REINHOLD NIEBUHR: THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER* merican political thought, we have often been told, is mediocre, second-rate, largely because "it has not been characteristic of Americans to concern themselves with the stratosphere of political speculation, and the result among others is that our soil has "1 bred no Hobbes, no Locke, no Marx, no Rousseau. True, perhaps; but we have often been neglectful as well, particularly toward those thinkers in our midst who have theological predilection, such as Josiah Royce or the subject of this essay, Reinhold Niebuhr.2 If it is the task of the political philospher to attempt to understand the human self and the human community as well as the moral dilemmas associated with being a self and being in a community, then Reinhold Niebuhr is such a thinker, possibly, as Hans J.

A

* The debts incurred in the preparation of this essay are many. I must especially acknowledge four: Professor Rene Williamson, who stimulated the project; the Louisiana State University Graduate Council for the financial support to spend a Summer perusing the writings and papers of Reinhold Niebuhr; the staff of the Archives at the Library of Congress where Niebuhr's papers are housed; and Mr. Laurence Holland, student worker, who performed most of the tedium associated with any such study and whose recent and tragic death cause all who were associated with him to grieve over their loss. 1 Robert G. McCloskey, "American Political Thought and the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review LI (March, 1957), p. 115. 2 A quick perusal of textbooks in American political thoughtwill substantiate this thesis. Such "classics" as Francis G. Wilson, The American Political Mind (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949), Alpheus T. Mason and Richard H. Leach, In Quest of Freedom (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), or Allen P. Grimes, American Political Thought (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960) mention Niebuhr and Royce only in passing or not at all. Newer works, Mason Druckman, Community and Purpose in America: An Analysis of American Political Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971) or David W. Minar, Ideas and Politics: The American Experience ( Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1964) present no exception to this rule. A. J. Beitzinger's A History of American Thought (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1972) is a major deviation in this regard. His exceptionally thorough work has i mportant discussions of both Niebuhr and Royce. Beitzinger's work may be an indication of a trend. Recent issues of The Political Science Reviewer have also exhibited a major interest in theology, European and American. See for example: Rene Williamson, "The Political Implications of the Theology of Paul Tillich," III (Fall, 1973), pp. 109141 and "The Political Implications of the Theology of Karl Barth," IV (Fall, 1974), pp. 105-131; as well as L. Earl Shaw, "The Political Implications of the Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr," VII (Fall, 1977), pp. 53-90.

104

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

Morgenthau has suggested, "the only creative political philosopher since Calhoun."3 Niebuhr is known best as a Christian realist who counseled a political pragmatism and whose thought was closely bound to his intense social activism. There is truth in this, but his thought transcends the turbulent decades before and after World War II. It is more than the apologetics of a "timely" thinker and because of that, is deserving of reemphasis and reassessment. The Man and His Work

Reinhold Niebuhr was born July 21, 1892 in Wright City, Missouri but lived most of his early years in Lincoln, Illinois. 4 His father was a German immigrant and pastor of the local congregation. of the Evangelical Synod. 5 The influence of the father was so strong that both Reinhold and his brother H. Richard Niebuhr entered the ministry, H. Richard becoming a highly respected theologian, certainly a more systematic theologian than his better known brother. Reinhold Niebuhr received his secondary education in Lincoln, attended Elmhurst College in Elmhurst, Illinois and then studied at Eden Theological Seminary and Yale Divinity School. In 1915 he was ordained a minister in the Evan3 Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Influence of Reinhold Niebuhr in American Political Life and Thought," in Reinhold Niebuhr: A Prophetic Voice in Our Time, ed. Harold Landon (Greenwich, Connecticut: The Seabury Press, 1962),

p. 109.

4 The biographies of Reinhold Niebuhr include the following: Ronald H. Stone, Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet to Politician (New York: Abingdon Press, 1972) and Paul Merkley, Reinhold Niebuhr: A Political Account (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1975). As their titles indicate, both are intellectual biographies with special emphasis on the relationship between Niebuhr's writings and his political commitments. A broader and more personal account of Niebuhr's life, although it too discusses the relationship between thought and action, is June Bingham, Courage to Change: An Introduction to the Life and Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961). Finally, Nathan A. Scott; Jr:s "Introduction," to a volume he edited entitled The Legacy of Reinhold Niebuhr (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974) is a short but excellent biographical and intellectual introduction to Niebuhr upon which I have relied heavily. Other biographical information about Niebuhr can be found in Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, editors, Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956). 6 The Evangelical Synod was a small Lutheran sect which merged with a Calvinist group in 1934 forming the Evangelical and Reformed Church. This group in turn merged with the Congregational Church in 1956 to form the United Church of Christ.

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

105

gelical Synod of America and served from then until 1928 as Pastor of Bethel Church in Detroit, Michigan. During this tenure as pastor of a small working class congregation, in what was a Henry Ford town, Niebuhr became deeply concerned about the problems of social justice in a bourgeois democracy. He adopted a Christian pacifist stance in the face of World War I and gradually began to move toward the Socialist Party. As always, he wrote prolifically in the Atlantic Monthly, The Christian Century and The Nation and published his first book, Does Civilization Need Religion?6 in 1927. Largely a product of the Detroit years, this volume is still useful as an introduction to Niebuhr's thought. His views on the importance of personality, his criticisms of fundamentalism and liberals, and his emphases on the ethical aspects of religion are not terribly well developed, but they do serve as a clear prelude to his later thought. In 1928 Niebuhr joined the faculty of Union Theological Seminary in New York City where he would remain until retirement in 1960. In this vital center of intellectual and political life he flourished, becoming national chairman of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (a pacifist organization), the Socialist Party's candidate for Congress from Morningside Heights and one of the founders of the Fellowship of Socialist Christians. His preoccupation with social justice and growing disenchantment with liberal Christianity reached a high point in 1932 with the publication of one of his best known works, Moral Man and Immoral Society. ? A quasiMarxist work in analytical terms, it attacks laissez-faire capitalism and the bourgeois ethics of a liberal society and church. This early stage of Niebuhr's career, sometimes referred to as his "ChristianMarxist" phase, reached its culmination in 1934 with still another publication, Reflections on the End of an Era . s Niebuhr's association with pacifism and socialism was shortlived. Events in Europe during the 1930's and the world depression sobered his mood and increased his affinity for a political realism based upon an equilibration of power. He felt it necessary to disassociate himself from the pacifist movement and did so both instiReinhold Niebuhr, Doe, Civilization Need Religion? ( New York: The MacCo., 1927). 7 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932). 8 Reinhold Niebuhr, Reflections on the End of An Era (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934). 6

millan

106

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

tutionally and intellectually, the latter expression taking form in a work published in 1940, Christianity and Power Politics.° During these same years of growing disenchantment with the left, Niebuhr's interests turned more systematically to an exploration of theology, predictably in the areas of ethics and politics. The occasion on which he began this venture was the invitation to deliver the Rauschenbusch Lectures at Colgate-Rochester Divinity School in 1934. The lectures appeared a year later and became his first significant theological statement, entitled An Interpretation of Christian Ethics. Y°

The Rauschenbusch Lectures, along with two other works, (a collection of essays based upon sermons) and the aforementioned Christianity and Power Politics, established Niebuhr as one of the important social thinkers of the twentieth century. His reputation as a dialectical theologian, emphasizing the tensions between the law of love and the reality of man, grew along with his already well known abilities as a social critic. It was no surprise that he was invited to deliver the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 1939. He chose as his subject "The Nature and Destiny of Man. " The lectures were published shortly thereafter in a two volume work of the same name. 12 Highly influenced .by Augustine, Kierkegaard, and especially Pascal, this magnum opus is a far ranging work on the influence of the Renaissance, Reformation, Marxism, and Romanticism as well as Greece on modern culture. Brilliantly interwoven with these historical analyses is the development of a 13Christian philosophy of history and a "phenomenology of selfhood." The fame brought to Niebuhr as a result of his Gifford Lectures only served to intensify his intellectual and political activities. He continued his extraordinary schedule of teaching, directing graduate students, preaching at college chapels, and lecturing literally across the globe. Additionally, he was, for a time, associate Beyond Tragedy"-

9 Reinhold Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940). 10 Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1935). 11 Reinhold Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937). 12 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Volume I, Human Nature (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941); Volume II, Human Destiny (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943). 13 Scott, The Legacy of Reinhold Niebuhr, p. xvii.

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

107

editor of The Nation, editor of Christianity and Crisis (a journal he established in 1941) and Christianity and Society, the official journal of the Fellowship of Socialist Christians. He was vicepresident of the Liberal Party of New York State and first national chairman of the Union for Democratic Action, a forerunner of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) which was founded in 1947 and in which Niebuhr was an active member. He was also instrumental in establishing organizations such as the Committee for Cultural Freedom, the American Association for a Democratic Germany, the American Christian Palestine Committee, and the Resettlement Campaign for Exiled Professionals. In the latter part of the decade of the 1940's he was a chief advisor to the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. In addition to these political activities, his intellectual output was enormous. In the decade from 1942-1952 he wrote 182 articles for major journals such as Sewanee Review, Commentary, and Atlantic Monthly.'4 In 1946 he published another collection of essays (rewritten sermons), Discerning the Signs of the Times, 15 two rather "realistic" treatises on democracy and the American tradition-The Children of Light and the Children of Darhness 16 and The Irony of American History 17-and a major essay expanding upon the themes of the Gifford Lectures, Faith and History. 18

The energy required for such an outpouring of activity took its toll, however; and in February of 1952 Niebuhr suffered the first of many small strokes that would threaten his life, slow his pace to that of a "normal" human being, cause some partial paralysis of arm and hand, but never still his indomitable spirit. He eventually returned to the classroom at Union until mandatory retirement in 1960. His years after 1952 were quiet, less active, convalescent ones in which eleven books were written and published! Three remain important: Christian Realism and Political Ibid., pp. xix-xx. is Reinhold Niebuhr, Discerning the Signs of the Times (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946). 16 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944). 17 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (New York: Charles Scribner 's Sons, 1952). 15 Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History: A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views of History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949). 14

108

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

a collection of essays on Marxism, socialism, liberal and conservative foreign policy, and a very important essay on "Augustine's Political Realism"; The Self and the Dramas of History, 20 a quasi-metaphysical exploration of selfhood and history; and The Structure of Nations and Empires,21 a philosophical exegesis on community and dominion in the contemporary world.22 The 1960's, a turbulent decade in American history, was a quiet one for Niebuhr. He moved to Stockbridge, Massachusetts with his wife, Ursula, who relinquished her chair of the Department of Religion at Barnard College to care for her husband. Yet, Niebuhr continued to offer sympathy and counsel to the civil rights movements of the decade, as well as to the resistance to American involvement in Southeast Asia. Still active in the ADA, recipient of many honorary degrees and awards, he had time for a final statement, Man's Nature and His Communities, 28 partly a continued exploration of his views on human nature and the possibilities of a loving community and partly a mildly autobiographical apology for the perceived extremes of earlier works. Reinhold Niebuhr died 24 on June 1, 1971. What is one to say about such a career? How is it possible to assess the intellectual contributions of Niebuhr? One conventional and quite sensible approach is to view Niebuhr's thought in terms of its chronological development. Ronald H. Stone does this and elucidates four periods of Niebuhr's intellectual life: The liberal, the Socialist, the Christian realist and the pragmatic liberal Problems"

1

9 Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953). 29 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955). 21 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959). 22 Scott, The Legacy of Reinhold Niebuhr, pp, x-xx. 23 Reinhold Niebuhr, Man's Nature and His Communities (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965). 24 In addition to the writings of Reinhold Niebuhr mentioned in this short biographical introduction there are a number of collections of his writings worth consulting: Justice and Mercy, edited by Ursula M. Niebuhr (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), a collection of sermons and prayers; Love and Justice: Selections from the Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, D. B. Robertson, editor (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1976); Faith and Politics: A Commentary on Religious, Social and Political Thought in a Technological Age (New York: George Braziller, 1968); and a most important work Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics, edited by Henry R. Davis and Robert C. Good (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960).

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

109

phases. 2 5 Similarly Paul Merkley sees Niebuhr's ideological development as proceeding from the protestant progressive period as "Bethel's Pastor," to the "Apostle of the Left," "Theologian of 26 Crisis" and finally, "Theologian of the Vital Center." Others, like D. R. Davies 27 and June Bingham, 28 see Niebuhr as a supremely dialectical thinker, desirous of understanding and explaining the world in a rationally coherent manner but not afraid of admitting ignorance in the midst of the irrational, nor uneasy about paradox. Indeed, Niebuhr agreed with his friend Paul Tillich that "reality is "29 dialectical. This essay shall take the latter approach to Niebuhr, insisting on the supremely dialectical quality of his thought with two slight revisions. First, despite the fact that Niebuhr altered his views, there are themes which remain essentially unchanged. In terms of political philosophy these are the important aspects of Niebuhr's thought. I shall, therefore, emphasize the "continuity" of Niebuhr's thought in terms of four major themes: Social criticism; the Self; the Self and Community; and the Self and History. Second, in the process of pursuing the thematic continuity of his works, I shall attempt to temper the overly zealous and exclusive inclusion of Niebuhr into the political realist encampment. Social Criticism

Niebuhr regarded himself as a teacher of social ethics, not a systematic theologian. The brief biographical account above substantiates the notion that his interest in ethics was anything but an academic one. He was always "testing" ideas in the world of experience, always revising, amending, and reassessing his views on how the basic principles of his ethic should apply to politics. The account of his life also indicates how seriously he viewed his role as a teacher of ethics. As an apologetic, he quite simply believed that the Christian faith was relevant to the social world, primarily because of its view of the self and history., But, as a believer, he was never uncritical or dogmatically insistent on a particular set of tenets. Criticism, in fact, was his method. He often Stone, Reinhold Niebuhr:. Prophet to Politician. Merkley, Reinhold Niebuhr: A Political Account. 27 Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet from America (London: James Clarke & Co., 1945). 26

26

28 29

Courage to Change. Ibid., p. 33.

110

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

began a treatise ort grace or history by looking at how others had viewed these concepts and then subjecting them to a critique. Out of these criticisms come syntheses of new and, at times, clearer understanding. Thus, while his intellectual debts are many: Paul, Luther, Augustine, Kierkegaard, Tillich, and Pascal, few of these escape unscathed from his critical view. Neither does the modern world. Indeed, it is appropriate to begin an analysis of Niebuhr's thought with an examination of his critique of modernity. Modern culture is characterized by the dominance of reason and optimism. Both are rooted in the Renaissance view of man and history as well as the vitalism of the 19th century. Both have given rise, fully developed, to an empirical culture which is "blind" to 3 some obvious facts. ° The Renaissance, is, in part, a spiritual movement where the limitless possibilities of human existence are affirmed and where history is rediscovered as having meaning. This optimism was not entirely misplaced. The success of the Renaissance point of view has brought about significant advancements in science, increases in wealth and commerce, changes in political systems, and the discovery of a new world. The Renaissance, however, does not deal with the problems of power and ignores the need for grace. This is so because it accepts the classical view that logos or reason can suffice to bring the chaos of the world under its dominion. Further, in Renaissance thought the belief in the heightened capacity of the individual does not contain within it a recognition of the possibility for evil. History is the advancement of the good, the rational. Contemporary sectarian radicals, especially the Marxists, are the children of this faith in reason and progress. They express all of the utopian visions of the Renaissance and, of course, fail to comprehend the significance of Christian eschatology where " the end of history is both judgment and fulfillment. The modern conception 31 sees the end as only fulfillment." The apex of the triumph of the Renaissance perspective may be found in modern empiricism, especially as it is expressed in the social sciences. Niebuhr's criticism of the "sciences" of man echo those of Eric Voegelin. He attacks political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists who have severed their roots from the humanities and endeavored to emulate the physical sciences. The result is 30 31

Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History, p. 128. Niebuhr, Human Destiny, p. 166. See also pp. 160-181.

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

111

frequently a preoccupation with minutiae which obscures the grand and tragic outlines of contemporary history, and offers vapid solu"n tions for profound problems. Niebuhr points to John Dewey as having given classic expression to the optimism of the academic culture and the host of social scientists that hide behind the cloak of disinterestedness in values. Their error lies in their limited view of the self. "None of them deal profoundly with the complex `self' whether in its individual or in its collective form." 33 The positivist dream, then, of finding the laws of society and applying them is likely to become a nightmare. Niebuhr emphasizes this point by frequently using the example of Churchill listening to the Dean of Humanities at M.I.T. speak with awe of the impending capability of the sciences to control the thoughts of human beings with precision. Churchill is reported to have responded, "I shall be very content to be dead before 34 that happens." Niebuhr's objections to modern empiricism are based on epistemological grounds as well as normative ones. The "facts" of sense data, he argues, are limited. Traditional scientific empiricism does not deal confidently or profoundly with other "facts" of reality, such as the freedom of the self, the historical character of the self, or the inevitable possibility of the corruption of the self. Empiricists are ironically blind "to the curious mixtures of egoism and creativity in human selves, manifesting itself on all levels of behavior. "36 Some, B. F. Skinner is given as an example, attempt to manage the historical process in such a fashion as to destroy both that egoism and creativity. Skinner's utopias ... are significantly without any trace of dignity and nobility as well as of jealousy or competitive impulses. These conditioned persons of the psychological utopia are obviously not real selves, and are bereft of the indeterminate possibilities of good and evil characteristic of free selves. 36 Skinner is not alone. Freudian empiricism and Hegelian rational metaphysics are equally incapable of comprehending the wholeness of the self.3 7 The Irony of American History, p. 60. Ibid., p. 82. 34 Ibid. 36 Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History, p. 133. 36 Ibid., p. 132. 37 Ibid., pp. 128-144. 32

33

Niebuhr,

112

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

Niebuhr's critique of the epistemology of modern empiricism extends to the sociology of knowledge as well. Actually he is quite willing to accept the broader implications of the Marxian sociology of knowledge, namely that we are all given to the temptation of selfinterest in interpreting the world. That temptation is even greater in the social sciences because we are dealing with a complex chain of causal events where human agents are intervening in an often unpredictable fashion. The inadequacy of the Marxian view of this ideological propensity is its failure to apply it to itself. 38 The fact that modern culture has not measured man in a "dimension sufficiently high or deep to do full justice" to his capacity for good and evil and yet is able to retain such a good opinion of itself is the final ironic condemnation of its false optimism. This stubborn resistance is the final sin which, as Luther put it, is the unwillingness to concede that we are sinners." It is also the motivation for Niebuhr's turning to another understanding of human na ture, the Christian, which in his opinion is a much more profound and "empirical " view than that offered by modernity. Before developing that view, however, he characteristically subjects it to the critical perspective. Niebuhr's critique of religion began very early in his career when as Bethel's Pastor he witnessed the indifference and impotence of the bourgeois church toward the growing injustices of industrialism. This is the source of his attack on pietism in Moral Man and Immoral Society. Never a strong partisan of the theology of Barth, he argued that the sense of contrition is so strong in the Barthian revival of Lutheran orthodoxy that the distinction between the holiness of God and the sinfulness of man makes it seem as if "man is convicted, not of any particular breeches against the life of the humanity community, but of being human and not divine:" 40 The effects of these attitudes on the life of the church and the believers are to encourage a sense of moral defeatism or indifference accompanied by a desire for ascetic withdrawal from the social realm altogether. Dogmatism in the Christian consensus was equal anathema to Niebuhr, although he was much more drawn to speaking out on it in his later writings, e.g. The Self and the Dramas of History, Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, pp. 79-91. Niebuhr, Human Nature, pp. 121-124. 40 Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 68. 38 39

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

113

partly out of the desire to allay the attempts by interpreters to make him into a fundamentalist thinker. A particularly obnoxious dogma for Niebuhr was the notion that original sin was transmitted from generation to generation and was primarily sensuality rather than self-love. Like pietism the results of such a belief are too often a "system of salvation in which ascetic spirituality became 41 the path to redemption." The dogma of papal supremacy, indeed the whole of the medieval synthesis, was also condemned by Niebuhr; because in the first instance, allowing the claim of the Pope to be Vicar of Christ on earth and to govern the world in His name was evidence of a failure to keep a proper distance between the divine and the human. Papal supremacy had the unfortunate result of diminishing religious experience of the ultimate, what ought to be a matter of personal commitment, into that which is approved by political authority. It transformed the meaning of dogma, which at its best represents an attempt by the faithful to arrive at a consensus on common convictions and commitments, into an expression of mere religious authority.42 In the second instance, the medieval synthesis itself was lacking. Too rational, it could not provide enough limitations on the growth of superstitution and the reduction of grace to magic. Nor, when combined with the rigidity of authority, could its rationality adapt its moral theories to the exigencies of modern life, as for example its inability to deal perceptively with the prohibition of contraception and the moral problem of over-population. 43 Niebuhr was very harsh on Catholicism. Although in his final work, in a spirit of reconciliation, he admits he has a "new appreciation of the fact that a great religious tradition . . . has been able creatively to help modern technical cultures of the West to solve the moral . problems of industrial collectivism." 44 He was no more harsh on Catholicism, however, than of the tradition from which he grew, the Reformation. The Reformation, in Niebuhr's view, made too easy a capitulation to the forces of commercialization. Its preoccupation with the "inner life" actually accelerated the process of secularization in the post-Renaissance world, and Adam Smith replaced Thomas Acquinas as moral authority of that world: The medieval Church was Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History, p. 99. Ibid., pp. 92-104. 43 Ibid., p. 102. See also Niebuhr, Man's Natures and His Communities, p. 19. 44 Niebuhr, Man's Nature and His Communities, p. 19. 41 42

114

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

much more effective in regulating the communal life of human beings whereas Protestantism was more interested in and more stubbornly resistant to the natural appetites of the individual. Actually it is the Protestant Puritan heritage in America which explains rather well how our national life could be religious and materialistic at the same time. 45 The Reformation emphasis on faith and the authority of the scripture had two additionally unfortunate consequences. The first is a tendency toward anti-intellectualism, a contentment with abstract principles of Christian life without the attendant intellectual rigor necessary to apply those principles in practice. The second is Biblicism, the replacement of the authority of the Church with a new idolatry, the Scripture. The Reformation, in sum, was morally too pessimistic and culturally too indifferent. It was defeated by the forces of the Renaissance and that defeat determined the spiritual life of modernity4 The failings of the Reformation in particular have led to the inability of modern Christianity to deal effectively with the problems of politics. Among the many possible causes of this failure . . . the most basic is the tendency of Christianity to destroy the dialectic of prophetic religion, either by sacrificing time and history to eternity or by giving ultimate significance to the relativities of history.Christian orthodoxy chose the first alternative, and Christian lib eralism the second. 47 While modern orthodox Christianity may, in its theological insights, be superior to modern liberalism, it is impotent, too pessimistic, too reactionary, guilty in the final analysis of making Christian ideals irrelevant to political issues. It has abandoned the prophetic tradition and allowed the force of piety to overcome the force of spirituality. Christian liberalism has, on the other hand, adopted the naive optimism of the age of reason, supplanting the "simple gospel of Jesus" for the more paradoxical pessimism and optimism of prophetic religion. Yet, Niebuhr insisted that Christianity was "in the 48 position of having the materials for . . . an adequate morality." The Hebrew-Christian religion has the capacity of dealing signifi-

Niebuhr, Does Civilization Need Religion? pp. 85-103. Niebuhr, Human Destiny, pp. 152-156. 47 Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 129. 45 46

48

Ibid., p. 149, pp. 128-165.

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

115

cantly with moral and social problems because it at once affirms the importance of the mundane world and refuses to capitulate to it. The success of such a religion will depend to a large degree on the quality of "tension it perceives between the historical and transcendent." The Hebrew-Christian faith has such a tension; it has more. It has that "distinctive contribution of religion to morality, . . comprehension of depth in life." 1 ° Niebuhr spent his intellectual life explicating that Christian view of depth beginning with its expression in the notion of the self. The Self

Human nature, for Niebuhr, is a paradox. The paradox stems from the fact that we are self-conscious beings, creators and creatures. The paradoxes of human self-knowledge point to two facts: "man is a child of nature" . . . and . . . "man is a spirit who stands outside of nature." 50 Modern culture, as we have seen, is largely dominated by a view of the rational self and a dualism which assumes the goodness of that self (mind) as opposed to the potential evil of the rational self's temporary crucible (body).5 1 The HebraicChristian view of the self, posited by Niebuhr, disavows this Cartesian dualism. The self engages in a variety of dialogues with itself, but it is an organic unity. There is a rationalistic absurdity to the self because it is "in time and beyond time," spatial and non-spatial; but there are no sharp distinctions that can be made between these dimensions. 5 2 The Biblical view of the self as created in the "image of God" and yet as a creature of sin is to be distinguished from the classical conception in terms of its emphasis on three aspects of human existence. First, it posits a view of human transcendence, more accurately self-transcendence. The self is possessed of a spiritual dimension because it is created in the image of God. Second, we are finite creatures, involved in the contingencies of the temporal mundane world of nature. Niebuhr argues that in its purest form Christianity views man as a unity of these two components. Man is a unity of God-likeness and creatureliness in which he remains a creature even in the highest spiritual dimensions of his existence Ibid., p. 15, pp. 15-39, 93. Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 3. 51 Ibid., pp. 3-13. 62 Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History, pp. 23-25. 49

90

116

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

and may reveal elements 63of the image of God even in the lowliest aspects of his natural life. The third aspect of our nature is bound to the first two and is the source of creativity as well as destruction. The self seeks to escape the creature, seeks freedom from the finite. It is the peculiar nature of man, according to the Biblical view, to deny the contingent aspect of existence and rebel against God or attempt to ursurp Him. The religious dimension of this rebellion is sin, the social dimension is injustice. 54 This paradoxical relation of finitude and infinity, and consequently of freedom and necessity, is the mark of the uniqueness of the human spirit in this creaturely world. Man is the only mortal animal who knows that he is mortal, an act which proves that in some sense he is not mortal. Man is the only creature imbedded in the flux of finitude who knows that this is his fate; which proves that in some sense this is not his fate. Thus when life is seen in its total dimension, the sense of God and the sense of sin are involved in the same act of self-consciousness; for to be self-conscious is to see the self as a finite object separated from essential reality; but also related to it or there could be no knowledge of separation. If this religious feeling is translated into moral terms it becomes the tension between the principle of love and the impulse of egoism, between the obligation to affirm the ultimate unity of life and5 the urge to establish the ego against all competing forms of life. The sins of the ego are many; There is the "pride of power" associated with a self that assumes it has achieved sufficiency and stupidly imagines itself to be secure. Elites, those who have power, are most guilty of this. But there is also the "lust for power which has pride as its end," more apt to be the pride of those forces in a society who are moving into power. These two distinctions are analytical not experiential, for as Niebuhr points out, no one who is powerful is ever likely to be secure. There is the "pride of knowledge." Those who are ignorant of the limitations of the human mind or who wish, for, some reason to obscure the finiteness of the intellect, are guilty of this. The Marxists are an interesting example of the quality and persistence of the sin of pride in human nature. They attribute pride and self-interest to all classes, most especially the bourgeois, yet they commit the same pitiful sin themselves. There is "pride of virtue," the pretentious claim, as in the case of 53 54 55

Niebuhr, Human Nature,

p. 150. Ibid., pp. 150-185. Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, pp. 66-67.

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

117

the Marxist again, that one's virtue is superior. Niebuhr maintains that these three forms of egoism intermix and meet in a form of pride which is spiritual in character and which is "pride and selfglorification in its inclusive and quintessential form." 60 It is important to note that sin involves primarily or primordially, self-love, and not sensuality. He rejects the Hellenistic emphasis in Christianity which equates sin and lust. It is too embued with the Hellene division of spirit and body. Sensuality or lust, however, is a form of sin in the sense that it is another expression of self-love as is drunkenness, gluttony, or inordinate materialism. 67 Niebuhr's emphasis on, some would say preoccupation with, sin is based upon the myth of the Fall. But, he is less interested in the metaphysical connotations of the Fall than he is the psychological and moral ones. If the Fall is a symbol of sin that "lies at the juncture of spirit and nature," we can only comprehend it as we understand the paradoxical Y' elationship of the self as free and contingent. If a free, willing self is involved in sin, not just a "natural" self, then "the reality of moral guilt and responsibility is asserted because the forces and impulses of nature never move by absolute necessity but under and in the freedom of the spirit." 58 This, for Niebuhr, is part of the genius of the prophetic tradition. It also explains why he argues vehemently against doctrines of original sin and total depravity.° 9 If the doctrine of original sin means an inherited corruption, usually associated with lust, this destroys the notion of freedom and responsibility basic to sin. If the self is totally corrupt, then it is not sinful at all, for it is freedom that makes sin possible; and all conno tations of guilt and moral responsibility have been stripped away. 80 The Christian doctrine of original sin with its seemingly contradictory assertions about the inevitability of sin and man's responsibility for sin is a dialectical truth which does justice to the fact that man's self-love and self-centeredness is inevitable, but not in such a way as to fit into the category of natural necessity. 81 Niebuhr was clearly troubled in later years about the confusion over his emphasis on sin and the difficulty of disassociating his view Niebuhr, Human Nature, pp. 188. Ibid., pp. 188-240. 58 Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 81. 59 Ibid., pp. 65-85. so Ibid., pp. 86-93. 51 Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 263. 56 57

118

. THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

of it from the Pelagians, Augustinians, and Biblical literalists. Paul Tillich apparently convinced him of the lack of utility of such symbols as the Fall and original sin. In a preface to The Nature and Destiny of Man, written in 1963, twelve years after its initial publication he wrote, I believed and still believe that human evil, primarily expressed in undue self-concern, is a corruption of its essential freedom and grows with its freedom. . . My only regret [over having used the symbols of the Fall and original sin] is that I did not realize that the legendary character of the one and the dubious connotations of the other would prove so offensive to the modern mind, that my use of them obscured my essential theses of my 62 "realistic" rather than "idealistic" interpretation of human nature.

In a letter to his biographer, June Bingham, he reiterates this regret, adding that he should have used the phrase "universality of selfconcern." 63 Niebuhr's concept of human evil is existential and for a good reason. If the self can be convinced that it is a finite creature, and become "resigned" to its finite condition as well as its "universality of self-concern," then begins the basis of the self's reconciliation to God. If Niebuhr's conception of the self begins in the dialectial tension between freedom and necessity, it reaches its existential climax in his doctrine of grace. Niebuhr's conception of grace is best formulated in the second volume of The Nature and Destiny of Man, in a short exegetical "64 essay entitled "Grace as Power in, And as Mercy Towards, Man. He uses as his text, "I am crucified with Christ: Nevertheless I live; yet not I but Christ liveth in me. .. ." 65 Grace is a process, a.never ending hope of forgiveness, necessary at the beginning as well as at the end of the Christian life. It is a reflection of the mystery of losing the self and thereby saving it; and it begins, as Paul states, with crucifixion of the sinful self. The paradoxical consequence of this crucifixion is the emergence of the new being "fulfilled from beyond itself." Yet it is a new self, it is not I, but "Christ that liveth in me." Only God through Christ can accomplish the reconstruction of the self which begins when the self "opens the door" through repen62 63

Ibid., p. viii.

Reinhold Niebuhr, Letter to Mrs. June Bingham, Undated.

Reinhold Niebuhr. 64 Niebuhr, Human Destiny, pp. 107-126. 65 Galatians 2:20.

Papers of

L

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

119

tance. Both the self and Christ, then, are necessary, each on their own level. If this notion of grace is correct, then "all history remains an 'interim' between the disclosure and the fulfillment of its meaning!'" The self as it relates to others and as it acts in this 'interim' will experience "positive corruptions" and "partial realizations." Niebuhr argues that realization of the sinful self does not destroy the possibility of historical achievement, nor does it release us from the obligations of attempting to realize truth and justice in history. Yet redemption does not guarantee the elimination of sinfulness. "All historical activities stand under this paradox of grace." 67 As we have seen, the self engages in dialogue with itself and with God; and in the process may recognize its sinfulness, guilt, and responsibility as well as the possibility of forgiveness and acceptance. The self also engages in dialogue with others, and with history. A full appreciation of Niebuhr's political philosophy requires a closer examination of both of those colloquies. Self and Community

The self is a social animal; it cannot avoid communities. What is more, human beings are rational and capable of considering the needs of others even when they conflict with their own. The fact that individuals are outraged by the actions of collective man is evidence of this social conscience. The morality of man, then, consists in this capacity to consider broader interests than the ego. The rationality of man makes it possible to translate these sympathies into a sense of justice. But, in company with one another, particularly the company of race, class, or nation, these forces of individual morality weaken as the propensity toward communal self-interest strengthens. There is "less capacity for self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of others and therefore more unrestrained egoism... ." sa The egoistic impulse of groups is greater than we imagine, and the larger the group the more likely will be its tendency to express itself selfishly. Its power will cause, it to be less subject to internal restraints and its inevitable imperial ambitions will be aggravated by the desires of its leaders. ss 66 67 88 89

Niebuhr, Human Destiny, p. 213. Ibid.

Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. xi. Ibid., pp. 1-48.

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

120

In Moral Man and Immoral Society Niebuhr was concerned about the impact of economic groups in modern society. He contended they were more powerful than political or military groups. He would subsequently alter this quasi-Marxist approach to include a broader array of group egoisms. Even in this early work his mild optimism about the morality of man is tempered. He admits that the social conscience and rationality of man is limited, that the self will assert itself; and thus, force will always be a necessity in any "70 More importantly, the fact that groups "process of social cohesion. are more egoistic than individuals means that relationships between groups must always be political, not ethical. Such relations will be determined by considerations of power "at least as much as by any rational and moral appraisal of the comparative needs and claims of each group. "71 The hopes of collective man must be limited by this realization. Romantic illusions of perfect harmony and justice have little understanding of the nature of society in their. overestimation of the intellectual and moral capabilities of collective life. The concern of collective man must be not the creation of an ideal society in which there will be uncoerced and perfect peace and justice, but a society in which there will be enough justice, and in which coercion will be sufficiently non-violent to 72prevent his common enterprise from issuing into complete disaster.

Niebuhr never abandoned the basic thesis of Moral Man and In The Irony of American History he argues that collective man is "morally complacent, self-righteous and lacking a sense of humor." 73 In a preface to a latter edition to Moral Man and Immoral Society, written in 1960, he reiterates his belief in the differences between the morality of individuals and collectives. In later works, however, he amplifies on the theme, as in his discussion of human sin in The Nature and Destiny of Man, and is more consistently "realistic" in his treatment of both individual and collective behavior. So much so, that he reports in his final work that a young friend suggested altering the title of the 1932 work to read The Not So Moral Man in His Less Moral Communities. 74 The one Immoral Society.

Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. xxiii. 72 Ibid., p. 22. 73 Niebuhr, The Irony of American History, p. 169. 74 Niebuhr, Man's Nature and His Communities, p. 22. 7° 71

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

121

later work in which the theme of self and community is taken up most profoundly is The Self and the Dramas of History. Here the relationship between the self and the community is decidedly more complex. The self is in a constant dialogue with others which is characterized by dependence and independence. The psychology of this dialogue involves the self's consciousness of the fact that it is dependent upon others for recognition. At the same time, the self also realizes it is independent from all relationships. The permanent social pattern which this dialogue between the self and others takes is the community. The relationship between the individual and community is comprised of a vertical and horizontal dimension. In the vertical dimension the individual looks to the community for sustenance, both moral and physical. The community can be the sustainer of life, the vehicle of fulfillment. Niebuhr uses Hegel's phrase "concrete universality" as an expression of this sense of moral fulfillment which the self can experience in community. He is quick to point out, however, that like most rationalists, Hegel did not fully comprehend the complete nature of selfhood, especially that aspect of selfhood which exists above the realm of reason, the self as a transcendent creature. Because the self is so comprised, there is another component to the vertical relationship between the self and community. The individual has a higher sense of the moral, a better conscience, than the community, and looks down upon it to judge it. In short, the individual's higher sense of morality leads to frustration with the community over its inability to provide for a moral order. This second aspect of the vertical dimension has important implications. First, it assumes that any regime that attempts to insist upon the absolute rightness of its collective morality as opposed to individualconscience will be a brutal totalitarianism where the self is in danger of destruction. Thus, Niebuhr's strong preference for a democratic society. Second, Niebuhr insists that the capacity of the individual to judge a society should not be sentimentalized into an optimistic view that just communities can be rationally and artificially constructed or dispensed with altogether once freedom is achieved. Finally, the vertical relationship between individual and community, comprising as it does both fulfillment and frustration, is but one more substantiation of Niebuhr's view of the self. We are free and contingent. Our moral sense is both determined by and

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

122

free from our social ties. Moral judgments are, in fact, a reflection of the tension between the two. 75 Lamentably, Niebuhr has little to say about the horizontal dimension of community save to indicate that it is likely to emerge whenever an individual's community is in conflict with another. Presumably this dimension includes the identification of the pride of the individual with the pride of the race, tribe, or city. This dimension has a dualistic aspect as well. The community can and often does appeal to the frustrated individual for allegiance to a social organization whose pride becomes the source of fulfillment. Yet, a community in the horizontal sense can develop a conscience also. Its memory has as much force as the individual's and can be used to develop a sense of tradition which, when combined with the ideas of citizens about what a community can be, provides a powerful force for socal cohesion. 76 The horizontal dimension, and its dialectical quality, can be best understood in terms of Niebuhr's consideration of the community as organism and artifact. Every community is and ought to be both. The integrated loyalties and forms of authority, customs, and traditions of a community grow unconsciously without conscious contrivance. Yet, no community is without some form of cohesion and integration that is partly an artifact. Modern society, influenced as it has been by Enlightenment and Reformation thought, is likely to regard both community and government as artifacts, creations of human reason. The social contract theory is the prominent expression of this belief. Liberalism's adoption of it has led to a denigration, or lack of appreciation, of those forms of cohesion that are not necessarily rational or consciously constructed. Niebuhr uses the phrase "majesty" to describe the phenomenon that ascribes legitimacy to a government. Its source is historic or religious prestige, as in the case of constitutional monarchy, or moral prestige, as in the case of a regime that has managed to achieve a modicum of justice. Niebuhr's appreciation for constitutional monarchy as a symbol of order and authority is an expression of the desire for "majesty" in government. In the United States "majesty" is found in the symbol of the constitution. More broadly considered, Niebuhr's discussion of organism and artifact is a reflection again of his view of man as creature and crea75

Niebuhr,

76

Ibid.

The Self and the Dramas of History, pp. 34-40.

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

123

tor. The self which considers itself wholly as creator will be oblivious to the contributions of the past or ignorant of any providential order in socal life. Such a self will imagine itself free to construct a new society as it pleases and will experience the tragedy of seeing that there are "worse corruptions than the traditional ones." On the other hand, a self that considers itself wholly a creature will never challenge existing traditions of a community and thus will not provide the judgment necessary to improve a system of faulty justice. Such a self will merely be a victim of the past. 77 Niebuhr's pessimism regarding the moral efficacy of groups is deepened when applied to nations. The nation, and with it, nationalism, represents collective pride in its most pathetic attempt to overcome finitude. The pride of the nation may not be wholly specious if its claims of representing values that transcend contingent existence have any factual basis. Still, the nation represents the victory of the primal community, particularly of ethnic kinship. It is the egocentric form of community, characterized by hypocrisy and imperialistic design. "The very essence of human sin is in it. "7S Because we live in a technical civilization which can and does rely more and more on artificial contrivances of governance, we forget that nations are communities composed of organic elements of cohesion. Our forgetfulness leads us to conclude that world community itself could be artificially constructed. Such a belief is illusory. Its fallacy lies in the twin realization that no government, national or world, is created by fiat; and the forces of international social cohesion are insufficient to overcome the power of national egoism. It is possible that in some distant future economic interdependence, fear of mutual annihilation and perhaps the moral conscience of those human beings who have commitments to their fellow humans above and beyond the level of the nation-state will provide the "social tissue" necessary to bring about world government. 79 For the present, we would be wise to practice a wise and prudent politics of self-interest which avoids the moral cynicism that says all collectivities must follow their self-interest as well as the moralism which refuses to acknowledge the potentially destructive pride of all nations. Within the nation, particularly our own, we would do well to Ibid., pp. 163-182. Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 213. 79 Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, pp. 17-28. 77 78

124

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

insist that the dualism between the self and community, the tension between the conscience of the individual and the community, never be abolished. Niebuhr prefers the interpretation of the mandate to "give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's" given by John Milton. My conscience," Milton wrote, "I have from God, and therefore I cannot submit it to Caesar."8 The necessity of maintaining this dualism is the basis of Niebuhr's support of democratic government. The Christian and Jewish faiths have contributed some essential ingredients to democratic thought. The above mentioned assumption that humans have a source of authority, a conscience, which transcends this world and allows judgment upon it, is one of them. So too is the view of the dignity and worth of the self which forbids its being used as an instrument of a particular political program. These are important virtues often associated with democracy. What Niebuhr adds as a third contribution is more significant. The radical freedom of the self which makes man a potentially creative as well as destructive being, that Christian view of the self is also an essential ingredient. It is upon this base that Niebuhr builds his defense of democracy, most notably in The Children of Light and "

0

81

the Children of Darkness.

Niebuhr's defense of democracy is also an attempt to rescue it from the overly optimistic assumptions of the liberal culture with which it has been most often associated. Failure to do so would imperil the future of democracy because experience was refuting the optimistic view of the world. Thus, . . . modern democracy requires a more realistic philosophical and religious basis not only in order to anticipate and understand the perils to which it is exposed; but also to give it a more persuasive justification. Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but his inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary. 82

The major revision of democracy which Niebuhr undertakes is to insist that it rid itself of its typical preoccupation with freedom at the expense of order and justice, that it rid itself of its bourgeois idealism and adopt an essentially more limited if not tragic view of the world consistent with the Christian view of human nature. Democracy must do justice to both dimensions of human existence, the transcendent as well as the contingent. In order to accomplish 0 Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History, p. 229. 81 Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, pp. 96-101. 82 Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, p. xiii.

8

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

125

this, it must pay some attention to the needs of the individual for community, as well as the essential uniqueness and variety of human life. Freedom and order must be made to support one another. Above all, the children of light "must know the power of selfinterest in human society without giving it moral justification; They must have this wisdom in order that they may beguile, deflect, harness and restrain self-interest, individual and collective, for the sake of the community."" Niebuhr obviously felt such a democracy had strong roots in America. We have, as he often put it, achieved justice by equilibrating power. Ironically, our democracy is not one consistent with the articulated wisdom of the 18th century rationalists. It is not Jefferson and Paine who have led us, but Adams and Madison who "feared the potential tyranny of government as much as Jefferson; but . . understood the necessity of government much more." 84 Niebuhr's ap proach . to democracy as represented in the equilibrated power of the constitution owes much to Edmund Burke, in whose thought, he contends, we get the passion for order of a Thomas Hobbes and a passion for freedom of a John Locke uniquely balanced in a conception of the state which derives its authority from its tradition and capacity for ordering the human community without destroying the unique gifts of its individual members." The dialogue of the self with others is only part of a larger dialogue of the self with history. The reason for the association is quite simple. Human beings have unlimited appetites for power, but they also have dreams. The creator self often wishes to actualize those dreams in history, sometimes with the aid of its community, at other times beyond the bounds of it. The freedom and creativeness of man has led him to suspect that history itself is under his direction. History, in turn, has given us ample testimony of the truth that as human freedom has increased, the moral ambiguities of human life have as well. We must turn to Niebuhr's theory of history to understand this larger dialogue. Self

and History

The very fact that the self is conscious and free gives to man the possibility of understanding and making history. The self has the Ibid., p. 44. See also pp. 1-3. Niebuhr, The Irony of History, p. 97. 85 Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires, pp. 51-58. 83 84

126

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

capacity of memory of past events and can project itself into goals which often transcend the contingencies of history. But again, man is creature; death occurs; and the self is shown to be limited by history. Niebuhr often refers to this history where man is creator and created as a drama of the engagement of self and God. As such, it is difficult if not impossible to ever fully comprehend history. Uniformities and regularities of behavior may be found but "the biographical pinnacles of history are the most vivid"a8reminders of its dramatic character which defies scientific analysis. Just as the concepts of selfhood, sin, and grace are beyond the total comprehension of philosophy, so too the life of the individual and the total drama of man's existence cannot be coherently conceived in rational terms. The Christian view of history which Niebuhr espouses makes a radical distinction between nature and the world of human history. However much history may have a natural basis, it has another basis as well that is not natural, but transcendent. Human existence in its individual or communal form, the self in all its dialogues with itself and with others, cannot be reduced to natural coherence. Human history contains the ultimate dialogue between the self and God, a God who intervenes in history and introduces creative and unanticipated elements into the flux of time. This creativity is grace. It appears for no reason, as in the case of God's covenant with Israel 87 or as in the Christ. The drama of Christian history centers around the figure of Christ. Niebuhr maintains that the basic difference between historical and non-historical religions "may be succinctly defined as the difference between those which expect and those which do not ex"88 pect a Christ. In classical culture, where there is no such expectation, either nature or reason is god; and history is deprived of its uniqueness and its meaning. 9e Messianism, however, can take many forms because the human understanding of the type of Christ to be expected differs. Niebuhr maintains that there are three important levels of messianism. In egoistic-nationalist messianism expectation is centered in the future triumph of a nation, empire, or culture. The ethical-universalistic level looks toward a messianic king, often a shepherd king, to bring Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History, p. 47. Niebuhr, Christian Realism. and Political Problems, pp. 177-200. ss Niebuhr, Human Destiny, p. 4. 89 Ibid., pp. 1-15.

86

87

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

127

power and goodness into history and triumph over evil. Finally, and for Niebuhr most profoundly, there is a supra-ethical religious messianism which is the beginning of revelation in history and can be found in Hebraic prophetism. 9 ° Prophetism begins to understand the real problem of history by centering its attention on the pretentious endeavors of human beings who seek to deny their finite selves. History involves evil and sin; and the prophet "apprehends a divine word of judgment spoken against the whole human enterprise, by faith. "fl1 The most genuine understanding or disclosure of the meaning of history lies not with prophetism's approaching the Christian doctrine of original sin, but in the figure of Jesus as a "foolish" messiah. Jesus rejects Hebraic legalism and nationalism and thus was rejected as a Hebraic messiah. Yet, His rejection of legalism is correct, since "no law can do justice to the freedom of man in history." Law cannot ultimately restrain evil, in fact keeping the law can become an instrument of evil The rejection of nationalism, finally expressed in Paul's dictum to preach the gospel to the gentiles, was bound to be offensive; but Hebraic nationalism was far too particularistic to be acceptable. The offense over its rejection was not so much the affront given the egoism of a nation as it was the insult to the pride of man. The "foolishness" of the Christ was the actuality of the suffering Godman, Jesus, taking upon himself the "sins of the world." He exemplifies the view that "the contradictions of history are not resolved in history" but on the level of the transcendent, the divine. In reinterpreting the idea of eschata, Jesus actualizes the double notion that "the 'Kingdom of God has come' and that it is 'coming.' " History, thus, becomes an interim. The fulfillment of history in Niebuhr's Christology has two aspects to it. In every instance where the self establishes a relationship with God in repentance and faith, there is fulfillment. But, the self is limited and92life ultimately must wait for fulfillment. "We are saved by Hope." The Christian view of history, as interpreted by Niebuhr, is paradoxical. It begins with earthly expectation that justice, love, and brotherhood are possible. There are no limits in history. In this first sense the hopes of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment are correct. The Kingdom of God is a source for the development of a con9

Ibid., pp. 18-25. Ibid., p. 25. 92 Ibid., pp. 40-62. 0

91

128

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

tinually more profound and real expression of agape in history. The "uneasy conscience" of the self when confronted with injustices in history is evidence of the truth of these hopes. Whatever the legitimacy of these expectations, the other side of the paradox is that they are only half true. The ultimate realization of love, the Kingdom of God, is not found in history. The Crucifixion symbolizes the extent to which the self can expect to fulfill its pretensions of virtue in the world. The Cross is a symbol of the triumph and integrity of love. But society, the state, and the church conspired in it and will always do so."3 It represents "the final goodness which stands in contradiction to all forms of human goodness in which self-assertion and love are compounded!'" Niebuhr's view of human history is the basis for much of his criticism of secular messianism, most especially Marxism. In one of his early works, Moral Man and Immoral Society, he expresses considerable sympathy with the Marxist goals of history. Equality is an ideal, much like that of Christian love, which is impossible to realize consistently but toward which a rational society must move. Indeed, its religious-like nature is indication of its power. The Marxist dream of the final destruction of power is also a realistic awareness of the fact that the "disproportion of power in society is the real root of social injustice!'" Despite these assertions Niebuhr recognizes that Marxism is not a science of history, nor even a philosophy of history, but an apocalyptic vision. In An Interpretation of Christian Ethics he would once again admit that Marxism shares some of the insights of prophetic religion but fails to see that its own spirituality is as conditioned as all other types. He cautions against the dangers of Marxism becoming a "new spiritual pretension." 96 The Niebuhrean philosophy of history is not merely a basis for criticizing modern political movements. It, along with Niebuhr's view of the self, is the foundation for a philosophy of Christian realism. Augustine is Niebuhr's source, unashamedly but not uncritically so, for the development of his theory. Augustine views the self as an integration of mind and body dominated by a mysterious egocentric identity called soul. The social and political effects of this egocentricity are explained in terms of Augustine's division between Niebuhr, Niebuhr, 95 Niebuhr, 96 Niebuhr, 93

94

Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 82. Human Destiny, p. 89. Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 163. An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 114.

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

129

the life of the city of the world, civitas terrena, and the city of God, civitas dei. "The 'city of this world' is dominated by self-love to the point of contempt of God; and is distinguished from the civitas. dei which is actuated by the 'love of God' to the point of contempt of self. "97 The city of this world is a city of self-interested tension andconflict. No social group within it, from the family to the state, is immune from the frictions caused by self love. The latent cynicism in this observation is softened by the insistence that the civitas dei commingles with the. civitas terrena. The love of God tempers the principle of the love of self. This leavening effect of a higher loyalty of love than the self keeps Augustinian realism from degenerating into a philosophy of self-defeat. At the same time, Augustine's separation of the two loves, particularly of the two cities, gives the mistaken impression of two peoples commingling, the saved and the unregenerate, which in fact is not true. Niebuhr makes what he believes to be the necessary correction to Augustine by arguing that it is important to avoid this impression of two types of selves dwell"98 ing together. There is a "love and a self-love in every soul. Secular political philosophy has had great difficulty in approaching the wisdom of Augustine's realism. It has more often been ex cessively. realistic, to the point of cynicism, or just as excessively sentimental. Hobbes, for example, shared Augustine's view that the self dominates the mind but failed to discern that this dominant self was a "corrupted" one. Modern realists are aware of the power of collective self-interest but know little of its blindness. Pragmatists know the futility of fixed norms in a social realm but fail to comprehend the necessity of love as the final norm. And, modern liberal Christians are sentimentally attracted to the final norm of love to such an exent that they forget "the power and persistence of selflove." 99 Love is not a reliable guide for the practice of politics at any level, most especially at the international level. Power is, but it must be a power suffused with the hope of love. Niebuhr's political realism is a posture that insists upon the relevance of the marvelous and potentially generative utopian visions of the Jewish and Christian traditions. These dreams become distorted when they forget that nature will always prevent their fulfillment. Likewise Paul's descrip97 98 99

Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 124. Ibid., pp. 125-138. Ibid., p. 146.

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

130

tion in Galatians of the new being, the heedlessly self-giving being in whom Christ lives, is a moral ideal scarcely possible for individloo uals much less "self-regulating nations." The perfectionist model of ethics embodied in Jesus has little to do with the immediate moral problems of human existence. It has nothing to say about contending political and economic groups, about the necessity for prudential self-regard in social relationships, about balances of power. It is, in fact, not possible to construct a social ethic on the religious and moral insights of Jesus. Niebuhr insists they are nonetheless relevant because of their eschatological and mythical nature. The final and actual fulfillment of Jesus' ethic of love is possible, but only "when God transmutes the present chaos "101 The placing of this realization of the world into its final unity. of love at the end of time, and not out of time, is the mythical and forceful component of the ethic. It is also its connection with pro phetic religion. Stating the matter mythically, Niebuhr argues, does "justice to the fact that the eternal can only be fulfilled in the ternporal." x0 2 The ethic of Jesus is not a prudential one. "It is a heroic ethic with an eschatological background. 1103 The relevance of the ethic of love can be further illustrated in its dialectical relation to the law. The law of love, Niebuhr asserts, is both "the summary of all law, and it transcends law." It is a summation of all law because it contains a mandate to love the neighbor as oneself. This is inclusive of all of our social obligations to one another. Yet it transcends the law because in that mandate are found both sacrificial and forgiving love, both of which are frequently not possible or desirable in a social context. Does one forgive, for example, by eliminating prisons? Does one unilaterally disarm? Because love is the summary of all law, it must have in it the canons of justice. Justice may well be the instrument of love; but once the sinfulness of the self is presupposed, it becomes an approximation of love and has to deal with all of the ambiguities of competing interests in politics and lead them to a balance of power. Finally, because the individual has responsibilities beyond itself to the community, it cannot always observe the sacrificial and forgiving requirements of love, at least not as easily as might be done in the 100 101 102

Niebuhr, Man's Nature and His Communities, p. 42. Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 59. Ibid.

Reinhold Niebuhr, Letter to Reverend J. T. Stocking. Dated March 28, 1935, The Papers of Reinhold Niebuhr. 103

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

131

individual context. "Therefore the application of love to the social structure which guarantee justice is ambiguous, and will be so in my opinion, until the end of history. "1 04 These conclusions that the ethic of Jesus is relevant to political affairs in a very limited sense, that justice involves the prudential balancing of powerful interests, when coupled with the contention that the self was inherently prideful, give Niebuhr's Christian realism a pessimistic quality and can lead to those misinterpretations of his thought which only emphasize his "realism." Perhaps one reason for the potential misconstruction is that the "excessive idealism" of liberalism is frequently the target of Niebuhr's most trenchant criticism. It is not surprising that he would be accused of being cynical or indifferent to social inequalities and injustices. But it is 5 inaccurate.'° It ought to be abundantly clear by now that Niebuhr was a dialectical thinker. A manifestation of that dialectic is his life. While espousing and defending his "realistic" assessments of human nature, Niebuhr was actively involved in liberal political causes. Even after his disavowal of pacifism and socialism, Niebuhr can be consistently found on the left, espousing causes of human rights and social equality while defending a political philosophy that contains views of the self and politics more commonly associated with the right. What is forgotten about Niebuhr's realism is the fact that it is Christian realism; and that part of Christianity, aside from the notion of sin, to which Niebuhr most often refers is the prophetic tradition and the ethic of love. In other words, Niebuhr's emphasis on the necessity of realistic assessments is accompanied by an equally emphatic reference to an ideal. In the first volume of his magnum opus, The Nature and Destiny of Man, he refers to this ideal in terms of the natural law which transcends law, the law of love. It consists of three components: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God" is an expression of the ideal relationship of the self to God. Obedience is transformed into love. "With all thy heart and all thy soul and all thy mind." In such a love there will be a resulting internal order of impulses and desires, a "harmony of the soul. "Thou shalt 104 Ibid. See also Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, pp. 171-172. 105 Niebuhr specifically defends himself against one such charge of cynicism and indifferentism in an interesting letter to David Riesman, dated July 2, 1951. The Papers of Reinhold Niebuhr.

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

132

love thy neighbor as thyself."106 Finally, the harmony of the relation to God and the self is extended to others. Niebuhr concludes, Against pessimistic theories of human nature which affirm the total depravity of man it is important to assert the continued presence in man of the justitia originalis, of the law of love, as law and requirement. It is equally important, in refutation of modern secular and Christian forms of utopianism, to recognize that the 107 fulfillment of the law of love is no simple possibility.

In the second volume of The Nature and Destiny of Man, the ideal is referred to,as the Kingdom of God. Niebuhr contends that we have an obligation ,to build the kingdom, to perfect the communal life, to move history toward the realization of justice. The prophetic element of this ideal is contained in the awareness that the judgment of God will be levied on every new realization of brotherhood. Such a just social order will be characterized by harmony and equality, for "equal justice is the approximation of brotherhood under the conditions of sin." 10 8 Niebuhr warns again, however, that no human community will achieve this ideal, because no human community is 1governed solely by reason or conscience. 9 Power is a consideration. ° Niebuhr's Christian realism is dialogue of the ideal and the real. His life and his work substantiate the nature of the tension between what the self can be and what it is. In sum, this realism is best expressed in terms of Niebuhr's contention that "it is a good thing to seek for the Kingdom of God on earth, but it is very dubious to claim to have found it." 110 Conclusion

Throughout this essay I have emphasized what I believe to be the major themes of Niebuhr's work, at the exclusion of the hundreds of essays he wrote on a variety of public issues. These have been neglected only partially for reasons of time and space. They represent application of a philosophy rather than explication of one. They are ever changing attempts to understand a particular segment of time and are not as relevant to us as the philosophy which they 106

Niebuhr, Human Nature,

107

Ibid., p. 296.

108

Niebuhr, Human Destiny,

lo° Ibid., pp. 244-286. 110 Ibid., p. 5.

pp. 288-89. p. 254.

THE DIALECTICS OF GRACE AND POWER

133

represent. One thing can be said about Niebuhr's "policy essays" by way of general evaluation. They represent a highly rational and critical attempt to assess public policy in terms of the demands of justice and the realities of power. Such a process is demanding, and it ought to be remembered that Niebuhr's skills at analysis and rational criticism are high skills, requiring intelligence as well as faith. But what of the philosophy itself? What can be said about it in terms of critical evaluation? Niebuhr can be accused of exploring the various dialogues of the self in a too critical, too pessimistic fashion. While he maintains that man is a creature and a creator, far more time is spent examining the creature. I have already indicated the degree to which Niebuhr himself was upset with any interpretation of him that was excessively pessimistic. I have also emphasized the degree to which Niebuhr did perceive the self to be a creator, motivated by ideals of justice and love. If he emphasized the creaturely aspects of human existence, it was because of the felt necessity to counter his time's excessive optimism. Niebuhr can also be accused of being a social ethicist without a plan. There is no system of ethical principles, even in the essays on policy, to which one can point. This criticism of Niebuhr is valid only in so far as it recognizes that he never intended to create a system of ethics. Indeed, he specifically rejected such an attempt. Like Kierkegaard he was unwilling to create any set of abstract principles which would devour the unique personality of the self. His sympathy for the great religious traditions of Judaism and Christianity was based on their reverence for just such a personality. Unlike Kierkegaard, he was willing to risk his principles in the world of politics, making judgments and giving advice. Here, he simply knew of no abstract principle which would consistently tell him how the cold war should be conducted or how and when one should decide to use nuclear power. Thus, he chose to be pragmatic, balancing the exigencies of political order and necessity with those of brotherhood. It can be said that Niebuhr's proclivity for paradox is illogical, often irrational. But Niebuhr rejects the notion that the world can be understood as a rationally coherent entity. He quite firmly embraces, in his thought and political activity, the notion that the proper stance of the Christian is the toleration of ambiguity. Niebuhr's criticism of other systems of thought, especially the

134

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

Greek, are excessively narrow and too confined. Aeschylus, for example, has as profound an understanding of pride and guilt, and the necessity for a political community to bring about an approximation of order among the gods, as Paul or Augustine. Niebuhr would, no doubt, respond that Greek pietism lacked the power of the immanent-transcendent good represented in the Christian Christ; and he would be correct. Niebuhr's philosophy of self and history is both religious and empirical. In the latter sense the history of human kind suggests that it is a rather accurate "empiricism." In the former sense, especially as it is embued with a Christology, it is ultimately acceptable only on the basis of faith. I must "confess" sympathy with Niebuhr here. I think he is correct in adopting what is basically a Christian existentialist stance, emphasizing the freedom and the contingency of the self. The political philosophy which Niebuhr builds upon this view of the self is a profound one, expressed simply and poetically in the view that "man, as the creature of both necessity and freedom, must, like Moses, always perish outside the promised land." m CECIL L. EUBANKS Louisiana State University

i

Niebuhr, An

Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 77.