Religion in international relations: A European specificity? Jeffrey Haynes, London Metropolitan University, UK The aim of this paper is to examine the issue of religion in Europe’s recent and current international relations. The context is the regional debate about multiple modernities. A specific case study linked to the multiple modernities issue is that of Turkey’s bid to join the European Union. The paper starts by reviewing briefly the development of secularization in Europe as a fundamental aspect of modernization, a trajectory leading to an end state, modernity, premised on the demise of religion as a significant public actor and its inexorable privatization. The assumption was that modernization and its outcome, modernity, are both unavoidable and inevitable. Moreover, patterns and outcomes associated with modernization and modernity were thought to produce predictable patterns of uniformity and standardization not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world. In other words, Europe’s experience was assumed to be globally applicable, a universal temple for religion’s public marginalization, whereby other cultures, countries and regions would replicate Europe’s cultural and historical experiences.

Prior to the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, religion was widely seen as rather insignificant in international relations. This view derived in part from the prominence of secular international security issues during the Cold War. Underpinning such a view were two widely accepted assumptions in European-American – that is, ‘Western’ – social science: (1) rationality and secularity go hand in hand, and (2) ‘modern’, political, economic and social systems are

1

found in societies that have modernized, via a process of secularization, that publicly marginalizes or ‘privatizes’ religion.

To understand the process of modernization in Europe it is useful to start by reminding ourselves of Europe’s particular experiences in nation- and state-building, and the role of religion in those processes. Prior to the eighteenth century and the subsequent formation and development of the modern international state system, religion was a key ideology that often stimulated conflict between societal groups. However, following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the development of centralized states first in (Western) Europe and then via European colonization to most of the rest of the world, religion took a back seat as an organising ideology both domestically and internationally.

Now, however, it is often observed that there is a widespread resurgence of religion (See, for example, Norris and Inglehart 2004). One of the strands of this was that after the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, increased examples became apparent of conflicts characterized by cultural/civilizational issues, with religion very often a key component (Huntington 1996). Many observers point to the Iranian revolution of 1978-9 as a key example in this regard, more generally marking the reappearance of religion as a significant political actor. More generally, the last two or three decades have seen an increased political involvement of Muslim political actors in many countries. Attention is especially focused on Islamism (pejoratively, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’) in the Middle East, West Asia, the Horn of Africa and elsewhere. Europe appeared to be an exception to the trend of religious resurgence, with most regional countries still characterized by continuing secularization. However, the importance of religion in democratization in Poland in the late 1980s, the rise of ‘Muslim politics’ in Britain, France, the Netherlands and elsewhere in the 1990s, and the religious

2

component of Turkey’s bid to join the European Union (EU) highlighted that, ‘even’ in Europe, religion was a component of continuing political and social issues.

Secularization Secularization, ization, secularism and modernization modernization ‘Secularization’ implies a significant diminishing of religious concerns in everyday life, a unidirectional process, whereby societies move from a sacred condition to an increasingly areligious state – until the sacred eventually becomes socially and politically marginal. According to what became known as ‘secularization theory’, both religion and piety are destined universally to become ‘only’ private matters; consequently, religion would no longer be an important public actor. Such was secularization theory’s claim to universalism that it was ‘the only theory which was able to attain a truly paradigmatic status within the modern social sciences’ (Casanova 1994: 17). Secularization has a long intellectual and historical pedigree, with roots in Europe. Leading European social scientists in the nineteenth and twentieth century – among them, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, Auguste Comte, Sigmund Freud, Talcott Parsons and Herbert Spencer – maintained that secularization is an integral facet of modernization, a global trend of relevance everywhere: to be modern is to be secular. Durkheim, Weber, Marx and the others ‘all believed that religion would gradually fade in importance and cease to be significant with the advent of industrial society. ‘The belief that religion was dying became the conventional wisdom in the social sciences during most of the twentieth century’ (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 3). As modernization extended its grip, so the argument went, religion would everywhere be ‘privatized’, losing its grip on culture, becoming a purely personal matter. Thus religion would no longer be a collective force with significant mobilizing potential for social change. In short, secularization, Smith (1970: 6) proclaimed, was ‘the most fundamental structural and ideological change in the process of political development’. Secularization was believed to be a one-way street: 3

societies gradually – but inexorably – would move away from being focused around the sacred and a concern with the divine to a situation characterized by significant diminution of religious power and authority.

The end result of secularization is secularism. Secularism is a term that was for a long time associated in much Western social science with terms like ‘worldly’ and ‘temporal’, lacking reference to a transcendent order involving a divine being, such as God or gods. Secularism is normatively characterized by both universalist pretensions and a claim to superiority over each and every set of religious ideas. In order to dominate ideologically, secularism requires religious ideas to be publicly marginalized. It seeks to do this by marking out the domain of the ‘secular’, characterising it with normatively desirable attributes, such as, tolerance, common sense, justice, rational argument, the public interest and public authority.

The secularization thesis – with its perceived end stage, secularism – was a core assumption of Western social sciences for decades, including in the decades immediately following World War II. It animated two highly significant sets of ideas: modernization theory from the 1950s and early 1960s, and dependency theory from the late 1960s and early 1970s. Both schools of thought maintained – or rather implicitly accepted the then conventional wisdom, then at its most unchallenged – that the course of both international relations and of integrated nation-states necessarily lay squarely in secular participatory politics. In an example of theory guiding ‘real world’ politics, many political leaders – especially in the developing world, vast areas of which were emerging from colonial rule in the decades after the end of World War II – worked from a key premise. It was that – sometimes irrespective of their own religious beliefs and cultural affiliations – they must for ideological reasons necessarily remain neutral in respect of entanglements stemming from particularist religious

4

and cultural claims if they wanted to build successful nation-states and conduct flourishing international relations. Not to do so would serve both to encourage dogmatism and reduce tolerance (‘Isn’t this what the post-Westphalian history of Europe tells us?’, they queried) and as a result be antipathetic to the development of viable nation-states, democracy and the smooth running of the (secular) international system. Secular nationalism à la Europe was thought not only to be universally applicable and morally right but also to be a natural outcome of modernization. In sum, as a consequence of the global advance of Europe’s secular, centralized states from the seventeenth century via colonialism and an international system from which religion was from the eighteenth century expunged – because of its demonstrable ‘bad influence’, reflected in numerous religious war between Christians, on the one hand, and between Muslims and Christians, on the other – religion was relegated to the category of a potentially dangerous but actually rather minor issue that must not be allowed to intrude on the search for domestic national unity and international political stability and progress.

In recent decades, however, theoretical space has opened up for a wide-ranging reconsideration of modernity, now increasingly perceived in more empirically realistic and metaphysically open terms than when it was synonymous with European-style modernity alone. As a consequence, much is now written and discussed about the complex issue of ‘multiple modernities’, brought to the fore and examined in recent years in the work of, inter alia, S.N. Eisenstadt (2000), David Martin (2005) and Charles Taylor (2007). The essential idea behind the multiple modernities ‘thesis’ is that ‘modernity’ and its characteristics and effects can be received, developed, and expressed in significantly different ways in different parts of the world. That is, while modernization is still observed to operate via powerful historical changes and contemporary mechanisms around the globe, currently propelled

5

above all by the multiple processes of globalization (Haynes 2005a), the original understanding of both uniformity and standardization, including the related secularization thesis, are now substantially questioned. It is widely agreed that different societies and cultures – such as, those of Japan, Iran, Singapore, and South Africa - can all be understood as being ‘modern’, while having very different cultural, social, political and religious characteristics. In short, the notion of ‘multiple modernities’ refers to the view that ‘modernity’, once understood almost solely as existing and developing in the Western cultural and historical, actually can be expressed in various ways, leading to various articulations of modern society, with societies around the world developing their own often singular experiences of and responses to their individual histories and cultural foundations, informed by the impact of multifaceted processes of globalization.

Europe, religion and international relations

Following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the subsequent development of the modern international system, religion lost its earlier international political significance. Previously, that is, before the seventeenth century, both Islam and Christianity had been key political actors. Islam had expanded from its Arabian heartland in westerly, easterly, southerly and northern directions for nearly a millennium. As a consequence, vast territories in Africa and Asia and smaller areas of Europe (parts of the Balkans and much of the Iberian Peninsula) came under Muslim control. But, unable to deal with the consequences of increasingly centralized Christian polities in Western Europe – with their superior firepower and organizational skills – Islam found itself on the back foot. The consequence was a significant reduction in the faith’s influence in Europe from the late fifteenth century. Overall, however, despite this setback, Islam elsewhere developed into a holistic religious, social and cultural

6

system, over time becoming a global religion via the spread of transnational religious communities.

The recent resurgence of religion noted on all levels of social activity – including international relations/International Relations 1 – calls into question the stubbornness of Western social sciences, apparently unwilling (and unable) to treat religions as important social factors on their own terms, on a par with secular discourses. Four approaches to international relations – realism, liberal internationalism, neo-Marxism, and constructivism – are briefly reviewed next, in order to assess how each understands the issue of religion in international relations. The conclusion of the short survey is that none of the four perceives religion to be a consistently important component of contemporary international relations.

First, the realist perspective contends that the state is always the most important factor in international relations because there is no higher authority; international organizations are regarded as always subservient to the state. The global system is a global states system grounded in competition, conflict and cooperation. States must rely upon their own resources to achieve the power they need to thrive, even if they are prepared, as most are, to collaborate with others to achieve general goals. Serious conflict is not the usual status of the international system because peace is maintained through local and global balances of power. Realism emphasizes how hegemonic powers, such as the United States, have an important role in establishing and maintaining order in the international system and stresses that the structure of power in the international system shapes the character of the political order (Bull 1977). In short, realist analyses places great stress on the significance of military power, because states must ultimately rely on their own efforts to achieve their goals. It ignores or 1

The academic discipline of ‘International Relations’ (upper case) is the study of ‘international relations’ (lower case). 7

seriously downplays the role of religion, not least because very few – if any – states proclaim that their foreign policies are driven by religious factors.

Second, the liberal internationalist paradigm begins from the premise that the state is no longer automatically the primary actor in world politics. The growth of transnational relations points to the significance of non-state actors, especially transnational corporations and international organizations of various kinds – including cross-border religious groups, such as al Qaeda – which can be independent of any individual state’s or group of states’ control (Haynes 2001, 2005b). Indeed, the state itself is not regarded as a unitary actor. Rather, it consists of a body of bureaucratic organizations and institutions. The global system is perceived as an aggregate of different issue areas, such as trade, finance, energy, human rights, democracy and ecology, in which domestic and international policy processes merge. The management of global interdependencies is carried out through processes of bargaining, negotiation and consensus-seeking. Order is maintained not by a balance of power, as realists contend, but by the consensual acceptance of common values, norms and international law. In other words, global order is maintained because states have a vested interest in so doing, while the global political process does not involve states alone but also includes a variety of non-state actors. Despite the fact that the liberal internationalist perspective recognizes that religious actors can be important transnationally, their importance is seen in terms of particular issues – for example, human rights – rather than more generally.

Third, the neo-Marxist views political processes at the global level primarily as expressions of underlying class conflicts on a global scale; and religion is not seen as an important facet of class issues. Neo-Marxists differ from realists in not conceiving of global order as based upon the structure of military power, nor as sustained by networks of interdependence as

8

liberal internationalists do. One of the dominant characteristics of the global order for neoMarxists is the structural differentiation of the world into core, peripheral and semi-peripheral centres of economic power. While, traditionally this was regarded as the division between the ‘North’, ‘South’ and the communist Eastern bloc, the emergence of the East Asian Newly Industrialising Countries and the demise of the Eastern communist bloc has comprehensively undermined the simple (and increasingly simplistic) three-way international economic division. In short, for neo-Marxists, global order is preserved through the power of the leading capitalist states, by international agencies, such as the United Nations, by transnational corporations, and by international regimes which together serve to legitimate a global diffusion of a dominant ideology of liberalism and Western-type modernization.

Finally, constructivism is an approach to international relations that is not restricted to one form, view or paradigm. Instead, what constructivist approaches have in common is the aim of understanding the behaviour of agents, states and non-state actors alike, in social and cultural contexts. For constructivists, political decision-making is understood in both ideational and material terms. Theoretically, then, constructivists might be expected to consider to a greater degree than realists, liberal internationalists and neo-Marxists, factors like culture, history and religion. This is because they have a say in helping craft significant players in international relations, including, but not restricted to, states. In short, constructivism, with its central role for identity, norms, and culture, provides a potentially favourable theoretical environment in which to bring religion into international relations theory.

We can see the value of constructivism when we turn to the specific issue of religion in Europe’s contemporary international relations. However, as Katzenstein (2006) notes,

9

scholars usually examine secular Europeanization, including the European Union’s (EU) impact on key areas, including national administrative practice, monetary affairs, human rights, democracy and environmental policy. In such examples, the influence of the EU on individual member states is clear – although outcomes can vary from country to country. In short, over time, during the process of expansion from six to the current 27-member EU, the main scholarly concern has been exploration of the effects of multiple secular issues on the EU’s growth and development.

Now, however, according to Katzenstein (2006: 1), ‘European enlargement is infusing renewed religious vitality into Europe’s political and social life, thus chipping away at its exceptional secularism’. There are three reasons why this development is worthy of attention. ‘First, religious vitality has the potential to revive political recognition of the Christian and specifically Catholic foundations of European integration. Second, renewed attention to religious differences could ignite political reactions that in the foreseeable future may well impede Europeanization. Third, the growing salience of religion is likely to demand new terms of coexistence with secularism. Legal and cultural Europeanization have left problematic and undefined the core of the European project. In the future religion may help fill that core by offering a focal point for political debate, engagement, and conflict.’

Developing analysis of these issues, the next section of the paper examines the following issues – religious vitality, religious differences, and the growing salience of religion – in relation to a specific subject: Turkey’s controversial application to join the EU. We discuss the opposition of some EU member states, political leaders and populations to countenancing the entry of Turkey into the EU, primarily because it would mean that a large Muslim country would join the Union. (Turkey has a population of nearly 80 million people, of whom 99 per

10

cent are Muslim.) The fear is that this would result not only in an ‘unacceptable dilution’ of the EU’s claimed ‘Christian’ cultural characteristics but also further open up Europe to infiltration from Muslim extremism. This issue is an example of what Katzenstein (2006: 28) identifies as a cultural element within Europeanization, which explores the Union’s effect on national identity and people’s sense of community. Examining this topic is useful in helping explore the politics and political contestation of the multiple modernities now shaping the future of the European Union. We will see that in the new, enlarged EU, religion plays a much more important role than it once did: it helps form and develop both multiple modernities and associated senses of community. The next section turns to a focus on Europe’s contemporary dialogue with Turkey, addressing the issue of multiple modernities in relation to a key international relations issue: Turkey’s putative entry into the European Union.

Turkey and the European Union In his book, The Crescent and the Star: Turkey between Two Worlds (2001), Stephen Kinzer examines social and political tensions in Turkey, encouraged by the country’s bid to join the EU. Kinzer explores the cult of modern Turkey’s founder, Kemal Atatürk, and the country’s historical background rooted in Islam. He also focuses on the state’s oppression of Turkey’s minority peoples, including the Kurds and Alevis, as well as the long struggle to free control of Turkey from the grip of military leaders. In addition, Kinzer also highlights an issue of both regional and international significance: Can Turkey survive as a secular state in the Islamic world? If not, what are the chances of other modernising Muslim countries – including Indonesia, Kuwait, Morocco and Tunisia – being able to make the transition to modernity with their roots in Islam while having significantly different characteristics than

11

European countries, with their different historical, cultural and religious backgrounds and qualities?

According to Kinzer (2001), Turkey reached an important turning point on August 17, 1999. On that day, more than 18,000 Turks were killed in a massive earthquake. The inadequacy of the state’s response to the earthquake led millions of Turks to question the country’s entire power structure, until then rooted in the military’s ‘guardianship’ of the country’s political, social and cultural development (Jenkins 2008). Turks had long been promised both stability and security through application of an authoritarian model of government, dominated by the military. Yet these same authorities had allowed thousands of death-trap buildings to be constructed, and then stood by impotently with no disaster plan to put into operation when many of them collapsed.

In addition, powerful forces of globalization have also affected Turkey’s political culture and corresponding modernization. This is particularly manifested in the sustained controversy about the country’s bid to join the EU. Coincidentally, in the same year as the traumatic earthquake (1999), the EU announced that Turkey was an official candidate for membership. A wave of ecstatic self-congratulation washed over the country, accompanied by solemn newspaper commentaries declaring it the most important event since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923. But the EU then laid down the conditions under which Turkey could become a member, and the military and its civilian (secular) allies balked. To attain membership of the EU, the following reforms would be necessary: (1) Repeal limits on free speech (2) grant every citizen the right to cultural expression, including the Kurds (3) subject the military to emphatic and consistent civilian control (4) resolve social conflicts by conciliation, and (5) allow all citizens to practice their religion as they see fit. Such was the

12

overall magnitude of these putative changes that many among the ruling elite seriously questioned how desirable it would be actually to join the EU (Jenkins 2008: 174-179).

Thus, EU membership was the touted reward – if Turkey made profound progress towards an interlinked democratic and human rights regime which attained EU standards. Over the next few years, there were signs of clear progress. In 2010, as Table 1 shows, Turkey’s political system was judged by Freedom House to be ‘partly free’. The qualifying adjective (‘partly’) is awarded because the country is still emerging from many decades of strong military involvement in politics and, while Turkey’s democratic credentials are respectable, they are still not (yet) unimpeachable. 2 In a bid to encourage improved democracy and human rights, the EU has sought to apply both political and economic conditionality during the 2000s. 3

Table 1 about here

There is in addition another important factor to note regarding current EU-Turkey relations: the impact of 9/11 and subsequent developments, including Western invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Following the al Qaeda attack on New York and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, it became clear to many EU governments that it was better to have ‘Muslim-moderate’ Turkey in the EU rather than, potentially, as a component of an ‘anti-western’ grouping of radical Islamist countries. Partly as a consequence, in early 2003, the European commission 2

The American nongovernment organization, Freedom House, reported that ‘Turkey [had] registered forward progress as a result of the loosening of restrictions on Kurdish culture. Legislators made progress on an improved human rights framework, the product of Turkey’s effort to integrate into European structures. At the same time, political rights were enhanced as the country’s military showed restraint in the aftermath of a free and fair election that saw the sweeping victory of a moderate Islamist opposition party’ (Emphasis added; Freedom House 2002: 12). In 2007, in addition, Turkey ‘received an upward trend arrow for holding free and fair parliamentary elections’ (Freedom House 2008). 3 Yilmaz defines conditionality as the ‘effectiveness, visibility and immediacy of external punishments and rewards’. The EU has employed conditionality since the 1980s to achieve certain foreign policy goals – including, good governance, democratization, better human rights, the rule of law, and economic liberalization – in numerous transitional democracies and non-democracies (Yilmaz 2002: 83). 13

recommended that foreign aid to Turkey should be doubled – from €0.5bn to €1.05bn – in 2004-6. This was a calculated attempt both to encourage the then newly elected AKP government to refrain from military intervention in Iraq as well as to encourage continuation with domestic political and human rights reforms that would hopefully bring the country ‘civilizationally’ closer to Europe (Osborn 2003). Subsequently, during 2007-2013, the EU’s foreign aid programme to Turkey continued, with financial transfers scheduled to amount to nearly €800 million over this seven year period. While this was a significant fall, some 20%, overall compared to 2004-6, it still represented a considerable sum of money at a time of European and global financial restraints in the context of the financial meltdown of 2008. Continued significant financial aid to Turkey underlined the EU’s sustained commitment to support continued democratization and human rights reforms in Turkey (Ayvaz 2008), in effect to continue to support the country’s modernization along recognisably European lines.

Is Turkey a ‘European state’ or a ‘Muslim country’? Findings from recent opinion polls

In 2005, the Pew Global Attitudes Project conducted an extensive survey among more than 17,000 people in 17 countries – including seven European countries. Pew reported that large majorities in various European countries saw as worrisome a perceived rise in Islamic extremism both in their own countries and around the world (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005: 3). As Table 2 indicates, there were significant concerns about Islamic extremism, both domestically and internationally, in Russia, Spain, Germany, Britain, The Netherlands, and France. Before the July 7 2005 (7/7) London terrorist attacks, Britons had expressed more concern about Islamic extremism around the world than they did at home. Perhaps surprisingly, the 7/7 bombings – when over 50 people were killed – and the abortive attempt

14

to replicate them two weeks later – on 21 July 2005 – did not significantly trigger a rise in anti-Muslim prejudice in Britain (Pew Global Attitudes Project Report 2006).

Table 2 about here

The findings in Table 2 also indicate that for many Europeans, fears of Islamic extremism are closely associated with worries about their own domestic Muslim minorities. Table 3 suggests that many non-Muslim Europeans believe that Muslims living in their countries want to remain distinct from society, not consensually to adopt European customs, cultures and life styles. Table 3 also indicates that there is a widespread perception in many European countries – especially those with significant Muslim minorities, such as Britain, Germany, and France – that resident Muslims have a strong and growing sense of ‘Islamic identity’ which is different from, and opposed to, that of Europeans.

Table 3 about here

The mixed attitudes expressed in the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project about Islam in Europe find a focus in the issue of Muslim Turkey’s proposed entry into the EU. This question has inspired many comments from politicians and opinion-formers to the effect that Turkey’s entry into the EU would not only unacceptably dilute ‘European identity’ but also open up the region to increased threat from extremist transnational Islamist networks (Gül 2004), such as al Qaeda. In 2005, two-thirds of French (66%) and German (65%) respondents opposed Turkey’s EU bid, as did a majority of the Dutch (53%). European nations expressing

15

support for Turkey’s admittance to the EU included Spain (68%) and Britain (57%) (Pew Global Attitudes Project Report 2005).

You cannot separate the issue of Turkey from domestic politics. There is a very important trend emerging and we see this in the Netherlands. The liberal-thinking people... have a feeling that the Muslim identity combined with Turkish accession to the EU is putting into danger what the EU has achieved in the societies...that the sexual/gender issues, the honor killings, the head scarves, these could become the lifestyles if it continues like this. 4

As this quotation from an unnamed ‘European Union Parliamentarian’ indicates, Turkey’s putative membership of the EU is controversial among many Europeans. Concerns over ‘Islamic extremism’ are reflected in some European opinions about Turkey’s bid to join the EU. However, attitudes towards immigration are even more strongly associated with views about Turkey’s admission to the EU. As Table 4 indicates, over two-thirds (68%) of Turks strongly endorsed membership of the Union in 2005. An equally large majority in Spain (68%) also favoured Turkey’s admission, as did 57% in Britain and 51% in Poland. Among some other European countries, however, there were sometimes significant majorities opposed to allowing Turkey to join the EU: 66% in France, including 30% who strongly opposed Turkey’s membership; 65% in Germany; and 53% in the Netherlands. In addition, as the Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2005 noted:

4

‘A European Union Parliamentarian born in Germany of Turkish parents’. From one of the Interviews conducted by Katrin Bennhold in France, Judy Dempsey in Germany, Salman Masood in Pakistan, Evelyn Rusli in Indonesia and Marlise Simons in the Netherlands, all of the International Herald Tribune, and Mayssam Zaaroura in Lebanon of The Daily Star, in 2005. 16

Attitudes toward immigration are associated with these views. Those who consider immigration (from the Middle East and North Africa, or from Eastern Europe) to be a bad thing are more likely to oppose Turkey’s membership into the European Union. This pattern is particularly strong in the Netherlands, France and Germany. Similarly, those who are more concerned about Islamic extremism in their homeland are more likely to oppose having Turkey join the E.U., especially in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, but less strongly elsewhere (Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2005: 3).

Table 4 about here

The survey data referred to above highlight not only European concerns about Islamic extremism but also the extent to which Turkey is a desirable potential member of the EU. The data on Turkey also highlight that a significant minority of Turks – 27% - opposed membership of the EU in 2005.5 It is not possible to be certain on what grounds nearly three in ten Turks oppose EU membership. When such a question is asked, people are not asked for their religious affiliation. So, for example, we cannot know if some Turks oppose EU membership because they view it as a ‘Christian club’ or because, for example, they resent the EU criticising Turkey for its Cyprus or Kurdish policy.

Can Turkey display the necessary credentials and clear signs of commitment to European norms and values? How might such characteristics find expression? To answer such questions requires a focus upon the political and social role of Islam in Turkey, as well as 5

In 2009, the percentage of Turks opposing EU membership had hardly changed: it stood at 29.5% (‘51.9% of Turks Supports EU Membership’ 2009)

17

Turks’ attitudes towards Europe and, more generally, the West. It is no doubt the case that part of Turkey’s long-running desire to join the EU is linked to the perception – held alike by both government and many ordinary citizens – that joining the Union would be likely to enhance Turkey’s economic prospects.

The advance of European integration implied by the expansion of the EU in recent years is regarded in various ways by academic observers. For some, the EU is an example of ‘turbocharged globalization’, while others regard it more as ‘a protective shield against the negative “fall-out from” globalization’ (Christiansen 2001: 511-12). Both interpretations can be invoked to explain and account for the EU’s recent – and likely future – expansion, not only into southern and eastern Europe but also to the periphery of the region, including Turkey.

Until 2004, the EU was exclusively a Western European regional grouping of established democracies. However, in May of that year, it expanded both numerically and geographically, to welcome 10 new members: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. In January 2007, two further countries, Bulgaria and Romania, joined the EU. To some, the enlarged EU symbolizes the end to Europe’s artificial division at the end of World War II. Now the organization is a panEuropean Union. However, the road to EU enlargement was a drawn-out and complex process, dominating the politics of Europe’s pan-regional relations for a decade prior to the actual enlargement. The process began with the first manifestations of Euro-enthusiasm from Poland and Hungary in the early 1990s, a time when both countries were emerging from decades of communist rule. In 1993, the EU officially set out its definition of membership criteria in response to requests from requests to join: aspirant countries must have democratically-elected governments, a good human rights regime and liberal economies

18

without ‘too much’ state control. Shortly after, in early 1994, the first formal EU accession applications were submitted, from Hungary and Poland. Applications then followed from Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic (Bardi, Rhodes and Nello 2002: 227). Following the EU announcement in 1999 that Turkey was an official candidate for EU membership, at the Helsinki Summit in the following year, Turkey was given the status of being a candidate country for full EU accession.

The political and economic criteria that the EU attaches for putative members were important factors in encouraging both democratization (and the consolidation of democracy) and the marketization of putative member states’ economies. Pridham lists six ‘broad types of influence exerted by the EU on democratization in applicant countries’ (Pridham 2000: 299). This amounts to a combined ‘carrot-and-stick approach’. It features the use of political and economic ‘conditionality’ in order to encourage putative new members to implement satisfactory political economic policies. The chief incentive for putative members was a ‘clear timetable for quick accession to the EU’ and ‘generous aid, credit and direct investment flows from the member to the candidate countries’ (Yilmaz 2002: 73). However, some observers claim that for the new members the objective of joining the EU goes beyond expected economic benefits; it is also seen as emblematic of a rediscovered, shared ‘European-ness’. For Hettne, the ‘question “what is Europe?” can only be answered by the political process of self-recognition. It is a social construct …an idea rather than a territory’. It implies that ‘the content of “European” can be defined normatively by: a strong role for civil society, various institutionalized forms such as parliamentary decision making, and a democratic culture stressing above all individualism and human rights inherent in the

19

individual human being.…’ (Hettne 2001: 38-9). 6 In this context, the issue of ‘Europeanness’ is important as it sheds light not only on the question of Turkey’s bid for EU membership but also on the larger issue of ‘European identity’ and where, more generally, Europe’s Muslims fit in.

Some senior European figures have expressed opposition to Turkey’s bid to join the EU. For example, in September 2004, Frits Bolkestein, then the EU single market commissioner 7 and former leader of the Dutch Liberal Party, warned that ‘Europe’s Christian civilization’ risked being ‘overrun by Islam’. He also claimed that the EU was in danger of ‘imploding’ in its current form if over 70 million Turkish Muslims were allowed to join. According to Bolkestein, Turkey’s entry could undermine Europe’s ‘fragile’ political system, ending all hopes for the continent’s integration. He also claimed, at a speech at Leiden University, the Netherlands, in September 2004 that demography was the ‘mother of politics’, that is, ‘while America had the youth and dynamism to remain the world’s only superpower, and China was the rising economic power, Europe’s destiny was to be “Islamized”’. Quoting the Orientalist American author Bernard Lewis, Bolkestein warned that in a few decades Europe could become an ‘extension of North Africa and the Middle East’. He also compared the EU to the former Austrian-Hungarian empire, which included so many different people from various cultures that it eventually became ungovernable. Bolkestein did however imply that under certain conditions a closer relationship between Turkey and ‘Europe’ was desirable:

Although a secular state, Turkey is still rooted in Islam. As such she could spearhead a cultural continent with its Arab neighbours and thus become the main actor of a 6

For Hettne, civil society brings together a range of ‘inclusive institutions that facilitate a societal dialogue over various social and cultural borders … identities and loyalties are transferred from civil society to primary groups, competing with each other for territorial control, resources and security’ (Hettne 2001: 40). 7 A spokesperson for the European Commission stressed that the Dutch commissioner ‘was speaking in a personal capacity’ (Lobjakas 2004). 20

culture with its own identity but with whom others can share common humanist values. This idea does not oppose close and friendly association and collaboration with Europe; instead, it could foster a common front against all forms of fundamentalism (‘Turkey-European Union’, 2004)

In an August 2004, shortly before he became Pope Pope Benedict XVI in mid-2005, the then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger appeared to endorse Bolkestein’s opinion regarding the undesirability of Turkey joining the EU. In an interview with the French newspaper Le Figaro, Ratzinger commented on Ankara’s application to join the EU by stating that: ‘Europe is a cultural and not a geographical continent. Its culture gives it a common identity. In this sense, Turkey always represented another continent throughout history, in permanent contrast with Europe’. It would thus be wrong, he believed, to equate the two sides for ‘mere commercial interests’ as it ‘would be a loss to subsume culture under the economy’. Instead, like Bolkestein, Ratzinger urged Turkey to assume leadership of the ‘moderate’ Muslim world, spearheading dialogue with the West (Kay 2005)

These high profile and controversial comments unsurprisingly stimulated a high-level Turkish response. In December 2004, Turkey’s then foreign minister, now the country’s president, Abdullah Gül, claimed that the ‘carrot’ of EU membership was a key component of Turkey’s ‘process of political and economic reform that has been remarkably successful and has received widespread popular support’. Gül also claimed that Turkey was demonstrating strong commitment to internal political, social and economic restructuring that merited recognition by the European and wider global community. Moreover, Gül averred, the numerous requirements for Turkey’s EU membership had now been addressed and thus fears expressed by figures such as Bolkestein and Ratzinger were unwarranted.

21

Finally, according to Gül, Turkey’s Muslim identity would neither be a handicap nor ‘political time bomb’ Instead, ‘positive EU-Turkey relations will show that shared democratic values and political unity prevail, sending the message that a “culture of reconciliation” within Europe is at hand’ (Gül 2004). The Pope’s visit to Turkey from 28-30 November 2006 did not therefore begin with auspicious signs of success. While the Pope’s visit was not a European Union matter, the political background helped to reinforce existing concerns – highlighted following Benedict XVI’s Regensburg (Germany) address on 12 September 2006, entitled ‘Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections’8 - that religious and historical differences render Turkey and Europe incompatible as long-term partners. However, despite these concerns, it appears that the Pope has reversed his opposition to Turkey’s efforts to join the EU, appearing to back the overwhelmingly Muslim country's hard-fought push towards membership at the start of his visit. While in Turkey in late 2006, Benedict XVI appealed for Christian-Muslim reconciliation and called on all religious leaders to ‘utterly refuse to support any form of violence in the name of faith’ (Owen 2006). The EU Commission was at the time of the interventions by Ratzinger and Bolkestein working on a report on the issue of Turkish accession to the Union. The EU enlargement commissioner, Gunther Verheugen, put forward a broadly positive verdict. Verheugen asserted that Turkey now met various basic tests for EU membership, including a free market economy and pluralist democracy, conditions that had progressively strengthened since the early 2000s. Moreover, the death penalty in Turkey had been abolished and the Kurdish language recognized. Largely as a result of Verheugen’s positive verdict, accession talks finally began in early 2005. However, in part because of the controversy about Turkey’s application in many existing EU members, the talks were certain to be lengthy and without certainty of

8

The Pope’s speech is available online at (Last accessed 10 June 2010). 22

eventual success. Now, however, over five years later (July 2010), there appears to have been little concrete progress.

A recent article by Scherpereel (2010) attempts to determine whether Turkey can rationally be placed within Europe’s emerging ‘pan-European cosmopolitan culture’ (Laitin 2002) or whether the country (still) demonstrates significant cultural ‘otherness’. Laitin (2002) suggested, in the context of the enlargement of the European Union after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent inclusion of a number of former communist Central and Eastern European countries, that social mobility in contemporary Europe requires individuals to possess several overlapping cultural repertoires. Drawing on various survey data – including Eurobarometer, World Values Survey, and European Values Survey – Scherpereel (2010) compares the cultural repertoires of citizens from four groups of European countries – the EU’s founding members; countries that joined the Communities between 1973 and 1995; countries of the 2004/2007 enlargement wave; and Turkey. Overall, the data support the conclusion that Turkey is culturally somewhat different from other, non-Muslim EU countries. On the other hand, however, Scherpereel (2010) concludes that the political implications of these cultural differences do not preclude the possibility of a relatively smooth Turkish integration into the EU.

Conclusion

The paper began by reminding the reader that, following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the subsequent development of the modern international system, religion lost its earlier international political significance in much of, especially Western, Europe. Given this historic context it came as a major surprise when many observers and analysts claimed to see a recent 23

resurgence of religion, noted on all levels of social activity – including international relations/International Relations – in many parts of the world, including the West. This obviously calls into question the stubbornness of Western social sciences, including International Relations theory, to treat religions as important social factors on their own terms, on par with secular discourses. Four approaches to international relations – realism, liberal internationalism, neo-Marxism, and constructivism – were briefly reviewed, in order to assess how each understands the issue of religion in international relations. The conclusion of the short survey was that none of the four approaches perceives religion to be a consistently important component of contemporary international relations.

The brief examination of the role of religion in International Relations formed the background to the second section of the paper. In the section, we examined both historic and thematic relationships between religious and political actors in the context of multiple modernities, as it affects both the EU and Turkey. We saw that, although once highly politically consequential, religion lost most of its political importance in Europe between the mid-seventeenth and late twentieth centuries. Now, however, many commentators see a widespread resurgence of religion with political consequences in many parts of the world, including Europe. Many religious actors now pursue political goals of various kinds, consequential to the impact of modernization, secularization and globalization. We examined two sets of actors – Islam in Turkey, and the Roman Catholic Church in Europe – to explain why religion and culture have become key issues in relation to Turkey’s bid to join the EU.

Overall, what does the issue of Turkey’s bid to join the EU tell us about the issue of multiple modernities? It demonstrates that while the EU still pursues a one-size fits all approach to membership – and by implication modernization and modernity – its leaders are aware that

24

there are other issues, not least that of post 9/11 security in international relations, which encourage pragmatism in relation to Turkey’s bid to join the EU. From Turkey’s perspective, it seems clear that the country is not prepared to accept a European template of modernization but instead seeks to make its own way as a regional power with its approach to modernity encouraged by Turkey’s distinctive culture, history and traditions.

25

References

‘51.9% of Turks Supports EU Membership’ (2009). The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 5 July. Available HTTP: (Accessed 11 June 2010). Aspalter, C. (2002) ‘Worlds of Welfare Capitalism: Examining Eight Different Models’, Research Center on Societal and Social Policy Research Paper Series No. 6, University of Hong Kong. Available HTTP: (Accessed 14 July 2004). Ayvaz, T. (2008) ‘Turkey to receive 495 million euro pre-accession EU aid’, Turkish Daily News, 18 July. Bardi, L. Rhodes, M. and Nello, S. (2002) ‘Enlarging the European Union: Challenges to and from Central and Eastern Europe—Introduction’, International Political Science Review, 23, 3, pp. 227–33. Bull, H. (1977) The Anarchical Society, London: Macmillan. Casanova, J. (1994) Public Religions in the Modern World, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Christiansen, T. (2001) ‘European and regional integration’, in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 495-518. Eisenstadt, S. N. (2000) ‘Multiple modernities’, Daedalus, 129, 1, pp. 1-29. Freedom House (2008) ‘Freedom in the World - Turkey’. Online. Available HTTP: (Accessed 22 March 2009. Haynes, J. (2001) ‘Transnational religious actors and international politics’, Third World Quarterly, 22, 2, pp. 143-58 Haynes, J. (2005a) Comparative Politics in a Globalizing World, Cambridge: Polity. Haynes, J. (2005b) ‘Al-Qaeda: ideology and action’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 8, 2 (June 2005), pp. 177-91. Hettne, B. (2001) ‘Europe: Paradigm and paradox’, in M. Schulz, F. Söderbaum, and J. Öjendal, (eds.) ‘Regionalization in a Globalizing World. A Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors and Processes, London, Zed Books, pp. 22-41. Huntington, S. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations, New York: Simon and Schuster.

26

Jenkins, G. (2008) Political Islam in Turkey. Running West, Heading East?, Basingstoke, UK, and New York: PalgraveMacmillan. Katzenstein, P. (2006) ‘Multiple modernities as limits to secular Europeanization?’, in T. Byrnes and P. Katzenstein (eds.), Religion in an Expanding Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-31. Kay, J. (2005) ‘Pope Benedict XVI’s political resume: theocracy and social reaction’, 22 April. ‘World Socialist Web Site’. Online. Available HTTP (Accessed 22 March 2009). Kinzer, S. (2001) The Crescent and the Star: Turkey between Two Worlds, New York: Farrar Straus Giroux. Laitin, D. (2002) ‘Culture and National Identity: “The East” and European Integration’, West European Politics 25, 2, pp. 56-80. Lobjakas, A. (2004) ‘EU: Commissioner Fans Flames of Debate On Turkish Membership’, ‘Radio Free Europe’. Online.Available HTTP: (Accessed 22 March 2009). Martin, D. (2005), On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Norris, P. and Inglehart, R. (2004) Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Osborn, A. (2003) ‘EU lifts Turkey’s hopes’, The Guardian, 27 March. Owen, R. (2006) ‘Pope turns other cheek to Muslim Turkey’, The Australian, 30 November. Online. Available HTTP: (Accessed 11 June 2010). Pew Global Attitudes Project Report (2005) ‘Islamic extremism: Common concern for Muslims and Western publics’, ‘17-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey’, July. Online.Available HTTP: (Accessed 22 March 2009). Pew Global Attitudes Project Report (2006) ‘The Great Divide. How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other’, June 22. Online.Available HTTP: (Accessed 22 March 2009). Scherpereel, J. (2010) ‘European culture and the European Union’s “Turkey question”’, West European Politics, 33, 4 (July 2010), pp. 810-829. Smith, D. E. (1970) Religion and Political Development, Boston: Little, Brown.

27

Taylor, C. (2007) A Secular Age, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press ‘Turkey-European Union’ (2004) AsiaNews.it, 8 September. Online.Available HTTP: (Accessed 22 March 2009). Yilmaz, H. (2002) ‘External-internal linkages in democratization: Developing an open model of democratic change’, Democratization, 9, 2, pp. 67-84.

Tables

Table 1: Political rights and civil liberties in Turkey, 1973-2007 Year 1973 1977 1983 1987 1993 1997 2003 2007 2010

Political rights (PR) 2 2 4 2 4 4 3 3 3

Civil liberties (CL) 4 3 5 4 4 5 4 3 3

PR + CL average 3 2.5 4.5 3 4 4.5 3.5 3 3

Freedom rating Partly free Free Partly free Partly free Partly free Partly free Partly free Partly free Partly free

Source: Freedom House, ‘Map of freedom in the world’ (Online). Available at: (Acces sed 11 June 2010) . Table 2: European Concerns about Islamic Extremism Country Russia Spain Germany Britain The Netherlands France Poland

In your country? Very Somewhat 52 32 43 34 35 43 34 36 32 44 32 41 7 30

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005: 3

28

In the world? Very 51 45 48 43 46 46 23

Somewhat 33 37 39 37 44 43 39

Table 3: Perceptions of Muslims in European Countries ‘Muslims want to remain distinct’ (%) Germany 88 Russia 72 Spain 68 Netherlands 65 Britain 61 France 59 Poland 42 Country

‘Increasing sense of Islamic identity’ (%) 66 55 47 60 63 70 20

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005: 3 Table 4: Turkey and membership of the European Union Country Turkey Spain Britain Poland Netherlands France Germany

In favour % 68 68 57 51 44 33 32

Oppose % 27 21 29 22 53 66 65

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2005: 3

29

Don’t know % 5 11 14 27 2 1 3