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The meaning and existence of restricted competition Okeoghene Odudu

in The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81 Published in print: 2006 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press March 2012 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199278169 eISBN: 9780191699962 acprof:oso/9780199278169.003.0005 Item type: chapter

This chapter explains the meaning of restricted competition and the reason for its existence. Also, this chapter is concerned with the main problem of what is meant by a restriction of competition. Restriction of competition is a jurisdictional rather than substantive requirement. This view is regarded as reflecting past practices, but not those to be used in the future. Moreover, this is asserted whenever a purchaser loses an element of the freedom over what to do with goods or services. This shows that competition law aims to protect and promote certain freedoms. However, allocative efficiency is said to be the effect of restricting competition. This effect of restricting competition is determined by the scope and content of the most intensive intervention centres in cases involving collusion legally presumed to have resulted in allocative inefficiency.

Competition Law and Industrial Policy: Conflict, Adaptation, and Complementarity Thorsten Käseberg and Arthe Van Laer

in The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law Published in print: 2013 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press September 2013 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199665358 eISBN: 9780191748578 acprof:oso/9780199665358.003.0006 Item type: chapter

This chapter examines the relationship between competition policy and industrial policy. It shows that the principal determinants that influenced the relationship between competition policy and industrial policy in the European Economic Community (EEC) include the Treaty of Rome and its system of ‘undistorted competition’, which installed a competition Page 1 of 6 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 22 January 2017

regime with a strong, ‘constitutional’ character. The interaction of competition policy and industrial policy was also shaped by the personal characteristics and relationships of individual Commissioners, and by the broader economic context — a factor that became particularly important when it was realized that the plight of certain industries was not only acute but structural as well.

The European Union: The Competition Law System and the Union’s Norms Loannis Lianos and Arianna Andreangeli

in The Design of Competition Law Institutions: Global Norms, Local Choices Published in print: 2012 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press January 2013 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199670048 eISBN: 9780191744341 acprof:oso/9780199670048.003.0009 Item type: chapter

This chapter discusses the history, institutional structure, mandate, procedural characteristics, and agency performance of the EU's competition law system. The competition law provisions of the European Treaty have remained unchanged since the Treaty of Rome was adopted in 1957. The Treaty is now called the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The European Commission is the body primarily responsible for the enforcement of these provisions. Through the initiation of the Competition Directorate, the European Commission investigates, enforces, and adjudicates all issues relating to competition law within its jurisdiction.

Corporate and Individual Sanctions Christopher Harding and Julian Joshua in Regulating Cartels in Europe Published in print: 2010 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press 2011 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199551484 eISBN: 9780191594977 acprof:oso/9780199551484.003.0012 Item type: chapter

This chapter provides a detailed account and critical evaluation of the range of sanctions now used in the European context to deal with cartel violations, as applied to both corporate and individual offenders. The core of the discussion is the use of financial penalties — still the primary sanction imposed upon corporate actors — and the increasing resort to criminal penalties and in particular prison terms, which may be applied to individual offenders at a national level. These penal developments and their origins are fully debated, and the evidence to date regarding the Page 2 of 6 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 22 January 2017

comparative effectiveness of these measures is considered. Necessarily there is also discussion of the pragmatic moderation of sanctions, through strategies such as leniency programmes, penalty discounts, and shorter settlement procedures, all of which have become an important aspect of this penal landscape. Other sanctions, notably termination orders, private claims for compensation, disqualification, and confiscation are also discussed, and generally the need to establish a coherent and sensible ordering of sanctions is addressed.

The European Model Daniel A. Crane

in The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement Published in print: 2011 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press 2011 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780195372656 eISBN: 9780199893287 acprof:oso/9780195372656.003.0010 Item type: chapter

This chapter analyzes the “European Model” from the vantage point of the European Commission and European courts. It also looks at their relationship with Member State institutions. The chapter pays particular attention to four areas of contrast between the United States model and European model. These are: the roles of expertise and independence, the balance between inquisitorial and adversarial process, federalism, and private antitrust enforcement. The difference between the United States and European antitrust models is that the United States employs an administrative model, whereas the European Commission employs an inquisitorial administrative model.

Chile

Damien Géradin and Michel Kerf in Controlling Market Power in Telecommunications: Antitrust vs. SectorSpecific Regulation Published in print: 2003 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press March 2012 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199242436 eISBN: 9780191697104 acprof:oso/9780199242436.003.0007 Item type: chapter

This chapter discusses the origins and characteristics of the regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector in Chile. The Chilean government promoted competition in all segments of the telecommunications market in the early 1980s. Sector-specific rules were largely confined to technical standards, monitored by the telecommunications regulator Subsecretaría de Telecommunicaciones Page 3 of 6 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 22 January 2017

(SUBTEL). The regulatory framework was modified in the late 1980s and in the first half of the 1990s to include further sector-specific rules in pricing, interconnection, and market structure, and to grant additional responsibilities to the regulator. A shift thus occurred from a regulatory framework dominated by economy-wide components to one with more emphasis on sector-specific components.

The International Institutions of Competition Law: The Systems’ Norms Eleanor M. Fox and Amedeo Arena

in The Design of Competition Law Institutions: Global Norms, Local Choices Published in print: 2012 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press January 2013 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199670048 eISBN: 9780191744341 acprof:oso/9780199670048.003.0010 Item type: chapter

This chapter examines four institutions that have or prospectively may have a significant role to play in global competition law or policy: the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the International Competition Network (ICN). For each institution, it first describes the institutional system to the extent necessary to report what process norms are implied or express in the inputs and outputs of the system. It then examines the norms against notional international standards. Finally, it offers a critical evaluation and recommendations. It is shown that compliance with institutional performance and due process norms varies considerably among the four international institutions, as do their institutional design and mandate.

Sanctions: A Complex European and International Grid Christopher Harding and Julian Joshua in Regulating Cartels in Europe Published in print: 2010 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press 2011 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199551484 eISBN: 9780191594977 acprof:oso/9780199551484.003.0011 Item type: chapter

This chapter sets the scene and provides context for a discussion of the range of sanctions now being used to deal with established cartel violations. The point is emphasised that there is now a complex typology and geography of sanctions in relation to international cartels — across jurisdictions and at different legal levels (international, European, and Page 4 of 6 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 22 January 2017

national). Important critical themes of discussion are also outlined — the impact of leniency on the choice and operation of sanctions, the way in which the range and severity of sanctions has increased, and the cost and effectiveness of this process of penal expansion. The purpose of the chapter is to provide a critical framework for the detailed discussion of sanctions contained in the following chapter.

National Traditions of Competition Law: A Belated Europeanization through Convergence? Adrian Kuenzler and Laurent Warlouzet

in The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law Published in print: 2013 Published Online: Publisher: Oxford University Press September 2013 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199665358 eISBN: 9780191748578 acprof:oso/9780199665358.003.0004 Item type: chapter

This chapter assesses the influence of the national traditions of competition policy on the Community as well as the flows from the European level back to the national tier. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the economic context and regulatory framework up to the end of the Second World War, underscoring that a cartel-friendly environment existed in Europe at that time. Section 3 describes how the national trajectories evolved under these circumstances. Section 4 shows that while the national legislators began to take into account European competition law, the particular economic policy contexts and designs of national institutions, as well as a dimension of cross-fertilization, influenced and shaped supranational norms to a significant extent. Section 5 summarizes and draws out more generalized lines of conclusion.

The Importance of Harm

Christina Bohannan and Herbert Hovenkamp in Creation without Restraint: Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in Innovation Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May Publisher: Oxford University Press 2012 DOI: 10.1093/ ISBN: 9780199738830 eISBN: 9780199932702 acprof:oso/9780199738830.003.0004 Item type: chapter

This chapter analyzes the unjustified differences between proof of harm in competition and innovation policy. In antitrust law, harm is never presumed and must be proven without undue speculation, and legal remedies are often denied to those who were clearly harmed. By contrast, IP law often presumes harm, sometimes even going to the Page 5 of 6 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 22 January 2017

extreme of awarding damages to IP owners who were actually benefitted rather than harmed by a defendant's actions. The rhetoric of “property” that is used in IP discourse explains part, but hardly all, of this difference.

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