IN COUNTRY: THE VIETNAM WAR factored in to various game functions. This goes back to an analysis of Vietnam I once did which led to the S&T article.

IN COUNTRY: The Vietnam War | Alcohol, Alamo & Texas Rev | Auchinleck vs Montgomery | Battle of Actium

#281 JUL − AUG 2013

In Country: The Vietnam War IN CouNtry Notes, Part I

by Joseph Miranda In Country: Vietnam 1965-75 was something of a payoff for years of research on the Vietnam War. It got its start way back when I played John Prados’ Year of the Rat (YOTR) covering the 1972 North Vietnamese offensive into the South. YOTR’s game system modeled the conventional aspects of the War in Vietnam. It could do so because by 1972, the war had gone over to its largely conventional phase. Still, there were several periods of the war where large-scale conventional operations were, or could have been,

decisive, notably in 1965, 1968 and 1970. The article I wrote for S&T 281 accompanying the game gives my analysis of this. In Country, in turn, provides a way to play out the assumptions: could the US and its allies have gained a military decision in Vietnam during these windows of opportunity? Having said that, I want to emphasize that the game deals primarily with military factors. There are rules for assorted unconventional aspects of the war, but these are shown only insofar as they affect the military situation. Since the game’s scenarios emphasize the periods of major military conflict, the unconventional and political aspects could be

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Balance of Firepower If you line up the total firepower of Free World forces in Vietnam, you’d see that they had a considerable edge over the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC). This is all the more pronounced when you add in the American aerial armada. Yet Free World forces were never able to destroy a Communist main force division such that it could not be reconstituted. It’s true NVA and VC divisions or regiments might take massive casualties, but they would always return to the order of battle in one form or another. This worked both ways. No US, ARVN or Free World major unit was wiped out either, at least not until the NVA final offensive in 1975 (a couple of regiments or divisions might have been routed here or there, but they were reformed). This is in the game in the form of the Refit Table. Units eliminated in combat come back into play after a randomly determined number of turns, depending on the quality of the infrastructure supporting the army. This can vary from year to year and country to country. There is a small possibility for a unit to be permanently destroyed, but in the optional rules they can be rebuilt by expending military or political points. Why this was so is something worth examining in a future article. Effectively, tactics in Vietnam were attritional. This is interesting as the doctrine of both sides was to fight decisively. For US forces, it was by the application of massive firepower and helicopter maneuverability; for the communists, by isolating enemy units and destroying them piecemeal. Yet no Dien Bien Phu style battle occurred during the era of American military involvement in Vietnam. A battle such as Hue in 1968 was something of a protracted slugfest as opposed to a decisive battle. The Free World player’s potential combat power doesn’t quite pay off in action. Let’s look at this more closely. It’s been standard wargame practice that a unit surrounded by enemy forces and/or zones of control can be

| Designer & Player Notes | JUL–aUg 2013

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IN COUNTRY: THE VIETNAM WAR types of airmobile units. The first are those which require transport by helicopter units. The second type is termed “air cavalry” for the game. These have sufficient organic helicopter assets to lift all units. Air cavalry units operate out of firebases. Their movement is restricted to moving out of their base up to range, attacking or providing defensive support, then returning. Within this framework, they are actually quite flexible. But again, they are tied to the position of their bases and can’t hold hexes they have attacked. While they may have great tactical mobility, their operational value is restricted, though you can move their bases and thus their centers of operations. (This concept, by the way, was thought up by Ty Bomba and simply but effectively shows how these sorts of units worked. They have tactical mobility, but strategic mobility is a different matter.)

Bases or Boonies?

destroyed if forced to retreat. The US tried enveloping Communist units in Vietnam, using vertical envelopment or amphibious forces, but found that these tactics did not quite work in the field. From the big picture view, it would seem easy for US forces to encircle and destroy Communist units by exploiting helicopter mobility; in the game, the Free World player indeed can launch airmobile assaults. But several things mitigate their being decisive. There are a limited number of Landing Zone (LZ) markers, used to designate hexes which can be the targets for airmobile assaults. There thus will be a limit on the number of these operation. This models various command control, intelligence, and logistical factors. Even though you the player may see enemy occupied hexes on the map, it doesn’t necessary mean the enemy is actually there. He may have heard of your planned attack via his own intelligence operations and took off before the operation hit. Another factor is in the game’s use

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Given the difficulty of totally destroying enemy units, what then is a game strategy for winning? Simple. It revolves around taking and holding enemy bases while maintaining control of your own. Bases are printed on the map. These of zones of control (ZOC). You have represent major logistical and training two general types of units, heavy and areas. They are vital because players light. Heavy unit ZOCs do not extend can place reinforcements and refit into certain types of terrain. Since units on them. Players can also build airmobile units are mainly heavy up brigades or regiments into divisions types, this means that surrounding on bases. The actual front line is not so Communist units can be difficult. much in the positions of mobile units, Conversely, light unit ZOC extend but the line of forward bases. It’s where into all types of adjacent hexes. Most the enemy can mobilize the big units. Communist units are light types. If the Take those bases, and the enemy is Communists can catch a Free World forced back that much further. Control unit in rough terrain, they can surround of bases (and cities) also provides a and destroy them, though this can be player with victory points, and these can difficult, as will be seen. This also gives be translated into various advantages the Communists an edge which is not throughout the game. There’s an added otherwise apparent by toting up combat impetus for the Free World to take factors. It also makes the relatively small Communist bases because these are number of Free World light units – ARVN the movement termini for the latter’s Rangers, Special Forces (SF) mobile supply units. And as will be seen, supply strike forces, the ANZ Task Force, the CIA is vital for any Communist offensive. White Star folks – vital for offensive operA dilemma for Free World forces is ations. The downside is that these units that most Communist bases are potentend to be relatively weak in combat tially out of reach, being located in strength. Given the C2 rule (see below), Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam. they can be difficult to concentrate. Still, there are several which are in South Incidentally, there are two general Vietnam such as the Iron Triangle,

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| Designer & Player Notes | JUL–aUg 2013

U Minh Forest and A Shau Valley. A determined Free World offensive can take them. As I point out in the article, the failure of Free World forces to take those bases from the get-go undermined subsequent operations. It’s a question of emphasis: do you go after the enemy’s forces in the field or the infrastructure supporting them? Aside from the printed bases, the Free World has Firebases and Special Forces (SF) Camps. These are static units. Firebases provide friendly units operating within a two hex radius a combat bonus, representing artillery support, forward logistical support, and morale advantages. SF Camps allow the Free World player to examine enemy units which are attempting to move by them, representing recon patrols operating out of them. Their high unconventional warfare strength is also useful when defending since it allows for choice of combat results table. Communist units attempting to take SF Camps can run into Ambushes



generated by the Mobile CRT. Firebases and SF Camps are also pads for airmobile operations, something which can be critical for the Free World side. The placement of Firebases and SF Camps thus can be a critical for the Free World player. Having them in the right area can potentially allow you to dominate the pace of operations. At the same time, they tie down units in their defense. I was also getting in the element of “firebase psychosis,” the tendency of conventional units to operate within range of friendly bases. Again, while Free World airmobility appears to give much operational maneuverability, the requirements for basing means that other areas of the countryside will not be covered. You end up with the historical situation as a result of the game mechanics without it being forced by special rules. On the Communist side, printed Bases provide supply to units within range. This is traced regardless of enemy units or terrain. I did it this way in part to

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keep things simple, but also because the supply Bases represent centers of operations for logistics occurring throughout a region. Out of supply Communist units have their movement and attack strengths halved. So operating within radius of a Base is vital for them. The Communists also have supply units. These can be moved from Base to Base, again making those hexes critical. The Communist player can expend supply units to provide Maximum Attack Supply, doubling the combat strength of attacking units. This represents higher expenditure of ammunition and replacements as well as moving up heavier guns and rocket launchers. Maximum Attack Supply gives Communist units a chance of taking on the more powerful Free World units. There is no equivalent maximum supply state for Free World forces because their logistics were, historically, so overwhelming that they are reflected in the high combat strengths of many of their units. For example, a standard

| Designer & Player Notes | JUL–AUG 2013

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IN COUNTRY: THE VIETNAM WAR One other aspect of the game is that some US and ARVN units have a reverse side showing them in different configurations. For US units, this is a higher unconventional warfare rating, going on the assumption that the Army was better prepared for insurgency. For ARVN, it shows their post-Vietnamization strength. Their infantry divisions have higher combat factors, and their counterinsurgency units are better at UW. Since it’s a long war, this had to be shown and this was the easiest way to do it. Then there are US Special Forces. These include SF Camps, Mobile Strike Forces (MSF), and SOGs. The MSF units add considerable UW value to the Free World side. If I had to do it again, I’d put restrictions on the cooperation between them and conventional Army forces. There were some real failures in what today would be called Joint Operations. Then again, it’s more rules.

US division has a combat sterngth of 12 compared to a median NVA divisional strength of five. Any anomalies are taken care of by the Firebase rule, with the idea that Free World units operating within radius of them are also better supplied and maintained, thus getting the combat shift. Maximum Attack Supply also gives the Communist player additional decisions. He has to think about where he wants to position his supply units, and then when he wants to expend them. Building up for an offensive becomes a major game issue. Again, the Allied player can potentially forestall an enemy offensive by seizing control of forward supply bases, though this can be difficult. This gets back to one of the fundamental themes of the game, that a quantitative evaluation of unit strength is at best a rough guide to actual combat power. For example, Communist units gain the defensive advantage of certain terrain types while Free World units generally do not. This represents a variety of tactical factors, such as firepower being more effective the open, the cover and concealment provided by jungles, and so forth.

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C2—Who’s on First Command Control (C2) was critical in the original campaign. Generally, the Communists had an edge here with their centralized command structure and intelligence apparatus. For In Country, each force has a C2 rating. This ranges from three to seven, and can change over the years. The C2 value generates the movement factors and is the maximum number of units which can cooperate in a single attack. The attack limit creates some tradeoffs. For example, the Free World player might have two US divisions in an attack. He might want to break them down to six brigades to cover more hexes. But let’s say the US C2 level is five. This means only five of the brigades could be involved in a single attack. Of course, he could keep one division together and its three brigades would count as only one unit. But in so doing, he loses flexibility. This is true across the board. Simply having a lot of units does not mean much if you cannot get them to act together effectively. Obvious, this is a reason for the Communists to build up NVA divisions. It also shows how the independent ARVN elite units, while powerful in themselves, nonetheless can be difficult to concentrate.

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one More tour… I’m pretty much satisfied with the design of In Country. But I am thinking of a couple of variants. One is to give the Communists mobile base units. These can be used to create forward bases so they are not tied to the ones printed on the map. The system if flexible enough to absorb many concepts. There are also some additional scenarios in the works, such as one looking at the Pentagon’s expected war in 1964-65, one which can involve the Red Chinese. It’s all part of the game of simulating Vietnam.

| Designer & Player Notes | JUL–aUg 2013

In Country Notes, Part II

by Joseph Miranda

One of the challenges in designing In Country: the War in Vietnam 1965-75 (S&T 281) was in simulating material versus non-material factors of the conflict. The United States brought tremendous machine power to Vietnam in terms of weapons and logistics. Opposing this buildup, the Communists cranked up their PSYOP apparatus and what today would be called “asymmetrical warfare” capabilities. The various game systems shows each side’s strengths and weaknesses.

Airpower The Free World side has considerable airpower (mainly American). The game models air war at the operational level. There are four types of air units : Tactical (TAC), Strategic (SAC—B-52s), Helicopters and Air Commandos. Each air unit represents a quantification of relative number of sorties flown, though for order of



battle purposes each one corresponds to an air wing or helicopter group. The Free World player can utilize airpower for two general functions: airstrikes and airmobile transport. Airstrikes are launched before each player turn’s ground combat phase and thus can be used both offensively and defensively. They are resolved on the Bombardment Table and can result in the elimination or suppression of enemy units. There are also some antiaircraft results which cause the recycling of an attacking air unit. You’ll notice that there is no close air support mission in which airstrikes are added to the combat strength of ground units. This in part reflects the origins of the system with John Prados’ Year of the Rat game. But it also reflects the design assumptions. In Country is an operational level game. You are seeing the impact of airpower not at the tactical level but in the bigger picture: how it affects enemy regimental and divisional sized units in the course of a campaign. Over time, airpower will degrade and sometimes destroy

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Communist formations. At the same time, the attrition of attacking air units represents losses due to combat and operational factors, such as wear and tear on aircraft as well as pilot burnout. Use too much airpower and you will find it decreasing in effectiveness until you have a few turns of refit. If there’s more than one enemy unit in a hex, they are each attacked by the full strength of airstrikes applied against that hex. The assumption is that enemy concentrations make better targets, as well as reducing the intelligence requirements to find and fix the units. This brings in a dilemma for the Free World player. Do you concentrate your airpower against a small number of hexes containing several enemy units each in the hopes of eliminating some of those units? Or do you disperse your airpower to inflict suppressions against enemy units which may be engaged with friendly ground forces? Since suppressions reduce enemy combat strength, this can make a major difference in combat.

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IN COUNTRY: THE VIETNAM WAR Helicopters

other air units

Helicopters have two uses. One is for bombarding enemy units adjacent to friendly units. The second is can support airmobile movement. Ground units with the airmobile symbol can move from friendly printed bases, firebases, Special Forces (SF) camps, and/or Landing Zone markers. But to do so, the Free World player must utilize a helicopter unit. Again, this represents the concept of air units as sorties. You allocate maintenance and support efforts to gunships or utility choppers, generating missions. The idea is that there is never enough to do everything. SAC attacks (Arc Light) provide an airstrike bonus, shifting the column used to the detriment of the targets on the ground. SAC is also immune to enemy antiaircraft fire, so it can be a pretty powerful weapon in the arsenal. However, they increase the points that the Communists get for collateral damage. There’s no free lunch in Vietnam!

Several countries have Air Commando units. These represent various special operations aviation forces used for counterinsurgency. The CIA operated a considerable number of these aircraft, also. In the campaign rules, their use can prevent collateral damage, as well as providing airmobile support for special ops units. They are one of the more valuable unit types for the Free World. Later in the war, the US gets a special TOW helicopter. These were armed with wire guided antitank missiles, and proved useful in taking out Communist armor. They were also used against various point targets such as fortified positions. Finally, the US gets a couple of naval bombardment units, representing the Navy’s offshore units. These act like airpower but are obviously immune to enemy antiaircraft fire. I didn’t give the Communist air units. This was in part to keep the game simple. The air battles between Free World

and Communist air forces took place largely off the north edge of the map and is factored into the Campaign Game’s Bombing North Vietnam rules. Any anomalies are taken care of by the inclusion of Communist air defense units, which reduce the effectiveness of Free World airpower within a two hex radius.

air strategies There are two strategic air campaigns which you can employ against the North. The first is Rolling Thunder (1965-68) and the second is Linebacker (1972). In Linebacker, the combat value of American airstrikes is increased, representing the use of early precision guided weapons. The Bombing North Vietnam Table builds in a lot of things. Broadly, the more airpower the Free World uses, the more likely they will get positive results, bringing in more political and military points, or preventing the Communists from building certain kinds of units. But there

BoMBING NortH VIetNaM taBLe (CaMPaIGN ruLes) Bomber counters bombing => die roll 1 2 3 4 5 6 Bombing North Vietnam Results LD: Limited Damage MD: Major Damage

DD: Decisive Damage

R: Reaction

A1 A2 -

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1

2

3

4

5-6

7-8

9-12

13-16

17+

LD R +A2 A1

LD LD R +A2 A1

LD LD LD R +A2 A1

MD LD LD R +A2 A1

MD LD LD LD R +A2 A1+R

MD MD LD LD R +A2 A1+R

DD MD MD LD R +A2 A1+R

DD MD MD MD R +A2 A1+R

DD DD MD MD R +A2 A1+R

Restricted Bombing

Unrestricted Bombing

Double the number of points expended for Communists to build Supply units and NVA regiments this turn. Allies roll a second die and receive that number of Political Points. Communists cannot build any Supply units or NVA regiments this turn.

Double the number of points expended for Communists to build Supply units and NVA regiments this turn. Allies roll a second die and receive double that number of Political Points. Allies roll a third die and receive that number of Military Points.

Allies roll a second die and receive that number of Political Points. Allies roll a third die and receive that number of Military Points. Communists cannot build any Supply units or NVA regiments this turn. Communists roll one die and receive that number of Political Points.

Allies roll a second die and receive double that number of Political Points. Allies roll a third die and receive double that number of Military Points.

Communists cannot build any Supply units or NVA regiments this turn.

Communists cannot build any Supply units or NVA regiments this turn.

If this is 1965-71, Communists roll one and receive triple that number of Political Points. If this is 1972 or later, Communists roll one die and receive double that number of Political Points. Anti-Aircraft: The Allied player eliminates one bombing unit (which may be SAC) and place it in the Refit box. Anti-Aircraft The Allied player eliminates two bombing units (which may be SAC) and place them in the Refit box. No effect

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is also a greater chance for a reaction, giving the Communists more points. You have a choice between Restricted and Unrestricted Bombing, which can modify results still further. Finally, intruders can take losses which are built into the table. Since this all takes place off map, it removed the need to write extensive rules to recreate “Going Downtown,” but you get the effects.

Reinforcements The Communists do not appear to have anything capable of providing the same combat power as American air. But check the order of battle. The Communists regularly receive VC and NVA regiments as reinforcements. These units represent the ongoing mobilization of manpower made by Hanoi and COSVN (Central Office for South Vietnam, the term for the Communist high command in the South). These regiments are on top of the various infantry divisions and armored regiments in the order of battle. What they do is allow the Communists to maintain a pace of operations even in the face of massive casualties. It’s those non-material factors. There could have been any number of ways to show, this, but this was the easiest. The Allies get their historic reinforcements, but as you can see, aside from the American buildup following 1965, these can be few and far between. There’s not that consistent reinforcement at the local and regional level. When the Communists launch the Tet Offensive, ARVN gets a Rally, which brings in some additional local forces as well as providing a positive die roll modifier for Refit attempts. This represents the general South Vietnamese mobilization in response to the Communist attacks. Again, it represents a non-material aspect of the war, built into an existing game system.

Unit Strength & Flexibility This brings me to a discussion of evaluating combat strengths for units. Most American divisions have a combat strength of 12, most ARVN divisors a strength of two, and most Communist divisions five. Does this mean that a US division had six times the firepower of a South Vietnamese



division or 2.5 that of an NVA division? The answer is “maybe.” The US military could generate a lot of firepower on the ground, and the strengths include helicopter and close air support not otherwise portrayed by the air system. Why are the ARVN divisions so weak? OK, they were often understrength and some commanders were political hacks. But there’s more to it than that. As my article on Vietnam in S&T 281 points out, ARVN divisions tended to be territorial organizations. In the game, their strength is partially subsumed into things such as the self-defense value of cities and firebases. What the division counters represent is what could be mustered for offensive operations. This gets back to why units can be refit after elimination. The loss of a division on the game map does not mean it was wiped out. Rather, its offensive abilities have been rendered ineffective. Unit strength also in built into the ability of units to break down into component organizations. A “shattered” result causes either the elimination of one unit, or the breakdown of a division into its component brigades/ regiments (with no unit loss). This means that those divisions which can be broken down (NVA, US, ROK, ROC, Thai) have more resiliency than divisions which cannot (ARVN, Cambodian) and more than separate brigades and regiments. For example, a US “12” division breaks down into three “3” brigades (total strength f of “9”). But a division has a de facto second

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“step” (to use wargamese) because a Shatter result leaves the brigades intact, allowing you to rebuild the division via the Reorganization rule. It thus often makes sense to keep a division together, beyond the fact that its total strength of the division is more than that of the component brigades/regiments. While their divisions are generally weak, ARVN does have some powerful units in their Airborne, Ranger, and Marine regiments and brigades. Some of these units have the added benefit of being airmobile, as well as having moderately good Unconventional Warfare (UW) values (“2”, a match for NVA regulars). The Free World player ends up with the historical situation of an ARVN composed of two parts: a mass of divisions with limited mobility and weak offensive power, and an elite which can be hard hitting, but only in limited numbers and lacking the resiliency of the divisions. Both sides get special assault units: armor, mechanized, and Communist sappers. The latter were elite reconnaissance engineers who conducted assaults on base camps and infiltration of cities. Assault units provide a column shift to attacking forces. This represents their shock effect in the attack. Having them at the right place and time can be critical. The US gets several Riverine units. These represents the flotillas which dominated the Mekong during operations such as SEALORDS. I gave the riverines an Unconventional warfare value of “2” (where most US infantry units

| Designer & Player Notes | JUL–AUG 2013

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IN COUNTRY: THE VIETNAM WAR SOGs at first, gradually building up by 1968. I added in a couple of extra SOGs representing Operation Phoenix, the combined intelligence campaign against the VC infrastructure. Again, it’s the use of an existing game mechanic to show much more complex realworld activities. The result is that for In Country, a campaign can be decided by the astute play of non-material forces. Of course, the big units are still needed to take the big objectives. You have to balance both conventional and unconventional factors, and therein lies game strategy.

have a “1”) because they were very effective in interdicting VC/NVA in the Delta.

unconventional Warfare Each ground unit has an Unconventional Warfare (UW) factor, representing its ability to conduct intelligence, PSYOP, and guerilla warfare. In combat, the side with the higher Unconventional factor gets the choice of combat results table: Positional or Mobile. The Positional CRT is fairly standard wargame stuff, with 3-to-1 odds needed to ensure success or at least stalemate. The Mobile CRT is a little more subtle. One of the results is Ambush. This causes the side which did not choose the CRT to lose a unit. Since Ambush results can happen starting at 1 to 3 odds and going towards the higher end, it means whoever chose the table is going to have an immense tactical advantage. Ambush deals with a situation facing designers for games involving guerrilla warfare: how to deal with the fact that the side which had inferior combat strength could gain the upper hand in small unit skirmishes. The In Country Ambush result represents is not so much division or regiment sized bushwhacking as the cumulative outcome of many smaller actions fought below the scale of the units. A division may lumber into an area containing guerrillas who have dispersed to fight

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at company and platoon strength. This results in many small victories for the guerillas which add up to the intruding division losing combat effectiveness. Since the ability to choose the CRT is a critical tactical function in the game, I wanted to give both sides a means to influence it beyond simply piling more units into the fray. Normally, you can use the UW value of one (and only one) engaged unit to determine who gets the CRT choice (with ties going to the defender). This means that large scale assaults can fall apart when the other side has superior UW strength. Effectively, this is a way to show how non-material factors could trump firepower. There’s one more thing which influences CRT selection. Both sides have special units, Cadres for the Communists and Special Operations Groups (SOG) for the Free World. A player can deploy one per combat (attacking or defending) to raise their side’s UW value by “1.” After the combat, the Cadre or SOG is placed in the Refit box and must be brought back to play via die roll. This means that you have to wait for the right moment to “burn” these units, such as a critical attack or during a general offensive when it is all-or-nothing. The Cadres/SOGs represent not only personnel but also overall UW capability. The Communists start out in 1965 with considerable Cadre strength. The Free World has a relatively weak showing in

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| Designer & Player Notes | JUL–aUg 2013