11 February 2013

NYSE Euronext’s Response to ESMA-EBA’s Consultation Paper on “Principles for Benchmark-Setting Processes in the EU”

1.

NYSE Euronext

1.1

NYSE Euronext is a leading global operator of financial markets, a manager of index and other referential data and a provider of innovative trading technologies. NYSE Euronext’s regulated markets in Europe (Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, London and Paris) and exchanges in the United States provide for the trading of cash equities, bonds, futures, options, and other Exchange-traded products. NYSE Liffe is the name of NYSE Euronext’s European derivatives business and is the world’s second largest derivatives business by value of trading. It comprises regulated markets in five EU Member States which operate on the basis of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MIFID”). In addition, NYSE Euronext has over 25 years of experience in compiling, calculating and publishing a wide range of benchmark indices in Europe and the United States, including the CAC40 and AEX indices.

1.2

NYSE Liffe makes available for trading a broad range of futures and options contracts, including products based on Sterling LIBOR, Swiss Franc LIBOR and EURIBOR. In addition, NYSE Euronext’s futures exchange in the United States, NYSE Liffe U.S., lists a futures contract based on U.S. Dollar LIBOR and has recently launched a product based on the DTCC’s General Collateral Finance (“GCF”) Repo Index.

1.3

NYSE Euronext’s company address is as follows: 11 Wall Street New York 10005 United States

39 rue Cambon 75039 Paris Paris

2.

General Comments

2.1

NYSE Euronext welcomes ESMA-EBA’s Consultation Paper on “Principles for BenchmarkSetting Processes in the EU” (“the Consultation Paper”), as well as the regulatory initiatives which are underway in the UK (i.e. implementation of the conclusions of the Wheatley Review of LIBOR) and internationally (i.e. the review of benchmarks which is being undertaken under the auspices of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions

www.nyx.com

(“IOSCO”)). The level of scrutiny by policy makers and regulatory authorities at the present time is extremely positive both in terms of finding a practical and effective solution to the issues which have been identified by the regulatory authorities and also in preventing the occurrence of further misconduct and abuse. 2.2

The scope of the Consultation Paper is broad and covers indices that are used as benchmarks1 in a wide array of interest rate, equity and commodity markets. The basis on which those benchmarks are constructed differs significantly (i.e. some are based on polled rates and others are based on transactions or are calculated through a combination of data on transactions, bids and offers). Moreover, the markets from which those polled rates or transactions/bids and offers are sourced range from transparent, regulated markets in the case of some benchmarks to less transparent and less regulated OTC markets in the case of others.

2.3

Given the degree of diversity in the benchmarks in question, and in the sources and characteristics of their inputs, NYSE Euronext believes it is necessary to place them into the following three categories for the purposes of considering further policy action: a) Category 1: benchmarks based on polled rates which are sourced from Over The Counter (“OTC”) markets. b) Category 2: benchmarks based, in whole or in part2, on transaction data from OTC markets. c) Category 3: benchmarks based on transaction data from regulated markets.

2.4

Regulatory authorities have recently identified misconduct in, and have taken disciplinary action against attempted manipulation of, a number of benchmarks in Category 1, most notably in the cases of the London Inter Bank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) and the Euro Inter Bank Offered Rate (“EURIBOR”). In the case of LIBOR, a comprehensive package of measures is being implemented in order to strengthen its governance, regulation and calculation methodology which NYSE Euronext fully supports3.

2.5

Separately, IOSCO has examined the efficacy of some benchmarks within Category 2 as a result of concerns about their reliability, principally due to selective reporting of data and opacity and variations in assessment methodologies. Thus far, these examinations have related specifically to the role of Price Reporting Agencies (“PRAs”) within spot oil markets4,

1

In responding to the Consultation Paper, NYSE Euronext has applied the definition of benchmarks which is set out on page 4 of the Consultation Paper. Moreover, NYSE Euronext notes that the terms “indices” and “benchmarks” are used interchangeably in the Consultation Paper. For the purposes of clarity, NYSE Euronext’s response uses the term “benchmarks” throughout. 2 Some of the benchmarks in Category 2 are calculated using a hybrid methodology which incorporates data on bids and offers as well as transactions. 3 See “The Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Final Report”, dated September 2012. 4 See “Principles for Oil Price Reporting Agencies: Final Report”, dated 5 October 2012 which explains on page 6 that “IOSCO has examined numerous PRA processes for the purposes of identifying common vulnerabilities that could, if not addressed by appropriate controls and policies, result in an assessed price that is an unreliable indicator of the physical oil market value that it is intended to reflect”.

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but they are being broadened in IOSCO’s current work which covers other benchmarks that are produced from OTC data. Such benchmarks warrant further scrutiny given that the OTC markets from which the relevant data is derived are not subject to orderly and proper markets requirements, nor are they transparent or multilateral in nature. 2.6

In contrast, whilst benchmarks in Category 3 are not immune from regulatory failure – and whilst they are also within the scope of IOSCO’s work – their governance and operation have not been the subject of serious regulatory concern, nor have the regulatory authorities identified any demonstrable misconduct in relation to their compilation. A key differentiating factor of benchmarks within Category 3 is that typically they are calculated on the basis of the price of shares traded on regulated markets. Those regulated markets are required to comply with stringent regulations concerning market integrity, orderly and transparent price formation, and the operation of proper markets. Moreover, their compliance with such regulations is subject to close and continuous oversight by the relevant regulatory authorities.

2.7

In light of these considerations, NYSE Euronext believes that it would be appropriate for the following framework to be established: a) All benchmarks should be brought within the scope of civil and criminal sanctions against manipulation5, and their governance, transparency and calculation methodology arrangements should be subject to a set of high level principles such as those being devised by IOSCO and EBA-ESMA; b) In addition, the administration of6, and the process of contributing to, benchmarks within Categories 1 and 2 should be regulated activities. This would enable regulatory authorities to create bespoke regulations and associated sanctions in relation to these activities. That new regulatory regime should be supported by enabling provisions which would enable it to be extended, where necessary, to any benchmarks within Category 3 (e.g. if in future any such benchmark were to suffer from significant regulatory failure).

2.8

The approach to changing the regulatory perimeter proposed in paragraph 2.7(b) above would enable policy makers to retain their focus on addressing – as a matter of urgency - the issues which have occurred, and the deficiencies which have been identified, in relation to benchmarks within Categories 1 and 2 on the one hand, without losing sight of the potential benefits of broader application of such policy action (i.e. potentially extending it to some benchmarks within Category 3) on the other. The benefits of wider application, and any requisite tailoring of regulations to other types of benchmark, could then be given due consideration over the medium term without delaying the much needed action in relation to Categories 1 and 2.

5

This is already being taken forward within the EU as a result of the proposed extension of the Market Abuse Regulation and Market Abuse Directive to cover the manipulation of benchmarks. 6 The only exception to this rule would be the administration of those benchmarks which are managed by public authorities, such as the inflation indices which are produced by the UK Office of National Statistics.

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2.9

Within the context described in paragraphs 2.1-2.8 above, NYSE Euronext believes that the key reform which is necessary is the effective management and mitigation of conflicts of interest in the processes of contributing to and administering benchmarks. NYSE Euronext believes this can be achieved by implementing a comprehensive package of measures which is designed: a) to implement technical improvements in the calculation methodology of benchmarks, where this is necessary; b) to create a more robust governance and accountability framework; c) to reduce the incentives for abuse; d) to bring the administration of benchmarks within Categories 1 and 2, and submissions to such benchmarks, within the regulatory perimeter; and e) in relation to Categories 1 and 2, to create bespoke regulations and sanctions in relation to these activities.

2.10

We should like, in particular, to emphasise the following points: a) Extending Regulatory Powers: Whilst the FSA in the UK has demonstrated its ability to take enforcement action against authorised firms in relation to misconduct concerning LIBOR and EURIBOR on the basis of breaches of the FSA Principles for Business, contributing to those benchmarks and managing and administering such benchmarks are currently not regulated activities under EU or UK law. In consequence, EU regulatory authorities do not currently have the ability to make specific rules governing such benchmarks; nor are they able to take enforcement action against individuals within firms who have perpetrated misconduct unless those individuals happen to be registered with the regulatory authority for other purposes, or unless market manipulation can be proved (which is often difficult). These deficiencies need to be rectified as a matter of urgency and the regulatory perimeter should be expanded in relation to benchmarks within Categories 1 and 2. This course of action is already underway in the UK in relation to LIBOR. This is important not just in terms of the substance of regulatory scrutiny and powers, but also in terms of the perception within the contributing banks of the status of the rate setting process. Changing perceptions among the individuals involved within the contributing banks is key to achieving the necessary improvements given that individuals’ motivations and behaviour, and the management and compliance structures which oversee them within the banks, form the first line of defence against potential misconduct. b) Strengthening Governance and Accountability: The governance framework which overlays the management and calculation of benchmarks is the second line of defence against misconduct. In some cases it needs to be strengthened significantly in order to deliver a far greater degree of independence from the contributing organisations, to facilitate enhanced monitoring and scrutiny of the benchmark setting process and to impose tougher sanctions on those who fail to meet the requisite standards of integrity. 4

c) Enhancing Calculation Methodologies: Benchmark calculation methodologies should be reviewed and, where necessary, enhanced to make them more robust. In doing so, it is important that the fundamental nature of the benchmark is not changed. For example, in relation to EURIBOR it should remain an “offered rate” in the unsecured inter-bank market, otherwise there is a significant risk that the economic value of contracts which are based on it will be changed. d) Alternatives to Existing Benchmarks: Whilst it is perfectly legitimate to consider whether alternative benchmarks should be used in relation to particular forms of business, NYSE Euronext sees this as a market-driven exercise and would caution generally against policy makers and regulatory authorities mandating the use of specific benchmarks for particular forms of business (an exception may be made in relation to business in government debt). We believe that the role of policy makers and regulatory authorities in this context is to set appropriate standards and requirements for all benchmarks and to oversee any migration by regulated entities from using one benchmark to another, given that any such migration would inevitably involve investor protection and market integrity issues. e) International Coordination: Benchmarks such as LIBOR and EURIBOR serve international markets and regulatory investigations, consultations and reforms are underway at national, EU and international levels. It is vital that the separate initiatives that are underway to review such benchmarks are coordinated and that they arrive at consistent conclusions in order that the policy responses are comprehensive, avoid the scope for regulatory arbitrage, and do not create inefficiencies by, in effect, preventing the use of a benchmark on a global basis and thus jeopardising its valuable network effects.

3.

Specific Comments and Answers to the Questions Raised in The Consultation Paper

3.1

This section of the paper provides answers to the specific questions which are raised in the Consultation Paper. For ease of reference, the section headings and chapter and page references (shown underlined) are those used in the Consultation Paper. The questions from the Consultation Paper are reproduced in bold italic text. In each case, they are followed by NYSE Euronext’s response, which is shown in normal text.

3.2

Definitions (pages 4-5)

3.2.1

Question 1: Do you agree with the definitions provided in this section? Is this list of activities complete and accurate?

3.2.2

NYSE Euronext agrees with the proposed definitions.

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3.3

Principles of good conduct for benchmark setting (pages 7-14)

3.3.1

Question 2: Would you consider a set of principles a useful framework for guiding benchmark setting activities until a possible formal regulatory and supervisory framework has been established in the EU?

3.3.2

NYSE Euronext supports the development of interim principles by ESMA and EBA until a formal regulatory and supervisory framework has been established at EU level. It is important that the principles are consistent with those being devised by IOSCO.

3.3.3

In addition, we believe the interim proposals should focus on the areas covered in paragraph 3.3.5 below.

3.3.4

Question 3: General principles for benchmarks: Do you agree with the principles cited in this section? Would you add or change any of the principles?

3.3.5

We broadly agree and would like to make the following comments: a) Methodology: Benchmark calculation methodologies should be reviewed and, where necessary, enhanced to make them more robust. In doing so, it is important that the fundamental nature of the benchmark is not changed. For example, in relation to EURIBOR it should remain an “offered rate” in the unsecured inter-bank market, otherwise there is a significant risk that the economic value of contracts which are based on it will be changed. Consistent with the conclusions of the Wheatley Review of LIBOR, enhancements to the EURIBOR process should include appropriate use of transaction prices to corroborate rate submissions, but EURIBOR should not be changed into a transaction-based rate instead of a polled rate (please see the Annexe to this paper for further details). In light of these considerations, we do not agree with the statement in paragraph A.1 on page 8 of the Consultation Paper that “Actual market transactions should, as a matter of preference, be used as a basis for a benchmark, where appropriate” because it fails to acknowledge fully the need for application of judgement in the termination of a number of key benchmarks. b) Governance Structure: The governance framework which overlays the management and calculation of benchmarks is the second line of defence against misconduct. In some cases it needs to be strengthened significantly in order to deliver a far greater degree of independence from the contributing organisations, to facilitate enhanced monitoring and scrutiny of the benchmark setting process and to impose tougher sanctions on those who fail to meet the requisite standards of integrity.

3.3.6

Specifically, the governance structure of a benchmark should contain the following elements: a) Independence: As a basic rule, those with a vested interest in the value of a benchmark – either in absolute terms or relative to other benchmarks or prices – 6

b)

c)

3.3.7

should not be responsible for its oversight. The independence of the oversight function exercised in relation to benchmarks needs to be reviewed and, in some cases, significantly enhanced by broadening the membership of the relevant committees. Indeed, in order to comply with generally accepted standards of corporate governance best practice, the balance of membership of such committees should include a majority of independent members. This means, for example, that a committee responsible for overseeing a polled rate (such as LIBOR or EURIBOR) could not be dominated by the banks which contribute to that benchmark. Instead, the existing committee structure would need to be significantly overhauled or, as is planned for LIBOR, the existing benchmark administrator would need to be replaced by a new one. Effective Oversight: The efficacy of the benchmark setting process would be enhanced if the relevant oversight committee were to establish a code of conduct to which contributors to the benchmark would be required to adhere. The code of conduct would provide a more comprehensive and detailed framework for contributing to the benchmark concerned and would establish a uniform standard for the quality, accuracy and integrity of contributions. A code of conduct would need to be supported by effective and properly resourced oversight arrangements which are augmented by a sanctions regime that acts as a credible deterrent to misconduct and abuse. Such sanctions should go beyond those which are currently available to some oversight committees (which are limited to a power to expel a contributing bank from a benchmark panel at the next review point) and should also include financial penalties and referrals to the relevant regulatory authorities to consider whether additional action is warranted (e.g. the imposition of bans or suspensions against specific individuals). Transparency: Membership of the body (and its sub-committees) which is responsible for the administration of a benchmark should be made public, as should key documents such as the code of conduct, the benchmark calculation methodology, the results of reviews of the benchmark setting process and an annual report summarising any issues and concerns which have arisen with the benchmark setting process, and the remedial action which has been taken or which is planned.

In relation to the transparency of contributions submitted by individual contributing banks, there is a case for making them public on a deferred basis or in anonymous form only. This would help address one of the motivations which has been identified for the submission of inaccurate LIBOR contributions, i.e. the “credit-signalling or stigma effect” which, as has been established by the FSA, may motivate an individual bank to lower submissions during periods of market stress in order to avoid external perceptions that its relative creditworthiness has been negatively affected. Whilst this change would regrettably result in a reduction in the degree of existing transparency concerning the individual contributions upon which the relevant benchmark is calculated, it would remove one of the main incentives for misconduct.

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3.3.8

Question 4: Principles for firms involved in benchmark data submissions: Do you agree with the principles cited in this section? Would you add or change any of the principles?

3.3.9

In relation to Category 1 and 2 benchmarks, NYSE Euronext believes that each benchmark submitter should be required to provide to the benchmark administrator all information used to enable it to make its benchmark submission on a daily basis along with an explanation of the rationale used and, if applicable, the expert judgement made to establish the benchmark submission. In addition, the benchmark administrator will need to ensure that the information on which the submitted rates were determined was not selective (or, if it was selective, the benchmark administrator will need to consider whether the degree or type of selection was justified). As ESMA and EBA will be aware, the issue of selective reporting has been recently identified as a problem by IOSCO in the context of its work on the operation of price benchmarks in the oil markets7. NYSE Euronext considers that it is important to prevent an analogous issue developing in relation to the determination of the submissions to other benchmarks.

3.3.10 This could be achieved by the benchmark administrator receiving data in relation to all relevant quotes and transactions –e.g. in the inter-bank money market and related markets in the case of LIBOR and EURIBOR – from the contributing banks and inter-dealer brokers (“IDBs”). This would provide the benchmark administrator with the information necessary to question, in an informed and substantive manner, any contributing firm about the basis for its submissions. This could be achieved through a stipulation in the principles developed by ESMA and EBA that contributing firms should comply with the reasonable requests for daily and intra-day data made by the benchmark administrator for the purposes of conducting its oversight role. 3.3.11 If the approach described in paragraph 3.3.10 cannot be agreed, an alternative approach would be to build upon the proposed principles on benchmark setting8 which require contributing firms to have an effective methodology for establishing benchmark submissions on the basis of objective criteria and relevant information. In addition, each contributing firm should be required to provide the benchmark administrator with a written explanation of its methodology. Adherence to the stated methodology could then be subject to periodic audit to enable the benchmark administrator to verify that the contributing firm is applying its methodology in an appropriate and consistent fashion. The benchmark administrator’s oversight process would also benefit if contributing firms were obliged to provide the benchmark administrator with the inputs to their methodology (or blanks where there were no inputs, e.g. because there had been no activity at the tenor concerned) alongside their submissions. 3.3.12 Furthermore, consideration should be given to providing the benchmark administrator with access to an additional type of information that could shed light on the extent to which a 7 8

See “Principles for Oil Price Reporting Agencies: Final Report”, dated September 2012. Paragraph A.1 on page 8 of the Consultation Paper.

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contributing firm had, at a corporate-entity level, a trading book that would benefit on the day in question from higher or lower fixing levels in individual currencies and tenors. While such information may need to be passed to the benchmark administrator by a different route, and possibly post-event, it would give additional grounds to refute or escalate any possible concerns about the integrity of submissions.

3.3.13 Question 5: Principles for benchmark administrators: Do you agree with the principles cited in this section? Would you add or change any of the principles? 3.3.14 NYSE Euronext agrees with the proposed principles. Please see the answer to Question 3 above for further comments. 3.3.15 Question 6: Principles for benchmark calculation agents: Do you agree with the principles cited in this section? Would you add or change any of the principles? 3.3.16 NYSE Euronext agrees with the proposed principles. Please see the answer to Question 3 above for further comments. 3.3.17 Question 7: Principles for benchmark publishers: Do you agree with the principles cited in this section? Would you add or change any of the principles? 3.3.18 NYSE Euronext agrees with the proposed principles. Please see the answer to Question 3 above for further comments. 3.3.19 Question 8: Principles for users of benchmarks: Do you agree with the principles cited in this section? Would you add or change any of the principles? 3.3.20 NYSE Euronext broadly agrees with the proposed principles, although it does not believe that a benchmark user will be in a position to “ensure that the relevant benchmark administrator and benchmark calculation agent comply with the principles applying to benchmark administrators and benchmark calculation agents”9 Instead, that responsibility should fall to the relevant regulatory authority. 3.3.21 The principal responsibility in ensuring the appropriateness, suitability, and relevance of the use of a benchmark should rest with banks and investment firms. They should ensure that the benchmarks embedded within the products that they provide to their customers are both suitable to the type of investor concerned and fit for the intended purpose of the product in question. As a general matter, other entities which are further removed from the customer cannot do so as they are not aware of the customer’s needs or circumstances.

9

Paragraph F.2 on page 13 of the Consultation Paper.

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3.3.22 In addition, in designing contracts for admission to trading on a trading venue, the operator of the venue in question should satisfy itself and its regulator that any benchmark underlying a contract will form a reliable and robust basis for the contract. This is, of course, already standard practice within regulated markets and – particularly in relation to listed derivatives based on equity indices - is the subject of existing IOSCO guidance10.

3.4

Adequacy of the principles to any benchmark-setting process (page 14)

3.4.1

Question 9: Are there any areas of benchmarks for which the above principles would be inadequate? If so, please provide details on the relevant benchmarks and the reasons of inadequacy.

3.4.2

No.

3.5

Legal continuity (page 14)

3.5.1

Question 10: Which principles/criteria would you consider necessary to be established for the continuity of benchmarks in case of a change to the framework?

3.5.2

In relation to transition to an alternative benchmark (e.g. an alternative to EURIBOR), one must consider what the rate is designed to capture. Is it designed to be broadly equivalent to EURIBOR or is it intended to be an entirely different rate (e.g. based on the rate upon which banks fund themselves in current market conditions, such as a repo rate)?11 There are a number of important factors in considering these issues. First, when considering any interest rate on a loan between two counterparties, we need to be cognisant of the fact that the rate is governed by the period of the loan and the perceived risk of the counterparty defaulting on the repayment of the loan. Another factor is what else the depositor could have done with the funds over the period of the loan, i.e. the opportunity cost. Typically, the greater the perceived risk of the counterparty defaulting and the longer the funds are committed to that counterparty, the higher the interest rate. Consequently, when considering an alternative rate to any given EURIBOR rate, it is necessary for continuity purposes to ensure that the alternative rate encapsulates the same period and credit factors as the original.

3.5.3

Failure to address the continuity issue could change the value of the existing stock of outstanding positions, which we estimate to be worth in excess of €100 trillion. In addition, given that new transactions are entered into in order to manage existing exposures that

10

Reports of The IOSCO Technical Committee entitled “The Application of the Tokyo Communique to Exchange-Traded Financial Derivatives Contracts” (September 1998) and “Contract Design of Derivative Products on Stock Indices and Measures to Minimise Market Disruption” (October 1992) refer. 11 EURIBOR is not necessarily the rate at which an individual bank could borrow in the inter-bank market, but is an average of perceived borrowing costs in that market.

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market participants have to EURIBOR-based risk in other asset classes, those market participants would likely prefer to continue to hedge such risk in futures with the same or as close to identical financial characteristics as existing contracts. 3.5.4

Furthermore, to put the issue of alternatives into context NYSE Euronext would reiterate the sentiment contained in The Wheatley Review that no alternative benchmark could act as a panacea for the failings that have been uncovered in relation to LIBOR and EURIBOR and that no interest rate benchmarks are immune from attempted misconduct or potential abusive practices. Specifically, in the context of considering alternative mechanisms for compiling an interest rate benchmark (based on uncommitted submissions such as LIBOR, average transaction prices, or committed quote-based trading), The Wheatley Review notes that: “None of these mechanisms are immune from attempts to manipulate the benchmark, especially while conflicts of interest exist. Therefore, in order to mitigate these problems each mechanism would require credible governance and oversight procedures, and indeed, they may require official regulation.”12 NYSE Euronext agrees with these sentiments and believes that the key reforms which are necessary are the more effective management and mitigation of the conflicts of interest which currently exist. This can be achieved by implementing a comprehensive package of measures which is designed to create a more robust governance and rate-setting framework, to reduce the incentives for abuse, to bring the administration of, and submissions to, benchmarks within Categories 1 and 2 within the regulatory perimeter and, where necessary, to implement technical improvements in the benchmark methodology. Each of these measures would need to be implemented in relation to any alternative to the existing benchmarks.

3.5.5

In addition, transition to an alternative benchmark would bring with it the need to manage a complex set of migration issues, which would be fraught with technical, operational, logistical and legal problems. These problems could be avoided by placing the main emphasis on the strengthening of existing benchmarks rather than replacing them.

3.5.6

There is a wide range of different interest rate benchmarks which is available to the market. We believe that the role of the regulatory authorities in this context is to set appropriate standards and requirements for all interest rate benchmarks (including requirements that they be fit for the intended purpose), leaving it to the market to decide which benchmarks to use in practice. Moreover, the relative utility of a particular benchmark is likely to change over time and in response to different economic circumstances, as described in the Annexe to this paper. This means that there is, in practice, a limit to which a mandating approach could be applied.

12

Paragraph 4.23, page 38, The Initial Discussion Paper of The Wheatley Review of LIBOR.

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3.5.7

A number of these other benchmarks and the financial products based upon them do, indeed, play a key role in the operation of the financial markets. The role being played by NYSE Liffe U.S.’s Futures on DTCC General Collateral Finance (GCF) Repo Indices is particularly noteworthy. This suite of products is assisting market participants in managing the recent growth in the secured lending market.

3.5.8

Regardless of whether any migration occurred through a “Big Bang” conversion of existing contracts or through a phased approach, the lead times involved are likely to be significant. This reflects the myriad of different types of benchmark-related contracts which are in existence, held by both retail and wholesale customers, the different regulatory jurisdictions involved and the complex business, legal, operational, logistical and investor protection issues which would need to be resolved. There would be a tension between these practical issues on the one hand and the market’s need for achieving certainty and clarity, without undue delay, on the other.

4.

Next Steps

4.1

NYSE Euronext would welcome the opportunity to discuss the contents of its response to the Consultation Paper with ESMA and EBA, particularly if both authorities require any clarification about the contents of this response. The relevant contact details are set out in section 5.

4.2

NYSE Euronext is content for its response to the Consultation Paper to be made public.

5.

Contact Information

5.1

If ESMA and EBA would like to discuss any of the points made in this response they should contact the following: Laurence Walton Director of Regulatory Policy European Government Affairs and Public Advocacy NYSE Euronext t: +44 (0)20 7379 2782 m: +44 (0)7921 280055 e: [email protected] Cannon Bridge House 1 Cousin Lane London EC4R 3XX

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ANNEXE Specific Comments about the EURIBOR Calculation Methodology

A1.1

As noted in paragraph 2.10(c) of this paper, it is important to consider the extent to which changes to the EURIBOR rate setting methodology can be made without invalidating existing contractual arrangements or subjecting them to a significant risk of successful legal challenge (e.g. by changing the value of existing contracts). Given that in excess of €100 trillion worth of existing wholesale market contracts13 are referenced to EURIBOR, in addition to an unquantified number of consumer credit agreements and household mortgages, such invalidations or litigation would cause severe market disruption and threats to investor protection which would impact wholesale and retail customers in multiple jurisdictions. Technical changes to the methodology for setting EURIBOR will therefore need to be constrained to the extent that is necessary in order to avoid these risks. The two key factors in this regard are as follows: a) EURIBOR is an “unsecured inter-bank” rate: EURIBOR represents the cost of borrowing in the inter-bank market on an unsecured basis. If the definition of funding were, for instance, widened to include bank borrowing from money market funds, commercial paper, certificates of deposit, corporate deposits and other funding sources, it could be argued that the financial value of existing EURIBOR-based contracts would be changed and there would be winners and losers in this process. For example, the pricing of credit risk associated with an unsecured three month deposit may be significantly different from that associated with an instrument such as a certificate of deposit, which is tradable in the secondary market within that period. b) EURIBOR is an “offered” rate: EURIBOR represents the cost of borrowing on the offered side of the market. As a result, any initiative to move away from EURIBOR being calculated on the basis of an assessment of (actual or theoretical) offers to a mechanical calculation based on actual transactions should be treated with caution as it may be subject to challenge. This is because actual transactions will not necessarily have been agreed at the offered price (EURIBOR), but may have been agreed at the bid price (EURIBID). Therefore, a data set comprising the price of a series of money market transactions (e.g. for three month deposits) would facilitate the calculation of an average rate which would be more akin to a mid-point between EURIBOR and EURIBID rather than EURIBOR per se. In the absence of any adjustment to take account of this fact, parties with existing contractual arrangements could claim that a key term of their contracts had been amended without their consent, such that their EURIBOR- based contract had been changed to be a EURIBOR/EURIBID-based contract instead.

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Source: BIS Quarterly Review, June 2012, with the assumption that 25% of Interest Rate Swaps, Forward Rate Agreements and associated options worldwide and 75% of European listed interest rate derivatives are referenced to EURIBOR.

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A1.2

Moreover, EURIBOR is a complex of 15 rates with maturities ranging from one week to 12 months. At any one time a maturity within that complex will be more active or less active relative to the other maturities depending on a number of factors, including general economic and financial conditions, overall perceptions of creditworthiness and liquidity needs. It is unlikely that all maturities will experience periods of high activity simultaneously and, over time, it can be expected that the focus of activity will move between different points on the maturity curve. As a result, rates for some (i.e. currently inactive or less active) maturities will need to be calculated and judged by reference to their relationship with other (i.e. currently more active) maturities in order for the theoretical pricing of the entire complex to be constructed and maintained. Having said that, the full range of the existing 15 maturities should be reviewed and some degree of rationalisation should be applied, as it is unlikely that the continuance of the full range of existing maturities is necessary.

A1.3

Provided the considerations and constraints described in the two previous paragraphs are acknowledged and respected, technical changes can be made to improve the methodology for setting EURIBOR, e.g. along the lines suggested in paragraph 2.10(c) of this paper.

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