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ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION | JUNE 2013
The Dynamics for Transition in Tunisia AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON THE ECONOMY by Mondher Ben Ayed
In association with:
www.li.com www.prosperity.com
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ABOUT THE LEGATUM INSTITUTE
Based in London, the Legatum Institute (LI) is an independent non-partisan public policy organisation whose research, publications, and programmes advance ideas and policies in support of free and prosperous societies around the world. LI’s signature annual publication is the Legatum Prosperity Index™, a unique global assessment of national prosperity based on both wealth and wellbeing. LI is the co-publisher of Democracy Lab, a journalistic joint-venture with Foreign Policy Magazine dedicated to covering political and economic transitions around the world. This paper is part of a joint series of lectures and papers on ‘The Role of Economics in Democratic Transitions’ organised by the Legatum Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies, and World Affairs. www.li.com www.prosperity.com http://democracylab.foreignpolicy.com
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CONTENTS
Introduction: Background on the Economy
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What Went Wrong?
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The Contemporary Challenge
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The Way Forward
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Role of the International Community
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Conclusion
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About the Author
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About Our Partners
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References
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About the Legatum Institute
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INTRODUCTION
T
he January 2011 revolution in Tunisia provided the opportunity for the birth of the first democracy in the Arab world. But if Tunisia is to make a successful
transition to democracy its government must meet the economic expectations of its citizens. This paper describes the economic challenges facing Tunisia in the context of the country’s recent history, and offers an outlook on the way ahead.
Background on the Economy Despite some bad management and leadership decisions, Tunisia’s macroeconomics have been relatively healthy in recent years. In the five years prior to the revolution, the Tunisian economy achieved an average annual growth of just under 4.5 percent1. Inflation was slightly higher than 3 percent2, the budget deficit was less than 3 percent3, the debt to GDP ratio was near 50 percent4, and the GDP per Capita was around $4,0005. The Tunisian economy is quite diversified. Since independence in 1956, tourism and textiles have been the most important industries. Since the establishment of a free-trade agreement with Europe in March 1998, the country has also developed an electro-mechanical and automotive industry, food industries, high value-added IT, and aerospace industries. European investors own many of the key companies that cater to the EU market. In fact, Europe is the primary trading partner of Tunisia, capturing around 67 percent6 of the total foreign-exchange volume of goods and services. Tunisia does not possess significant natural resources. Minimal phosphate mines in the south and a few small oil and gas deposits do not cover the country’s energy needs. Tunisia’s wealth consists mainly in its educated and highly qualified workforce. The country invested heavily in education after independence. With a literacy rate of 80 percent7, Tunisia stands as one of the most advanced
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countries in Africa in terms of education. As early as 2011 about 3 percent of the population was attending a university or college, and today we can estimate the number is higher.8 Relative to its neighbours, Tunisia has excellent infrastructure, as well as established labour unions inherited from the colonial French period. The latter played a decisive role during the revolution. By any standard, women enjoy equal opportunities, and women play an important role in the economy. Approximately 25 percent of the workforce is female9, and in some professions, such as pharmacists, the number exceeds 50 percent10. More than 50 percent of university students are women11. Before 2011, Tunisia seemed—on the surface—as if it were well positioned to continue its transition from a state-controlled economy to a functioning free-market economy. This raises intriguing questions concerning the roots of the revolution.
Tunisia seemed—on the surface—as if it were well positioned to continue its transition from a stated-controlled economy to a functioning free-market economy
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What Went Wrong? In addition to politics, at least three major economic issues helped cause the revolution. The first is geographical inequality. There are major developmental disparities between coastal Tunisia and the interior of the country, especially in infrastructure. Since independence, most state investments were carried out in coastal areas that were well provided with public services and infrastructure, giving them greater opportunities for economic growth. Thanks to these advantages, hotels and factories are concentrated mainly in coastal towns. Meanwhile, the interior regions of the country, deprived of investment, had much greater levels of unemployment and poverty. Unemployment was so high, in fact, that it was another factor contributing to the revolution, hovering around 13 percent in the immediate years prior12. Just before the revolution, Tunisia had about 600,000 unemployed people, of whom 200,000 held college diplomas13. The high-unemployment rate was driven by demography: the young population was growing faster than the economy. It is estimated that Tunisia would have needed a 7 to 8 percent economic growth rate per year in order to absorb all the new job seekers14. The third major problem was the corruption of Tunisia’s leader, Ben Ali, and his family. By the end of his reign, Ben Ali and his family owned almost every major business in the country, controlled the privatization of major state assets, captured every major license in every field, and received a commission on almost every large business transaction. The business environment was characterized by injustice, an absence of the rule of law, bullying and racketeering. Major corruption led to a sharp decline in both local and international investment. Of course, the revolution had political causes as well. During his 23 years in power, Ben Ali tolerated no political opposition, and no freedom of press or speech. He jailed, tortured, and even assassinated political dissidents. Using the power of the police and various law enforcement agencies, Ben Ali’s regime effectively repressed both ends of the political spectrum: the Salafis and the more moderate Islamists of Ennahdha on the one side, and the communists and other leftist groups on the other. He also succeeded in taming the labour unions using a mix of force and bribery. By late 2010, the level of anger and dissatisfaction across all levels of Tunisian society was unbearable. Following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazzizi, a street fruit vendor, people took to the street. Ben Ali was obliged to flee the country on the January 14, 2011.
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The Contemporary Challenge The political changes that have occurred since 2011 have created new challenges for Tunisia’s economy. The eight most important economic issues are listed below.
1. Uncertainty and lack of transparency The revolution weakened the state, still run by the remains of the old establishment, and weakened the police who were regarded as the main tool of oppression. At the same time, it unleashed the power of the moderate Islamists of the formerly banned Ennahdha party, the labour unions, Salafis, and many other secular-left and centre-left parties, which were also oppressed under Ben Ali but to a lesser degree. Street protests continued during most of the early phase of the transition (January to October 2011), mostly aimed at preventing the old establishment from regaining control. The revolutionary forces also demanded a new constitution and a new electoral code to ensure a fair governing system. Meanwhile, the existing constitution and the legal system created by former presidents Bourguiba and Ben Ali, regarded as favourable towards dictatorship, were dismantled. For a time the country had no constitution or parliament. A succession of fragile governments was nominally in control. The first government, led by Mohamed Ghannouchi, the last prime minister under Ben Ali, lasted for one week. It collapsed due to popular street pressure because it was composed mainly of key figures from the old regime. The second government, also led by Mohamed Ghannouchi, lasted for six weeks. It was again brought down by popular street protest because it was not trusted to lead the political transition process and because it excluded new forces such as Ennahdha, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), and the Tunisian Workers’ Communist Party (POCT), and lacked a clear road map for new elections and institutions. The third government, led by Beji Caid Essebsi, lasted ten months and left power after the election of a constitutional assembly on October 23, 2011. It was composed mainly of technocrats who were not tainted by the old regime, and who committed not to run for the upcoming elections. Essebsi’s government devoted most of its energy to running state affairs, and ensuring the continuity of the state until the election of a new legitimate government. Nevertheless, in the absence of elections, the Essebsi government could only rule through consensus. It lacked the force of a legitimate government, and it was very soft on security, social, and economic issues. It focused on day-to-day affairs rather than reforms.
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The post-October-2011 government consists of three parties: the Ennahda Party, the Ettakatol, and the Congress for the Republic. Together, the three are known as the Troika. While it is more legitimate and representative than its predecessors, it is still considered to be temporary, since its main function is to manage state affairs for the second transition period while the newly elected constitutional assembly drafts and approves a constitution. Hence, its ability to carry out any significant economic reform is limited. The term of the national constitutional assembly was estimated for one year but was never specified because the effective end date corresponds to the adoption of a new constitution. More than one year and eight months later there is still no constitution and no definite date for new elections. The new constitution will define the permanent political system, the new government institutions, their role, and the way they are elected. The elections that will follow the adoption of the new constitution are regarded as the end of the second and final transition period, and the beginning of the new normal phase of government where the assembly, the government, and the president are elected for a full five-year term with full legitimacy to rule. In conclusion, the two post-revolution transition periods were characterized by weak and fragile governments that lacked full legitimacy. While important for consensus building, their temporary nature hindered their ability to achieve any economic reforms. In addition, the many uncertainties that dominated the two transition periods discouraged both local and international investors.
2. Inexperience of the current government A key factor that weighs on the economy is the new government’s lack of experience. Most of the new decision makers in the governing Troika have no experience in government affairs and very little managerial skills. The current government excludes individuals associated with the old regime, which in practice means there is a lack of experience and competence among all of the leaders in all aspects of government. The learning curve of the new leaders is steep. To many, it seems as if the society is actually regressing.
3. Security and social unrest The security apparatus completely disintegrated after January 14, 2011. The Tunisian police were hated almost as much as Ben Ali himself, and were regarded as the
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regime’s main tool of oppression. By contrast, the army was respected, both because it was regarded as an institution that served the nation and not an individual leader, and because the army refused the orders of Ben Ali to shoot at protestors during the revolution. The army was the glue that kept the country together during the first critical days of the revolution. But the army alone has not been able to cope with national security. During the revolution, many criminals escaped from prisons that were left unguarded. As a consequence, crime levels rose significantly. In addition to crime, the labour unions and other groups have contributed to the general disruption by carrying out multiple strikes and sit-ins. This chaotic situation fuelled popular demand for the re-establishment of law enforcement. A new process for police reform was introduced and police empowerment gradually increased. Security has been improving steadily since. Nevertheless, insecurity caused by the rise in general crime, political violence, and repeated strikes and sit-ins had a devastating effect on investment and economic activity in general, with the tourism and mining sectors particularly suffering. Tourism revenues registered in 2011 and 2012 were 30 and 10 percent less respectively than in 201015.
4. Salafi violence* In addition to criminality, Tunisia faces a specific problem of radical Islamist violence. Ben Ali succeeded in crushing all Salafi movements and groups—both the Jihadi and peaceful ones. He pronounced them a threat to society that should not be allowed to develop. His policies, however, simply drove them underground. Their re-emergence poses a complex challenge as Tunisia tries to build a society where freedom of thought, expression, and religion should be upheld for all peaceful groups. A small percentage of the Salafis—some 3,000 individuals—have declared themselves jihadists. Over the past two years they have resorted to violence, destroying public bars, disrupting cultural events, and attacking journalists and political activists. Many cases of intimidation of women have also been reported. Two of the most significant violent acts were the attack on the US embassy on September 14, 2012—attributed to a jihadi group named Ansar al-Sharia—and the assassination of the communist leader, Chokri Belaid, on February 6, 2013—attributed to an extreme religious group yet to be identified.
*This paper was prepared in early June 2013, therefore it does not include mention of significant subsequent events.
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The army and law enforcement units relentlessly fought and dismantled jihadi cells in possession of firearms, mainly brought from Libya after the fall of Gaddafi. Casualties have been reported on both sides. The jihadists now claim that the current Ennahda-led government has killed 15 of their followers in two years16. These incidents caused mainly by Salafi violence have also had a devastating effect on tourism and international investment, creating a negative image of Tunisia overseas.
5. Social movements and pressure Tunisia has a long tradition of a strong labour movement. UGTT, the main labour union, was established during the French colonial period, and has participated effectively in the national liberation movement. UGTT was prominent during Bourguiba’s reign, as well as Ben Ali’s, although there were many clashes between the unions and the government during the post-independence period. In the absence of significant political opposition, UGTT was regarded as the government’s main political opponent. In general, the unions’ leaders espouse communist and leftist ideology. After the fall of the regime and a string of successive weak governments, UGTT emerged as the most organized and most effective force in the country—even more than Ennahda. UGTT exercised substantial pressure through successive strikes and protests in order to increase salaries, increase subsidies, stop privatization, and recruit workers in the public sector. This significantly affected the macro-economic equilibrium of the country, and led to many poor economic decisions whose effects will be hard to undo. Examples of excessive growth in the public sector include: the size of the Tunisair workforce (the Tunisian national carrier) increased from 4,000 to 8,000 employees17; Tunisie Telecom (the Tunisian national telecommunication operator) increased from 5,000 to 8,000 employees18; CPG (state phosphate company) increased from 9,000 to 27,000 employees19; and the administration recruited close to 60,000 new public servants during the last two years20. Salaries in the public sector increased from 6.5 billion dinars in 2010 to 9.7 billion dinars in 201221, and food and energy subsidies increased from 1.7 billion dinars in 2010 to 4.4 billion dinars in 201222. Repeated strikes and sit-ins at the national company exploiting phosphate mines in the Gafsa region resulted in a $1 billion loss in foreign-currency revenues per year for the past two years (2011–12)23, severely impacting foreign currency reserves and the balance of payments.
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The Troika, and Ennahda party in particular, have repeatedly accused UGTT of using their social movement to drive a political agenda rather than to defend workers’ interests. Tensions still remain high between the two and might lead to potential future conflicts.
6. The image of the business community There has been a love-hate relationship between the business community and the government, and the business community and society in general, during the transition period. On the one hand, business leaders are regarded as corrupt capitalists who profited from the old regime and their relations with the Ben Ali clan, and many believe they should be held accountable. There are currently more than 800 court cases of corruption and money laundering24 involving more than 1,200 businessmen and previous government and administration leaders25. More than 40 major businessmen are not allowed to travel abroad26. This climate of constant threat has destroyed confidence, negatively impacting local investment and the economy as a whole. Internal investment has completely stalled and billions of dinars in cash have been withdrawn from the banking system, resulting in a liquidity crunch27. The portrayal of all businessmen as corrupt capitalists also discourages entrepreneurship and helps to explain why most of the 800,000 unemployed youth, 200,000 of which have college degrees, are seeking government jobs28. It is imperative to restore the image of business people and the private sector to encourage entrepreneurship. New laws that pardon economic crimes of the past (for example, the elimination of prison terms for economic abuses committed before the revolution) could pave the way for effective contributions by the business community in economic reconstruction. Most political stakeholders do recognize the need for a strong private sector as a locomotive of investment, growth, and employment. Most parties want to settle the issues of past abuses, and to reconcile the business community with society in order to re-establish confidence, and move forward in building the economy.
7. External factors Two major external factors affected the economy in Tunisia: the European economic crisis and the war in Libya.
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Tunisia has enjoyed a free-trade agreement with the EU for the past 14 years. Nearly 70 percent of Tunisia’s exchanges are with EU countries, especially France, Germany, and Italy29. Close to 3,000 European firms have established factories in Tunisia (1,269 French firms, 747 Italian firms, and 241 German firms30) for exports to Europe, particularly in textiles, and in automotive-electrical and mechanical components. Thanks to the European economic crisis, there was a reduction in aid, investment, as well as a reduction in industrial orders traditionally awarded to Tunisian companies. This trend is continuing through 2013. As one example, the electro-mechanical sector, which was previously growing at an annual rate of 18 percent, is now growing at merely 9 percent31. On another front, the war in Libya had a strong impact on the Tunisian economy—in both good and bad ways. During the war, foreign agriculture workers (mainly Egyptians and African workers) fled, which resulted in a complete halt of the food industry in Libya. As a result, the food industry in Tunisia has profited, growing at around 35 percent due to exports to Libya32. However, as a side effect, food prices in Tunisia witnessed a sharp increase, and inflation reached 5.5 percent by 201333. The medical industry has also profited due to a high influx of Libyans seeking health care in Tunisia. According to the African Development Bank “Libyan patients constitute the large majority of foreign patients, and are reported to occupy 40 percent to 80 percent of clinic beds in Sfax and Tunis, Tunisia’s largest cities”34. Over half a million Libyans migrated permanently to Tunisia after the war35. Many are wealthy and are contributing significantly to the Tunisian economy by boosting consumption in all fields. However, this also contributes to inflation.
8. Inflation The rise of food prices and inflation tarnished the image of the newly elected government by making it impossible to meet expectations of improved standards of living. In fact, many people believe that their standard of living fell after the revolution. In reaction to rising food prices, the government decided to reduce food exports, fix the prices of some key food items, and intensify the fight against food smuggling on the borders. The government also maintained food and fuel prices at existing levels. This resulted in an increase of subsidies from 1.7 billion dinars in 2010 to 4.4 billion dinars in 201236. Three factors were responsible for this huge increase: the rise in
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consumption, the rise in world commodity prices, and the weakening of the dinar with respect to the dollar and the euro. Fuel and food subsidies will be a serious economic and budgetary problem in Tunisia for the foreseeable future. The budget deficit rose from 3 percent in 2010 to 6.5 percent in 2012 mainly because of salary increases for government workers and food and fuel subsidies37. These expenditures come at the expense of much needed infrastructure investment, especially in the interior regions. Efforts are underway in order to reform the subsidy system. As an immediate measure to alleviate the weight of subsidies on the state budget, the government resorted to increasing fuel prices at the pump by 3.5 percent twice in 201238. Electricity prices were increased by 2 percent for individual consumption, and up to 8 percent for industrial consumption during the same year39. Moreover, a new study initiated by the government is underway in order to substitute the system of general subsidies with a more adaptable system where subsidies are directed only to those in need.
The Way Forward Tunisia’s economic statistics are troubling: inflation rose from 4.4 percent in 2010 to 5.6 percent in 201240, the budget deficit rose from 2.6 percent in 2010 to 6.6 percent in 201241, foreign currency reserves fell from 140 days of imports in 2010 to 100 days of imports in 201242, and foreign debt/GDP ratio rose from 48.5 percent in 2010 to 53.7 percent in 201243. Yet Tunisia is far from bankruptcy, and still has the opportunity to turn around its economy and restart the investment machine quickly. Expecting tough times for 2011 and 2012, successive governments increased public expenses in order to stimulate the economy. The government budget increased from around 18 billion dinars in 2010 to just under 27 billion dinars in 201344. This has resulted in a positive growth of 3.6 percent in 2012, and a drop in unemployment from 18.4 percent in 2011 to 16.7 percent in 201245. However, this also resulted in an increase in inflation, and the employment was created mainly in the public sector. Lacking major natural resources, the government of Tunisia does not have the means to stimulate the economy by increasing public spending beyond what it already did during the past two years. It must rely on an increase in productivity and investment, mainly in the private sector, in order to renew with growth superior to 5 percent and
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reduce unemployment. For this to happen, the government needs to improve security and visibility for investors. It also needs to boost private sector confidence, and introduce much needed reforms to improve the business environment. At least four reforms have been started or announced. The first reform concerns the banking sector. Public sector banks were left with many non-performing loans after the revolution. These loans were not granted on objective bases, but were allocated from the influence of the Ben Ali family through nepotism rather than project performance or proper risk management assessment. This problem affected three major government owned banks: STB Bank, BNA Bank, and BH Bank. Today, these banks are in no position to play their expected role in providing the economy with much needed finances. The reform programme has begun by issuing an international tender to carry a full audit of these banks and to provide recommendations regarding their proper capitalization, as well as better governance practices for the future. The governor of the central bank declared that as a result of these reforms, these banks may be privatized partially or totally, or they may merge into one large bank46. The adoption of a new investment code is another significant reform. The old investment code significantly constrained both local and international investment. The rules were vague, most of the lucrative activities were protected, and many authorizations were needed to carry any significant investment. Investors were at the mercy of a heavy administration and arbitrary decisions; corruption was often needed to move through the red tape. The new investment code is intended to better the investment environment through deregulation and simpler, more transparent rules. The government has finalized the content of the new projected investment code, and is currently discussing it with the business community. It should be adopted by December 2013. Two other reforms are underway: reform of the subsidies system and of the fiscal code. These reforms are needed urgently to re-establish macro-economic equilibrium. As detailed earlier, recent government expenditures due to salary increases and fuel and food subsidies have put significant stress on the state budget. The government needs to find ways to decrease spending, and increase income in the near future. The current reforms in energy subsidies are a step in the right direction. The fiscal code is also undergoing reform through alleviating fiscal pressure and enlarging the base of collection to cover more people and economic activities. Major corporations that follow transparency standards can pay up to 40 to 48 percent of their total
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salaries in taxes and social contributions (30 percent personal income tax and 18 percent social contributions)47. Furthermore, the declared employees of the private and public sectors contribute 80 percent of the total personal income tax due to withholding regulations, while those who are self-employed (such as accountants, lawyers, doctors, pharmacists) are able to self-declare, and thus only contribute 3 percent of the total personal income tax per year48. In addition, there are more than 360,000 small companies that pay a penalty of 50 DT (approximately 30 US Dollars) per year, according to statistics published by the ministry of finance for 201249. Moreover, according to a recent IMF study, the informal sector represents 30 percent of GDP50. This shows that there is much room for improvement in terms of fiscal income in Tunisia, and for the instauration of a better fiscal equity.
Role of the international community The success of the democratic transition in Tunisia is important for more than just Tunisia, but also for the world. It will encourage other Arab countries on the path to democracy, which will have a positive impact on world peace and stability. The success of the political process remains the sole responsibility of Tunisians. But the international community can contribute in two areas: security and economy. Aid for Tunisian law enforcement, which needs equipment and training in order to fight crime, track terrorists, and control borders, is crucial. Tunisian law-enforcement forces and military forces were already poorly equipped before the revolution, and they lost much of their equipment during. It is urgent for the international community to move on security cooperation with Tunisia. Some help came from the US, France, Turkey, and Qatar, but much remains to be done. On the economic front, Tunisia is in serious need for both finances and investment. The country is unable to respond to the expectations and needs of its population in the current transition period. Patience is eroding, and we may not witness the democratic fruit of the revolution if no progress is made on the economic front. The role of the international community, the US, Europe, and international donor institutions in particular is crucial. However, in light of the global financial crisis the international community’s willingness to provide security and economic assistance is unclear. Foreign direct investment is still very limited, as explained above, due to the lack of stability and visibility during the transition period. It is expected that FDI should improve after the adoption of the constitution and after the next elections.
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Conclusion The solutions to the economic pains of Tunisia remain largely political at this stage. Today, all stakeholders recognize that it is urgent to shorten the current transition period by accelerating the adoption of the new constitution, and by holding new presidential and parliamentary elections before the end of 2013. This will open the way for a new, strong, and legitimate government and institutions capable of achieving national reconciliation and engaging reforms, thus insuring visibility and predictability for at least one full term. Many reforms need to be made without further delay, in particular reforms of the financial and banking sector, of the fiscal code, of the investment code, and of the subsidy system. Many of these reforms have already started, but are complex and require a legitimate government to carry them through. While transition is a long and often difficult process, the political climate that prevails today offers promise for the future. It is marked by a steady return of security and by a general consensus achieved by major stakeholders on key constitutional issues, the future mode of governance, and on the election code and dates. The fundamentals of Tunisia are still sound and will enable its economy to bounce back in the near future. Therefore, if the political transition continues on this path, a timely constitutional consensus occurs, and the incoming government carries through necessary economic reforms, we can realistically be optimistic about the success of the Tunisian experience.
While transition is a long and often difficult process, the political climate that prevails today offers promise for the future
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mondher Ben Ayed Mondher Ben Ayed is President and Chief Operating Officer of TMI, a Tunis based technology firm that has worked with Oracle, Sun Microsystems, and Acer to provide services around value-added solutions to telecommunications operators, banks, financial institutions, and government entities. He also has been active in various civil society positions since the mid1990s, serving as President of the Tunisian-American Chamber of Commerce from 2007 to 2009 and as the private-sector coordinator on behalf of the Tunisian Business Association for the World Summit on the Information Society in 2005. He served from 2011 to 2012 as an advisor to the Prime Minister of Tunisia on economic issues and international relations.
ABOUT OUR PARTNERS The International Forum for Democratic Studies The International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy is a leading center for research, discussion, and analysis on the theory and practice of democracy around the world. Among the Forum’s central activities are efforts that seek to analyze the challenges of democratic transition, reform, and consolidation. The Forum has several interrelated initiatives: the Network of Democracy Research Institutes (a global think tank network), the Journal of Democracy, the Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows program, and an active research and conferences program.
World Affairs Based in Washington, DC, World Affairs is a bimonthly international affairs journal that argues the big ideas behind US foreign policy. Always striving to encourage open and informed debate, its website WorldAffairsJournal.org builds upon this tradition by featuring regularly updated news, opinion, and research from media, governments, and think tanks around the world, as well as essays and blogs from leading commentators.
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1.
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18.
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19.
‘What Tunisia’s Phosphate Crisis Says About Its State of Affairs’ Al Monitor http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ business/2013/05/tunisia-phosphate-crisis-politics.html
20.
‘Tunisie: Plus de 34 mille emplois dans le secteur public d’ici fin 2011’, Afriquinfos, September 21st, 2011. http://www.afriquinfos.com/articles/2011/9/21/ brevesdafrique-187360.asp ‘25 mille nouveaux emplois dans le secteur public à l’horizon 2012’, Businessnews, January 4th, 2102. http://www.businessnews.com.tn/details_article. php?temp=1&t=520&a=30253 ‘23 267 emplois dans la fonction publique en 2013’, Directinfo, November 28th, 2012. http://directinfo.webmanagercenter.com/2012/11/28/ tunisie-23-267-emplois-dans-la-fonction-publique/
21.
‘Tunisie : Budget de l’Etat 2010 en détail’, Investir en Tunisie, November 10th, 2009. http://www.investir-entunisie.net/index.php?option=com_content&id=2938 ‘Les salaires de la fonction publique est élevée à 33% du budget de l’Etat’, 365 Tunisie, June 2013. http://www.365tunisie.com/2013/06/tunisieactualiteles-salaires-de-la-fonction-publique-estelevee-a-33-du-budget-de-letat/
22.
Tunisia to reduce blanket subsidies, tax high income brackets,’ Tunisia Live, November 27, 2012. Available at: http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/11/27/the-tunisiangovernment-resorts-to-more-austerity/. Only covers 2012 level, not 2010.
23.
IMF Time Series Data and African Economic Outlook 2012 Report, African Development Bank. Available at: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/ Documents/Generic-Documents/Tunisia%20Full%20 PDF%20Country%20Note.pdf.
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24.
Tunisia: Anti-corruption committee receives more than 800 reports,’ Kuwait News Agency, February 4, 2011
25.
‘1200 personnes impliquées dans des affaires de corruption’, Directinfo, 29 Fevrier 2012. http://directinfo. webmanagercenter.com/2012/02/29/tunisie-1200personnes-impliquees-dans-des-affaires-de-corruption/
26.
‘Tunisie : que reste-t-il des 460 hommes d’affaires interdits de voyage ?’ Investir en Tunisie, 18 Mars 2013. http://www.investir-en-tunisie.net/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18919
27.
28.
29.
‘La Tunisie est menacée par une crise majeure ‘, Kapitalis, 11 Septembre 2012. http://www.kapitalis.com/ tribune/11699-la-tunisie-est-menacee-par-une-crisemajeure.html ‘Tableau 8: Taux de chômage selon le sexe 2006-2013 - en %’ and ‘Tableau 2: Evolution de la population active (en milliers) 2006-2013’, National Institute for Statistics – Tunisia. Available at: http://www.ins.nat.tn/ indexen.php. Report prepared by European Commission, ‘EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World, Tunisia’, May 23, 2013. Available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ docs/2006/september/tradoc_122002.pdf.
37.
African Economic Outlook 2013 Report, African Development Bank. Available at: http://www. africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/ aeo/2013/PDF/Tunisia.pdf; ‘IMF Executive Board Concludes 2012 Article IV Consultation with Tunisia,’ International Monetary Fund Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 12/96, August 3, 2012.
38.
‘Tunisia raises petrol prices to trim budget gap’ – Reuters, Sept 2012. Available at : http://uk.reuters. com/article/2012/09/02/tunisia-energy-pricesidUKL6E8K22MR20120902
39.
‘Tunisie :Augmentation de la tarification de l’electricité’ – Tunisie Numerique, Sept 2012. Available at : http:// www.tunisienumerique.com/tunisie-augmentation-dela-tarification-de-lelectricite/145730
40.
World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund, April 2013. Selected dataset available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ weo/2013/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=44&pr. y=15&sy=2010&ey=2018&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=co untry&ds=.&br=1&c=744&s=PCPIPCH%2CGGXW DG_NGDP&grp=0&a=#notes
41.
‘Tunisia Targets Budget Deficit of 2.5% of GDP for 2011, TAP Agency Says’, Bloomberg, Nov 2010. – 2010 figure. ‘Tunisia trims 2013 budget gap forecast to 5.1 pct/GDP’, Yahoo, April 2013. – 2012 Figure. Available at : http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-23/ tunisia-targets-budget-deficit-of-2-5-of-gdp-for2011-tap-agency-says.html and http://news.yahoo. com/tunisia-trims-2013-budget-gap-forecast-5-1141238947--business.html
30.
http://www.investintunisia.tn/site/fr/article.php?id_ article=160
31.
http://www.investintunisia.tn/site/fr/article.php?id_ article=197 ‘Banque Centrale de Tunisie: Ralentissement de l’activité économique’, Tunisie Numérique, 25 Avril 2012. http://www.tunisienumerique.com/banquecentrale-de-tunisie-ralentissement-de-lactiviteeconomique/120361
42.
32.
Doing business in Tunisia: 2012 Country commercial guide for US companies. 2012 http://photos.state.gov/ libraries/tunisia/231771/PDFs/2012%20Tunisia%20 Country%20Commercial%20Guide.pdf
Sliding foreign reserves threaten crisis for Tunisia,’ Reuters, July 3, 2013. Available at: http://www.reuters. com/article/2013/07/03/tunisia-payments-deficitidUSL5N0F602K20130703
43.
33.
African Economic Outlook 2013 Report, African Development Bank. Available at: http://www. africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/ aeo/2013/PDF/Tunisia.pdf
‘IMF Executive Board Concludes 2012 Article IV Consultation with Tunisia,’ International Monetary Fund Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 12/96, August 3, 2012.
44.
34.
‘The impact of Libya’s conflict on Tunisian economy: A preliminary assessment’, AFDB, July 2011. http:// www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/ Publications/The%20Impact%20of%20Libyan%20 Conflict%20on%20Tunisia%20ENG.pdf
35.
‘Plus de 530 000 Libyens se sont etablis en Tunisie’, Leaders, 10 Juin 2012. http://www.leaders.com.tn/ article/plus-de-530-000-libyens-se-sont-etablis-entunisie?id=8643
36.
‘Tunisia to reduce blanket subsidies, tax high income brackets,’ Tunisia Live, November 27, 2012. Available at: http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/11/27/the-tunisiangovernment-resorts-to-more-austerity/.
State budget for 2010 - The Report : Tunisia 2010 – Oxford Business Group. Available at : http://books. google.co.uk/books?id=ThwIIvtU_68C&pg=PA26&lpg =PA26&dq=tunisia+budget+2010&source=bl&ots=CA bLbXYPBL&sig=x0m2209BVrnqzzyGW4NyFRPJJCo&hl =en&sa=X&ei=U9XaUdW1Da_T7AbC_4CwAw&ved=0 CEcQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=tunisia%20budget%20 2010&f=false. State budget for 2013 Tunisia-Budget 2013: 4.9% increase and 4.5% growth rate - African Manager. Available at : http://www.africanmanager. com/site_eng/detail_article.php?art_id=19432
45.
National Institute for Statistics – Tunisia; World Bank Tunisia Overview, April 2013. Available at: http://www. worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/overview.
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46.
‘STB, BNA, BH: Les trois options envisageables’, Leaders, 01 Avril 2013. http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/stbbna-et-bh-les-3-options-envisageables?id=11126
47.
http://www.tunisieindustrie.nat.tn/fr/doc.asp?mca t=3&mrub=58&msrub=195&dev=true http://www. tunisieindustrie.nat.tn/fr/doc.asp?mcat=3&mrub=58& msrub=188&dev=true
48.
‘Le produit du régime forfaitaire ne représente que 0,2% des recettes fiscales’, L’économiste Maghrébin, 15 Avril 2103. http://www.leconomistemaghrebin. com/2013/05/14/le-regime-forfaitaire-ne-constitueque-02-des-recettes-fiscales/
49.
2012 Budget preparatory note, ministry of finance: ‘Fiscalité transitionnelle : amnistie ou taxation ?’ Néji BACCOUCHE. Séminaire sur la fiscalité transitionnelle organisé par IACE Sfax, Juin 2013. http://www.iace.tn/ sf/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Intervention-de-M.Neji-BACCOUCHE.pdf
50.
‘Tunisia: informal economy: How to fix it?’ – African Manager: Available at : http://www.africanmanager. com/site_eng/detail_article.php?art_id=19362
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