A Brief Overview

Myths of the Vietnam War And Its Lessons Professor Robert F. Turner

23rd National Security Law Institute

 A Brief Overview

Myths of the Vietnam War And Its Real Lessons The Value of Effective Political/ Professor Robert F. Turner Psychological Warfare 20th National Security Law Institute

V. I. Lenin Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder (1920) 

Understanding

“The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skillful and obligatory use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who do not understand this reveal a failure to understand even the smallest grain of Marxism, of modern scientific socialism in general.”

Leninist Strategy

V. I. Lenin Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder (1920) 

“The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skillful and obligatory use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and . . . also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who do not understand this reveal a failure to understand even the smallest grain of Marxism, of modern scientific socialism in general.”

Truong Chinh on Political Warfare Against French-1 

•“We must act in such a way that the French people . . . will actively support us . . . .” •—Truong Chinh •Secretary General •Indochinese Communist Party

Truong Chinh on Political Warfare Against French-2 

•“The French people and soldiers should oppose the war by every means: oppose the sending of troops to Indochina, oppose military expenditures . . . . demand . . . peaceful negotiations . . . .”

New York Times on Hanoi’s Political Warfare Strategy (1965) 

• “Communist hopes for victory [in Vietnam]…now turn more on American withdrawal through exhaustion or in response to the pressure of public opinion rather than on conventional military success.” •

New York Times, 20 October 1965

The Viet Cong Appeal (1960 NLF Program [excerpts]) 

• • •

To Bring Into Being a Broad and Progressive Democracy .... 2. To promulgate all democratic freedoms: freedom of expression, of the press, of assembly, of association, of movement, etc. To guarantee freedom of belief; to do away with discrimination against any religion on the part of the State.

VWP Resolution on Strategy—1 (9th Plenum, VWP Cent. Com. 1963) 

• “…During the past few years, the NLFSVN has attained considerable achievements in this respect but still not enough. We have the capability to obtain more results in the above filed.

We must make every effort to motivate various peace organizations…and various organizations of the people of Africa, Asia and Latin America to take stronger actions in asking the U.S. imperialists to end their aggressive war, withdraw their troops, military personnel and weapons from South Viet-Nam, and let the South Vietnamese people settle their own problems. We must also win the sympathy and support of the people of the national and imperialist countries (the U.S., France, and England).” •

Continued on next slide…

VWP Resolution on Strategy—2 (9th Plenum, VWP Cent. Com. 1963) 

• “In our hard and complicated struggle against the U.S. imperialists, international support and solidarity are important factors in our victory. Along with the intensification of our armed and political struggles in South VietNam, we must step up our diplomatic struggles for the purpose of isolating warmongers, gaining the sympathy of antiwar groups in the U.S. and taking full advantage of the dissensions among the imperialists to gain the sympathy and support of various countries which follow a peaceful and neutral policy.” •

—Reprinted in Turner, Vietnamese Communism, pp. 245-46 (1975)

See Anything Unusual in this “Catholic Procession”? 

Follow the arrow (Any Catholics in the audience?) 

Bui Cong Tuong  •Bui Cong Tuong (left in bottom photo) was Chief of Propaganda, Education, Culture and Training for VC in Ben Tre (Kien Hoa) Province. •He’s also the “priest” smoking cigarette in the “Catholic procession.” •He explained to me that no one told him smoking in a formal religious procession was not allowed.

The American “Peace Movement” was “Conned” by Hanoi 

Much of what Americans are taught even today about the Vietnam War is mythology

We Are Thus

Learning the Wrong Lessons 

"Those who refuse to learn from history are condemned to repeat it.” -George Santayana

MYTH # 1 

America intervened to support French colonial aggression and oppose nationalism and self-determination.

William J. Lederer on U.S. Support for French Colonialism 

“The U.S. self-deception began in earnest in 1945 when we first started helping the French to regain their Indochina colonies.” - William J. Lederer, Our Own Worst Enemy

French General Jean Sainteny Complains of OSS Resistance (1946) 

“[I am] face to face with a deliberate Allied maneuver to evict the French from Indochina . . . . At the present time the Allied [OSS] attitude is more harmful than the Viet Minh.” - Radio Message to superiors in Calcutta, quoted in Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams 68-69 (Rev. ed. 1964).

Do you remember the “Pentagon Papers”? 

A leaked highly classified multi-volume Pentagon history of the war.

Do you remember the “Pentagon Papers”? 

• Leaked highly classified multi-volume Pentagon history of the war. In 1972 I showed that the actual documents in this report undermined most of the arguments being used by the critics.

Do you remember the “Pentagon Papers”? 

• Leaked highly multi-volume Sadly, few peopleclassified on either side of the Pentagon the war. debate tookhistory the time of to actually read the In 1972 I showed documents. that the actual documents in this report undermined most of the arguments being used by the critics.

Do you remember the “Pentagon Papers”? 

• Leaked highly multi-volume Sadly, few peopleclassified on either side of the Pentagon the war. debate tookhistory the time of to actually read the

My 1972 monograph is In 1972 I showed documents. that the actual available on the documents in this report undermined Center’s Web page and most of the arguments being memory on your NSLI used by the critics. sticks.

Pentagon Papers: United States Opposed French Colonialism Prior to 1950



“[T]he U.S. steadfastly refused to assist the French military effort, e.g., [by] forbidding American flag vessels to carry troops or war materiel to Vietnam. . . . However, the U.S., deterred by the history of Ho’s communist affiliation, always stopped short of endorsing Ho Chi Minh or the Viet Minh.” The Pentagon Papers, vol. 1, pp. 3, 4 (Gravel ed. 1971)

Pentagon Papers: U.S. Rationale for Funding French in Indochina (1950)  “[T]he rationale for the [1950] decision to aid the French was to avert Indochina’s sliding into the communist camp, rather than aid for France as a colonial power or a fellow NATO ally. . . . Washington kept its eyes on the ultimate goal of the de-colonization of Indochina. Indeed it was uncomfortable in finding itself - forced by the greater necessity of resisting Viet Minh communism - in the same bed as the French.” - The Pentagon Papers, vol. 1, pp. 77 (Gravel ed. 1971)

MYTH # 2 – Ho Chi Minh was a Nationalist Patriot Rather than a “Communist” 

Ho Chi Minh: George Washington or Benedict Arnold? 

“Ho is sometimes called the George Washington of Vietnam.” - Dr. Spock on Vietnam 17 (1968)

Ho Chi Minh’s 1920 Conversion to Leninism  “A [French Socialist Party] comrade gave me Lenin’s ‘Thesis on the National and Colonial Questions’ . . . to read.” “. . . . What emotion, enthusiasm, clear-sightedness and confidence it instilled in me! I was overjoyed to tears. Though sitting alone in my room, I shouted aloud as if addressing large crowds: ‘Dear martyrs, compatriots! This is what we need, this is the path to our liberation!” - 4 Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works 449 (1962)

In Dec. 1920 Ho Co-Founded French Communist Party 

Ho Was Very Active in USSR Communist International (Comintern) 

Pentagon Papers on Ho Chi Minh 

“Ho Chi Minh was an old Stalinist, trained in Russia in the early ‘20s, Comintern colleague of Borodin in Canton . . . .” - 1 Pentagon Papers 261 (Gravel ed. 1971)

ICP Sec. Gen. Truong Chinh on “Mistakes” of the August Revolution (1945) 

“Here is the third weakness of the August Revolution. Immediately after the establishment of revolutionary power, we did not firmly eliminate the various categories of traitors. . . . For a newborn revolutionary power to be lenient with counterrevolutionaries is tantamount to committing suicide.” - Truong Chinh, The August Revolution 39-41 (Hanoi: 1947)

Ho Invites French to Return (6 March 1946 Modus Vivendi)



Pentagon Papers: Ho Chi Minh Worked with French to Eliminate Nationalist Rivals 

“On 6 March 1946, Ho signed an Accord with the French providing for French re-entry into Vietnam for five years in return for recognizing the DRV as a free state within the French Union. This Accord taxed Ho’s popularity to the utmost, and it took all Ho’s prestige to prevent open rebellion. . . .

Pentagon Papers: Ho Chi Minh Worked with French to Eliminate Nationalist Rivals 

“[I]n mid-June [1946], the Viet Minh, supported by French troops, attacked the Dong Minh Hoi and the VNQDD [nationalist groups], as ‘enemies of the peace’ effectively suppressed organized opposition, and asserted Viet Minh control throughout North Vietnam.” - The Pentagon Papers, vol. 1, p.46 (Gravel ed. 1971)

Pentagon Papers: Ho Chi Minh Worked with French to Eliminate Nationalist Rivals 

“[I]n mid-June, the Viet Minh, supported by French troops, attacked the Dong Minh Hoi and the VNQDD [nationalist groups], as ‘enemies of the peace’ effectively suppressed The “Viet Minh” was a classic “united front,” but few organizedLeninist opposition, and asserted Viet who fought for it knew it was Minh control throughout North controlled by Communists. Vietnam.” - The Pentagon Papers, vol. 1, p.46 (Gravel ed. 1971)

MYTH # 3 

Ho Chi Minh was a Potential “Asian Tito” Who Would Have Resisted Chinese Expansion

Ho As Tito 

• After Tito’s Communist Party of Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, the Viet Minh staged public protests against Tito; and Viet Minh radio denounced Tito as “a spy for American imperialism.”

Ho As Tito 

• After Tito’s Communist Party of Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, Perhaps that was the Viet Minh staged public protests against Tito; because Ho needed and Viet Minh radio denounced him Stalin’s support for as “a spy for American his war against imperialism.”

France?

Ho As Tito 

After Stalin died (March 5, 1953), Khrushchev visited Belgrade in 1955 and made peace with Tito.

Ho Still Rejected Tito 

• But the Vietnamese Communists still didn’t get on board. • In 1957, Ho did visit Yugoslavia, where he denounced “American Imperialism.”

North Vietnamese Attack on “Revisionism” (1957) following Ho’s Visit to Tito’s Yugoslavia 

“All frenzied attacks of imperialism in every form, particularly under the signboards ‘national communism’ or ‘revisionism,’ aimed at sowing discord among and destroying the forces of socialism will certainly be smashed by the monolithic solidarity of brotherly parties and countries in the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union.” - Vietnam

News Agency (Hanoi), 8 September 1957

VWP First Secretary Le Duan Attacks “Titoism” (3d Party Congress, 1960) 

“The modern revisionists represented by the Tito clique in Yugoslavia are trumpeting that the nature of imperialism has changed. . . . [I]f we want to lay bare the aggressive and bellicose nature of imperialism . . . the Communist . . . parties must necessarily direct their main blow against revisionism. . . .

VWP First Secretary Le Duan Attacks “Titoism” (3d Party Congress, 1960) 

“It is precisely the Chinese Communist Party, headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, which has most brilliantly carried into effect the teachings of the great Lenin.”

MYTH # 4 

The entire war was based on a “lie” about North Vietnamese “aggression”

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident Occurred but was NOT why we went to war 

After 50 years there is no evidence of a conspiracy or that LBJ wanted to go to war in Indochina. The Aug. 2, 1964, attack on the USS Madox clearly did occur, and Hanoi has confirmed that. It was a relatively minor attack, and was not the reason we went to war.

 The August 2 attacks clearly did occur.



General Vo Nguyen Giap confirmed that when Robert McNamara visited Hanoi in 1995. The August 2 attacks clearly did occur.

Brinks Hotel (BOQ) Bombing Christmas Eve 1964 

Had there been no Two Viet Cong terrorists, dressed as an “incident” in the Gulf of ARVN Major and his driver, parked a car with Tonkin on August 2, 1964, explosives in trunk in parking lot under Saigon building not housing American officers. that would have kept the United States out of Results: Vietnam. 2 Americans killed 58 Americans injured

Brinks Hotel (BOQ) Bombing Christmas Eve 1964 

Two Viet Cong terrorists, dressed as an ARVN Major and his driver, parked a car with explosives in trunk in parking lot under Saigon building housing American officers. Results: 2 Americans killed 58 Americans injured

Brinks Hotel (BOQ) Bombing Christmas Eve 1964 

Two Viet Cong terrorists, dressed as an ARVN Major and his driver, parked a car with explosives in trunk in parking lot under Saigon building housing American officers. Results: 2 Americans killed 58 Americans injured

Brinks Hotel (BOQ) Bombing Christmas Eve 1964 

Two Viet Cong terrorists, dressed as an ARVN Major and his driver, parked a car with explosives in trunk in parking lot under Saigon building housing American officers. Results: 2 Americans killed 58 Americans injured

Brinks Hotel (BOQ) Bombing Christmas Eve 1964 

Two Viet Cong terrorists, dressed as an ARVN Major and his driver, parked a car with explosives in trunk in parking lot under Saigon building housing American officers. Results: 2 Americans killed 58 Americans injured

MYTH # 5 

The war was illegal

The War was Legal  I have deleted numerous slides making these points: Two sovereign States emerged from the 1954 Geneva Conference (just as two sovereign States in Korea emerged from Yalta). It was no more legal for Hanoi to use force to conquer Saigon than it was for Pyongyang to invade South Korea in June 1950 (as the Security Council made clear), or East Germany to invade the West during the Cold War. The “NLF” was not independent of Hanoi and thus it was not just a “civil war” within South Vietnam.

The Issue of the July 1956 Elections 

Professor George Kahin on U.S. Position on 1956 Elections 

“But with American encouragement, Diem refused to permit the elections in 1956 . . . [B]y encouraging Diem to defy this central provision of the Geneva Agreements, the United States reneged on the position it had taken there in its own unilateral declaration. Civil war in Vietnam became inevitable.” - Widely quoted statement from 1965 “Teach In”

David Shoenbrun on Proposed 1956 Elections 

“Washington and its supporters still claim today that free elections could not have been held in North Vietnam. They may well be right. The fact is, however, that they never once raised such a contention in the course of the Geneva Conference. The fact is that they never held a single meeting or put forward a single proposal to impose the conditions of free elections or to put the Communists to the test and expose them. . . . Since the elections were not held, then the entire agreement was null and void.”

Geneva Conference and 1956 “Elections” Issue 

At the 1954 Geneva Conference the U.S. and the independent “State of Vietnam” insisted on UN supervised elections and refused to sign or accept any agreement when the Communists refused international supervision. Ike did not say Ho would defeat Ngo Dinh Diem in 1956 by 80% of the vote, but that he would defeat Bao Dai in 1954 – before the worst of the repression in North Vietnam – and that Bao Dai’s lack of leadership left most Vietnamese with “nothing to fight for.”

 Cartoon of Bao Dai on the French Riviera with his French and Vietnamese “concubines.”

 Bao Dai drove a custommade Ferarri (above) and owned a casino in Lyon, France. Cartoon of Bao Dai on the French Riviera with his French and Vietnamese “concubines.”



He lived very well so long as he signed whatever the French government put in front of him.

Bao Dai drove a custommade Ferarri (above) and owned a casino in Lyon, France. Cartoon of Bao Dai on the French Riviera with his French and Vietnamese “concubines.”

Pentagon Papers: Communists Blocked Effective Supervision of Geneva Accords 

“In the original Viet Minh proposals, implementation of the cease-fire was left to joint indigenous commissions, with no provision for higher, international supervision. ... Molotov expressly rejected the American plan, supported by the Indochinese delegations and Great Britain, to have the United Nations supervise a cease-fire. . . . Molotov . . . saw no reason why [a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission] could not reach decisions by unanimous vote on “important” questions. . . .

Pentagon Papers: Communists Blocked Effective Supervision of Geneva Accords 

“The Communists . . . clearly hoped to duplicate in Indochina the ineffective machinery they had foisted on the United Nations command [in Korea], one in which effective peacekeeping action was basically proscribed by the built-in veto of a four-power authority evenly divided among Communist and non-Communist representatives.” - The Pentagon Papers, vol. 1, pp. 140-41 (Gravel ed. 1971)

Pentagon Papers: South Vietnam Protested Partition; Favored U.N Supervised Elections  [Cable from U.S. Mission, Geneva, to Secretary of State Dulles (19 Jul ‘54)]

“Vietnamese DEL handed us late this afternoon their new proposal . . . QUOTE French, Soviet, and Viet Minh drafts all admit the principles of a partition of Vietnam into two zones, all of North Vietnam being abandoned to the Viet Minh. Although this partition is only provisional in theory, it would not (repeat not) fail to produce in Vietnam the same effects as in Germany, Austria, and Korea . . . The Vietnamese DEL therefore proposes: . . . (5) Control by the United Nations . . . (A) Of the cease-fire . . . (E) Of the general elections, when the United Nations believes that order and security will have been everywhere truly restored.”

Position of South Vietnam at 1954 Geneva Conference 

• The Associated “State of [South] Vietnam” had on 4 June 1954 been recognized by France as “a fully independent and sovereign state in possession of all qualifications and powers known in international law” • Throughout the conference South Vietnam protested over being excluded entirely from French-Viet Minh talks • South Vietnam protested partition and called for UNsupervised elections

Position of South Vietnam at 1954 Geneva Conference 

• At final session of Conference (21 July), Delegation head Dr. Tran Van Do announced:

• “[T]he Government of the State of Vietnam wishes the Conference to take note of the fact that it reserves its full freedom of action in order to safeguard the sacred right of the Vietnamese people to its territorial unity, national independence, and freedom.”

Position of South Vietnam at 1954 Geneva Conference 

• At final session of Conference (21 July), Delegation head Dr. Tran Van Do announced:

• “[T]he Government of the State of Vietnam wishes the Conference to take note of the fact that it reserves its full freedom of action in order to safeguard the sacred right of the Vietnamese people to its territorial unity, national independence, and freedom.” I had dinner with Dr. Tran Van Do in 1970 in Saigon.

The 1956 Elections Issue (New York Times (Editorial), 5 March 1956)



“[F]ree Vietnam has never endorsed the idea of such an election, and it is unlikely to do so until there is evidence that it could really be free. . . . To suggest a ‘free’ election in a Communist territory is to presume the possible existence of conditions and safeguards for which there is neither assurance nor precedent.”

British Position on 1956 Elections Issue 

As co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference, Great Britain sent a note to the Soviets (the other co-chair) on 10 April 1956 recognizing that South Vietnam was not legally bound by the armistice agreements since it had not signed them and had protested against them at the Geneva Conference. - New York Times, 11 April 1956

Pentagon Papers: Why the United States and South Vietnam Opposed “Elections”



“[T]he basis for the policy of both nations [SVN & US] in rejecting the Geneva elections was . . . convictions that Hanoi would not permit “free general elections by secret ballot,” and that the ICC would be impotent in supervising the elections in any case.” - The Pentagon Papers, vol. 1, pp. 246-47 (Gravel ed. 1971)

Constitutional Issues 

• We discussed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution yesterday during my War Powers talk.

Myth # 6 

The State Department lied about “Aggression from the North”

Professors Kahin & Lewis on the “Independent” NLF 

“[The NLF] is not ‘Hanoi’s creation’. . . Abundant data have been available to Washington to invalidate any argument that revival of the war in the South was precipitated by ‘aggression from the North.’” - Profs. George Kahin & John Lewis The United States in Vietnam 120 (1967)

Le Duan Calls for a “National United Front” in South (Sept. 1960)  At the Third Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960, Party First Secretary Le Duan announced: “To ensure the

complete success for the revolutionary struggle in south Viet Nam, our people there, under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Party of the working class, must strive to . . . . bring into being a broad National United Front directed against the U.S.

This is yet another myth clearly refuted and Diem and based upon the worker-peasant alliance. . . . The Front must carry by out its Hanoi. work in a very flexible manner, in order to rally all forces that can be rallied, win over all forces that can be won over, neutralize all forces that should be neutralized and draw the broad masses into the general struggle against the U.S.-Diem.” - 1 DRV, Third National Congress of the VNWP 62-63

Le Duan Calls for a “National United Front” in South (Sept. 1960)  At the Third Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960, Party First Secretary Le Duan announced:

“To ensure the complete success for the revolutionary struggle in south Viet Nam, our people there, under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Party of the working class, must strive to . . . . bring into being a broad National United Front directed against the U.S. and Diem and based upon the worker-peasant alliance. . . .

Le Duan Calls for a “National United Front” in South (Sept. 1960) 

The Front must carry out its work in a very flexible manner, in order to rally all forces that can be rallied, win over all forces that can be won over, neutralize all forces that should be neutralized and draw the broad masses into the general struggle against the U.S.-Diem.” - 1 DRV, Third National Congress of the VNWP 62-63

 Le Duan (left) and Ho at the 3d Party Congress.

Resolution of the Third Party Congress (1960) “On the Tasks and Line of the Party in the New Stage”



“To ensure the complete success of the revolutionary struggle in south Vietnam, our people there must strive to . . . . bring into being a broad National United Front.” - 1 Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Third National Congress of the Viet Nam Workers’ Party 225 (c. 1961?)



FYI: I found these volumes as an undergrad in 1966. Learning the truth by reading admissions against interest published in English by Hanoi did not require tremendous talent or effort.

Any Subtle Hints the NLF Was Tied to the DRV? 

Any Subtle Hints the NLF Was Tied to the DRV? 

Any Subtle Hints the NLF Was Tied to the DRV? 

Post-War Admissions from Hanoi  • In May 1984, Vietnam Courier admitted VWP’s decision to liberate South Vietnam was made on May 19, 1959, but kept “absolute secret” as the Ho Chi Minh Trail was built and hundreds of thousands of troops were sent south with supplies.

Prof. William Duiker on Origins of War in South Vietnam  “ [O]ne of the most pernicious myths about the Vietnam War—that the insurgent movement in South Vietnam was essentially an autonomous one that possessed only limited ties to the regime in the North—has been definitively dispelled.” - William Duiker, “Foreword: The History of the People’s Army,” in Victory in Vietnam at xvi.

The End of the International Law Debate 

• The argument that it was illegal for the United States to help defend South Vietnam was premised almost entirely upon the assumption that the NLF was autonomous and not controlled by Hanoi. • After Hanoi’s post-war admissions, very few of the old anti-war stalwarts among international lawyers have been willing to debate the issue.

The End of the International Law Debate 

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to debate the issue. (See the debate in The Real Lessons of the Vietnam War.)

MYTH # 7 

We foolishly went to war without the support of Congress or the American people

Gallup Polls on Vietnam War—I 

We talked about congressional • Late August 1964—More than 70% of authorization yesterday during Americans said US was handling the war “as well as could be expected”; our• War Powers presentation. November 1965—60% of those with opinion said they would be “more likely” to support a candidate for congress who favored “sending a great many more men to Vietnam”; • September 1966—60% of those expressing opinion on options in Vietnam favored escalation of war effort; • February 1967—75% favored continuing the bombing of North Vietnam;

Gallup Polls on Vietnam War—I 

• Late August 1964—More than 70% of Americans said US was handling the war “as well as could be expected”; • November 1965—60% of those with opinion said they would be “more likely” to support a candidate for congress who favored “sending a great many more men to Vietnam”; • September 1966—60% of those expressing opinion on options in Vietnam favored escalation of war effort; • February 1967—75% favored continuing the bombing of North Vietnam;

Gallup Polls on Vietnam War—II 

• May 1967—69.4% said U.S. was “morally justified” to have become involved in Vietnam; • January-February 1968 – Tet Offensive • September 1970—60% favored “withdrawal”; • June 1971—By 2 to 1 margin, Americans said sending troops to VN had been “a mistake.”

U.S. Public Opinion and the 1968 Tet Offensive 

“The Tet offensive of winter 1968 was the event that turned public opinion decisively against the war. . . . Those in favor of the war fell from 62 percent to 41 percent. For the first time in the war, the “doves” were in the majority, practically doubling their numbers in one month, from 23 percent to 43 percent.” —The Lessons of the Vietnam War 177 (Starr, 1991)

MYTH # 8 

The war was in any event “unwinnable”

New Prados Book (2009) 

• Subtitle: THE HISTORY OF AN UNWINNABLE WAR

Military Consequences of Tet Offensive 

• “Truong Nhu Tang, one of the NLF’s founders …observed: ‘The truth was that Tet cost us half of our forces. Our losses were so immense that we were simply unable to replace them with new recruits.’” • “General Giap lost 85,000 of his best PAVN troops and had virtually nothing militarily to show for it.” • By the 1972 Easter Offensive about 90% of the day-to-day combat in the South was by PAVN, that is, North Vietnamese regulars in uniform operating in the South. • LBJ halted all bombing of North Vietnam •

Quotations from Douglas Pike, U.C. Berkeley

NVA Col. Bui Tin’s Assessment of 1968 Tet Offensive 

• “Our losses were staggering and a complete surprise. Giap later told me that Tet had been a military defeat, though we had gained the planned political advantage when Johnson agreed to negotiate and did not run for re-election. The second and third waves in May and September [1968] were, in retrospect, mistakes. Our forces in the South were nearly wiped out by all the fighting in 1968.” •

—“How North Vietnam Won the War,”

• Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1995, pp. 1.

NVA Col. Bui Tin’s Assessment of Tet ’68 

• “It took us until 1971 to re-establish our presence, but we had to use North Vietnamese troops as local guerrillas. If the American forces had not begun to withdraw under Nixon in 1969, they could have punished us severely. We suffered badly in 1969 and 1970 as it was.” • —“How North Vietnam Won the War,”

• Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1995.

1968 Tet Offensive By the Numbers 

• • • •

By early March 1968, the US Mission reported: 2,000 American soldiers had been killed 4,000 South Vietnamese soldiers had been killed 50,000 “enemy” (PAVN/VC) soldiers had been killed •

—Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History 534.

Hanoi confirmed after the war that their Tet loses were 70% higher than U.S. estimates (85,000). For every American or ARVN soldier killed during Tet, Pike estimated more than 14 communist soldiers died.

1968 Tet Offensive By the Numbers 

• • • •

Yet large numbers of Americans still believe that the 1968 Tet Offensive was a major Communist victory.

By early March 1968, the US Mission reported: 2,000 American soldiers had been killed 4,000 South Vietnamese soldiers had been killed 50,000 “enemy” (PAVN/VC) soldiers had been killed •

—Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History 534.

Hanoi confirmed after the war that their Tet loses were 70% higher than U.S. estimates (85,000). For every American or ARVN soldier killed during Tet, more than 14 communist soldiers died.

Former DCI Bill Colby (author of Lost Victory) 

Colby on 1972 Spring Offensive 

“A free Vietnam had proven that it had the will and the capability to defend itself with the assistance, but not the participation, of its American ally against the enemy to the north assisted by Soviet and Chinese allies. On the ground in South Vietnam, the war had been won.” Colby, Lost Victory 321 (1989).

Military Historian Lewis Sorley (author of A Better War) 

Dr. Lewis Sorley Notes the War Was “Won” 

“There came a time when the war was won. The fighting wasn’t over, but the war was won. This achievement can probably best be dated in late 1970, after the Cambodian incursion in the spring of that year. By then the South Vietnamese countryside had been widely pacified, so much so that the term ‘pacification’ was no longer even used.” - Sorley, A Better War 217.

John Lewis Gaddis On Modern Conventional Wisdom  “Historians now acknowledge that American counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam were succeeding during the final years of that conflict; the problem was that support for the war had long since crumbled at home.” —Prof. John Lewis Gaddis Yale Univ. (Dean of American Diplomatic Historians)

Hanoi Never Expected to Win a Military Victory 

Their strategy from the start was to win the political struggle and undermine America’s will.

NLF Leaders Acknowledged Their Only Hope was for a Political Victory 

• “None of us had any illusions about our ability to gain a military decision against the immensely powerful American war machine,” and thus “the political front was primary.” Former PRG Minister of Justice Truong Nhu Tang, A Viet Cong Memoir 58

Col. Bui Tin on Importance of Anti-War Movement  “[The anti-war movement] was essential to our strategy. . . . Every day our leadership would listen to world news over the radio at 9 a.m. to follow the growth of the American antiwar movement. Visits to Hanoi by people like Jane Fonda . . . gave us confidence that we should hold on in the face of battlefield reversals.” - “How North Vietnam Won the War,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1995 at 8.

Col. Bui Tin on Importance of Anti-War Movement  “[The anti-war movement] was essential to our strategy. . . . Every day our leadership would listen to world news over the radio at 9 a.m. to follow the growth of the American antiwar movement. Visits to Hanoi by people like Jane Fonda . . . gave us confidence that we should hold on in the face of battlefield reversals.” - “How North Vietnam Won the War,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1995 at 8.

Do you remember when hundreds of thousands of Americans marched for “peace”? 

My generation of college students was outraged over America’s involvement in Vietnam and demanded an end to human rights oppression by our “puppets” and that we “stop the killing” in Indochina.

Col. Bui Tin on 1968 Tet Offensive  Q. What about Gen. Westmoreland’s strategy and tactics caused you concern? A. Our senior commander in the South, Gen. Nguyen Chi Thanh, knew that [in 1966] we were losing base areas, control of the rural population and that his main forces were being pushed out to the borders of South Vietnam. He also worried that Westmoreland might receive permission to enter Laos and cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In January 1967, after discussions with Le Duan, Gen. Thanh proposed the Tet Offensive. . . .

Tet was designed to influence American public opinion. We would attack poorly defended parts of South Vietnam cities during a holiday and a truce where few South Vietnamese troops would be on duty. . . .

Col. Bui Tin on 1968 Tet Offensive 

• Q. What about the results? • A. Our losses were staggering and a complete surprise. Giap later told me that Tet had been a military defeat, though we had gained the planned political advantage when Johnson agreed to negotiate and did not run for re-election.

The American Media Erred 

• Few journalist in Saigon wanted to risk getting shot, so they filed their stories from major hotels based on “reports” they received (often from covert Communist agents who regularly “helped” the foreign press). • The Tet Offensive was reported as a great Communist victory, and many Americans still believe that today.

Pham Xuan An Was a Top Reporter for Time and Reuters 

Pham Xuan An Was a Top Reporter for Time and Reuters 

He also happened to be an intelligence operative from the North Vietnamese Army.

Pham Xuan An Was a Top Reporter for Time and Reuters 

He also happened to be an intelligence operative from the North Vietnamese Army.

Pham Xuan An Was a Top Reporter for Time and Reuters 

When he died in 2006 he was a Major General and “Hero of the People’s Armed Forces.”

The Media Totally Misreported the Tet Offensive 

The Media Totally Misreported the Tet Offensive The misreporting of the war by the media helps explain the phenomenon disclosed by public opinion polls that Vietnam veterans supported the war by a margin more than twice than of the general public at home—despite seeing the horrors of war first hand. 

The Media Totally Misreported the Tet Offensive 

Professional public opinion polls show: three out of every four Vietnam veterans enjoyed their service; more than 90 percent are glad they served;  We are more than twice as likely as the average American to take pride in what America tried to do in the Vietnam War;

The Media Totally Misreported the Tet Offensive 

more than two-thirds of us believe we were “right to get involved” and would have gone back again even if we knew the final outcome.

The Media Totally Misreported the Tet Offensive 

more than two-thirds of us believe we were “right to get involved” and would have gone back again even if we knew final outcome. FYI, the in WW II, 2/3ds of American soldiers were draftees.

The Media Totally Misreported the Tet Offensive 

more than two-thirds of us believe we were “right to get involved” and would have gone back again even if we knew final outcome. FYI, the in WW II, 2/3ds of American soldiers were draftees. In Vietnam 2/3ds were volunteers.

MYTH # 9 

It was a “senseless” war for no good reason

Vietnam in the Cold War Context 

• Leninism committed to world revolution • Post-WW II guerrilla warfare in southern Europe (e.g., Greece, 1947) • Mao’s victory in China (1949) • Invasion of South Korea (June 1950) • NSC-68 Containment Doctrine • (in National Security Law Documents p. 35)

• Chinese support for Viet Minh (1949-54)

Vietnam in the Cold War Context 

• Communist victory in North Vietnam (1954) • SEATO Treaty pledged U.S. to protect Indochina from Communist aggression (Feb. 1955) • Dulles (“massive retaliation” at a “time and place of our own choosing”) deterred Khrushchev • Mao said “people’s war” could defeat Imperialists, who were but “paper tigers” and could not resist guerrilla warfare • Vietnam War seen as “test case” of Mao’s strategy.

Lin Biao on International Significance of Vietnam War 

• “The United States has made South Vietnam a testing ground for the suppression of people’s war. . . . And everybody can now see that the U.S. aggressors are unable to find a way of coping with people’s war. . . .”

The Communists Saw Vietnam as a “Test Case” 

• [A Communist victory in Vietnam] “will lead to a chain reaction . . . . The people in other parts of the world will see . . . that U.S. imperialism can be defeated, and that what the Vietnamese people can do, they can do too.” — Lin Biao Vice Chairman CCP Central Committee 3 Sept. 1965

Ché Guevara on Vietnam 

• “When today we enthusiastically raise the flag of South Vietnam [Viet Cong], we do . . . it because that battlefront is most important for the future of all America. . . .

Ché Guevara Nov. 20, 1963



• “Vietnam is the great laboratory of Yankee imperialism . . . . [T]he victorious end of this battle will also spell the end of North American imperialism.” — The Speeches and Writings of Ché Guevara 289 (1968).

What We Bought By Delaying a Communist Victory 

• In 1964 Thailand and Indonesia were very vulnerable. By 1975 both were stronger and much more secure. • In 1964 China was exporting revolution to Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and as far away as Mozambique. That stopped during Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-69).

What Went Wrong? 

If we were winning the war, by 1972, what went wrong?

What Went Wrong 

1. I haven’t mentioned the civilian micoUnder pressure management of the warfrom and the refusal of LBJ anti-war and McNamara to head the consistent “peace” advice of the JCS that “gradualism” activists, in and MayCIA 1973 would not work. Prof. Parks will discuss part Congress by statute of that problem next. defeatunder fromNixon and 2. Thatsnatches strategy changed the jaws victory. Abrams, by lateof1972 we were clearly winning on the ground in South Vietnam and in the air over North Vietnam – and Hanoi returned to Paris and accepted the peace agreement.

Congress “Pulls the Plug”: The 1973 “Fulbright” Amendment 

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds heretofore or hereafter appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance the involvement of United States military forces in hostilities in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, unless specifically authorized hereafter by Congress.” —FY 1973 Dep’t of State Auth. Act, Pub. L. 93-126, 87 Stat. 451

Failure of U.S. Deterrence 

North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong said in late 1974 of the possibility U.S. combat troops might return to help South Vietnam:

“They won’t come back even if we offered them candy.” —Karnow, Vietnam: A History 661

Consequences of Deterrence Failure: The 1975 Invasion of South Vietnam 

Confident that the United States would not reintervene, Hanoi sent more than 20 PAVN divisions—virtually its entire Army, minus 1 division left in all of North Vietnam, 1 division in Laos, and 2 divisions in Cambodia—into South Vietnam to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Vietnam by force.

Consequences of Deterrence Failure: The 1975 Invasion of South Vietnam 

Confident that the United States would not reintervene, Hanoi sent more than 20 PAVN divisions—virtually Many Americans its entire Army, minus 1 division left in all of North rejoiced: the hated Vietnam, 1 division in Laos, and 2 war over – South divisions in was Cambodia—into “peace” was the at Government Vietnam to overthrow of the Republic hand. of Vietnam.

The Consequences 

Were the peace movement’s goals of promoting human rights and stopping the killing realized?

In the former South Vietnam 

•Prof. Lewis Sorley writes that as many as 250,000 former ARVN and GVN officials died in “Reeducation Camps” in South Vietnam.

In the former South Vietnam 

• Another 1.5 million people were forced to move to “New Economic Zones,” where another estimated 48,000 perished from starvation, disease, or abuse.

In the former South Vietnam 

•Prof. R.J. Rummel estimates 400,000 “boat people” died while trying to flee Communist Vietnam.

Yale University Cambodian Genocide Program  •“The Cambodian genocide of 1975-1979, in which approximately 1.7 million people lost their lives (21% of the country's population), was one of the worst human tragedies of the last century.”

““Killing Fields’ Lure Tourists in Cambodia” National Geographic Today, Jan. 10, 2003



•“Guides explain that bullets were too precious to use for executions. Axes, knives and bamboo sticks were far more common. As for

children, their murderers simply battered them against trees.”

Douglas Pike on the Consequences of the Communist Victory in Vietnam 

“Even by the most cautions estimate, more Indochinese have died violently since the end of the Vietnam War than during the war itself, perhaps by two million . . . . Human suffering has been on an unprecedented scale, far worse than the wartime days.”

““Killing Fields’ Lure Tourists in Cambodia” National Geographic Today, Jan. 10, 2003



•“Guides explain that bullets were too precious to use for executions. Axes, knives and bamboo sticks were far more common. As for

It didn’t have to happen.

children, their murderers simply battered them against trees.”

If this seems personal . . . 

After returning in 1971 I became among the most vocal people warning of a “bloodbath” if we abandoned Indochina.

If this seems personal . . . 

After returning in 1971 I became among the most vocal people warning of a York Times “bloodbath” if weNew Oct. 24, 1972 abandoned Indochina.

The Wall Street Journal did several editorials on my writings 

If this seems personal . . . 

In April 1975 I was in Saigon trying to get to Cambodia to rescue orphans.

If this seems personal . . . 

In April 1975 I My mission was in Saigon failed. trying to get to Cambodia to rescue orphans.

If this seems personal . . . 

In April 1975 I My mission was in Saigon failed. trying to get to Cambodia to rescue orphans.

If this seems personal . . . 

In April 1975 I My mission was in Saigon failed. trying to get to Cambodia to rescue orphans.

Prof. Rummel on

Pol Pot’s Cambodia 

“[N]o other megamurderer [in 20th century] comes even close the the lethality of the communist Khmer Rouge in Cambodia during their 1975 through 1978 rule.”

Other Consequences of Our Abandoning Vietnam 

 The Soviets moved 50,000 Cubans to Angola (500,000 died after Congress again cut off funds);  Soviets invaded Afghanistan (killing another 1.3 million and creating the Taliban);  Soviets unleashed Communist movements in Latin America (wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua – fought in part with M-16s provided by Hanoi), killing another 150,000 or so;  Iran seized U.S. Embassy in 1979; . . . .

Was it important to stop Communist aggression? 

• If you have any doubts, read this book.

Was it important to stop Communist aggression? 

• If you The total death toll of international have any in the 20 Communism century is estimated at doubts, 80 to 100 million lives. read this book.

th

Any Questions? 

I like to reserve the first question for someone who is really upset.

W. Hays Parks 

• Retired USMC Col. (Vietnam veteran). • Special Assistant to Army TJAG for law of war matters (20+ years); • Former Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, Naval War College; • Adjunct Professor at American Univ. Law School; • Law of War Chair, Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense; • Lots more – legendary figure on jus in bello.



My Background 

• Like John, I was very active in “Teach Ins” and other programs in mid- to late1960s; • Undergrad honors thesis (450 pp.) on Vietnam War (written 1966-67); • Journalist in VN briefly after graduation; • Army (two VN tours assigned to NVA/VC Affairs Division of American Embassy in Saigon);

My Background 

• Visited 42 of 44 RVN provinces plus Laos and Cambodia between 1968 and final evacuation in 1975; • Fellow at Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford Univ. 19711974) • Author of Vietnamese Communism • Assoc. Editor (Asia & Pacific), Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (1973, 1974);

• Teaching Vietnam seminars past 25 years.



I had hair once!





Vietnamese Communism (1975)  • “Turner’s volume is certainly one of the most refreshing to appear in several years on the subject of Vietnam, and it rekindles confidence that there is quality work again appearing after an interlude of emotional and severely biased pieces. In fact, Turner’s work must rank as a landmark in the treatment of Vietnamese communism.”

•

—American Historical Review

Wrote First Major English-language History of Vietnamese Communism



“. . . definitive account of Vietnamese Communism” American Political Science Review

Wrote First Major English-language History of Vietnamese Communism



“The subject is rich in material for political science, and . . . nineteen out of every score of Mr. Turner’s footnotes refer to utterances by Vietnamese communists, not by their detractors.” Times (London) Literary Supplement Sept. 19, 1975

Washington Post on Viet Cong Strategy (1966) 

• “Viet Cong leaders still base their long-term strategy on the conviction that the United States lacks the ability and determination to wage a long-drawn-out war.” •

—Stanley Karnow,Washington Post, • 22 December 1966, p. 1.

Congress Authorized The NLF or “Viet Cong” didthe not even be Warpretend by ato99.6% Majority WeAgainst will discuss formal would a sovereign State . . .whom “declarations of war” we have “declared  next Tuesday war”? afternoon. We did not need a formal Declaration War . . . Weofdid not wish to go to war against North Vietnam.

Congress Authorized the War by a 99.6% Majority 

We did not need a formal Declaration of War

Congress Authorized the War by a 99.6% Majority Against whom would we have “declared  war”? We did not need a formal Declaration of War

Congress Authorized The NLF or “Viet Cong” didthe not even be Warpretend by ato99.6% Majority Against a sovereign State . . .whom would we have “declared  war”? We did not need a formal Declaration of War

Congress Authorized The NLF or “Viet Cong” didthe not even be Warpretend by ato99.6% Majority Against a sovereign State . . .whom would we have “declared  war”? We did not need a formal Declaration War . . . Weofdid not wish to go to war against North Vietnam.

Southeast Asia (aka “Gulf of Tonkin”) Resolution (1964) 

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. - Pub. L. 88-508, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (emphasis added); repealed by Pub. L. 91-672 § 12 (1971)

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) 

During the Senate floor debate, Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its Chairman Fulbright was asked national interest and to world peace the maintenance whether this resolution wouldingive of international peace and security southeast Asia. withauthorization the Constitution of“to the use United States theConsonant President and the Charter of the United Nations and in such force as lead tounder war,” accordance withcould its obligations the Southeast Asia and heCollective replied:Defense Treaty, the United States is therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

“That is the way I would interpret it.”

- Pub. L. 88-508, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (emphasis added); repealed by Pub. L. 91-672 § 12 (1971)

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) The SEATO “protocol Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its states” were South national interest and to world peace the maintenance Vietnam, Laos,peace andand security in southeast Asia. of international Consonant with the Constitution of the United States Cambodia. and the Charter of the United Nations and in 

accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. - Pub. L. 88-508, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (emphasis added); repealed by Pub. L. 91-672 § 12 (1971)

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) Those who complained that the President The SEATO had no“protocol authority to enter Cambodia in 1970 were onStates three regards counts: as vital to its Sec. 2. Thewrong United states” were South national interest and to world peace the maintenance Vietnam, Laos,peace andand security in southeast Asia. of international Consonant with the Constitution of the United States Cambodia. and the Charter of the United Nations and in 

accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. - Pub. L. 88-508, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (emphasis added); repealed by Pub. L. 91-672 § 12 (1971)

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) Those who complained that the President The SEATO had no“protocol authority to enter Cambodia in 1970 were onStates three regards counts: as vital to its Sec. 2. Thewrong United states” were South 1. We had and a SEATO treaty commitment; national interest to world peace the maintenance Vietnam, andand 2.Laos, It was included in the Tonkin of international peace security in Resolution; southeast Asia. 3. Nixon more needed new authority to Consonant withno the Constitution of the United States Cambodia. and the Charter of the United Nations and in 

attack North Vietnamese forces in accordance with than its obligations under theGerman Southeast Cambodia FDR did to attack Asia Collective Defense Treaty, theWW United forces in North Africa during II. States is therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

- Pub. L. 88-508, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (emphasis added); repealed by Pub. L. 91-672 § 12 (1971)

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) 

The SEATO “protocol Sec. House 2. The United States regardsRes. as vitalwas to its The vote on Tonkin states” were South national interest and to world peace the maintenance unanimous, the Senate voted 88-2. of international Vietnam, Laos,peace andand security in southeast Asia. The combined was 504-2, or a States Consonant with thevote Constitution of the United Cambodia. and the majority. Charter of the United Nations and in 99.6% accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Congress didDefense not approved Asia Collective Treaty, the the United States is therefore,requested prepared, as by the LBJ President determines, funding – to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

- Pub. L. 88-508, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (emphasis added); repealed by Pub. L. 91-672 § 12 (1971)

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) 

The SEATO “protocol Sec. House 2. The United States regardsRes. as vitalwas to its The vote on Tonkin states” were South national interest and to world peace the maintenance unanimous, the Senate voted 88-2. of international Vietnam, Laos,peace andand security in southeast Asia. The combined was 504-2, or a States Consonant with thevote Constitution of the United Cambodia. and the majority. Charter of the United Nations and in 99.6% accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Congress didDefense not approved Asia Collective Treaty, the the United States is therefore,requested prepared, as by the LBJ President determines, funding – it more to take all necessary steps, including the use of than tripled requested amount. armed force, tothe assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

- Pub. L. 88-508, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (emphasis added); repealed by Pub. L. 91-672 § 12 (1971)

Early Congressional Support for Vietnam 

• 1955: Senate approved SEATO Treaty with 1 ‘nay’ vote • 1964: Tonkin Resolution approved 504-2 • (Appropriated more than three times LBJ’s request for Vietnam along with enacting resolution)

• 1966: $13 billion supplemental appropriation passed 389-3 in House and 87-2 in Senate • 1967: $12 billion supplemental passed 38511 in House and 77-3 in Senate • (House rejected amendment to prohibit funds for combat over North Vietnam 77-3)

Senator Thomas Eagleton (1970) 

• “Although the existence of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution did not make the war we have waged in South Vietnam any wiser or any more explicable, it did make it a legitimate war authorized by the Congress.”

Prof. John Hart Ely on the Legality of the Vietnam War 

• “[A]s the constitutional requirement of congressional authorization has historically been understood, Congress does indeed appear (years of denial and doubletalk notwithstanding) to have authorized each of these phases of the war.” •

—Ely, War & Responsibility 12 (1993)

Public Approval of President Johnson Immediately Before and After Tonkin Incident 

Gallup Poll—Percent of Americans having a “favorable” view of LBJ (change attributed by Gallup to support for handling of Vietnam issue)

July 1964: August 1964:

42% 72%

Public Approval of President Johnson Immediately Before and After Tonkin Incident 

Gallup Poll—Percent of Americans having a “favorable” view of LBJ (change attributed by Gallup to support for A 58% issue) handling of Vietnam

increase! July 1964: 42% August 1964: 72%

By coincidence, I received an email a few years ago from a friend who was visiting Hanoi and sent photos of torpedo tubes in their war museum identified as having been used on 2 August 1964 to “chase away” the USS Maddox. 

General Vo Nguyen Giap confirmed that when Robert McNamara visited Hanoi in 1995. The August 2 attacks clearly did occur.

Reports of an August 4 attack were probably mistaken 

The evidence shows NSA mistranslated one intercepted radio transmission (later covered up); Several sailors reported seeing “streaks” (perhaps phosphorus?) in the water they thought were torpedo trails; Radar operators reported sounds of enemy boat propellers (possibly produced by the other U.S. warship).

Reports of an August 4 attack were probably mistaken 

The evidence shows NSA mistranslated one intercepted and The key is radio that atransmission second manyattack sailorswas did reported report seeing and “streaks” they thought wereintorpedo trails. Radar acted upon good faith, operators reported sounds of enemy and not part of some boat propellers (possibly produced by conspiracy to “lie” to the other U.S. warship). Congress or deceive the public.

Congressman Dante Fascell on Reason for Tonkin Resolution 

“My own impression of what happened at that time was that most everybody said, well, the President wants this power and he needs to have it. It had relatively little to do with the so-called [Gulf of Tonkin] incident.” - Quoted in Ely, War and Responsibility 20 (1993)

What Went Wrong 

 I haven’t mentioned the civilian micomanagement of the war and the refusal of LBJ and McNamara to heed the consistent advice of the JCS and CIA that “gradualism” would not work. Prof. Parks will discuss part of that problem next.  Changes occurred under Nixon and Gen. Abrams, and by late 1972 we were clearly winning on the ground in South Vietnam and in the air over North Vietnam – and Hanoi returned to Paris and accepted the peace agreement.

What Went Wrong 

 There was a steep learning curve in Vietnam, and in the early days we made many errors:  Failure to isolate the battlefield (denying Hanoi the ability to get supplies easily to the south via Haiphong Harbor and the Ho Chi Minh Trail;  Temptation to fight the war ourselves and not help prepare our allies to defend their country;  “Search and Destroy” instead of “Clear and Hold”;  Failure to realize that “struggle” includes military, diplomatic, economic, political, and even legal aspects.

What Went Wrong 

 There was a steep learning curve in U.S. forces Vietnam, and in won the early days we made every major battle many errors: we to fought  Failure isolate in the battlefield (denying Hanoi the ability to get supplies easily to the south via Vietnam.

Haiphong Harbor and the Ho Chi Minh Trail;  Temptation to fight the war ourselves and not help prepare our allies to defend their country;  Inadequate LOAC training, undermining perceptions America held the high moral ground;  Failure to realize that “struggle” includes military, diplomatic, economic, political, and even legal aspects.

What Went Wrong 

We usually failed to  There was a steepeven learning curve in engage in the U.S. forces Vietnam, and in won the early days we made political struggle— every major battle many errors: where we lost the we to fought  Failure isolate in the battlefield war. (denying Hanoi the ability to get supplies easily to the south via Vietnam. Haiphong Harbor and the Ho Chi Minh Trail;  Temptation to fight the war ourselves and not help prepare our allies to defend their country;  Inadequate LOAC training, undermining perceptions America held the high moral ground;  Failure to realize that “struggle” includes military, diplomatic, economic, political, and even legal aspects.

What Went Wrong 

We usually failed to  There was a steepeven learning curve in engage in the U.S. forces Vietnam, and in won the early days we made political struggle— every major battle many errors: where we lost the we to fought in  Failure isolate the battlefield war. (denying Hanoi Tomorrow morning the ability to get supplies easily to the south via Vietnam. Maj.Haiphong Gen. Dunlap willthe Ho Chi Minh Trail; Harbor and  talk Temptation fight the war ourselves and not to youtoabout help prepare our allies to defend their country; “Lawfare” – a  Inadequate LOAC training, undermining problemAmerica of perceptions held the high moral ground;  Failure to realize that “struggle” includes military, increasing diplomatic, economic, political, and even legal importance today. aspects.