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Articles Housing or Dehousing? The Public Housing Waiting List, Eviction, and the Homeless in Toronto, Canada Cyrus Vakili-Zad Although Canadian social housing providers are not mandated by law to house the homeless, the internal allocation system in many provinces, including Ontario, designates homelessness as a ‘‘vulnerable’’ or ‘‘disadvantaged’’ population, and thus provides them with some special status in placement.1 In Ontario, the tenant selection process is chronological (first come, first served), with special provisions for those in dire need of housing. The Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC), the largest social housing provider in Canada, groups the homeless applicants with several others (e.g., refugees, the youth, newcomers, and separated families) as ‘‘disadvantaged households’’ and assigns the group one-tenth of the annual vacant units. The system has been designed to be fair; however, it is afflicted by a major contradiction. Under this complicated system of accessing social housing, an average of approximately 400 applicants designated as ‘‘homeless’’ are housed annually. At the same time, annually, approximately 190 households are evicted due to nonpayment of rent. There is little chance that these tenants who are unable to pay the social housing rents, which are about 30 percent of their gross income, will be able to pay the much higher rents in the private market. Thus, it is likely that if these families are unable to secure other forms of accommodation with friends or relatives, this forced exit from social housing will become the beginning of a life cycle characterized as moving in and out of homeless shelters. This article evaluates public housing polices in Toronto, Ontario, in regard to three major issues: (1) access to public housing, (2) subsidies and rent, and (3) eviction or ‘‘forced exit’’ due to the nonpayment of rent. In order to provide a comparative perspective, this study will discuss U.S. and British public housing policies in the analyses and recommendations.2 The paper’s objective is to examine the role of public housing in the social construction of homelessness. The issue raised here is how a system Cyrus Vakili-Zad, Ph.D., currently is teaching in the Department of Public Policy, Faculty of Economics, Management and Accountancy, at the University of Malta in Msida. 1

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designed to house the poor and prevent homelessness can be creating an environment that exposes households to the danger of homelessness. Methodology Although the study uses eviction data collected by the legal branch of the Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC), analysis is based more on qualitative data (participant observation) than quantitative data. The author has been the coordinator for corporate business planning and performance measurement and has worked for the last five years with the property management staff as well as the corporation’s legal branch on eviction-related issues. Furthermore, the author had access to data collected regularly and reports submitted by different branches, as well as access to briefing notes and reports to the corporation’s board of directors on these issues. Specifically, the author was involved in (1) the audit of performance reports and files of tenants who were subject of eviction due to nonpayment of rent, (2) reviewing briefs prepared for court presentation, (3) preparing reports to the board of directors on the issue, and (4) discussion and advice to property management staff in communities with high eviction rates. Public Housing and Homelessness On June 30, 2003, there were 71,625 households on the Housing Connections (a Toronto social housing organization operated by TCHC) waiting list, which has waits that may last between five and seven years.3 The fact that access to these units requires a long wait often becomes a major catalyst for homelessness. Many households on waiting lists who exhaust the ability or willingness of their family, friends, and relatives to provide them with temporary accommodations may end up on streets or in shelters if not provided with permanent, affordable, and suitable units.4 The federal government in Canada stopped building public housing in the mid-1980s. In 1995, the Ontario government announced in 1995 its intention to leave the ‘‘housing business’’ and terminated the nonprofit and cooperative housing programs, claiming the private sector would fill the gap. Since 1977, however, the private sector has built less than 2,000 rental units annually where 25,000 were needed.5 The shortage of affordable housing is exacerbated further in large cities like Toronto, where thousands of affordable housing units every year are (1) lost to urban renewal, (2) abandoned, (3) converted into condominiums, or (4) demolished.6 Recent information on the homeless presents a disturbing trend. The homeless population traditionally consisted of mostly white, middle-aged, single men and very few single women. The new homeless are increasingly single mothers (often minorities) with young children, new immigrants, and refugees.7 It is perhaps not a coincidence that the majority of the public housing population is also made up of women, children, and minorities; these

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groups have, after all, formed the most disadvantaged population pool. This ever-growing population on public housing waiting lists, doubled up with relatives and friends, and tenants unable to pay rising rents are the homeless in waiting. With exception of a few works,8 there is no reliable data on the possible correlation between eviction and prolonged homelessness. Eviction could precipitate the downfall of the individual, but usually personal and/or structural impediments are the factors preventing the person from getting back on his feet and avoiding prolonged homelessness. Crane and Warnes cite six different studies interviewing homeless households in the United Kingdom that indicated in an average of 14 percent of cases, a direct path could be drawn between eviction and homelessness.9 Experts, however, believe these tragic incidents could be prevented if an adequate number of affordable and suitable housing units with security of tenure and support services were available.10 Preliminary Observations Public housing in Canada was first built in the 1940s to house lowincome, working-class families. However, much like in the United States, due to ill-advised policies and practices in the 1960s and the 1970s, it has become a refuge for mostly the poor, minorities, and unemployed single mothers with children.11 Public housing is considered by many to be the last resort and the only refuge from the cold and violence of the streets. Those who are evicted for nonpayment of monthly rent are usually unable to afford a place with the private rental sector after eviction; lack of money was the major reason why they were in public housing originally. Thus, eviction from public housing often means homelessness and the beginning of a cycle, which sometimes ends when frozen bodies are found under bridges or in abandoned buildings. In 1995, the Ontario government introduced ‘‘workfare’’ to replace ‘‘welfare’’ and cut social assistance to the poor by 21.6 percent. The government also eliminated 300 nonprofit and cooperative housing projects by terminating the provincial nonprofit and cooperative housing program. That eliminated approximately 17,000 units of nonprofit and cooperative housing that had already reached the final stage of approval and funding.12 The government also revised rent control guidelines by allowing landlords to raise the rent of vacated units as much as they could and as allowed by the market. The results of these policies have been higher average rents, lower vacancy rates, and increases in the rate of eviction due to nonpayment of rent. Under such an environment, finding and maintaining affordable accommodations have become very difficult for the working poor and those on social assistance. A recent study conducted by the City of Toronto indicates that the number of evictions has been steadily increasing since 1997. In 1998, a total of 23,183 applications for evictions were filed. This represents a 9 percent

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increase from the year before. The number of applications reached 26,379 in 1999, representing an additional increase of 14 percent over 1998.13 The Point Rating System Two of the major policy issues for managing public housing are the selection of tenants and the amount of the rent they have to pay. The policy of tenant selection becomes especially critical when there is a limited number of available units and a large number of applicants on the waiting lists. In other words, one has to decide who should have access to public housing and how much the household should contribute towards the rent. In the 1960s, the point rating system was introduced into Canadian public housing to give priority to families living in substandard housing and housing about to be demolished pursuant to urban renewal projects. To determine a household’s need, applicants were given points in a number of areas, most importantly income. In the early 1970s, the point rating system was expanded to include an increasing emphasis on affordability: the income level of the applicants became the major factor determining eligibility. The maximum number of points was also increased from 100 to 110.14 The system was further expanded in 1978 to include a wide range of social and economic factors in addition to income, such as overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, shared facilities, number of dependents, disrepair, and health factors. The maximum number of points was raised again to 125, from which 50 points were assigned to need. Although from 1949 to 1970 only working class families with both parents present were admitted into public housing, subsequent revisions to the point-rating system allowed access by others who demonstrated a definite need. In 1978, applicants with physical disabilities were admitted, which opened the door for other groups traditionally prevented from entering public housing. First, single elderly households were admitted in 1956. By 1976, all of the admission restrictions on the type of households were eliminated. In 1981, the maximum number of points was raised again to 135, from which 60 points were given to applicants with the greatest financial need. Finally, in 1983, the maximum number of points was raised to 200. The objective of these alterations with the access policy was to accommodate the increasing number of poor people on waiting lists by giving weight to income as a major eligibility criterion. However, these policies of admitting only the most poor and the most disadvantaged have resulted in the unintended consequence of residualization of the housing sector and the creation of urban ghettos in many otherwise middle-class neighborhoods. Similar policies have been implemented in the United States and the United Kingdom with predictable results. Under Margaret Thatcher’s government, more than 1.7 million public housing (council) units were sold to their relatively well-to-do sitting tenants. Such a policy effectively removed the best units and higher income tenants from the affordable housing sys-

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tem, leaving mostly high-maintenance flats and tenants who are now predominantly minorities and single-mother households.15 In all three countries, the unintended consequences of housing the most poor and disadvantaged in one housing model (public or council housing) has been the residualization of public housing and a substantial increase in the cost of the operation and management. In fact, the policy resulted in increased government subsidies.16 The direct result of reducing the supply of affordable housing during a time of increasing need is an increase in waiting time. Thousands of families have been doubling up with friends and relatives in public housing in major North American cities waiting desperately for a housing opportunity. This is often known as the ‘‘pre homelessness’’ or ‘‘near homelessness’’ stage—and an orientation to an uncertain life in shelters and on the streets.17 In 1988, it was estimated that out of 150,000 public housing units of the New York Housing Authority, more than 17,000 units were doubled up.18 In New York City public housing, the doubled-up families outnumber the ‘‘officially’’ homeless by twenty to one.19 In 1993, there were approximately 400,000 household families on council waiting lists and over 200,000 families doubling up with others.20 In 1987, the chair of the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority (MTHA) estimated that 25,000 people were doubled up in MTHA’s 33,000 units. 21 Modified Chronological Tenant Selection System In 1998, the Modified Chronological Tenant Selection System (MCTSS) replaced the point rating system in Ontario. The system was designed to provide households on waiting list a predictable system. However, this ‘‘first-come–first-served’’ system had to be modified to cater to the households experiencing emergency situations and requiring priority in accommodation. Under the MCTSS, there are two priority categories: (1) Overriding Priority (urgent) for either applicants who are abused by a partner or the terminally ill, and (2) ‘‘The Disadvantaged,’’ which includes refugees and refugee claimants; 16- and 17-year-old applicants, and the homeless people in shelters and families that are separated due to inappropriate housing. This is the first, albeit indirect, attempt to assist the homeless in finding accommodations. This fairly large category receives only 10 percent of all vacancies in a portfolio. Rent Regulation in Ontario Since 1970, some kinds of rent control (i.e., Landlord and Tenant Act [LTA]) have been regulating the rental properties in Ontario with the intention of protecting and ensuring the affordability of rental accommodation.

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On November 28, 1997, the conservative government in Ontario introduced Bill 96, ironically called the Tenant Protection Act (TPA).22 The Act was proclaimed on June 17, 1998, and became law in Ontario. The TPA replaced six pieces of legislation, including the Rent Control Act, the LTA, and the Rental Housing Protection Act. Under the TPA, the jurisdiction from the provincial superior court, and the former Rent Control Act of 1992, the Ministry of Housing was transferred to the newly created Ontario Housing Tribunal, staffed by the former Ministry of Housing employees.23 Under the TPA, landlords are obligated to respect the annual guidelines set by the ministry for raising a unit’s rent; however, when a unit becomes vacant, a landlord is allowed to raise that unit’s rent as the market allows: the new tenant has to pay the new rent if he or she wants the unit. Such a provision provided incentives for landlords to evict their longtime tenants who paid less than the market and then to raise the rents for the new tenants. In fact, many Rent Supplement landlords (14,000 units in Ontario in 1999) left the program by canceling their agreements with local housing authorities (LHAs) when agreements expired because they knew that they could raise the rent and make more money in the long run.24 In Peel Region, where its housing authority had more Rent Supplement units than regular public housing, the new legislation has shown the most adverse impact. Peel lost 200 Rent Supplement units in 1999 and was to lose another 300 units in 2000, when many of these agreements were to expire.25 The TPA had many shortcomings, according to a research lawyer and editor of the Legal Aid Ontario. In general, the act failed to fully protect tenants from wrongful eviction and also failed to honor their rights to security of tenure.26 TPA and Its Impact on Affordable Housing One policy area that is affected by the TPA is the rent-increase policy in public housing and the Rent Supplement program. Under the Rent Control Act (RCA) and LTA, landlords were required to give ninety days’ notice before increasing rents for all tenants. Under the TPA, however, landlords are no longer required to give ninety days’ notice before increasing rent for rent-geared-to-income (RGI) tenants if the increase is due to an increase in income. In 1997, it was estimated that approximately 10,000 tenants were going to be affected by this policy in public housing and 1,500 in Rent Supplement. The government was to snatch an additional $1.8 million from public housing tenants and $26,000 from the Rent Supplement program tenants.27 In 1999, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing adopted the TPA for social housing. It was estimated that the policy change would affect 35 percent of seniors and 45 percent of families in the Rent Supplement program, and about 44 percent of seniors and 44 percent of families in public housing.28

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Another difference between the LTA (R.R.O. 1990) and the TPA that replaced it was the shortening of the time period in which a landlord could serve the delinquent tenant with a notice of eviction. Under the TPA, the time was reduced from twenty days to fourteen days. Rent Arrears, Eviction, and Homelessness Recent data indicates that rent arrears have been increasing among public housing tenants in North America and the United Kingdom. In the majority of urban areas, vacancy rates are at their lowest, rents are skyrocketing, and mortgages in arrears and foreclosures have both risen steadily.29 Although the average U.K. public housing tenants have a higher income than their American or Canadian counterparts and pay a smaller portion of their income (average 12 percent) for rent, a growing number of tenants have been falling behind in their rent. In 1995, for example, 43 percent of council housing tenants were behind in their rent for several weeks.30 Another study in the United Kingdom indicates that more than 9 per cent of tenants are in serious arrears and are facing the threat of eviction.31 More tenants are in arrears in London councils, where between 1989 and 1994 weekly rent soared 91 percent. The worst ten authorities in London accounted for some #183 million of arrears. To add insult to injury, some housing association landlords (nonprofit housing providers) in the United Kingdom were lobbying the government to evict tenants without going to court.32 In the United States, the situation has reached critical proportions. The District of Columbia Housing Authority, for example, fails to collect $6 million in rent every year, which is more than 32 percent of its entire rent. In New York and St. Louis, more than 25 percent of tenants were at least three months behind in rent. In New York City, on average, approximately 25,000 tenants are evicted annually for nonpayment of rent.33 Rent Scale in Ontario Public Housing After the decision is made regarding which populations should have access to public housing, the next important policy concern is to determine the rent scale. At the beginning, public housing tenants’ rent was calculated on a federal scale applied across Canada. However, with the construction of Regent Park in Toronto (the first and largest public housing community in Canada) in the early 1950s, a rent scale was established based on a study conducted by Humphrey Carver and Alison Hopwood comparing English, Australian, and American models. The Carver-Hopwood scale then became the official guideline for the next two decades in Canada.34 Under the guideline, rent scale was based on 20 percent of monthly income for shelter rent, with variations for family size and income, plus a monthly service charge for heating, water, etc. The maximum amount of rent charged by the authority to conform to the provisions of the National Housing Act of 1944 was $72 a month for shelter and $13 for services.35

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Although the scale has been adjusted several times since its origination, the basic premise has remained the same: tenants in social housing pay rent based upon their incomes. In other words, rent is based on a household’s gross income, i.e., RGI. The higher the income, the higher the rent, with no regard to the size of the unit or the household. As a result, it is possible for a family in a five-bedroom townhouse to pay less rent than a family in a two-bedroom apartment. Over the years, changes have occurred in the percentage of income used to calculate a tenant’s rent. In 1962, a revised scale was introduced; it was a straight-line scale, beginning at 25 percent for $100 incomes and raised to 31.3 percent at $479 and above.36 In 1967, the scale was adjusted again to change the amount of the rent tenants pay. Under the revised scale, a minimum rent of $32 a month was set, and the new maximum became 30 percent of income for tenants earning $560 or more a month. In 1970, another change in policy introduced a new rent scale, which reduced the amount of rent tenants pay. Under this scale, the minimum rent became $28 a month for very low-income families. At the top end, tenants paid 25 percent of income. The new system included numerous rent-reduction allowances that could be claimed by working families as well.37 In general, rents were based on a complex point rating system, which tended to reward poverty and social disability over the ability to pay rent. In 1994, under a fiscal constraint, the OHC introduced yet another policy, in which the percentage of income was to be gradually increased to 30 percent of income. Under this new policy, tenants were to pay 26 percent of income for 1994, an amount that would increase 1 percent each year thereafter until it reached 30 percent by 1998. In addition, tenants were also asked to pay for the recent increases in utility costs, which were previously paid for by the OHC. Utilities had always been part of the rent; however, tenants had been charged only the original cost, and the housing authorities paid any increases in cost. Finally, in the late 1990s, a ‘‘rent ceiling’’ was introduced to provide a maximum rent (a little lower than market rent), after which the rent would stop rising and remain constant. The intention of the policy, which covers only approximately 2 percent of the housing authority’s tenants, was to retain working tenants with higher income, thus providing income mix and stability in the community. The government’s policy in regard to public housing tenants has historically been schizophrenic at best. In the beginning, the housing program was introduced as a transitional stage, where tenants paid the low end of the market rent and were expected to save and move up and out of public housing. However, the government, unable to regulate the distribution of income or provide an appropriate number of affordable housing units to its citi-

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zens, used public housing by default to ‘‘warehouse’’ the poor. Therefore, in the 1960s and 1970s the government reduced the rent to make it easier for the poor to remain in public housing. In the 1980s and 1990s, in an attempt to abate the formation of the ‘‘culture of poverty,’’ the government again changed the policy and raised the rent, thereby punishing tenants who had lived in these communities for two and three generations. The attack on public housing and public housing tenants is evident in all three countries in the respective policies on the sale of the units, in the drastic decreases in the government funding, and in the increases in rent and utility costs.38 Public Housing Policies on Eviction of Tenants with Rent Arrears Evictions have increased dramatically over the past decades in many American cities. Eviction has been seen as one of the major causes of homelessness.39 In New Jersey, for example, more than 150,000 eviction proceedings are initiated through the courts each year.40 Another report indicates that of 3,100 families in the New York shelter system, two-thirds were homeless due to eviction.41 A study in 1983 indicated that 52 percent of hostel residents were victims of eviction.42 In 1994, 2,214 notices to vacate were sent to public housing tenants in metropolitan Toronto; out of those, 169, or approximately 8 percent, were actually evicted. In 1995, the numbers went up when 2,702 households were given notice to vacate the premises; out of those, 208 households were evicted. Although the number of notices to vacate and the number of those evicted rose from 1994 to 1995, the percentage of those evicted remained the same. In 1997, approximately 2,830 applications were filed with the tribunal, but only 110 were actually evicted. This data, however, does not reflect the number of households that somehow managed to find the money they owed, paid up, and were reinstated by the housing manager; it also fails to show the entire process of evicting tenants, from giving notice to tenants to the moment when the sheriff removes the delinquent tenant and returns the unit to the housing corporation. In fact, in 2002, the housing corporation issued 6,131 notices to vacate to its delinquent tenants. Approximately 2,864 households paid and were taken off the delinquency list. The applications for the remaining 3,267 were filed with the tribunal, out of which only 711 were referred to the sheriff’s office for eviction; finally, only 133 households, or 2 percent, were evicted. The 2002 data indicates that 73 households managed to pay their debts and retain their homes even after the sheriff approached to physically remove the household from the premises. The above data indicates that the number of the households that were actually evicted increased from 1997 to 2000 and then decreased in 2001. Then in 2001, the MTHC and the Toronto Housing Corporation (THC) amalgamated to form Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC).

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Eviction Data—MTHC

Year

Number of Applications Filed with the Tribunal

Number of Evictions

Ratio of Evictions to Applications Filed with the Tribunal

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

2,830 2,382 2,872 4,644 5,588

110 134 187 252 191

3.8% 5.6% 6.5% 5.4% 3.4%

Eviction Data—TCHCa

Year

Number of Notices Given to Delinquent Tenants

Number of Applications Filed with the Tribunal

Number of Evictions

Number of Households Rehousedb

2002c

9,761

4,312

254

145

(a) The data reflects the eviction of tenants for the two housing corporations (MTHC and THC) combined after they amalgamated in 2001 to form TCHC. Eviction refers to cases in which the sheriff was required to remove the household from the premises. The term does not include cases in which there was an order against a household and the household left as required by the order without contesting it. (b) These are cases in which the delinquent household, during eviction by the sheriff, somehow finds the money and directly pays the property manager, who has the discretion to reinstate tenancy (rehouse the ‘‘former’’ tenant). (c) No evictions were recorded March 13–May 6, 2002, because of an OPSEU (the union representing the tribunal staff) strike.

That merger brought the total number of housing units of the new corporation (TCHC) to approximately 60,000 units. The above data indicates that after this merger, the number of evictions rose again. However, the 2002 eviction report suffers from the following problems: • A near halt in processing eviction files for two months due to the strike by the tribunal staff. • The time it took to harmonize the two different approaches used by these two corporations in regard to the handling of the eviction procedures (one had an in-house legal branch, and the other contracted out) prior to the merge. • The 2002 reporting included two new data fields (i.e., (1) number of notices issued to delinquent tenants, and (2) number of evicted tenants who somehow managed to pay what they owed and were thus allowed to return) that were not collected previously.

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As a result, a large number of cases were not processed; thus, the data presented is not very accurate and is obviously underreported. However, the 2002 report reveals new data that is collected for the first time, which provides some interesting insights into this complicated process. The new information indicates that approximately 60 percent of tenants who received notice to vacate paid the rent they owed and were removed from the legal process. However, in comparison to 2001 data, the percentage of tenants who were evicted by the tribunal in 2002 increased. In order to have some understanding of this phenomenon, the policies and procedures of the housing authority in dealing with rent arrears and eviction is presented next. The Eviction Process According to the Ontario public housing policies, the dwelling’s rent is due on the first day of the month. If the rent is not paid on the first day of the month, that household is technically in rent arrears. The administration manual used by the housing authority puts rent arrears on the top of the list of ‘‘the most likely reasons for tenant evictions by Housing Authority.’’ However, the manual provides extensive guidelines on dealing with a tenant who is late with a monthly payment or is unable to pay the rent at all. The manual advises the landlord to (1) send reminder notices, (2) discuss arrears with the tenant to determine the reasons, (3) review the tenant’s income to make sure the rental rate is based on current income, (4) decide if the tenant is eligible for a deferral agreement or rent forgiveness, (5) obtain an arrears agreement, (6) provide advice on budgeting, (7) refer the tenant for credit counseling, (8) discuss possible tenant arrears agreement with the counselor, (9) conduct a case conference with one or more agencies, (10) request that a tenant on social assistance agree to direct payment, and (11) serve a notice of eviction if all of these efforts failed. Current procedures identify the following steps in notifying a tenant in arrears: • Around the fifth business day of each month, a notice of overdue account is sent to tenants in arrears. • If tenants are still in arrears on or around the seventh business day, a notice of termination is served to tenants. • Property management staff contacts tenants in arrears by phone or by knocking on doors. • Property management staff makes requests for community services’ intervention/assistance for tenants that may need additional support. • About a week before the expiry of the notice of termination, letters are sent to tenants warning them that applications will be made to the tribunal to evict them. • If the rent is not paid in full and no arrangement ‘‘agreement’’ is reached by the tenant to pay it in installments, the legal branch sends the termination file to the tribunal.

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• The tribunal sets a time for the legal branch staff and tenant to appear and present their cases. • If the tenant does not show up, a default order is issued by the tribunal. Current procedures also identify the seven distinct steps in the eviction process: 1. In the case of a default order or an order obtained at the hearing, the tribunal serves the order on the tenant (s) and forwards a copy of the order to the housing authority’s legal branch. 2. The legal branch confirms with the property manager/delegates the current status of the tenant, and the property manager authorizes the eviction. 3. The legal branch files the order with the sheriff’s office. 4. The sheriff’s office sends to the tenant(s) a notice to vacate the premises. 5. The property management staff contacts the tenant(s) and warns of the imminent eviction. 6. The property management staff works with agencies and tenants to avoid eviction. 7. The legal branch notifies the property management staff of the date and time of the eviction. During the seven-step process, which may take four to six weeks, tenants have opportunities to pay arrears in full and thus have the order nullified. In some cases, payments are accepted and tenants are reinstated even after evictions are actually carried out. Eviction Prevention Strategies In 1999, the City of Toronto commissioned the Centre for Equality in Accommodation (CERA) to implement the Early Intervention Pilot Project, which assists tenants in danger of losing their accommodations to remain housed. The Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal provided CERA with the addresses of 4,309 tenants whose landlords had filed applications to evict them. CERA’s final report, issued in April 2000, indicates the following findings: • The average length of tenancy was 3.7 years. • More than 75 percent of tenants were spending more than 30 percent of their income on rent. • Of those in arrears, 85 percent were two months or less in arrears and the average balance owed to landlords was $1,205. • Almost one-third of tenants interviewed by CERA had not received from their landlords a copy of the application to evict. • Over 70 percent of the applications to evict resulted in orders to evict either by default or by hearing. • In 80 percent of tenants surveyed where a language barrier was identified, no disputes were filed.

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• One-third of the tenants who had received a copy did not understand that they had to respond to the application in writing within five days if they wanted a hearing.43 Currently, the City of Toronto, in addition to the Early Intervention Pilot Project, has two other initiatives, Shelter Fund and Rent Bank, to assist tenants in need. The information collected and insights learned by the Early Intervention Pilot Project should help policymakers to come up with a more comprehensive plan for preventing unnecessary evictions. Meanwhile, for the past three years, the housing authority has worked very closely with representatives from legal clinics to assist tenants in arrears. Both parties believe that early intervention is crucial in preventing evictions. To ensure that residents are aware of the availability of legal clinic services, the housing authority, as early as 1999, has handed out flyers with legal clinic information, and currently each notice of overdue account includes the name and phone number of the relevant legal clinics in the community. In many cases, legal clinics are instrumental in obtaining funds from the Shelter Fund for residents behind in their rent. Such efforts often result in the settlement of the rent arrears, preventing the eviction. Another more controversial solution has been in use in Ontario with tenants on social assistance for many years. With tenant consent, the Ministry of Community and Social Services (MCSS) could pay shelter allowances (included in the government assistance benefit package) directly to the housing authority instead of to the tenant. This policy, which usually improves the collection of rent and may ultimately save some tenants the only homes they can afford, should be encouraged and facilitated. However, some critics perceive the policy as paternalistic and another sign of making poor people more dependent on outside decision makers. Many property managers use eviction notices as a threat to make tenants pay rent on time. There are, however, tenants who have difficulty managing their meager budgets and fall behind in the rent by not using their income prudently; there are also some tenants who were released from institutions and placed in public housing without proper supervision. Shelter allowances would help in both situations. The common understanding among the majority of property managers is that if tenants are contacted early in the month, there is a better chance to collect the rent. Tenants who often have to decide between paying rent and putting food on the table tend to use the money on necessities other than housing, and there is usually nothing left to the cover the rent later in the month. One of the problems mentioned by property managers most often is the inconsistent practice of the policy and procedures by property management staff. Not all property management staff are firm in collecting the rent due and enforcing the policy. Eviction is costly for landlords, the tenants, and society. There are approximately 190 tenants who vacate the housing authority units with ar-

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rears amounting to one million dollars annually. Public housing staff has no interest in issuing eviction notice unless they find no other solution. What make their work more difficult are the thousands of applicants who are on the social housing waiting list hoping to access affordable accommodation. Fortunately, the number of tenants actually evicted from housing authority units is very small. On average, less than five percent of applications filed resulted in eviction. The comparative figure for the private sector was 28 percent in 1995 and 50 percent in 2000.44 Conclusion In spite of major shortcomings, public housing offers permanent accommodation (when it is available) to the poor and disadvantaged households, which is not the case with hostel or shelter systems. The shortage of affordable housing may seem to be the most important obstacle in preventing homelessness. However, finding a permanent housing unit is only the first step. Perhaps the most important problem faced by many low-income tenants is how to maintain the tenancy with a shrinking income and rising rent. The issue becomes more complicated when dealing with individuals who may have various kinds of disabilities. Recent studies indicate that government actually saves money and prevents reoccurrence of homelessness if individuals with severe mental illness are placed in subsidized permanent housing with social support services provided.45 Although the Canadian housing authorities have developed detailed procedures ensuring that tenants receive all the help and support they need to pay their monthly rents, the number of tenants with rent arrears has been increasing. That should direct our attention to possible problems with the administration of rent payment or tenant perception. The housing authority has to make sure that tenants understand that they are responsible for the rent and have to make their best effort in paying it on time. The housing authority should also get involved in community economic development, education, and skill development assisting tenants in job searches and income-generating activities. The average number of tenants who are annually evicted from housing authority units is small. However, the problem is much more than its size may suggest. When families, after all the opportunities provided to them, are unable to pay RGI rent (currently 30 percent of a household’s gross income) and save their homes, they surely cannot afford private rent, which is often more than 50 percent of one’s income. The loss of a subsidized unit is a devastating blow to the life of a tenant, who may end up using her/ his basic food allowances money to pay for the much higher rent in the private sector. Alternatives include moving in with friends and relatives or moving to a shelter, if one can be found. Even if we assume that only 200 families are evicted every year, it is not hard to predict that a large percentage of these households will end up in shelters or on the streets.

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It is ironic that although on average 200 public housing residents in Toronto are evicted annually due to nonpayment of rents, more than 400 applicants who fall in the homeless ‘‘disadvantaged’’ category are being housed by the same corporation. In the private and for-profit sector, one could perhaps rationalize evicting tenants who are unable or unwilling to pay rent. However, there is no rationale to justify a public nonprofit housing provider to evict a household for nonpayment of rent when the corporation’s mission is to house the poor and those unable to secure a place in the private sector. There is a definite need for reliable studies to explore the possible correlation between eviction and homelessness, including an assessment of the costs of eviction to tenants, landlords, the community, and taxpayers in general. There is also a need for studies exploring the circumstances that force some tenants to fall behind in rent and the types of assistance they need to be able to pay their monthly rent and remain housed. It often takes fewer resources to keep a family in their unit than to place them in a shelter. The cost of homelessness should not only be measured in monetary values, but also in the psychological and emotional injuries to the people involved, especially young children. These costs are often hard to measure and almost impossible to heal. In addition to thousands of affordable housing units every year, there is an urgent need for supported housing and supported housing programs. All three levels of government (federal, provincial, and municipal) have to make a commitment to work with the private sector to provide affordable and suitable accommodations for the households in need. Communitybased and government-funded programs are needed, which not only help individuals and families access affordable housing, but also provide them with support services and counseling in maintaining and securing the tenancy. The beneficiaries of a more enlightened policy will be the government, the community, and, of course, the homeless. 1. Social housing is equated with public housing and usually refers to rental housing whose construction and rents are subsidized from public funds. See Peter Emms, Social Housing—A European Dilemma? 11–12 (1990); Michael Oxley & Jacqueline Smith, Housing Policy and Rented Housing in Europe 82 (1996). Social housing has the following major characteristics: • Social housing includes both the public housing (council housing) provided by housing authorities and housing associations and the nonprofits, which include the cooperative housing corporations. • Rent is set with tenants’ income in mind and with limited or no profit. • The profit gained becomes a ‘‘collective profit’’ and is used to improve the community, add services, or pay corporate debts. • Dwellings are allocated according to principles of need, with ability to pay not being paramount. • One or more levels of government are always involved. • A housing community could include tenants on government assistance as well as others who pay market rent.

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• In the United Kingdom, some housing communities include units that are owned by its occupiers (these are units sold to their former tenants under the ‘‘right to buy’’ legislation). • Eligible low-income tenants pay rent based on their income, Rent-Gearedto-Income (RGI), which may range between 17 and 30 percent (in different countries); and government subsidizes the gap between the amount tenants pay and the market rent of the unit. • Social housing could be managed by the government (usually municipal), private property management companies, labor unions, churches, or residents themselves; but the main policies and regulations are set by the government. These social housing providers may be required to make annual reports, ensure provincially or municipally set standards, and determine performance measurements. 2. In 2000, the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority, which managed public housing in Toronto on behalf of the Ontario Housing Corporation (OHC), was returned to the City of Toronto and incorporated as a separate housing agency calling itself the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Corporation (MTHC). In 2001, MTHC changed its name to Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC). In January 2002, the City of Toronto decided to integrate its two housing agencies into one: it sold Toronto Housing Company (THC), the City of Toronto’s other social housing company, to TCHC, making it the largest social housing provider in Canada and the second largest in North America. In order to avoid confusion, this article will be using the term public housing instead of social housing. 3. Housing Connections was formed in June 1998. It was set up as a centralized body to make it easier for applicants to find out about social housing in Toronto and how to gain access to it. Housing Connections maintains a centralized waiting list and provides this service on behalf of the City of Toronto under an Operating Agreement with Toronto Community Housing Corporation. On July 30, 2003, the Board of Directors of Toronto Community Housing Corporation approved a plan to establish a stand-alone subsidiary, Access Housing Connections, Inc.,. that will be responsible for providing coordinated access for all social housing in Toronto. Housing Connections operates as a citywide and multitiered network, including agencies, housing providers and the Housing Connections office. More than 250 housing providers can accept applications and provide vacancy information related to their respective locations. In addition, nineteen Access Centres provide services in a variety of languages and supplement the efforts of Housing Connections by assisting applicants with their housing search. Fifteen of these agencies have computer dial-up access to the waiting list database. Housing Connections, Welcome to Housing Connections, www.housing connections.ca/default.asp. 4. See generally Jonathan Alter et al., Homeless in America, in Housing the Homeless 3–16 (Jon Erickson & Charles Wilhelm eds., 1989); G. Bramley, Explaining the Incidence of Statutory Homelessness in England, 8 Housing Stud. 128– 47 (1993); D. Brewer, Homelessness—The Local Authorities’ Approach, Local Gov’t Stud. 33–47 (Sept./Oct. 1990); Maureen Crane & Anthony M. Warnes, Evictions and Prolonged Homelessness, 15 Housing Stud. 757–73 (2000); P. Lidstone, Rationing Housing to the Homeless Applicant, 9 Housing Stud. 459–72

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(1994); and D.K. Whynes, Homelessness and the Intermediate Accommodation Sector: A Demand and Supply Analysis, 6 Housing Stud. 96–111 (1991). 5. After years of pressure put on the three levels of government by housing advocates, it seems the federal government has shown some willingness to reenter the housing field. On November 30, 2001, the federal, provincial, and territorial ministries responsible for housing met in Quebec City and agreed on a framework to increase the supply of affordable housing across Canada by investing $1.4 billion in cash or in-kind on new housing units over the next five years. The funding is estimated to produce between 20,000 to 30,000 new units over the period, which is still short of the actual need of 20,000 units annually as estimated by the housing advocates. Cyrus Vakili-Zad, Public Housing: A Summary of Major Differences Between the United States and Canada, 11 J. Affordable Housing & Community Dev. L. 111–15 (2002). 6. See generally G. Daly, The State’s Response to Homelessness: A View of Three Countries, in 2 The Changing Canadian Metropolis: A Public Policy Perspective 391–414 (Frances Friksen ed., 1994); P. Dreier, The New Politics of Housing, 63 Am. Plan. J. 5–27 (1997); Joe R. Feagin, Urban Real Estate Speculation in the United States: Implications for Social Science and Urban Planning, in Critical Perspectives on Housing 99–118 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986); Marjorie Hope & James Young, The Politics of Displacement: Sinking Into Homelessness, in Housing the Homeless 106-? (Jon Erickson & Charles Wilhelm eds., 1989); Jonathan Kozol, Rachel and Her Children (1988); and Jack Layton, Homelessness—The Making and Unmaking of a Crisis (2000). 7. See generally Dennis Culhane, Chang-Moo Lee & Susan M. Wachter, Where the Homeless Come From: A Study of the Prior Address Distribution of Families Admitted to Public Shelters in New York City and Philadelphia, 7 Housing Pol’y Debate 327–65 (1996); M. J. Dear & J. Wolch, Homelessness, in The Changing Social Geography of Canadian Cities 298–308 (Larry S. Bourne & David Ley eds., 1993); M. Drake, Fifteen Years of Homelessness in the UK, 4 Housing Stud. 119–27 (1989); Lesley D. Harman, When a Hostel Becomes a Home: Experiences of Women (1989); K. McChesney, A Review of Empirical Literature on Contemporary Urban Homeless Families, 69 Social Service Review 429–60 (1995); P.H. Rossi and L. Weinrob, The American Homeless Family Shelter System, 69 Soc. Service Rev. 86–107 (1995); David C. Schwartz, R.C. Ferlauto & D.N. Hoffman, A New Housing policy for America (1988); David C. Schwartz, Donita Devance-Manzini & Tricia Fagan, Preventing Homelessness: A Study of State and Local Homelessness Prevention Programs (1991); Brewer, supra note 4; Bramley, supra note 4; and Layton, supra note 6. 8. See Madeline Stoner, The Plight of Homeless Women, in Housing the Homeless 279–94 (Jon Erickson & Charles Wilhelm eds., 1989); Crane & Warnes, supra note 4; and Hope & Young, supra note 6. 9. See Crane & Warnes, supra note 4. 10. See generally Martha R. Burt & Barbara E. Cohen, America’s Homeless (1989); A. Deacon, J. Vincent & R. Walker, Whose Choice, Hostels or Homes? Politics for Single Homeless People, 10 Housing Stud. 345–63 (1995); George Fallis & Alex L. Murray, Housing the Homeless and Poor (1990); D. Hulchanski, The Right of Housing . . . We are Still Waiting, Can. Housing 6–9 (Spring 1996); B. O’Flaherty, An Economic Theory of Homelessness and Housing, 4 J. of Housing Econ. 13–49 (1995); K. Ringheim, Investigating the Structural Deter-

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minants of Homelessness, The Case of Houston, 28 Urb. Aff. Q. 617–40 (1993); David Thorns, The Production of Homelessness: From Individual Failure to System Inadequacies, 4 Housing Stud. 253–66 (1989); R.W. White, Jr., Rude Awakenings: What the Homeless Crisis Tells Us (1992); Bramley, supra note 4; Crane & Warnes, supra note 4; Culhane et al., supra note 7; Drake, supra note 7; Layton, supra note 6; and McChesney, supra note 7. 11. See generally Robert A. Murdie, Blacks in Near Ghettos? Black Visible Minority Population in Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority Public Housing Units, 9 Housing Stud. 435–57 (1994); I. Skelton, The Geographic Distribution of Social Housing in Ontario, Canada: Comparing Public Housing and Locally Sponsored, Third Sector Housing, 11 Housing Stud. 189–206 (1996); Nancy Smith, Challenges of Public Housing in the 1990s: The Case of Ontario, Canada, 6 Housing Pol’y Debate 905–31 (1995); and Cyrus Vakili-Zad, Privatizing Public Housing in Canada, A Public Policy Agenda, 11 Neth. J. of Housing and the Built Env’t 47– 67 (1996). 12. See Layton, supra note 6. 13. The Toronto Report Card on Homelessness (2000). 14. See Betty Meredith Really Cares for the People—Who Needs an OHC Home,15 Ont. Housing 4–5 (1970). [Author: Or should it be . . . for the People Who Need an . . .?] 15. See Vakili-Zad, supra note 11. 16. Id.; Ian Cole & Robert Furbey, The Eclipse of Council Housing (1994); Peter Malpass, Housing Management—By the People for the People, 42 Housing Rev. 58–61 (1993); and Christine M. E. Whitehead, Privatizing Housing: An Assessment of U.K. Experience, 4 Housing Pol’y Debate 101–39 (1993). 17. See generally A. Caspi, T.E. Moffitt, P.A. Silva & B.R.E. Wright, Factors Associated with Doubled-Up Housing—A Common Precursor to Homelessness, Soc. Service Rev., March 1998, at 92–111P. Marcus, The Condition of Housing Supply, in Handbook of Housing Policies and Practices 340 ( Willem Van Vliet 1990); Culhane et al., supra note 7; and McChesney, supra note 7. 18. Tim Robbins, New York’s Homeless Families, in Housing the Homeless 28 (Jon Erickson & Charles Wilhelm eds., 1989) 19. Caspi et al, supra note 17. 20. Malpass, supra note 16. 21. Fallis & Murray, supra note 10. 22. Many advocates call it the Landlord Enrichment Act, arguing that the Act not only failed to protect tenants, but also placed them in jeopardy by allowing landlords to raise the rent as they please. Contrary to what the government wanted the public to believe, the Act did not result in more new rental units, but rather lower vacancy rate and higher rents. 23. It is perhaps interesting to note that rent control in Ontario was introduced by the same political party (Progressive Conservative) when it was in government in 1975. Then rent control was presented as a response to the rental supply crisis and the rising costs of moderate-income housing. M. McMahon, Metro’s Housing Company: The First 35 Years (1990); and P.S. Rapsey, See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Remedy No Evil: How the Ontario Rental Tribunal Is Failing to Protect the Most Fundamental Rights of Residential Tenancy, 15 J. of Law and Soc. Pol’y 163–64 (2000). 24. The Rent Supplement program, established in 1980s, is similar to the Section 8 program in the United States. However, while Section 8 agreement

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is with the applicant, the Rent Supplement agreement is with the unit, the majority with private landlords. By 1994, Ontario had more than 20,000 Rent Supplement units. 25. J. Stewart, Peel Big Losers in Affordable Housing Market, Mississauga News, August 1, 1999, at 1. 26. See J. Ramsay, Eviction and Homelessness Prevention Strategy: Final Report (2000); and Rapsey, supra note 23. 27. Ont. Hous. Corp. Bd., Impact of Tenant Protection Act on Ontario Housing Corporation (Mar. 26, 1998). 28. (THIS IS NOT IN THE CITED MATERIALS) 29. See John Atlas & Peter Dreier, The Tenants’ Movement and American Politics, in Critical Perspectives on Housing 378–97 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986); W. Bine et al., Managing Social Housing (1993); Bramley, supra note 4; Caspi et al., supra note 17; and Layton, supra note 6. 30. H. Green & J. Hansbro, Housing in England—1993–1994 (1995). 31. Bine, supra note 29. 32. See Landlords Seek Powers to By Pass Courts on Eviction, 4 Inside Housing 2 (August 2000). 33. Income and Affordability Study, at 8 (NYC Rent Guidelines Bd. 1998). 34. See Humphrey Carver, Compassionate Landscape 84–85 (1975). 35. Regent Park North Housing Project, at 13 (Housing Authority of Toronto 1951). 36. H. Borland, Rent To Income Formula for Public Housing, 15 Ont. Housing 16–24 (1969). 37. See New Rent Scale: Opportunity to Earn Additional Money Without Paying Higher Rent, 15 Ont. Housing 5, 20 (1970). 38. See generally Peter Emms, Social Housing—A European Dilemma? 11–12 (1990); Chester Hartman, Housing Policies Under the Reagan Administration, in Critical Perspectives on Housing 362–76 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986); Anne Power & Rebecca Tunstall, Swimming Against the Tide (1995); and cole & Furbey, supra note 16. 39. See Alter et al., supra note 4. 40. See Schwartz et al. (1991), supra note 7. 41. See Robbins, supra note 18. 42. Metropolitan Toronto Policy & Planning Div., No Place to Go: A Study of Homelessness in Metropolitan Toronto: characteristics, Trends and Potential Solutions (1983). 43. Ramsay, supra note 26. 44. Id. 45. See Dennis P. Culhane, Stephen Metraux & Trevor Hadley, Public Service Reductions Associated with Placement of Homeless Persons with Severe Mental Illness in Supporting Housing, 13 Housing Pol’y Debate 107–63 (2002).