Turkey’s New Approaches

toward the PKK, Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish Question ERTAN EFEGİL*

ABSTRACT In a sharp break from the past, Turkey’s AK Party government now openly accepts the existence of a domestic Kurdish problem, and views it moreover as being mutually interrelated with the rise of separatism among Iraqi Kurds and the problem of PKK terrorism. Turkey now has official contacts with the Iraqi Kurds and is working to find a lasting solution to the Kurdish problem by implementing socio-economic and cultural measures in addition to the military one. While the Iraqi Kurds, the American administration and Turkey are beginning to reconcile their differences concerning the Kurdish issue, Turkey faces internal division; certain parties such as the General Staff, the National Movement Party and the Democratic Society Party continue to push for radical measures. Today, there seems to be little opportunity to find common understanding. But as existing conditions deteriorate and pressure mounts both within the domestic sphere and from the international community, it grows increasingly important for Turkey to find a lasting solution to the Kurdish issue. Insight Turkey Vol. 10 / No. 3 / 2008

pp. 53-73

T

urkey’s Kurdish question has a long history dating back to the Sheikh Said uprising of 1925 and the Dersim events of 1938. A new wave began after the attacks by the Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK) in 1984. In their first years, Turgut Özal, then Prime Minister, did not take the PKK assaults seriously, describing the PKK terrorists as plunderers. Only when the PKK began to target civilians as well as soldiers did Turkey begin to take the group more seriously. At that time, the military option was widely viewed as the only appropriate mechanism for combating PKK terrorism. They concerned that first of all they had to enforce the PKK to stop their assaults and then they could implement some democratic and economic reforms in Turkey, such as giving some individual rights to the minorities and the Kurdish people. For that reason, the General Staff became the sole actor that defined Turkey’s strategy for fighting against the PKK. Although Turkey sometimes used legal * Associate Professor, Departmet of International Relations, Sakarya University, [email protected]

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The membership talks with the EU have fueled Turkey’s drive toward developing a comprehensive plan that aims to stop PKK terrorist movements and deal with the Kurdish issue in the interest of a lasting peace

instruments, such as the Law of Pardon, in order to encourage PKK militants to return to their homes, Turkey failed to implement a complementary policy that would at once block terrorism and address the Kurdish issue comprehensively.

In the period between 1992 – 1996, the Turkish officials had good relations with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders. In 1996, in order to get rid of the Saddam regime, the American administration began to provide military, financial and diplomatic support to the Iraqi opposition groups, including the Iraqi Kurds. But after the US operation against the Saddam regime in 2003, Turkey totally lost its control over the developments in the northern Iraq. Even the Turkish soldiers deployed in the region were unable to act beyond their military installations. The PKK attacks of 2007 changed the situation in the region. The Turkish policymakers, together with the military elites, began to seriously discuss a more farreaching military option, i.e. a cross-border military operation into northern Iraq to destroy the PKK camps and put an end to the nascent establishment of an independent Kurdish state. However, due to the 2007 parliamentary and presidential elections, the Turkish government did not want to use the military option, despite the suggestions of the opposition parties, the military and some diplomats. When PKK groups raided the Turkish gendarmerie stations after the elections, however, the General Staff, the diplomats, the government and Turkish public opinion overwhelmingly agreed that Turkey could use the military option in spite of the objections of the United States, the European Union, the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Kurds. Harkening to this pervasive domestic climate, the Turkish government and military officials used diplomatic instruments to encourage other actors, especially the United States, to empathize with Turkey’s concerns. After long negotiations and much bargaining, consensus was reached, and Turkey launched several air and land operations against the PKK camps. The paper argues that in regard to the fight against the PKK, the Kurdish question and the northern Iraq issue, the AK Party government has pursued a policy that takes into account existing regional and global realities as well as the attitudes of other countries. Concerning the northern Iraq issue, Turkey’s policy toward the regional administration has radically changed. On the Kurdish issue, Turkey has yet to take serious new measures in political, economic and social fields, in addi-

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Turkey’s New Approaches toward the PKK, Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish Question

tion to the military measures, in order to find a lasting solution. But when the attitudes of the AK Party government, the General Staff, the opposition parties and the Democratic Society Party toward the Kurdish issue have been analyzed, it can be assumed that it is not so easy that the parties concerned can reach a common understanding on that matter. Beginning with a summary of the AK Party’s new foreign policy approach, this paper analyzes the developments that occurred after the Dağlıca attack,1 making reference to the attitudes of Turkish policymakers and non-governmental actors, and the concerns of the United States, the Iraqi central authority and the Iraqi Kurdish regional administration. In order to understand the factors that encouraged the parties to change their approaches to the Kurdish issue, the article examines the considerations of the General Staff, the opposition parties, the Democratic Society Party (DTO), the U.S., the EU and the Iraqi Kurds.

The AK Party’s New Approach Until 2002, Turkish policymakers had viewed PKK terrorism, the Kurdish issue and the developments in northern Iraq as completely independent and unconnected matters.2 In this respect, they did not need to formulate a comprehensive policy that might place all these issues in one basket. The PKK incursions in 2007, however, created an opportunity for Turkey to simultaneously solve the PKK and the Kurdish question, while at the same time controlling developments in northern Iraq, which Turkish officials viewed as a threat to Turkey’s unity. Contrary to previous governments’ policies, the AK Party government had begun to consider these issues as interconnected matters. In handling them, the AK Party has taken into account the concerns and expectations of all related parties, including such Western entities as the United States and the European Union, as well as the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Kurds. Why has the AK Party pursued such a novel attitude? The first reason behind the shift is the AK Party’s understanding of foreign policy. The AK Party supports a multi-dimensional and multi-directional foreign policy, suitable to existing international structures and much influenced by a liberal outlook. The AK Party feels strongly that a vision-focused mentality, rather than a crisis-focused mentality, should dominate Turkey’s foreign policy process. It adopts the view that any event should be treated not as a single matter, but should rather be assumed to be connected in significant ways with several other related issues. Thus, the AK Party rejects a passive foreign policy attitude, opting instead to make Turkey a more proactive country that has the ability to influence international and regional 55

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developments. In line with goal, the AK Party prefers to use soft power elements, such as the economy and culture, rather than hard power. The government underlines a balanced foreign policy, in touch with the concerns and objectives of global and regional actors, in line with existing conditions, and proportional to Turkey’s power capabilities. In this context, the AK Party holds that Turkey must promote economic, cultural and political ties with its neighbors, thereby forming a secure welfare belt around itself. With this aim in view, AK Party officials have worked to improve institutional relations with the Balkan, Caucasian, Middle Eastern and Central Asian states. Naturally, the incumbent Turkish government has formulated its Iraq policy in accordance with this holistic mentality.3 The second reason has to do with the negotiations for Turkey’s full membership in the European Union. In order to conclude the process successfully, Turkey must accomplish two things. On the one hand, Turkey should resolve, or at least negotiate, its tensions with neighboring countries in order to find a solution to them within the framework of the ‘Good Neighborhood Policy’ of the Union. On the other hand, it should legally guarantee the rights of minorities in Turkey, including the Kurds. As part of the accession process, Turkey must negotiate its concerns with the Iraqi government as well as with the Kurdish regional administration. The membership talks with the EU have fueled Turkey’s drive toward developing a comprehensive plan that aims to stop PKK terrorist movements and deal with the Kurdish issue in the interest of a lasting peace. The third reason is that the AK Party promised to remove regional differences, improve socio-economic conditions in southeastern Anatolia, and find a lasting and radical solution to the Kurdish issue during the July 2007 general elections. Thanks to these promises, a considerable number of voters in the region voted for the AK Party. Therefore, the government is now coming under pressure to take concrete steps toward the realization of these promises.

The AK Party’s Policy prior to the Erdoğan–Bush Meeting Before the general elections of 2007, even when PKK terrorists infiltrated Turkey, the Turkish government did not support cross-border operations into the PKK camps, because it did not want to lose electoral support in general, or the support of the region in particular. The AK Party felt that a cross-border strike at that time could have damaged the unity among the Turkish people. During the debate about the elections for the Presidency, Turkish society was thus divided into two different camps: a neo-nationalist group that supported the proposed military operation and saw the AK Party as a threat to the existing regime due 56

Turkey’s New Approaches toward the PKK, Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish Question

to its pro-Islamist policies, and b) the liberals and conservatives that back its policies.4

U.S. cooperation was needed to eliminate the PKK and to put pressure on the Kurdish regional government to change its policies

In the elections, the AK Party obtained 47 percent of the vote and performed even better in east and southeast Turkey as a result of its promises to expand freedom of expression vis-à-vis ethnic identities, and to bring greater economic welfare, stability and peace to the region. After the elections, both the government and the military stated that military instruments as well as economic, social, cultural and political measures were necessary to end terrorism in Turkey. In the meantime, the PKK was to be deprived of the support it received in the form of financial assistance from the Kurds living in European countries, broadcasts on TV and in the newspapers, and drug trafficking in the international arena. From this point of view, following the PKK incursions, the government had already begun to implement its new strategy without neglecting to gain the support of the military side.

Disregarding the demands and concerns of neo-nationalist groups, military officials and the government preferred not to immediately launch military operations into northern Iraq as a response to the PKK attacks.5 Instead of an exclusively military operation, they preferred an approach that would keep military measures as well as diplomatic channels available. The prevailing view was that this approach would create a suitable ground for cooperation among the related parties against the PKK, and would garner the support of other countries. The Turkish parliament adopted the motion for the cross-border military operation, making Turkey’s position in the diplomatic arena stronger and forcing other countries to take Turkey’s concerns seriously. First of all, in order to remove the worries of other actors, the government announced its aims: to put an end to PKK terrorism, to stop its attacks, and to destroy the PKK camps in northern Iraq.6 The government wanted to underline that its real intention was neither to threaten Iraq’s territorial integrity nor occupy northern Iraq. After adopting this motion, the government asserted that Turkey has a right to defend itself against PKK incursions within the framework of the UN Security Council resolutions adopted after the September 11 attacks. It expressed further that the PKK camps in Northern Iraq and the incursions initiated from them posed a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. Despite the adoption of the motion, the government pointed out that it did not have any intention to use it immediately; rather the motion was seen as a coercive instrument to be used as a last re57

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The American side explained that it would cooperate with Turkey through sharing intelligence, supporting limited military operations against the PKK camps, and pressuring the Kurdish regional administration

sort.7 As part of this stance of readiness, the Ministry of Interior Affairs began to reorganize its special units to better prepare for fighting against terrorism.8 The cities of Şırnak, Hakkari and Siirt were declared security areas.9

In the diplomatic field, the government informed European and Middle Eastern countries about its policies. Ali Babacan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, paid official visits to certain Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan. President Abdullah Gül held meetings during the Council of Ministers of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation.10 Beşir Atalay, the Minister of Interior Affairs, explained Turkey’s policy during the meeting of the Ministers of Interior Affairs of the Extended Iraqi Neighbors.11 Turkey also decisively directed its own energy upon American officials, knowing that Turkey could not realize its aims without U.S. support, and that only the Bush administration could force the Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi government to change their attitude toward Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkey accused the Kurdish regional administration, namely Massoud Barzani, of aiding PKK terrorism.12 In their contacts with the Americans, Turkish officials stressed that they wanted to see concrete steps rather than verbal commitments. Although special representatives had been appointed previously, they noted, that system did not work.13 Additionally, due to the fact that US-Turkey bilateral relations had rapidly deteriorated and a lack of mutual confidence had emerged especially after the 1 March 2003 motion, the Iraqi government and the American administration were reluctant to take concrete measures in spite of Turkey’s continuous demands. Turkey described the United States as a protector of the Kurdish regional administration which was under direct U.S. control. Therefore, the U.S. administration had a negative image in the eyes of Turkish officials as well as the Turkish public. Turkish officials stressed that they expected the United States to take concrete measures against the PKK if they still considered Turkey as their strategic partner. The Iraqi central government did not have enough power to pursue suppressive policies toward the PKK; U.S. cooperation was needed to eliminate the PKK and to put pressure on the Kurdish regional government to change its policies.14 The Extended Neighbors of Iraq Conference was organized on 2-3 November 2007 in Istanbul. After Turkey’s serious attempts, the participating countries

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Turkey’s New Approaches toward the PKK, Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish Question

accepted a declaration that supported Turkey’s perspective on the PKK and the Kirkuk referendum. Turkey tacitly consented to the establishment of a democratic, united and federal Iraq by accepting that declaration.15 In addition to its diplomatic attempts, the Turkish National Security Council adopted a decision on the economic embargo on northern Iraq. According to the decision, Turkey could stop the flow of electricity to the region, close official operations at the Habur gate, put an end to the commercial activities of the Turkish firms in the region, and control the activities of some firms that had commercial relations with the Barzani family.16 Turkey also continued its policy of eliminating popular support for the PKK in the region by taking economic, cultural and political measures.17 The government began to take greater steps toward the economic development of the southeast. For instance, on 25 October 2007, 485 businessmen and the governmental officials discussed investment opportunities in the region.18 The government also announced that it would provide financial assistance to firms that invest there. Prime Minister Erdoğan explained that the Kurds in Turkey would be able to express their identities without any limitation, and that some legal regulations would be made in order to ease the process of returning home for PKK militants who had laid down their weapons.19

Developments after the Bush–Erdoğan Meeting Before the meeting on November 5, both Turkish and American officials expressed their concerns and expectations through statements given to the press and through diplomatic channels. For instance, during the conference of Iraq’s neighbors in Istanbul, Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, declared that the PKK was a common enemy and that the trilateral mechanism between Iraq, the U.S., and Turkey should become operational again. The American side explained that it would cooperate with Turkey through sharing intelligence, supporting limited military operations against the PKK camps, and pressuring the Kurdish regional administration.20 Thus, both sides clarified their previous commitments during the meeting in Washington and mutually committed themselves to take these concrete steps.21 By the end of the meeting, they had confirmed the PKK a common enemy, agreed to share actionable intelligence, and formed a trilateral mechanism among the Turkish General Staff, the American General Staff and the American commander in Iraq.22 They also agreed to clear the PKK camps and to eliminate the PKK’s international financial sources. Just after the meeting, both sides took concrete measures within a very short 59

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Turkey still insisted that the developments in northern Iraq should not lead to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state

time. First of all, under the strategy of fighting against the PKK, both countries began to share intelligence, starting on November 15. The Kurdish military groups, the Peshmergas, strengthened the security measures along the Turkish–Iraqi border and cut off the logistic 23 channels of the PKK terrorists. On November 21, the trilateral mechanism organized its first meeting in Ankara to discuss the presence of the PKK in Northern Iraq.24 On November 28, the government gave official permission to the General Staff to implement the motion.25 On November 1, the Turkish army launched its first operation against the PKK camps in Northern Iraq. Prime Minister Erdoğan called for the return of the PKK militants to their homes, adding that Turkey would make some legal regulations, such as changing the scope and context of article 221 of the Turkish Criminal Code, in order to encourage PKK militants to return.26 Turkey also arranged a program whereby the families of PKK militants were encouraged to convince their children to return home. Throughout 2007, 155 PKK militants returned to their homes as a result of this program.27 In the cultural area, Erdoğan declared that the government would prepare a new constitution that would guarantee the cultural rights of the Kurds in Turkey at the individual level. Thus, the Kurds would be able to express their identities freely.28 In the economic field, Turkey would take measures to develop cattle breeding and hand–made industries. The government planned to appoint 10,000 health personnel, teachers and imams, and to implement land reform whereby agricultural lands would be distributed to landless peasants.29 The government also expressed willingness to have positive and harmonious relations with the Kurdish regional administration after the conclusion of the constitutional reform in Iraq. However, Turkey still insisted that the developments in northern Iraq should not lead to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state.30

Developments after the Land Operation Upon the receipt of actionable intelligence, Turkish military officials undertook several air operations against the PKK camps in northern Iraq. In February, nearly seven thousand Turkish soldiers crossed the Iraqi border31 and destroyed the PKK’s organizational infrastructure.32 Just before launching the land operation, the National Security Council had decided to work toward the improvement of bilateral relations with the Iraqi central government in the fields of politics, economics, commerce, culture, military, and energy.33 In the meantime, President 60

Turkey’s New Approaches toward the PKK, Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish Question

Gül invited Iraqi President Talabani to pay an official visit to Ankara.

After Talabani’s visit, the National Security Council decided to consult with all groups in Iraq, including the Iraqi Kurds, thus accepting official contact with the regional Kurdish administration

Turkish officials continued to negotiate with the authorities of the Iraqi Kurds at the informal levels. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Ministry, and Murat Özçelik, Special Representative of Turkey to Iraq, went to Baghdad and negotiated with President Talabani, Prime Minister Nuri Al Maliki and Prime Minister of the Iraqi Kurdish Administration Nechirvan Barzani.34 During the negotiations, Turkey proposed the creation of “a strategic dialogue mechanism” to enable mutual consultations among the parties on political, economic and security matters. Turkey expressed a willingness to improve its relations with the regional administration if it did not support the PKK terrorists.35 In March, Murat Özçelik visited northern Iraq to consult with the Iraqi Kurds.36 And during the official visit of Jelal Talabani to Ankara, both sides agreed to develop mutual relations and continue to cooperate against PKK terrorism. In the meantime, President Talabani openly declared that the Iraqi Kurds did not have any intention to seek independence. After Talabani’s visit, the National Security Council decided to consult with all groups in Iraq, including the Iraqi Kurds, thus accepting official contact with the regional Kurdish administration.

With the land operation, the AK Party’s policy regarding the Kurdish issue became more clear. First of all, the AK Party planned to weaken the PKK through military methods, and then take socio-economic measures in order to prevent the support of local people to the PKK. At the same time, while maintaining Turkey’s unitary structure as well as its secular, democratic and social welfare state characteristics, it intended to put fundamental human rights reforms at the individual level under the constitutional guarantee. At the regional level, Turkey also strengthened its diplomatic relations with the United States, Iran, Syria, Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds in order to isolate the PKK terrorists and to deprive the PKK of human and financial resources. The government also urged PKK militants to benefit from the legal advantages of article 221 of the Criminal Code.37 Still, Prime Minister Erdoğan expressed that since the Kurds are equal citizens of Turkey, minority rights, such as education in their mother tongue, cannot be granted to them. But they can establish Kurdiology Institutions.38 He explained the action plan for the Southeast Ana61

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Turkey has tacitly recognized a federal Iraq with a powerful central authority, including a federative Iraqi Kurdistan

tolian Project (GAP).39 He claimed that Turkey’s Kurds were not subjected to any ethnic discrimination and assimilation policies.40 In his address unpacking the GAP project, Erdoğan declared that Turkey would improve the socio-economic and cultural conditions of the Kurdish people.

Reasons for Changing Attitudes toward the Kurdish Regional Administration Turkey Turkey’s concerns about Iraq and especially northern Iraq are directly linked to its territorial integrity and national security concerns. The total disintegration of Iraq and the emergence of an independent Kurdish state, or the establishment of a federal state based on ethnic lines, are expected to have negative effects on regional security and pave the way for Turkey’s partition.41 Since 1992, by gaining the political support of the American administration, Kurdish leaders had openly expressed their desire to create an independent Kurdish state,42 and had also stated that Kirkuk should be a part of it, given its “Kurdish character” in demographic terms. By the same token, Messoud Barzani had not declared the PKK a terrorist group, and had criticized Turkey’s operations against the PKK. For Barzani, these operations violated the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of the Iraqi Kurds. Such attitudes negatively affected the perceptions and heightened the concerns of Turkish policymakers in regard to the Iraqi Kurds. This atmosphere naturally created a handicap for the parties who intended to improve mutual relations between the two sides. As a result of U.S. diplomatic pressure, however, Kurdish leaders took practical measures against the PKK terrorists43 and frequently mentioned that northern Iraq was an indivisible part of a federal Iraq. Their new approach encouraged Turkish policymakers to develop informal contacts with Iraqi Kurdish officials. Although the Turkish General Staff objected to recognizing the Iraqi Kurds as an autonomous administration, given the improved attitude of the Iraqi Kurds after the land operation, Turkish military officials started to express potential support for the formation of a federal structure in the region, which would be similar to the U.S. and Germany models.44 In other words, Turkey has tacitly recognized a federal Iraq with a powerful central authority, including a federative Iraqi Kurdistan.45 62

Turkey’s New Approaches toward the PKK, Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish Question

In tandem with the shift in attitudes on the part of the Iraqi Kurds, Turkish officials came to understand that without getting their assistance, finding a lasting solution to the domestic Kurdish issue would not be possible. Therefore, Turkey sought the support of the Iraqi Kurds, together with the United States, Iraq and Iran, in order to isolate the PKK in the region.46 As it worked to improve its relations with the regional administration, Turkey also aimed at increasing its regional influence. Without having close relations with the Iraqi Kurds, Turkey realized, it could not influence developments in the region.47 Within the framework of the fight against the PKK, Turkish officials concluded that alienating the Iraqi Kurds would force them away from the Iraqi central authority and thus escalate their demands for independence. A possible Kurdish state would pursue a more hostile policy toward Turkey that would destabilize southeast Anatolia and strengthen the PKK.48 Lastly, Turkish authorities wanted to see Turkish firms benefit from the economic advantages of northern Iraq. In the meantime, Turkey endeavored to ensure the transfer of the region’s oil to the European Union through its own territory and toward this end sought to make the Yumurtalık–Kirkuk oil pipeline operational within a short time.49 Mutual interdependence between Turkey and northern Iraq, they reasoned, would prevent the emergence of any independent Kurdish state and remove the threat of damage to Turkey’s territorial integrity. The Iraqi Central Government and the Kurdish Regional Administration The responses of the Iraqi central government to Turkey have been friendlier than those of the Kurdish regional administration. Contrary to the approaches of the Iraqi Kurds, the Iraqi government took Turkey’s threat of using the motion seriously and therefore did not express its opposition to the military operations against the PKK camps in Northern Iraq. Iraqi officials even stated that Turkey had a right to use force against the PKK militants.50 Still, they have openly rejected any comprehensive military operation, which could lead to further regional instability. Already burdened with internal fighting, the Iraqi government did not want to deal with new issues as a result of the PKK incursions. They frequently expressed their desire to create a trilateral coordination mechanism. Iraqi forces Turkey sought the support of strengthened their security controls the Iraqi Kurds, together with along the Turkish–Iraqi border and esthe United States, Iraq and Iran, tablished control points in order to stop in order to isolate the PKK in the logistic support to PKK as a confirthe region mation of their decisiveness.51 They also 63

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Barzani changed the tone of his speeches after the November 5 meeting between Bush and Erdoğan

overtly objected to emergence of a loose federation that would lead to an independent Kurdish state.52

For their part, the Iraqi Kurds consistently rejected any kind of military operation. Massoud Barzani even declared that should Turkey launch such an operation, they would use force to repel the Turkish forces within the framework of self-defense. Additionally, he claimed that entrance of the Turkish soldiers into Iraqi territory would be accepted by themselves as a casus belli.53 According to Barzani, the real aim of Turkey was and is to eliminate the Kurdish regional authority rather than to destroy the PKK camps, thus changing the region’s map in favor of its own objectives. During the operation, he predicted, Turkish forces could occupy Iraqi cities such as Kirkuk and Mosul, and be deployed in the region for a long time.54 For that reason, Barzani always refused to sign any security agreement between Turkey and Iraq that would allow the use of force by Turkey against the PKK camps in northern Iraq. As far as PKK terrorism was concerned, Barzani’s attitudes and speeches disturbed Turkish officials, especially the military. Barzani did not describe the PKK as a terrorist organization; rather, he stated that Iraqi Kurds would view PKK as a terrorist organization only if it rejected any proposal for a political solution. Yet Barzani constantly announced that the Kurdish regional administration did not support the PKK and underlined that they objected to the PKK incursions. He maintained, however, that Turkey should find a political solution to the Kurdish issue. Although they did not undertake to hand over PKK leaders to Turkey, the Kurdish regional administration demanded the withdrawal of PKK militants from northern Iraq.55 Barzani changed the tone of his speeches after the November 5 meeting between Bush and Erdoğan. Both Jelal Talabani and Massoud Barzani promptly agreed to take joint action against the PKK together with the Iraqi government and the American forces. They did not raise their objections to the limited military operations by aircraft. Concerning the future of Iraq, Barzani claimed that the Kurdish administration is a part of federal Iraq and that Iraqi Kurds did not have any demand for independence. Further, after the land operation, Barzani clearly announced the Kurdish regional administration’s intention of having good relations with Turkey. In order to demonstrate his decisiveness, he did not give any appointment to DTP representatives.56 In his speeches, Barzani stressed Turkey’s territorial integrity and expressed his wish to live together with other Iraqi

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Turkey’s New Approaches toward the PKK, Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish Question

groups within a federal Iraq. In the meantime, he demanded Turkey’s respect for Iraqi Kurds’ autonomy.57 Barzani additionally supported the diplomatic attempts of the United Nations for the status of Kirkuk and accepted a delay of the referendum.58 In the meantime, President Talabani accepted a proposal according to which Arabs, Kurds and Turcomans will have equal ruling rights.59 The first reason behind Barzani’s shift is the support of the American administration for Turkey’s military operations after the November 5 negotiations. During the Bush-Erdoğan talks, the parties announced that the PKK was (and is) their common enemy. At the same time, the Iraqi Kurds began to understand that an independent Kurdistan was not a suitable option, because it would be perceived by their neighbors as a threat to their security and integrity. Turkey previously had announced that such a situation would be regarded as a casus belli. Thus the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan could spark civil war in the region and in neighboring countries.60 Being a land-locked country, northern Iraq would need to have cooperative relations with its neighbors for the sake of its economic and political development; otherwise it would be completely dependent upon U.S. assistance, which is not a viable option for an independent state.

Reactions of the Domestic Actors to the Government’s Policies The Opposition Parties Contrary to the AK Party’s liberal perspective,61 the opposition parties (the Nationalist Movement Party and the Republican People’s Party) pursued more nationalist policies. From their perspective, “a more democratic environment and a more civilized political regime in Turkey will pave the way for Turkey’s partition. Moreover, the Kurdish regional administration is a direct threat to Turkey’s integrity; therefore, its independence should be blocked.”62 From this point of view, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) advocated the idea of launching a comprehensive military operation against the PKK formations in northern Iraq without any Contrary to the AK Party’s delay,63 and the idea that the motion liberal perspective, the should have contained the targets of opposition parties (the both the PKK camps and the Kurdish Nationalist Movement Party regional administration.64 The party and the Republican People’s also supported the idea of temporarily deploying Turkish soldiers to northern Party) pursued more nationalist Iraq.65 The MHP’s leader, Devlet Bahçeli, policies 65

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For the General Staff demands for more cultural rights will come to imply a threat to Turkey’s nation-state structure and territorial integrity

proposed the declaration of martial law in southeast Anatolia. However, contrary to his previous statements, he gave his support to the limited operations against northern Iraq.66 The MHP saw the DTP as a mouthpiece of PKK. Rejecting the DTP’s proposals for a po67 litical solution, Bahçeli asserted that Turkey would not become a country based on the cantonal system, like Switzerland. The MHP regarded legal guarantees of Kurdish cultural rights as a concession to the PKK’s demands and an admission of defeat by Turkey.68 Deniz Baykal, leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), held that the military operation was necessary, and that Turkish forces should control some part of northern Iraq as a security line.69 In Baykal’s view, the government’s present policies only aimed at appeasing public opinion, and Turkey stood to lose its influence in the region under the existing conditions. On the other hand, he blamed the Iraqi central government and the Kurdish administration for protecting PKK militants. While objecting to the government’s social, cultural and political measures,70 Baykal did not advocate limited military operations, since such operations, he argued, would not eliminate the PKK for good.71 Instead, Baykal proposed the following: broadcasting toward northern Iraq in the Kurdish language, developing economic and social relations with northern Iraq, acknowledging the cultural rights of Kurds in Turkey, and improving relations with the Kurdish administration.72 Additionally, when he visited Diyarbakır, he advocated that the cultural rights of the local people should be under the protection of law and that they should be able to express their identity freely. The General Staff After the general elections of 2007, the General Staff and the government reached a common understanding on the matters of PKK terrorism and the Kurdish issue. Together, they drew the roadmap for the military operations. Contrary to the suggestions of the opposition parties, the military did not advocate any comprehensive military operation,73 preferring instead to launch air attacks and land special forces directly on the PKK camps. Moreover, the General Staff softened its concerns about the Kurdish regional administration as a result of the diplomatic bargaining between Turkey and the United States The difference between the views of the government and the General Staff appears mainly on the matter of Kurdish cultural rights. Military officials see the DTP as a representa-

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Turkey’s New Approaches toward the PKK, Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish Question

tive of the PKK in Parliament, and a bas- For the DTP the Kurds are one tion of separatist views. The policies of of the constituting units of the the DTP are viewed as similar to those Turkish republic with a right to of the PKK and Barzani.74 The General self–determination Staff describes the party as an instrument used by the PKK to legalize and politicize itself, threatening Turkey’s territorial integrity and unitary structure.75 The military is also against extension of cultural rights to the Kurdish people in Turkey. According to military officials, Turkey has already introduced cultural rights by allowing minorities the use of their mother tongue, teaching it, and broadcasting radio and television programs in the Kurdish language. Therefore, for the General Staff demands for more cultural rights will come to imply a threat to Turkey’s nation-state structure and territorial integrity.76 For the military leadership, the developments in northern Iraq ran the risk of escalating into the partition of Iraq, an unacceptable outcome from Turkey’s perspective.77 Still, military officers have publicly announced that they will display a friendly approach to any federal formation similar to that of the U.S. and Germany.78 The Democratic Society Party Regarding the Kurdish issue and the PKK, the DTP promoted a radical stance that prompted harsh criticism from other political parties and the state elites. First of all, the DTP does not describe the PKK as a terrorist organization, seeing it rather as “a political organization that aims to find a political solution to the Kurdish issue,” “an organization that uses violence as a method,” and/or “a formation that emerged after the denial policy of the Turkish state towards the Kurdish identity”.79 They also view Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of PKK, as “the leader of the Kurdish nation.”80 They propose that the Turkish government should negotiate with the PKK on the Kurdish issue in order to find a political solution.81 For them, any approach based on the “denial policy” cannot provide solution to the issue. In the meantime, the EU’s proposal of minority rights status is not viewed as favorable, as Kurdish people in Turkey would not benefit from the EU’s minority rights as a nation, but only as a minority group.82 For the DTP the Kurds are one of the constituting units of the Turkish republic with a right to self–determination. The Kurdish area should have an autonomous status and their cultural and political rights should be protected by the constitution.83 They propose that Turkey become a federal state, such as the Turkish-Kurdish (con) federal republic. Needless to say, such a proposal is not acceptable to state and military officials. 67

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The EU has adopted a dual policy supporting Turkey’s fight against the PKK, which it now acknowledges as a terrorist organization, and demanding more political rights for the Kurdish people

Although the DTP criticizes the PKK for using violence as a method and urges them to apply political methods, it refuses to advocate the surrender of PKK leaders to Turkey, before comprehensive pardon for all PKK militants, including the leaders, and objects to the military operations launched against the PKK camps. But in the meantime, its own policies are being criticized by Kurdish civil society organizations and Kurdish elites, who demand that the DTP pursue a completely different attitude from that of the PKK.84

The European Union and the United States In the early 1990s, the approaches of the European Union and the United States to the PKK were quite different from each other. The European Union was reluctant to describe the PKK as a terrorist organization and to close its newspapers, associations and foundations located in some European countries. The Europeans did not differentiate PKK violence from the Kurdish question. For that reason, they mainly limited themselves to criticizing Turkish authorities for violating the rights of the Kurds. More recently, however, the EU has adopted a dual policy supporting Turkey’s fight against the PKK, which it now acknowledges as a terrorist organization, and demanding more political rights for the Kurdish people. From the beginning, the EU has objected to a comprehensive military operation because it could lead to further destabilization of the region. The EU feared that Turkey would use disproportional force in violation of international law. Nonetheless, the Union has not raised objections to limited operations, and Union officials have declared that Turkey has a right to use force against the PKK in order to defend itself.85 However, the EU has demanded that Turkey work to find a political solution to the Kurdish issue and to improve socio-economic conditions in southeastern Anatolia.86 It has also called on the PKK to stop the violence. The EU insists that the DTP sever its direct or indirect ties to the PKK and condemn terrorist actions.87 Lastly, the Union urges Turkey to normalize its relations with the Kurdish regional administration. Thus the EU officials have changed their approaches toward the Kurdish issue in favor of concerns of Turkey. Today, the United States and the EU have pursued similar policies concerning the PKK terrorism, while supporting the AK Party’s openings on the Kurdish is68

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sue. First of all, the United States is overtly against the partitioning of Iraq, which is in line with Turkey’s priorities. Both believe that partition would provoke other problems that would cause further instability in the region. For example, several of Iraq’s big cities, such as Kirkuk and Basra, have mixed populations. As a result of any partition, the parties might apply an ethnic cleansing policy. Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni states might threaten the territorial integrity, national security and stability of regional states. Especially after the establishment of a Shiite state, Iran could also increase its influence in the region.88 Due to these factors, the American administration advocates the creation of a federal Iraq and the establishment of a Kurdish federative state within Iraqi territory. Similarly, the United States opposed a comprehensive military operation because it would threaten the relative stability and peace in northern Iraq, stop logistic support to American soldiers in Iraq from Turkey, harm regional balances, lead to an increase in the anti-Americanism and Kurdish nationalist feelings in Turkey, stop the reform process in Turkey and cause further deterioration of the Turkish-American relations. The operation could also encourage Iran to use force against the PJAK in Iraq. 89 In the course of time, the limited operation option thus gained the support of American officials. President Bush had always warned that Turkey should not launch a unilateral operation, and a trilateral coordination mechanism between Turkey, Iraq and the United States should be formed in order to fight against the PKK.90 Although American soldiers would not take an active role in launching any kind of operation, they were directed to share daily intelligence with Turkey in order to put pressure on the PKK. Meanwhile, the U.S. called for a peaceful political solution to the Kurdish issue.91

Conclusion After the PKK’s assault in Dağlıca, a new period in Turkish-Kurdish relations began. Turkish policymakers faced the challenge of finding a solution to the Kurdish issue, fighting the PKK and managing the Iraqi Kurdish administration simultaneously. As part of this process, close Turkish policymakers faced the cooperative relations between Turkey challenge of finding a solution and the Iraqi Kurds will certainly help to the Kurdish issue, fighting to create more suitable conditions in the the PKK and managing the region to address the issue. This will also Iraqi Kurdish administration help Turkish firms expand their economic presence in the region. Erdoğan’s simultaneously 69

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The moderates’ demand for freedom to speak and learn their mother tongue as well as to establish Kurdishoriented political parties and foundations may not necessarily contravene Turkey’s national interests

official visit to Baghdad on July 10, 2008 will strengthen cooperation both in the field of the economy and the fight against terrorism. Both sides have decided to establish a High-Level Strategic Council in order to coordinate joint activities against the PKK terrorism and bilateral relations.

The November 5 meeting of Bush and Erdoğan positively affected bilateral relations after the chill caused by the rejection of the motion by the Turkish Parliament on 1 March 2003. The two sides seem to have upgraded their mutual relations back to the strategic partnership level once again. Turkey succeeded in isolating the PKK in the region and weakening its operational capability. The PKK militants now encounter difficulties in northern Iraq and face internal fighting. All these developments create an opportunity for Turkey to find a lasting solution to the Kurdish issue which will end PKK terrorism and contribute positively to Turkey’s territorial integrity. Therefore, Turkey should not perceive the moderate demands of the Kurdish people as a threat. The moderates’ demand for freedom to speak and learn their mother tongue as well as to establish Kurdish-oriented political parties and foundations may not necessarily contravene Turkey’s national interests. The Turkish government should guarantee human rights while working to improve socio-economic conditions in the region, the unhelpful attitudes of DTP, the General Staff and the MHP notwithstanding.

Endnotes 1. An attack by the PKK in October of 2007, in which 10 Turkish soldiers were killed. 2. Serhat Erkmen, “Türkiye’nin Kuzey Irak Perspektifi ve Hareket Alanı,” Stratejik Analiz (June 2007), pp. 18–21; “Baba ve oğul Talabani’nin operasyon telaşı,” Milliyet, 13 December 2007; “Foreign Policy: A General View,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ MFA_tr/DisPolitika/GenelGorunum/Genel+Gorunum.htm. (access date: 8 January 2008). Turkish officials announced five basic objectives concerning Iraq and northern Iraq issues: 1) Iraq’s unified structure should be preserved, 2) An independent Kurdish state should not be established, 3) Iraqi Turcomans should be accepted as a founding nation, 4) A just (fair) referendum in Kirkuk should be held, and 5) All natural resources should be under the control of the central Iraqi government. But none of these objectives could be realized. 3. To view the AK Party’s Declaration during the general elections, visit http://www.akparti.org. tr/beyanname.asp. (Access date: 4 January 2008). 4. Murat Yetkin, “Çekilmeyen kılıç…,” Radikal, 11 October 2007.

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5. Murat Yetkin, “PKK üzerine tam saha baskı,” Radikal, 10 October 2007. 6. “Tezkerenin üç hedefi,” Akşam, 11 October 2007. 7. Bülent Aras, “Turkey’s War on Terror,” SETA Policy Brief, No 2, (November 2007), pp. 1-6. 8. “Özel Tim yeniden yapılandırılıyor,” Zaman, 17 October 2007. 9. “Mehmetçik sınır boyunda hareketli, dağlarda çatışma var,” Milliyet, 19 October 2007. 10. Murat Yetkin, “Irak sınırında sinir harbi,” Radikal, 26 October 2007. 11. “Bakan Atalay: Irak tedbirleri almalı,” Radikal, 24 October 2007. 12. Ertuğrul Özkök, “Sefer Görev Emri,” Hürriyet, 23 October 2007. 13. Murat Yetkin, “Ankara’da Kürt Devleti Gerilimi,” Radikal, 28 September 2007. 14. “BBC: Irak heyeti Ankara’ya çok uluslu güç önerdi,” Zaman, 28 October 2007. 15. “İstanbul Zirvesinde tarihi adım: Irak’ta Birleşmiş Milletler devreye giriyor,” Zaman, 2 November 2007. 16. “K. Irak’a Ambargo,” Yeni Şafak, 25 October 2007. 17. “Para ise para, tezkere ise tezkere,” Radikal, 10 October 2007. 18. “Güneydoğu’nun yüzü gülecek, dev yatırım seferberliği başlıyor,” Zaman, 19 October 2007. 19. “Silahı bırak, Meclis’e gel,” Radikal, 20 October 2007. 20. “Washington’da Tarihi Görüşme,” Zaman, 5 November 2007. 21. Zeynep Gürcanlı, “Bush’a dört liste verecek,” Vatan, 21 October 2007. 22. Ali H. Aslan, “Oval Ofis’ten Vaad Çıktı,” Zaman, 6 November 2007. 23. Sami Kohen, “İşaretler olumlu, ama yetersiz...,” Milliyet, 28 November 2007. 24. “ABD’li Komutanlarla PKK Mesaisi,” Radikal, 21 November 2007. 25. “İlk Nokta Operasyonu,” Radikal, 2 December 2007. 26. “Ya Dağ Ya Siyaset,” Radikal, 18 November 2007. 27. “Aileler devreye girdi, bir yılda 155 PKK’lı baba ocağına döndü,” Zaman, 11 December 2007. 28. “Yeni bir yasayla, bu kez eve dönüşü sağlayabiliriz,” Zaman, 9 November 2007. 29. “Eve dönüş’te kilit ‘etkin pişmanlık’ maddesi,” Radikal, 12 December 2007. 30. “Dağdan inerlerse yeni yüz, yeni kimlik,” Milliyet, 24 December 2007. 31. “Mehmetçik Irak’a karadan girdi: Bin terörist namlunun ucunda,” Zaman, 23 February 2008. 32. “Zorlu Bölgeden Dönüş,” Radikal, 1 March 2008. 33. “MGK’dan ‘Kürt Gruplarla görüşme’ kararı,” NTVMSNBC, 25 April 2008. 34. Murat Yetkin, “Gates Gelmeden Mesajı Geldi,” Radikal, 28 February 2008. 35. “Kuzey Irak’la resmi temaslar başladı; Neçirvan Barzani, Türkiye’ye gelecek,” Zaman, 2 May 2008. 36. “Ankara, Kuzey Irak’la temas kurdu,” Zaman, 29 March 2008. 37. Murat Yetkin, “Sınır Ötesi Harekât, kapsamlı Kürt paketi ve hükümetin bakışı,” Radikal, 26 February 2008. 38. “Devlette Ergenekon’un uzantıları var,” Radikal, 18 February 2008. 39. “AK Parti Genel Başkanı ve Başbakan Erdoğan, GAP Eylem Planı’nı Açıkladı; Yeni Eylem Planımız Hiç Kuşkusuz Türkiye için Yeni bir Milat, Yeni bir Dönüm Noktası Olacaktır,” 27 May 2008, www.akparti.org.tr, (Access date: 1 June 2008).

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40. “Erdoğan’dan PKK’ya: Yolun Sonu Geldi,” Milliyet, 12 May 2008. 41. Bill Park, Turkey’s Policy towards Northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectives, (London: Routledge, 2005). 42. Michael M. Gunter, “Kurdish Future in a Post-Saddam Iraq,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1 (April 2003), pp. 9-27; Khaled Salih, “Kurdish Reality in an Emerging Iraq,” Middle East Policy, Vol. XI, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 122-126. 43. “Kürt Yönetimi teminatını yineledi: Bölgemizi PKK’ya kullandırmayacağız,” Zaman, 23 May 2008. 44. Murat Yetkin, “Kürt Sorununda Petrol Şirketleri,” Radikal, 27 November 2007. 45. Murat Yetkin, “Talabani’nin Gelişi ve Sonrası,” Radikal, 6 March 2008. 46. “PKK yalnızlaşıyor,” Milliyet, 6 May 2008. 47. Mehmet Ali Birand, “Askerin K. Irak tutumu esniyor,” Posta, 8 May 2008. 48. Beril Dedeoğlu, “ABD –İran-Türkiye Ekseninde Irak: Türkiye’nin Açılımını Nasıl Okumalı,” Zaman, 5 May 2008. 49. Radikal, 5 May 2008. 50. “Irak’ta tezkere telaşı,” Zaman, 17 October 2007. 51. “Irak Dışişleri Bakanı Zebari: Türkiye havadan vuracaktır,” Radikal, 18 October 2007. 52. Murat Yetkin, “Bu defa ciddi gibi,” Radikal, 21 November 2007. 53. “Sınır ötesi harekat hiçbir işe yaramaz,” Radikal, 10 October 2007. 54. “Kürtler ve AB: Bunu Yapmayın,” Radikal, 12 October 2007. 55. “Barzani: PKK Terörist değil, Talabani: Türkiye rüya görüyor,” Radikal, 22 October 2007. 56. “DTP’ye soğuk duş,” Milliyet, 9 May 2008. 57. “Kürt yönetimi teminatını yineledi: Bölgemizi PKK’ya kullandırmayacağız,” Zaman, 23 May 2008. 58. Sami Suruş, “Kerkük Sorunu Çözüm Yoluna Giriyor,” Hayat, 11 May 2008. 59. “Komşular, Sadr’a karşı savaşında Maliki’ye tam destek verecek,” Zaman, 22 April 2008. 60. Michael M. Gunter, “Why Kurdish Statehood is unlikely,” Middle East Policy, Vol. XI, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 106-110; Nihat Ali Özcan, “Could a Kurdish State be set up in Iraq?,” Middle East Policy, Vol. XI, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 119-122; M. Hakan Yavuz, “Provincial Not Ethnic Federalism in Iraq,” Middle East Policy, Vol. XI, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 126-131. 61. According to that perspective, Turkey’s territorial integrity can be preserved by strengthening the democratic regime and giving more democratic/cultural rights to the Kurds in Turkey (Şahin Alpay, “Irak Kürtleri ve ABD için tarihi fırsat,” Zaman, 25 October 2007). 62. Alpay, “Irak Kürtleri ve ABD için tarihi fırsat” 63. “Bahçeli: AKP, ABD gücenmesin diye teröre göz yumuyor,” Radikal, 3 October 2007. 64. “Barzani’de hedef alınsın ve bağımsız Kürt devleti önlensin,” Radikal, 17 October 2007. 65. “MHP operasyona referandum istedi,” Radikal, 10 October 2007. 66. “Operasyon, milletin yüreğine su serpti,” Zaman, 26 December 2007. 67. Vatan, 17 October 2007. 68. “MHP: ABD ve AB telkini uygulanmak isteniyor,” Radikal, 12 December 2007. 69. “Başbakan Erdoğan: Sınır ötesi için fayda analizi şart,” Radikal, 11 October 2007.

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70. “Baykal ‘eve dönüş’ün esnetilmesine de karşı,” Zaman, 26 December 2007. 71. “Eve dönüş’ ABD işi, katkı verilmemeli,” Radikal, 12 December 2007. 72. “Irak’a Kürtçe yayın yapalım,” Yeni Şafak, 7 November 2007. 73. Barlas Yurtsever, “ABD, Türkiye’yi destekler mi?,” Vatan, 17 October 2007. 74. Fikret Bila, “Büyükanıt’ın mesajındaki tehdit algısı,” Milliyet, 28 October 2007. 75. Speech by the Commander of Land Forces, General İlker Başbuğ, during the opening session of War Academy, 25 September 2006, http://www.kkk.tsk.mil.tr/BasinHalklaIliskiler/KonusmaMesajlar/KHO_Konusma.docK. (Access Date: 8 January 2008); “Büyükanıt: Terör Legalleşti,” Radikal, 12 December 2007. 76. Fikret Bila, “84. Yılında Cumhuriyetin Kırmızı Çizgisi,” Milliyet, 30 October 2007. 77. Yetkin, “Kürt Sorununda Petrol Şirketleri” 78. “Operasyon iş olsun diye yapılmaz,” Radikal, 10 November 2007. 79. “DTP’den İlginç Çıkış: Sınır Ötesi Operasyonlar Kalıcı Barışa Vesile Olabilir,” Zaman, 25 December 2007. 80. “DTP’den farklı ses: Meclis dışından genel başkan olmaz,” Zaman, 2 November 2007. 81. Aysel Tuğluk, “Kürt Sorununun Geleceği,” Radikal İki, 28 October 2007, p. 4. 82. Ali Bayramoğlu, “Kürt sorunu nasıl çözülür,” Yeni Şafak, 17 October 2007. 83. “DTP ‘Öcalan halk önderi’ dedi, özerklik ve ayrı bayrak talep etti,” Radikal, 31 October 2007. 84. “DTP’lilerden Talabani’ye Destek,” Radikal, 26 December 2007; “DTP’ye göre PKK, Kürt sorununun çözümünü isteyen siyasi bir örgüt,” Zaman, 27 December 2007. 85. Murat Yetkin, “PKK’ya nokta harekat seçeneği,” Radikal, 17 October 2007. 86. “Barışı teşvik etmeyen birisi varsa o Büyükanıt,” Radikal, 3 October 2007. 87. “AB: Irak’a Girmeden İki Kere Düşünün,” Radikal, 25 October 2007. 88. Şanlı Bahadır Koç, “ABD’nin Kuzey Irak Politikası ve Türkiye’nin Çıkarları Üzerindeki Etkileri,” Stratejik Analiz (June 2007), pp. 31-40. 89. “ABD ile Bilek Güreşi,” Milliyet, 13 October 2007. 90. “Bush: PKK Durdurulmalı,” Radikal, 22 October 2007. 91. “Wilson DTP’yi uyardı: Terörle aranıza mesafe koyun,” Cihan News Agency, 6 December 2007.

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