within the closed parks will likewise be closed to the public and that “commuters who routinely use trails within the closed parks will instead need to seek alternative routes during this time”; g) “[p]arks will reopen if cull activities are completed before March 31”; and h) the following parks and nature areas are the ones that will be closed: Arbor Hills, Argo, Bandemer, Barton, Bird Hills, Black Pond Woods, Bluffs, Braun, Cedar Bend, Dhu Varren Woods, Foxfire South, Foxfire West, Furstenberg, Huron Parkway, Kuebler Langford, Leslie Park Golf Course, Leslie Woods, Narrow Gauge, Oakridge, Oakwoods, Olson, Onder, Ruthven, South Pond, Stapp, and Traver Creek. 191. Wondrash further noted that “[s]ignage will be posted at impacted park and nature area entrances to notify visitors of closures” and that “[r]esidents living near designated parks or nature areas will be informed of these closures directly via postcard. 192. The City has begun to post signs. 193. The signs posted are not rigid and show damage and easily become inconspicuous and remain inconspicuous because of normal weather conditions and,

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thus, are inadequate forms of notice of the danger to the public in order that they may protect themselves, their children, their guests, and their pets. 194. The notices, upon information and belief, are in only the English language. 195. Many of those who frequent and will frequent the subject parkland areas and environs do not understand English, including but not limited to many foreigners, such as Asians, Latinos, and Hispanics, which segments comprise significant portion of the population of Ann Arbor, as detailed above. 196. The notices are on ordinary weight 8 ½ x 11” paper and do not withstand a light breeze or a soft rain. 197. The forms of notice have been and remain insufficient to give adequate notice to persons who may seek to enter the parks from an unlimited number of entry points on foot or otherwise, such as foreign visitors to Ann Arbor or persons not knowledgeable of the English language. 198. Upon information and belief, there are at least 123 City parks, golf courses, and nature areas that constitute all parkland of the City. 199.

On December 21, 2015, Bissell, on behalf of the D.N.R. Wildlife

Division and the D.N.R. Law Enforcement Division wrote to Borneman stating his request “for a permit to conduct an out-of-season cull of urban white-tailed deer . . . on various city parks and nature areas in an effort to reduce human-deer conflicts 40

and negative impacts of deer activity on biological diversity in natural areas” was justified and that the permit requested would be granted by D.N.R. “to complete control activities in 2016.” 200. There is no greater specificity in the plan posited by the City or in the plan approved by D.N.R. identifying or describing the location, nature, and extent of the “various city parks” Bissell references in any information publicly available or made available to Plaintiffs, notwithstanding numerous duly made requests of the City, D.N.R., and the U.S.D.A. under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act and under the United States Freedom of Information Act; upon information and belief, therefore, either no such information exists in any form subject to public dissemination or disclosure or these levels of government refuse to make such information knowable by the citizenry because of a plan to conceal it. 201. There is no greater specificity in the plan posited by the City or in the plan approved by D.N.R. identifying or describing the location, nature, and extent of the “various nature areas” Bissell references in any information publicly available or otherwise made available to Plaintiffs, notwithstanding their numerous duly made continued and continuing requests of the City, D.N.R., and the U.S.D.A. under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act and under the United States Freedom of Information Act; upon information and belief, therefore, either no such information exists in any form subject to public dissemination or disclosure or these 41

levels of government refuse to make such information knowable by the citizenry because of a plan to conceal it. 202. There is no greater specificity in the plan posited by the City or in the plan approved by D.N.R. identifying or describing the location, nature, and extent of the “human-deer conflicts” Bissell references in any information publicly available or otherwise made available to Plaintiffs, notwithstanding their numerous duly made continued and continuing requests of the City, D.N.R., and the U.S.D.A. under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act and under the United States Freedom of Information Act; upon information and belief, therefore, either no such information exists in any form subject to public dissemination or disclosure or these levels of government refuse to make such information knowable by the citizenry because of a plan to conceal it. 203. There is no greater specificity in the plan posited by the City or in the plan approved by D.N.R. identifying or describing the location, nature, and extent of the “negative impacts of deer activity on biological diversity” Bissell references in any information publicly available or otherwise made available to Plaintiffs, notwithstanding their numerous duly made continued and continuing requests of the City, D.N.R., and the U.S.D.A. under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act and under the United States Freedom of Information Act; upon information and belief, therefore, either no such information exists in any form subject to public 42

dissemination or disclosure or these levels of government refuse to make such information knowable by the citizenry because of a plan to conceal it. 204. There is no greater specificity in the plan posited by the City or in the plan approved by D.N.R. identifying the location, nature, and extent of the “natural areas” in which biological diversity is alleged to be harmed that Bissell references in any information publicly available or made available to Plaintiffs, notwithstanding numerous duly made requests of the City, D.N.R., and the U.S.D.A. under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act and under the United States Freedom of Information Act; upon information and belief, therefore, either no such information exists in any form subject to public dissemination or disclosure or these levels of government refuse to make such information knowable by the citizenry because of a plan to conceal it. 205. Without such information, Defendants are knowingly impairing the ability of Plaintiffs and other interested parties from determining the nature and extent to which and when they will fall into spheres of danger such that they may seek judicial relief or be joined as necessary or proper parties to this action or other similar proceedings. 206. Upon information and belief, Defendants, acting separately or in one or more groups or combinations of two or more persons pursuant to a common plan or with a common purpose to frustrate the rights of the citizenry and the public in 43

general, including but not limited to their fundamental rights to free speech, to assemble, and to petition the government for redress of grievances. 207. Upon information and belief, it has been and remains the plan and strategy, both in anticipation of litigation or of political fallout, of one or more Defendants or their constituent members, former or present, to conceal information to which Plaintiffs and others have a right well established and fundamental under constitutional and other law in order to protect themselves in their political rights, their civil rights, and in their rights not to be the subject of imminent threat of harm to their life, liberty, personal quietude, safety and health, and to their property. 208. On December 23, 2015, D.N.R. issued Damage and Nuisance Animal Control Permit to Borneman as Permitee that “provides for actions outlined in the 2015 Ann Arbor Deer Management Plan. Unknown number of deer.” 209. The duration of the Permit is from January 2, 2016 to March 1, 2016. 210. The Permit does not contain an Authorized Shooter List. 211. All permits are required by law, regulation, custom or practice to contain an Authorized Shooter List. 212. A permit without and Authorized Shooter List is, upon information and belief, unprecedented in Michigan. 213. An urban cull such as the one the U.S.D.A. threatens immediately to embark upon is, upon information and belief, unprecedented in Michigan. 44

214. An urban cull such as the one the U.S.D.A. threatens immediately to embark upon is, upon information and belief, unprecedented in the United States. 215. Upon information and belief, the U.S.D.A. has become in recent years, and remains, the subject of numerous, substantial, and carefully documented and substantiated public and private complaints, many of which are still pending and are yet unresolved, and that the U.S.D.A. and those acting under color and authority of the U.S.D.A. and the laws and regulations of the United States have demonstrated entrenched, continuing, and repeated customs and practices of failing to adhere to safety and specific animal management rules, policies, customs and practices. 216. The “vast array of illegal activities” of U.S.D.A. Wildlife Services and its departments, divisions, agencies, and agents, as documented by reports of investigators including former high-level agents of U.S.D.A. Wildlife Services, includes but is not limited to its unbridled and excessive practices pertaining to the killing of animals (both openly and clandestinely, both ostensible and subject to their control and authority and those covert and overt practices not subject to their lawful control and authority, including but not limited to: a) the unlawful and felonious shooting at and killing of animals (e.g., mountain lions) from aircraft in violation of United States criminal and civil laws and regulations; b) no enforcement or adherence to laws and rules governing the use of poisonous substances to kill animals; c) shooting or threatening to shoot deer with M-44 rifles (which would, 45

upon information and belief, be a violation of D.N.R. rules and regulations if enforced); d) the improper and unlawful administering of sodium cyanide to destroy coyotes and other animals; evidencing that predator control should be run by qualified and professional private, not public, contractors and agencies, as this public agency, in particular, exemplifies the argument that government agencies are not well trained, suited, competent, or trustworthy enough to carry out such practices in a safe, reliable, and lawful fashion. 217. The Permit applies to the “specific location” of “City of Ann Arbor Wards 1 and 2.” 218. That is not a “specific location,” at it comprises nearly half of Ann Arbor. 219. The Permit (Addendum) forbids shooting within 150 yards of occupied building, dwelling, house, residence, or cabin without written permission of the occupant. 220. The Permit (Addendum) allows sound suppression “in accordance with a federally issued permit.” 221. The Permit (Addendum) allows shooting from a platform and a blind. 222. The Permit (Addendum) allows shooting from a vehicle.

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223. The Permit (Addendum) allows shooting between the hours of 4:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. with assistance of artificial lights and “night vision optics” from one half hour preceding sunset until one half hour succeeding sunrise. 224. The Permit (Addendum) allows the use of bait at designated shooting locations. 225. The Permit purports to effectuate a complete and absolute release of the State of Michigan, its departments, divisions, and agents, from claims for persons, their children, or their pets who may be killed by the U.S.D.A. shooting and may look to government agents and entities to be financially responsible to compensate for such losses and for such other losses, including but not limited to loss or impairment of interests in property: “Permittee hereby releases . . . and covenants not to sue the State of Michigan . . . from any liability . . . for all losses, injury, death or damage” and to hold harmless the State of Michigan for claims for death or injury that any person or entity may have arising out of “any occurrence” pertaining to “the activities authorized by this permit.” 226. Contrary to the Agreement between the City and the U.S.D.A., the D.N.R. Permit does not “list” U.S.D.A., APHIS, Wildlife Services as “subpermitees.” 227. The City has not publicly stated it will stand financially responsible to cover such losses. 47

228. The State of Michigan has not publicly stated it will stand financially responsible to cover such losses. 229. The United States has not publicly stated it will stand financially responsible to cover such losses. 230. Upon information and belief, the City is not adequately insured to compensate for the risk of loss presented by its Deer Management Plan. 231. Upon information and belief, the State of Michigan is not adequately insured to compensate for the risk of loss presented by the Deer Management Plan. 232. Upon information and belief, the United States is not adequately insured to compensate for the risk of loss presented by its Deer Management Plan. 233. Upon information and belief, the City intends to and will assert upon deaths or injuries suffered as a result of the shooting it is not legally or financially responsible for such loss under the doctrines, laws, and constitutional protections of governmental and official immunity or otherwise. 234. Upon information and belief, the State of Michigan intends to and will assert upon deaths or injuries suffered as a result of the shooting it is not legally or financially responsible for such loss under the doctrines, laws, and constitutional protections of sovereign, governmental and official immunity or otherwise. 235. Upon information and belief, the United States intends to and will assert upon deaths or injuries suffered as a result of the shooting it is not legally or 48

financially responsible for such loss under the doctrines, laws, and constitutional protections of sovereign, governmental and official immunity or otherwise. 236. Upon information and belief, the City will take the position upon the shooting resulting in the death of men, women and children or other injury to persons or property that it has not waived its immunities from suit, leaving the blood shed by the piercing of government bullets on the hands of the victims and the victims, alone. 237. Upon information and belief, the State of Michigan will take the position upon the shooting resulting in the death of men, women and children or other injury to persons or property that it has not waived its immunities from suit leaving the blood shed by the piercing of government bullets on the hands of the victims and the victims, alone. 238. Upon information and belief, the United States will take the position upon the shooting resulting in the death of men, women and children or other injury to persons or property that it has not waived its immunities from suit. 239. The Agreement provides: APHIS WS assumes no liability for any actions or activities conducted under this Cooperative Services Agreement except to the extent that recourse or remedies are provided by Congress under the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2401(b), and 2671-2680). 49

240. Upon information and belief, U.S.D.A. intends to shoot at deer while inside of cars, trucks, all-terrain vehicles, or other vehicles. 241. Upon information and belief, U.S.D.A. intends to shoot at deer while inside of moving cars, trucks, all-terrain vehicles, or other vehicles. 242. Neither the D.N.R. nor the U.S.D.A. has published any guidelines or rules the City must follow as a part of its Deer Management Plan to give adequate notice of the dangers of the urban gunfire. 243. The City has not publicly disclosed the extent to which, if at all, the cull will take place simultaneously, seriatim, or at other times or in which sequence, at all of the 26 locations identified over the period January 4 – March 31, 2016. 244. The U.S.D.A. has not publicly disclosed whether it will begin its shooting on New Year’s Day, January 1, 2016. 245. Neither the City nor D.N.R. has publicly disclosed whether U.S.D.A. will begin shooting on New Year’s Day, January 1, 2016. 246. The City has announced the closures as of January 1, 2016 and that the areas will be open on Saturday and Sunday, January 2 and 3, 2016. 247. For purposes of the shooting, the City has not defined “Saturdays and Sundays” by hours in relationship to the published shooting plan; that is, whether a shoot beginning on Friday at 4:00 p.m. will conclude on 12:00 a.m. on Saturday or

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at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday, for one example, or whether a shoot beginning on a Monday will begin at 12:00 a.m. or at 7:00 a.m. that Monday. 248. There is a conflict among the government documents concerning the schedule. 249. That is, on the one hand, the City has publicly announced the shooting will begin on January 1, 2016 and last until the later of March 31, 2016 or when “cull activities are completed,” the Agreement says “removal activities” could start as early as January 1, 2016 and could run as late as March 31, 2016, and the D.N.R. permit says it allows for actions the City “outlined” in its 2015 Deer Management Plan for an “unknown number of deer.” 250. On the other hand, the D.N.R. permit by its terms states the “duration of permit” is from January 2, 2016 to March 1, 2016. Additionally, neither the D.N.R. nor the U.S.D.A. make any allowance for any abatement of the shooting on “Saturdays and Sundays,” while the City has publicly stated there will be not shooting on “Saturdays and Sundays.” 251. The November 18, 2015 Agreement explicitly provides that the City must “coordinate with APHIS WS [U.S.D.A.] before responding to all media requests.” 252. Upon information and belief, Borneman, Wondrash, or other authorized representative of the City consulted with U.S.D.A. before issuing the 51

press release or takes the position that the City had no such obligation to do so under the Agreement or applicable law. 253. The Deer Management Plan is not supported by competent data, rationale, or argument. 254. The Deer Management Plan is not supported by reason or logic. 255. The Deer Management Plan is not supported by objective, verifiable scientific or social data. 256. Defendants have not established the existence of any legitimate deer overpopulation problem in reality in Ann Arbor. 257. Defendants’ alleged identification of a public problem is nothing more than unbridled conjecture or biased speculation founded in no permissible or proper aesthetic, health, social, scientific, or other purpose. 258. Defendants have no baseline data. 259. Without baseline data, Defendants have no way to measure the likelihood of any efficacy at all of the proposed Deer Management Plan. 260. The City has knowingly put forth as its public purpose that the deer population of Ann Arbor is increasing when, in fact, those in control of the City have commissioned studies concluding exactly the opposite – thus, those in control are and have been knowingly publishing false information to the citizenry to satisfy and ulterior, impure, dishonest, and unrighteous purpose. 52

261. According to the government documents alone, as detailed herein, persons are at risk of being killed or injured by the shooting as early as the National Holiday, New Year’s Day, January 1, 2016 at 4:00 p.m. 262. The City is giving notice of park closures for parks at which no discharge of firearms can happen other than within the 450-foot buffer zone. 263. The City intends to cause the discharge of firearms within the 450-foot buffer zone. COUNT ONE DEFENDANTS VIOLATE LOCAL LAW AND THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF ANN ARBOR 264. As detailed herein, Defendants have violated, are violating, and threaten imminently to continue to violate local law. 265. Local law prohibits the possession, use, and carrying of rifles Defendants are doing, as well as the purpose and manner in which they are doing so. 266. The law prohibits hunting animals in public parks, but that is what the City Defendants and the State Defendants are having the U.S. Defendants do. 267. The law prohibits motor vehicles in parks, but that is what the City Defendants and the State Defendants are having the U.S. Defendants do. 268. The law says persons may sit and walk quietly in the parks at night, but the City Defendants threaten to prosecute people for doing so.

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269. The law prohibits the possession and carrying of loaded rifles in motor vehicles, but that is precisely is what the City Defendants and the State Defendants are having the U.S. Defendants do. 270. The U.S. Defendants threaten to cause damage to the city or others, yet the City has refused or failed to obtain adequate security from the U.S. Defendants to protect the people against injury. 271. The law prohibits all parkland activity that is contrary to the rights of others to the peaceful enjoyment of natural and scenic areas and for recreation, but that is what the City Defendants and State Defendants would have U.S. Defendants do. 272. The U.S. Defendants are not “City employees.” 273. The U.S. Defendants, along with all other Defendants, has interfered and continues to interfere unreasonably with the use of the parks and of neighboring property by others, contrary to local law. 274. The local law is to be enforced by the local police, but the City Defendants threaten to require local police to permit the unlawful, illegal, criminal, and unconstitutional conduct. 275. The City Defendants seek to insulate local law enforcement officers and U.S. Defendants from the requirements of local law, contrary to local law. 276. The City Defendants are not immune from obeying local law. 54

277. Law enforcement officers are not immune or excused from obeying and enforcing local law. 278. Law enforcement officers failing or refusing to perform their duties to the public to enforce the local laws pertaining to the use of, and conduct on and in, public places such as parklands, rights of way, and other places will place them in breach of the public trust and render them liable for derogation of duty. 279. Either the criminals will be breaking the local law or the police will be breaking the law for not arresting and prosecuting the criminals for doing so. 280. Upon information and belief, Baird will not enforce the local law as against the U.S. Defendants or any other of Defendants, thus placing himself in breach of the law and of the public trust. 281. Neither Hagler nor any other Defendant has the power to grant immunity to any other of the Defendants for violating local or state law. 282. Neither Snyder nor any other Defendant has the power to pardon, in advance, the imminent illegal and criminal conduct of Defendants and those acting in active concert with them. 283. None of the Defendants is above the law. 284. Within a City Park, no person shall hunt, drive or park any motor vehicle, drive or park a motor vehicle between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., obstruct

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any walk or drive, make any sound that may be heard at a distance of more than 50 feet, park. ANN ARBOR, MICH. CODE §3:2 (2015). 285. All parks are closed from midnight to 6:00 a.m. Id. §3.3. 286. Persons may quietly sit and walk in the parks even when closed. Id. 287. “The function of the park system is to provide persons with the opportunity to peacefully enjoy natural and scenic areas, to provide recreation opportunities, to preserve natural habitats for wildlife and to permit athletic competition in designated areas.” Id. §3:7. The City may issue a permit for a special activity to take place within a park only to the extent it is consistent with these purposes. Id. No activity that will “unreasonably interfere with the use of parks and of neighboring property by others” or others may be permitted. Id. §3:7. 288. Before issuing a permit, the Community Services Area Administrator must obtain “adequate security against damages to the city or others.” Id. 289. City employees may perform work on parks and use vehicles and other equipment for performing work. Id. §3:10. 290. The Ann Arbor Police Services Unit is charged with the responsibility of enforcing ordinance provisions governing parks. Id. §3:8(2). 291. The presence of farmland and other open space lands within the City makes the City a desirable place to live, work and visit. Id. §3:61(2). And “[i]t is the policy of the City of Ann Arbor to protect, preserve and enhance farmland and open 56

space lands through its ordinances, the authority granted it by the Farmland and Open Space Preservation Act (MCL 324.36101 et seq.) . . . and other state and city ordinances . . .” ANN ARBOR, MICH. CODE §3:61(10). 292. No person shall cruelly kill an animal. Id. 9:35. 293. No person shall feed a deer. 9:54(2). “Persons authorized by the City of Ann Arbor to implement the Deer Management Program approved by the City Council” may feed a deer. Id., 9:54(3)(b). Food may be placed for purposes of taking deer pursuant to a Michigan D.N.R. permit. Id. 9:54(c). 294. No person shall unreasonably obstruct the free and uninterrupted passage of the public along any street or sidewalk in a public place. Id. 9:62(9) 295. No person shall cause a disturbance of the public peace and quiet by loud or aggressive conduct when persons affected reasonably believe giving notice to that person would constitute a risk to their personal safety. Id. 9:62(11). 296. No person shall possess a rifle in any public place. Id. 9:262. 297. No person shall discharge a rifle or other firearm within the City of Ann Arbor. 9:263. 298. No person shall knowingly brandish a firearm in public. Id. 9:269(1). “A person lawfully engaged in hunting” may do so. Id. 9:269(2)(b) 299. No person shall transport or possess a loaded firearm in or upon a motor vehicle or self-propelled vehicle for land travel. Id. 9:274. 57

300. Attempts by Defendants to assert they are excused from the constitution and laws of the United States, the constitution and laws of the State of Michigan, and the charter and ordinances of the City of Ann Arbor because of the purported adoption of resolutions is without evidentiary support or legal merit, and any alleged “moratorium” on the enforcement of the laws and on the ensuring of Plaintiff’s rights to due process and equal protection of the laws is a legal nullity and must immediately be declared so. 301. The rights to life, liberty, property, due process and equal protection are inalienable. 302. The City by purporting to pass a resolution cannot empower itself as a matter of law to alienate the inalienable rights of Plaintiffs guaranteed explicitly under the constitutions of the State of Michigan and of the United States. 303. There has been no proper repeal, amendment, substitution, or reinstitution of any provision of the City Charter or of the City Code of Ordinances that permits the threatened conduct. 304. The Agreement is void ab initio or voidable because it was not lawfully presented for consideration to the City Council, it was not, in fact, considered by the City Council, and it was signed in violation of the Charter. 305. The Agreement affords no protection to the U.S. Defendants or any other of the Defendants from the liability asserted herein, from their obligations to 58

obey the law; nor does it excuse Defendants from their obligation to perform their lawful duties and to protect the rights of Plaintiffs, the persons whom for whom they swore an oath to protect by upholding the laws and the constitutions. . 306. Even assuming for the sake of argument the Agreement were lawfully entered into, it would afford no protection to the U.S. Defendants or any other of the Defendants from the liability asserted herein and from their obligations to obey the law, to uphold the constitution, and to protect Plaintiffs in their persons, liberties, and homes. 307. Nor may the City Defendants or any other of Defendants empower themselves to violate or suspend, or to cause others to violate or suspend, the obligations under the law of the State of Michigan not to discharge firearms near homes, which all Defendants threaten imminently to do or cause to be done. 308. One or more of the meetings of the City Council at which some of the governmental action of theirs they contend was lawfully undertaken was improper or unlawful, and, consequently, any such governmental action is void ab initio or voidable and a legal nullity. 309. Further, Council members met on numerous occasions in numerous combinations of other council members and lobbyists, either by electronic means, use of wire, or in person, and have refused to share information equally with their constituents and other lobbyists, subjecting them to continuing liability for their 59

ongoing violations of the Michigan Open Meetings Act and the Michigan Freedom of Information Act. 310. The City of Ann Arbor is not a superlegislature. 311. The City Defendants are conducting themselves and have conducted themselves ostensibly in their official capacities to apply the constitutions and laws so as to convert the City from what it lawfully is, with appropriate limitations on its powers by constitution, charter, statute, and by its own ordinances, into what they seek to have it be: a proverbial “Third World Country unto itself.” 312. The actions and threats to act detailed herein are violative of constitutional guarantees under both the U.S. constitution and the Michigan constitution, and, thus, present compelling, sharpened, and fundamental federal questions hotly contested and ripe for immediate resolution by this Court. 313. Neither the expansion of the time, place, and manner of hunting nor the limitation or prohibition against the time, place, and manner of hunting is within its power. 314. There is an actual case and controversy before this Court that requires immediate judicial intervention and relief. 315. Therefore, Plaintiffs pray this Court for immediate declaratory relief adjudicating the respective rights and obligations of the parties, granting immediate relief temporarily restraining Defendants from committing the unlawful and 60

unconstitutional acts against the peace, against the public trust, and against the rights of Plaintiffs, and continuing such relief provisionally by preliminarily enjoining Defendants pendente lite, and, upon trial of this cause, issue a permanent injunction or decree as prayed for herein, along with an award of damages necessary to redress Plaintiffs’ continuing injuries. The damages Plaintiffs claim for their injuries and which they seek herein to recover against the U.S. Defendants in the aggregate do not exceed the amount of $10,000. COUNT TWO DEFENDANTS VIOLATE STATE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 316. As detailed herein, Defendants have violated, are violating, and threaten imminently to continue to violate state law. 317. State law prohibits the taking of deer by the discharge of rifles out of season (that is, other than between November 15 – 30) and the taking of deer other than in daylight, and the taking of other than one deer per licensee hunter per season, the taking of deer by unlicensed persons, the discharge of a rifle from a motor vehicle, moving or otherwise, to take a deer, the discharge of a rifle to take a deer within 150 yards of a residence, the use of laser-sighting devices, the use of silencers or suppressors, and poaching, but all of that is precisely what the City and State Defendants would have the U.S. Defendants do, and that is exactly what U.S.

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Defendant have expressed an irrevocable and definite intention to do, and imminently. 318. State law further prohibits possession of a firearm by a felon or one committing or attempting to commit a felony, transporting or possession a loaded firearm in a vehicle, intentionally discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle or an off-road vehicle intentionally discharging a firearm at a dwelling or occupied structure, brandishing a firearm in public, discharging a firearm within a right of way, using an animal as a target as a test of marksmanship skill, and knowingly main or kill an animal other than while in the act of lawful hunting, yet that is what Defendants are doing and promising to continue to do. 319. State law forbids poaching, yet that is what Defendants are doing and promising to continue to do. 320. State law forbids the transfer of a dead animal from one vehicle to another only at a licensed facility. 321. State law prohibits the use of an artificial light in taking game or in an area frequented by animals. 322. State law prohibits the throwing or casting of rays of a spotlight, headlight, or other artificial light in a field, woodland, or forest while having a firearm.

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323. State law prohibits the use of an artificial light for the purpose of locating animals. 324. State law prohibits the possession or discharge of a loaded firearm without a hunting license by any person taking or attempting to take game. 325. The possession of a muffler, silencer, or any other device or contrivance for muffling, silencing, suppressing, or deadening the report of a firearm. 326. State law prohibits a person not wearing hunter orange from taking game. 327. State law protects animals in a public park from the acts the U.S. Defendants committed, are committing, and intend continuously to commit immediately and for the ensuing sixty days: No person shall hunt for, pursue, trap, capture, kill or destroy by any means whatever, or attempt to trap, capture, kill or destroy by any means whatever, any animal commonly known as deer . . . in or within 2 miles from any public park belong to any city and containing over 200 acres of which 150 acres or more is woodland: Provided, This section shall not apply to any act done in any public park by the superintendent, keeper or custodian thereof. M.C.L. §317.121. 328. No peace officer is exempt from the State laws pertaining to the possession and discharge of rifles unless regularly employed and paid. 63

329. Under state law, the U.S.D.A. does not constitute an authorized police agency of the United States regularly employee peace officers, and the federal agents of Defendants for the subject shoot-to-kill plan are not peace officers regularly employed and paid by the United States. 330.

State law provides that an individual who intentionally discharges a

firearm from a motor vehicle or off-road vehicle is guilty of a crime. 331. State law prohibits local units of government from enacting and enforcing ordinances that conflict with state law, such as ordinances, resolutions, or other local governmental action that conflict with generally accepted agricultural and management practices. M.C.L. 286.474(6). 332. The government is not averting a nuisance but is creating a nuisance. 333. The plan is not consistent with, but conflicts with, generally accepted management practices. 334. The deer destruction plan subjects Plaintiffs to a substantial and unreasonable interference of their rights and exposes Plaintiffs to risk and endangerment of human beings and the environment without justification in scientific evidence taking into account economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits. 335. Michigan law further provides “[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws . . .” MICH. CONST 1963 art I, §2. The Defendants run afoul 64

of this and other constitutional guarantees by having selectively enforced, and by promising continuously selectively to enforce, the constitutions, laws, and regulations at issue so as to allow one class of persons to enjoy rights, privileges and immunities while at the same time denying those rights, privileges, and immunities to Plaintiffs. 336. “The person, houses, papers, and possessions of every person shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. . .” MICH. CONST 1963 art I, §11. The gross disruption and invasion, and the threatened gross disruption and invasion by Defendants, of the peace, and into the privacy and quietude of Plaintiffs, runs afoul of this and other constitutional guarantees, while others not similarly situated to Plaintiffs are left in their own peace, privacy, quietude, and tranquility. 337. “The conservation and development of the natural resources of the state are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest of the health, safety, and general welfare of the people. The legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment or destruction.” MICH. CONST 1963 art IV, §52. 338. “The white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) is designated as the official game mammal of this state.” M.C.L. §2.71. 339. The State of Michigan has the duty to hold, keep and protect wildlife, a natural resource of the State, as trustee for the benefit of the people. 65

340. The State is a public trust of ferae naturae held in trust for all people of the state of Michigan in their collective capacity. 341. State law provides that all animals found in the State of Michigan are the property of the people of the State of Michigan, and Defendants lack any superior claim, right, or title to the subject animals that would impair or deprive the right of Plaintiffs in the subject animals. 342. Deer are a natural resource in which Plaintiffs have a right and interest superior to the Defendants. M.C.L. §324.40101 – 324.40113a. 343. Quietude, itself, is a natural resource under the Michigan Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, the impairment of which may be redressed by resort to the judicial process, in which the question is reviewed de novo. 344. Defendants seek to, and would have, Plaintiffs be deprived of all of their rights as beneficiaries and their part of and participation in the cestui que trust. 345. Plaintiffs enjoy in the subject wildlife equitable title, which is superior to the title the State has in the subject wildlife, which is merely legal title. 346. Defendants are accountable in equity for their past, continuing, and future breaches of trust. 347. The concepts underlying the public trust doctrine are conservation, public access, and trusteeship.

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348. Defendants threaten to deprive Plaintiffs of their right to access to this natural resources and thereby breach their trust and other obligations owing to Plaintiffs. 349. The acts of Defendants and threatened by Defendants are causing and will continue to cause the unconstitutional appropriation of state resources. 350. The decisions of the State Defendants fail to protect these natural resources from impairment and destruction and they are accountable in law and equity, therefore. 351. The Michigan Defendants, as trustees, owe to Plaintiffs all duties of trust owing in equity by the legal titleholder to the equitable titleholder, including but not limited to the duties of utmost faith and care, the duty of loyalty, the duty to avoid conflict of interest or self-interest, the duty to protect natural resources held in trust for Plaintiffs, the duty to account to Plaintiffs, the duty of being candid to Plaintiffs, to keep Plaintiffs informed, and not to conceal pertinent information from Plaintiffs. 352. In derogation and abdication of such duties, the Michigan Defendants have willfully breached the public trust intentionally, recklessly, or negligently, and with callous indifference.

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353. Defendants’ purported and attempted conduct, if not restrained, would result in the violation of Michigan law of conversion and would constitute poaching under Michigan law. 354. Defendants are charged with the duty of enforcing the laws, such as the laws prohibiting poaching and conversion; however, Defendants have explicitly publicly announced the stated intention to engage in poaching and conversion, leaving Plaintiffs with no remedy within the executive offices of the City of Ann Arbor and the State of Michigan, and leaving them no feasible option to protect their constitutional and legal rights through any means other than to resort to this Court for immediate relief. 355. Not only have the Michigan Defendants failed to care for the interests and rights of Plaintiffs, they have made malicious decisions that have put Plaintiffs, their children, pests, and guests great risk and jeopardy of life and limb over and above the deprivation of constitutional and statutory rights in the subject wildlife, adding insult to injury. 356. Decisions of the officials of the Michigan D.N.R. may be challenged directly and without any need to exhaust administrative remedies. 357. The wildlife population of the state and their habitat are of paramount importance to the citizens, and sound, scientific management is in the public interest. M.C.L. 40113a. 68

358. While Michigan D.N.R. may issue permits authorizing the taking of animals to prevent or control damage and nuisance, it may not override applicable law. 359. Michigan D.N.R. is not a superlegislature. 360. Michigan D.N.R. has abdicated its responsibility to ensure the City of Ann Arbor deer destruction plan is based on “sound, scientific” evidence or is a sound plan based on any basis at all, let alone a scientific basis. M.C.L. §324.40113a(1)(b). 361.

Michigan D.N.R. has abdicated its responsibility to ensure the plan is

necessary to prevent or control damage or nuisance and that the methods proposed are in any way, rational or otherwise, related to any possible way of preventing or controlling damage or nuisance. 362. In fact, the plan is not necessary or even a rationale way to prevent or control damage or nuisance, and, in fact, there no causal or logical nexus between the methods proposed in the plan and the purported public concern or the purported public remedy. 363. While Michigan D.N.R. may suspend or abridge the open season on deer, there is no constitutional or statutory authority for it to enlarge the open season on deer.

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364. Defendants may not constitutionally and lawfully empower themselves to violate or suspend, or to cause others to violate or suspend, the obligations under the law of the State of Michigan not to discharge firearms near homes, which all Defendants threaten imminently to do or cause to be done. 365. One or more of the meetings of the City Council at which some of the governmental action of theirs they contend was lawfully undertaken was improper or unlawful, and, consequently, any such governmental action is void ab initio or voidable and a legal nullity. 366. Further, Council members met on numerous occasions in numerous combinations of other council members and lobbyists, either by electronic means, use of wire, or in person, and have refused to share information equally with their constituents and other lobbyists, subjecting them to continuing liability for their ongoing violations of the Michigan Open Meetings Act and the Michigan Freedom of Information Act. 367. The actions and threats to act detailed herein are violative of constitutional guarantees under both the U.S. constitution and the Michigan constitution, and, thus, present compelling, sharpened, and fundamental federal questions hotly contested and ripe for immediate resolution by this Court. 368. The City Defendants have breached the public trust by earmarking, apportioning, and allocating public monies in violation of State law, as well as in 70

violation of its own Charter and Ordinances and must be made to take necessary corrective action to re-allocate or restore such funds to the City treasury. 369. The actions and threats to act detailed herein are violative of constitutional guarantees under both the U.S. constitution and the Michigan constitution, and, thus, present compelling, sharpened, and fundamental federal questions hotly contested and ripe for immediate resolution by this Court. 370. Any person may maintain an action for declaratory and equitable relief against any person for the protection of natural resources and the public trust in these resources from impairment or destruction. M.C.L. §324.1701(1). 371. Defendants have not shown and cannot show there is no feasible and prudent alternative to their conduct. 372. Defendants have not shown and cannot show their conduct is consistent with the promotion of the public health, safety, and welfare in light of the paramount concern of the people of the State of Michigan for the protection of the natural resources of the state from impairment or destruction. 373. Plaintiffs are entitled to relief to restrain Defendants’ unlawful conduct under the Michigan Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. 374. The Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act provides for declaratory and injunctive relief even where the action at issue does not violate a

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statute or regulation, enabling the courts to develop a common law of environmental quality such as that which has evolved as the common law of nuisance or other torts. 375. There is an actual case and controversy before this Court that requires immediate judicial intervention and relief. 376. Therefore, Plaintiffs pray this Court for immediate declaratory relief adjudicating the respective rights and obligations of the parties, granting immediate relief temporarily restraining Defendants against committing the unlawful and unconstitutional acts against the peace, against the public trust, and against the rights of Plaintiffs, and continuing such relief provisionally by preliminarily enjoining Defendants pendente lite, and, upon trial of this cause, issue a permanent injunction or decree as prayed for herein, restore improperly allocated resources to the City treasury to redress injury to the interests of Plaintiffs as municipal taxpayers, along with an award of damages necessary to redress Plaintiffs’ continuing injuries. The damages Plaintiffs claim for their injuries and which they seek herein to recover against the U.S. Defendants in the aggregate do not exceed the amount of $10,000. COUNT THREE DEFENDANTS VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 377.

The acts of all Defendants complained of and detailed herein violate the

rights of Plaintiffs under the constitution and laws of the United States.

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378. “The Congress shall have the power to . . . regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3. 379. Plaintiffs have the right as citizens of the State of Michigan not to have their rights impaired by excessive control and regulation of the government of the United States. 380. By virtue of the Agreement, the U.S. Defendants Vilsack, Brown, and Duffiney and those acting in active concert with them seek to exercise federal power over Plaintiffs and the State of Michigan by making policy and enforcement decisions affecting Plaintiffs outside of interstate commerce. 381. Such an act by the U.S. Defendants is prohibited under the Commerce Clause and its negative implications, principles of federalism, and the doctrine of the separation of powers of the United States government from the powers of the governments of the several states and notions which hold inviolate the rights of the sovereign states to govern and control intra-state commerce. 382. Only intra-state interests are implicated in this action. 383. The government of the United States has no legitimate interest in the circumstances and occurrences underlying this civil action and should never have had any involvement in the Defendants’ joint plan of action to implement the wildlife destruction campaign for each of the next four years.

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384. The U.S. Defendants cannot exercise power over Plaintiffs without constitutional authority or as provided for under the laws of the United States; their conduct and threatened conduct is prohibited by the Commerce Clause. 385. The federal government cannot lawfully or constitutionally override state law that outlaws the use of silencers and suppressors in the case of the present Ann Arbor deer destruction plan simply by issuing a “federal permit,” as the Michigan D.N.R. and the City of Ann Arbor would have the U.S.D.A. do in this case therefore, its efforts to do so, and the efforts of Defendants to have the federal government do so, must be immediately restrained. 386. Plaintiffs have the right to petition all levels of government for redress of injuries and to enjoy the freedom of information, of expression, and to associate, which includes the right to public and open meetings and the right not to be deprived of the freedom of seeking redress because of secret meetings of government officials contrary to Plaintiffs’ inalienable rights in this regard pertaining to the deer destruction plan and the control that the U.S. Defendants exercise and seek in the future exercise over Plaintiffs. U.S. CONST. amend I; MICH CONST.1963, 1.I(3)-(5). 387. U.S.D.A. has an obligation to prepare an environmental assessment of the subject deer destruction plan under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4331, et seq., which governmental obligations Plaintiffs have the power to sue to enforce under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §701, et seq. 74

388. Upon information and belief, U.S.D.A. has failed or refused to prepare an environmental assessment and an environmental impact statement on its plan to control and carry out the deer construction plan in Ann Arbor. 389. Plaintiffs have duly made a request on U.S.D.A. to provide all information regarding the proposed deer destruction in Ann Arbor, including documentation on whether U.S.D.A. takes the position or made the decision to forego production of an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment in favor of a categorical exclusion, but U.S.D.A. has so far failed and refused to do so, impairing to an even greater degree the rights and abilities of Plaintiffs to protect themselves by informing themselves of governmental and public information which they have a right to known but which has been concealed from them by all levels of government in this case, the local government, the state government, and the federal government. 390. Plaintiffs’ interests are regulated and protected under the constitutional and statutory provisions on the protection of the environment and natural resources of the people of the State of Michigan implicated by Defendants’ proposed wildlife destruction program. 391. Plaintiffs have the right to be secure in their homes. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MICH CONST. of 1963, 1.I(8)&(11).

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392. Plaintiffs have the right to due process of law and to just compensation for governmental takings, temporary or permanent. U.S. CONST. amend. V, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 393. 394. Plaintiffs have the right to equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. V, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; MICH CONST. of 1963 1.I(2). 395. Plaintiffs have the right not to be victims of Defendants’ proposed selective enforcement of the laws, and Defendants run afoul of such constitutional guarantees to Plaintiffs by seeking to do so. 396. The conduct of Defendants is violative of these rights, constitutes a taking of their property without due process of law, violates Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights, procedural due process rights, and violates Plaintiff’s political and speech rights, as well as their rights to be free from invasion of their homes and to equal protection of the laws. 397. Defendants discriminate against Plaintiffs in regard of their fundamental constitutional rights. 398. Defendants cannot demonstrate their policies and regulations are not so vague as to be constitutionally infirm and violative of due process. 399. Plaintiffs have been deprived of notice and an opportunity to be heard.

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400. The legislation and regulations at issue are self-contradictory, confusion, vague, unintelligible, and effect a chill on Plaintiffs rights to participate in the political process, petition the government for redress of grievances. 401. The U.S. agents cannot have powers, rights, and privileges and immunities to move and speak freely in the City of Ann Arbor with them at the same time, in concert with the remaining Defendants deprive Plaintiffs, as residents, citizens, and taxpayers of the City of Ann Arbor from enjoying those very same rights. 402. The U.S. Defendants cannot grant themselves powers to control local governmental affairs and issues local to Plaintiffs as citizens of Ann Arbor or of the State of Michigan and privileges and immunities not to be subject to the criminal laws and the natural resources laws and at the same time remove the protection of those very laws from Plaintiffs. 403. The U.S. Defendants are not above the law. 404. The U.S. Defendants are not a superlegislature. 405. The U.S.D.A. is not a superlegislature. 406. Defendants cannot establish a compelling governmental interest. 407. Defendants cannot demonstrate the deer destruction plan is narrowly tailored and necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest.

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408. Among other of the fundamental rights of Plaintiffs detailed herein are their rights to personal security ad bodily integrity. 409. Plaintiffs are entitled to be free from unjustified intrusions on personal security. 410. No right is more sacred than the right of every person to the possession and control of his own person and to be free from all restraint and interference of others without clear and unquestionable authority of law. 411. The governmental conduct has violated and threatens to infringe on Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights. 412. Defendants are threatening to create dangers and risks and increase the dangers and risks of loss of life or grave personal injury resulting in a state-created danger to which Plaintiffs are now subject, have been subject, and will continue to be subject. 413. Defendants may not cause or greatly increase the risk of harm to Plaintiffs through its own affirmative acts without due process of law. 414. Plaintiffs stand in a special relationship of trust with Defendants, and Defendants owe Plaintiffs heightened duties given the special circumstances putting Plaintiffs at risk of loss of life and limb. 415. Plaintiffs face special danger because the Defendants’ acts place them specifically and uniquely at risk of being victims of the ultrahazardous activity and 78

gave risks they are creating for Plaintiffs who are most likely to suffer harm because of their situation as detailed herein. 416. The risk to Plaintiffs is different from a risk that affects the public at large, as supported and specifically averred in detail herein. 417. Before embarking upon their campaign of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance complained of herein, Defendants have known or clearly should have known that their actions specifically endanger Plaintiffs. 418. Defendants currently know or certainly should know that their planned course of conduct specifically endanger Plaintiffs in ways dissimilar to the ways they endanger the public at large. 419. Defendants cannot demonstrate the deer population is a legitimate local or federal governmental interest. 420. Defendants cannot demonstrate any rationale for the deer destruction plan. 421. Defendants cannot demonstrate the plan and their conduct pertaining to and surrounding the plan is anything other than arbitrary, capricious, malicious, and illegitimate, as the evidence demonstrates that such, at best, is arbitrary and capricious and, at worse, fraudulent, malicious, and illegitimate. 422. Defendants cannot demonstrate a legitimate purpose for the legislation of the City; nor can they demonstrate a rational basis for the deer destruction plan. 79

423. Therefore, Plaintiffs pray this Court for immediate declaratory relief adjudicating the respective rights and obligations of the parties, granting immediate relief temporarily restraining Defendants against committing the unlawful and unconstitutional acts against the peace, against the public trust, and against the rights of Plaintiffs, and continuing such relief provisionally by preliminarily enjoining Defendants pendente lite, and, upon trial of this cause, issue a permanent injunction or decree as prayed for herein, restore improperly allocated resources to the City treasury to redress injury to the interests of Plaintiffs as municipal taxpayers, along with an award of damages necessary to redress Plaintiffs’ continuing injuries. The damages Plaintiffs claim for their injuries and which they seek herein to recover against the U.S. Defendants in the aggregate do not exceed the amount of $10,000. COUNT FOUR ULTRA VIRES AND PREEMPTION 424. The acts of Defendants complained of and detailed herein are ultra vires and preempted by State law, as they contravene express provisions of the Michigan constitution, statutes, and laws. Because the acts of Defendants are ultra vires, unconstitutional

and

patently

illegal,

they

are

null;

attempts

by

Defendants to continue to exercise powers not held by them must be immediately restrained.

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425. A bedrock principle underlying Michigan’s constitution is the separation of the powers among the three branches of its government. 426. “The powers of government are divided into three branches, legislative, executive, and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch may properly exercise powers belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.” MICH. CONST of 1963 art III, §2. 427. No person exercising powers of the executive branch shall exercise powers belonging to the legislative branch. MICH. CONST. of 1963, Art. III, §2. Michigan D.N.R., therefore, cannot exercise the power of adopting laws governing any topic, that being solely the power of the legislative branch. Michigan D.N.R. and the Natural Resources Commission has no constitutional authority to exercise legislative power or override or veto the legislative power of the State of Michigan, which is vested solely in a senate and a house of representatives. “The legislative power of the State of Michigan is vested in a senate and a house of representatives.” MICH. CONST. of 1963, Art. IV, §1.IV(1). 428.

No municipality has the power to override by local legislation a

legislative framework of the state, not even the City of Ann Arbor: “. . . Each such city and village shall have power to adopt resolutions and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, property and government, subject to the constitution and law. . . .” MICH. CONST. of 1963, Art. VII, §1.VII(22). 81

429. Specifically regarding the Defendants’ plan to destroy wildlife, the taking of game is exclusively a matter of State law and cannot be the subject of municipal regulation. M.C.L. §324.40113a provides, in part: The natural resources commission has the exclusive authority to regulate the taking of game . . . in this state. The natural resources commission shall, to the greatest extent practicable, utilize principles of sound scientific management in making decisions regarding the taking of game. The natural resources commission may take testimony from department personnel, independent experts, and others, and review scientific literature and data, among other sources, in support of its duty to use principles of sound scientific management. . . . 430. Likewise, Defendants’ bold attempt to override the power of the Michigan senate and house of representatives through its legislation to govern the manner of using, possessing, transporting, and storing firearms within the parkland of the City of Ann Arbor, the State Legislature has already spoken just as clearly and emphatically on that topic as it has on the topic of the discharge of firearms: all legislation pertaining to the possession and transportation of firearms is exclusively within the province of the State of Michigan, and any attempt by municipality to legislate on the subject is a nullity. M.C.L. §123.1102 provides, in part: A local unit of government shall not . . . enact or enforce any ordinance . . . pertaining to [the] transportation, possession of . . . firearms . . . or components of pistols or other 82

firearms, except as otherwise provided by federal law or a law of this state. 431. A city cannot appropriate state resources without running afoul of the state laws and constitution. 432. The City of Ann Arbor lacks the power to appropriate state resources for its own benefit, as such is contrary to the constitution, laws, and stated public policy of this State. 433. Any ordinance, resolution, or other governmental action created by or threatened to be effectuated or enforced by a governing body of a home rule city is presumptively invalid unless it pertains to only uniquely local interests, is consistent with powers conferred by the State in its constitution and statutes, and fall within the scope of authority delegated by the electorate in the City’s Charter. 434. Provisions of an ordinance, resolution or other governmental action of a home rule city are void where such power lies within the senate and house, whether contravening or inconsistent with state law or not. 435. All charters, ordinances, and resolutions of a home rule city are subject and subordinate to the constitution and general laws of the state. 436. Even assuming arguendo the subject were within the purview of legislation by Defendants, no local or special act shall take effect until approved by a majority of the electors in the subject district voting thereon.

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437. Even where there is no conflict between the two schemes of regulation, a municipality may not enter the subject of state legislation where the state has enacted a statutory and regulatory framework occupies the field of regulations, such as in those legal, statutory, and regulatory principles that are the subject of, and govern the outcome, of the present case on the merits. 438. The electors of the City of Ann Arbor have not voted, nor have they been afforded the opportunity to vote, on a referendum concerning the proposed deer destruction campaign using the shoot-to-kill method. 439. There is no constitutional or other authority for a municipal corporation summarily to effectuate a plan of massive animal shooting deaths, even with the express permission of the Michigan D.N.R. Enforcement Division. 440. Municipal and executive or administrative officials have no power to enact legislation for or in the name of the people of the State of Michigan, such as the purported overriding by the Defendants of the 150-feet firearm discharge rule of Public Act 451 of 1994. 441. Yet that is precisely what Defendants are doing, are seeking to do, and will continue to do if not immediately restrained by this Court. 442. State law as it pertains to the present case is expressly preemptive and the state legislative scheme is pervasive.

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443. The nature of the subject matter regulated demands exclusive state regulation to achieve uniformity necessary to serve the state’s purpose and interest. 444. The State of Michigan statutes detailed herein have preemptive force as against the subject resolutions of the City of Ann Arbor attempting to open the way for the implementation of the death by rifle shot of hundreds of deer and their in utero offspring within City parkland over the course of the coming four years, beginning immediately if not restrained by this Court. 445. Therefore, Plaintiffs pray this Court for immediate declaratory relief adjudicating the respective rights and obligations of the parties, granting immediate relief temporarily restraining Defendants against committing the unlawful and unconstitutional acts against the peace, against the public trust, and against the rights of Plaintiffs, and continuing such relief provisionally by preliminarily enjoining Defendants pendente lite, and, upon trial of this cause, issue a permanent injunction or decree as prayed for herein, restore improperly allocated resources to the City treasury to redress injury to the interests of Plaintiffs as municipal taxpayers, along with an award of damages necessary to redress Plaintiffs’ continuing injuries. The damages Plaintiffs claim for their injuries and which they seek herein to recover against the U.S. Defendants in the aggregate do not exceed the amount of $10,000.

85

COUNT FIVE ESTOPPEL TO ASSERT GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FOR ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES CLAIMS, AND FOR ANTICIPATORY ASSAULT AND NUISANCE CLAIMS 446. The transport of loaded firearms discharge of firearms by persons carrying them on foot, in motor vehicles while in motion, or in motor vehicles that are stationary in the dark of night within the confines of a large densely populated metropolis is an ultrahazardous, extrahazardous, inherently dangerous, and abnormally dangerous activity under Michigan law, federal law, and American law. 447. The threatened activity involves an appreciable chance of causing serious injury to Plaintiffs or others within the sphere of danger. 448. A mishap resulting in some harm to Plaintiffs or others similarly situated is likely to occur. 449. The failure to warn persons of the deadly threat with signs of adequate visibility and in other languages in addition to the English language and through other avenues of giving notice is a separate breach of duty owing by Defendants to Plaintiffs, especially given the large proportion of foreign-born members of the populace likely to enter or seek to enter the park. 450. There are numerous additional ways to effectuate proper notice to Plaintiffs and to the public, but Defendants have failed and refused to take necessary action to given even the most minimally effective notice. 86

451. The notice given so far is inadequate and certainly not in proportion to the extreme degree of danger about which the public must be warned and warned conspicuously and forcefully. 452. The subject activity is highly dangerous as a pure matter of law because it is one not the kind commonly engaged in at a setting not commonly the locus of such activity, and, even where reasonable care is exercised, the risk of harm is great and the gravity of the harm is great. 453. Defendants, knowing this, nevertheless seek to move forward with the activity. 454. Defendants are intentionally exposing others to great danger. 455. No matter how socially desirable the activity, because its danger cannot be checked, and because Defendants nevertheless insist on creating the danger the law allocates the risk of harm to the person or entity engaging in that ultrahazardous and abnormally dangerous activity. 456. If Defendants insist on embarking on their campaign to turn the parks of Ann Arbor into killing fields, they should do so knowing they are estopped to raise and assert the defenses and immunities attending to them as governmental entities and agents engaged in a governmental function that might relieve them from liability and enable them keep the blood off their own hands, leaving it on the bodies

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of the Plaintiffs, and leaving it to Plaintiffs and their loved ones to bear the loss without recourse. 457. Defendants each seek to claim they are released from liability, and, upon information and belief, Defendants lack adequate insurance and lack the ability to post adequate security to stand as an injury fund to compensate Plaintiffs for injuries result from the massive urban assault. 458. Defendants, therefore, must be estopped from refusing to accept legal responsibility. 459. Defendants, further, should be estopped from claiming they are not strictly liable under applicable law. 460. Defendants should further be estopped from asserting the defenses of comparative negligence, contributory negligence, license, or legal justification or excuse, or other defense which violates public policy of the State of Michigan, of the several states, or the public policy of the United States. 461. Defendants’ activity, in addition to being an ultrahazardous, extrahazardous, abnormally dangerous, and inherently dangerous activity, also constitutes anticipatory assault, nuisance, and gross negligence (at best). 462. As a condition to embarking on the ultrahazardous activity, Defendants should be required to post a bond with the Clerk of this Court in an amount not less than $10,000,000. 88

463. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that Defendants will, upon any injury, be deemed at law to be strictly liable 464. Further, Defendants must be held accountable for other eventualities, such as damage to property, or the management of a deer that, though injured, may survive long enough to tread onto a public highway thus threatening public traffic safety, or the eventuality of a deer coming within the boundaries of the property of Plaintiffs, so that Defendants will be forewarned of their legal liability to Plaintiffs should they trespass on their lands to recover the animal or the remains of the animal, and be fully liable and accountable to the Plaintiffs and to this Court to correct and remediate adverse health and environmental consequences. 465. Therefore, Plaintiffs pray this Court for immediate declaratory relief adjudicating the respective rights and obligations of the parties, granting immediate relief temporarily restraining Defendants against committing the unlawful and unconstitutional acts against the peace, against the public trust, and against the rights of Plaintiffs, and continuing such relief provisionally by preliminarily enjoining Defendants pendente lite, and, upon trial of this cause, issue a permanent injunction or decree as prayed for herein, restore improperly allocated resources to the City treasury to redress injury to the interests of Plaintiffs as municipal taxpayers, along with an award of damages necessary to redress Plaintiffs’ continuing injuries. The

89

damages Plaintiffs claim for their injuries and which they seek herein to recover against the U.S. Defendants in the aggregate do not exceed the amount of $10,000. COUNT SIX CLAIMS AGAINST CITY AND STATE DEFENDANTS FOR DEPRIVATION, ACTING UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW, OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES SECURED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS 466. City Defendants and State Defendants, acting under color of state law, have subjected, have caused to be subjected, and threaten to continue to subject Plaintiffs to the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the constitution and laws of the United States as detailed herein and are, therefore, liable to Plaintiffs for redress. 467. Defendants, having knowledge of the wrongs to be done and the power with reasonable diligence to prevent them, are liable to Plaintiffs for their injuries. 468. Such conduct is willful or knowingly ignorant, is done pursuant to a policy under color of state law, and is done with callous disregard of such rights of, and injuries to, Plaintiffs. 469. Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for all relief and damages to which they are entitled under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985 and 1986. 470. Therefore, Plaintiffs pray this Court for immediate declaratory relief adjudicating the respective rights and obligations of the parties, granting immediate relief temporarily restraining Defendants against committing the unlawful and 90

unconstitutional acts against the peace, against the public trust, and against the rights of Plaintiffs, and continuing such relief provisionally by preliminarily enjoining Defendants pendente lite, and, upon trial of this cause, issue a permanent injunction or decree as prayed for herein, restore improperly allocated resources to the City treasury to redress injury to the interests of Plaintiffs as municipal taxpayers, along with an award of damages necessary to redress Plaintiffs’ continuing injuries. The damages Plaintiffs claim for their injuries and which they seek herein to recover against the U.S. Defendants in the aggregate do not exceed the amount of $10,000. COUNT SEVEN CLAIMS AGAINST UNITED STATES DEFENDANTS FOR DEPRIVATION, ACTING UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW, OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES ANDIMMUNITIES SECURED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS AND FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS ACTING UNDER COLOR OF UNITED STATES LAW 471. U.S. Defendants, acting under color of state law, have subjected, have caused to be subjected, and threaten to continue to subject Plaintiffs to the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the constitution and laws of the United States as detailed herein and are, therefore, liable to Plaintiffs for redress. 472. U.S. Defendants, acting under color of the laws of the United States, have subjected, have caused to be subjected, and threaten to continue to subject Plaintiffs to the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the 91

constitution and laws of the United States as detailed herein and are, therefore, liable to Plaintiffs for redress. 473. U.S. Defendants are otherwise liable for the constitutional rights deprivations to the injury of Plaintiffs as detailed herein, such conduct constituting a constitutional tort or several constitutional torts simultaneously. Simultaneously, in seriatim, or in the aggregate. 474. Defendants, having knowledge of the wrongs to be done and the power with reasonable diligence to prevent them, are liable to Plaintiffs for their injuries. 475. Such conduct is willful or knowingly ignorant, is done pursuant to a policy under color of state law, and is done with callous disregard of such rights of, and injuries to, Plaintiffs. 476. Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for all relief and damages to which they are entitled under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985 and 1986. 477. Therefore, Plaintiffs pray this Court for immediate declaratory relief adjudicating the respective rights and obligations of the parties, granting immediate relief temporarily restraining Defendants against committing the unlawful and unconstitutional acts against the peace, against the public trust, and against the rights of Plaintiffs, and continuing such relief provisionally by preliminarily enjoining Defendants pendente lite, and, upon trial of this cause, issue a permanent injunction or decree as prayed for herein, restore improperly allocated resources to the City 92

treasury to redress injury to the interests of Plaintiffs as municipal taxpayers, along with an award of damages necessary to redress Plaintiffs’ continuing injuries. The damages Plaintiffs claim for their injuries and which they seek herein to recover against the U.S. Defendants in the aggregate do not exceed the amount of $10,000. COUNT EIGHT CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 478. Two or more of Defendants, in one or more combinations or series and system of several combinations among at least any two of them, acting in active concert pursuant to a common plan, plans, or series of plans, committing wrongful acts by lawful means, lawful acts by wrongful means, or unlawful acts by unlawful means, have deprived, either directly or indirectly, Plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws and of equal privileges and immunities under the laws and for the purpose of hindering the authorities of the State of Michigan from giving or securing to persons within the state the equal protection of the laws. 479. Defendants, having knowledge of the wrongs to be done and the power with reasonable diligence to prevent them, are liable to Plaintiffs for their injuries. 480. Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for all relief and damages to which they are entitled under 42 U.S.C. §§1985 and 1986. 481. Therefore, Plaintiffs pray this Court for immediate declaratory relief adjudicating the respective rights and obligations of the parties, granting immediate 93

relief temporarily restraining Defendants against committing the unlawful and unconstitutional acts against the peace, against the public trust, and against the rights of Plaintiffs, and continuing such relief provisionally by preliminarily enjoining Defendants pendente lite, and, upon trial of this cause, issue a permanent injunction or decree as prayed for herein, restore improperly allocated resources to the City treasury to redress injury to the interests of Plaintiffs as municipal taxpayers, along with an award of damages necessary to redress Plaintiffs’ continuing injuries. The damages Plaintiffs claim for their injuries and which they seek herein to recover against the U.S. Defendants in the aggregate do not exceed the amount of $10,000. COUNT NINE COMMON LAW CONSPIRACY 482. Two or more of Defendants, in one or more combinations or series and systems of several combinations among at least any two of them, acting in active concert pursuant to a common plan, plans, or series of plans, committing wrongful acts by lawful means, lawful acts by wrongful means, or unlawful acts by unlawful means, have injured or threatened to injure, either directly or indirectly, Plaintiffs, in the manners and ways, using the means, detailed herein. 483. As a direct result of this conspiracy or combination, or these conspiracies and combinations, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer injuries. 94

484. Therefore, Plaintiffs pray this Court for immediate declaratory relief adjudicating the respective rights and obligations of the parties, granting immediate relief temporarily restraining Defendants against committing the unlawful and unconstitutional acts against the peace, against the public trust, and against the rights of Plaintiffs, and continuing such relief provisionally by preliminarily enjoining Defendants pendente lite, and, upon trial of this cause, issue a permanent injunction or decree as prayed for herein, restore improperly allocated resources to the City treasury to redress injury to the interests of Plaintiffs as municipal taxpayers, along with an award of damages necessary to redress Plaintiffs’ continuing injuries. The damages. Plaintiffs claim for their injuries and which they seek herein to recover against the U.S. Defendants in the aggregate do not exceed the amount of $10,000. COUNT TEN DECLARATORY RELIEF 485. Plaintiffs have demonstrated herein an actual case and controversy ripe for, and requiring, immediate adjudication by this Court. U.S. CONST. art. 3, sec. 2. 486. Therefore, Plaintiffs pray this Court immediately to adjudicate the respective rights and obligations of the parties in the context of the factual and legal allegations detailed in support herein, imposing a constructive trust over all benefits wrongfully gained by Defendants to the detriment of Plaintiffs and those similarly situated to them. 95

COUNT ELEVEN INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 487. Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of one or more of their claims detailed and factually supported herein. 488. Plaintiffs lack an adequate remedy at law to redress the harms suffered and the harms they will continue to suffer if this Court does not immediately intervene to prevent it. 489. An immediate, preliminary and provisional restraining order and injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo. 490. A balance of the harms to Plaintiffs and to the public interest if the injunctive relief requested is not granted against the harms to Defendants if the requested injunctive relief is granted weighs heavily if not conclusively in favor of Defendants. 491. As further demonstrated herein, the injunctive relief request will not hurt the public interest but will indeed serve the public interest. 492. The public interest will be harmed if the injunctive relief requested is not granted. 493. Therefore, Plaintiffs pray this Court for immediate relief temporarily restraining Defendants against committing the unlawful and unconstitutional acts against the peace, against the public trust, and against the rights of Plaintiffs, and 96

continuing such relief provisionally by preliminarily enjoining Defendants pendente lite, and, upon trial of this cause, to issue a permanent injunction or decree as prayed for herein, restore improperly allocated resources to the City treasury to redress injury to the interests of Plaintiffs as municipal taxpayers. PRAYER FOR IMMEDIATE, PROVISIONAL, AND PERMANENT EQUITABLE RELIEF AND DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT Therefore, Plaintiffs prayer this Court for immediate, provisional, and permanent equitable relief and other equitable relief detailed and supported herein or to which the Court deems and decrees Plaintiffs are entitled. Plaintiffs further demand judgment against Defendants for compensatory, actual, incidental, consequential, exemplary, punitive, and other damages. Plaintiffs’ claim for their injuries and damages which they seek herein to recover against the U.S. Defendants in the aggregate do not exceed the amount of $10,000. Plaintiffs also request an award of costs, interest, expert witness fees, attorneys’ fees, and other expenses necessitated by Defendants’ nonfeasance, misfeasance, and malfeasance. CRANBROOK LAW GROUP, P.C.

By /s/ Barry R. Powers BARRY R. POWERS (P40589) 39533 Woodward Ave., Ste. 170. Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48304-5099 (248) 642-9888 Attorneys for Plaintiffs DATED: December 30, 2015 97

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