The Critical Years, 1990–95

Saadia Touval

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Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars

Advances in Political Science: An International Series Members of the editorial board: Asher Arian (general editor), Luigi Graziano, William Lafferty, Theodore Lowi and Carole Pateman

Titles include: Christa Altenstetter and James Warner Björkman (editors)

HEALTH POLICY REFORM, NATIONAL VARIATIONS AND GLOBALIZATION

Asher Arian, David Nachmias and Ruth Amir

EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE IN ISRAEL

Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (editors)

CONDITIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE, 1919–39

Systematic Case-Studies

Klaus von Beyme

PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY

TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN EASTERN EUROPE

Ofer Feldman

THE JAPANESE POLITICAL PERSONALITY

Luigi Graziano

LOBBYING, PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY

Justin Greenwood and Henry Jacek (editors)

ORGANIZED BUSINESS AND THE NEW GLOBAL ORDER

Asha Gupta

BEYOND PRIVATIZATION

Saadia Touval

MEDIATION IN THE YUGOSLAV WARS

The Critical Years, 1990–95

Mino Vianello and Gwen Moore (editors)

GENDERING ELITES

Economic and Political Leadership in 27 Industrialised Societies

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As an expression of its commitment to global political science, the International Political Science Association initiated this series to promote the publication of rigorous scholarly research by its members and affiliated groups. Conceptual and theoretical developments in the discipline, and their explication in various settings, represent the special focus of the series.

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Saadia Touval

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© Saadia Touval 2002 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2002 by PALGRAVE Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE is the new global academic imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave Publishers Ltd (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd). ISBN 0–333–96503–5 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Touval, Saadia. Mediation in the Yugoslav wars ; the critical years, 1990–95 / Saadia Touval. p. cm. — (Advances in political science)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0–333–96503–5

1. Yugoslav War, 1991–1995—Diplomatic history. I. Title. II. Advances in political science (New York, N. Y.) DR1313.7.D58 T678 2001 949.703—dc21 2001034804 10 11

9 10

8 09

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6 07

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1 02

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Chronology

vii

Preface

xi

Maps

xiii

1 Introduction

1

2 Failed Attempts to Prevent War

15

3 The Entry of Mediators

39

4 The Ceasefire in Slovenia

49

5 The Search for a Comprehensive Settlement

61

6 The Ceasefire in Croatia

87

7 Collective Mediation in Bosnia, 1992±94

103

8 US Policy and the Making of the Dayton Accords

135

9 Priorities

171

Notes and References

185

Index

205

v

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Contents

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1918 1941±44 1980 1987 1989 1990 1990±91 1990 1991 4 April 21 June

Establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (name later changed to Yugoslavia). Yugoslavia occupied by Nazi Germany and its allies. Tito dies. MilosÏevic becomes leader of Serbia. Berlin Wall falls. First free multiparty elections held in the republics. Nationalists rise to power. Growing support for secession in Slovenia and Croatia. Crisis in the Gulf. US proposal to discuss Yugoslavia at NATO Council opposed by Europeans in November.

The EC Troika visits Belgrade. US Secretary of State James Baker visits Belgrade for last-minute attempt to prevent the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. 25 June Croatia and Slovenia proclaim independence. 27 June War begins in Slovenia and Croatia. 27 June European Council meeting in Luxembourg dispatches the Troika to Yugoslavia. 28 June Yugoslav parties agree to a ceasefire. 30 June Troika again visits Belgrade. Yugoslav leaders readopt ceasefire. 7 July The Brioni Declaration, mediated by the EC Troika, ends the war in Slovenia. 18 July The Yugoslav federal presidency decides to withdraw federal forces from Slovenia. 19 August Coup attempt against Gorbachev. Disintegration of the Soviet Union accelerates. 27 August EC foreign ministers decide to convene a peace conference at the Hague. 7 September The Hague peace conference begins under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington. 25 September First UN Security Council meeting on Yugoslavia. 4 October Carrington presents the outlines of his peace plan to Yugoslav leaders. 8 October Cyrus Vance appointed as UN secretary-general's representative.

vii

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Chronology

23 November Vance mediates fifteenth ceasefire agreement for Croatia: `The Vance Plan'. 7 December The Badinter Commission proclaims that Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution. 11 December European leaders meet at Maastricht to conclude negotiations establishing the European Union. 17 December EC foreign ministers decide to recognise Yugoslav republics upon the meeting of certain criteria. All republics desiring independence invited to apply by 23 December. 1992 15 January EC foreign ministers formally recognise the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. 21 February Ceasefire in Croatia found to be holding. Security Council decides to dispatch peacekeeping force. 23 February All three Bosnian parties accept first version of Cutileiro Plan. 25 February Izetbegovic withdraws his acceptance of the Cutileiro Plan. 29 February Bosnia holds referendum on independence. Serbs boycott referendum. March US and EC agree to recognise Bosnia's independence in April. 18 March The three Bosnian parties accept revised Cutileiro Plan. Croats and Muslims soon renege. 7 April EC, US and others recognise Bosnia's independence. War begins. 26 August Carrington resigns. London Conference meets. ICFY, headed by Vance and Owen, established to help settle all Yugoslav disputes. October First version of the Vance±Owen Plan presented to the parties. 1993 30 January Muslims join Serbs and Croats in accepting the constitutional principles of the Vance±Owen Plan. 25 March Muslims and Croats accept full plan; Serbs refuse. 3 May Stoltenberg becomes UN representative on ICFY, replacing Vance. 6 May Bosnian Serb Assembly finally rejects Vance±Owen Plan, defying MilosÏevicÂ's plea to accept. August All three Bosnian parties accept principles of the ICFY's Invincible Plan. 20 September Three Bosnian leaders meet on the Invincible but fail to sign the plan. 7 November Germany and France launch the EU Plan for a Bosnian settlement. 1994 January EU Plan dropped by its sponsors. February The US, assisted by Germany, mediates Muslim±Croat agreement establishing the Bosnian Federation. April Contact Group established.

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viii Chronology

Chronology ix

1995 May

Contact Group Plan presented to the parties. Croat±Muslim Bosnian Federation accepts the Contact Group Plan; Serbs' ambiguous response taken as rejection.

US resumes negotiations with MilosÏevicÂ. Croatia occupies Serb-held western Slavonia in Croatia. NATO airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs, who respond by taking hundreds of UNPROFOR prisoners and using them as `human shields'. June Bildt becomes EU representative on ICFY, replacing Owen. July Bosnian Serb army occupies UN-proclaimed safe areas and massacres thousands of Muslims at Srebrenica. 23 July Croatia and Bosnian Muslims begin joint military operation against Serbs. August US launches a new diplomatic initiative, taking the lead in the negotiations. Croatia occupies additional Serb-populated area in Croatia, `cleanses' area of Serbs. 28 August Start of NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serbs after explosion of another mortar shell in Sarajevo. 30 August Holbrooke in Belgrade. Bosnian Serbs agree to authorise MilosÏevic to negotiate on their behalf. 8 September Holbrooke brokers Geneva agreement between the three parties' foreign ministers on the principles for a settlement. 25 September Holbrooke mediates New York agreement between the three parties' foreign ministers on additional principles. 14 October Ceasefire comes into effect in Bosnia. 1 November Dayton conference begins. 20 November Dayton Accords signed.

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6 July 19 July

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This book arose out of my long-term interest in the mediation of international conflicts. While mediation is usually looked at from the peacemaking perspective, I argue that mediation by states is also a form of intervention, motivated by broad strategic objectives. An understanding of international mediation therefore, requires an examination of both perspectives. I have tried to contribute to our understanding of mediation within the broader context of international politics through case studies as well as conceptual±theoretical writings. Previous cases I have written about concern the mediation of African territorial disputes and the Arab±Israeli conflict. When fighting erupted in Yugoslavia in 1991 I turned my attention to third parties' attempts to stop that war. It was more than pure intellectual curiosity that drew my attention. I was born in 1932 in what was then the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Even in the first year of primary school in Novi Sad I was acutely aware of the ethnic±national distinctions between people, and sensed the latent tension between them. I knew my classmates not only by their names, but also by their national identity ± Serb, Croat, Hungarian, German and Jewish. From 1991, when the war erupted, several major powers attempted to mediate between the parties, sometimes acting alone and sometimes jointly with others, under the aegis of international organisations. Unfortunately it took a very long time to end the fighting. And in Bosnia we witnessed the unusual process of the West combining military action with mediation. When trying to understand the difficulties encountered during that mediation effort I focused on the political considerations and the relationships among the mediating entities ± states and intergovernmental organisations. I assumed that (besides the obvious obstacles posed by the policies of the disputing parties) an examination of the complex motives of the mediating governments and the tangled relationships between them would significantly help to explain the disappointing results of the mediation efforts.

xi

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Preface

I drew on a variety of sources when preparing this study. The abundant secondary literature provides an enormous amount of information, but it leaves many questions unanswered. To fill the gaps I utilised the published memoirs of several participants, and learned much from interviews with policy makers and negotiators. The interviews were especially useful for verifying information obtained from secondary sources and press accounts. As requested by the persons interviewed, I have not cited their names. I am beholden to them all. I wish to thank a number of individuals and institutions for help along the way. Initial encouragement came from the United States Institute of Peace, which invited me to spend a year as Jennings Randolph Fellow at the Institute. Among the Institute's staff I particularly wish to thank Joseph Klaits, Director of the Jennings Randolph Fellows Program, and his predecessor Michael Lund; Sally Blair, who was Program Officer; Richard Solomon, the Institute's President; Charles Nelson, Executive Vice-President; and Barbara Cullicott and Kerry O'Donnell. My research assistants, Dan O'Connor and Jim Walsh, were enormously helpful. Several of the Fellows, and especially Fen Hampson, provided valuable advice. I am also grateful for the advice and encouragement I received from my long-term friend and frequent collaborator, Bill Zartman. The anonymous reviewers, together with Steven Burg, Stephen Low and Susan Woodward, who read parts of earlier versions of the manuscript, provided valuable inputs. The Paul S. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies was also helpful in numerous ways. For help in getting the book published I am indebted to Asher Arian, my good friend since the time that we were both at Tel Aviv University. I also wish to thank Alison Howson, who accepted the book on behalf of Palgrave and lent her encouragement and assistance. I am grateful also to Kwaku Nuamah, who prepared the index. Finally, many thanks to Keith Povey for his skilful copy-editing and his patience. Sa a d i a To u v a l

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xii Preface

xiii

18

46 SLOVENIA

20

Pecs

46

Karlovac

Dr av e

C R O A T I A

Sisak

V Kan eliki K al ana l

v na Du

va Sa

ube Dan

Zagreb

Osijek

Vojvodina

Tisa- Dun

av (autonomous province)

Vukovar Novi Sad Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Brcko (The status of Brcko will be Bijeljina determined by arbitration)

Banja Luka Doboj

Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) (Dayton agreement line)

Kljuc

BOSNIA

Belgrade

Sav a

Sabac

Tuzla

Drin

a

AND

s

ba

Vr

Glamoc

Knin

Ruma

a

Republika Srpska

Bihac

Udbina

Danube

sn Bo

Un

a

Prijedor

a Tis

Sava

Slavonski Brod

Zenica

Srebrenica

Serbia

HERZEGOVINA

44

44 Zepa

Sarajevo

Uzice

Pale

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Sibenik

ina Dr Gorazde

Split

m Li

Mostar

Otok Brac

Piva

Republika Srpska

Otok Hvar

Ta ra

Ploce

Kom arnic a

Otok Korcula Neum

Montenegro Niksic

CROATIA

Kosovo (autonomous province)

Dubrovnik

Adriatic

Podgorica Tivat

Sea

Lake Scutari

ALBANIA Bar

42 18

Shkoder

42 20

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Post-Dayton 1995

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HUNGARY

Yugoslavia 1991

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xiv

1

Did any good come out of the efforts to mediate the conflicts in former Yugoslavia? The short answer is `Yes, but . . .'. Mediation brought about agreements that halted the fighting in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia.1 Yet these successes were overshadowed by the tragedies that diplomacy failed to prevent. The negotiations took too long and the successes came too late. Between 1991 and 1995 some 200 000 people lost their lives and close to two million were uprooted from their homes. This book examines why the negotiations and mediations were not more effective. To be sure, mediation cannot resolve all conflicts, but it is difficult to avoid asking whether more effective mediation could have reduced the magnitude of the tragedy. Analysing the mediation efforts in former Yugoslavia is a worthwhile endeavour even if one accepts the argument that early military intervention could have stopped the war. Even when military intervention in a conflict does take place, and succeeds in forcing the combatants to obey the intervenor's commands, negotiations are still necessary to bring about an agreed settlement that is self-sustaining and does not depend on continued enforcement by outsiders. Such an examination is also worthwhile because reluctance to intervene militarily in others' wars is widespread and deeply rooted, reflecting the unwillingness of third parties to sacrifice their own in order to save Yugoslavs, Rwandans, Somalis or others from mutual slaughter. This reluctance is likely to influence the international community's response to similar situations in the foreseeable future. Therefore mediation and other forms of diplomacy are likely to 1

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Introduction

remain the preferred means of intervention in such conflicts. Examining what impeded the diplomatic efforts in Yugoslavia might help make mediation more effective in the future. As stated above, the question addressed in this book is why the mediations were not more effective. Specifically, I investigate why some mediation efforts failed, and why those which did succeed took so long to do so. Could the wars have been prevented? Could the ceasefires, especially those in Croatia and Bosnia, have been achieved sooner? Was a comprehensive settlement of Yugoslavia's problems achievable?2 What do I mean by `effective', `success', `failure' and `settlement'? By effective mediation I mean that the mediation effort accomplished its proclaimed purpose, and did so in a timely manner before fighting exacted many casualties, caused a massive flow of refugees or produced a major change in circumstances. A successful mediation effort was one that produced an agreement between the disputants and managed to bind the parties to its terms for several years. Failure means that the mediation attempt did not produce an agreement. Finally, settlement refers to an agreement that reduced the conflict between the disputing parties (though the parties did not necessarily view it as having resolved the cause of the dispute).

Mediation in international politics This inquiry focuses on the political problems that the mediators encountered, and only incidentally on their tactics and skills. The discussion is influenced by certain ideas suggested by theoretical writings on the mediation of international conflicts. But the book is not about theory. When referring to theoretical concepts my purpose is not to test hypotheses or theories, but merely to use the concepts as tools for a historical±political analysis. Since there exist a number of different theoretical approaches to international mediation it is important to clarify at the outset what I mean by this term.3 It is also important because readers may be influenced by their notions of mediation in a variety of domestic contexts, such as disputes relating to divorce, labour relations or business deals. As will become evident, in this book international mediation is viewed as part of international politics and therefore as quite different from the mediation processes that take place within a state.

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2 Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars

I use the term mediation to denote a particular type of third-party intervention. Like most interventions in the international arena, one of its purposes is to advance the intervenor's interests, but it differs from other forms of intervention in that it is not based on the direct use of force and is not aimed at helping one side in the conflict to win. Its goal is to bring the conflict (or part of it) to a settlement on terms that are consistent with the mediator's interests and acceptable to the disputants. To occur, mediation requires the consent and cooperation of the disputants (unlike military intervention, which does not).4 Mediation is usually considered to be a legitimate intervention in another country's affairs, in contrast to armed intervention, the legality of which is often contested. Not only does it enjoy international legitimacy, but a government's mediatory intervention usually enjoys wide domestic support. Mediation is a political process in which there is no advance commitment by the parties to accept the mediator's ideas. It differs from arbitration, which employs judicial procedures and issues a verdict that the parties have previously agreed to accept as binding. Mediation is pursued through negotiation, but it differs from other negotiations engaged in by states in that its declared purpose is to help others to settle their differences by mutual agreement. Furthermore the purpose is not to change the disputants' behaviour towards the mediator, but their behaviour towards each other.5 My interpretation of international mediation is informed by the realist tradition of international relations studies.6 Accordingly the mediation of international disputes is regarded as an integral part of international politics. The principal actors in the process are states, acting either unilaterally or jointly with others through intergovernmental organisations and ad hoc groupings. International organisations are the instruments of their members, and it is difficult to separate their role from the specific interests and concerns of the leading member states. This book therefore examines the actions of governments and international organisations, rather than those of individuals, and the word mediator refers to governments and international organisations, rather than individual diplomats. The book discusses the political and systemic influences that shaped the mediation processes in former Yugoslavia. It discusses the diplomacy directed at governments and at the principal groups concerned. It does not examine

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Introduction 3

mediation efforts at the local level, directed at alleviating local tensions. Why do states engage in mediation? They do so not only for ethical and moral reasons, but also for self-interest. States use mediation as a foreign policy instrument. Resort to mediation is usually prompted by the perception that other peoples' conflicts affect one own's interests ± one's welfare and security. Therefore helping disputants to settle their conflict may be one goal of a mediator, but it is not the only goal. Mediation, like negotiation, often has additional objectives, such as fostering relationships, enhancing the mediator's stature and influence and preventing competitors from achieving their aims. Mediators in international conflicts are seldom impartial.7 Since third parties can be affected not only by a conflict but also by the process and terms of its settlement, mediators usually try to ensure that their own interests are advanced, or at least protected. The idea that mediation is pursued for selfish motives is not novel, and is widely held among observers of international politics. This is perhaps the reason why governments that engage in mediation often deny that their motives are self-interested and tend to characterise their efforts as those of an `honest broker'.8 Although mediators may be able to accept a wider range of outcomes than the disputants, mediators' concern with protecting their own interests, both external and domestic, may lead them to reject certain options. As the mediator's interests shape the parameters of acceptable outcomes, the mediator also sets the parameters of possible settlements between the disputants. For mediation to take place it is not enough for there to be motivated third parties. Mediation also requires the disputants to accept the mediator's intervention and to cooperate with the intervenor. How can disputants' acceptance of such interference in their affairs be explained? Sometimes, when both parties wish to find a way out of their conflict they welcome mediation. This may happen when there is a stalemate, when neither party expects continued confrontation to be to its benefit. Sometimes neither party wishes to deescalate the conflict or alter its policies. More commonly, one does and the other does not. Yet even those who wish to continue the confrontation must weigh the consequences of rebuffing would-be mediators. When engaged in

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4 Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars

a conflict, disputants are particularly sensitive to the attitudes of third parties and usually want to gain their support. If they cannot win their support, they definitely do not want to alienate them or see them aligned with the enemy. They are therefore likely to accept mediation as the lesser evil, viewing cooperation with the mediator as less risky than antagonising it by rejecting its offer to mediate. The mediation of interstate disputes, unlike military intervention, is considered legitimate by international law. Its legitimacy was confirmed by the 1907 Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which proclaimed that `Powers strangers to the dispute have the right to offer good offices or mediation even during the course of hostilities. The exercise of this right can never be regarded by either of the parties in dispute as an unfriendly act.'9 For state authorities confronted by internal opponents challenging their legitimacy, external attempts at mediation pose difficult dilemmas. When the government itself is a party to the conflict, acceptance of outside mediation carries a bargaining disadvantage. It implies that it recognises its opponents as being equal in status, entitled to present their point of view to an outside body, regardless of the government's claim to exclusive jurisdiction over the citizens living in its sovereign territory. Placing the internal opponents of a government on an equal footing with the regime implies that the opponents' claims are no less legitimate than those of the government. Since this inevitably weakens the position of the government and strengthens that of its opponents, governments are usually reluctant to accept external mediation in domestic conflicts. Governments that oppose external mediation can draw support from international law, which considers respect for the sovereignty of states to be a cornerstone of international order. Indeed it is enshrined in the charter of the United Nations: Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 7.10

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Introduction 5

In recent years the principle of sovereignty has ceased to shield states from external intervention in domestic disputes. But unlike military intervention for humanitarian purposes, which has given rise to extensive ethical arguments and new legal justifications,11 the mediation of domestic disputes has provoked little controversy. The probable reason is that mediation is always consensual; it cannot take place without the active cooperation of the disputing parties. Despite their reluctance, governments often accept external mediation of internal disputes and cooperate with the mediators. Probably the best explanation of this is again the one offered above. All disputants are sensitive to the attitudes of third parties. They are eager for support, and exert themselves to prevent third parties from aligning with their enemies. Moreover, in practice conflicts are seldom kept within state boundaries. They tend to spill over into neighbouring states, attracting intervention. Therefore governments may accept offers of external mediation in the hope that this will avert more harmful types of intervention. The functions and qualifications of mediators The search for explanations of why the mediation effort in former Yugoslavia was not more effective can benefit from a few ideas offered by the theoretical literature on factors that facilitate or impede successful mediation. There seems to exist a broad consensus that the outcome of mediation is the combined product of numerous factors. Some of these relate to the parties, the issues in dispute, the dynamics of the conflict and the international context of the conflict. Other factors are associated with the mediator ± its characteristics and activities.12 For our purposes it is relevant to note that the number of parties in the conflicts mediated in the former Yugoslavia varied. While some of the conflicts that the mediators tackled ± the ceasefires in Slovenia and in Croatia ± were bilateral, other problems were multilateral. The Bosnian problem involved three major protagonists ± the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims. The attempt to conclude a comprehensive settlement of the problems surrounding the dissolution of Yugoslavia involved six major parties ± the six republics comprising Yugoslavia. Trying to bring three or six disputants to a mutually agreed settlement is more difficult than mediating between two. It is also important to note that each of the parties perceived the issues in dispute as

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6 Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars

concerning their nations' physical security, identity and right to selfdetermination. Such issues are notoriously difficult to resolve by mutual agreement. The timing of mediation efforts is often considered to be of critical importance. It has been observed that interventions that take place in situations of a `mutually hurting stalemate', where the disputants recognise that their existing policies will not achieve their goals and that alternative policies may be very risky, are particularly conducive to a settlement. But the principal focus of this book are the mediating entities. How do the identity, characteristics, goals and actions of the mediators influence the effectiveness of their peacemaking efforts? Mediation entails a wide range of activities. Mediators help the disputants to communicate. They sometimes seek to change a party's image of the adversary or interpret the adversary's behaviour in a manner that will facilitate settlement of the dispute. Mediators can help each party to understand their adversary's concerns and the constraints to which the adversary is subjected. Mediators may also suggest how the interests of the parties might be reconciled, and what kinds of compromise or trade-off might facilitate a settlement. They can also help the parties to save face when making concessions. Disputants usually believe that it is less damaging to their reputation to accept a proposal made by a mediator, than one made by their adversary. To succeed in their task, mediators must influence and persuade the disputants to modify their policies, and to agree to terms they have hitherto considered unacceptable. As in all negotiations, mediators pursue their persuasive efforts through clarification of the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. In trying to persuade the parties to change their policies, mediators often need to bargain with the parties, communicating to them conditional promises and threats, and actually employing rewards and punishments. A mediator's ability to confer or withhold benefits, or to shift benefits to the adversary, is often vital to its ability to influence the disputants to change their policies and accept the mediator's proposals. Moreover powerful mediators need not wait for a hurting stalemate to occur, but can use their resources to create it.13 Considering the activities that mediators engage in and the resources that are often necessary for such activities, it is obvious that the identity of the mediator and its characteristics are of critical

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Introduction 7

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