World Bank Parliamentary Staff Training Program Parliament and Governance
Prepared by John K. Johnson State University of New York’s Center for International Development
Table of Contents Forward Introduction
Unit 1: What Do Parliaments Do? .................................................................................. 9 Representation .............................................................................................................. 9 Lawmaking................................................................................................................... 16 Oversight...................................................................................................................... 20 Unit 2: A Model of Parliamentary Power..................................................................... 26 Rubber Stamp Legislatures ....................................................................................... 27 Arena Legislatures ...................................................................................................... 28 Transformative Legislatures...................................................................................... 28 Emerging Legislatures................................................................................................ 29 Unit 3: Factors Influencing How Legislatures Carry Out Their Functions.............. 32 Political Systems ........................................................................................................ 32 Electorial Systems...................................................................................................... 37 Formal Parliamentary Powers ................................................................................... 40 Political Will and Political Space ............................................................................... 41 Parliamentary Technical Capacity ............................................................................ 41 Unit 4: Strategies and Tools for Building More Effective Parliaments.................... 46 Parliamentary Independence and Financial Control.............................................. 46 Expanding Formal Powers ......................................................................................... 47 Using Powers more Effectively ................................................................................. 49 Building Internal Capacity ......................................................................................... 49 Reaching Beyond the Walls of Parliament.............................................................. 52 Summary.......................................................................................................................... 54
Forward: A growing emphasis on legislatures The beginning of the 21st Century may be one of the most interesting moments in history for parliament watchers and for those who spend their careers in parliaments. There are more nations and more parliaments than at any other time in history, and more of them can be considered “free” (see Table 1, below). TABLE 1 GLOBAL TRENDS IN FREEDOM1 Year Under Review
1994
1999
2004
Free
76
85
88
Partly Free
61
60
55
Not Free
54
47
49
Total
191
192
192
Political scientist Samuel Huntington has called this worldwide phenomenon the “Third Wave of Democracy”, and he dates the beginning of this “wave” from the military coup in Portugal which ended the dictatorship of Marcelo Caetano in 1974 (Huntington 1991). Changes since that time include the fall of the Berlin Wall, ultimately leading to the breakup of the Soviet Union, the creation of several new Central Asian nations, and the independence of former Soviet bloc nations, such as Poland and Hungary; the end of 1
From Freedom House’s Map of Freedom 2005. Each year, Freedom House rates political and human rights developments in 192 nations, and divides nations into 3 categories. “In Free countries, citizens enjoy a high degree of political and civil freedom. Partly Free countries are characterized by some restrictions on political rights and civil liberties, often in a context of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic strife, or civil war, In Not Free countries, the political process is tightly controlled and basic freedoms are denied. In 2004, there were 2.82 billion people living in Free societies, representing 44% of the world’s population. There were 1.19 billion people living in Partly Free societies, representing 19% of the world’s population. There were 2.39 billion people living in Not Free societies, representing 37% of the world’s population.” http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/map2005.pdf. Viewed over the Internet October 18, 2005
the Cold War, leading to the termination of US and Soviet support for wars in several nations; civilian governments replacing military governments in several Asian nations, including the Philippines, Korea and Taiwan; the de-legitimization of military governments in Latin America; the demise of one party states in Africa; and the end of apartheid in South Africa and Namibia. Several other factors have also encouraged the development of more effective parliaments. For one, citizens and groups in society are demanding more from their governments, and many are organizing and articulating their demands before parliaments.
The growing concern with government corruption and the damage it
inflicts on societies has increased pressures on parliaments to conduct more effective executive oversight. And third, through greater contact and information flows among parliamentarians and parliamentary staff worldwide, parliaments are learning from one another’s examples. A final factor leading to freedom in government is the changed focus of international aid programs.
International assistance in the 1960s and 1970s tended to focus on
agriculture and direct human needs. Governance assistance tended to concentrate on public administration – on upgrading government programs, staff development, drafting and administration of national development programs, etc.
Public administration
assistance, however, was followed by assistance in democracy-building– which included aid to legislatures, to civil society organizations, and to justice systems. Bilateral and multilateral agencies such as the World Bank , United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), US Agency for International Development (USAID), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) have all provided technical support of one type or another to parliaments in less developed countries. Some of this parliamentary support has been directed towards helping legislatures to carry out their representative function, and some of it has had a focus on anti-corruption, helping legislatures to more effectively carry out their oversight responsibilities. The early 21st Century holds the promise of stronger, more effective legislatures and parliaments worldwide.
Our hope is that this parliamentary staff orientation course
gives you a clear understanding of the roles of parliaments, how they function, and how many of them are changing; provides you with new perspectives on your own parliament; and offers useful ideas which may help you as you further develop your own institutions.
Introduction Modern democracies are characterized by shared decision-making responsibilities by the legislative and executive branches of government. Generally, a country’s constitution formally structures this interaction. Practicality, precedent and habit then fill in the gaps to create the political system under which a government operates on a daily basis. Because these circumstances differ considerably in each country, democracies vary widely in how political power is shared and the relative influence each branch of government has over policy formulation (NDI 2000). For legislators to be able to play their role of representation, oversight, and legislation, “…there needs to be a certain degree of cooperation between the branches in policymaking (each side must be willing to bargain and compromise in order to get some policy benefits), the legislature must have some capacity to monitor the executive, and the executive needs to be willing to comply with legislative enactments,” (Remington 2004). The role of parliament in government varies depending on a number of factors. This course examines the effect of four factors: the type of political and electoral system, formal legislative powers, political will and political space, and technical capacity. The question of the role of parliament in government has become even more important to understand in the past decade as more and more countries are making a transition to democratic forms of government. These countries that are making the transition are faced with a number of new challenges as well as opportunities. In nearly all democracies, leaders of the executive branch (i.e., presidents, prime ministers, cabinet ministers) typically command much of the political power, control the country’s financial resources, maintain staff dedicated to developing policies and implementing laws, produce the bulk of legislation, manage government contracts, and administer government programs. Despite executive dominance in many countries, the relative balance of power between the legislative and executive branches in a country can be changed. If new legislatures are going to have a central role in a nation’s
governance, it is up to legislators themselves to build strong legislative institutions, by asserting themselves in the regular law-making or oversight functions, or through specific structural changes via constitutional amendment, legislation or rules of procedure (NDI 2000). This course attempts to document some of the current efforts by which legislatures are trying to play a more influential role in government. Unit 1 of this course defines the central functions of parliaments. Unit 2 presents four models of legislatures, depending on the power and influence they have on the executive. Unit 3 outlines some factors that impact the relative power of the legislature and the executive. And finally, Unit 4 describes some of the efforts that parliaments are making to strengthen themselves. The concluding section briefly summarizes the course.
Unit 1: What Do Parliaments Do? Learning Objectives What Do Parliaments Do? After studying this unit, you should be able to: •
Understand and describe the representation roles of parliaments and parliamentarians;
•
Describe the representation features of your own parliament;
•
Understand and describe the lawmaking and budget making roles of parliaments, including your own;
•
Understand and describe the role of parliaments in conducting oversight of the executive branch;
•
Describe how oversight is conducted in your own parliament, and be ready to suggest some ways it might be done more effectively.
Representation Throughout the world citizens tend to identify with parliament members in more personal ways than they do other public officials. Constituents talk of “my MP”, “my congressperson”, “my senator”, “my deputy”, or “my representative.”
One does not
often hear people speak of “my president”, “my judge”, or “my bureaucrat.”
Unlike
chief executives, who represent entire nations, or bureaucrats and judges, whose responsibility it is to carry out and interpret the law impartially toward all citizens, legislators are responsible for representing the differences in society, and for bringing those differences into the policy-making arena.
These differences may be rooted in
geography, ethnicity, religion, political identification, gender, or other characteristics, but MPs are expected to represent them at the national level. Representation involves more than simply living in a specific area in the country, or having characteristics in common with those one represents (e.g., political beliefs, religion, gender,). It involves listening to constituents and groups and making decisions
and exercising influence on their behalf.
Political scientist Nelson Polsby calls
parliaments the “nerve endings” of the polity (Polsby 1975). They are the branch of government closest to people, and MPs, and more than any other officials at the national level, they need to be aware of the needs of constituents, and are expected to respond to those needs. Transparency is important to representation.
Democratic parliaments are the most
transparent and accessible of the three branches of government.
Most parliaments
open their plenary sessions to the public and to the press, and a growing number allow citizens to attend committee meetings.
South Africa’s parliament even publishes
committee schedules on the Internet, as do several others. Daily news reports cover events in parliament, and an increasing number of parliaments televise their plenary sessions giving citizens the opportunity to view their parliament in action. The Congress of Peru makes its internal budget, progress on spending, salary scales, vendor contracts, and an evaluation of the impact of its budget available to the world via the Internet. Not only are parliaments more open and accessible than other government branches, MPs themselves are more accessible. In many systems, the legislature’s representation function involves constituent services, (i.e., helping citizens cut through government bureaucracies to receive their benefits, assisting with special problems), and accessing government funds for projects to benefit the constituency, such as bridges, clinics, water systems, schools, etc. Parliamentarians become well known and help ensure their re-election by providing such services.
Concepts of representation What do we mean when we say that parliamentarians “represent” citizens? The concept of representation has shifted over time, and even now is in flux.
The classic
representation dichotomy contrasts legislators as delegates – where legislators mirror or transmit constituency attitudes and preferences, with legislators as trustees – where the legislators themselves determine what is in their constituent’s best interests. Legislators acting as trustees consider themselves selected because of their special abilities, and see their job as adapting their constituents’ needs into the national welfare.
The “delegate – trustee” dichotomy, however, does not really apply to those parliaments where party discipline is high, and where members never – or almost never – dare vote against the dictates of their party. In the responsible party model, parties put forward alternative platforms to the electorate, and citizens indicate their preferences by electing one party over another. Proponents of this model argue that since voters vote for a party and a platform, party members are obliged to support that platform.
In
parliamentary systems, the government’s survival depends upon the votes of governing party members, and in presidential systems party cohesion and assurance of votes from party members enables parties to get their programs through the legislature. Critics of this model contend that no party platform can be specific enough to cover all of the issues considered during the life of a parliament, and that members should therefore have some latitude in voting their conscience or in support of the needs of their constituents.
But in systems where party discipline is very strong, a
representative’s preferences for or against specific legislation might have little impact on how he or she votes. Political party leaders have numerous tools at their disposal to ensure that party MPs do not vote against the interests of the party.
Especially in
nations with parliamentary systems and party list electoral systems (see Unit 3), it is very difficult for MPs to vote against their party (Zappal 1999).
TABLE 2 Trustees or Delegates? Legislators in Five US States Do legislators see themselves as delegates or as trustees? Alan Rosenthal, an expert on US state legislatures, asked legislators from the Senate and House of five US states*, “If a constituency position on legislation were to come into conflict with your views or judgments, which would generally prevail when you cast your vote?” The mean score for all legislators was 3.47 (somewhat toward “vote own judgment”). In general, the larger the district (and, therefore, the more heterogeneous), the greater the likelihood that legislators would vote according to their own judgment (Rosenthal 2004).
Vote Constituency Position (Delegate) 1 6%
2 14%
Vote Own Judgment (Trustee) 3
4
21%
44%
5 15%
* Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio, Vermont, Washington
An increasingly common phenomenon in recent years is what Anne Phillips calls the politics of presence. This concept of representation assumes that to truly represent a group in society, one has to share specific characteristics of that group (only women can represent women, for example). Gender and ethnicity are the most commonly used characteristics, but they might also include religion, age, profession, or even disability. Guarantees of parliamentary representation by ethnicity or religion have been included in several peace agreements in recent years as a means of ensuring “buy in” to the peace process or a new government.
Following are some examples of this kind of
representation. •
Argentina requires that party lists for candidates for congress include a minimum of 30% women candidates.
•
Afghanistan’s Wolesi Jirga, the more powerful house, consists of 250 delegates directly elected through a system of proportional representation.
At least 64
delegates (two from each province) must be women; they are appointed by the president who also nominates two representatives of the physically disabled, and two Kuchi nomads.
•
Colombia’s constitution states that “There will be an additional two senators elected in a special national electoral district for indigenous communities” (these are added to the 100 other members).
These two members are expected to
represent the interests of Colombia’s indigenous communities. •
Uganda’s Constitution requires representation be provided for several groups in the nation, including a woman representative from each district; representatives of the army, youth, workers, and persons with disabilities.
•
Lebanon: The 1989 Ta’if Accords in Lebanon – negotiated by the then most recently elected parliament – changed the national representation formula. The agreement redistributed power among three main sets of participants in Lebanon –Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shiite Muslims. Within the Parliament seats were shifted from the traditional 6 to 5 ratio of Christians and Muslims to one of equal distribution…more accurately reflecting population breakdowns in the nation.
Representation of Women in Parliaments In addition to quotas, what other factors help explain the growing number of women represented in parliaments in so many nations? The following excerpts provide a perspective from the Nordic countries, and from Latvia (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2005). Mr. Björn von Sydow, Speaker of the Riksdag of Sweden
"We have several explanations for the high presence of women in the Nordic parliaments. One is the proportional electoral system. In Finland, there is a proportional list but the individual choice of the voters also comes into play. Another explanation is to be found in ideological debates in the country. In this area in Scandinavia, politics is, so to speak, in the lead. The business world is falling behind, and the academic world lags behind as well. We have not enough women university professors, and women are also poorly represented in the trade unions." Mrs. Ingrida Udre, Chairperson of the Saeima of Latvia
In Latvia, we have approximately 20% of women in parliament. We do not have a quota system because we believe strongly that people are elected on the basis of their professional capabilities. Women are quite active, not only in the family but also in politics. Our President is a woman, our Minister of Foreign Affairs is a woman, the Speaker of Parliament is a woman and the Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee is a woman too. This doesn’t mean that we have some kind of gender issues against men; it is purely to do with the development of society. Historically, women in Latvia have been very active. We are elected because people trust us and think that we are capable of doing the job. We can still do more, especially on issues such as violence in the family, or ensuring equal pay for women and men.
Representation and Constituent Relations Legislators in several nations have significant constituent relations and constituent services responsibilities. Most common in constituency-based representation systems (see Unit 3), constituent services might include helping citizens cut through government bureaucracies to receive their benefits; assisting citizens with special problems; and accessing government funds for projects to benefit the constituency, such as bridges, clinics, water systems, schools, etc.
In some legislatures, especially those in poorer
nations, representatives are on their own when it comes to constituent relations and services; while better endowed legislatures may have staff to help representatives draft letters and conduct constituents. Staff members may also interface with government bureaucracies on behalf of constituents.
In Unit 3 we will consider how the design of political and electoral systems (i.e., presidential versus parliamentary political systems, and single-member districts versus party list systems) impact the way legislators view and carry out their representation roles, and in Unit 4 will discuss some things legislatures are doing to maintain closer relations with constituents. We end our discussion on constituent services with the following humorous excerpt from a speech describing citizen demands on their MPs given by Hon. Michael Mataure, former MP in Zimbabwe, at a SADC (Southern African Development Community) Parliamentary Forum parliamentary orientation seminar in Maseru, Lesotho in 2003.
Hon. Member, You Promised By Hon. Michael Mataure, former MP of Zimbabwe Honourable Member, you promised….. To be there for your constituents, i.e., to be seen, reached, smelt and be accessible to them round the clock. No strict office hours; no vacation/leave; or personal time. You could in a way be referred to as a roaming prisoner. To be the people’s representative/emissary to and from the capital in a consistent manner. Indeed, you have assumed the role of a glorified postman/messenger and bearer of good news, bad news and in fact all news. However, for political and survival reasons you are expected to bring good news and gifts of all manner of description and value to key people and institutions on a regular basis if you still want to remain popular. To be the Principal Agent/Proponent and Activist for ensuring that there is improvement in the infrastructure and service provision of the Constituency, including: a) Upgrading of roads, bridges and related infrastructure; b) Improvement of health services and facilities, e.g., clinics, staff; c) Improvement of schools and related facilities; d) Identifying donors and NGOs to bring material and financial resources for projects in the area; e) Organizing scholarships and employment for a host of demanding political stakeholders including campaign supporters and party activists. Nurturing and maintaining the support of spouses, family (immediate and suddenly extended) and a plethora of friends, acquaintances and hangers-on. To be the chief celebrant/benefactor at feasts, weddings, field days and graduations of various sorts. Your contribution must be seen to be the largest or among the large ones. To be the chief sympathizer/principal mourner in cases of bereavement and death. You are expected to play the role of undertaker when and if we as your constituents cannot afford a coffin or access a vehicle to ferry our beloved relative for burial.
To be the individual but unofficial/substitute social welfare unit for all those in need in your constituency including the various fundraising functions to which you are invited, may decline to attend but to do so at great personal risk to your political career. To be your party’s most ardent defender, promoter/public relations agent. You are expected to be a party loyalist, worker, volunteer and resource mobiliser. In this case your personal resources, vehicle, house, telephone, time, etc, are part of the party’s pool of resources to be accessed as and when required. To be the willing and unwilling subject/object of close public scrutiny and examination. The media are this unique type of vulture that love fresh meat in the form of errant public officials behind whom or who are associated with scandal or who occupy houses with cupboards full of skeletons. For those who serve in cabinet, your constituents expect that you can marshal and commandeer resources easily and get development finances without much difficulty.
Lawmaking The second function of legislatures is to make laws, the rules that govern society. Effective legislatures not only represent the differences in society, they must also reach agreements on policy, taxing and spending with which groups and individuals generally agree.
This is difficult under the best of circumstances, but it becomes more so in
deeply divided societies and in poor nations with few resources to distribute. Citizens might not think of the national budget as a law, but in reality it is probably the most important law the legislature enacts each year. The budget determines what the nation does, with and for whom, and at what cost. It determines as well, who pays – and who does not pay – for these services, whether the nation will incur debt, how much debt, how the debt will be repaid and over how many years. Budget consideration periods for legislatures vary considerably, from as little as a month in some nations, to about eight months in the United States.
The Lawmaking Process In Unit 3 we will present several factors which influence the types of roles parliaments play in the lawmaking process. In this section we describe the general steps through which legislation passes.
In most legislatures with committee systems, proposed legislation (bills) are introduced formally on the floor of the house, and then referred to the committee with jurisdiction over the legislation. Westminster systems (i.e., those descending from the British House of Commons) typically hold bills on the floor for a second reading and a debate and vote on the bill “in principle”. After this, bills are referred to committees where committee members typically work on technical details and amendments. In presidential systems, bills introduced are immediately referred to committee, and those bills, over which more than one committee has jurisdiction, are referred to more than one committee. An education bill with financial implications, for example might be referred to both the education and finance committees. In political systems with a very large volume of legislation (more than 10,000 bills are introduced each year in the US Congress, for example), most legislation never gets beyond committee.
If the
legislature has two houses, bills may move through each house simultaneously, or through the houses consecutively. Two house legislatures generally devise methods of reconciling different versions of the bills.
In some systems, such as the Chilean
legislature, the president prioritizes legislation, applying different levels of “urgency” to different bills. The Chilean Congress is then required to act on bills within the time allotted by the president. Openness of the Legislative Process Legislatures differ dramatically in the degree of access granted to the public in the lawmaking process. Nearly all democratic legislatures hold open plenary sessions, but because of concerns with security – or simply traditions of not allowing citizens to participate – citizens may not be allowed to observe plenary sessions.
Legislatures
located deep within guarded compounds, or those that which lack clear systems of access, are difficult for citizens to actually attend parliamentary sessions.
A growing number of legislatures open not only their plenary sessions, but their committee meetings as well. Some legislative bodies open all committee meetings (with
the exception of those dealing with intelligence or security matters) to the public, and publish and distribute agendas in advance so that interested parties may attend. According to the UK House of Commons website, some meetings of Select and Standing Committees are open to the public. open.
Nearly all of Uganda’s committee meetings are
South Africa’s are open, and monitors cover all sessions and provide reports via
the Internet on each committee meeting covered.
Openness of the legislative process refers not just to legislatures providing information to citizens and allowing them to watch legislative proceedings, but to their efforts to listen to citizens and groups in society and allowing them a voice in the process. To this end, some committees conduct public hearings on legislation that they are considering. Public hearings allow committees to hear from citizens, interest groups, and experts about their interests and concerns with regard to proposed legislation, and their comments may lead to legislative amendments.
Public hearings also serve an
educational function, providing citizens an opportunity to see their legislature in action, and to participate in the legislative process.
TABLE 3 More Active Mexican Congress (Bills introduced in House of Deputies) Recent experience in Mexico illustrates how the legislature’s role in the legislative process can change. With Mexico’s Party of the Institutionalized Revolution (PRI) losing control of both the Congress and the presidency in recent years, Congress’ role in the legislative process has become greater than the president’s, both in the percentage of legislation introduced, and the percentage enacted into law. Congress’ power may expand even more with a constitutional amendment taking effect this year (2005) lengthening the congressional spring term. Bills Sponsors Introduced Percent* Deputies 23 57.5% Executive 15 37.5% _______________________________________________________________________ 1996 Deputies 22 66.7% Executive 11 33.3% _______________________________________________________________________ 1997 Deputies 34 81% Executive 8 19% _______________________________________________________________________ 1998 Deputies 71 86.6% Executive 9 11% _______________________________________________________________________ 1999 Deputies 90 80.4% Executive 12 10.7% _______________________________________________________________________ 2000 Deputies 80 84.2% Executive 5 5.3% _______________________________________________________________________ 2001 Deputies 55 64.7% Executive 22 25.9% _______________________________________________________________________ 2002 Deputies 178 86.4% Executive 7 3.4% _______________________________________________________________________ 2003 Deputies 233 82.9% Executive 2 .7% _______________________________________________________________________ 2004 Deputies 264 84.3% Executive 13 4.2% Spring Term 1995
* Totals may not equal 100% because state legislatures and the Senate may also introduce legislation in the House of Deputies. Not only has the percentage of bills introduced by the executive falling relative to the Congress, but the percentage of executive bills enacted into law is shrinking. In the spring 2001 term, 48% of legislation enacted was initiated by the president. This percentage fell to 43% in spring 2002, 12.1% in spring 2003, and 7.1% in spring 2004.
Oversight In addition to representing individuals and groups in society, and establishing the policies and budgets that govern society and distribute wealth, legislatures oversee the actions and spending of the executive branch.
Oversight is one of the legislature’s
“check and balance” functions, through which it seeks to ensure that programs are carried out legally, effectively, and for the purposes for which they were intended.
In
practicing oversight, parliaments look back on government spending and activities to determine whether money was spent appropriately, and to ask “value for money” questions.
Different political systems practice oversight in different ways; a nation’s
political structure, formal oversight powers, and access to budget information all influence the practice of oversight. The increased national and international attention on government corruption in recent years has led to a greater focus on this aspect of parliamentary responsibility.
What is Oversight? Oversight of the executive is a simple concept, but difficult in practice.
Consider the following
example of oversight, and its application to the work of a parliament. Suppose you hire a contractor to build you a new home. You and your contractor have agreed on a plan for your home, materials to be used, a completion date, and a price. As the new homeowner, you are “conducting oversight” when you stop by periodically to check on the contractor’s progress, ensure that he is using the materials he said he would use, and try to ensure that the contractor is on schedule and within budget. Once the job is completed, you might ask the contractor for a final accounting of all spending. Parliaments and executives might be thought of in the same way. By enacting the national budget, the parliament (homeowner) is charging the executive branch (contractor) with implementing the budgeted program. Parliament has the right, and the obligation, to stay abreast of ministry progress in carrying out specific parts of the program, in knowing how closely the program costs conform to budgets, and whether they are “working” (accomplishing their goals). At the end of the year, parliament receives an accounting for costs, and should be to investigate any expenses.
Oversight Tools Parliaments use a variety of tools – both formal and informal – in overseeing executive spending and activities. They include: Public audits: These are yearly reviews of government spending. Typically, a nation’s supreme audit agency (sometimes called the Auditor General – AG) reviews government accounts and prepares a yearly report for parliament.
Auditors independent of the
executive (i.e., those whom the executive cannot hire or fire, and whose budgets they do not control) are freer to conduct independent investigations of executive spending and programs. Audit agencies need sufficient funds and adequate staff if they are to conduct their work effectively. Public Accounts Committees (PACs): The majority of Westminster parliaments use PACs to follow-up on findings of public audits, to investigate irregularities reported, and to recommend changes to rectify any problems discovered.
PACs invite ministers and
other ministry officials to testify before the committee, and, in some systems, have the power to subpoena witnesses. Both government and opposition MPs serve on PACs, which more often than not are chaired by a key member of the opposition. AG staff members sometime assist members and staff of PACs in carrying out their investigations. Questions to ministers:
Westminster parliaments typically conduct weekly question
periods where MPs ask ministers about issues within the purview of their ministries. Question may concern MPs constituencies (regarding construction or repair of a road within the constituency, for example) or more general concerns. Question times work best when parliaments are able to follow-up and determine whether government has taken any action on the question (if action is needed), and when parliament has some authority to sanction –or at least express its displeasure – when the executive is not responsive.
Departmental (also called standing, sessional, permanent) Committees:
These
committees, responsible for overseeing line ministries, frequently have the authority to question ministers and ministry staff of the ministries they oversee. Select (investigative) committees are temporary committees established for a specific period of time and with a mandate limited to investigating the matter for which they were established. (See the text box, below) In addition to formal oversight tools, parliaments need access to information, sufficient staffing and funding, and sometimes, access to media communications, if they are to be effective.
If the executive is unwilling to provide information, parliaments cannot
investigate effectively.
Without authority to compel the government to provide
information, the legislature’s hands are tied. But even when a parliament lacks some of the basic powers to ensure compliance, access to the communications media may help. Public knowledge may create pressure for government to change certain policies.
Select Committees in Uganda Uganda’s Constitution gives parliament the power to censure ministers, and parliament has made use of this power. Section 118 states that “(1) Parliament may, by resolution supported by more than half of all members of Parliament, pass a vote of censure against a Minister on any of the following grounds: (a) abuse of office or willful violation of the oath of allegiance or oath of office; (b) misconduct or misbehavior; (c) physical or mental incapacity, namely, that he or she is incapable of performing the functions of his or her office by reason of physical or mental incapacity; (d) mismanagement; or (e) incompetence. Upon a vote of censure being passed against a Minister, the President shall, unless the Minister resigns his or her office, take appropriate action in the matter.” Between 1997 and 1999, parliament worked through its select committees to conduct nine high-profile investigations of government officials accused of corruption, two of which led to the censure of the Minister of State for Education and the forced resignation of the Minister of State for Privatisation.
Following a
parliamentary investigation of the vice president in her second role as Minister for Agriculture, the President was forced to remove her from her ministerial position and reshuffle the Cabinet. Presidential inquiries led to the departure of the President’s own brother from an important post and other resignations in anticipation of censure or other actions. Another example of oversight, though one which did not produce the same definitive actions, was the effort of a parliamentary minority to question and hold to account the President’s actions in waging war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
A War Powers Act was introduced, and questions were raised in
parliamentary forums about the conduct of the war.
In 2001, parliament established the Select Committee on the Ministry of Defence on Allegations of Mismanagement, Abuse of Office and Corruption in the Ministry of Defence, to investigate payroll inefficiencies and procurement procedures.
The
committee recommended several improvements, which are being implemented in the military. Among other issues, the committee investigated alleged embezzlement of 1.2 billion Uganda shillings meant for troops in the DRC, the purchase of military helicopters that could not fly, the purchase of rotten canned food for the military, and the purchase of ill-fitting uniforms.2
Unit 1 Questions Please answer each of the following questions. If you are taking this course in a group you may then meet to discuss your answers. Representation: 1.
Which best describes representatives in your parliament – delegates, trustees, responsible party, other? Explain why.
2.
What is the percentage of women MPs in your parliament? Are measures being pursued to increase this percentage?
3.
How important is it that MPs share characteristics of those they represent? Describe the electoral system in your country. Do MPs represent geographical areas, party, ethnic group, gender, other characteristic?
4.
What services are available in your parliament to help MPs in their dealings with constituents? Budget for travel? District offices? Is there staff dedicated to helping MPs in their relations with constituents?
Lawmaking 5.
Describe the lawmaking process in your parliament. Do private members introduce legislation? What percentage of bills which become law originate in the parliament, and what percentage come from the cabinet?
6.
How open, or closed, is the lawmaking process in your parliament?
7.
Are citizens able to attend plenary sessions, committee meetings? If they are, how many attend?
8.
What kind of professional services available to help with bill drafting? Do members need to fund their own research? Their own bill drafting?
Oversight 9.
Does your parliament use any of the oversight tools described in this chapter?
10.
What other oversight tools can you think of which might be helpful for your parliament?
In Unit 1 we considered the main functions of legislatures, and how they are carried out in several nations. In Unit 2 we will consider a model of legislative power which may help you better understand the power and independence of your parliament.
Relevant internet resources The World of Parliaments http://www.ipu.org/news-e/13-7.htm
Lawmaking and Stages of Legislative Procedure
http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/parliaments/Legislative%20Processes.htm
Parliamentary Monitoring Group http://www.pmg.org.za/whatispmg.php The United Kingdom Parliament http://www.parliament.uk/faq/visits_faq_page.cfm#vis3 Select bibliography Constitution of Colombia, Article 171. Samuel P. Huntington: The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century. University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. p.3 Strengthening Legislative Capacity in Legislative-Executive Relations, Legislative Research Series – Paper #6, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2000 Nelson W. Polsby, “Legislatures,” in Handbook of Political Science: Government Institutions and Processes, eds., Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1975). Remington, Thomas, Separation of Powers and Legislative Oversight in Russia, Legislatures and Oversight, WBI Working Paper Series, World Bank Institute, 2004 Alan Rosenthal, Heavy Lifting: The Job of the American Legislature, (Washington, D.C. CQ Press, 2004) P.44. SADC Parliamentary Forum, MPs Orientation Handbook, Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum, Windhoek, Namibia, 2004 Weldon, Jeffrey, The Spring 2004 Term of the Mexican Congress. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. pp. 25 - 26. 2004 Dr Gianni Zappal, Research Paper 28 1998-99, Challenges to the Concept and Practice of Political Representation in Australia, Parliament of Australia, 29 June 1999.
Unit 2: A Model of Parliamentary Power Learning Objectives A Model of Parliamentary Power After studying this unit, you should be able to: •
Describe different types of legislatures according to the models presented below;
•
Categorize your own legislature as one of the four types – or at least present characteristics from the different types which do describe your legislature;
•
Better understand the pressures for change in your parliament, if yours is an emerging legislature.
Are you and your colleagues experiencing new kinds of pressures on your jobs in parliament?
Are demands from parliament members, from leadership, or from the
public growing? Is your parliament bringing on additional new kinds of staff? Are you installing new information systems in parliament, or are growing numbers of constituents visiting the parliament? If you answered “yes” to any of these questions, it could be that your parliament is in transition from one type of parliament to another. And, as you know from personal experience, while transitions are some of the most challenging times in life – they are also times of great growth. In this Unit we propose a simple model of parliamentary power. We have presented to parliamentarians and parliamentary staff in several nations who have told us that it helped them better understand their parliaments. The model attempts to categorize parliaments with regard to their level of independence, and the extent to which they exercise power relative to the executive. As you read the unit, try to determine which model of legislature best describes your own.
Rubber Stamp Legislatures We may think of parliamentary power as moving along a continuum from little independence and power on one end, to very influential and active legislatures on the other. The simplest of legislatures are called rubber stamp legislatures. These bodies simply endorse decisions made elsewhere in the political system, usually by parties and/ or the executive branch.
They are often associated with communist or totalitarian
nations, where decisions are made by a leader or vanguard party, and in which the parliament is expected to simply endorse their decisions. Because demands on them are few, rubber stamp legislatures need little internal structure or expert staff and need not conduct long legislative sessions. The Duma of the former Soviet Union and the Mexican Congress during the decades of PRI dominance could be considered rubber stamp legislatures. “Rubber stamp” generally connotes non-democratic, but it could also describe components of the election process such as the US Electoral College, whose delegates are expected to vote according to the dictates of those who sent them, and not according to personal opinion.
Because
rubber stamp legislatures do communicate extensively with citizens, do not process great quantities of information, do not hold public hearings, and do not amend laws and budgets, their resource requirements are few and they are generally the least expensive legislatures to operate.
Model 1: Rubber stamp legislatures Rubber Stamp
Less
Little internal structure Low information needs
(Parliamentary power and independence)
More
Complex internal structures High information needs
Arena Legislatures Moving right on the arrow of parliamentary power and independence, we come next to arena legislatures. Arena legislatures are more powerful than rubber stamp legislatures, and are places of real discussion, speech, and debate. Policy initiates still come from outside the legislature, generally from executives or political parties.
In arena
legislatures, differences in society are articulated and government actions and plans are evaluated from different perspectives, but they tend not to initiate or dramatically reshape policy proposals. Arena legislature information needs are greater than those of rubber stamp legislatures: they need sufficient internal capacity to organize debate; a committee system adequate for channeling the business of the house; and capacity to analyze proposals in order to comment on them critically, and to make some technical amendments. A useful analogy for an arena legislature is a thermometer. As thermometers take accurate readings of the temperature around them but do not change the temperature, so arena legislatures accurately reflect the “political temperature” with regard to the issues before them. The British House of Commons today might be considered an arena legislature. Model 2: Arena legislatures Arena
Less
(Parliamentary power and independence)
Little internal structure Low information needs
More
Complex internal structures High information needs
Transformative Legislatures Moving right again we come to the least common type of legislatures, transformative legislatures. Transformative legislatures not only represent diverse societal interests,
but they shape budgets and policies. They amend legislation and budgets received from the executive branch, initiate their own policy proposals, reach out to citizens, and conduct public hearings. Transformative legislatures can be likened to a thermostat. As thermostats change the room temperature by activating heat or air conditioning, transformative legislatures change policies and budgets proposed by government, and even initiate policies of their own. Not surprisingly, transformative legislatures are the most expensive to operate. They have highly complex internal structures (including strong committee systems); great information needs, and depend heavily on highly trained professional staff.
The US Congress is probably the best example of a
transformative legislature.
Model 3: Transformative legislatures Transformative
Less
(Parliamentary power and independence)
Little internal structure Low information needs
More
Complex internal structures High information needs
Emerging Legislatures And finally, a fourth legislative type is called an emerging legislature.
Emerging
legislatures are in the process of change from one type to another. Worldwide several legislatures are attempting to exercise greater influence over government policies and carry out their oversight responsibilities more effectively, and could be classified as emerging legislatures. Expanding their powers usually requires major legislative changes, among them amending rules and procedures, building stronger committees, expanding professional staff, developing improved information systems, and others.
Mexico’s Congress and
Kenya’s and Uganda’s Parliaments could be classified as emerging legislatures (See Annex 1).
In recent years both Mexico and Uganda established professional budget
offices, helping those parliaments to play a more assertive role in the budget process. All three legislatures expanded professional staff, and Kenya and Uganda’s have made their administration independent of the executive. Kenya and Uganda staff members are no longer civil servants; they serve at the command of parliament’s leadership. The parliaments also now set their own budgets. Emerging legislatures are under significant stress, as parliament’s managers and staff struggle to meet the growing demands. Staff and resources that were sufficient for a less assertive legislature are no longer adequate. Emerging legislatures need new kinds of staff, more professional staff, better information systems, additional office space, and other capacities to help them carry out their representation, lawmaking, and oversight roles more effectively. MPs demand more of parliamentary staff members, who must respond more quickly, work faster, and do more than they have in the past. Model 4 shows a legislature growing in strength relative to parties and executives. Model 4: Emerging legislatures
Less
(Parliamentary power and independence)
More
Emerging
Little internal structure Low information needs
Complex internal structures High information needs
The balance of political power in any political system ebbs and flows, with the legislature at times gaining, and at other times losing power relative to the executive. In balanced governments, the branches act as checks on one another so that no branch becomes overly powerful relative to the others. In developing - and frequently in developed - countries, legislatures tend to be weak cousins of the executive, lacking sufficient powers and resources to function as an
effective check on the executive. An overly assertive legislature is much less common, but as legislatures grow in strength we should pay heed to one of the US’s founding fathers James Madison’s warning in Federalist Paper Number 48. Madison warns of the dangers of “… legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations.” Checks and balances in democracies are meant to keep any branch of the government from gaining too much power, and this can include parliaments.
Unit 2 Questions Please answer each of the following questions. If you are taking this course in a group you may then meet to discuss your answers. 1.
Which model (rubber stamp, arena, transformative, emerging) best describes your parliament?
2.
Are demands of parliament and parliamentarians on legislative staff and systems in your legislature increasing, decreasing, or staying about the same? Can you illustrate this with any specific examples?
3.
Which types of legislatures are probably the least difficult for staff to function in? Which are the most difficult?
4.
Which legislative type(s) would you most prefer to work in? Why?
Unit 1 described different functions of legislatures, and some of the ways they carry them out. Unit 2 compared legislatures in terms of their power and independence. In Unit 3 we will consider several characteristics of parliaments which help explain why they behave so differently in different nations.
Unit 3: Factors Influencing How Legislatures Carry Out Their Functions Learning Objectives Factors Influencing how Legislatures Carry Out their Functions After studying this unit, you should be able to: •
Describe the basic types of political systems, and understand how they can influence the ways a parliament carries out its functions;
•
Describe the three basic types of electoral systems,
•
Describe the advantages each electoral system provides;
•
Describe the formal powers your parliament possesses;
•
Discuss how effectively your parliament uses its powers;
•
Be able to describe the technical capacities of your legislature, and explain how they impact on the level of work your parliament carries out.
Have you ever considered why legislatures in different nations conduct themselves so differently? Why, for example, do representatives in one nation spend so much time, money, and effort reaching out to citizens, while others seem to have very little contact with them?
Why do some legislatures make absolutely no change to the budget
proposed by the executive, while others seem free to rewrite it? Why is party discipline so strong in some legislatures, and so weak in others? In this chapter we will consider how several factors influence the ways parliaments carry out their functions, and try to provide at least a partial answer to questions such as these. The five factors we will consider are: 1. The type of political system; 2. The type of electoral system through which representatives are elected; 3. The legislature’s formal powers;
4. The combination of the political environment within which the legislature functions, and the political will of legislators to exert parliament’s powers; and 5.
The technical capacity of the parliament.
Two quick points before we proceed: The first is that while these factors influence and help explain the ways a given legislature carries out its basic functions of representation, lawmaking, and oversight, no single factor determines legislative behavior. is that the powers and performance of legislatures are not static.
The second
Remember the
example of the Mexican Congress in Unit 1, which over a period of a few years became the dominant lawmaking power in Mexico.
The balance of power is fluid in every
political system, with legislatures sometimes gaining, sometimes losing power relative to other actors.
Political Systems In this section we explore in some detail the level of independence and potential policymaking roles of presidential (US), parliamentary (UK) and hybrid (France) legislatures, and comment on some systems that combine characteristics of the three types. The degree of separation or unity between the legislative and executive powers illustrated in these models is probably the single most important factor in determining the potential strength and independence of a legislature. Parliamentary (UK): Because of the substantial unity between the legislative and executive branches, the House of Commons plays a relatively minor policy-making role in the UK.
In parliamentary systems, the parliamentary majority party or coalition
selects the chief executive from among its members. Cabinet members are also named from the parliamentary majority.
Therefore, obviously in parliamentary systems, the
executive and legislature cannot be controlled by different parties.
The prime minister, cabinet and bureaucracy control the legislative agenda and the budget, and individual MPs have little power to introduce their own initiatives. Legislative amendments are very narrow and technical, and committee staff are quite
small (Australia is an exception, with a larger staff system than that of the UK). Party caucuses, rather than committees, tend to make the important policy decisions. A vote of no confidence in the government results in both the government and parliament leaving office, so majority parliamentary and executive leaders do all they can to avoid such a vote. The system tends not to support the development of strong, aggressive committees able to challenge the executive – and to challenge the implementation of a platform on which the majority of the parliamentarians were elected.
Overt executive occurs when legislative conflict is not common in
parliamentary systems, nor is the parliament likely to exercise aggressive oversight. Divisions within the governing coalition however, will reduce this executive when there is parliamentary unity.
In true parliaments political parties are generally well disciplined; voting against one’s party is rare and can endanger one’s future with the party. MPs will likely conform to the responsible party model (page 10).
The government’s survival depends on a
cohesive majority party, generally characterized by strong discipline, bloc voting and distinct party platforms.
Similarly, opposition parties will have little likelihood of
replacing the government in power if they are not able to count on the votes of theirconstituents. In addition to the United Kingdom, much of continental Europe, and most of the former British colonies in Africa and Asia and most Caribbean nations have adopted some variation of parliamentary system.
Several former British colonies are not pure
parliamentary systems, but mix characteristics of both parliamentary and presidential systems (see Table 4).
The worldwide network of parliaments based on the
Westminster system (the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association) has been both a means of socializing parliamentary members and staff from scores of nations into the traditions and trappings of the Westminster system, and also of sharing issues and parliamentary developments among members. Presidential (USA): In presidential systems, the president and legislature are elected separately, from different constituencies and often for different terms. The president
selects the cabinet from outside parliament.
Term lengths for presidents and
parliaments are fixed and the fates of the legislature and president are not intertwined as they are in parliamentary systems. With the government thus divided, parliament has incentives to develop strong, effective committees and to play a competitive lawmaking role.
The government does not need to “win” on every issue, since losing a
major vote does not endanger the executive’s term in office, as it would in parliamentary systems. It is not uncommon for different houses of the legislature, and the executive and legislatures iin presidency to be controlled by different parties. The executive can draft laws and most significant laws enacted in presidential systems come from the executive branch but only members of the legislature have the authority to introduce laws on the floor. The legislature is free to set its own agenda and pass its own bills. Executives and legislatures in presidential systems often work to formulate legislation together. These incentives for legislatures in presidential systems do not mean that they will necessarily become assertive institutions.
Lack of political will to develop a strong
legislature, poor infrastructure, strong political party control from outside the legislature, a tradition of acquiescence to a strong executive – these and other factors reduce the likelihood that the legislature will become strong and independent. The United States is the most commonly cited example of a presidential system. Presidential systems have also developed in other nations that have been influenced by the United States, including most Latin American nations and the Philippines. Table 4 describes several characteristics of the US presidential and the UK parliamentary political systems.
TABLE 4 Presidential and Parliamentary Legislatures Pure Presidential (US)
Pure Parliamentary (UK)
Degree of Separation of Powers
Clear separation of powers between legislative and executive branches.
Greater fusion of powers between executive and legislature.
Term Length/Removal from office
Fixed terms. Legislature has the power to remove a president but only in extreme cases. President cannot dissolve the legislature.
Variable. The legislature dissolves chief executive and cabinet through a vote of no confidence, forcing new parliamentary elections.
Elected together or separately?
Elected separately – often for different terms.
Elected together. The legislature selects the executive.
Cabinet Selection
President selects cabinet, whose members must be approved by the Senate. Cabinet members may not be serving in the legislature.
Prime minister selects cabinet members from within the parliament.
Who initiates legislation?
Both the executive and the legislature initiate legislation.
The executive initiates almost all legislation.
Policy-making roles
Both the executive and the legislature can play strong policy-making roles. Incentives exist for strong, well-staffed and resourced committees.
Policy-making functions tend to be concentrated in the parties or ministerial bureaucracy. Less of a need for strong committees.
Focus of lobbying
Lobbying focused on those with power to make and/or amend policy - both executive and legislature.
Lobbying tends to focus on party leaders in government, party organization, and/or bureaucracy.
Role of opposition
Minority parties are not necessarily excluded from policy-making roles.
Opposition parties excluded from policymaking role. Tend to focus on oversight and readiness to replace the government.
Source: USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening
Hybrid (France):
The term hybrid generally refers to a system with an elected
president who shares executive power with the prime minister. The French system is the most commonly cited hybrid legislature, and former French colonies, such as Cote D’Ivoire, Gabon, and Mali have structured their political systems after that of France. The French president has the power to select the prime minister and to nominate his own cabinet. The president, his cabinet, and bureaucracy initiate and draft most of the legislation. The president has well defined powers to conduct foreign affairs, but the running of the government is the responsibility of the prime minister and the cabinet.
In the French system members are empowered to introduce legislation, but bills introduced by the executive take priority over member bills. The executive sets the agenda in the legislature and can make any bill it initiates result in a motion of censure, dissolving the parliament. The president also has the authority to enact legislation by bypassing the legislature by going to the public directly through a national referendum. If the public approves the referendum, the measure becomes law without any input from the legislature. Mixed systems:
We use the ideal types – the British, US, and French models to
represent parliamentary, presidential, and hybrid systems. In reality, most democracies in the world are a mix of characteristics and rarely conform precisely to these ideal types. There are presidential systems in Latin America, for example, which have some parliamentary characteristics. Bolivia’s constitution, for example, requires that congress choose the president from the top candidates if no candidate wins a majority of the vote. As these are multiparty systems, it is rare for a presidential candidate to win more than 50% of the vote, so congress frequently selects the president. A number of African legislatures, while adhering to the traditions of the British House of Commons, are a blend of characteristics of both presidential and parliamentary systems. Kenya, Zambia, and Uganda, for example, elect the president through direct nationwide elections – as in presidential systems, but the president selects ministers from the parliament, as in parliamentary systems. The parliaments of Kenya and Uganda have utilized these powers in recent years by passing some very significant private member legislation. Both have enacted legislation making the legislature formally independent of the executive, giving parliament control over its budget, staffing, and management. Does the decision to adopt a parliamentary form of government then relegate parliament to become a rubber stamp legislature, and mean that the legislature in a presidential system will necessarily be strong and independent? By no means. While the strongest legislatures in presidential systems will be stronger and more independent than the strongest parliaments in parliamentary systems, there are considerable
variations. Legislatures in presidential systems with very strong political parties or weak internal capacity (the Mexican congress prior to the end of PRI dominance in the late 1990s, for example) may be little more than rubber stamps, and some parliaments exercise more authority than others.
Electoral Systems MPs in every nation must win elections to get, and to stay, in office, but the system through which they compete will affect the way they relate to constituents and their degree of independence once in office. In this section we will consider the three major types of electoral systems (1) plurality-majority; (2) proportional representation; and (3) semi-proportional; and the likely impact of each on the behavior of the legislature. There are, in addition, several variations on these types. Plurality – Majority (PM):
In PM systems (also called single-member district, or
constituency-based), constituents in a geographic area vote directly for a candidate, and the candidate receiving the most votes wins. Since members are identified with specific districts, they may see their primary duty as being responsive to the needs of their constituents,
and
the
concerns
of
their
party
and
its
platform
secondary.
Representatives of single-member districts are likely to be freer to represent constituent interests than representatives in proportional representation systems (i.e., able to act as delegates or trustees – see page 9). Yet there are several factors which can still limit the independence of PM legislators. If political parties are very strong, if candidates need a party’s endorsement to run for office, if they rely on party patronage for positions in parliament, if they are MPs in a parliamentary system, or if they depend on the party for funds to run for office, MP independence will be checked. Parties with several “carrots and sticks” at their disposal are better able to enforce party discipline, even in single member districts. The United States, UK, and over half of all nations elect representatives through the PM system. Proportional Representation (PR):
In contrast to PM systems, where constituents
vote directly for their candidate who represents a geographic area, in proportional
representation (PR) systems candidates are placed on a list, and citizens vote for parties rather than for candidates directly.
The percentage of votes the party – not the
candidate – wins, determines whether or not a candidate gets into office.
If, for
example, a party wins 40% of votes cast in an election, the top 40% of candidates on that party’s list are elected.
MPs in PR systems will tend to be most responsive to their
parties’ leaders who determine whether and where a candidate will be placed on the party list in the next election.
Most continental European countries elect
parliamentarians through the PR method.
Semi-Proportional: Semi-proportional electoral systems combine features from both single-member and PR systems.
In a nation with a bi-cameral legislature, members
from one house may be chosen according to a PR system, and in the other through a single-member district system.
Alternatively, some percentage of members in a house
would be selected through a single-member district system and others in the same house through PR.
Nations using semi-proportional electoral systems attempt to
combine positive elements of both PR and single-member district systems – maintaining representation by region at the district level, and allowing greater representation of minority groups which might never get into office in a majoritarian system. Germany, Bolivia and Mexico all use semi-proportional systems.
TABLE 5 Comparing Advantages of Different Electoral Systems
Russia,
Plurality-Majoritarian (PM) Constituency-based Single Member District
Proportional Representation (PR)
Semi-Proportional
Description
Simple electoral method that also links representatives with geographical areas.
Reduces the disparity between a party’s share of the national vote and the number of seats in parliament.
Combines elements of both majoritarian and proportional systems.
Numbers of parties
Encourages the existence of two or three major parties.
Facilitates the participation of many political parties, representing a broad spectrum of interests and variety of views.
PM elements allow from direct representation while PR elements allow for some minority representation.
Encourage/ Discourage Coalition Governments?
Because there are fewer parties, this system discourages coalition governments.
More parties increase the likelihood of coalition government.
In theory, should lead to a less fragmented system than pure proportional representation, but possibly broader based government than in a PM system.
Who Benefits?
Benefits broadly based political parties which must try to act as umbrellas for multiple interests to attract votes.
Facilitates minority party representation. This may be important in divided societies to guarantee representation for certain ethnic, regional, or religious interests which might otherwise be locked out of the political process by dominant parties.
May reward small parties which would have been unsuccessful in PM elections with PR seats. In highly divided societies, a semiproportional system may lead to less polarization than in a pure PR system.
Links to parties or to politicians?
Provides for a stronger link between legislators and their constituents since legislators represent particular geographic areas.
If candidates are elected based on the appeal of a party platform or ideology, the entire party can be held accountable if it does not adhere to the platform.
The PM elements allow for direct representation, while PR elements allow for some minority representation and party accountability.
Other benefits
Provides an opportunity for popular independent candidates to be elected, particularly important in developing countries where parties are weak and candidates may be selected based on kinship or patronage.
Easier to implement gender and other quotas through PR systems (some nations require every 3rd candidate on a party list to be a woman, for example).
Able to encourage women and minority election on party lists, while allowing for specific geographic interests and independent candidates to be elected through the single member district seats.
Source: UNDP
Formal Parliamentary Powers We have considered how the type of political system and the method through which a nation elects members might impact on the independence and behavior of a legislature.
We will now examine how a legislature’s formal powers, usually defined in its constitution and standing orders (or rules of procedure), can impact on its independence and power. Some parliaments enjoy broad formal powers, allowing members and committees to introduce legislation (even legislation with significant financial impact), to dramatically rework executive taxing and spending proposals, and requiring the executive to obtain legislative approval to borrow money.
Formal powers in other legislatures are more
circumscribed. For reasons we have noted above, legislatures in presidential systems tend to possess greater formal powers than do legislatures in parliamentary systems. But parliamentary systems have oversight mechanisms not common to presidential systems, specifically, there are question periods for ministers and public accounts committees which routinely examine how governments use their funds.
Many
parliaments have used those powers to conduct oversight more thoroughly than their presidential counterparts. Table 6 lists several formal parliamentary powers.
TABLE 6 Examples of formal parliamentary powers • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Power of members and/or committees to introduce legislation Power of members to introduce legislation with fiscal costs Power to substantially amend executive proposals Power to override executive vetoes Power to approve cabinet officials Power to approve court justices Power to approve government borrowing Power to approve or disapprove of overseas travel by the chief executive Power to compel the executive and others to provide information Power to censure government ministers and other officials Power to approve/disapprove the budget Power to reduce, increase, shift spending in the budget Power to remove the chief executive Authority to set the parliament’s budget, manage own staff
Political Will and Political Space Possessing formal powers does not mean that legislatures will use them.
In fact,
constitutions and standing orders generally grant parliaments more power than they
ever use effectively. Two factors which impact on how legislatures use their powers are political will and political space.
Political will is the strength of the desire of
parliamentary leaders and influential members to exercise or expand the powers of parliament. Power gained in one place is generally lost in another, and because of this, MPs leading efforts to expand the role of parliament may pay political costs inflicted by those who fear losing their power. Political space refers to the willingness of others in the political environment to cede or to share political power with parliaments.
Authoritarian political systems grant
legislatures little political space, while more pluralistic, competitive systems permit more. In parliaments where the party discipline is strong, much of the use of the available political space, and any attempts to expand the political space, is largely determined by the political party’s disposition.
In the final unit of this course we will see several
examples of legislatures that are making better use of the constitutional powers they possess.
Parliamentary Technical Capacity Finally, a parliament’s ability to exercise its representation, lawmaking and oversight functions effectively rests to some degree on its managerial and technical capacity. Listening to citizens and processing their input, seeking and considering expert advice on budgets and policies, developing sound policy proposals, drafting technically sound amendments and legislation, making available legislative proceedings via the Internet or other medium quickly and accurately, and any of the dozens of other tasks in which legislatures might be involved require effective systems and skilled professionals to manage those systems. Most parliamentary strengthening efforts being made today focus on building parliamentary capacity – by strengthening management, infrastructure, and staffing. More assertive parliaments need more and better equipped staff to meet their greater information needs, and faster, more effective, and better-coordinated administrative systems. The need for rapid reform is especially challenging for traditional, hierarchal
legislatures that rely on long-established traditions and procedures to guide them in what was formerly a methodical and moderate workflow. Legislatures expanding their roles struggle with increased workloads, growing demands by MPs, and new kinds of requests, even as they are attempting to restructure the institution. Change is not easy, and reforming complex institutions like parliaments is especially challenging. Table 7, summarizes much of the above discussion on factors influencing parliamentary power and independence by listing factors that tend to encourage, or discourage, parliamentary independence and power. Table 7 Characteristics Influencing Legislative Independence and Power* Less independence and power (1) Parliamentary political system
More Independence and Power Presidential political system
(2) PR electoral system
Single member districts
(3) Limited lawmaking/oversight power lawmaking/oversight powers
Significant
(4) Weak political will to exercise independent power
Strong political will to exercise independent power
(5) Limited political space to expand expand parliament’s power (6) Weak technical capacity
Broad
political
space
to
parliament’s power Strong technical capacity
*This table illustrates tendencies only.
There are, for examples, legislatures in parliamentary systems that are stronger than legislatures in some presidential systems.
Unit 3 Questions Please answer each of the following questions. If you are taking this course in a group you may then meet to discuss your answers.
Political Systems 1. Which legislative type best describes your parliament (presidential, parliamentary,
hybrid, or mixed)? 2.
What roles does your parliament play in making public policy? In oversight? Are parliament’s roles in these area changing, or staying about the same?
3.
What role, if any, do individual legislators play in the policy making process? How much difference does their being majority or minority legislators make?
Electoral Systems 4. Describe the method through which representatives are elected in your country. 5.
What impact does the electoral system have on the way legislators behave once they are in office (i.e., with regard to representation, party-discipline, etc.)?
6.
Describe what you consider to be the most beneficial/least beneficial aspects of the system through which parliament members are elected in your country.
Formal Powers 7. Using Table II, above, discuss some of the formal powers your parliament possesses, or does not possess. (You may need to check your constitution, Rule of Order, or other documents.) 8.
What impact do you think your nation’s political and electoral systems may have on the formal powers your legislature possesses?
9.
Were you surprised to learn of specific powers your legislature possesses?
10.
Were there powers you thought your legislature possessed that it does not?
Political Will/Political Space 11.
Are there powers your legislature possesses that it is not using? If yes, what are they?
12.
If you answered “yes” to question 11, where do those powers seem to actually reside?
Parliamentary Technical Capacity 13.
Is the technical capacity of your parliament growing, diminishing, or staying about the same?
We mentioned at the beginning of this unit that “…the powers and performance of legislatures are not static. The balance of power is fluid in every political system, with legislatures sometimes gaining, sometimes losing power relative to other actors.” In our final unit we will consider several ways parliaments are attempting to strengthen themselves and to become more effective.
Relevant internet resources Commonwealth Parliamentary Association http://www.cpahq.org/ UNDP Parliamentary Strengthening Reference Material http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/parliaments/ Viewed October 18, 2005. UNDP
Select bibliography James Madison, Federalist No. 48, These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other, from the New York Packet. February 1, 1788. The Impact of Electoral Design on the Legislature. UNDP Internet publication available at http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/parliaments/. Presidential and Parliamentary Legislatures Compared. USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening. February 2000. Appendix B. and Governing Systems and Executive Legislative Relations, UNDP Parliamentary Strengthening Reference Material.
Unit 4: Strategies and Tools for Building More Effective Parliaments Learning Objectives: Strategies and Tools for Building More Effective Parliaments After studying this chapter, you should be able to: •
Explain several ways parliaments are working to strengthen themselves and become more effective;
•
Talk about efforts your parliament might be making to become more effective.
•
Discuss whether any of the examples parliaments in other nations are taking to strengthen themselves might be useful in your own parliament.
We began this course by considering the great expansion of democracies worldwide over the past 30 years, noting that there are more parliaments than ever before, as well as greater possibilities for parliaments to use their powers effectively than at any time in history.
This final Unit of the parliament in Government course discusses five ways
parliaments
are
working
to
realize
this
potential:
establishing
parliamentary
independence and financial control, expanding their formal powers, using the powers they possess more effectively, building their internal capacity, and reaching beyond the walls of the parliament.
Parliamentary Independence and Financial Control Legislatures are most successful at strengthening themselves when leaders and members come together across party and other divides and cooperate to build the legislature as an institution. Leaders of the Bolivian and Nicaraguan legislatures formed modernization commissions, comprising members from all political parties, in the 1990s. Under their authority the legislatures were able to bring on additional staff and improve their
information
systems.
Bolivia’s
modernization
commission
spearheaded
constitutional changes and rule reforms to establish direct election for half of the House
of Deputies.
In the late 1990s the East African nations of Kenya and Uganda
established similar leadership groups, called the Parliamentary Commission in Uganda, and the Parliamentary Service Commission in Kenya.
Parliamentary Commissions in Uganda and Kenya Parliaments in two neighboring East African nations enacted legislation in the late 1990s establishing their administrative independence and giving them authority over their own budgets.
Prior to the change (1997 in Uganda, 1999 in Kenya)
parliamentary staff were employed by the public service commissions – not the parliament. The executive, not parliament, set staff levels, and was responsible for hiring, firing, and terms of employment. Staff levels, especially in Uganda, were very low, facilities were inadequate, and the government was ensconced in parliamentary offices. With these legal changes each parliament has become responsible for its own staff and its own budget. The commissions (not the executive), which comprise of the Speaker, cabinet members, backbenchers and oppositions members, are now responsible for parliamentary staffing including salaries, hiring and firing of staff, and overseeing the parliaments’ budgets and services. Since enacting these measures, both parliaments have expanded their staff, increased office space and salaries , and established new services and positions.
Expanding Formal Powers Through legislation and, sometimes, constitutional amendment several legislatures have taken action to strengthen themselves as institutions. Several examples follow: US: In response to President Nixon’s impounding funds that Congress provided for domestic programs, the US Congress adopted the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (Budget Act) in 1974. The Act curtailed the president’s power to impound funds, created the Congressional Budget Office to provide independent budget expertise to Congress, and created the budget committees within each house.
Nicaragua: Reforms made by the Nicaraguan Assembly which took office with the departure of the Sandinistas from power in 1990 increased the power of the Assembly and reduced the independence of the military and the president. The reforms: Prohibited the President from appointing family members to political office; Reduced the power of the executive and put more fiscal authority in the hands of the National Assembly; Reduced the presidential term from 6 to 5 years, and prohibited the president from serving more than 2 nonconsecutive terms; Gave the Assembly sole authority to create, modify, and approve taxes; Gave the Assembly authority to approve international loans and treaties; Put the army under civilian control; and Reduced the role of the state in the economy. Uganda: Uganda’s 1995 constitution gave the parliament power to censure ministers and approve presidential appointments, and granted committees the authority to introduce legislation.
Later reforms initiated by parliament established a permanent
budget committee, established a professional budget office to assist MPs in analyzing the proposed executive budget, set limits on what government could borrow without prior parliamentary approval, and required Government to submit a draft executive budget to parliament three months prior to the normal budget submission date. Mexico: 2004 constitutional amendments initiated by the Mexican Congress extended the period within which Congress considers the proposed executive budget (the executive must now present it two months earlier) and the length of the congressional spring term (from 47 to 87 days). Kenya:
Changes to parliament’s standing orders in 1997 established departmental
committees with responsibility to review legislation within their areas of jurisdiction. By 2001 committees in the Kenya parliament were spending unprecedented numbers of days meeting as committees, holding hearings (on coffee, sugar, and health bills, for example) and amending government legislation (Nakamura & Johnson 2003).
Using Powers More Effectively It is not always possible, necessary, or even desirable for legislatures to expand their powers in order to be more effective. At times they may simply need to use the powers they possess more effectively. Most of the dramatic expansion of the powers of the Mexican Congress, for example, has occurred without legal changes. Political changes made it possible to the Congress to use powers it had not used before. Parliaments are also learning that even without expanding their formal powers; they can help bring about change by working closely with the press. Media publication of the Kenya Anticorruption Committee’s “List of Shame” (2000) pressured the government to reduce corrupt activities.
Public accounts committees without censure or enforcement
powers, for example, might still pressure government to reduce corruption by publicizing the findings and conclusions of their investigations. Parliaments worldwide use public hearings, including budget hearings, to pressure government through the press coverage that hearings receive. Kenya’s Parliament has not amended its legislative or budget powers, but within the past five years has begun introducing – and passing – private member bills, and making significant changes to government tax policies.
Building Internal Capacity Since World War II governments’ roles in societies worldwide has expanded dramatically, as have the levels and types of expertise governments need.
As
governments expanded and professionalized, legislatures often fell behind, even in wealthy nations with systems of divided government. To redress this imbalance, and in order to continue to play a meaningful lawmaking and oversight role, the US Congress developed several new professional agencies and expanded professional partisan staff in the 1940s and 1950s.
Congress established the General Accounting (now General
Accountability) Office (GAO), the Congressional Research Service (CRS), and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). US states followed Congress’ lead beginning in the 1960s, and today legislatures throughout the world are making a concerted effort to
build professional capacity. While this is especially important in presidential systems, legislatures in parliamentary systems also need the technical capacity to perform increasingly complex oversight, ensuring that government funds are being spent for the purposes for which they were budgeted and that government is getting “value for money.” Following are several ways parliaments are building necessary internal capacity to enable them to effectively carry out their representation, lawmaking, and oversight responsibilities.
Management
and
Infrastructure:
Infrastructure
requirements
of
modern
parliaments are unique, and if parliaments are to expand their representation, lawmaking and oversight performance, they generally need to upgrade their infrastructure. Modern parliaments need effective information systems, both intranet systems for internal communication and high-speed connections to the Internet to enable MPs and staff to connect quickly and efficiently with the world. A number of parliaments now broadcast parliamentary sessions over radio and television, and a growing number now open committee meetings to the public. Parliamentary Openness and the Internet The Case of Peru The Peruvian Congress makes available through the Internet so much information about its budgets, plans, spending and staffing, that it is likely one of the most transparent legislatures in the world.
The Congress makes available on line the
names of all of its employees and their salary grades, the budget of Congress and the budget of the nation, an analysis of congressional spending against budget targets, information on all contracts out for bid, who wins the contracts and their value, and more.
It also provides the national budget, transfers to local governments,
information on the internal and external debt, the general account of the nation, and more. This information is available at the congress’ web site at: http://www.congreso.gob.pe/transparencia/administrativa/congreso.htm
As parliamentary workloads increase, as parliaments seek to do more things faster, and as committees conduct more meetings, parliamentary administrative procedures often need to be streamlined and regularized. Forms and procedures need to be established
to enable staff to make routine purchases and conduct procedures quickly and transparently. Many parliaments are reforming rules of procedure in ways that open the institution and allow more voices into legislative processes. Equipping Members and Staff: New MPs, or MPs wishing to be more effective, benefit from several kinds of training provided by parliaments or institutions assisting parliaments. Orientation programs introduce new members to legislative facilities and their new responsibilities, and help returning MPs learn about changes to parliament. MPs in several nations take advantage of computer training programs to enable them to use email, surf the net, and write correspondence. Similarly, orientation and technical training programs help new professional staff understand the workings of parliament, and, when needed, their areas of responsibility. Parliamentary staff members in many nations – particularly among commonwealth parliaments – frequently support staff attachments to other parliaments. Finally, parliamentary internships for university students or recent graduates are becoming increasingly common.
Internships bring
talented young people into parliaments to assist with research and other needs; helps open parliaments, and assist parliaments in finding new professional staff.
Bureau of Parliamentary Studies and Training India India’s Lok Sabha publishes information on the professional services it provides on the Internet. According to the site, the Bureau of Parliamentary Studies and Training provides several services to legislators, staff and government officials from India, and parliamentary exposure courses for government officials. Bureau services include orientation programs and seminars for parliament members and staff from both the state and national levels, provide exposure courses in the operations of parliament for government staff, a parliamentary internship program, and a program in legislative drafting (for Indians and parliamentary staff from other nations). In addition, the Bureau manages visits and attachments from other nations, and conducts computer awareness courses for members.
As legislatures develop they shift more of their work to committees. Donor sponsored assistance programs conduct several types of activities to help make committees more effective. These include committee retreats to help members in setting agendas and strategies for parliamentary sessions, assistance with conducting public hearings, providing directories of experts (these are broken down by committees and list experts with their contact information who are willing and able to testify and advise on relevant policy areas, and expert studies and seminars on committee issues
Building New Capacities: In addition to training MPs and staff, and strengthening committees, parliaments worldwide are building new expert capabilities. Several have established parliamentary research offices, whose staff conducts research for committees and members. Others have built budget or fiscal offices, which interpret complex executive budgets for MPs and assist them in carrying out their oversight responsibilities. And as more MPs seek to introduce legislation, several parliaments have established bill-drafting services, which take MP ideas and translate them into parliamentary language.
Reaching Beyond the Walls of Parliament And finally, several parliaments are improving the ways that they communicate with and listen to society.
Several have established district offices for MPs, making
parliamentarians more accessible to their constituents. Others have established public affairs or press offices to provide information to the press and public about parliamentary actions and events. Such offices also publish newsletters for use both inside and outside of the parliament, as well as publications on parliament for children and adults.
Public affairs offices conduct public outreach activities, such as youth
parliaments and student essay contests .
Public affairs offices are frequently charged
with developing and maintaining parliamentary web sites and ensuring that the parliamentary record is on line. Reaching out includes not just communicating with, but also listening to society. In many nations the richest source of policy expertise is found in civil society organizations
(CSOs) and think tanks, but relations between CSOs and parliaments in many nations are very poor. In others, however, parliaments have learned to tap the experts within CSOs in order to build up their own expertise.
Unit 4 Questions Please answer each of the following questions. Students taking this course in groups should meet to discuss your answers. 1. Did any of the examples in this chapter bring to mind parliamentary strengthening activities under way in your parliament? 2. Are there specific powers your parliament possesses which it might use more effectively? 3. Has parliament in your country taken any measures to build internal capacity in recent years? If it has, what actions have they taken? 4. Does parliament reach beyond itself and the government to obtain information? What other sources of useful information might it tap?
SUMMARY Parliaments’ basic functions are representation, lawmaking, and oversight, and they carry out these functions in unique ways. Representation is a complex process, and traditional concepts of representation in parliaments are giving way to new ones – most commonly, representation based on shared characteristics – such as gender. The roles of legislatures in the lawmaking process vary considerably, as does the openness of the process. Oversight, while a relatively simple concept to understand, proves difficult for many parliaments to practice effectively. A variety of oversight tools exist, but even legislatures with few formal oversight powers can use their access to the communications media to influence government action.
Parliaments can be classified as rubber stamp, arena, transformative, and emerging, based on their level of independence and power.
Rubber stamp legislatures simply
endorse decisions made elsewhere in the political system.
Arena legislatures are
institutions in which the differences in society are articulated and government actions and plans are evaluated from different perspectives, but they tend not to initiate or dramatically reshape policy proposals. Transformative legislatures, the rarest type of legislature, actually change policy – often significantly. As a consequence, they have great information needs and are complex and expensive institutions. The dramatic increase in democratic and free states over the last thirty years has meant that a significant number of legislatures may now be classified as emerging, as legislatures are attempting to – and to some degree succeeding at – becoming more powerful and independent.
Combinations of several factors help explain why some legislatures tend to play more significant policymaking roles and be more independent than others.
One very
important factor is the type of political system. The governing party (or parties) in a parliament, because their political fortunes are so closely linked with those of the executive they put into office, tend not to develop strong policy-making capacities or challenge the executive. Legislatures in pure separation of powers presidential systems,
on the other hand, do not threaten the executive’s hold on power when they develop their own policy-proposals. Legislatures may have greater incentives to develop strong committees, and policies made tend to be compromises between the different branches of government.
France’s system of government, with an elected president sharing
powers with a prime minister, is called a hybrid political system. Finally, many nations can be considered mixed systems – blending characteristics from a number of these three political systems.
It is important to remember that while the type of political
system influences a parliament’s power and independence, by itself, it is not determinative. A second structural factor which impacts on legislative behavior is the type of electoral system through which representatives are elected. Legislators elected through pluralitymajority (PM – also called single member district) systems, because they are elected directly by their constituents, have significant incentives to be responsive to those who elect them.
Those elected through systems of proportional representation (PR) – party
list systems (where voters vote for a party, rather than an individual legislator), have strong incentives to be responsive to leaders of the political party who determine where they will be placed on the list in the next election. Semi-proportional electoral systems mix characteristics of both systems – in some cases mixing both PM and PR legislators in one house and electing members of two different houses in others create a mix of the two different systems. The three other factors influencing the power and independence of a legislature mentioned in Unit 3 were formal political powers, political will/political space, and the technical capacity of the parliament.
Unit 4 described several ways in which legislatures have made themselves more effective.
One way has been to make themselves financially and administratively
independent from the executive. A second has been to increase their formal powers. In many cases legislatures that have become more effective have done it without increasing their formal powers but they are using their powers more effectively. Sometimes political changes – such as the end of PRI domination in Mexico – will allow parliaments to use powers they have always possessed, but the politics did not allow them to do so before.
A major means of increasing parliamentary effectiveness has been through building internal parliamentary capacity.
Most parliamentary strengthening activities have
focused on this technical area. Capacity building has included making management and infrastructure improvements, better equipping members and staff, and building new capacities, such as budget offices. And finally, legislatures become more effective when they reach beyond the walls of parliament to take advantage of the expertise available in their nation.
Relevant internet resources http://www.parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/intro/p10.htm
Select bibliography
Robert Nakamura and John Johnson, Legislative Assertiveness in Uganda and Kenya 1996 to 2002, Paper delivered at the 19th International Political Science Association World Congress, Durban, South Africa, June 29 to July 4, 2003. page 23
Glossary Arena legislatures – A form of legislature in which policy initiates come from outside the legislature, generally from executives or political parties, and where differences in society are articulated and government actions and plans are evaluated from different perspectives, but tend not to initiate or dramatically reshape policy proposals. Auditor General – Auditors independent of the executive who review government accounts and prepares a yearly report for parliament. Constituent services – Services including helping citizens cut through government bureaucracies to receive their benefits, assisting citizens with special problems, and accessing government funds for projects to benefit the constituency, such as bridges, clinics, water systems, schools, etc. Departmental Committees – Also called standing, sessional, or permanent committees, these committees are responsible for overseeing line ministries and frequently have the authority to question ministers and ministry staff of the ministries they oversee. Emerging legislatures – Legislatures that are in the process of change from one type to another. Laws – the rules that govern society. Legislators as delegates – A system in which legislators mirror or transmit constituency attitudes and preferences Legislators as trustees – A system in which the legislators themselves determine what is in their constituent’s best interests and the legislators consider themselves selected because of their special abilities, and see their job as adapting their constituents’ needs into the national welfare. Majority party – A political party that is generally characterized by strong discipline, bloc voting and distinct party platforms. Oversight – This is one of the legislature’s “check and balance” functions, through which it seeks to ensure that programs are carried out legally, effectively, and for the purposes for which they were intended. Overt Executive – An executive system in which legislative conflict is not common in parliamentary systems and the parliament is not likely to exercise aggressive oversight. Plurality-majority – An electoral system in which constituents in a geographic area vote directly for a candidate, and the candidate receiving the most votes wins. Since members are identified with specific districts, they may see their primary duty as being responsive to the needs of their constituents, and the concerns of their party and its platform secondary.
Proportional Representation (PR) – An electoral system in which candidates are placed on a list, and citizens vote for parties rather than for candidates directly. The percentage of votes the party – not the candidate – wins, determines whether or not a candidate gets into office. If, for example, a party wins 40% of votes cast in an election, the top 40% of candidates on that party’s list are elected. MPs in PR systems will tend to be most responsive to their parties’ leaders who determine whether and where a candidate will be placed on the party list in the next election. Most continental European countries elect parliamentarians through the PR method. Public Accounts Committees (PACs) – Used by the majority of Westminster parliaments to follow-up on findings of public audits, to investigate irregularities reported, and to recommend changes to rectify any problems discovered. PACs invite ministers and other ministry officials to testify before the committee, and, in some systems, have the power to subpoena witnesses. Public audits – Yearly reviews of government spending conducted by a nation’s supreme audit agency. Pure Parliamentary Legislature – In pure parliamentary systems there is a greater fusion of powers between the executive and the legislature. The terms of office are variable. The legislature selects the executive and the legislature dissolves the chief executive and cabinet through a vote of no confidence, forcing new parliamentary elections. The Prime Minister selects cabinet members from within the parliament and the executive initiates almost all legislation. Policy-making functions tend to be concentrated in the parties or ministerial bureaucracy. Pure Presidential Legislature – A pure presidential legislature has a clear separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches with fixed terms. The legislature has the power to remove a president but only in extreme cases. The president selects the cabinet, whose members must be approved by the Senate and the cabinet members may not be serving in the legislature. Both the executive and the legislature initiate legislation and both can play strong policy-making roles. Incentives exist for strong, well-staffed and resourced committees. Rubber stamp legislatures – This is the simplest type of legislature in which decisions are made elsewhere in the political system, usually by parties and/ or the executive branch and decisions are made by a leader or vanguard party, and in which the parliament is expected to simply endorse their decisions. Select (investigative) committees – Temporary committees established for a specific period of time and with a mandate limited to investigating the matter for which they were established. Semi-Proportional – An electoral system that combine features from both single-member and PR systems. Transformative legislatures – Legislatures that represent diverse societal interests and shape budgets and policies. They amend legislation and budgets received from the
executive branch, initiate their own policy proposals, reach out to citizens, and conduct public hearings. Westminster system – The Westminster system is a democratic system of government modeled after that of the United Kingdom system. It is used in most Commonwealth and ex-Commonwealth nations.
Appendix 1: Parliamentary Commissions: A Tool for Building Parliamentary Capacity Parliamentary commission legislation enacted in Uganda and Kenya effectively “delinked” the national assemblies from the executive branches, making the assemblies responsible for their own administration and budgets. Since enacting this legislation, Uganda’s and Kenya’s parliaments have become two of the most independent in Africa. This paper originally published as a World Bank PREMNote briefly describes how the legislation was enacted, the makeup and responsibilities of the commissions, several changes to the parliaments since enacting these laws, and concludes with some observations for parliaments and donors.
Establishing Parliamentary Commissions in Uganda and Kenya Newly elected to Uganda’s Sixth Parliament in 1996 (the first democratically elected parliament in Uganda in several years), MP Dan Ogalo of Bukooli South was frustrated by the parliament’s inability to function effectively and to provide the professional services he and other Members needed. Seven clerks served 17 committees, there were no researchers, one staff person served the poorly equipped library, secretaries and information processing equipment were almost non-existent, and even the Speaker was without a personal or security assistant. Ogalo requested additional parliamentary staff but was turned down; Parliament was ineligible because of a ban on Government hiring.3 Ogalo realized that the fundamental problem was not a lack of staff, equipment, or adequate space; it was that the Parliament, while in theory an independent branch of government, was actually being treated as a Government Department. It had no administrative or financial autonomy. The parliamentary staff were employed by the Public Service Commission. This Commission, not Parliament, was responsible for setting staff levels, hiring, firing, and terms of employment; it could even transfer staff from parliament and into government ministries. Hon. Ogalo states in a paper on drafting private member bills that,
“Although in theory Parliament is supposed to control Executive expenditure it was the other way around. I thought there was no way Parliament could fulfill its legislative, representative and oversight functions if its staff were under the control of [the] Executive and did not have sufficient funds to do its work. To me, this was the problem to be overcome. 4‘ Ogalo was determined to remedy the situation by introducing a private member bill to make Parliament independent of the executive. He modeled his first draft after a bill prepared for introduction in the UK. But later, on the recommendation of Speaker James Wapakhabulo, Ogalo redrafted the bill to conform to a more detailed parliamentary independence bill from Papua New Guinea. An expert Ugandan bill
drafter put the bill into a form that was suitable for introduction into the Ugandan Parliament. Hon. Ogalo then sought leave of the House to introduce the bill, and despite opposition from many in government, negative newspaper editorials, and the fears of a number of parliamentary staff, leave was granted. Five ministers attended the meeting of the Committee on Parliamentary and Legal Affairs and spoke against the bill, but Ogalo, who chaired the committee, and the committee members prevailed. The Committee presented its report to the Plenary, and the Bill was passed into law on July 17th, 1997. 5 Two years later in neighboring Kenya, Hon. Oloo Aringo, then an Opposition parliamentarian but formerly a minister with KANU, the governing party, succeeded in enacting similar private member legislation. Like the Uganda Parliament, the Kenyan Parliament had been administratively and financially dependent on the Executive, its staff was answerable to the Government – not Parliament – and there was a severe shortage of office space and equipment. Aringo drafted legislation similar to Uganda’s, and, with the support of a group of reformers within the parliament, was able to enact a constitutional amendment that made parliament financially and administratively independent. At the 11th hour, when it was clear that the measure would pass with the support of many of the Government’s own members, Government got behind the amendment, which passed in November 1999. Like the law in Uganda, the amendment made Kenya’s National Assembly financially and administratively independent from the executive, and creates a Parliamentary Service Commission that is responsible for its management and budget.
Makeup and commissions
responsibilities
of
the
parliamentary
Uganda’s Parliamentary Commission and Kenya’s Parliamentary Service Commission (PSC) have similar memberships. The Speaker chairs the Commission, and Opposition members and backbenchers on the Commission elect the Vice Chair. Key ministers, and additional Government and Opposition MPs make up the remainder of the members.6 PSC’s responsibilities are also very similar. Uganda’s Parliamentary Commission is responsible for: • Appointing, promoting, and disciplining persons holding public office in Parliament; • Reviewing terms of service, standing orders, and the training of parliamentary officers; • Providing a parliamentary reporting service; • Providing necessary staff and facilities to ensure the efficient functioning of parliament; • Preparing parliament’s budget; and • Recommending, or determining (with the approval of the Parliament), allowances and privileges of Parliament members.7 The Kenyan Parliamentary Service Commission is charged with: • Constituting and abolishing offices in the parliamentary service;
• • • • • • • •
Appointing, disciplining, and removing parliamentary staff; Providing necessary services and facilities to enable the efficient functioning of the Assembly; Overseeing the parliament’s administration and budget; Preparing parliament’s budget – and providing for yearly audits; Providing for the Parliament’s security; Determining the terms and conditions of offices of the parliamentary service; Appointing independent bodies to review and make recommendations regarding member salaries and allowances; Reviewing parliamentary powers and privileges and such other things as may be necessary for the well-being of the members and staff of the National Assembly.
The constitutional amendment is specific regarding the independence of the parliament, stating that, “… In the exercise of its powers or the performance of its functions under this Constitution, the Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any 8 other person or authority.”
Changes to the Parliaments since the establishment of the Commissions Since establishing their independence and being placed under the direction of Parliamentary Commissions, the Kenya and Uganda Parliaments have improved their physical and professional capabilities, and have expanded their lawmaking and oversight roles. Uganda’s parliament was just coming out of a long dormant period when Ogalo’s legislation was enacted. Years of oppressive rulers and then military government had marginalized parliament, reducing staff and leaving the physical plant in very poor condition, with government offices actually occupying much of the parliament building. Changes since the new law came into effect include all of the following: •
New Department and Equipment: Parliament established a Department of Library, Research, and Documentation. With assistance from USAID and the State University of New York, parliament installed its own satellite uplink, computer equipment, and an information center.
•
Increased Office Space: The Commission convinced the Executive branch to vacate the North and East wings of the parliament building, which it had occupied for years. (Parliament threatened not to debate the budget unless the Executive vacated the premises). The Commission had the space refurbished, and today parliament has sufficient offices for members, sufficient committee rooms for meetings, a large library and a well-equipped training center.
•
Increased staff: The Commission increased the numbers of clerks from seven to 17 (one per committee). As of 2002, Parliament had recruited 52 additional staff members.9
•
Improved terms of employment: The Commission increased staff and member salaries and benefits. Staff salaries today are significantly higher than those of their public service counterparts.
•
Budget Office: Parliament’s independence has also enabled it to create a budget office which assists parliament in debating and overseeing the implementation of the budget.10
Without the financial and administrative independence provided through the 1997 Independence of Parliament Act, Parliament would have had to have negotiated each of these changes with the Executive. And since each change helped strengthen parliament’s capacity vis-à-vis the Executive, it is unlikely that they would have been embraced by the Executive branch. Kenya’s Parliament has made similar changes. It has not added as many staff members or new functions as Uganda’s, but both are increasing.11 Parliamentary committees have become stronger, routinely amending or blocking government legislation, and, while the numbers have been small, Parliament is even initiating some legislation.12 Staff pay and benefits have been enhanced relative to their public service counterparts, and they also receive low interest on home and car loans. MP retirement programs have been improved, MPs receive funds for a vehicle, and their pay has increased by a factor of seven (from around US$800/month prior to the PSC law, to approximately $6,000 per month).13 The Kenyan Parliament acquired a building to house the PSC, and also acquired and refurbished a large office building providing an office for each MP. The PSC drafted a comprehensive, 12 year plan (2000 – 2012), which presents an insistent vision for parliament. The PSC plan states that the Assembly is responsible for legislation, financial appropriation and control, oversight and supervision of governance, checking and balancing the other two arms of government, representing the people before the Government, leading the people and the nation, “making and unmaking of the Government”, and functioning as the watchdog for democracy.14
Observations and Comments (1) The power of example: The extension of independence of parliament legislation illustrates how ideas are carried from one place to another, rather than being reinvented in each new location. Hon. Ogalo used legislation from the UK in developing his idea for a more independent parliament, and legislation from Papua New Guinea for the additional detail he needed. Kenya’s constitutional amendment is very similar to Uganda’s law. Hons. Ogalo and Aringo, and other members and staff of the Ugandan and Kenyan parliaments have traveled throughout the region sharing their experience, and leaders of several parliaments have met with the parliamentary commissions in Kenya and Uganda. Based partially on such contacts, Zambia’s parliament developed a draft Parliamentary Service Commission bill which it unsuccessfully attempted to pass in 2004. A parliamentary lawyer ruled that establishing the PSC would require a prior constitutional amendment, which many expect to be included as part of the new 15 constitution being drafted in Zambia. Political scientist Samuel Huntington cites “the demonstration effect”, or “snowballing” as one reason for the expansion in the numbers of democracies in the Third Wave.16 A
similar demonstration effect helps explain the growth in independence of parliamentary legislation in sub-Saharan Africa. (2) Why Kenya and Uganda? Why have Kenya and Uganda been such leaders in parliamentary independence? There are many country-specific causes, but one factor may simply be that Kenya’s and Uganda’s hybrid political systems allow for stable divided governments. Some commentators believe that the essential unity of parliamentary and executive powers in pure parliamentary systems (such as India’s or South Africa’s) is a significant disincentive to parliamentary independence. The government (prime minister and cabinet) in true parliamentary systems is chosen by the ruling parliamentary party or governing coalition, and a vote of no confidence in the government leads to new elections. A parliament acting independently of the government – building strong committees, proposing alternatives to government proposals, practicing aggressive oversight – challenges its own executive branch, and endangers its own hold on power. In presidential, or separation of powers systems, by contrast, the chief executive is elected directly by the voters (rather than the parliament), and for a fixed term. Legislatures in pure presidential systems can amend government proposals, propose and enact their own initiatives, and, in some cases, significantly amend the budget – all without threatening the tenure of the executive or his party. The political fortunes of the executive and legislative branches are less tightly linked in presidential than they are in parliamentary systems. Kenya and Uganda’s systems are hybrids, combining characteristics of both parliamentary and presidential systems. Cabinet members are selected from among MPs (as in parliamentary systems), but, most importantly, chief executives are elected directly by voters nationwide (as in presidential systems). An independent parliament, substantively amending government policies and proposals, does not present the threat to political stability it might in a pure parliamentary system. A stable system of divided government is possible in such hybrid systems. We might expect, therefore, that similar “independence of parliament” initiatives would be more likely in presidential or hybrid systems, than in pure parliamentary systems. (3) Initiatives with local roots work best: Latin American experience provides a useful counter example to parliamentary commissions in Uganda and Kenya. Several Latin American nations (e.g., Bolivia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Colombia), with encouragement and sometimes financial assistance from donors or international lending agencies, have established congressional modernization committees in the mid–late 1990s. These modernization committees responsibilities were similar to those of the East African parliamentary commissions, and were made up of political leaders from the major political parties in the congresses.17 In general, modernization committees in Latin America have not been as effective or as long lasting as parliamentary commissions in Uganda and Kenya. One reason may be that the parliamentary commissions in Uganda and Kenya were local initiatives carried by local champions with local support and enacted over the objections of their governments. Parliamentary leaders fought for these changes which fundamentally
restructured power relations between the two branches of government. The modernization committees established in Latin America, by contrast, were developed with strong encouragement from outside actors and little executive opposition (in fact, in Bolivia, the chief proponent was the Vice President of the nation). Another factor may be the greater strength and institutional consciousness of many Commonwealth parliaments relative to their counterparts in Latin America. With the notable exceptions of Brazil, Chile, and, increasingly, Mexico, annual staff turnover in Latin America legislatures after elections has been as high as 100%. Legislatures in Latin America do not enjoy the longevity of professional staff and the kind of parliamentary tradition instilled through history, and through organizations such as the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. (4) Possible Concerns: Excessive concentration of power in the legislative branch: Executives and others have raised concerns that stronger, more independent parliaments in Africa pose potential dangers to national stability and can upset the balance of power. The same concern was raised by James Madison in Federalist Paper number 48 in which he warned that “…legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations.”18 In theory, legislatures do have the capacity to upset the balance of power and make a nation ungovernable. But given the post-independence histories of Kenya and Uganda – indeed, of much of Africa – with power concentrated in the hands of military strong-men or presidents for life, of massive corruption and one-party rule, an over-concentration of power in the executive appears still to be a greater risk than excessive power in legislative hands. The executives in both Uganda and Kenya are still a good deal stronger than the parliaments. Parliamentary Overspending The costs of upgraded parliaments, expanded staff, and higher salaries are a burden on poor nations. Proponents of stronger, more independent parliaments, however, argue that while legislative institutional building is expensive, the benefits should outweigh the costs. More independent parliaments with access to expertise are able to bring additional voices into the policy-making process, potentially sharpening and improving government proposals. Better equipped, more independent parliaments can more successfully oversee implementation of these policies, and should be better able to uncover – and help limit – government corruption. If Parliaments use their greater independence and resources well they can help nations save money. Higher MP salaries can encourage better qualified individuals to run for parliament. Better educated, more highly paid professionals have begun to run for office in Kenya since salaries were increased. The majority of the members of the Health Committee, for example, are medical doctors. Higher salaries may also reduce incentives for MPs to engage in corrupt behavior. Constituents in Kenya, as in some other African nations, expect MPs to help pay community expenses (for building schools and clinics, etc.) as well as constituent expenses (such as school fees, hospitals, and funeral costs).
Reelections hinge, to some degree, on MPs paying these costs. According to Kenyan MPs interviewed by the author, higher MP salaries had liberated them from the need to go to the executive for these funds – which, of course, came with strings attached. Another concern raised is that parliaments with so much control over their own budgets will simply dole out patronage in the form of jobs for unqualified relatives or supporters. While this is certainly a potential problem, during the period the author was involved with these parliaments (Uganda 1996 – 2000, Kenya 2000 – 2004) he observed that parliamentary commissions were careful to hire professional, qualified staff through competitive processes. Finally, the greater openness of parliaments (relative to executives) and the media focus on all that is said and done there can act as a brake on spending abuses. Parliament’s discussions and decisions take place under the watchful eye of the communications media. Citizens unhappy with parliament’s spending decisions can punish their MPs at the ballot box. An editorial critical of parliament’s capital improvement plans published in the June 24, 2005 Nairobi Standard newspaper illustrates how open these discussions can be.
“….few people can understand why the Government wants to spend Sh775 million [approximately $10 million US] when so many critical sectors in the country are crying for funds…. But it is the utter lack of modesty and the sheer profligacy in doing so that gall many Kenyans. This grandiose project has overstepped the bounds of financial modesty in a country where many cannot even afford a square meal.” 19 What was impressive is that newspaper and TV reporters were welcome to cover the meeting in which the proposal was discussed, and to witness MPs on both sides of the issue argue publicly for and against the proposal. Executive decisions to spend much greater sums of money are not subject to such media scrutiny.
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