CAMRI Global Perspectives Monthly digest of market research & views
Issue 31, March 2016
The Rash of Economic Forecast Downgrades? By Brian Fabbri Visiting Research Fellow, CAMRI & President, FABBRI Global Economics prognosticators thought that economic activity in the US would accelerate to 3.5% to 4% from a dismal 2.4% in the past two years. Now the perceived wisdom in the financial markets is that economic growth should remain around its new long‐term structural average of slightly more than 2%. For example, the Federal Reserve’s latest forecast of long‐run economic growth is 1.8% to 2.1%. Moreover, there are now many well‐known market pundits predicting that the US economy will stumble into recession within the next 12 months.
Recent spell of pessimism hits global forecasters In the past 6 months the conventional wisdom of the consensus view on global economic growth has changed significantly. For example, in October 2015 at the IMF annual global economic forecast, the prediction was that global growth in 2016 would be 3.6%. They subsequently revised their forecast several times and now have a present view of 3.4%. The reduction in their growth outlook was well dispersed: the economies of the US and emerging markets were revised downward the most. All US Federal authorities (US Federal Reserve, Congressional Budget Office) have similarly lowered their expectations for US growth in 2016.
What caused this rise in pessimism? At present there are very few real economic indicators that would lead to the conclusion that the US is on the verge of recession, however, there are many economic variables that imply that economic growth will be disappointingly low in 2016 and beyond.
The US went from darling to question mark Another example of the change in perceptions was about the economic fortunes of the United States. In the fall of last year many respected private
There are several factors that cause experts to draw conclusions on the length of 1
previous eras. The present cycle has lasted 81 months making it one of the longest lasting expansions in history, but not the longest. That honor belongs to the previous cycle starting in 2001; it lasted 120 months. In fact, the last three expansions have lasted significantly beyond the average. Thus, the present expansions length is not a good guide to the duration of the current business cycle expansion.
business cycles. One of these is the history of business cycles and the cyclical nature of free market economies worldwide. A second factor is the proliferation and dominance of industrial data releases, which have been retreating rapidly. A third factor is the inferences drawn from the direction of financial markets, which are thought to lead economic developments. A fourth element is survey data. There are now reputable surveys of businesses, consumers, homebuilders, and small business owners. A fifth indicator is the relationship of credit to income. A sixth is the relationship of inventories to activity. Finally, there is employment and income growth, without which there would be no economic growth.
The high frequency of industrial data
Length of Business Expansions in US 140
120
100
Chart 2
80
60
As financial markets increasingly traded the inferences received from high frequency data over the past two decades their direction became more attuned to the signals from the industrial sector of the economy. The various government agencies and private sector data providers found monitoring industrial output much easier than collecting data from service providers even though service providers account for nearly three fourths of US output.
Averages
40
20
0 1854‐1919
1919‐1945
1945‐2009
1991
2001
2009
NBER
Chart 1
The cyclical nature of free market economies. The National Bureau of Economic Research has identified the turning points in business cycles in the US over the past 150 years. In the 1945 to 2009 era business cycle expansions have lasted 58.4 months on average. They have been much more enduring than business expansions from
Thus, as the demand from China for international goods ratcheted downward, and simultaneously, as the US dollar 2
appreciated, the demand for US industrial output declined. US Industrial production and various regional Federal Reserve linked business surveys swooned with it, such as the Federal Reserve of Philadelphia’s business index, as shown in Chart 2. It bears remembering that industrial output accounts for less than 15% of US GDP. Moreover, at least one industrial indicator, the Philadelphia Fed index, which has closely resembled the movements of the industrial production index, has finally picked up.
Chart 3
accompanying chart of some of the prominently followed surveys, most are slightly below their cyclical peaks. However, they are not plunging and they remain relatively high from a cyclical perspective. Home‐builders are the most enthusiastic, especially when compared with small businessmen, whose views have sunk in this presidential election year. Nevertheless, consumer psychology remains optimistic and conducive to greater spending.
Implications from the direction of financial markets At the end of 2015 financial markets seemed to be in free fall, suggesting dour outcomes for economies around the globe. As I wrote in the February 2016 CAMRI Global Perspectives, financial markets don’t always predict economic outcomes. (Read article for more detail). The 13% drop in US equity prices and soaring corporate credit quality spreads hit their nadir in early February, and over the past month stock prices have recovered 80% of their losses and corporate spreads have rallied to recover 62% of their lost value. More to the point, these financial market indicators are no longer signaling an imminent recession.
Cheap credit is plentiful Today’s cost of credit is cheap by any historical standard. It is a legacy from the enormous battle central banks have waged against the excesses of the last ‘great recession’.
Surveys have remained buoyant Surveys of consumers, businessmen, home‐ builders, small businessmen, and investors are fortunately prevalent in the US and around the global economy. As seen in the
Chart 4
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the expansion, business greed took over and businessmen began to produce more and more goods. Once sales growth subsided and production was in full swing imbalances occurred and inventories piled up diminishing manufacturers’ optimism and raising their carrying costs. This was the beginning of the end of the business cycle expansion, because their next decision was to cut costs, production and eventually employment.
Then, abundant and cheap credit, especially from the prospect of borrowing terms, was a major cause of the last ‘great recession’. Households took advantage of the cheap lending terms to borrow unprecedented amounts of debt and this caused a credit‐ fueled spike in house prices, which led to excess building and eventually a great plunge in overall economic activity. Present credit costs are cheaper than in the run‐up to the ‘great recession’, although the terms to borrow have been appropriately tightened, making debt more credit worthy. The important credit monitors such as the household debt to income ratio are comfortably below the peaks of the last recession and within historic guidelines, as shown in the accompanying chart.
In the years since those early post‐WWII business cycles, technological advancements revolutionized the way manufacturers implemented their production and supply chain management, leaving inventory imbalances as a thing of the past.
Chart 5
Chart 6
Simultaneously, manufacturing became a smaller component of overall GDP. Consequently, even if an imbalance were to occur, it would probably not precipitate a business cycle recession.
Business inventories are high though not threatening In the past (1950s, 1960s, and 1970s) many business cycle recessions began from an imbalance between inventory accumulation and sales. As sales rose in the early part of 4
Therefore, a quick glance at the accompanying chart of inventory levels and the inventory sales ratio indicates that inventories have risen and have dragged inventory sales ratios with them. While businessmen continue to benefit from technology, they have kept their inventories at a non‐threatening level because they quickly decimated their production schedules as a direct response to insufficient demand and mounting inventories of unsold products.
the average monthly change in payrolls over the past 6 months is 235,000 new jobs. This employment growth has buoyed consumer confidence throughout the plunge in stock prices.
Personal Income Grew Faster than Wages 10.00
8.00
6.00
Personal income
4.00
2.00
‐2.00
If energy prices appreciate back to their 2014 – early 2015 levels, then there is potential for manufacturing activity to rebound and briefly send GDP growth above its recent trend rate.
Hourly Earnings 2009‐05‐01 2009‐07‐01 2009‐09‐01 2009‐11‐01 2010‐01‐01 2010‐03‐01 2010‐05‐01 2010‐07‐01 2010‐09‐01 2010‐11‐01 2011‐01‐01 2011‐03‐01 2011‐05‐01 2011‐07‐01 2011‐09‐01 2011‐11‐01 2012‐01‐01 2012‐03‐01 2012‐05‐01 2012‐07‐01 2012‐09‐01 2012‐11‐01 2013‐01‐01 2013‐03‐01 2013‐05‐01 2013‐07‐01 2013‐09‐01 2013‐11‐01 2014‐01‐01 2014‐03‐01 2014‐05‐01 2014‐07‐01 2014‐09‐01 2014‐11‐01 2015‐01‐01 2015‐03‐01 2015‐05‐01 2015‐07‐01 2015‐09‐01 2015‐11‐01 2016‐01‐01
0.00
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‐6.00
Chart 8
The missing piece from the labor market is wage growth. Hourly earnings growth has stumbled along at a stingy pace of 2.3% over the past year. Total income growth however, has grown somewhat faster at an annual pace of 3.9%. This implies that other non‐ wage compensation has made up for the paltry growth in wages. Fortunately for consumers, inflation has remained muted in the past few years, allowing real income to grow at a relatively steady rate of 2.8% in the past twelve months and 2.5% for the past five years. Such real income growth has supported real consumption growth of 2.8% in the past year, and 2% per annum over the past five years. It also supported an important increase in household savings since the ‘great recession’. It is this steady growth in real consumption and income that keeps the US economy percolating along in spite of the unpleasant movements in
Chart 7
A Relatively healthy labor market The key labor market indicators are signaling a quite healthy labor situation. The unemployment ratio has fallen to 4.9%, a low level by nearly any US business cycle standard. The annual growth in payroll employment has settled in around 1.8%, and 5
financial markets and the meltdown in industrial output.
suddenly going to jump. It hasn’t. Non‐farm productivity has grown at an average annual rate of 0.5% over the past 4 years. Productivity growth is easier to achieve in manufacturing or agriculture than in the provision of services. In the US, agriculture is too small and already very efficient, while manufacturing suffered from the decrease in demand from China and the strong dollar. Productivity growth, therefore, has been dormant and US GDP growth has been and is likely to remain stagnant at significantly less than 2% for the foreseeable future.
Chart 9
Conclusion: Hard to understand the original enthusiasm
Financial market participants will have to adjust their profit and growth expectations to materially slower US and world economic growth over the next few years. The slower that US and world economic growth is, the more volatile financial markets will be in light of growth disappointments, or global shocks.
The stability in wages and income growth both underscore the resilient growth of the US economy and belie the enthusiasm that most forecasters predicted late last year. The consistency in the growth in employment at 1.6% over the past five years coupled with the current low rate of unemployment implies that labor force growth is very unlikely to accelerate in the next few years and will probably slow down significantly.
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Consequently, the sage forecasters who bet on 3%, or faster US economic growth this year had to believe that productivity was
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INDEX
LEVEL (LC)
S&P500 FTSE NIKKEI HANG SENG STI EUR YEN CMCI Oil
1,932.23 6,097.09 16,026.76 19,111.93 2,666.51 1.0875 112.93 921.935 33.75
KEY INDICATORS TABLE (AS OF 29 FEBRUARY 2016) %1MO %1MO %1YR %1YR INDEX LEVEL %1YR (LC) (USD) (LC) (USD) ‐0.13% ‐0.13% ‐6.20% ‐6.20% 3MO LIBOR 0.63 141.78 0.87% ‐1.33% ‐8.48% ‐17.53% 10YR UST 1.73 ‐12.96 ‐8.41% ‐1.91% ‐13.19% ‐7.95% 10YR BUND 0.11 ‐67.40 ‐2.86% ‐2.76% ‐20.32% ‐20.52% 10YR SPG 1.53 21.42 1.51% 2.78% ‐18.89% ‐21.47% 10YR SGS 2.28 1.84 0.41% ‐2.87% US ISM 49.50 ‐7.10 ‐6.78% ‐5.60% EU PMI 51.20 0.40 0.32% ‐20.87% JP TANKAN 9.00 80.00 0.39% ‐32.17% CHINA IP 5.90 ‐25.30 Source: Bloomberg
APPENDIX GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS (Source: Bloomberg, with tickers in parenthesis. In US$ where applicable) S&P500: capitalization‐weighted index of the prices of 500 US large‐cap stocks (SPX) FTSE: capitalization‐weighted index of the prices of the 100 largest LSE‐listed stocks (UKX) NIKKEI: capitalization‐weighted index of the largest 225 stocks of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (NKY) HANG SENG: capitalization‐weighted index of companies from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HSI) STI: cap‐weighted index of the top 30 companies listed on the Singapore Exchange (FSSTI) EUR: USD/EUR exchange rate: 1 EUR = xx USD (EUR) YEN: YEN/USD exchange rate: 1 USD = xx YEN (JPY) CMCI: Constant Maturity Commodity Index (CMCIPI) Oil: West Texas Intermediate prices, $ per barrel (CLK1) 3MO LIBOR: interbank lending rate for 3‐month US dollar loans (US0003M) 10YR UST: 10‐year US Treasury yield (IYC8 – Sovereigns) 10YR BUND: 10‐year German government bond yield (IYC8 – Sovereigns) 10YR SPG: 10‐year Spanish government bond yield, proxy for EU funding problems (IYC8 – Sovereigns) 10YR SGS: 10‐year Singapore government bond yield (IYC8 – Sovereigns) US ISM: US business survey of more than 300 manufacturing firms by the Institute of Supply Management that monitors employment, production inventories, new orders, etc. (NAPMPMI) EU PMI: Purchasing Managers’ index for the 17 country EU region (PMITMEZ) JP TANKAN: Bank of Japan business survey on the outlook of Japanese capital expenditures, employment and the overall economy, quarterly index (JNTGALLI) CHINA IP: China’s Industrial Production index, with 1‐month lag (CHVAIOY) LC: Local Currency Disclaimer: All research digests, reports, opinions, models, appendices and/or presentation slides in the CAMRI Research Digest Series is produced strictly for academic purposes. Any such document is not to be construed as an offer or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any securities, nor is it meant to provide investment advice. National University of Singapore (NUS), NUS Business School, CAMRI, the participating students, faculty members, research fellows and staff accept no liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss arising from any use of this document, or any communication given in relation to this document.
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