SBY s balancing act: the presidency in Indonesia s emerging multipolar democracy
SBY’s balancing act: the presidency in Indonesia’s emerging multipolar democracy Stephen Sherlock Political Governance Consultant Visiting Fellow, Dep...
SBY’s balancing act: the presidency in Indonesia’s emerging multipolar democracy Stephen Sherlock Political Governance Consultant Visiting Fellow, Dept of Political & Social Change, ANU
Indonesia Update 2014
Themes of the paper • Post-2004 presidency was without historical precedent: not yet fully grasped by Indonesian political class. • Despite the new situation, SBY’s “rainbow cabinet” strategy exactly the same of his predecessors. Consensual approach to government produced little progress in approaches & systems to manage new institutional relationships – esp. executive-legislature dynamics. • Emphasis on DPR obstructionism during SBY’s administration is mistaken – mix of influences on legislation & policy, with bureaucracy still central. • SBY’s legacy of absences?
Historical context of Indonesian Presidency • “An important and enduring feature of Indonesian politics has been the dominance of the president. … Indonesia’s first two presidents set a precedent for the role and stature of their successors.” (Baswedan 2007) • 1945 Constitution centred on the President – interim – plans for later change • Perceived failure of parliamentary system 1950-59 • Sukarno reimposed 1945 Constitution • Presidential dominance from 1959 to 1998/9
1998: Post-New Order quasi-parliamentary era • After democratisation & 1999 elections problems of “disguised quasiparliamentary system” (Crouch 2010) emerged • President elected by MPR for 40 years – but rubber stamp • Post-1999 DPR/MPR now a truly representative body • President needed to maintain majority parliamentary support • Crisis of removal of Pres Abdurrahman Wahid • Need to clarify powers of executive & legislature • Constitutional reforms 1999-2002
The Presidency inherited by SBY • Historical assumptions & expectations of presidential dominance • A combination of relationships without historical precedent • Conventional presidential system + democratic environment • Empowered parties & DPR after democratisation • Multiparty parliament after 1999 & 2004 elections • Recent history of unstable relations with DPR & “impeachment”
SBY’s solution: the rainbow cabinet(s) • Despite new circumstances, same approach as Wahid & Megawati • Attempted to include all parties in cabinet • Economic ministries to technocrats • Other ministries to party representatives • Same strategy in 2004-09 & 2009-14 • Attempt to manage relations with parties in both cabinet & DPR
Composition of Oct 2009 Cabinet (34 members) 20 party (60%) 14 non-party (40%) [CATEGORY NAME] [PERCENTAGE] (3)
Did the strategy work? • Did not sustain party loyalty in either cabinet or parliament • Conceptually flawed regarding parliament • Based on assumption of majority decisions in DPR • Consensus decision-making & committee dominance in DPR • DPR alliances are “temporary & situational” (Jusuf Kalla 2004)
• Failed as a tool for cabinet management & effectiveness • Ministers viewed ministries as “theirs” • Did not ensure political cohesion & support • Did not promote decision-making or unified policy approaches
Could the “rainbow cabinet” have worked? • Required an interventionist president • Exercise discipline over cabinet ministers • Build processes for cabinet & ministerial coordination • Maintain close relations with DPR parties • Mechanisms for President-DPR coordination (Wanandi suggested a ministerial-level office)
SBY: leader or mediator? • SBY’s approach was to preside rather than lead • Mediate amongst interests & find consensus • 100 days, ministerial report cards not put enforced • Joint ministerial decree on Ahmadiyah (2008) • Afraid to isolate the three responsible ministers, despite wide opposition • Influenced by the most conservative elements
• Labour law amendments (2006) • Retreated in response to opposition by some unions • Concern to avoid possible social conflict
An obstructionist parliament? • DPR always fails to meet law-making targets (Prolegnas) • Incompetence? Obstruction by anti-reform forces? • But legislation is a joint government-DPR process (Art. 20) • Most laws are drafted in ministries • Legislative outcomes reflect intersection of many interests
Lawmaking: DPR, ministries & SBY • Legislation passed through DPR not always created by DPR • Civil service law – opposition by top bureaucrats • Law on intelligence (BIN) – power of military & intelligence agency • Economic nationalist laws – not just DPR protectionism – common view in ministries, reinforced by MK (electricity law, MIGAS) • SBY was often a bystander during legislative debates • Main lawmaker is still the bureaucracy • Ex-bureaucrats can become influential as DPR politicians
DPR & its oversight powers • DPR a problem for SBY when it used powers to question & investigate • Bank Century affair, Oil price issue, Iran sanctions • Easier role for a legislature with weak lawmaking capacity • Bank Century showed: • Failure of rainbow cabinet – SBY’s second term – Democrats largest DPR party & controlled Speaker’s position • Lack of systematic mechanisms to work with DPR – esp at committee level • SBY’s unwillingness to support politically exposed ministers
Reform or circumvent the bureaucracy? • SBY tactic of creating special units • Delivery Unit for Monitoring and Oversight (UKP4) • Poverty Reduction Unit (TNP2K)
• Aim to coordinate and oversee ministries on performance & programs • Compensate for weakness of Presidential Office • Units’ lines of authority & enforcement powers unclear • SBY retreated in face of resistance from existing agencies • Did not consistently support his officials – eg Boediono
• Lack of institutionalisation + lack of political support
SBY: A legacy of absences? • Peaceful transfer of power and stabilisation of politics • Inclusiveness will not buy loyalty or cohesion by itself • Jokowi has distanced himself from the idea
• Presidency – parliament relationship still ill-defined & dysfunctional • SBY sidestepped the task – worse under a less passive presidency
• Cabinet leadership not mediation – coordination mechanisms needed • Office of the presidency underdeveloped • Independent power of civil service still unchallenged • Jokowi & new civil service law?
• “New” presidential system not yet understood • Assertive parliament is not an aberration but a permanent feature
