Dingli Shen
Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats?
A
s long as states continue to perceive that external threats to their national security exist, alliances—the traditional means for states to ensure national security—will continue to matter. Although a security or military arrangement is not necessarily a prerequisite (alliances can also exist as a more informally codified political alignment among willing states), alliances are only legitimate if they establish security partnerships for defensive purposes that together provide a system of collective security for all parties involved. In the military context, all members of an alliance expect to maximize the deterrent effect of the arrangement to protect them from potential hostile acts against any individual member. The collective strength of the whole is perceived to be greater than that of its parts; an alliance thus increases the effectiveness of deterrence as well as the credibility of the will to use collective hard power in response to external aggression should deterrence fail. In contrast, alliances formed for aggressive purposes, such as World War II’s fascist Axis powers, inherently lack lasting legitimacy and subsequently lose relevance. Modern alliances were created primarily to deter and defend against Cold War threats. In this context, NATO was established to ally Western European nations with the United States (and Canada) against the threat posed by Soviet expansionism and communism. The Warsaw Pact formed NATO’s eastern counterpart, allying Eastern European nations with the Soviet Union against potential Western (U.S.-led) aggression. In the Pacific arena, the United States forged several crucial bilateral alliances, including those with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others to protect against the shadow of the Soviet Union as well as to prevent the rise of Red China. Dingli Shen is a professor of international relations and executive vice dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. He is also deputy director of the university’s Center for American Studies. © 2004 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Washington Quarterly • 27:2 pp. 165–179. T HE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY
■
SPRING 2004
165
l Dingli Shen The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a global era of counterterrorism following the September 11 attacks have fundamentally changed the primary threats to international security and redefined the concept of security for all states, although in different ways. Because an alliance’s legitimacy rests on its ability to provide collective defense for all its members, on an international level, contemporary conclusions about the current relevance of alliances can only be drawn from a fair analysis of how they serve to deter common threats today. Examining the role of alliances in protecting against current threats—in particular, those posed by international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and rising states perceived to have the potential to upset today’s balance of power, such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—provides an effective framework for such analysis. In the end, it is difficult to come to any sort of international consensus about the relevance and legitimacy of alliances today because national interests, threat perceptions, and concepts of collective security remain disparate even after the September 11 attacks.
Combating International Terrorism As stated in the most recent U.S. national security strategy, 1 Washington considers terrorism and WMD proliferation, especially the lethal combination of the two, as the foremost threats facing not just the United States but the greater international community today. As disagreements over whether to go to war with Iraq show, however, different nations view the collective threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and WMD differently. Yet, many would agree that each poses a formidable current threat to international security and thus merits discussion here. As they made the power of international terrorism apparent to the world, the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, gave the United States a unique sense of insecurity. Never before had the U.S. homeland felt so vulnerable to terrorist penetration. As a result, the United States has increased its focus on obtaining the cooperation of alliance partners in the war against terrorism. Especially concerned about the possibility that terrorists could acquire WMD, Washington has organized “coalitions of the willing” in its efforts against terrorism to augment existing military alliances and other permanent institutions. For the purpose of analyzing the relevance of alliances in combating the threat posed by terrorism, the significance of the events of September 11 is the unprecedented attack against a member state of NATO. Because NATO is a collective defensive mechanism, an attack against any single member automatically constitutes an attack against all member states and requires a 166
THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY
■
S PRING 2004
Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats
l
response from all members in the form of collective action. In fact, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty emphasizes that the “enduring” core mission of NATO is the collective defense of its members.2 Some NATO members, including the United Kingdom and Germany, assisted the United States in the military action to remove the Taliban regime from Afghanistan and continue to assist in removing latent Taliban and Al Qaeda forces from the country. NATO has since taken over command and coordination of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) there. NATO, originally formed to meet Cold War threats, has thus, in this case at least, proven effective in the face of the new threat posed by terrorism.3 ATO has proven In the military operation to defeat the tereffective, in at least rorist threat in Afghanistan, the United States one case, in the face also had access to international institutions of the new terrorist such as the United Nations and was able to secure greater participation from states that threat. are not part of various, traditional U.S. alliances by building a coalition of willing, supportive nations. The UN has passed various resolutions concerning Afghanistan, and many UN member states (some of which are not parties to U.S. alliances) have provided financial support to the reconstruction of that country. Despite these alternatives, however, NATO remains the most appropriate multilateral institution—one that Washington has built up for a half century and whose counteraggression capabilities can be utilized immediately. Even though the U.S. government will seek international cooperation from all available avenues to meet this particular new threat, Washington must consider NATO the most reliable strategic asset to respond effectively, not only based on its record in responding to terrorist threats so far (as they have been limited in number if not in gravity) but on its record in responding to other post–Cold War security threats. NATO’s involvement in Kosovo in 1999 provides another example of the relevance of this alliance. In the Kosovo crisis, for example, NATO participated in military operations against Yugoslavia when it became apparent that the United States and NATO would not be able to secure UN Security Council authorization for the use of force prior to going to war. Although the United States certainly would have had the ability to organize a coalition of the willing for this purpose had NATO not existed, it was far easier to achieve the military intervention with NATO already in place. This military alliance gave the United States institutional convenience. Moreover, on the occasion of NATO’s 50th anniversary in April 1999, its 19 members approved the “Strategic Concept of the Alliance.”4 This agree-
N
THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY
■
SPRING 2004
167
l Dingli Shen ment effectively redefined the mission of this Cold War alliance as one that dedicates the alliance to responding to a broad spectrum of possible threats including regional conflicts, WMD proliferation as well as their means of delivery, and transnational threats such as terrorism. This policy essentially transformed NATO from a Cold War collective security organization into a new one that attaches more importance to political dimensions and expanded its geographical focus beyond NATO territory. With NATO members thus collectively defining terrorism as a primary threat, peration Iraqi the utility of this alliance in providing comFreedom contradicted mon defense seems as applicable as it was the basic principles of before. alliances. Some have argued that NATO is irrelevant in meeting the threat posed by terrorism because of its refusal to participate in the 2003 U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. This argument confuses the purpose of an alliance as a legitimate agreement among nations on collective defense for an illegitimate one on collective offensive action. Because NATO as a whole refused to participate, the United States had to organize an international coalition of willing allies to launch its preemptive strike, a U.S. strategic action that some of its major traditional allies openly opposed. Yet, in waging a preemptive war to achieve regime change in Iraq, the United States went beyond actions in which a defensive alliance could be of assistance. In this particular case, Saddam’s government never was found to be linked to Al Qaeda nor to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Saddam’s regime indeed committed crimes against the Iraqi people as well as against several of Iraq’s neighboring states, and Saddam repeatedly violated international laws that prohibited Iraq from acquiring WMD. For these reasons, it was certainly legitimate for the international community to take action to bring about a behavior change. International law, however, also prohibits foreign forces from taking such preemptive action against the national sovereignty of a state without UN authorization. Therefore, declaring a war on Iraq on the grounds that it was a state sponsor of terrorism was not only a significant departure from the facts but was also illegitimate under international law and in no way obligated NATO members to fighting the war in Iraq because of their professed commitment to combating terrorism. The United States’ diplomatic frustration in gathering wider international support for its war in Iraq is apparent. Some key NATO members could not support Washington because they did not believe that Saddam posed an imminent threat. NATO’s failure to act simply does not prove that
O
168
THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY
■
S PRING 2004
Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats
l
the role of alliances will diminish as long as military action is taken for legitimate reasons.
Curbing WMD Proliferation As mentioned earlier, the U.S. government also views WMD proliferation as a dominant contemporary threat, believing that “rogue” state and nonstate actors will show no mercy when and if they have WMD at their disposal. It was precisely according to this rationale that the United States justified the preemptive war against Iraq, potentially providing a case study for the value of alliances to curb WMD proliferation. Because Saddam had violated UN Security Council Resolution 1441, passed in November 2002, some sort of further action was surely justified to coerce Saddam into compliance or allow more time for inspection by the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. There was no concrete evidence, however, that Iraq was in possession of WMD prior to the war. Contrary to the U.S. government’s belief that Iraqi acquisition of WMD had posed an imminent threat and justified a preemptive strike, no such weaponry has yet been found. In fact, a recent study conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concluded that “Iraq’s WMD programs represented a long-term threat that could not be ignored. They did not, however, pose an imminent threat to the United States, to the region, or to global security.”5 The point here, however, is not the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the war per se, but that the use of this alliance justifiably did not prove successful in Iraq because the very purpose of the alliance is to provide for defense, not because the alliance was irrelevant. Given the abuse of a legitimate use of the policy of preemption, some NATO allies, such as France and Germany, strongly disagreed with the Bush administration on the war and on employing NATO for this purpose. The war against Iraq was never a matter of legitimate defense but clearly one of offense—legitimate or illegitimate, depending on one’s point of view. Operation Iraqi Freedom was thus one that contradicted the very mission, or basic founding principles, of NATO and alliances more fundamentally. In spite of worldwide disagreement, the U.S.-led coalition ousted Saddam from power in Iraq with initial overwhelming success. Yet, the difficulties it has faced in the aftermath of military combat underlines the costs of acting without one’s traditional alliances. International accord was significantly weakened with the serious split that developed within the international community as well as in the UN Security Council. The United States experienced an unprecedented diplomatic setback when it received support from THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY
■
SPRING 2004
169
l Dingli Shen only about 30 countries during the course of the war. The split that occurred within NATO itself necessitated forming a separate coalition, at a higher political and financial cost for the United States. Finally, it appears as if the United States will be mired in Iraq for some time to come, largely because of the lack of support from the UN and the international community. Ad hoc coalitions can prove useful alternatives for accomplishing short-term or perhaps purely military goals, but in the long term, when utilized at the expense of undermining alliances, the costs appear to outweigh the benefits. In late May 2003, the United States launched another example of an operation by a coalition of the willing to curb the threat of WMD proliferation: the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Currently comprised of a small group of 11 countries—Australia, France, Germany, Italy, lliances face Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, challenges in Spain, the UK, and the United States—PSI adjusting to WMD aims to interdict WMD and related materials proliferation threats. that are transported in international space and waters.6 Whether PSI is compatible with existing international law is the subject of current debate, as it is arguable whether searching a cargo ship in international waters is legal. More relevant for this discussion, however, is whether such a coalition augments alliance efforts to meet this threat or, more fundamentally, whether such a coalition is capable of thwarting this particular threat in ways that an alliance cannot, precisely because of alliances’ defensive, rather than offensive, nature. Thus far, NATO has not expanded its alliance-wide mission to PSI due to its controversial legal nature, nor has the United States tried to pursue this initiative through smaller alliances, such as the U.S.-Japanese or U.S.-Australian alliances, despite the fact that those two countries are both members of PSI. Part of the reason is because WMD interdiction must be a global mission and neither the U.S.-Japanese nor U.S.-Australian alliances are capable of global military reach. Other alliance members that may not support the initiative include the Republic of Korea (ROK), which is not enthusiastic about participating in the PSI initiative because PSI’s prime targets include North Korea, with which the ROK seeks to avoid conflict (as long as Pyongyang does not pose a direct threat to Seoul). Therefore, a coalition seems to be a good alternative: it can cover a geographically wider area than a bilateral alliance can but does not require involving all NATO member states that would not necessarily agree with the PSI principles. Because WMD proliferation poses a very different kind of threat than that posed by one state’s physical invasion of another, it is not the kind of threat that necessarily requires being deterred or defeated in the traditional
A
170
THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY
■
S PRING 2004
Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats
l
sense. A traditional alliance created and maintained to unite a group for collective defense thus might not be the most appropriate or effective means of combating this contemporary threat. In this case, therefore, a coalitionof-the-willing type of grouping, including some states that are members of various alliances and some that are not, designed specifically to deter WMD proliferation might provide a more effective alternative. Even though the PSI mission is controversial, it is still important to halt WMD proliferation, potentially in new and creative ways to combat this developing threat effectively. What is important for this discussion is not the effectiveness of PSI but rather that the emergence of PSI highlights the ineffectiveness of traditional alliances, which provide collective defense, to curb WMD proliferation. Coalitions thus offer an alternative to traditional alliances in combating WMD proliferation.
Responding to Challenges from Rising States The third contemporary security challenge, against which the relevance of alliances should be tested, is the rising power of some states. Of today’s emerging states, Russia, China, and India are the ones that appear to be undergoing the most visible internal transitions that could potentially affect the international status quo. A brief tour of Europe and Asia, however, show that the rise of states with the potential to upset the international status quo or balance of power are not necessarily threats against which alliances can serve to deter. In Europe, the United States is interested in expanding NATO and further integrating Russia into the global system to prevent it from emerging as a credible challenger on the European continent. Russia is in the midst of an internal transition that the United States hopes will not cause Moscow to revert to international power-seeking ways. By bolstering the independence and stability of the former Soviet republics through security partnerships with them (including extending NATO membership), Washington is partly helping reduce the chances that Russia could act assertively again. The NATO-Russia Council is another U.S.-led effort to prevent this challenge through strengthening security relations between Russia and NATO members. Although this partnership is not an alliance in the traditional sense, it has a certain stabilizing effect as well as the potential to be upgraded to an alliance relationship. From Russia’s perspective, NATO fundamentally serves both as a check to Moscow’s power on the continent and a center of gravity for balance of power in the Euro-Atlantic community more generally. This concerns Russia as it deprives Moscow of the sphere of influence that it may aspire to regain after economic recovery. In the meantime, THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY
■
SPRING 2004
171
l Dingli Shen Russia is seeking partnership through dialogue as it realizes that currently it has not much ability to challenge the alliance. China’s case is quite different. Depending on national perspective and interests, this case illustrates that, in both historical and contemporary times, alliances that some intend to preserve a balance of power or the status quo is perceived by others to disrupt that very balance. The established alliance system in Asia, although also created largely by the United States out of Cold War concerns, differs from NATO in Europe in that it is primarily comprised of bilateral alliances. To protect against Soviet and Soviet allies’ inroads in the Pacific theater, the United States forged several critical bilateral alliances in the region, including those with Australia (1951), Japan (1951), and South Korea (1953). Following the outbreak of the Korean War and the U.S. bombing of Chinese territory, the PRC emerged as a perceived threat, and Washington and Tokyo signed the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in September 1951. (In 1960 the United States and Japan signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (or the Mutual Security Treaty).) In 1954 the United States and Taiwan signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, designed to prevent mainland China from attacking Taiwan. (That agreement was severed in early 1979 when Washington normalized its relations with Beijing.) The Chinese reciprocated in mid-July 1961 by forming an alliance relationship with the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), through the China-DPRK Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which is speculated to contain a clause that provides for mutual defense. After the Cold War, Washington sought to continue to strengthen its ties among “freedom-loving” nations 7 by not only strengthening relations with NATO countries but also with its Asian allies in the Pacific region, especially with Japan. These efforts have at least in part been motivated by a desire to check China’s rise in the region and as such have incurred a negative reaction from the Chinese government, which has been particularly critical of the strengthening of recent U.S. military alliances in East Asia.8 The U.S.-Japanese alliance, for example, was strengthened with the release of the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Guidelines in September 1997. The new guidelines transformed the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the two countries and mandated that Japan would assist the United States outside of Japan’s territory, that is, in “surrounding waters,” when a certain situation requires. China has asked Japan to clarify the definition of “surrounding waters” and to exclude the Taiwan area from its application, but Japan has refused. This is a significant departure from Japan’s defense-only policy, as Japan and the United States now share balanced responsibility and Japan shall be obliged to assist the United States if
172
THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY
■
S PRING 2004
Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats
l
the U.S. military is involved in warfare in the region. Given China’s concern about this agreement’s security implications for the Taiwan issue, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense, and Japan’s refusal to exclude Taiwan from the area in which the new guidelines apply, China naturally disapproves of the U.S.- Japanese alliance.9 Specifically, it sees the U.S.-Japanese relationship as one designed to deter China’s freedom of action to implement its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. From the Chinese perspective, not only is the U.S.-Japanese alliance a threat, but Beijing also considers the link between Washington and Taipei a quasi-alliance, given the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan and the substance of the military relationship between the two. The mishe rise of states sile defense as well as military command and are not necessarily communication systems that the United States threats which has sold to Taiwan are just a few examples of the quasi-alliance. Considering Australia’s close alliances can deter. relationship with the United States (Canberra has joined all major U.S.-waged wars since the end of World War II), the U.S.-Australian alliance could be viewed by Beijing as having some bearing on the Taiwan question as well. Taken together, the whole range of bilateral military alliances involving the United States in the Asia-Pacific region can be seen as essentially hostile toward Beijing. The issue of emerging states and the threats they pose, particularly the different views of the United States and China on the role of alliances and collective security in Asia, highlight the central problem in a more dynamic security environment without the dominant U.S.-Soviet rivalry: differing national threat perceptions and conceptions of national security can determine divergent national sentiments toward particular alliances, a particular nation’s role in them, and even the theoretical value of alliances more generally. The U.S. government, for example, believes that, “in pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path” 10 and has also declared that the U.S. military must “deter threats against U.S. interests, allies and friends; and decisively defeat any adversaries if deterrence fails.”11 Obviously, Washington does not consider the course China is taking as oriented toward maintaining the status quo. Therefore, the United States, in Washington’s mind, needs to preserve alliances against the rising challenges from China, to defend U.S. interests as well as its allies. China’s government, in contrast, recognizes that maintaining the status quo throughout the region, including Taiwan, is in the interests of the United
T
THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY
■
SPRING 2004
173
l Dingli Shen States and U.S. allies in the region. Yet, it is also in China’s interests to maintain the status quo, primarily to foster economic development that can lead to national integration. President George W. Bush’s December 2003 statement to Premier Wen Jiabao that the United States opposes Taiwan’s efforts to alter the status quo provides evidence of this common interest, at least for now. 12 Peace and stability across the strait allows the government on the mainland to focus on the country’s economic growth. Reclaiming Taiwan, nevertheless, remains China’s principal national objective in the long term, and thus making the status quo too permanent remains unacceptable to the PRC. To the extent that China perceives hina will need to that U.S. military alliances in the Asia-Paaccept that alliances cific region seek to lock in the status quo inare not likely to definitely, China’s cross-strait interests will disappear in the thus cause its tolerance of U.S. regional alliances to wane at some point in the future. coming decades. Beyond Taiwan, historical evidence exists that may suggest China’s rise could challenge U.S. global hegemony more broadly. Past experiences, such as the rise of Germany and Japan in the early twentieth century, illustrate that a rising power tends not to be content with the status quo and will eventually seek to alter the balance of power. On the other hand, at least one analyst who has studied recent trends in China’s foreign policy has offered evidence of Chinese behavior specifically that, in some cases, suggests an orientation that is more focused on preserving the status quo regionally. 13 Supporting evidence for this more benign view of the PRC is that it has become an indispensable partner of the United States in its global war on terrorism. Thus, although a rising China may theoretically pose a threat to U.S. interests in the region, what appears to be lasting and genuine cooperation between the two governments might offer an opportunity to transform the two country’s mutual suspicion into mutual trust. If this new pattern of bilateral cooperation can be sustained, it will potentially mitigate the need for the United States to continue its Cold War alliance network. Yet, it appears as if the two countries’ disparate threat assessments will preclude this optimistic scenario from emerging. From Beijing’s perspective, economic development and national reunification are its supreme interests, and anything that harms them poses a major threat. Although Beijing sees transnational terrorism, especially attacks that occur in China’s northwest frontier, as a significant threat, it does not consider it a primary threat to the extent that the United States does. Instead, a variety of factors—foreign in-
C
174
THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY
■
S PRING 2004
Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats
l
terference on the Taiwan question, peace and stability on China’s periphery, steady acquisition of overseas petroleum, fluctuation of foreign investment, and access to overseas markets—all rank higher on Beijing’s list of external threats to Chinese national interests. Thus, although some overlapping security interests have fostered a certain degree of cooperation between China and the United States, the two countries’ disparate threat assessments and foreign policy priorities as well as their ongoing mutual suspicion all preclude cooperation on a more fundamental level. Therefore, China is even suspicious of Washington’s strategic intentions as the U.S. military gains access to China’s neighboring states under the banner of antiterrorist operations. As long as Washington continues to perceive that a threat from rising powers such as China exists, it will not seek to reduce the role of its military alliances. Significant time and energy has obviously gone into creating and maintaining those bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific area, and these ties reassure U.S. allies. These alliances will not be abolished lightly for, if they were, the strategic landscape in the region may be altered and such ties may be difficult to restore. Even ad hoc coalitions cannot provide sufficient capacity to deliver credible deterrence vis-à-vis major new powers. Despite China’s concerns with alliances theoretically and with the U.S. role in regional alliances particularly, which Beijing sees as impediments to the PRC’s ability to achieve reunification with Taiwan, as well as Beijing’s assertion that it has a legitimate right to reintegrate the country, China genuinely believes that it is a responsible global player and as such will need to accept that neither the utility nor the vitality of alliances in general are likely to disappear in the coming decades.14 To be explicit, the Chinese government will have to demonstrate that its country can rise to power peacefully and be responsible as a rising power, as well as demonstrate that there is no threat against which America’s Asian alliances need to defend.
The Responsibility of Alliance Membership If Beijing can accept such alliances despite its opposition, however, members in those alliances must also accept the responsibility of membership to preserve the status quo and stability. Alliance partners cannot get a free ride on board an alliance and thereby jeopardize its foundation. In Northeast Asia, two particular cases are relevant to this issue: Taiwan’s path toward independence and Japan’s move toward nuclearization. Because Taiwan is thought to have U.S. protection through the Taiwan Relations Act 15 if it does nothing to provoke hostilities, Taipei enjoys a quasi-alliance relationship with Washington, even without a treaty currently. Because Beijing believes that Taiwan should not enjoy statehood, it THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY
■
SPRING 2004
175
l Dingli Shen does not feel that the island qualifies for intergovernmental relations, such as a bilateral military alliance—even a semiofficial one—in the first place. Nevertheless, the reality is that the relationship exists. The relationship is only “meaningful,” however, if the partnership is for defensive purposes. Although an alliance assures that should one member be attacked, the other is required to respond, this does not entitle a partner to provoke an attack just because it can be confident in the response of its partner. Beijing continues to maintain that the military relationship between Washington lliance members and Taipei could embolden Taiwan in its quest must also accept for independence. the responsibility The Chen Shui-bian government’s ongoing to preserve the drive toward a Taiwanese “defensive referendum” demonstrates the irresponsibility of status quo. Taiwan’s current leadership. On the surface, a referendum for peace might be an acceptable solution to someone who knows nothing of the history of the Taiwan issue. Nevertheless, history shows that the two sides were both part of China, and the mainland’s missiles aimed at Taiwan are a response to Taiwan’s drive to achieve independence, not a threat to all the people of Taiwan. The mainland has not deployed the missiles for the purpose of seeking a quick reunification but to deter any attempt by Taiwan to proclaim de jure independence. It is Taipei that seeks to upset the status quo unilaterally, not Beijing. From the U.S. perspective, Taipei has entered into a partnership with the United States for Taiwan’s security but must avoid any provocation that would force Washington into unnecessarily dangerous waters, especially when the U.S.-Chinese partnership is functioning fairly well in the war against terrorism. The United States is opposed to the idea of either side of the strait changing the status quo, and Chen’s government is clearly threatening to do this for purposes of reelection. In light of their semi-alliance, Taiwan has to remember its responsibility to the United States to defend this status quo, and the United States has a responsibility to restrain Taiwan in support of the status quo. For Japan, the security umbrella extended by the United States frees Tokyo of the need to possess an atomic bomb. Nevertheless, the Japanese government has reviewed its nuclear weapons policy over the decades and seems to have decided not to manufacture such a weapon but to develop the technical capability for doing so. In recent years, Tokyo has disregarded the taboo against developing nuclear weapons because of the perceived threat posed by North Korea’s development of missile and nuclear weapons tech-
A
176
THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY
■
S PRING 2004
Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats
l
nology. Whether Japan will embark on an open course of nuclear weapons development—currently a topic of much debate—still remains to be seen. Yet, even the country’s consideration of doing so tests the U.S.-Japanese security alliance. The U.S.-Japanese security alliance serves both countries’ common strategic interests in ensuring mutual defense. Japan has no reason to believe that it cannot count on nuclear protection from the United States, regardless of North Korean progress down the nuclear path. Pursuing an independent nuclear capability will unavoidably upset the status quo, complicating the security equation in the Far East and only weakening military relations between Washington and Tokyo further. Washington will not feel comfortable with a nuclear-armed Japan. For Japan’s own strategic interests, the country needs to adhere to its alliance with the United States and not upset the status quo. Conversely, the United States has its own responsibility to restrain Japan from upsetting the status quo.
Preserving the Status Quo Is the Test The concept of common and/or cooperative security is no longer new,16 but the road to such an ideal system remains long. Realistically, governments have been competing and hedging against one another since the seventeenth century. Until the international stage is truly transformed into a new world order in which trust and cooperation prevail, there is no reason to believe that states will abandon the technique of creating various groupings, such as alliances, to help ensure their national security. Given the differing threat assessments among states, each government’s strategy of handling perceived threats will be different. For Washington, alliances remain the core of its security strategy in its counterterrorism operations, with coalitions of the willing as a helpful supplement to U.S. efforts. Critics of the U.S. approach argue that alliances are increasingly irrelevant because coalitions can accomplish the same goals. The emergence of coalitions of the willing—looser, ad hoc groupings that tend not be bound by treaties—is part of the quest for security, and these arrangements have their own benefits and conveniences: they allow one state quickly to form partnerships for a particular purpose. Although a noticeable phenomenon that helps combat current threats, coalitions realistically cannot replace alliances. Military alliances have their own features and utilities. They are based on strategic trust and common security interests over a period of time with substantial political and military investment. These readily available groupings enable members to deal with aggression against their territories THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY
■
SPRING 2004
177
l Dingli Shen or other fundamental interests. In this sense, alliances and coalitions can supplement each other, with coalitions serving more as one-time, issuespecific arrangements. In sum, U.S. security strategy, including military alliances, currently faces a threefold task: combating transnational terrorism, ending WMD proliferation, and dealing with regional conflicts, including challenges that arise from the emergence of certain major states undergoing internal transitions. Given the new tasks that have been identified, it is impossible to consider alliances irrelevant today or in the near future, delliances will be spite the challenges alliances have faced legitimate only if they in recent history as discussed earlier, parserve solely to provide ticularly in adjusting to WMD proliferacollective defense. tion threats. Conversely, despite China’s opposition to U.S.-led alliances, Beijing must learn to live with them, accept the U.S. decision to continue and reform them, and hold their members accountable for their responsibility to preserve the status quo. In the process, Beijing can demonstrate that it is a responsible global actor that contributes to the common strategic goals of the United States and the PRC. One can only hope that, over time, the international system will be transformed into one that is more trusting and cooperative—in other words, one in which alliances are less necessary. Until then, alliances will continue to exist but will be legitimate only if they serve solely to provide collective defense. This places a substantial responsibility on alliance members to abide by the classic definitions of defense as well as preemption, so as not to reinterpret its meaning arbitrarily to include more aggressive actions, and ultimately to preserve the status quo through the behavior of all members of existing or future alliances.
A
Notes 1.
Executive Office of the President, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002); Executive Office of the President, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003).
2.
Article 5 of The North Atlantic Treaty states: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in
178
THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY
■
S PRING 2004
Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats
l
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 3.
NATO member countries have contributed more than 90 percent of ISAF troops so far.
4.
“The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65, April 24, 1999, www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm (accessed January 23, 2004).
5.
See Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews, and George Perkovich, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), http://wmd.ceip.matrixgroup.net/iraq3fulltext.pdf (accessed January 23, 2004).
6.
For details, see Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Statement of Interdiction Principles,” September 4, 2003, www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm (accessed January 23, 2004).
7.
Executive Office of the President, National Security Strategy of the United States (2002) (hereinafter 2002 NSS).
8.
See China State Council, Information Office, “China’s National Defense in 2000,” Beijing, October 16, 2000 (hereinafter 2000 Chinese National Defense White Paper).
9.
See Ren Xiao and Liu Xinghan, “U.S.-Japan Alliance in 1990s,” American Studies Quarterly, no. 4 (winter 2000): 67–96 (published in Chinese).
10. 2002 NSS. 11. Ibid. 12. Immediately after meeting with visiting Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, Bush said, “We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. And the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.” Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “President Bush and Premier Wen Jiabao Remarks to the Press,” December 9, 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2003/12/20031209-2.html (accessed January 22, 2004). 13. See Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no. 4 (spring 2003): 5–56. 14. For recent, although pre–September 11, government criticism of U.S. efforts to strengthen its regional alliances, see 2000 Chinese National Defense White Paper. 15. Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 8, 96th Cong., 1st sess., April 10, 1979. 16. See David H. Capie, Paul M. Evans, and Akiko Fukushima, “Speaking Asia-Pacific Security: A Lexicon of English Terms with Chinese and Japanese Translation and a Note on the Japanese Translation,” Joint Center for Asia Pacific Studies, University of Toronto-York University, Toronto, 1998 (working paper).
THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY
■
SPRING 2004
179
