The Franco-American Response to the Conscription Crisis in Canada, 1916-1918 ROBERT G. LEBLANC T he of approximately French Canadians to themigration United States between 1840one andmillion 1930 was distinctive.' Compared with other ethnic groups who arrived at the same time, the migrants were close to their motherland. Two-thirds of the total settled in New England mill towns, the remainder in the northern tier of states from New York to North Dakota. Whether the ancestral home and village were in Quebec (for the vast majority of migrants) or the Maritime Provinces (source of Acadians), they were readily accessible to most Proximity encouraged the maintenance of social and cultural ties between migrant communities and homeland. Family visits during holiday periods were promoted by special excursion fares on the railroads. Funerals and weddings were the occasion for additional visits. The transfer of cultural institutions was facilitated by the same condition. Proximity encouraged many migrants to adopt a "sojourner" men-

tality, seeking job opportunities in New England mills while harboring hopes of an eventual return to Canada with accumulated savings. Migrants could, and did, return to Canada whenever mills closed, only to cross the frontier once again when economic conditions in the United States provided the option of gainful employment chronically so lacking in French Canada. The intimacy of the bonding between migrants and their homeland ultimately slowed the rate of assimilation while raising the concern of nativists who viewed with suspicion a people seemingly slow to Americanize.' Close personal and institutional contact between the elites of French Canada and those in migrant communities promoted a shared perspective on most major issues affecting the well-being of French Canadians on either side of the border.' Members of the Franco-American elite were, in fact, Canadian-born and Canadian-educated at the beginning of the migration. Thereafter, many Franco-Americans, although American-born, were sent to Quebec for a classical college education.' Of the many issues confronting both groups, none was of greater importance than la survivance or cultural survival. The preservation of their French language and Roman Catholic religion was high on the agenda of each group. The strategies employed to achieve their cultural goals were similar as well, even though, as time revealed, the differing social contexts of their cultural battles became more apparent. The American Review of Canadian Studies (Autumn 1993): 343-372.

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Franco-American elite came to recognize that a strategy appropriate to la survivance in Canada might be less suitable to their own struggle in the United States. A case in point was the response of each group to the demands for support of, and participation in, World War I. For many French Canadians the war was the expression of an imperial struggle in which they had no perceived vested interest—a war which, were they to participate in it fully with the dispatch of troops to Europe, actually threatened their cultural survival. Franco-Americans, on the other hand, came eventually to realize that they could not risk any posture other than unequivocal support and participation. To do otherwise would do serious damage to their own prospects for survival. This paper will examine the response of the Franco-American elite to the war and to the opposition mounted to it by large segments of Quebec society. The perception of the war by the mass of Franco-Americans, mostly semiliterate mill workers, must be deduced from their collective behavior. The view of the elite, on the other hand, is well revealed in the frequent commentary of the editors of the francophone press in New England. The Franco-American Press The Franco-American press was flourishing at the time of World War I. From insecure beginnings in the nineteenth century, several newspapers had grown in size along with the communities they were established to serve.' Circulation, frequency of publication, and quality generally reflected the size of the Franco-American community. Those whose contents were examined include L'Avenir National, Manchester, New Hampshire (daily); L'Opinion Publique, Worcester, Massachusetts (daily); L'Etolle, Lowell, Massachusetts (daily); La Tribune, Woonsocket, Rhode Island (daily); L'Impartial, Nashua, New Hampshire (three times weekly); Le Messager, Lewiston, Maine (three times weekly); La Justice, Holyoke, Massachusetts (weekly); and La Justice, Biddeford, Maine (weekly). While other sources were consulted, the conclusions of this study are based largely on the evidence from these newspapers. The lack of a topical index for any of these newspapers made impractical a thorough search of each issue throughout the period of World War I. Stories and commentary on the conscription crisis were periodic and coincided with specific events such as a "conscription riot" in Montreal or an editorial in the New York Times critical of French Canada. A quick scan of page-one stories and of the editorial page

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served to identify these events, after which a more thorough search of the contents was conducted. The editorials were usually unsigned but generally the product of a single author well known to colleagues. Frequent use was made of editorials from other Franco-American and Quebecois papers. The editors and publishers of these newspapers were among the intellectual leaders of their communities. Well educated, well informed, masters of rhetoric and frequently egocentric, they occasionally engaged in acrimonious debate with each other while staunchly defending the perceived "national" interest. As members of the elite, they had assumed responsibility for charting the destiny of Franco-Americans. If they elicited laudatory or vitriolic commentary from fellow editors, they were less successful with their subscribers. Unfortunately, there were very few "letters to the editors," reflecting, most likely, the lack of sophistication of the readership and the political complexity of the issues. The editors perceived themselves as community leaders and sought to mold the opinion of their untutored readers. There were several significant events or issues which provoked editorial comment, the first of which predated the outbreak of World War

The Ontario School Issue All battles waged by French-Canadian minorities outside of Quebec for the continued use of their language in education had ended in dismal defeats. In Ontario, where anglophones constituted such a strong majority, the issue did not surface as early as it had in the Prairies or in the Maritimes where larger and potentially dominant francophone populations were well established. the small 6 B e tFrench w e epopulations n 1 7of Upper 6 3Canada had enjoyed the de facto use of the French language in their schools even in the absence of a n d clear legal guarantees. After 1867, the French language had no legal 1 8 6 7 , standing in the schools of Ontario, although once again its use continued in the primary schools wherever Franco-Ontarian registration was sufficiently large. The benign indifference of Ontario came to an end as continued migration of Quebecois into the province after 1880 raised the proportion of francophones to 10 percent . ed 7 to P restrict r e s s further u r e themuseoof uFrench n tand- to promote assimilation as rapidly as possible, culminating in the passage of the infamous Regulation 17 limiting the use of French as the language of instruction to the first two grades of primary school. The new law was criticized by Franco-Ontarians and inflamed the passions of Quebecois national-

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ists. Regulation 17 would be cited repeatedly, along with similar restrictions on the use of French across Canada, as one of several reasons that French Canadians should not support the Allied effort in World War The Ontario school issue immediately captured the attention of the Franco-American editors. It was a problem with which they and their readers could identify very easily. They could readily empathize with Franco-Ontarians in the latter's confrontation with the nativists among Ontario's population or with the Irish-Catholic hierarchy because of their own encounters with similar "assimilationists" in New England. The uniform sympathetic response of the editors was predictable. They carried stories and editorials from the "nationalist" press of Quebec in toto. They printed pleas of Franco-Ontarians for contributions to their legal defense fund. Some of the Franco-American editors were more aroused by the issue than others. L'Impartial carried stories and commentary in almost every issue in the winter and spring of 1915 and 1916. The editor of L'Opinion Publique, by contrast, showed no interest either in running the story or in commenting on it. He was so thoroughly absorbed in the war, with daily editorials on the status of the front and on international politics, including the Mexican War and the Irish uprising, that there seemed to be neither time, space, nor apparent inclination to cover even local issues concerning Franco-Americans. Most Franco-American editors took clear and unequivocal positions, critical of both Irish clergy and Orangemen. All agreed with their colleague from Lowell when he observed: Les Canadiens-francais s o n t Si peu traites avec justice dans la plupart des provinces a majorite anglaise, que leur ardeur pour alter defendre l'Angleterre, qui ferme les yeux sur la perskution des francais de l'Ontario, le Manitoba, etc., devrait s'en trouver passablement refroldie. Le pretendu 'fair play' britannique n'est qu'un vain mot (L'Etoile, 10 May 1916) Few8issues related to the controversy over French-Canadian partici-

pation in the war would evoke as uniform a response from the FrancoAmerican editors. The Participation of French Canadians in the War In its earliest expression, the conscription crisis was founded on the charge made by many in English Canada that French Canadians were not providing their fair share of support for the war effort, particularly as reflected in voluntary enlistments. The response of the French was either to dismiss the charge categorically by using data in such a

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way as to support their denial or to accept the validity of the basic charge while citing the many reasons for their reluctance to serve. It is clear that there was no popular support for the war in Quebec and that there was considerable active opposition to participation. While most members of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in the province deftly hedged their positions, the parish priest boldly counseled against participation, as did members of the middle class. It is clear also that large segments of Anglo-Canadian society were lukewarm in their support of the war effort, a point frequently made by Quebecois nationalists. Indeed, the greatest support by the measure of enlistments was provided by the British-born in Canada, a group described by French Canadians as more British than Canadian. ateN entreaties attacks by the Ontario 9 e i t h to e enlist r ptheir a support s s i nor o nvitriolic press moved French Canadians. Indeed, their opposition to the war increased as the conflict, the early end of which had been expected by many, continued. Opposition to the war by French Canadians was based on several considerations, not the least of which was the Ontario school crisis. Why, French Canadians asked, should they rush to defend an imperial power, England, that was so apparently uninterested in restraining the anti-French bigots of its Canadian dominion? The Department of Defense didn't help matters by insisting on the use of English as the only training and command language in the Canadian Armed Forces, by promoting an officer corps dominated by anglophones, and by dismantling the few exclusively French-Canadian regiments. The passage of the conscription law in 1917 and the prospect for the deployment of large numbers of French Canadians in the front lines of an increasingly lethal war caused some nationalists to raise the specter of cultural genocide. Readers of the Franco-American press were kept well informed about the criticisms leveled at their cousins. Stories were carried detailing the charges and the countercharges of English and French Canadians. Editorials from the Quebecois press were run frequently, revealing the division in the ranks of the editors on the war issue. They had been and remained uniform in the expression of their outrage over the Ontario school crisis. However, for a small number of newspapers, notably L'Elknement and La Patrie, the war was worthy of support by all Canadians including the French, a position at odds with the majority of the nationalist press, especially Le Devoir and Henri Bourassa, its outspoken editor. Franco-American editors saw their own monolithic perspective break down into differing views. All agreed that the visceral criticism of French Canadians by the Ontario Boches was un-

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justified. They dismissed as fictitious the published data on enlistments that supported the view that French Canadians were unwilling to serve. They presented their own statistics or borrowed some from Quebec papers to show exactly the opposite. They ran frequent stories of Quebecois who were serving willingly and proudly. Finally, they rushed to defend their cousins by citing all the reasons justifying the opposition to the war in Quebec, in so doing ironically admitting that the facts advanced by the opposition might be accurate. The Franco-American editors could not agree on the number of French-Canadian volunteers nor on the extent of the anticonscription sentiment in Quebec. La Tribune, in admitting the presence of nationalists like Bourassa and their influence in discouraging enlistments, pointed out that French Canadians, if divided on the war, would be rendered weaker in the larger struggle for cultural survival in Canada. The unity that the editor encouraged would be achieved if those Quebecois currently opposing the war would come to support it. L'Etoile responded that such criticism of the nationalists was excessively harsh and that French Canadians, despite the diatribes of Bourassa, continued to enlist and serve with credit. For La Tribune this was a rejection of the facts: Ce n'est pas en traitant les nationalistes de tetes chaudes, de sanspatrie qu'on supprimera leur existence A quoi bon chercher flier des faits indiscutables. (25 January 1916)'°

The dialogue between the editors from Lowell and Woonsocket continued. From L'Etolle: le tort enorme qu'ils se causeraient par cette abstention rejaillirait sur les descendants de la fawn la plus penible. En un mot, dans les circonstances, il vaut mieux pour les Canadiens-francais etre proAnglais que pro-Allemand, car il n'y a pas de milieu en face de cc conflit quasi-mondial N o u s concedons que Bourassa a serne le grain qui leve des divisions intestines parmi les Canadiens-francais; mais il n'a pu reussir jusqu'ici a empecher nos freres du Canada de s'enroler et de partir pour la guerre. (27 January 1916)"

From La Tribune: [L'Etolle] va meme jusqu'a nous accuser d'être du cote des ennemis de notre race N o y o n s , y a-t-il oui ou non, un groupe fort important de Canadiens-francais qu'on appelle des nationalistes et qui font feu des quatre pieds dans les journaux et dans les assemblees publiques pour recommander a leur compatriotes de rester tranquillement chez

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eux au lieu d'aller se battre en Europe sous le drapeau de l'Angleterre? Bourassa, Lavergne et rant d'autres, pensent-ils comme Msg. Bruchesi au sujet de la participation? Le Devoir a-t-il sur cc point la meme maniere que La Patne et La Presse? (1 February 1916) The12 brief and public exchange of views was concluded with the fol-

lowing comment by L'Etoile: Pourquoi transformer quelques divergences d'opinion en guerre intestine? A lire La Tribune on penserait que la province de Quebec est partagee en deux camps presqu'egaux, se battant pour et contre la participation a la guerre, quand c'est le contraire qui est vrai, puisque les deux partis, conservateur et liberal, logent a la meme enseigne concernant le devoir des Canadiens-francais pendant la crise actuelle mondiale. (3 February 1916) 13 Surprisingly, no other editors engaged in this debate, at least in print.

The position taken by L'Etoile is, nevertheless, indicative of the posture on the war assumed by many of the Franco-American elite. For a people so quick to defer to authority, it was easy to dismiss evidence of antiwar sentiment and behavior among French Canadians as Outright fabrication by detractors. What more could one expect from les Anglais? Claiming that French Canadians were contributing their fair share to the war effort did require the adoption of a prowar posture. That they were enlisting was commendable since they had far less reason to do so than Anglo-Canadians. The excesses of French-Canadian nationalism were criticized, but L'Etoile and other papers frequently carried the full text of Bourassa's speeches without comment. There were gradual and subtle shifts in position of L'Etolle as it wrestled with the reality of antiwar sentiment in Quebec. Bourassa was praised occasionally, but attacks on the patriotism of French Canadians were unacceptable even when the source was one of their own: L'Evenement , a la surprise de tous, a fait chorus avec les mangeurs de francais d'Ontario pour deblaterer contre sa race a propos de recruitement. (L'Etoile, 1 June 1916) 14 angry retort was in response to the conservative Quebec paL'Etoite's

per's wholesale charges of unpatriotic activity against the lower clergy and the petite bourgeoisie, as well as members of the Liberal Party. But, by the spring of 1916, the editors had another concern. Criticism of French-Canada in the U.S. Press The debate over French Canada's support in World War I was conducted largely between English and French Canadians. Were they or

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were they not enlisting in the Canadian Armed Forces? Should they or shouldn't they play their part? It was, after all, a Canadian story. The extent that Franco-Americans commented on the debate sprang from concern for the well-being of their motherland and the struggle of a people in pursuit of its own perceived national interests. In a larger context it was a debate over issues which challenged the future of the Canadian Confederation and of the survival of French Canada as an exotic enclave within Anglo-America. For Franco-Americans it ceased to be an exclusively Canadian story when the English-language press of the United States began to carry stories of the antiwar sentiment in Quebec. Seventy-five years ago, Canada was no more likely to be newsworthy to an American editor than it is today. But Canada, as a British dominion, was already at war. War-related stories reasonably could be deemed worthy of printing. The stories made their first appearance in the spring of 1916. An article in the Boston American of 9 March 1916, written by its Ottawa correspondent, reported that Franco-Ontarians were being advised against enlisting by their parish priests. A balanced article, it went on to provide the background of the language crisis in provincial schools as explanation for the antiwar sentiment. The editor of L'Impartial printed the story translated into French, but insisted in his accompanying commentary that French Canadians were joining in large numbers despite the very good reasons they might have for not doing so) 5 A major article representing a greater potential for damage to the image of French Canada in the United States appeared in the New York Times magazine section of 25 June 1916. It attracted more attention. "Priests Block Recruiting in Quebec Province" once more linked the antiwar feeling of QuaDecois with the Ontario school issue but went on to quote Rev. Huard, a former professor of Chicoutimi, at great length. The image presented in the article was of a province with a rapidly growing population, a religion in which "even the wink of a parish priest is far more effective with a French-Canadian farmer or fisherman than the most urgent call from Ottawa or the most eloquent appeal of the recruiting agent," and "extremists who hint at actual physical rebellion and civil war." Lest readers should doubt the veracity of the article, they were told that "the surprising thing is that the priests of Quebec admit the truth of many of these statements." Eight months later, a Boston Herald story by George Tufts aroused even greater concern. At great length, supported by the statements of three Quebec clerics, Tufts claimed that the clergy of Quebec openly

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denounced Protestant England, schismatic Russia, and the anticlericalism of both Italy and France. French Canadians, he claimed, were as opposed to conscription as they had been to recruitment and were close to taking up arms to establish their independence. In the same vein, The Manchester (New Hampshire) Union editorialized on 8 June 1917: Canada has its own Sinn Fein as well as Ireland I t doesn't inscribe 'For Ourselves Alone' on its banners but it embodies the words in its acts I t is characteristically unpopular I t obstructs conscription rand] refuses to share the responsibility of a coalition government.

Its readers could not have pondered long on the analogy even though "French Canadians" and "Quebec" were not used in the editorial. The Response of the Franco-American Editors Franco-Americans had good reason to be concerned over the criticism of French Canadians in the American press. In the popular mind of New England there was little to distinguish the two groups apart from country of residence. Many Franco-Americans had learned the English language, had become naturalized citizens, and had made an obvious commitment to becoming patriotic supporters of their adopted country. However, far more Franco-Americans, especially in the large textile cities of eastern New England, lived their lives in French in petits Canadas, which discouraged assimilation. Many were ambivalent on the subject of citizenship, including those who still harbored thoughts of repatriation to Canada. The Franco-American elite assured the Yankee hosts of the undivided loyalty of their people, but nativist suspicion lingered even after a half-century of residence. The fear of a disloyal "fifth column" within the ethnic enclaves of America would increase as the war dragged on. The reply of the editors to charges critical of French Canadians was a reiteration of their earlier responses. French Canadians, they insisted, were serving in the war and fulfilling their obligation as loyal Canadian citizens. If they were not serving in appropriate numbers, it was because of their poor treatment, especially outside of Quebec. The editors recognized the threat posed by the critical stories and editorials carried in American as well as Canadian newspapers. The loyalty of Franco-Americans would be challenged. A new dimension to their editorials was perceptible—no longer mere outrage and strident denial of all charges but, now, apprehension and fear.

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All Franco-American editors, even those who had seemingly distanced themselves and their papers from the unfolding story in Quebec, joined ranks. None could remain indifferent. These were absolute lies, unworthy of a reputable paper, charged L'Etoile's editorial, "Ecrit contre les Canadiens-Francais" of the Herald story by Tufts. II est etrange que la campagne de denigrement des Canadiens-francais se soit etendue jusqu'a la Nouvelle Angleterre, oft deja, une revue et un aurre grand journal de Boston ont publie sur le compte de nos freres du Canada des ecrits absolument mensongers [sic] et indignes de la haute reputation de ces feuilles. (12 April 1917) 16

All of the papers subsequently carried the full text of the letters from the three clerics denying nearly all that Tufts had claimed they had said. L'Opinion Ptiblique recognized the potential damage of the Herald story: De semblables Cents ont malheureusement une plus grande portee qu'on le crofter il importe que le public Americain qui est tres sympathique a notre element ne demeure pas sous l'impression facheuse qu'ont du lui causer les interviews habilement travestis et les revelations erronees de quelques plumitifs en mal de sensation. (12 April 1917)' 7

L'Independant (Fall River, Massachusetts) expressed the anxiety that all of the editors most surely felt: n nous semble que le Boston Herald devrait eviter de publier dam ses colonnes des diatribes q u i sont de nature a nuire a la bonne reputation des Canadiens-francais e t a causer aux Franco-Americains de tres graves ennuis. (10 April 1917)"'

The New York Times had continued with its coverage, balancing an occasional story disparaging French Canadians with letters refuting the negative content of the story or praising them. La Justice (Holyoke, Massachusetts) admitted that such negative reporting, when carried in reputable newspapers like the New York Times, posed a special threat and required a response: A tout moment, nous nous voyons forces de relever quelqu'article ridicule publie contre les notres et la province de Quebec. Quand ces ecrits paraissent sur des feuilles insignifiantes, on ne s'en preoccupe pas m a i s quand us sont loges dans des journaux de l'importance du "New York Times" il est impossible de les passer sous silence. (7 June 1917)'

L'Etoile called for censorship:

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• le gouvernement canadien devrait faire au 'Boston Herald' ce qu'll a fait aux journaux de Hearst. Le gouvernement devrait songer que nous avons des freres aux Etats-Unis et que de telles assertions vont revolter. (25 April 1917) 20

L'Impartial's call to action seems quixotic:

Comment contrecarrer une pareille campagne? T o u s les Canadiens-francais qui le peuvent doivent essayer d'atteindre la presse Americaine. (9 October 1917) 21

As if to reassure themselves and their readers that none of the charges had merit, the editors carried every possible story which praised French Canadians. If frustrated by their impotence to control the perceptions of New England Yankees, the editors were quick to seize upon the one strategy open to them. They would rally Franco-Americans to the war effort. La Tribune acknowledged that the damage done to the reputation of Franco-Americans was less than to that of French Canadians, but there was no room for complacency: Depuis longtemps des gens interesses a deprecier notre element insinuent mechamment que les notres ne font guere leur devoir I c i le mal est moindre mais ii convient de le prevenir et l'on ne pouvait trouver un meilleur moyen que le plan prepare par le secretaire de l'Union Saint-Jean-Baptiste. 22

When the project, listing all Franco-Americans currently serving in the military, is complete: les denigreurs de notre race a u r o n t la preuve irrefutable de notre attachement aux institutions du pays et de notre fidelite au drapeau etoile. (10 May 1 9 1 7 ) 23

The behavior of Franco-Americans, whether in response to the entreaties of the editors or not, was in stark contrast to that of French Canadians, a contrast revealed when, soon after its declaration of war, the United States passed a draft law. The U.S. Draft Law On 6 April 1917 the United States declared war on Germany. The Congressional bill arranging for the drafting of Americans into the armed forces was signed into law by President Wilson on May 18. Registration for the draft was scheduled to begin on June 6. The quick passage of the draft law provided Franco-Americans with a timely opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to their adopted country. A pre-

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diction of their support for the war was made even in advance of the passage of the draft law.

En pretendant que ces departs sont occasionnes par la crainte de la conscription, quand un si grand nombre des notres s'enrolent tous les jours dans l'armee des Etats-Unis, c'est evidemment le moyen le

La guerre vase declarer demain. je suis skir que pas un de nos leunes franco-americains ne voudratent [cornme les anti-conscriptionistes] aussi inconsiderement risquer sa reputation, entoures surtout comme nous sommes ainsi qu'au Canada, de races qui ne manqueraient pas d'en profiter pour nous ecraser d'un mepris immerite. (La Justice [Holyoke], 29 March 1917) 24

plus sill- de nous faire passer, bien a tort, pour des poltrons et des

The view of La Justice was shared by all editors. For some Franco-Americans, the conflict had begun even before the formal declaration of war in April 1917. Since so many of them had failed, for whatever reason, to become naturalized U.S. citizens, they were technically at liberty to join the Canadian Armed Forces. The departure of some Franco-Americans for Quebec to enlist was recorded carefully in local newspapers, as were the occasional reports of their heroic behavior, injury, or death on the battlefield. We may never know the numbers involved or the precise reasons for their enlistment, but the editors were obviously delighted with the opportunity to reveal to the world—or at least to their limited audience—the loyalty of Franco-Americans, especially since so many apparently were awaiting demonstration of that fact." While there may have been little doubt about how Franco-Americans would respond to the draft, one incident reveals both the anxiety of the editors and the fact that a few Franco-Americans (those not naturalized) may in fact have taken an unscheduled trip to Quebec in the spring of 1917. La Tribune, in an editorial, acknowledged that some Franco-Americans were then returning to Canada to avoid the draft and called on all readers to protest and discourage such stupid behavior: Nous ne devrions pas meme nous occuper de ces 'poissons d'avril' d'un nouveau genre, ils sont trop invraisemblables. (24 April 1917) 26

The horror of such an admission was discernible in the response of L'Etoile: L'article du confrere est de nature a faire croire que les Franco-americains ne sont pas aussi patriotes que les autres citoyens de ce pays. 11 ne s'imagine peut-etre pas tousle tort qu'il nous cause. Son ignorance sur ce rapport est phenomenal.

L'Etoile pointed out that it was common for Franco-Americans who still owned farms in Quebec to return there for the spring planting. The editorial continued:

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La Tribune's defensive response was that its charge of draft dodging was made in response to the personal request of a few factory owners who were fearful that if more left, there would be a dangerous decline in production. The editor insisted that some Franco-American families from Woonsocket and Manville, Rhode Island had left for Canada out of fear of impending registration—"nous le savons et nous [avons] des preuves irrefutables." He then took credit for correcting the problem: nous avons crie tres fort et, Dieu merci, notre cri a ete entendu. De fait, la sotte frayeur que nous deplorions a disparu. (I May 1917) 28 chose to let the matter rest there. L'Etoile

Most Franco-American males of draft age were still Canadian citizens while permanently domiciled in the United States. journer 29 T hmentality" e " sof omany - early migrants no longer prevailed. Young migrant families, well informed of the petits CanyAns, came with the intention of staying. Paradoxically, they were slow to become naturalized. They were required to register as aliens, but after the passage of the draft law they had the option of volunteering for military service with the United States. They could also register for the draft, but were not required to. That condition ended in September 1917 when all who had not registered or volunteered were required to register for potential service in the Canadian military under the provision of the conscription law just passed in Canada. The ambiguous status of Franco-Americans already had been exposed in late July with the arrival in New England of the Reverend Father Doyon, a Dominican priest and chaplain to the famous 22nd Regiment. His assigned task was the recruitment of Franco-Americans, as yet unnaturalized, for the Canadian military. His presence and his assignment were the occasion for another debate among the editors. L'Avenir National predicted that , even though Fran-

co would likely choose service in the American army and for very good reasons: A m Les injustices criantes commises par les autorites militaires du Cane r ada a Pegard des Canadiens-francais en cc qui se rapporte au service militaire ne sont pas un encouragement pour les leunes Franco-americ a ns h a

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icains a se mettre sous un commandant Anglais—ils prefereront servir sous notre drapeau etoile et as auront incontestablement raison. (17 September 1917) 3 L'Etoile expressed its clear annoyance with the Doyon mission: ° S'il est un simple agent recruteur pour le gouvernement anglais, qui laisse &eraser les Canadiens-francais de l'Ontario sous la botte des francophobes n o u s nous contenterons de lui rappeler que les Franco-americains s'ils doivent prendre les armes, prefereront naturellement s'enroler sous le drapeau etolle parce qu'll represente plus que celui de l'Angleterre, la justice, la liberte et l'independance. (25 July 1917) 31

Other editors were equally hostile or at least expressed the need for circumspection. bzi Justice, however, saw nothing to fear in Doyon's mis-

sion or in the idea of Franco-Americans serving in the Canadian forces. Its editor was forced to defend himself against charges of siding with the "cultural enemy." L'Etoile, meanwhile, sensitive to the potential charge of "slackers" in Franco-American communities, pleaded for patience. Its editor, feeling that an explanation of the large number of noncitizens in those communities was necessary, claimed that they simply hadn't gotten around to establishing citizenship. He pleaded that they be given a chance to show their patriotism. He claimed that because of the entry of the United States into the war, hundreds were becoming naturalized because they would rather fight for the United States than for England. The heated exchange of editorials between La Justice and other papers went on for a month. Tribune: 32 I t e n d e d w Les i Canadiens-francals t h ou autres, etablis aux Etats-Unis [qui] ont t neglige h i de ses faire naturaliser, vont , sans doute, se mordre les pouces. II eststoujours o b e r dangereux v a tde s'asseoir sur une cloture. (15 October I917)" i o n iApart from nthe sarcasm, the editorial clearly was intended to encourage naturalization and enlistment. L a After they had assured themselves that citizenship and the retention of their culture were not incompatible, naturalization had been on the agenda of the editors for decades. Naturalization, it has been noted, was not very high on the agenda of the average migrant. It now appeared increasingly important as a precondition to effective service in the armed forces of the United States. "Faites-vous naturatiser" was

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the plea carried almost daily along with lessons in American history and a list of test questions ("Who was George Washington?") likely to appear on the examination. Nothing was left to chance. Franco-Americans were exhorted regularly to do their patriotic duty while simultaneously provided with evidence that their obligations to their adopted country were being fulfilled admirably. Two months before the declaration of war, the Franco-American Brigade, a recently formed patriotic group with a self-assigned military mission, pledged its support in a letter to President Wilson: The BrigadP des Volontaires Franco-AmiTicains des Etats-finis, in con-

vention assembled at Central Falls, Rhode Island, wishes to reassert the undivided allegiance of its members to their flag as American citizens and as an organized body, stands ready to respond to the defense of American ideals in the current crisis. 34

Similar expressions of support were forthcoming from the major Franco-American organizations. L'Impartial urged its readers: S'il est un temps oil nous devrions manifester notre loyaute a notre patrie d'adoption, c'est bien a l'heure actuelle. Franco-Americains, partout oO vous demeurez, levez-vousl Montrez-vous de veritables

patriotes! (28 April 1917) 35 The words of the national anthem, as well as other patriotic songs, appeared regularly. "Faites votre devoir," Franco-Americans read on the eve of the first day of registration for the draft. When registering or enlisting, readers were told not to anglicize their names because authorities after the war would try to determine the level of participation of each ethnic group. Massive patriotic demonstrations were organized. Financial support of the war effort by the purchase of government bonds was encouraged. ("Souscrivez a l'emprunt de guerre—pas de tireau-fianc—pas de slackers.") With great pride, the editors announced the assignment of a Franco-American, Harold Gosselin, as secretary to General Sherman leagues, 36 a nR.I. d Bonneau, to the American embassy in Paris. a few instances among the editors over narrow issues, 37 A p a r t of squabbling f r o m o f all endorsed and supported the full participation of Franco-Ameritcanshin the e war. a pThe p effort o i of the Franco-American journalists to rally their group n t m e n appears to have been successful. During the war, the around the flag ethnic press was being monitored by authorities for evidence of dist loyalty or treason, and the assessment of the Springfield (Massachuo f o n e o

35 8 setts) Union must have gratified all Franco-Americans: L e While it is true that most of the newspapers printed in German and many o f the Swedish-American publications express sentiments B which actually are treasonable, or close to it, the papers printed in l French and Italian appear to be doing their utmost to uphold the cause a for which America and her allies are contending. 38 n What of the rank and file? Were they perceived as patriotic and loyal cto America? One appraisal from an impartial and well-positioned source certainly attested to their good behavior. The Boston Globe observed that: by contrast with French-Canadians who for the most part have no sympathy for England or France, it is comforting to examine FrancoAmericans who rather than being a cause of concern are a source of strength and are as loyal as any other group in the United States. (5 September 1917)

The Globe editorial was translated and appeared in nearly all of the francophone press. It was accompanied by expressions of pride and self-satisfaction and, one suspects, by considerable relief! The absence of any stories citing suspicion or criticism of Franco-Americans also suggests that, indeed, they did pass the test of loyalty. The charges of treason against French Canadians, however, continued and even increased in the spring and summer of 1917, and, regardless of favorable indicators showing Franco-American loyalty, the editors could not be complacent. The Conscription Law On June 11, the Military Service Act, a bill calling for conscription, was introduced in the Canadian Parliament. Prime Minister Borden frequently had expressed his personal opposition to conscription and had assured Parliament in January 1916 that he had no intention of resorting to it. Similar promises had been made to Liberal leader Wilfrid Laurier and to some members of the Catholic Church in Quebec to enlist their support in promoting, or at least not discouraging, enlistments in Canada's volunteer army. However sincere his promises in 1917, Borden became the captive of events over which he exercised little control. The war, in particular, was not going well. Thousands of men were bogged down in the trenches, and casualties were beginning to mount As enlistments declined across Canada, there was need for a more serious consideration of compulsory military service than ever had been thought necessary. How else could Canada fulfill the perceived manpower requirements of its military leaders?

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Political pressure for conscription, from within Canada as well as from England, became more vocal and insistent, as did the voices of those opposed to compulsory service. Opposition to the proposed law was hardly confined to Quebec, but it seemed lodged there in the popular Canadian mind. French Canadians at least were consistent. They were opposed to the conscription law as they had been opposed to voluntary enlistment. Following the tabling of the law on June 11, opposition took the form of mass demonstrations organized by nationalist leaders in Montreal, Quebec City, and elsewhere in the province. Passage of the conscription bill on 25 July 1917 and its signing into law on 29 August brought more public demonstrations. It also forced upon the political and ecclesiastical leaders of the province the decision of whether to encourage compliance or defiance of the law. French Canadians were left with their own decision—whether or not to register and, if called, whether or not to serve. Their behavior was closely monitored south of the 45th parallel. The responses of the Franco-American editors to the political drama unfolding in their pays natal was varied, leading in some cases to bitter exchanges. Most maintained the positions initially taken, although some temporized as they coped with the increasingly distressing news of "slackers," of violence, and of death. No longer able to dismiss the behavior of their cousins as mere fabrication, they were forced to come up with reasons or excuses for it Finally, they were challenged to reconcile in print their uniformly held position of unqualified support of the war effort by Franco-Americans with their rejection of a similar stance for French Canadians. It had become more than an idle exercise in the rhetoric in which they were so well trained. At stake were the honor and good reputation of both French Canadians and FrancoAmericans. The only common ground for agreement among the editors was their stand in opposition to the conscription law, although taken for different reasons. Soon after the bill was introduced, the outspoken editor of La Justice (Holyoke) called it a constitutional heresy: L'enrolement force de soldats pour aller combattre en dehors du territoire canadien constitue une heresie constitutionelle et une violation des prerogatives pour lesquelles ont lutte, si energiquement, au cours du siecle demier, les chefs de notre race et les peres de la Confederation. (31 May 1917) 39

L'Opinion Publique claimed that conscription was not necessary because military manpower was already adequate. 4 ° F o r L ' E t o i l e , c o n -

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scription in Canada represented a new chapter in the manipulation of its colonists by an imperial power: la conscription au Canada n'a pas sa raison d'être. C'est la premiere fois, croyons-nous, dans l'histoire universelle, qu'un gouvemement imperial force ses colons a se mertre en servage complet chez autrui. (15 September 1917) 1

La Tribune called the law unnecessary and an injustice because Canada already had contributed more than its fair share when compared with the contributions of France, England, the United States, or other colonies such as Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa. 42 The editors were not in agreement in assigning the responsibility for the conditions which seemingly had forced Canada to consider and adopt conscription. La Justice noted that two of French Canada's outstanding politicians, then engaged in the political battle over conscription, were themselves responsible for the problem. Wilfrid Laurier, it was claimed, had opened the door to Canada's participation in foreign wars by his willingness to send Canadians to fight in the Boer War. In amore general way, La Justice accused the current leaders of the nationalist movement in Quebec: En presence du spectre de la conscription qui se leve a Ottawa, les chefs du nationalisme quebecois, s'ecrient suivant leurs habitudes: 'Nous vous l'avions bien dit.' Its savent pourtant qu'eux seuls sont responsables de cette mesure. S'ils eussent kiss& la jeunesse canadienne s'enroler normalement, la conscription n'eut jamais ete cessaire. (28 May 1917)"

Henri Bourassa, the object of critical editorials by La Justice for more than two years, was singled Out for special blame: Mais vint la propagande nationaliste. Trouvant la une occasion nouvelle de faire du bruit autour de son nom, M. Bourassa l a n c a son ecole dans une propagande effrenee contre Penrolement et la participation. De la refroidissement graduel et paralysie d'un element considerable de la nation, avec repercussions, necessairement fatales dans toutes les sections du pays. (31 May 1917)"

La Justice concluded that Bourassa's antiwar campaign had been so successful in reducing French-Canadian enlistments that Canada had been forced to resort to conscription. Le Messager went even further, charging Bourassa with being more German than French-Canadian. The editor of L'Etoile, himself an occasional critic of Bourassa, took his frequent adversary from Holyoke to task for his allegation that

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Bourassa was responsible. He blamed current conditions on the political charlatans who had deceived the episcopate and all of Canada by insisting that conscription would never be established: a qui la faute sinon a un gouvernement qui gouverne sans mandat, et qui recolt ses ordres non du peuple mais de Londres. Estce ainsi que les choses doivent se passer dans un pays qui pretend faire partie de la grande famille democratique? (5 July 1917)"

Assessing the responsibility for the conscription crisis was, as it appears, easier than contending with the consequences of the law, whether during the two-month-long period of its debate or the period following its passage. Anticonscription sentiment was not new to Quebec or to other parts of Canada.° Its expression came quite naturally to many French Canadians. Opposition to conscription was confined largely to the nationalist press and the pulpit. It had been expressed before the federal government had indicated its position on the issue and continued after official assurances that conscription would not be necessary. With the imminent passage of the conscription bill, La Tribune wondered what the response of the anticonscriptionists would be while pointing out that French Canadians were confronted with a major dilemma: Maintenant , quel sera le devoir des anti-conscriptionistes ...? Devront-ils humblement Sc soumettre? Devront-ils, au contraire, resister? L a resistance, sok active, soit passive, c'est la justification de repressions sanglantes dont les Canadiens-francais seront les premieres victimes. De ces maux, quel est le moindre?" (27 July 1917) 47

In the spring and summer of 1917, as passions heightened, large public demonstrations were organized. Most were peaceful; some were not. L'Etoi le, having carried several stories on anticonscription demonstrations in Quebec without comment, finally expressed apprehension over those events. Quoting liberally from the impassioned speeches of two nationalist leaders at a meeting in Montreal, the editor concluded ominously: Ce qui precede suffit pour denoter une effervescence des esprits assez dangereuse dans notre pays natal. II faut esperer que les hommes calmes et moderes, pour ou contre la conscription, sauront faire contrepoids et prevenir une explosion. (16 June 1917) 48

La Tribune was equally apprehensive while clearly assessing blame: Ces troubles sont-ils les avant-coureurs d'une revolution? C'est possible. En tout cas, les Anglais du Canada, sinon ceux d'Angleterre,

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recoltent cc qu'ils ont seme. (29 May 1917) 49editors were less disposed to absolve anticonscription demonOther strators. On two occasions in late May 1917, a mob broke the windows of La Presse and La Patrie in Montreal, two newspapers which consistently had supported French-Canadian enlistments and, while not encouraging passage of the bill, certainly were not opposed to it. The incidents provoked Le Messager to observe:

Union saw sinister agents provocateurs in the Quebec mob, L'Avenir National found another guilty party:

Les vitrines de La Presse et La Pattie furent brisees l e s anti-conscriptionistes ne veutent pas se battre contre les Allemands, mais apparemment ils sont fameux contre les vitrines et les citoyens qui veulent defendre leurs meres-patries. (4 June 1917) 59

L'Etoi le assured its readers that all of the friends of French Canada deplored the recent violence in Quebec City and that the French-Canadian press was unanimous in its denunciation of the riots. The editor was certain that the hot-blooded Quebecois who participated surely would regret their behavior. L'Etoile concluded:

La Justice was no more conciliatory or sympathetic, dismissing the demonstrators as tetes chaudes blindly responding to the inflammatory rhetoric of the nationalists. 5 On 29 August 1917, the Military Service Act became law. La Presse' s prediction ' French did not materialize. Many failed to register and sim52 t hCanadians at, ply went into hiding. "Slackers," it was claimed, filled the forests of o n c e northern New England. Demonstrations against the law continued, and p a s s e the violence escalated. Over a period of three days on Easter weekend, d , anticonscription rioting resulted in the looting and sacking of 1918, tthe offices h of the Quebec Chronicle and L'Evenement and the burning of e the building containing all papers connected with the administration of the l a conscription law. Seeking to quell the riots, Ottawa sent a battalion of Toronto soldiers to Quebec City. The resulting confronw tations left five soldiers wounded by the rioters. Civilian casualties w o amounted to four dead and many wounded. Calm was restored evenu l tually, leaving a sense of bitterness and shock among a people who d generally were peaceful and law-abiding. The general reaction of the editors south of the border was of almost uniform horror and still b more disagreement about who should be blamed. La Justice equated e the rioters o b with the Boches (" ils sont bons pour demolir"). Le Message,. had no difficulty in assigning responsibility: e y Les ecrivains nationalistes [Bourassa and his colleagues] qui ont e d pousse nos compatriotes a cette attitude honteuse pour satisfaire b leur haine de l'Angleterre et de la France, sont-ils satisfaits? (3 April y 1918)

Oui, il y a eu des provocateurs, mais cc ne sont pas des espions mands, comme le donne a entendre notre confrere; ce sont des agents soudoyes par une influence mysterieuse: cc sont les espions recmteurs, anciens buvetiers, recevant $10 par tete de conscrits. (4 April 1918) 54

ne reste plus maintenant pour les perturbateurs qu'a entendre la voix du Cardinal Begin, d e leur maire, d e leurs journaux, enfin de tous leurs hommes les plus ponderes et de rentrer atement dans Pordre, dans la moderation et le respect de Pautorite Q u ' i l ne soit pas dit qu'a Quebec on n'obeit pas a la loi! (2

April 1918) 55 The reaction to and revulsion against the violence were experienced by all but a few fringe members of the anticonscription movement. A retreat from the edge of chaos followed. Henri Bourassa turned his editorial attention to the women's suffrage movement, another perceived threat to French-Canadian culture. 56 The nature of the events transpiring in Quebec—demonstrations turning increasingly violent and slackers slipping over the border to asafe refuge in the woods of Maine—alerted the Franco-American editors to their customary posture of defense. These events were inherently newsworthy and likely to be carried by the American press, and they once more cast a potentially unfavorable light on French Canadians. With an obviously strong bias, the Boston Post carried a story on the slackers reported in northern Maine. They are difficult to find, The Post claimed, because an ordinary French Canuck is not a conspicuous object in the Maine woods. There are many thousands of them, resident and nonresident, in the woods, camps, on the log drives, in the trappers' huts T h e y look alike, talk alike and many o f them are named alike. (5 May 1918)

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country. The Lewiston (Maine) Journal heaped scorn on the Quebec rioters, referring to them as pacifists, Bolsheviks, and Wobblies. The New York Times did likewise, calling the rioters "scurvy malingerers." Le Massager, in response, could not contain its foreboding. "Les troubles de Quebec sont en train de ternir la bonne reputation de notre vieille province francaise." cestry 57 Twas h epalpable. f e Damage a r control was the order of the day. L'Etoile called on all intelligent Franco-Americans to distance themselves as o f much as possible from the violence and to do everything possible to g u those i l responsible, t restrain but it failed to indicate how that was to be b y accomplished." Franco-Americans did what they had to do. They rega s for s the o draft, c they i avolunteered, they served. They bought bonds istered and They could not redeem their French-Canadian t i rolled o bandages. n cousins, but a n they were able to avoid becoming the targets of nativist bigotry in the United States. The zealous response of Franco-Amerid cans to the draft was quickly acknowledged by the English-language a n England, which nevertheless found it paradoxical when press of New compared with the persistent and increasingly demonstrative anticonscription sentiment of French Canadians. According to La Tribune, it was unreasonable of the Boston Globe to praise Franco-Americans while condemning French Canadians: Les Canadiens-francals et les Franco-Americains soot de meme race, ont les memes sentiments de justice et de patriotisme, et il n'est guere raisonnable de louanger les uns au detriment des autres. (5 September 1917) 59

The Manchester Union found it difficult to explain the treasonous behavior of the rioters in Quebec City: Considering the patriotic alacrity with which Americans of FrenchCanadian extraction have sprung to the colors in this and in previous wars ....We in the United States know the bravery of the French-Canadian stock too well to accept any disparagement of their behavior Quebec is acting unworthy of herself. She should take her example from boys of French-Canadian origin w h o are now fighting bravely under the Stars and Stripes T h o s e boys are a credit to their mother country as well as to the country of their own or their ancestors' adoption. (2 April 1918)

L'Avenir National welcomed the warm praise of the Union, and, while not endorsing the violence of the demonstrations, defended those opposed to the conscription law. The Union, it claimed, would not find

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the current situation difficult to understand were it aware of the grave injustices suffered by French Canadians at the hands of the English over the years. plexed by the behavior of the rioters, the editor sought to enlighten 6 it as well: (' W h e n t hSi leseCanadiens-francais de la Nouvelle-Angleterre ont fait preuve pour la cause des Allies c'est qu'lls ont ete B de o tant s d'enthousiasme t bien accueillis par le gouvernement tandis qu'au Canada les Canao diens-francais n sont meprises et maudits c ' e s t gulls savent gulls T font r apartie n d'une grande et noble nation, tandis qu'au Canada leurs sont denonces comme des traittes, c ' e s t gulls sas compatriotes c r i vent que c'etait pour combattre pour le triomphe des minorites et p t des petites nations tandis qu'au Canada lea minorites sont persef cutees o quand elles sont francalses et catholiques. (18 April 1918) u 61 n The Transcript obviously had not been convinced by the article d prepared by Yvonne LeMaitre, its Paris correspondent, and printed i t some seven months earlier. In "Why Francois Won't Fight," the Franco-American journalist from Lowell carefully revealed to the readers s e of the Transcript the differences between the United States and Canal f da that served to explain the distinctive posture taken by each group e q to the war, despite the culture which they shared. u LeMaltre a was partially successful, for her article seems to have linspiredl the Boston Globe's praise of Franco-Americans. y other and 61 T h eAmerican G l papers, o b ehowever, never were able to accept fully aprationalization of the antiwar behavior of so many French Canadians and their leaders. e r Conclusion During the war, the Franco-American elite was anxious to convince everyone of its loyalty to the United States and its support of the war effort. In addition, it felt compelled to explain the antiwar behavior of most French Canadians. Attempts to reconcile the two forced Franco-American editors to ponder the difference between their own experience in the United States and that of French Canadians in Canada. They uniformly concluded that the United States offered the more benign environment for cultural survival and that French Canadians, especially those outside of Quebec, were oppressed. When deteriorating relations between English and French Canadians in 19 17 and 1918 provoked another round of debate on the annexation of Quebec by the United States, some of the Franco-American editors contem-

3 6 plated with approval the prospect 6

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of an enlarged state (Quebec-New England) dominated by French Canadians whose culture would flourish." However, with greater prescience, Henri Bourassa saw annexation as leading to eventual national suicide." The attempt to reconcile the different perception of World War I by Franco-Americans and French Canadians led inevitably to the conclusion that cultural divergence had occurred. After a half-century of community formation by Franco-Americans in the United States and despite persistent and close contact with Quebec, their separate experience had produced measurable differences. Rumilly, writing the first general history of Franco-Americans some forty years later, concluded that by the time of World War Les Franco-Americains, qui jadis acclamaient Mercier, ne comprennent plus le nationalisme des Canadiens-francais U n orateur perdrait ses effets en invoquant lea heros de 37, ou meme le gibet de Regina. 65

Their response to the War was the unmistakable evidence that the 45th parallel had begun to make a difference in the evolution of French Canadians and Franco-Americans. Cultural assimilation of the latter accelerated thereafter and, despite the maintenance of close cultural and personal bonds, the gap between the two continued to grow. Robert G. LeBlanc Department of Geography University of New Hampshire

NOTES Research for this paper was supported by a Faculty Research Grant of the Academic Relations Division, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C. and is gratefully acknowledged. Additional funding was provided by a Summer Research Fellowship of the Liberal Arts College of the University of New Hampshire. The text has benefited from a critical reading by the author's colleague, Professor William H. Wallace and the anonymous referees of ARCS. The translations were rendered by Professor Juliette Rogers, Department of French, University of New Hampshire. 1. Ralph Vicero, "The Immigration of French Canadians to New England, 18401900 (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1968); Yolande Lavoie, L'emigation des Canadiem aux Etats-Linis avant ruzo (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972); Yolande Lavoie, "Les mouvements migratoires des Canadiens entre leurs pays et les EtatsUnis aux XIXe et XXe siecles: etude quantitative" in La population du Quisbec: etudes retrospectives, ed. by Hubert Charbonneau (Montreal: Les Editions du Boreal Express, 1973), 73-88; Gilles Paquet, "L'emigration des Canadiens francais vers la Nouvelle-Angleterre,

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1870-1910, prises de vue quantitatives," Recherches sociographiques 5 (septembre-decembre 1964): 319-371; Albert Faucher, "L'emigration des Canadiens frangais aux Etats-Unis au XIXe slide: position du probleme et perspective," Recherches sociographigues, 5 (septembre-decembre 1964): 277-317; Christian Morissonneau, "Mobilite et Identite Quebecoise," Cahiers de Ckographie du Quebec 23 (avril 1979): 29-38; Gilles Paquet and Wayne R. Smith, "L'emigration des Canadiens francais vers lea Etats-Unis, 1790-1940: problematique et coups de sonde," L'Actualik economique 59 (1983): 423-453; Bruno Ramirez, "French Canadian Immigrants to the Cotton Textile Industry: A Socio-Economic Profile," Labour/Le Travail leur 11 (1983): 125-142; Bruno Ramirez, "Du Quebec vers les EtatsUnis: Petude des lieux d'origine," Revue d'Histoire de l' Arnkrique Fraticalse 38 (hiver 1985): 409-422; Gerard J. Brault, The French Canadian Heritage in New England (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986); Francois Weil, Les Franco-Americains, /86o-100 (Paris: Belin, 1989); Yves Roby, Les Franco-Americains de la Nouvelle-Angleterre, 760-1930 (Sillery, P.Q.: Editions du Septentrion, 1990) and Armand Chartier, Histoire des Franco-Ankricains de la Nouvelle-Angleterre, z 775rcigo (Sillery, P.Q.: Editions du Septentrion, 1991). 2. Elliott R. Barkan, "Proximity and Commuting Migration: An Hypothesis Explored via the Bi-Polar Ethnic Communities o f French-Canadians and Mexican Americans," in American Ethnic Revival, ed. by Jack Kinton (Aurora, III: Social Science and Sociological Resources, 1977): 163-183; Robert G. LeBlanc, "Colonisation et rapatriement au lac Saint-Jean (1895-1905)," Revue d'Histoire de l'Amerique francaise 38 (hiver 1985): 379-408; Robert G. LeBlanc, "Regional Competition for Franco-American Repatriates, 1870-1930," Quebec Studies 1 (Spring 1983): 110-129, and Claude Savary, ed., Les Rapports culture's entre le Quebec et lea Etars-Unis. (Quebec: Institut Quebecois de recherche sur la culture, 1984). 3. Pierre Anctil, "Aspects of Class Ideology in a New England Ethnic Minority: The Franco-Americans of Woonsocket, Rhode Island ( 1865-1929)" (Ph.D. diss., New School for Social Research, 1980) and Pierre Anctil, "La franco-americanie et le Quebec d'en bas," Cahiers de Geographie du Quebec 23 (avril 1979): 39-52. 4. Robert G. LeBlanc, " A French-Canadian Education and the Persistence of La Franco-Americanie," Journal of Cultural Geography 8 (Spring/Summer 1988): 49-64. 5. Major studies of the Franco-American press include Alexandre Belisle, Histoire de la presse franco-arnericaine (Worcester: Ateliers typograpiques de ('Opinion publique, 1911); Maximilienne Tetrault, Le role de la presse dans l'evolution du peuple franca-amexicain de la Nouvelle- Artgleterre (Marseille: Imprimerie Ferran et Cie, 1935); and Claire Quintal, ed., La journalisme de langue francaise aux Etats-Unis, (Quebec: Le Conseil de la Vie &ancaise en Amerique, 1984). 6. Brief historical surveys and the current legal status of the French language in Canada outside of Quebec are covered in a comprehensive set of articles by Robert McGill: "Bilingualism in New Brunswick and the Future of L'Aeadie," American Review of Canadian Studies 10 (Autumn 1980): 56-74; "Federal, Provincial and Local Language Legislation in Manitoba and the Franco-Manitobans," American Review of Canadian Studies 12 (Spring 1982): 30-52; "Federal and Provincial Language Policy in Ontario and the Future of the Franco-Ontarians," American Review of Canadian Studies 13 (Spring 1983): 13-43; "Language Policy in Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia and the Future of the French in the West," American Review of Canadian Studies 15 (Spring 1985): 16-37. 7. Robert Choquette, Language and Religion: A History of the English-French Conflict in Ontario (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1975): 161. See also Chad Gaffield, Lan-

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guage, Schooling and Culture Conflict: The Origins of French-Language Controversy in Ontario (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987), 31-61. 8. French Canadians a r e so rarely treated with justice in most anglophone provinces that their enthusiasm to defend England, which has closed its eyes to the persecution of the French in Ontario, Manitoba, etc., should be somewhat dampened. The so-called English "fair play" are but empty words. 9. For comprehensive treatment of the conscription crisis in Canada, consult Elizabeth Armstrong, The Crisis of Quebec, 1914-1918 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974) and I.L. Granatstein and I.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977). See also A.M. Willms, "Conscription 1917: A Brief For the Defence," Canadian Historical Review 37 (December 1956): 338-351 and Mason Wade, The French Canadians, 1760-1967, rev. ed. (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968), vol. 2, 708-780. On enlistment levels, see Granatstein and Hitsman, 22-24 and Armstrong, 122. Brian Cameron, "The Bonne Entente Movement, 1916-1917: From Cooperation to Conscription," Immo/ of Canadian Studies 13 (Summer 1978): 42-55, examines the failed attempt at improving the relations between Franco- and Anglo-Canadians. 10. We will not suppress the existence of the nationalists simply by calling them hotheads or stateless persons ....What good is there in denying indisputable facts. 11.... the enormous wrong that they would bring upon themselves through their abstention would involve their descendents in the most painful manner. Briefly, under the circumstances, it is better that French Canadians be pro-English than pro-German, as there is no middle ground in this quasi-global conflict ....We concede that Bourassa sowed the seeds that have brought out internal divisions among the French Canadians; but he has not yet succeeded i n keeping our brothers of Canada from enlisting and leaving for the war. 12. [L'Etoile] has gone so far as to accuse us of being on the enemy's side C o m e now, is there, yes or no, a strong and influential group of French Canadians whom we call "nationalists" and who fire up the newspapers and the public assemblies in order to recommend that their compatriots stay at home instead of going to battle in Europe under the English flag? Bourassa, Lavergne, and so many others, do they think as Msgr. Bruchesi does on the subject of participation? Does Le Devoir take the same path on this point as La Patrie and La Presse? 13. Why transform certain differences of opinion into a domestic war? Reading La Tribune, one would think that the province of Quebec is divided into two almost equal camps, fighting each other for and against participation in the war, when the contrary is actually true, since the two parties, conservative and liberal, are in the same boat concerning the duty of French Canadians during the present world crisis. 14. L'Evenement t o the surprise of all, expressed approval of the anti-French population in Ontario, and flung abuses at its own race on the subject of recruitment. 15. L'Impartial, 11 March 1916. 16. It is strange that the campaign to denigrate French Canadians has spread to New England, where a revue and another important Boston newspaper have already published stories about our brothers of Canada that are absolute lies, and unworthy of the good reputation of these papers. 17. Unfortunately, such writings have a stronger bearing than one would think and it is important that the American public, which is very sympathetic to our element, not

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remain under the false impression caused by those skillfully distorted interviews and erroneous revelations written by some hack writers in need of sensationalism. 18. It seems to us that the Boston Herald should avoid publishing diatribes w h i c h are of an injurious nature to the good reputation of French Canadians a n d a cause for very serious problems for Franco-Americans. 19. We constantly see ourselves forced to challenge some ridiculous article published against our own people and the province of Quebec. When these writings appear in insignificant papers, we don't worry b u t when they are found in newspapers of the rank of the New York Times, it is impossible to let them pass in silence. 20.... the Canadian government should do to the Boston Herald what it did to the Hearst newspapers. The government should remember that we have brothers in the United States and that such assertions will prove shocking. 21. How to thwart such a campaign? A l l French Canadians who are in a position to do so must try to reach out to the American press. 22. For a long time, those interested in belittling our group have insinuated maliciously that our brothers are lacking in their duty H e r e the evil is least felt, but it is advisable to anticipate it and one could not hope to find a better way than the plan prepared by the secretary of the Saint-Jean-Baptiste Union. 23.... the denigrators of our race w i l l have the irrefutable proof of our attachment to the institutions of our country and of our allegiance to the American flag. 24. War will be declared tomorrow. I am sure that not one of our young Franca' Americans wishes [as the anticonscriptionists do] thoughtlessly to risk his reputation, surrounded as we are, as well as in Canada, by races which would not miss the opportunity to crush us with an unmerited contempt. 25. L'Opinion Publique, Orme 1917. The Franco-American editors held France in high esteem and passionately proclaimed their love for la mere patrie and their outrage at its violation by the Kaiser. Their early support of the war was coupled with a restlessness over the policy of neutrality supported by President Wilson. See Bernard Lemelin, "Les Franco-Americains de Woonsocket, R I et la Premiere Guerre Mondiale" (M.A. Thesis, Universite Laval, 1987), chapter 1. 26. We should not even get involved with this new type of "April Fool's" prank, it is too implausible. 27. The article by our colleague leads one to believe that Franco-Americans are not as patriotic as other citizens of this country. He does not comprehend perhaps all the wrong that he thereby causes us. His ignorance on this matter is phenomenal B y claiming that these departures are caused by the fear of conscription, when a great number of our brothers enlist in the United States Army every day, is evidently the surest way to make us look like cowards or antipatriotic, and wrongly so. 28.... we called out loudly and, thank God, our call was heard. In fact, the stupid fear that we deplored has disappeared. 29. The United States Census Bureau estimates that in 1910, 21 percent of FrancoAmerican males over 21 were naturalized. As late as 1930, only 47 percent of all FrancoAmericans had become citizens. See Elliott Barkan, "French Canadians," in Harvard En.

LeBlanc 3 7 0 c-yclopedia of American Ethnic Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 388401. 30. The glaring injustices committed by the military authorities of Canada with regard to French Canadians and their military service do not encourage young Franco-Americans to place themselves under the command of an Englishman-they will prefer to serve under our American flag, and they will be incontestably right in doing so. 31. If he is a simple recruiting agent for the English government who has allowed the French Canadians of Ontario to be crushed under the boots of the francophobes w e will be happy to remind him that the Franco-Americans, if they must take up arms, will naturally prefer to enlist under the American flag because it represents, more than the English flag, justice, liberty, and independence. 32. See especially the editorial exchange between La Justice, 16, 23, 30 August and 6 September 1917 and L'Etoile 10, 20,21 August and 4, 6 September 1917. 33. French Canadians or others l i v i n g in the United States [who] have neglected to become naturalized citizens are going to be biting their nails, no doubt. It is always dangerous to sit on a fence. 34. Le Canado-Americain, 26 February 1917. 35. If there is ever a time when we should demonstrate our loyalty to our adopted country, it is now. Franco-Americans, wherever you are, arise! Show that you are true patriots! 36. La Tribune. 7 July 1917. 37. L'Opinion Publique, 13 December 1917. 38. As quoted in L'Opinion Publique, 20 August 1917. 39. The forced conscription of soldiers to go to combat outside of Canadian territory constitutes a constitutional heresy and a violation of the prerogatives that the leaders of our race and the fathers of Confederation fought so energetically for during the last century. 40. L'Opinion Publique, 5 June 1917. 41.... conscription in Canada does not have a raison d'etre. We believe that it is the first time in universal history that an imperial government has forced its colonists to place themselves in complete bondage to a foreign power. 42. La Tribune, 27 July 1917. The claim, except for the United States, is not supported by the comparative manpower contributions. Granatstein, Broken Promises, 66. 43. In the presence of the specter of conscription which is rising out of Ottawa, the leaders of Quebecois nationalism cry out, as is their habit: 'We told you so.' They know, however, that they alone are responsible for this measure. If they had allowed Canadian youth to enlist normally, the draft would never have been necessary. 44. Then came the nationalist propaganda. Finding a new occasion to make a buzz around his name, M. Bourassa l a u n c h e d his school in an unbridled propaganda campaign against inscription and participation. From there, we saw a gradual cooling and par-

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alysis in a considerable portion of the nation, with repercussions that were necessarily fatal in all sections of the country. 45.... whose fault is it, if not the government's, which governs without a mandate and receives its orders not from the people but from London. Is this how things should happen in a country that claims to be a part of the great democratic family? 46. Granatstein, Broken Promises, chapter 1. 47. Now, what will be the duty of the anticonscriptionists ? S h o u l d they humbly submit? Should they, on the contrary, resist? Resistance, whether active or passive, is the justification for bloody repressions of which the French Canadians will be the first victims. Which is the lesser of these two evils? 48. The above statements suffice to denote a rather dangerous effervescence of the minds in our native country. It is to be hoped that calm and moderate men, for or against conscription, will know how to balance things and prevent an explosion. 49. Are these troubles the forerunners of a revolution? It is possible. In any case, the English of Canada, if not those of England, are reaping what they have sowed. 50. The display windows of La Presse and La Patric were broken t h e anitconscriptionists do not wish to combat the Germans, but apparently they are pretty good against windows and citizens who wish to defend their motherlands. 51. La Justice, 6 September 1917. 52. Armstrong, Crisis of Quebec, 167. 53. Are the nationalist writers [Bourassa and his colleagues], who have pushed our compatriots to this shameful attitude to satisfy their hatred of England and France, now satisfied? 54. Yes, there were provocateurs, but they are not German spies, as our colleagues would like us to believe; they are agents paid by a mysterious power: they are recruiting spies, former barkeepers, receiving $10 for each conscript. 55.... it remains now for the rioters to listen to the voice of Cardinal Begin, o f their mayor, o f their newspapers, o f all their most thoughtful men, and t o return immediately to order, in moderation and in respect of authority. L e t it not be said that in Quebec we don't obey the law! 56. Susan Mann Trolimenkolf, The Dream of Nation: A Soda! and Intellectual History of Quebec (Toronto: Gage, 1983), 214. 57. The troubles of Quebec are in the process of tarnishing the good reputation of our old French province. Le Message; 3 April 1918. 58. L'Etoile, 2 April 1918. 59. French Canadians and Franco-Americans are of the same race, have the same feelings of justice and patriotism, and it is hardly reasonable to praise the one group while condemning the other. 60. L'Avenir National, 4 April 1918.

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61. If the French Canadians of New England have proven their great enthusiasm for the cause of the Allies, it is because they were welcomed by their government, while in Canada, the French Canadians are despised and accursed i t is because they [in New England] know that they are part of a great and noble country, while in Canada, their compatriots are denounced like traitors, i t is because they [in New England] know that the Allies fought for the triumph of minorities and small nations, while in Canada, the minorities are persecuted when they are French and Catholic. 62. See note 40. 63. La Tribune, 30 july 1917; L'Impartial, 8 January 1918, 12February 1918; L'Etoile, 27 December 1917. 64. Le Devoir, 28 July 1917. 65. Franco-Americans, who formerly acclaimed Mercier, no longer understand the nationalism of French Canadians A n orator would lose his effect by invoking the heroes of '37 or even the gallows of Regina. Robert Rurality, Histoire des Franco-Amricains (Montreal: Robert Rumilly [under the auspices of the Union Saint-jean-Baptiste d'Amerique], 1958), 310-311.

At the Top of the Mosaic: Doubts about the Data RICHARD OGMUNDSON T here have been few society's books in intellectual history which had aslife profound an impact on their andhave political as have The Vertical Mosaic of John Porter (1965) and The Canadian Corporate Elite of Porter's student, Wallace Clement (1975). These books have indelibly impressed Canadian intellectual life with the notion that Canada was and is characterized by a rigid, almost caste-like, ethnic hierarchy in which those of British origin dominate, and in which those of other ethnic origins, most notably the French, are predestined to hold subordinate positions. Clement's book, a passionate Marxist tract, has provided the basis of a sociological conventional wisdom which has served to radicalize an entire generation of university-educated Canadians. Curiously, there has been little examination of the data on which the original claims of British dominance of Canadian elites were based. This paper begins that task. The Vertical Mosaic Porter studied seven elites in The Vertical M o s a i c : bor, — political, b u s i public n e s sservice, , l amass - media, religious, and intellectual. The famous results, assembled here in one table, apparently for the first time, are reported below. (See Table 1.) Given the profound influence that these data have had upon academic beliefs and public policy in Canada, it becomes important to examine precisely how they were generated. A critical initial decision has to do with how the elites themselves are delineated. This decision can change the findings dramatically. For example, if one defined a political elite as consisting of the cabinets of all ten provinces, the French-Canadian proportion would be found to be minimal. On the other hand, if one defined a political elite as consisting of the cabinets of the two most powerful provinces—Ontario and Quebec—the French-Canadian proportion of the Canadian political elite would then be found to be substantial. Black has argued that The Vertical Mosaic is characterized by a "centralist" definition of elites which is such that it misleadingly reduces the proportions of francophone and "third ethnic" Canadians.' For example, the political and public service elites include very few representatives from QueAmerican Review of Canadian Studies (Autumn 1993): 373-386.