JOÃO BRAVO FURTADO FACULDADE DE ECONOMIA DA UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA (FEUNL) HOME ADDRESS & TELEPHONE: Rua Ilha das Flores, 23, 2º Dto. 2775-802 Carcavelos Portugal +351 969069506

DATE OF BIRTH: September 28th 1970

OFFICE ADDRESS, TELEPHONE & E-MAIL: Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa Campus de Campolide 1099-032 Lisboa Portugal +351 213801600 (Ext. 3139) [email protected] SEX: M

CITIZENSHIP: Portuguese

CURRENT POSITION: Teaching Assistant, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Lisbon, Portugal) GRADUATE STUDIES: Sept. 2003 – July 2009

Sept. 2003 – Sept. 2005 2002 – 2003

PhD in Economics (highest honors), FEUNL Thesis Title: “Rationality and Rhizomatic Thinking in Games: Collective Action, Voting Behavior and Voting Rules” Committee: Pedro Pita Barros (FEUNL), Paulo P. Côrte-Real (Advisor, FEUNL), Jean-François Laslier (École Polytechnique), Susana Peralta (FEUNL), Cesaltina Pires (Universidade de Évora), José Tavares (FEUNL) Courses’ component of the Doctoral and Master’s Program at FEUNL (highest average point grade) MSc in Operations Research and Systems Engineering (highest honors), Instituto Superior Técnico (IST), Universidade Técnica de Lisboa (UTL)

UNDERGRADUATE STUDIES: 1988 – 1993

Licenciatura (5 year degree) in Physics Engineering (first class honors), IST, UTL

REFERENCES: Prof. Paulo P. Côrte-Real (Advisor) Faculdade de Economia Universidade Nova de Lisboa Campus de Campolide 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal [email protected] Tel: +351 213801600 (Ext.1363) 3. Prof. Pedro Pita Barros Faculdade de Economia Universidade Nova de Lisboa Campus de Campolide 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal [email protected] Tel: +351 213801600 (Ext.1345)

1. Prof. Susana Peralta Faculdade de Economia Univ. Nova de Lisboa Campus de Campolide 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal [email protected] Tel: +351 213801600 (Ext.1331)

2. Prof. José Tavares Faculdade de Economia Univ. Nova de Lisboa Campus de Campolide 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal [email protected] Tel: +351 213801600 (Ext.3235)

4. Prof. Jean-François Laslier École Polytechnique Département d'Economie 91128 Palaiseau Cedex France [email protected] Tel: +33 (1)69333018

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JOÃO BRAVO FURTADO RESEARCH INTERESTS: Primary Fields: Economic Theory, Game Theory, Political Economics, Rationality and Behavior Secondary Fields: Mathematical Economics TEACHING INTERESTS: Undergraduate Level: Economics, Mathematical and Quantitative Methods Graduate Level: Microeconomics, Game Theory, Mathematical and Quantitative Methods TEACHING EXPERIENCE AT FEUNL: 2005 – 2008 – 2008 – 2009 2007 – 2008 2007 – 2008 2006 – 2007

Mathematical Analysis II, undergraduate level Information and Games, undergraduate level Analysis of the Industry and of the Competition, graduate level Public Economics, graduate level Microeconomic Theory II, graduate level Game Theory, graduate level

OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES: 1993 – 2004 1994 – 2001 1999 – 2000 1996 – 1997 1995 – 1996 1993 – 1994 1991 – 1993

Private Tutor of undergraduate and graduate students (Mathematics, Statistics, Physics and Economics) Freelancer in photography and creative writing Business Trainer at TASI (Advanced Technologies and Information Systems) and Forpescas, Lisbon Teaching Assistant, Dep. of Mathematics, Universidade Independente, Lisbon th 9 grade Teacher of Physics and Chemistry, Lisbon Teaching Assistant, Department of Mathematics, IST, UTL, Lisbon Undergraduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Physics, IST, UTL

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS: 2008 – 2010 2003 – 2007 2006 – 2007 2003 – 2004 1992 – 1993

Researcher of the Research Project “Voting Behavior and Voting Rules”, Research Grant from the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal PhD Scholarship, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia Fellowship from Fundação Amélia de Mello, FEUNL award Prize “Unisys Research”, for the Best Research Project in Econometrics, Doctoral and Master’s Program, FEUNL Scholarship for Young Researcher, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia

SELECTED PRESENTATIONS: June 2008 June 2007 May 2007

The 9th International Meeting of the Society for SCW, Montreal 5th International Conference on Logic, Game Theory & Social Choice, Bilbao QED Jamboree, Departamento de Economia, Ca’Foscari University of Venice

LANGUAGES: English (fluent), Portuguese (native), Spanish (basic), French (basic). OTHER QUALIFICATIONS: 2002 2001 1988

Certificate of Pedagogical Aptitude as a Business Trainer, Institute of Employment and Business Training, Portugal Certificate of Professional Photographer, Portuguese Association of Photographic Art Certificate of Proficiency in English by the University of Cambridge (grade B)

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JOÃO BRAVO FURTADO COMPLETED PAPERS: Job Market Paper: “Approval Voting: Large Elections with Rhizomatic Voters” I consider a multinomial model of strategic Approval Voting (AV) in large multi-candidate elections, where I allow for the possibility of Rhizomatic Thinking (RT). The rhizomatic assumption (introduced in Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2008)), states that each agent may condition her optimal response on an exogenous belief she possesses over the proportion of like-minded others that will take the same action as she does, and rhizomatic beliefs will induce agents to perceive that they may be pivotal with a non-vanishing probability. I show that my model is asymptotically equivalent to Roger Myerson's model of Poisson population uncertainty when all voters are individually rational. In this case, the set of equilibrium winners for a given polity may be different for different distributions of the intensity of preferences. Under RT, the best responses of a rhizomatic voter will no longer depend on intensity of preferences. Moreover, RT impacts strongly on equilibrium selection and characteristics. It may help to uniquely select a majoritarian candidate, in cases where standard predictions would yield other winners. But it may also help to uniquely select a strong candidate who is not a "lowest/low common denominator" CW, which may mitigate a common criticism directed to AV. Comparing AV and Plurality Rule (PR), I conclude that both rules are sensitive to perceptions of group identity and saliency, and that RT tends to favor stronger candidates under both rules, suggesting that equilibrium outcomes under PR and AV are more often coincident when voters are rhizomatic. My results therefore call attention to the role of partisanship and group identity in the design of optimal voting rules. Other Completed Papers: “Rhizomatic Thinking and Voting Equilibria in Large Multi-Candidate Elections under Plurality Rule”, joint with Paulo P. Côrte-Real We consider a model of strategic voting behavior in large multi-candidate elections under Plurality Rule where we allow for the possibility of Rhizomatic Thinking. Our rhizomatic assumption states that each agent may condition her optimal response on an exogenous belief she possesses over the proportion of like-minded others that will take the same action as she does. In our pivotal-agent game, we therefore relax self-goal choice - and rhizomatic beliefs will induce agents to perceive that they may be pivotal with a non-vanishing probability. We modify the trinomial pivotal-voter model of Palfrey ([1]) and solve for asymptotic equilibria using techniques from large deviations theory, given the distributions of preferences and beliefs. We fully characterize best responses and show existence and possible uniqueness of equilibria in this setting. We then conclude that our model may help select equilibria, adding predictive power to standard game-theoretic settings. We also find that Duverger's Law may be violated in equilibrium and, as an application, we suggest Rhizomatic Thinking can help provide a compelling rationale for the non-Duvergerian outcome of the 1992 US presidential election. Correlations between rhizomatic beliefs and preferences explain the different equilibrium outcomes and our model therefore calls attention to the role of partisanship and group identity in plurality election outcomes. References: [1] Palfrey T (1989), A Mathematical Proof of Duverger’s Law, in Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Peter C. Ordeshook, ed.) Univ. of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor 1989: 69-91

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JOÃO BRAVO FURTADO “Rationality, Behavior and Rhizomatic Thinking: revisiting the self-goal choice assumption in games”, joint with Paulo P. Côrte-Real Game Theory can be presented as both a positive and a normative theory, but has received criticism on both counts due to its underlying notion of individual rationality - that usually comprises self-centered welfare, self-welfare goal and self-goal choice. A tension between notions of individual and collective rationality arises in several settings where standard theory provides solutions that seem to contradict empirical and experimental evidence. We address the behavior of self-interested individuals in one-shot games relaxing only the self-goal choice assumption and introducing the possibility of Rhizomatic Thinking. Our rhizomatic assumption states that each agent may condition her optimal response on exogenous beliefs she possesses over the proportion of "like-minded" others that will take the same action as she does (where the definition of "like-minded" others will be game-specific). We argue that allowing for Rhizomatic Thinking may be appropriate in models of collective action and we show that it can simultaneously help provide explanations for observed coordination patterns in games with multiple equilibria (such as the Assurance Game), as well as for observed coordination on nonequilibrium efficient outcomes in games with inefficient dominant strategy equilibria (such as the Prisoner's Dilemma) and in games with inefficient Nash equilibria (such as the Traveler's Dilemma).

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JOÃO BRAVO FURTADO COURSES AND GRADES 1 , DOCTORAL AND MASTER’S PROGRAM, FEUNL: 1st Year: Mathematical Analysis: A Microeconomic Theory I: A Macroeconomic Theory I: A Econometrics: A Microeconomic Theory II: A Macroeconomic Theory II: B Approved in the Microeconomics and Macroeconomics Qualifier Exams (pass/fail exams). 2

nd

Year:

History of Economic Thought: A Microeconometrics: A Game Theory: A Economia Financeira I (Corporate Finance): A Economia Financeira II (Asset Pricing): A Advanced Microeconomics: A Approved in the Field Exam in Game Theory: (pass/fail exam). SELECTED TEACHING EVALUATIONS (SCALE OF 1 TO 5): 2008 – 2009: Overall Assessment of 4.64 (Faculty’s Overall Assessment: 4.28) 2007 – 2008: Overall Assessment of 4.58 (Faculty’s Overall Assessment: 4.34) 2006 – 2007: Overall Assessment of 5.00 (Faculty’s Overall Assessment: 4.21)

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The conversion of the grades from the scale of 0-20 to the ECTS grading scale followed the FEUNL standards. Due to the inherent subjectivity of such conversion, grades such as A+ or A- were not considered.

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