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THE 1954 FLOOD AND THE ASCENDANCE OF MONARCHY IN NEPAL Sharad Ghimire

In late July 1954, when Nepal was still an apprentice in democracy (Baral 2012), a massive flood inundated the central and eastern Nepal. The episode of the flood is mentioned in the country’s political and development history literature (Joshi and Rose 1966: 118; Shaha 2001: 310; Isaacson et al. 2001: 9; Shrestha 1990: 185; Mihaly 2002[1965]: 80). Writings on Nepal’s natural hazards and disasters have also cursorily looked at the incident (Dixit 2003; Shakya et al. n.d.). However, its significance has remained relatively unexplored. The story of 1954 flood is important for three reasons. First, it sheds light on Nepal’s tryst with foreign aid-led development. The disaster attracted US aid for relief and recovery that became a basis for the resettlement program in Nepal’s southern plains, the Tarai, particularly in Chitwan valley. Second, the saga is helpful in understanding the dynamics of state response to natural disasters when the state itself was modernizing. The incident triggered the first state-sponsored rehabilitation efforts in the aftermath of a natural disaster in Nepali history (Dixit 2003: 173). Third, as this chapter shows, the story links the aftermath with the emergence of a particular political order in Nepal. This article locates the disaster in the political context of the 1950s Nepal. It analyzes the relationship between the nature of disaster response by the Nepali state and the reconfiguration of its political landscape in the aftermath of the 1954 flood. The overwhelming state response to the flood created various institutional structures for relief and recovery. These new structures and relations reconfigured the political space and led to what some historians have called ‘the monarchy in ascendance’ (Whelpton 2005). Like Olson and Gawronski (2010) have noted, disasters originate as a natural event, but become political. By focusing on the political consequences of the 1954 flood, this article aims to add a natural factor to the disintegration of the democratic platform and the ascendancy of the monarch. Standard literature has attributed the political development in the 1950s to the ambitions of the new monarch, division among political elites, lack of significant socioStudies in Nepali History and Society 18(1): 57–80 June 2013 © Mandala Book Point

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economic change, frictions among the political orientations, and the external interventions and geopolitics of that time (Baral 2012). This essay argues that the challenges posed by the massive scale of the disaster management helped change the government by accelerating erosion of its legitimacy. When people lose confidence over the capacity of their government to respond to the disaster, their support to the government dwindles. The popular perception of failed management will further erode its credibility. This is Olson and Gawronski’s 5C+A framework which seeks to explain the link between disaster management and state’s legitimacy to rule. The 1954 flood also overwhelmed the new post-1951 regime, and forced it to find a reactive and top-down approach to disaster management. Yet, unlike in India, the massive institutional response of the state failed to put in place policy mechanisms to deal with such incidents in the future.1 The absence of an anticipatory mechanism and the incompetence of the incumbent coalition government meant that the politics around its response, while massive, turned into liabilities and triggered its collapse. This chapter acknowledges other political factors for the political changes in the 1950s, such as the downfall of political parties’ government in 1955. However, it claims that an analysis of the relationship between a natural crisis and politics in 1954–1955 provides a fresh perspective on that downfall. This analysis aims to establish the significance of studying environmental issues like natural hazard, deforestation and land degradation in the political context. This chapter is divided into three sections. It first provides a snapshot of the impact of the flood in different parts of Nepal as covered in the stateowned national newspaper Gorkhàpatra. Then, it describes how various governmental agencies, including the Advisory Assembly (AA), nongovernmental agencies and political parties responded to the flood for immediate rescue and relief. Then the chapter attempts to relate flood crisis to the consequent political crisis. It also sheds light on the popular understanding of the flood by comparing it briefly with the great 1934 earthquake. The latter conjecture warrants further exploration.

1

In India, the same 1954 flood led to the launching of the National Programme of Flood Management (Mohapatra and Singh 2003: 138). In Nepal, such policy statement would come after three decades in the shape of the Natural Disaster Relief Act, 1982.

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The Flood and Its Impact The 152-mm daily average of heavy rainfall from 24 to 28 July 1954 caused an immense flood in central and eastern Nepal. The second bout of rainfall after a month devastated Kathmandu valley, East No. 1 and 2, and central Tarai. The first downpour claimed hundreds of lives and caused extensive damage to infrastructures and crops in and around Kathmandu valley, in the region connecting the valley to southern plains and several cities in the eastern mid-hills, and the Tarai belt (Shaha 2001: 310). The extent of the damage can be gleaned through the official media coverage of the disaster. The river Bagmati and its tributaries cut off the city of Kathmandu from the town of Sankhu and the north-eastern ridges of the valley. Consequently, the supplies of firewood and grains from the region were affected.2 In the city itself, a house in Gyaneshwor suddenly collapsed, burying ten people under the rubble.3 While the newspapers only briefly reported the damage outside the valley, one report is helpful to assess the destruction caused by the second rainfall. A government official’s field account (Amatya 2011 v.s.) indicated that the valley was also cut off from the southern plains. The road linking the valley to Bhimphedi, and thereafter to Amlekhganj, the railway track from Amlekhganj to Raxaul, and the ropeway from the valley to Dhursing ropeway terminus were unusable. The entire stock at Dhursing was destroyed. The city of Birganj was nearly washed away. In the central western hills, a landslide killed nine people in Harkapur area of Nuwakot.4 It displaced dozens of households in Jhiltung. Three were killed in Katunje Torke village where the entire cropland was washed away. The downpour also hit the eastern hill region from East No. 1 and 2, Sindhupalchowk, Dolakha, Ramechhap, Sindhuli through Bhojpur, Dhankuta to Ilam. News about the loss of property and life in the eastern hills arrived late. Nevertheless, a delegation from far-eastern district of Ilam arrived in Kathmandu to inform the extent of destruction in that area.5 In Ramechhap, the cloudburst and subsequent pre-winter drought hit hard. Most arable 2

Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Sƒkhu Jàne Saóakmà Varùàko Prabhàv. 2 Bhadau, p. 4. Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Da÷ Janà Mànis Mañomunã, Duã Janà CahŒ Marisake. 2 Bhadau, p. 4. 4 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Pa÷cim Pahàómà Pairo ra Bàóhã: 9 Janà Mànis ra Kehã Ghar Samet Noksàn. 2 Bhadau, p. 4. 5 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Ilàmko Pratinidhimanóal Kañhmànóaumà. 2 Bhadau, p. 4. 3

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lands were left barren. Trails and bridges were damaged. Productivity of the regions plummeted.6 In East No. 1, the deluge affected 3,689 households, killed 104 persons and 187 cattle, and destroyed 2,247 houses and about 40,000 màñomurã land.7 In the western hills, the damage was sporadic but severe. In Chisapanigadhi, 13 maujàs (villages) were affected. At least 48 people (the highest in Pangre maujà) and hundreds of cattle lost lives. Goods worth about NRs. 300,000 were lost.8 In Gorkha, the loss of 73 persons, 342 cattle, 80,000 màñomurã land area and 700 houses was reported. Devastation in the Tarai was more severe. The central Tarai, particularly Bara, Parsa, Rautahat, Sarlahi and Mahottari districts were hit most. For example, the river Bagmati wrecked havoc in Malangawa region submerging many villages, displacing hundreds of families, putting children and elderly in a severe distress and covering the agriculture land with silt.9 Memories of the devastation still describe extensive sedimentation, loss of paddy, collections of floating tree trunks, disruptions of the daily routine and the exodus of people to India in search of the menial jobs (Dixit et al. 2007: 145). The eastern Tarai saw breaking of the riverbanks. The landscape looked like an expanse of waters with scattered islands of huddled houses. The precipitation subsided on 26–27 July, but soared again on 21 August.10 A 15-member relief committee of Advisory Assembly estimated a loss of NRs. 1–1.5 crore, 300 human lives and 2,000 domestic animals. About two lakhs people in the Tarai were robbed of their means of livelihood, while about 10,000 people had their lands silted. Two hundred villages were washed away in the eastern Tarai only.11 The flood disrupted whatever communication 6 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Pårva 2 Nambarko Bàóhãjanya Vivaraõ Sthanãya Janatàdvàrà De÷vàsisanga Sahayogko Apãl. 2 Pus, p. 2. 7 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Pårva 1 Na. ra Pa÷cim 2 Na. mà Ativçùñile Dhanjanko Pra÷asta Kùati: Dubai Jillàko Nirãkùaõ Garã Kami÷an Farkyo. 2 Pus, p. 4. Land area: 4 màñomurã = 1 ropanã and 1 ropanã = 5476 sq.ft. or 521 sq.m. or 0.1289 acre. 8 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Ci.I. [Cisàpànãgaóhi Ilàkà] Bharko Bàóhãjanya Noksànã. 8 Asoj, p. 4. 9 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàgmatãle òhålo Kùetra Bàluwàmaya. 28 Bhadau, p. 2. 10 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Punaþ Lagàtàr Varùa ra Bàóhã Upatyàkà ra Varaparakà Jillàmà. 27 Bhadau, p. 1. 11 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàóhãle ôeóh Karoó Rupiyƒko Khatã Tãnsaya Jati Pràõ Hàni, Duã Hajàr Caupàyà Varga, Daslàkh Vyaktã Bàóhãpãdit; Bà.Pã.Sa. Samitãkà Adhyakùa ørã Bàlcandra øarmàko Vaktavya. 32 Saun, p. 1.

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infrastructure was at place. While the telephone lines were restored soon, postal service remained broken for several weeks. An extract from an internal communication cable sent from the United States Operations Mission (USOM) in Kathmandu to the Foreign Operation Administration (FOA) in Washington D.C. summarizes the impact of the flood: Nepal has suffered worst flood damage in last fifty years.…Government of Nepal forwarded following data to USOM/Nepal dated September 2: 1,529 hamlets were submerged in Birganj, Biratnagar, Kathmandu, Bhairahawa and Nepalganj centers resulting in damaging of estimated 35,000 homes and consequently 132,700 homeless refugees. More than 2000 miles roads and byways damaged and 56 bridges either washed away or seriously damaged. Crops on 76,000 bighas (123,006 acres) have been destroyed or seriously damaged.…Hospitals at Birganj, Bhimphedi and Biratnagar have reported their building have been so flooded that keeping indoor patients no longer possible, approximate number of deaths is 1,000. (FOA 1954)

Responding to the Flood Both the state and non-state actors responded to the flood immediately. The government ministries, departments and their line-offices integrated the response in their everyday work. The transitional legislature, the Advisory Assembly, reacted to the disaster in ways that shaped its other political processes. Political parties outside the ruling coalition and several non government organizations also showed their concerns but this aspect is less covered in the sources used for this study. The government established Vishesh Paristhiti Niyantran Samiti (Special Situation Control Committee, SSCC), under the commissioner of the Valley Zone, to manage the supplies of daily provision in the Kathmandu valley.12 SSCC aimed at transforming itself into a conspicuous state machinery during the crisis. It sought to estimate the available stock of food grains, salt, kerosene and other daily essentials and to provide credits to the victims. It asked the residents and businessmen in the capital to declare their stocks of goods additional to one year’s consumption.13 It banned the sale of the fuel

12 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Nepàlkà Dherai Bhàgmà Bàóhãle Bhãùaõ Hàni: Vi÷eù Paristhiti Niyantraõ Kamiñi Gañhit. 18 Saun, p. 1. 13 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Sarkàrã Såcanà. 20 Saun, p. 4.

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from the pumps14 despite its regular supply.15 SSCC fixed the market price of sugar, edible oil and kerosene.16 It asked the businessmen to state the amount, sale and current price of clothes, cotton (yarn), kerosene, salt (bekrota), edible oil, rice, pulses, spices, nuts, cigarette, matches and sugar. It forbade the public from hoarding and profiteering, and from excessively consuming the imported goods. Making the state’s presence more visible, the fourth meeting of the SSCC on 15 August 1954 focused on issues related to transporting the supplies, and to the ‘illegitimate’ profiteering approach of the traders. SSCC also collected information on the extent of damages and asked the Ministry of Public Works and Communication for their reconstruction.17 For instance, it found a bridge in Bhaktapur collapsed, several houses in Chabel damaged, a wall in Gokarna demolished, and roads to a power house in Sundarijal cut. The committee subsequently began regulating the import and the trade in the valley markets. It monitored the on-going reparation activities, and took initiatives to repair. It ordered to construct a wooden embankment to protect the Kuriayagaun and Panchayani Ghats near Thapathali and after four days found the progress satisfactory.18 Restoration of roads, particularly around the main city, was completed by Nepal Army’s Samarjung Company by the end of December.19 SSCC concurred with the government concern that the availability of the goods in the capital depended on the ropeways. Ministers made prompt inspection tours, and ordered to clear the overflowing stocks at the ropeways unloading station in Matatirtha.20 The SSCC included key administrative and police officials. It arrested some businessmen for selling

14

Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Vi÷eù Paristhiti Niyantraõ Samitiko Peñrolbàre Såcanà. 2 Bhadau, p. 3. 15 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Havàijahàjbàña Peñrol Osàridaicha. 4 Bhadau, p. 1. 16 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Vi÷eù Paristhiti Niyantraõ Samitiko Pƒcau Baiñhak: Bajàrkà Kehã Màlharåmà Darreñ. 2 Bhadau, p. 3. 17 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàóhãjanya Noksànãko Sudhàr Garne Sarkàrko Gahakilo Kadam. 2 Bhadau, p. 4. 18 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. KuriyàgàÒmà Bàóhã Kùetramà Vi÷eù Vyavasthà. 4 Bhadau, p. 2. 19 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàñoko Marammat HÒdaicha. 9 Pus, p. 1. 20 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Màtàtãrtha Ropway Sñe÷anko Nirãkùaõ ørã Yàtàyàt Mantrijyu ra ørã Gçhamantrijyudvàrà. 4 Bhadau, p. 1; Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Vi÷eù Paristhiti Niyantraõ Samitikà Sabhàko òhahar. 4 Bhadau, p. 4.

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ghee overpriced, and extracted cooperation from others.21 Its actions had a visible effect in the valley. Nevertheless, there were criticisms against the SSCC. For instance, a Hindi newspaper Sahã Ràstà published news about irregularities in the committee activities,22 the committee branded the news as unsubstantiated. Sahã Ràstà (2008 v.s.–2011 v.s.) was a precursor to Samàj, the party mouthpiece of the Praja Parishad (Upadhyaya 2013). Praja Parishad was represented in the cabinet, but was acting like an opposition incorporated (Gupta 1993[1964]: 69). The debate around SSCC thus reflected contemporary struggle for power. Differences between the government claims and the events did emerge. The government claimed that petrol was in smooth supply in the valley when the fuel had just been rationed.23 Its supply was eased by mid-September as frequency of flights from Kathmandu to the Tarai strip at Simara increased.24 More fuel was brought in once the Bhimphedi–Amlekhganj road was restored. The rationing was lifted only on 10 December.25 The government on its own part sent four medical teams to the eastern and western parts of the country. Each team consisted of a doctor and supporting staff, and had stocks of required medicines.26 India and the US also sent their medical assistance. Two Indian military medical teams went to Biratnagar and Birganj.27 The US Foreign Operation Mission appointed Dr Alexander Langmuir as a special consultant both for the immediate flood relief and for long term relief assistance to Nepal. He handed over the medical supply to Nepali officials on 28 September.28

21 22 23

Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Ghiu Sasto Hune â÷à. 7 Bhadau, p. 1. That issue of Sahã Ràstà could not be found. Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Vi.Pa. Niyantraõ Samitiko Peñrolbàre Såcanà. 9 Bhadau,

p. 4. 24 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàño Nabanunjelsammakà Làgi Vçddhi: Kàñhmànóau Simarà Havàã Sarbhismà. 28 Bhadau, p. 3. 25 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Peñrolbàña Niyantraõ Hatàiyo. 28 Magh, p. 1. 26 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Càrvatà Meóikal Pàrñã Pårva ra Pa÷cimtarfa Pañhàune. 5 Pus, p. 2. 27 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàóhãjanya Rogko Rokthamkà Làgi Bhàratdvàrà Sahàyatà Bhàratãya Sainik Meóikal Dalko Nepàl Tarai Bhraman. 14 Bhadau, p. 1. 28 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Ek Làkh ru. ko Auùadhã Liyera Dr Muir: Kàñhmànóaumà Auùadhãko Namunà Sarkàrlai Pradàn. 15 Asoj, p. 1. Langmuir’s field account portrayed the pathetic services in the valley hospitals:

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The relief works outside the valley progressed variously. Some places saw a flurry of government and non-government initiatives quickly, while others received delayed response. In the border district of Rautahat, officials distributed grains and cash to the victims and repaired water supplies in the town of Gaur.29 By contrast, they arrived late in other, worse affected villages of the same district. District relief committees were formed in the months of August and September, prompted often by the ministerial visits, and without any connection to the central SSCC to complement the works. The Rautahat Flood Victim Relief Committee instituted by the Minister of Transport, Bhadrakali Mishra, distributed NRs. 20,000 immediately with a clear priority given to 52 such villages.30 The Biratnagar committee, formed after the visit of the Minister of Forest and Land Revenue Naradmani Thulung, allocated NRs. 5,000 per victim and later doubled it.31 In Dumja Jhangajholi, in East No. 2, the Local Relief Committee, instituted without a prod from a minister, interacted with affected people, prepared a report of destruction to demand the government relief.32 Similarly, people made marches in Dharan for relief to The patients seemed to have received very little care of any types. There was essentially no nursing whatsoever in the hospital, medicines were almost nonexistent, the operating sterilizer was being heated by a very small primus pressure up to sterilization point. While the hospital itself was basically clean, it obviously had been scrubbed and almost flooded down immediately before my arrival. The floors were still wet. In the female hospital, the situation was far worse, records seemed nonexistent, although the floors were washed, birds were flying in and out the windows, including even crows and....The dogs that wander freely through the female hospital seemed to have been kept out at the time of my visit. I have never visited a medical situation so primitive and so utterly discouraging. (Langmuir 1954) 29 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Gaurka 18 Oña Kùetraharåmà Sarkàrko Gahakilo Kadam. 9 Bhadau, p. 1. 30 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàóhãpãdit Sahàyatà Samiti Banyo Rautahañ Jillàmà Sahàyatàkà Làgi 20000 Ru. Mufta Bitaraõ. 14 Bhadau, p. 1. 31 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Pƒc Hajàrko Nikàsa Birañnagarkà Bà.Pã. kà Làgi. 21 Bhadau, p. 1., and Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Morangkà Bàóhãpãditlaã 5000 ko Thap Sahàyatà. 11 Asoj, p. 2. 32 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Pårva 2 Nambar Dumja Jhangàjholimà Bàóhã-pãdit Sahàyatà Samiti. 9 Bhadau, p. 2; Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Pårva 2 Nambarmà Punaþ Bhiùaõ Bàóhã. 21 Bhadau, p. 2.

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and resettlement of flood victims.33 In Jhapa, a joint meeting of the Baóàhàkim, other officials and public assessed the flood damages, and not only distributed some relief to the displaced victims, but also provided credit to the households which lost cropland.34 Yet SSCC remained the key government mechanism during the crisis, particularly inside the valley. Its response was focused on restoring transportation and communication infrastructure and supplies of essential goods to the capital. SSCC was more influential than the government ministries or departments, which implemented its decisions. It initially emerged as an administrative attempt to respond to the crisis, but later turned out to be a de facto coordinating body for all disaster relief activities in the absence of other effective higher political institutions. As will be shown shortly, the Advisory Assembly, a transitional parliament-like body in the period, experimented with one such institution. But that would soon fail due to power struggles within the government coalition. The Advisory Assembly (AA) had been established (among its three avatars during 1951–1959) by the king in the middle of April 1954. Its members represented various political ideologies but often acted independently from their political affiliations. They were nominated individually by the king.35 The divisions within the ruling coalition, and between the government and the Assembly, were actually rife (Joshi and Rose 1966: 117). The issues related to the flood only exacerbated these differences. The first AA session had been adjourned on 23 July on account of the stiff opposition to the government’s budget presentation. When the AA reconvened on 29 July, debates around the flood crisis took the centre stage. The AA meeting on 3 August mulled over forming an Assembly committee, in addition to the SSCC of the government, to take active part in the relief 33

Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàóhãpãditharåko Sahàyatàrtha Sàrvajanik Sabhà. 23 Magh, p. 2; Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàóhã Pãdit Sahàyatà Samiti Dharànmà Sa§gañhit. 6 Kattik, p. 2. 34 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàóhãpãdit Kùetrako Nirãkùaõ ra Sahàyatà. 7 Bhadau, p. 3. 35 The second AA of 1954 had 113 members (including 7 ministers), representing various constituencies (districts and groups) [Joshi and Rose 1966: 116–117]. They were nominated by the king either in the recommendation of the political parties, the district governors (Baóàhàkims) or through the king’s own discretion. Therefore the members sometimes behaved like representatives of political parties and sometimes as independent members. It contributed to the fluidity in then politics as seen in the proceeding of the AA.

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operations. Proposals differed on the extent to which the AA committee would control the operations. Members concurred in forming local level sub-committees under the proposed committee, but differed in the mechanisms for mobilizing and distributing resources. On the following day, the AA decided to constitute a 15-member Flood/Rainfall Victim Assistance (Relief) Committee. The AA Speaker, who was elected the chair, nominated four cabinet ministers and ten most vocal critiques in the AA as members of the Relief Committee. The AA approved to release NRs. 10 lakhs for emergency relief works. It dismissed the Special Situation Right Bill (2011 v.s.) that delegated extensive power to the magistrate and public officers (Shaha 2001: 310). The AA wanted to execute the relief operations itself and sought to be visible also by controlling distribution of the public resources. The high-profile AA Relief Committee members, the Speaker Balchandra Sharma, Home Minister Tanka Prasad Acharya and the Minister of Transportation Bhadrakali Mishra soon began surveying the extent of the devastation by air. The three leaders would later forge an alliance to break the ruling coalition and to bring the Matrika Prasad Koirala-led government down. The air surveys indeed brought them together. They exchanged impressions about the havoc in the countryside and shared ideas on allocating the relief funds. Prime Minister Koirala, although a committee member himself, left for Calcutta for his medical treatment. While the AA Relief Committee was busy in the relief activities, and PM Koirala was in Calcutta, Crown Prince Mahendra Shah, who also chaired the Regency Council, ended the AA session on 17 August. Although many AA members were unsatisfied with the effectiveness of the AA proceedings, they saw the move as abrupt. Consequently, the Committee turned passive. Speaker Sharma resigned from the chair on 21 August. The committee, established at the very top political level with much fanfare, fiddled out unceremoniously. But it made a mark in history. It was referred to in the disaster relief agreement with the USA in October 1954. Curiously, the AA Committee members remained active individually and in their party capacity. Balchandra Sharma toured the flood affected areas in central and eastern Tarai for almost 20 days in October. He returned Kathmandu at the end of October only to fly again to the western hill areas, West No. 1 and 2, from 6 to 15 November. During his visits, Sharma met officials and local flood relief committee members, publicly addressed the victims’ gatherings and met the party cadres. Sharma acted as a mediator for

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the government. He faced the angry victims, gathered their complaints and made promises. He also handed over relief assistance or asked the local flood relief committee to do so. In the western hills, he recommended providing arable lands to the landless victims. Yet after his return to Kathmandu, he became busy in the second AA session. Sharma used the visits effectively to increase his political capital. So did other AA members, who highlighted the damages and demanded government relief in their respective constituencies.36 PM Koirala on his return from Calcutta stopped at his hometown Biratnagar and visited several villages along the river Koshi. He declared the land tax exemption of NRs. 25,000 for the farmers in Saptari and Biratnagar.37 Other ministers Bhadrakali Mishra and Naradmani Thulung had already visited their respective constituencies (Central Tarai and Eastern hill and Tarai) as part of their relief trips.38 The flood allowed these leaders of an ‘emerging’ democracy to work ‘in the interest of people.’ These relief operations were ad hoc and uncoordinated, and were implemented through extra-bureaucratic channels. They raised more questions about the efficacy of the government than actually contributed to its efforts. This issue would become a major political fault line in the AA. In the second session, the AA discussed several contentious policy issues, related and in addition to the direct responses to the flood. Following the inaugural speech of the Crown Prince on 17 November, many AA members criticized the government for its poor handling of the post-disaster operations. PM Koirala responded to the criticism by urging everyone to take collective responsibility for the failure. On 26 November, the government tabled the Fallow and Barren Land Acquisition Bill and the Citizen Rights Bill. The

36 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Gorkhà Jillàmà Anna ra Bàñoghàñoko Kùati: ørã Ràmhari øarmàdvàrà Bàóhãgrastaharåko Udvàràtmak Sujhàv. 9 Magh, p. 1; Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Pårva 2 Nambarkà Làgi 1 Làkh Rupiyƒ Sa.Ka.dvàrà Manjurã. 23 Kattik, p. 1; Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bhojpur Bàóhãpãdit Sahàyatà Samitiko Vibhinna Racanàtmak Kàm Garne Nidho. 25 Kattik, p. 2; Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàóhãgrasta Ilàkàharåko Nirãkùaõ Sallàhakàr Sabhàkà Sadasyadvàrà. 4 Kattik, p. 3; Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Pårva 1 Na. ra Pa÷cim 2 Na. mà Ativçùñile Dhanjanko Pra÷asta Kùati: Dubai Jillàko Nirãkùaõ Garã Kami÷an Farkyo. 2 Pus, p. 4. 37 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Yas Varùako Màlpot Minàhà Bhà.Ru. 25 Hajàrko Nikàsà ørã Pradhànmantrijyudvàrà Saptarãlaã. 16 Kattik, p. 1. 38 Mishra was the President of Jana Congress and Thulung was the President of Eastern regional unit of Rashtriya Praja Party.

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former had remained undecided in the previous session.39 The latter was sent to an expert AA sub-committee. An AA member Bedananda Jha asked whether the government had already implemented the once-rejected Special Situation Rights Bill (SSRB) in disguise. He sought a clarification on how the government could bypass the AA and, for special situations, the supreme ruler (king), in drafting and implementing the act. PM Koirala evoked the urgency of the natural crisis to justify the SSRB and the delay in promulgating the budget. Jha then proposed to terminate the AA session in view of the flood relief emergency and walked out in protest. Next day, the AA continued to deliberate on the responses to the flood and drought.40 PM Koirala revealed that the NRs. 15 lakhs of the government relief money had remained unutilized.41 He requested the AA to remove legal obstructions to form a new government committee for making a fresh start in the relief operations. The AA assigned the PM to propose the structure of the committee in the following meeting. It also sought analysis on the failure of the Speaker-chaired AA Relief Committee.42 On 29 November, Speaker 39 The bill was also related to the resettlement of the flood victim. For example, while answering a question about the government response to the flood victims, the Home Minister said that victims were provided assistance and they would be resettled soon, for which the bill related to obtaining the fallow and barren land had been tabled in the assembly. The bill was approved on 13 December after many rounds of debates. Actually the issue of resettlement of the flood victim got importance in the policymaking during that time. Similarly, flood victims in Sindhuli had also demanded for resettlement with the flood relief sub-committee members. 40 There was another series of drought and water scarcity in the central Tarai, particularly in Bara, Parsa, Rautahat, Mahottari and Saptari, right after the downpour. The drought was felt particularly in November 1954, when crops were drying up. Therefore the drought was also added in the AA debate along with the flood. Later in December 1954, the government established a commission based at the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Food with four members, headed by Phanindra Raj Hamal, assistant secretary and sent the team to the field to understand the existing situation and recommend for possible relief activities. 41 As informed in the AA meeting on December 6, the total fund released was Rs. 15,57,150 whereas the total expense was about NRs. 25,000: Dhankuta 2,990; Sarlahi 5,000; Kathmandu valley 600; Mahottari 5,161; Chisapani 4,394; East No. 2 1,639; officials’ trip from Chisapani to Rautahat 4,588. 42 For example, Gorkhàpatra, the government’s mouthpiece, also wrote an editorial on 3 December 1954 about the failure of the past committee and expectations from the future committee.

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Sharma narrated the circumstances of his resignation from the Committee. Highlighting the Committee’s achievements and his own tireless work, Sharma attributed the Committee’s failure to the government’s non-cooperation.43 He cited obstructions in his approach to the local flood relief committees, and the delays caused by the governmental inertia. According to him, the devastation caused by the flood was as momentous as that by the eradication of the slavery and as by the great earthquake. He had therefore requested the king to constitute a separate department for dealing with the nation-wide crisis. He acknowledged to have distributed NRs. 15,000 and IRs. 10,000 of the government at his own discretion, but said, he could submit accounts of his expenses for public scrutiny. Speaker Sharma’s lengthy speech in the AA shows the political character of the debates surrounding the flood crisis. It was apparent that the issue divided the AA and the government deeply. On 16 December, PM Koirala tabled a proposal to form a new 17-member strong AA committee to resolve the twin problems of flood and drought. The AA adopted the proposal in situ. Speaker Sharma, who was proposed as the chair in the proposal, pulled his name out subsequent to the demand by some members to avoid “unnecessary contradictions to the position of the chair.”44 The revised proposal expected the new committee to recommend an integrated plan for addressing both the disasters. PM Koirala assured the AA of his full cooperation for this purpose. While some AA members suggested reducing the size of the new committee, involving government officials in the committee activities, or adopting modalities of working with district sub-committees, none were entertained. Some members continued to accuse the government of laxity, pointing out that the Indian government had been distributing monetary support to the flood victims. Politics around the relief operations enmeshed with contemporary politics. PM Koirala’s analysis, as presented in the report to his party’s general committee in December 1954, reflects the difficulty faced by his government. He expressed the government’s inability to forge a political consensus.45

43

Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàóhãpãdit Kamiñibàre ørã Adhyakùajyuko Spaùñãkaraõ. 18 Magh, p. 2. 44 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàóhã ra Anàvçùtã Janit Samasyàko Samàdhànkà Làgi 17 Janàko Nayƒ Samiti Gañhan Garne Prastàv Swãkçt. 5 Pus, p. 1. 45 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Ràùñriya Prajà Pàrñãko Mahàsamitiko Baiñhak Pràrambha Adhyakùa Màtrikà Prasàdjyudvàrà De÷ko Vartamàn Paristhitiko Vi÷leùaõ. 12 Pus, p. 1.

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The party’s general committee asked him to execute disaster relief under a comprehensive plan.46 The committee also formed a five-member coordination committee to help carve out a consensus among democratic parties. Yet, on 10 January, the Home Minister, who was also the head of the Praja Parishad, a ruling coalition partner, was denied of his portfolio.47 On the same day, Nepali Congress, the party in opposition, called Satyàgraha but later withdrew.48 The government suffered another blow at the AA. PM Koirala had earlier presented a deficit budget.49 He justified the deficit by pointing at the higher costs of police and military reform, King Tribhuvan’s treatment abroad, increased public investment in education and health, the additional resource for the proposed election, and the AA expense.50 The budget also allocated NRs. 1.5 million for the disaster relief works. Out of the seven bills, in which the government sought additional resources,51 five were rejected or withdrawn. The remaining two were passed by the AA on 1 February with the backing of the dissenters from the PM’s party (Joshi and Rose 1966: 122). The legislative crisis led the PM to resign and simultaneously, to request the Crown Prince for the dissolution of the AA. The latter simply adjourned the AA session on 9 February and left for Switzerland to meet the ailing King. Meanwhile, there was a heightened sense of political crisis as the ruling coalition began to be reorganized. PM Koirala’s Rashtriya Praja Party had dismissed its dissenting Speaker Sharma, who then joined the Praja Parishad. Jana Congress of Bhadrakali Mishra had also merged with the Praja Parishad. The rift between the PM and Speaker over the government and the AA’s poor management of the flood relief works had surfaced.52 In the new 46

Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Ràùñriya Prajà Pàrñãko Mahàsamitidvàrà Vibhinna Prastàv Pàs: Ràùñriya Vipatti Nivàraõàrtha Asàdharaõ Yojanàko Sujhàv. 16 Pus, p. 1. 47 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Gçha Mantràlayako Tàluk Pradhànmatrijyuko Màtahatmà. 28 Pus, p. 1. 48 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Chàpdà Chàpdai: Satyàgraha Sthagit. 28 Pus, p. 1. 49 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. 11-12 Sàlko Bajeñ Sabhàmà Pe÷. 6 Magh, p. 1. 50 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. ørã Pradhàn Tatha Artha Mantriko Bajeñ Vaktavya: Gatanàko Bƒki. 11 Magh, p. 2. 51 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Sàtota Anudàn Màgkà Prastàv Swãkçti. 18 Magh, p. 1. 52 For example, as discussed above, there were accusations to the AA-based first relief committee from several members in the house and from government’s mouthpiece. The failure was also accepted by the prime minister. However, the speaker of the AA accused government’s non-cooperation for the failure.

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government committee, the PM had excluded his three rivals, Tanka Prasad Acharya, Bhadrakali Mishra and Balchandra Sharma. The crown prince’s termination of the second AA session also spoke of the “emerging new legislative situation.”53 He had begun to end all AA institutions, leading him to soon dissolve the AA and the cabinet. The response of very few individuals and institutions outside the government were recorded in the Gorkhàpatra. On 2 August, BP Koirala of Nepali Congress, appealed his cadres to assist the governmental and nongovernmental efforts. On 26 August, he urged people to contribute what they could to alleviate the conditions of the victims.54 BP was understandably highly critical of the existing political arrangement. He highlighted the government’s limited ability to deal with disasters, dismissing the government claim of distributing cheaper grains in Kathmandu.55 He also criticized its focus on the capital (Koirala 2066 v.s.[1954]). The government clarified that the policy of food subsidy to Kathmandu inhabitants was not the continuation of the Rana-time policy of extraction of agriculture produce from Madhes for Kathmandu, but was a response to the special situation.56 The policy was also framed as a ‘popular’ government’s action in the public interest.57 Outside of political formations, a philanthropic organization Paropakar,58 transported the injured flood victims from western Nepal to the capital and provided treatment. The organization mobilized volunteers to the area from Birganj to Bhainse and other parts of the Tarai to facilitate relief operations. It also provided rescue and relief in Dhading and Trishuli section in West No. 1. Another rare initiative was made by an NGO Bal Sakha Dal.59 The Dal previously had engaged children for its community work. Its executive members now decided to organize shows, football matches and door-todoor campaigns to generate relief funds. Narendramani Aa.Di., one of its 53

Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Sallàhakàr Sabhàko Dosro Adhive÷an Bhanga. 29 Magh,

p. 1. 54 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàóhãjanya Ràùñriya Sa§kañlai Sanghañhit Bhaã Hañàunu Pardacha: ørã Bi÷we÷wor Prasàd Koiràlà. 14 Bhadau, p. 4. 55 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Sasto Sarkàrã Càmal (editorial). 14 Pus, p. 2. 56 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Ràùñravaõiko Bhràmak Pracàr. 28 Pus, p. 4. 57 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Sarkàrã Càmal (editorial). 4 Magh, p. 2. 58 The institution of Paropakar emerged as an organization promoting volunteerism for public welfare in 1948 during a cholera epidemic (Neupane 2002: 3). 59 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Bàóhãpãditko Sahàyatàrtha Bàl Sakhà Dalko Tatparatà. 7 Bhadau, p. 3.

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members, made a public appeal on 5 September to that effect. The influence and effectiveness of these initiatives, however, was limited.

From the Flood Crisis to Political Crisis This section summarizes political dynamics during the flood relief period. It highlights the changing political equations and their possible connection with the flood crisis. The coalition government, instituted by King Tribhuvan in February 1954, was fractured from the start. Gupta (1993[1964]: 90) has called the coalition as ‘oppositional alliance’ of the political novices Tanka Prasad Acharya, Bhadrakali Mishra, and Dilli Raman Regmi against the PM, Matrika Prasad Koirala. Acharya later recalled how he had to join the cabinet upon the king’s insistence (Fisher 1997: 167). The division within the ruling coalition affected both the AA and the government proceedings. While there were specific issues of administrative appointments and of negotiated settlement among the political parties, personality clash was at the root of the problems. In the initial phase of the flood relief in August, the PM was in Calcutta, and other ministers Tanka Prasad Acharya, Bhadrakali Mishra and the Speaker Balchandra Sharma tried to expand their political influence. Their differences with PM Koirala on issues related to political settlement, the running of administration and instituting disaster relief committee effort brought them under the banner of Nepal Praja Parishad in February 1955. The Prime Minister was active in relief tours after his return from Calcutta. He inspected the rebuilding of Bhimphedi–Amlekhganj road on 26 September. But he was mainly involved in getting disaster assistance from the US. The US consultant for flood relief assessment admired him as a “very level headed, sincere, honest, patriot who was desperately trying to bring his country out of the chaos that it had been in” (Langmuir 1954:10). The US assistance deal, signed in Calcutta on 23 October, was perceived as an effort to diminish India’s monopoly over Nepal’s interaction with the world. Home Minister Acharya later recalled India’s displeasure on Nepal’s acceptance of the US offer (Fisher 1997: 167–68). The Indian attitude was also reflected in the Calcutta-newspaper coverage of the agreement (Foreign Service Dispatch 1954). The division between PM Koirala and Acharya was already visible. Acharya recalls:

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M.P. was surrounded by people who wanted to make money. And he had no command over his followers. He could not command even the Liberation Army.…The Home Secretary did not come to me. I complained [the matter] to the King…[and] asked him to please allow me to resign. The King said that I should not resign, so I did not. Then he called them to the palace and reprimanded them. (Fisher 1997: 168)

Acharya challenged Koirala’s dominance by asserting authority over his ministerial secretary. He demanded that the Secretary get his permission to meet the PM (Joshi and Rose 1966:116). Some suggest that this issue led Koirala to resign on 28 September (Shaha 2001: 313). On that occasion, Acharya’s portfolio was also rescinded. Acharya reveals: Eventually M.P. asked the King to relieve me or accept his resignation and I was disgracefully removed from the cabinet. I was not even given a chance to tender my resignation. I would have already taken the initiative in doing so, but I considered it unnecessary since Mr. Koirala had already tendered his collective resignation and its acceptance was expected any day. (Fisher 1997: 168)

Initially the king resolved the differences within the cabinet.60 The truce proved to be temporary. By early January 1955, Acharya had been dismissed from the cabinet. He shot a letter to the PM challenging the government’s legitimacy over its poor handling of the havoc created by disasters (Shrestha 1984: 223). The fissure in the ruling coalition, particularly between Koirala and Acharya deepened in January 1955. Increasing resentment over government’s ineffectiveness in dealing with the flood crisis made the coalition fragile. On 29 December 1954, Koirala’s Rashtriya Praja Party had opted to form a comprehensive national plan to tackle the current and future disasters.61 On 3 January 1955, the executive committee of Acharya’s Praja Parishad noted its anger over the poor utilization of the foreign assistance.62 The government failure to deal with the flood generated widespread discontent. The AA decision to set up a new 15-member strong committee should be seen in that

60

Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Sa§yukta Vaktavya. 29 Asoj, p. 1. Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Ràùñriya Prajà Pàrñãko Mahàsamitidvàrà Vibhinna Prastàv Pàs: Ràùñriya Vipatti Nivàraõàrtha Asàdharaõ Yojanàko Sujhàv. 16 Pus, p. 1. 62 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Ne. Prajàpariùadko Kàrya Samitiko Baiñhakmà Mahattvapårna Prastàvharå Pas. 21 Pus, p. 1. 61

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context. That discontent fed into the emerging political crisis and proved unfavourable to the ruling coalition. Another crisis in the cabinet, leading to the ousting of the Home Minister from his portfolio, was created by the Satyàgraha announcement of the Nepali Congress. The ruling parties denounced the movement. But PM’s radio address to the country on 8 January195563 and the press release by the Home Ministry64 differed on the ways to resolve that crisis. The PM’s party wanted to forge a single force, whereas the home minister’s party was for resolving the crisis through an all-party-convention (Joshi and Rose 1966: 120). The Home Minister called a meeting of various political parties in the bid to isolate the PM’s party. Koirala sacked Acharya from the Home portfolio but did not remove him from the cabinet.65 Nepali Congress withdrew the movement66 after Crown Prince Mahendra assured that an independent judiciary would be established and fresh elections would be held.67 The understanding of the Crown Prince and the main opposition party put the ruling coalition in the defensive. The Crown Prince, the chair of the regency council, had to clarify about his alleged alliance with the opposition.68 A new political crisis loomed large when the former AA speaker and Koirala’s party veteran Balchandra Sharma formed an alliance with Acharya. Koirala tried to control the damage by reforming the working committee of his party on 4 February.69 The government had already proved unable to defend its bills in the budget session of the AA. Koirala’s Praja Party

63

Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Samuhik Ekatà ra Sadbhàvanàko Làgi âhvàn Avaidhànik ra Hi§sàtmak Pravçttikà Vyaktiharålaã Gambhãr Cetàwanã, Pradhànmantri Màtrikà Prasàdko Reóiyo Bhàùaõ. 26 Pus, p. 1. 64 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Gçha Mantràlayako Vijnapti. 28 Pus, p. 1. 65 Prime minister would dismiss Acharya and Mishra from the cabinet only later, on 11 February, at the climax of the polarization. The news about the dismissal was published in Gorkhàpatra of 14 February quoting the statement of the regency council of 11 February, when the crown prince, head of the regency council, had already left for Switzerland. 66 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Nepàlã Kàïgres Kendrãya Kàryasamitiko Baiñhakmà Swãkçt Prastàvharå. 13 Magh, p. 2. 67 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. ørã 5 Yuvaràjadhiràjprati Kçtajnatà Jàher. 18 Magh, p. 1. 68 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Rà.Pa. kà Adhyakùa ørã 5 Yuvaràjadhiràjbàña Spaùñãkaraõ Nepàlã Kàïgresko Sthagit Satyàgrahakà Sa§bandhamà. 1 Magh, p. 1. 69 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Rà.Pra.Pàrñã Nayƒ Kendrãya Samitiko Ghoùaõà Pradhàn Mantri Gen. Màtrikà Prasàdjyudvàrà. 25 Magh, p. 1.

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announced that Sharma and his seven allies left the party.70 It claimed that the exit of Sharma’s faction freed the party from ‘reactionary’ elements.71 A dissenting faction of the Praja Party, Praja Party Struggle Committee also disowned Sharma.72 This splinter group later merged with its mother party, Rashtriya Praja Party on 12 February.73 These events polarized the political elite further. In the first week of February, Acharya’s Praja Parishad reorganized itself by inviting Balchandra Sharma’s group and Bhadrakali Mishra’s Jana Congress. The new alliance retained Praja Parishad’s flag, but some senior members within the merging parties, such as Mathura Lal Shrestha74 and Khadga Man Singh75 challenged the reorganization. The newly organized Praja Parishad emerged as a major political force in the days to come. Meanwhile, the Crown Prince terminated the AA’s second session on 9 February in what he described as a “new legislative situation.”76 The PM had actually tendered his resignation. The Crown Prince did not accept it, and instead, went abroad while keeping the nation in a political limbo. The Crown Prince, who now returned from Switzerland with a full royal authority,77 dissolved the regency council on 16 February, just two days before the democracy day that was celebrated to mark the end of Rana rule in Nepal in 1951. He raised questions over the fruits of the past democratic practices. He assumed a more assertive role, for example, by bringing various state authorities related to anti-corruption, public service, intelligence and civil

70

Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Rà.Pra.Pàrñã Kendrãya Kàryalayako Paripatra. 3 Fagun,

p. 2. 71 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Ràùñriya Prajà Pàrñãmà Phåñ Cha Bhanne Kuro Niràdhàr: ørã Bodh Prasàd ra Tripurvar Singhko Press Vaktavya. 25 Magh, p. 1. 72 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. ørã Bàlcandra øarmàkà Anuyàyã âdhà Darjan Vyakti Màtra Chan ørã Dayànidhi øarmàko Press Bijnapti. 27 Magh, p. 1. 73 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Rà. Prajà Pàrñãko Sa§gharùa Samiti Vighañit. 3 Fagun, p. 1. 74 Gorkhapatra. 2011. Navagañhit Prajà Pariùad Aprajàtàntrik ra Avaidhànik ho: ørã Mathuràlàlji ko Vaktavya. 27 Magh, p. 1. 75 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. ørã Khaóga Màn Singhko Ràjinàmà Navagañhit Nepàl Prajàpariùadbàña. 3 Fagun, p. 1. 76 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Sallàhakàr Sabhàko Dosro Adhive÷an Bhanga. 29 Magh, p. 1. 77 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. ørã 5 Mahàràjadhiràjbàña Ràùñriya Divasko Upalakùamà Bakseko Sande÷. 12 Fagun, p. 1.

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servants’ registration under his command.78 He asked all political and social organizations/parties to report within two weeks their organizational details along with future recommendations.79 The government tried to display its authority by passing the economic bill from the cabinet and sent it to the Crown Prince for approval.80 Mahendra, who would become the king after the death of his father on 13 March 1955, instead dissolved the cabinet on 2 March and began to run the country under his direct rule until January 1956.

Conclusions The 1954 flood received an overwhelming and unprecedented scale of response from the Nepali state. It was the first disaster incident that had such a country-wide scope and received great attention after the political change of 1951 when the country entered in the ‘modern era.’ Just two decades ago, in 1934, Nepal had faced a major earthquake. To respond to the 1934 earthquake, the Rana government also established institutions for relief operation and fund generation. But in 1954, the political elites were freer to air their differences about the workings of these institutions. They intervened in the distribution of relief fund. They made claims on behalf of and for the people. People’s welfare was a more explicit subject in 1954. There was major politics around the flood and subsequent relief operations. The politics disturbed the ruling coalition and helped the ascendancy of monarchy. Although not covered here, a detailed comparative study of these two disasters may illuminate the state–society relationship under two different political systems. Still we can draw few comparisons. In between 1934 and 1954, the common perception about natural disasters underwent a remarkable shift. It stopped looking at the disasters as the acts of god81 and started to view them as results of natural process, a view still dominant in Nepal (Dixit 2003: 163). However, according to Steinberg, disasters as acts of nature eclipsed the idea of acts of god in the late 19th century (in Nepal’s case, mid20th century), not because of better scientific knowledge, but rather due to 78

Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. ørã 5 Yuvaràjadhiràjbàña Bakseko Sande÷. 12 Fagun, p. 1. Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. ørã 5 Yuvaràjadhiràjbàña âja Nimna Prakàr Bijnapti Prakà÷ Garibakseko Cha. 12 Fagun, p. 1. 80 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Mantrimanóaldvàrà ârthik Bil Pàs, øàhã Swãkçtikà Làgi ørã 5 kà Hajurmà Pe÷. 14 Fagun, p. 1. 81 Rana (2041 v.s.: 92–93) lists out common beliefs about the earthquake of 1934 which can be regarded as defining the disaster as an “act of god.” 79

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the interest of power-holders to normalize calamity in their quest to restore order (Steinberg 2000: xix–xx). The flood of 1954 appealed the government and therefore the state played a major role in the relief operations. An emerging ‘alternative approach’ considers disasters as the result of socio-economic structures and political processes. In such a hypothetical linear model,82 the 1954 flood story lies somewhere at the initial stage of the second conception. The impact of the flood was so extensive that the state had to respond to the crisis. The state responded through the SSCC at its bureaucratic level and the AA-based flood relief committee at its political level. Bureaucratic mechanism was more successful in bringing normality in the Kathmandu valley than the AA-based committee. The failure of the AA committee also implicated the changes in the political equations. However, it provided leaders with an opportunity to speak of public welfare as the state was practicing democratic policy-making. Though in a limited extent, there were also organized and unorganized civil society engagements in the disaster relief. Notable was Paropakar, a recently formed civil society group that provided emergency medical support during the relief operations. Unorganized district level initiatives were focused on attracting the government’s attention for relief and reconstruction. The state’s role was limited to the post-disaster relief operations. At least four different central level government institutions were set up.83 The Nepali state’s substantial response to the disaster was characterized by the formation of top-down institutions and by the exertion of all its energies in relief operations. The state in the mid 1950s, however, did not have administrative and resource mobilization capacities to implement the operations effectively. The failure largely contributed to the eroding legitimacy of the incumbent 82

While studying natural disasters and Indian history, Roy (2012: 11–12) proposes such model as [I]n the eighteenth century, earthquakes and storms were seen as god’s punishment for sins committed by whole communities….In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they became act of nature….From the late twentieth century the discourse shifted again. Disasters are now, at least partly, the results of human action upon nature….These new parameters have changed the pattern of response… 83 These characteristics still mark the Nepali state’s response to disasters. For details on the current structure of disaster response, see Chhetri (2001: 67–68).

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government and caused a major rupture in the ruling alliance. The flood dislodged the political processes from its dynamic equilibrium. Consequently, the Crown Prince could assert the monarchy’s role more aggressively. Such in-depth ethnographic historical studies may illuminate newer dimensions of the major political changes that took place around emerging states like Nepal in the 1950s.

Acknowledgements I am indebted to Tom Robertson for introducing me to environmental history in a serious manner and providing some archival documents for this research. An earlier version of this paper was presented in the workshop on ‘Ruptures and Repairs in Nepali History’ organized at Martin Chautari during 19–20 August 2012. I am grateful to the discussant Ngamindra Dahal and other participants at the workshop for their comments. The final written version benefited from extensive critical inputs and editorial help from Yogesh Raj and an anonymous reviewer for which I would like to thank them. I am also thankful to other colleagues, particularly Pratyoush Onta, Ramesh Parajuli and Harsha Man Maharjan for various help. However only I am responsible for all remaining weaknesses and errors in this article which will also appear in the book Ruptures and Repairs in South Asia: Historical Perspectives to be published by Martin Chautari.

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Biographical note Sharad Ghimire has been a researcher of environmental justice for more than a decade. He has co-authored/co-edited five books on environmental justice, food security and biodiversity conservation, all published by Martin Chautari. He worked at Chautari from 2001 through 2012. He was also a faculty member of the Department of Conflict, Peace and Development Studies, Tribhuvan University during 2008-2012. Currently he is a freelance researcher doing research on various aspects of the environment-society interaction. Email: [email protected]