Stephan Zitzler

Maneuvering energy politics in the “ideal coalition” Political management of the “Strompreisbremse” in the black-yellow coalition. 4th June 2013

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Maneuvering energy politics in the “ideal coalition”. Political management of the StrompreisbremseA in the black-yellow coalitionB Author: Stephan ZitzlerC When a SMS reached the Minister of Economy and Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany, Philipp Rösler (FDP), on the morning of the 28th of January, he was hit by its content completely unprepared.1 His cabinet colleague and Minister for the Environment, Peter Altmaier (CDU), announced a foray in the promotion of renewable energies. The press should find out about this two hours later. The discussion about the affordability of the promotion of renewable energies got out of hand, causing pressure to act. Altmaier strove for a price cap for the EEGD surcharge, which was decisive for the promotion of renewable energies. The environment minister planned to make his plans public not some time in the following week, but on that very same day. Philipp Rösler could not exactly anticipate what would happen: what would Altmaier’s suggestions look like in detail, how would the involved stakeholders react, and how would this matter affect the economics minister’s standing? The internal early warning system of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) had failed. No information had leaked to the outside from the close circle of intimates around Altmaier, where this policy foray had been developed. No inter-ministerial consultations have been held. What has happened to the principal of collegiality? Rösler had been caught unawares. The economics minister faced a very hard decision: reject the foray or support Altmaier? Rösler would have to show his colors. Whatever position he adopted now would accompany him for the rest of the election year 2013 – and in the end it might even haunt him. There was a very tight schedule that Altmaier would have to meet if he wanted to put a cap on the promotion in the summer. On the last energy summit in November 2012, the appointment for the next summit with the minister-presidents of the Länder has already been scheduled for the 21st of March.2 A meeting of the Federal Government and the Länder governments on the 14th of February would prepare the federalism-dimension, which is crucial for

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ A

Strompreisbremse is the German term for ‚electricity price break’. It is the catchphrase in the debate about managing rising costs entailed by the energy reforms.

B

This term refers to the coalition government of the conservative sister parties CDU/CSU and the liberal FDP.

C

Stephan Zitzler graduated from the Master program Politikmanagement, Public Policy & öffentliche Verwaltung at the NRW School of Governance (University of Duisburg-Essen). His foci of research are policy analysis and energy politics. Translation from German by Christine Haakshorst.

D

EEG stands for Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz: the Renewable Energy Sources Act.

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the EnergiewendeA. This step should completely occupy Rösler, as a coalition committee was readily available to pour oil on troubled waters. When it comes to questions concerning the Energiewende, the ministers Rösler and Altmaier seldom shared the same opinion. Without a doubt a hot debate would emerge in this policy field during the election campaign. Working out a good starting position was crucial. According to the principle of not being ousted, the next steps of the political rivals had to be anticipated. On top of this, the politics of promoting renewable energies developed a symbolic meaning for the government’s ability to act in the Energiewende. Philipp Rösler had to decide for an appropriate strategy that could combine the framework in terms of content and time.

In the shadow of the transformation of the energy system After the tragedy of Fukushima in 2011, the environment minister Peter Altmaier described the Energiewende as a “Hercules task” and “one of the biggest challenges since the Reconstruction and Reunion”.3 However, the discourse about the German energy reforms was stuck in a dead-end in the beginning of 2013. A broad debate about energy prices tightly controlled energy politics. Thus, the new year began exactly as the old one had ended. After the EEG surcharge exploded with a fifty percent price increase, the topic dominated the political agenda. An average German household was charged with 185 euros for the promotion of renewable energies in 2013; that were approximately 60 euros more than in the previous year. The promotion of green electricity therefore was perceived as a massive cost driver. As a response, all political actors tried to combine two central messages. Especially the environment minister Peter Altmaier (CDU) and the economics minister Philipp Rösler (FDP) − they share the primary competencies in the energy reforms − employed the slogans “the Energiewende is not for free”4 and “electricity mustn’t become a luxury good”5. The Federal Government also agreed that the EEG had to be reformed. However, that is how for agreement went. While Altmaier presented an advancement of the EEG, Rösler dedicated himself to the removal of the EEG.6 Also the time framework caused frictions. The Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU) excluded the reform of the EEG in the current legislative period. Rösler, on the contrary, wanted to remove the EEG as soon as possible. In order to limit short-term electricity costs for the industry and consumers, Rösler wanted to lower the electricity tax. However, Altmaier had – supported by Angela Merkel − continually refused these plans. Thus, it has been nothing but lip service so far. Meanwhile, the opposition attacked Rösler’s role in the transformation of the energy system: “The transformation of the energy system will end in a complete mess”7, the GrünenB judged. Also, the social democrats’ vice parliamentary group leader, Hubertus Heil (SPD), said in the Bundestag: “In a world that is hungry for energy, Germany could be the supplier of renewable energies, energy efficiency and modern energy supply systems to the world if we can manage a successful transformation of ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ A

Energiewende is the German term for energy system transformation.

B

Die Grüne are the German environmental party.

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the energy system, which in itself is a great chance for this country. In your term in office, you [Philipp Rösler] have turned this chance into an economic and social risk for Germany. Energy prices are rising, supply safety is at stake, and Rösler and Altmaier, members of this Federal Government, fight like two children. […] The way you let the Energiewende fail will become an economic fiasco for this country.”8 Both the economy and consumer organizations harshly criticized energy politics – the different stakeholders put pressure on the government from all sides. The need for action became urgent – in the end, who wants to be blamed for rising energy costs in an election year? On the 28th of January Altmaier dropped his bomb. With his concept of energy price security (StrompreisSicherung)9 granted by the EEG he put all political actors on the spot; they had to make a decision. Altmaier’s attempt became known as the Strompreisbremse in the German media. This term had already appeared in the media in the 2012 discussion about the photovoltaic EEG amendment. Even though the measures didn’t have anything in common, this terminological congruency pointed at Altmaier’s clever move. Not only did he want to cap energy costs; he further thwarted his political rivals. As this plan hasn’t been discussed in advance, it hit Rösler without any preparation. Peter Altmaier had launched the election campaign on the battlefield of the Energiewende.10

The EEG and the debate about costs The inter-coalition debate concentrated on counter-measures to the rising costs entailed by the Energiewende. In 2011 the Federal Government decided to take a new road in energy politics and called for stepping up the energy reforms. This turning point had two important implications: first, it entailed the nuclear phase-out until 2022; second, it required the German energy supply system to be fundamentally restructured: by 2050, the share of renewables shall constitute 80 percent of the German energy mix. Thus, Germany moves toward a long-term production of green electricity. Of course, such a transformation is costly. Despite comprehensive reforms and ambitious targets, the financing was done by approved methods rather than new ones. Since the year 2000 the EEG has been regulating the promotion of renewable energies in the electricity market. A fixed feed-in tariff for electricity from renewable energies has been guaranteed for a period of twenty years. Selling the green electricity on the stock market can generate profits. The difference between the fixed feed-in tariff and the stock value determines the actual costs for the promotion of renewable energies. As the stock value of electricity has been nose-diving, costs for consumers have been rising correspondingly. According to the EEG, the promotion costs are redistributed to the electricity price. Basically, all consumers thus pay a surcharge, private households, service providers and industries alike. However, exceptions have been granted to energy-intensive industries in order to not put their international competitiveness at risk through high energy costs. The other side of the coin is that this regulation drives up costs for consumers who don’t enjoy this privilege. For this very reason, the exceptional regulation became the subject of dispute in the party competition. In 2013 the EEG surcharge had reached a new alltime high, the unprivileged consumer had to pay 5,28 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh). This meant a rise of 50 percent from 3,59 cents/kWh in 2012. About 20 billion euros will be redistributed in the promotion system – and the trend is on the rise (for detailed information refer to the dossier).

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What does this discussion mean for the future of the EEG? In the end, all parties agree that the EEG was the right instrument for the implementation of renewable energies. However, with more than 25 percent of the German energy mix being produced with regenerative energies, renewable energies have left their market niche. The debate about a comprehensive reform of the EEG had already started. This debate split the black-yellow Federal Government apart. Parts of the economy, politically supported by the FDP and the CDU’s economic council, demanded the elimination of the EEG and to replace the price control by quantity control, determined by a quota. Thus, they expected a decisively more cost-efficient expansion of renewable energies. The federal environment minister, however, wanted to hold on to the fixed feed-in tariff and supported an evolutionary reform of the EEG, which could meet the requirements of the importance renewables play in the energy market. Altmaier had already started a dialogue in the BMU on this issue.11 The opposition mostly supported his goals. The coalition-internal disagreement had thus far impeded a joint proposal of the Federal Government. Already in the beginning of 2013 it became clear that a consensus would most likely only be reached after the election. The differences were too serious and time was too short for comprehensive reforms.

Altmaier’s energy price security, a chronology In the long run, the promotion of green energy will change which will have effects on the EEG surcharge and the electricity price. But what’s on the short-term agenda? Whether it was about reducing electricity taxes or reforming the European emission trade system – Rösler and Altmaier were separated by deep gulf on these issues. Thus, it seemed as if the black-yellow government would continue political maneuvering until the election. However, what happened on the 28th of January fundamentally changed the debate about electricity prices. Altmaier’s concept of electricity price security, which ultimately entailed the cap of the green energy promotion, caused quite a stir. Freezing the EEG surcharge should control the costs for the Energiewende. On that day, the environment minister was omnipresent in the German media. On a press conference he said: “I’d like to discuss the chances that the Energiewende offers. Yet at the moment this is not possible, because right now I am only confronted with the question of how much the electricity price will rise.”12 Further he stated: “I want to contribute to a stable electricity price, and that the costs entailed by the energy reforms can be calculable and predictable.”13 That evening, in the Heute Journal, a German TV news program, he said: “I think we are in a serious situation here. The costs for electricity rose more in the last couple of years than anyone wanted it to rise. Everyone complained about that, and that is why we all have to contribute to the efforts to control this development. I wish that the Energiewende will be successful, but I also wish that energy will not become a luxury good. That is why we have to act now, otherwise this autumn, there will be the next price increase.”14 Indeed, the minister engaged all actors. His concept for price security provided for renewable energies plant operators to make a contribution. On the one hand, the starting of payments of the feed-in tariffs for new plants should be made more flexible − a payment should only be made when the EEG account was in balance. On the other hand, a one-time EEG solidarity contribution of a “low and reasonable” amount should be charged for already existing plants for one year. The imposition of such retroactive financial burdens would be an absolute novelty in the history of the EEG. Furthermore, the economy had

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to contribute mainly through the limitation of the exceptional rule for energy-intensive companies. Moreover, the paper provided for a termination of the increasing desolidarization of the EEG surcharge by in-house production and consumption. These measures should amount to savings of more than 1,3 million euros to insure against the anticipated additional costs. These regulations aimed at fixing the problem that the EEG, while it provided for incentives and stimuli for the promotion of renewable energies, did not determine an upper limit for costs.15 Altmaier thus introduced a promotion cap. The EEG surcharge should be frozen on the current level for the years 2013 and 2014 and the increase should be limited to a maximum of 2,5 percent thereafter. The environment minister intended to limit the financial burdens for consumers and that the risks related to further falling electricity stock prices, which would lead to higher differential costs. Altmaier also highlighted that the electricity price security would only apply if necessary (therefore, it is labeled a security) and serve as an “emergency break”. Thus, the concept was soon labeled the Strompreisbremse in the media. If it were for Altmaier, his reform would have come into force before August that year. Therefore, time was pressing, since a long parliamentary procedure had to be completed. Especially in the Bundesrat potential pitfalls had to be feared. However, to get there was a long way to go for the Strompreisbremse. Therefore, Altmaier was open for dialogue. Thus, Philipp Rösler had an opportunity to influence the further political process. Controversial assessments: highlights and lowlights The first reactions to Altmaier’s initiative couldn’t have been more contrary. Representatives of consumer interests, such as Gerd Billens, chairman of the Federation of German Consumer Organizations, and Ilse Aigner (CSU), Minister for Consumer Protection, supported his initiative. They emphasized the importance of signaling to the consumers that the industry will contribute more to the costs of the energy reforms. On the contrary, the opposition and renewable energy industry associations agreed that the expansion of renewables would be restrained. Especially Jürgen Trittin, parliamentary group leader of the Grüne, tried to counter the metaphor of the Strompreisbremse with that of the expansion break. “What Peter Altmaier calls a Strompreisbremse is not an energy price break, but nothing but an expansion break for the expansion of renewable energies.”16 The Strompreisbremse caused investment uncertainty and general confusion in the industry. Similarly, the coalition government of the Grüne and the SPD in Baden-Württemberg, led by minister-president Kretschmann (Grüne), opposed Altmaier’s initiative.17 Also, North Rhine-Westphalia clearly stated what they thought of the Strompreisbremse. North Rhine Westphalia’s environment minister Johannes Remmel (Grüne) said: “Altmaier is the “gravedigger” of the Energiewende”.18 On the other hand, the industry did not react unanimously. While Hildegard Müller, director of the German Association of Energy and Water Industries, welcomed Altmaier’s initiative, Ulrich Grillo, President of the Umbrella Association of German Industry BDI, was not so enthusiastic about it. Hans Heinrich Driftmann, President of the Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry, vehemently opposed the abolishment of the preferential treatment of the industry.19 And on top of all this there was the electoral setback of the CDU in Lower Saxony. On the 20th of January, the conservative-liberal government of CDU and FDP was replaced by a coalition of SPD and Grüne with a paper-thin advantage. Many traditional CDU voters had voted for the FDP in this election in order to lift the Liberals above the five percent hurdle. That caused great results for the FDP and great losses for the

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CDU. The German media interpreted Altmaier’s solo run as sign that everyone was fighting on their own terms now.20 Rösler’s first reactions While the fight about the sovereignty of interpretation had already erupted, Rösler kept a remarkably low profile on that issue. The media focused especially on the economics minister, as there had not been a formal consultation with him and Altmaier. A spokesperson of the BMWi said that Rösler only found out about Altmaier’s plans on the morning of the 28th of January. Even though Rösler had been completely taken by surprise, he in turn surprised the press by supporting Altmaier’s plans publicly. On that same day, he made a statement to the press: “A first step into the right direction, further must follow. […] First and foremost reforms of the EEG must be initiated, because Peter Altmaier confirmed that the most important cost driver of electricity prices is this excessive subsidy – that’s what we must tackle.”21 He further used this statement for his own image improvement: “You all know that I as the federal economics minister have been fighting for affordable electricity prices in Germany – for both the enterprises and the people. Therefore it is good that the Federal Ministry for the Environment also gets started now.”22 Rösler also called for a “major breakthrough” in the EEG reformation. His comment was orchestrated – obviously this time coordinated − with the help of the FDP fraction. Both FDP chairman Rainer Brüderle and environmental spokesperson for CDU/CSU Michael Kauch welcomed Altmaier’s initiative and wanted to support him in establishing this position in the UnionA.23 Furthermore, the electricity tax should be lowered by the amount that was earned from VAT due to increasing energy costs.24 In a TV morning show Rösler was asked what he was more angry about, the way he was taken by surprise, or that this campaign issue was taken from him. He answered: “This did not bother me at all, because one thing is clear: the environmental minister is responsible for the promotion of renewable energies and therefore also for the increasing costs. He had to face this responsibility. He did this – also for the entire Federal Government, and that’s a good thing. The only thing I am angry about is how the OppositionB seems to take the side of the “eco-smart set” instead of that of the consumers, because they are against a Strompreisbremse, even though that’s exactly what the people and companies in Germany need.” 25 Thus, Rösler rejected the responsibility for increasing costs and shifted the focus on the Opposition. For him, Altmaier’s propositions didn’t go far enough. For example, he opposed the regulation that plants not connected to the grid could still be compensated for 95 percent of their energy (management of the ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ A

This term refers to the German conservative sister parties CDU and CSU.

B

SPD and Grüne.

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compensation for the energy fed into the grid). Another electricity price break could be employed here. The direction Rösler was heading for was clear: from a planned-economy style EEG towards a marketeconomy style one, one that matches the social market economy. Furthermore, according to Rösler, it would be appropriate that the industry contributes a bigger share, since the Energiewende is a task for the whole society. Philipp Rösler therefore also agreed with Altmaier in this respect, leaving himself a backdoor open: jobs must under no circumstances be endangered. The parallel debate about electricity tax reduction Despite these mixed reactions to the Strompreisbremse, it seemed that the federal government was (almost) in agreement. At least in public, mutual criticism was avoided. That this “communicative peace” stood on shaky grounds became clear with the developments of the following days. Because of the increased media attention, an image race was hard to avoid – everyone wanted to jump on this train. First was North Rhine-Westphalia’s minister-president Hannelore Kraft, who was cited in the Handelsblatt, demanding “cut taxes instead of Strompreisbremse”. For an electricity tax reduction and against pressuring the energy-intensive industries was also the parliamentary CEO of the SPD, Thomas Oppermann – just as SPD vice chairman Hubertus Heil. On the contrary, Saarland’s SPD economics minister Heiko Maas called for easing the consumers’ burdens. Thus, one thing came to the fore: there was no stringency in the SPD. With regard to a coherent SPD concept, Oppermann had no other choice than to back-paddle by stating, “we [the SPD] will substantiate our suggestions”26. Especially as an echo to Renate Kraft’s statement, the FDP and CSU demanded that the electricity tax should be reduced immediately. Bavaria’s environment minister Marcel Huber even went a step further by asking for the omission of the turnover taxation of the EEG surcharge.27 An alliance for this measure to lower taxes formed as an alternative to Altmaier’s electricity price security. However, an intensification of this debate was not in the interest of the CDU leadership, since it has publicly time and again spoken out against such a measure. The coalition committee that met on the 31st of January came very conveniently. Even though no concrete decisions were made on the Strompreisbremse, a formal inter-ministerial agreement was made between the BMU and BMWi. Altmaier’s ‘omission’ should be made up for. Behind the curtains, the approaching disagreement in the Union should be nipped in the bud. A schedule was developed that granted time until the 14th of February to find a consensus. That was the day of the Bund-Länder meeting, and important milestone before the energy summit on the 21st of March. For the complicated talks with the Länder, a common ground should be found. Patrick Döring, general secretary of the FDP, said: “In the first instance, I understand that the social democratic minster-presidents accuse us to be too slow with the Energiewende. Therefore, we cannot imagine a blockade of the Bundesrat here.” 28 Only one day later, the concept of the Strompreisbremse was officially accepted when chancellor Angela Merkel called Altmaier’s plans “valuable, important and good”.29 Thus, the chancellor signaled her support for the environment minister. This was meant to guide the discussion into one direction – without saying that there was no alternative. Counter-concepts and political headwinds The opposition wanted to drive the federal government into a completely different direction with their position regarding the topic. The SPD didn’t take long to get over their own quarrels and rearrange their

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position. The social democrats started with the request that profits from the VAT that resulted from a higher EEG surcharge should be paid back to the consumers. Gabriel declared this measure as a negotiating proposal for the talks with the federal government. Furthermore, the SPD chairman tried to attack the government since the coalition summit ended inconclusively: “Here we go again, the federal government is fighting. Instead of saying whether Mr. Altmaier’s proposal reflects the common ground of the Federal Government, this topic has one more time been adjourned.”30 Even though the environment minister condemned the proposal of the SPD as being not expedient, the debate about electricity costs was given new impetus. That was not so much due to the innovative demands of the political competitors than to the coalition partner FDP. Contrary to his denial it seemed that Altmaier’s solo-run in this debate actually did make Rösler angry. On the 3rd of February the BMWi leaked a paper to the magazine Spiegel that condemned Altmaier’s energy price security. According to the paper, the energy price security does not tackle the wrong incentives of the EEG, but rather prefers pseudosolutions, which might even cause tremendous political resistance in the Länder. Furthermore, with regard to the confidence protection of investors, there might be legal objections against burdening existing plants. As a consequence, the implementation of Altmaier’s suggestion seems very unlikely.31 Without doubt this was a setback for Altmaier. If Rösler didn’t support him, his draft was virtually dead. The media made a feast out of this: “Rösler attacks Altmaier’s energy plan” or “Rösler ditches Altmaier” made the headlines. The winds seemed to have changed. At the same time, voices from the Union-led Länder criticized the EEG solidarity contribution. For instance, Christine Lieberknecht, minister-president of Thüringen and spokespersons of the CSU in Bavaria (both Länder where the solar industry plays a decisive economic role), regarded the measure as detrimental.32 Even though Altmaier tried to appear very confident in the following days, the opposing troops had been deployed. Also economy associations now called for a reduction of energy taxes instead of a Strompreisbremse. On the 12th of February, the Grüne made a counter-proposal to the freezing of the EEG surcharge, which they rejected outright in order to not risk the security for investment for renewables. Instead, they wanted a lowering of compensation for wind energy. In effect, the plans of the Grünen aimed at massively curtailing the privileges of the industry. Parliamentary group leader Jürgen Trittin explained: “Take for instance a French fries company: not one single French fry less will be produced, if the company has to pay for its energy. And not a single chicken less will be slaughtered, if they have to pay for it.”33

Political considerations and actors’ constellations 2013 was an election year, and thus it seemed as if questions of power overshadowed factual issues more than usually. On the one hand, the EEG surcharge contained a manifest problem, as a further increase in the surcharge was expected. The BMU expected an increase of up to seven cents/kWh until 2014 if nothing was done against it. The relationship was actually quite easy: if the stock price for electricity falls, the EEG surcharge rises. The surcharge-liable total energy amount could be used to counteract this development. On the other hand, electricity costs were an important campaign issue. The Strompreisbremse had the goal of reducing costs for consumers, who would go to the ballot boxes this autumn, and split the burdens of the Energiewende ‘more fairly’.

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This topic especially qualifies as a campaign hit if voters will have more money left in their wallets. However, hand in hand with the cost discussion came the general question of the acceptance of the Energiewende: when would the people and the economy reach the limit? When could the first voices be heard demonizing the Energiewende? Nevertheless, it was no coincidence that – in an election year – endeavors were made to please the consumers, not the industry. Altmaier was being accused of having made a not so professionally founded approach. The allegation that the Strompreisbremse would also slow down the development of renewables was not only politically motivated, but it was also explained and justified. For Altmaier, the political situation presented itself as follows: if the Strompreisbremse should be implemented, especially the Bundesrat was critical; only in the Bundestag CDU/CSU and FDP had the political majority. Thus, if Rösler and Altmaier could somehow find an agreement, organizing a majority would only be a formality. Of course, the Opposition tried to win the sovereignty of interpretation in this matter and at the same time present itself as the red-greenA alternative for the Federal Government’s energy politics. Despite the basic heterogeneity of the interests concerning energy politics of the Länder, blackyellow had to acknowledge the new majority in the Bundesrat. After the election in Lower Saxony in January 2013, red-green (with a majority of the SPD) again had the majority in the Bundesrat. Even if the EEG is only an abjection lawB, the Länder have shown in the past how much importance they attach to decisions made concerning the Energiewende. In May 2012, they put a damper on the former environment minister Norbert Röttgen, who was at the same time the top candidate for the CDU in North RhineWestphalia, in the photovoltaic reform of the EEG, just a couple of days before the election for the Landtag, by calling the mediation committee with a majority of two-thirds. In an election year, the signs all the more pointed to blockade. Altmaier’s strategic move of a Strompreisbremse burst the red-green political block in the Bundestag and Bundesrat. On a somewhat bluntly note one could say that the minister achieved this by giving all political actors something they wanted, but at the same time also taking something from them. Thus, several topics have been banned from the political discussion. The Grüne stood for a stronger responsibility of the industry; Altmaier suggested this (admittedly in a much smaller scope). The SPD stood for a relief of the consumers; Altmaier suggested this. At the same time, the Grüne were against the curtailment of the green energy privileges, while parts of the SPD were against the curtailment of industry privileges. In the Bundesrat this inner-oppositional conflict was personified in Hannelore Kraft, coordinator of the Länder with a SPD majority, and Winfried Kretschmann, the only ‘green’ minister-president. Thus the Strompreisbremse served also as an appropriate tool to drive a wedge between the Opposition. If the Opposition, as a result of their cleavages, would withdraw to a blockade, black-yellow could criticize their attitude of denial. With regard to the upcoming election, the opportunity to put SPD and Grüne in the corner of the electricity price inflators was more than welcome. But also the FDP had promoted the affordability and competitiveness of energy costs in the past. Thus, Altmaier also deprived his coalition partner of a grateful campaign topic. He avoided the FDP from further ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ A

This term refers to the oppositional parties, the social democrats (SPD) and the ‘green’ environmentalists, the Grüne.

B

An objection law (Einspruchsgesetz) is a law that can be ratified without the approval of the Bundesrat.

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criticizing the course of the Union and forced them to position themselves either against or with the Strompreisbremse. Further, there wasn’t only an institutional attitude of blockade. What was more, the ideological and political principles of renewable energies diametrically opposed. While the one side was suspected to be prone to a dreamy eco-feudalism, the other side was discounted as the industry lobby and the lackey of capital. These mutual accusations deepened the political divide between the state and the market. Right of the middle, a 100-per-cent-renewable-energy-world is discarded as illusionary, as a refusal of reality that doesn’t have to do anything with modern economy, which would eventually lead to broad deindustrialization. Furthermore, a new redistribution from poor to rich would occur. Therefore the FDP tried to win the sovereignty of interpretation over matters of social justice. On the contrary, left of the middle there is much suspicion towards the industry. The privileges for the renewables are justified with the distortion of competition, because coal and nuclear energy have received billions of subsidies in the past – even though they are climate and environment killers. There seems to be no other possibility to break apart the power cartel that political and economic forces have formed.

Maneuvering in a dead-end 13th of February: Philipp Rösler had to make a decision. Would he arrive at a common position with his cabinet colleagues? The Bund-Länder meeting was scheduled for the 14th of February. Altmaier, the Opposition and the media watched Rösler like a hawk. Could the Federal Government find a common ground? Rösler was in a dilemma. In an election year much was at stake, and a lot was depending on exactly this question. It was also about image – both about that of the FDP and that of the minister himself. Rösler faced a very basic decision: Should the Strompreisbremse fail? If yes, how could this be organized without him ending up as the scapegoat? Could Rösler, after having already publicly supported Altmaier, now give his veto? Or should he do anything for the success of the Strompreisbremse? Did Altmaier’s concept have a chance to be implemented in the Bundesrat anyways? Now the political realities had to be considered. Rösler wasn’t only the Federal Minister for the Economy, but also chairman of the FDP. This was also about the profiling of focus topics. Shouldn’t the economics minister, after all, defend the industry’s interest? Or the affordability of the Energiewende for the consumers and the unprivileged companies? Was there a way to combine these interests? Rösler had to answer the question whether he could find such a way to solve this conflict. How could one create ideal conditions for the FDP concerning the promotion of renewables in an election year? Should the focus remain on the very first request of the FDP, namely the energy tax reduction? Should the FDP collaborate with the SPD and against the Union in this question? What effects would that have on the black-yellow government? Or should the priority be the abolishment of the EEG in order to establish a quantity model? Could Rösler even drive Altmaier in this question before him? All cards were on the table now, could Rösler still pull an ace from his sleeve?

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Part II: Dossier Policy context: the promotion of renewable energies The Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) is the central instrument that guides and facilitates the promotion of renewable energies. It is based on a price control mechanism that is differentiated depending on the technology used and guarantees a fixed feed-in compensation for twenty years. That means: onshore wind is compensated for different from offshore wind, solar energy from roof systems different from solar energy from solar parks. The compensation is continuously reduced (degression); thus the promotion of renewables becomes cheaper over time. Further, operators are obliged to preferably feed in eco-power into the grid. Transmission system operators (TSO) collect the eco-power from single producers and sell it at the energy stock exchange.34 The revenue determines the market value of regenerative electricity. Because fixed feed-in tariffs are paid, the promotion costs are much higher than this market value. The difference between the feed-in tariff and the market value account for the true promotion costs for renewables (differential costs). These costs are passed to the un-privileged end consumer with the help of a redistribution mechanism. Consumers and industry pay for the promotion of renewables via this EEG surcharge mechanism. Thus in 2012 16 billion euros have accumulated – with a rising trend (for 2013, costs of about 20 billion are expected). Because of the guaranteed feed-in tariff for 20 years cost relief can only e expected for 2020. This is the year when the eligibility period will end for the first boom generation of highly compensated plant operators.35 Compared to this, the surcharge costs for already promised feed-in tariff for existing plants add up to 150 to 170 billion euros until 2020.36 Three central factors are crucial for the amount of the EEG surcharge. First, the amount of technologyspecific remuneration, second the EEG-assessable total energy capacity, and third the electricity stock market price. In 2013 the EEG surcharge had reached a new all-time high, with costs of 5,28 cents/kWh. In 2012, the allocation was 3,59/kWh, which means a cost increase of about 50 percent. The cost debate, which received a new impetus with the announcement of the TSO in October 2012, focused on two aspects. First, from the business friendly and EEG-skeptical side, the over-promotion of the photovoltaic industry was held responsible. The FDP was one of the forces in the Federal Government that used the photovoltaic amendment to massively melt down feed-in tariffs for solar energy. The amendment was determined in June 2012. Second, consumer protection groups and the Grüne as the oppositional party criticized the exceptional regulations for the industry, because the more industrial energy is free from surcharge, the more expensive energy becomes for the unprivileged end user. Initially, privileges for energy-intensive industries were introduced in order to protect them in the international competition. However, fulfilling the conditions to receive the preferential treatment became easier with the time, until the circle of potential candidates that are entitled for the benefits expanded. In 2013 the number of companies that wanted to benefit from this rule skyrocketed from 822 to 2057.37 Even golf courts and poultry breeding farms should be included in the circle of those eligible for privileges, which had a decisive impact on the public debate. Public opinion definitely demanded the curtailment of industry privileges. However, the Federal Government repeatedly emphasized that facts were not reproduced accurately in the media, because the application for exemption of the EEG surcharge payment and the final approval were not the same thing. The list of privileged end users supports this.38

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EEG surcharge and the Strompreisbremse Due to the acceleration of the development of renewables, especially the promotion of photovoltaic systems, the EEG surcharge increased continuously over the last few years. It rose from 0,88 cents/kWh in 2006 to 5,277 cents/kWh in 2013 – an increase of 597 percent in only seven years. Chart 1: Development of the EEG surcharge

Source: Author’s illustration based on http://www.eeg-kwk.net/de/EEG-Umlage.htm

The following chart illustrates that not only the amount of energy from renewables steadily grows; at the same time the differential costs increase. Comparing the EEG remuneration payments to the plant operators with the EEG differential costs it becomes clear that the market profits from renewables decrease. This phenomenon was especially noticeable between 2012 and 2013, since profits shrunk from 4,8 billion to 2,7 billion euros.

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Table 1: EEG surcharge forecast depending on underlying key assumptions

data based on Annual Statement and EEG balance of the TSO EEG account

EEG electricity generation in GWh EEG compensations to operators of plants in Mrd. Euro Total EEG costs (EEG differencial costs) in billion euros

EEG forecasts of the TSO

2010

2011

2011 (forecast from 14.10.11)

2012 (forecast from 14.10.11)

2013 (forecast from 15.10.12)

80.699

91.227

97.995

113.519

134.443

13,2

16,8

16,7

18,9

23,1

9,4

12,1

13,5

14,1

20,4

Source: Author`s illustration based on data from BMWI/ BMU (2012), p. 39

Basically, in the EEG surcharge one can differentiate between the pure costs for the promotion and external costs for promotion. Pure costs are those for the technology-specific remuneration costs, while external costs can only indirectly be allocated to the promotion. Examples for external costs are the exceptional rules for the industry or liquidity reserves that are granted to the TSO for negative account balances in order to not be financially disadvantaged in case of EEG forecast errors. Chart 2 shows the comparison of the years 2012 and 2013: Chart 2: Structure of the

Chart 3: Renewable promotion

EEG surcharge 2012/13 in ct/ kWh39

costs 2013 in ct/ kWh

6 5 4 3

2,97 pure promotion costs

1,48

external costs

2 1

0,91

2,11

2,29

2012

2013

photovoltaik 1,38

Other Renewables

0

Source: Author`s illustration based on data from BEE (2012)

Source: Author`s illustration based on data from BEE (2012), p. 6

A closer look reveals the composition of the EEG surcharge 2013. In this context, especially the “Special equalisation scheme for electricity-intensive enterprises and rail operators” (BesAR), that records the exemption rules for energy intensive industries, is of importance.

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Chart 4: Components of the

Chart 5: Part of growth of the

EEG surcharge 2013

EEG surcharge 2012 – 2013 in percent Supplementary payments 2012

decline in stock market price

7 5 11

40

16

Special equalisation scheme for electricity-intensive enterprise and rail pure promotion costs

21 Liquidity reserve

Market premium

Source: BEE (2012), p. 4

Source: BEE (2012), p. 5

Depending on the illustration, the composition of the EEG surcharge can vary extremely. A less differentiated graph assumes a lion’s share EEG surcharge of 4,18 cents/kWh with photovoltaics accounting for 2,25 cents of technology-specific costs.40 The decisive difference in these two illustrations is –among others- the difference of the EEG assessable energy volume, that has a great impact on the amount pure promotion costs. Regardless of the way the EEG surcharge is illustrated (which, nevertheless, has immense political implications, since those profiting from the exceptional rules can easily be identified), it causes extreme pressure. Peter Altmaier justified his foray of a Strompreisbremse with the rapid increase of the EEG surcharge. His concept especially concentrates on the costs for private consumers. The EEG share of household electricity prices rose from 4,5 percent in 2006 to 18,3 percent in 2013, accordingly to the to the increase of the surcharge. In order to develop a feeling for the amount of the EEG surcharge, the minister points to the fact that in 2013, for the first time, the EEG surcharge was higher than the stock exchange value (5,28 cents/kWh compared to 4,5 cents/kWh).41 Peter Altmaier strove for an EEG surcharge cap because he anticipated extreme cost risks in the allocation system. According to his concept, several factors were responsible for this42: • Factor stock exchange price for electricity “Of the actual 16 billion euros EEG surcharge costs, 14,5 billion can be allocated to feed-in remunerations for existing plants. Because of falling electricity stock exchange price the EEG surcharge could even mas-

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sively increase if the expansion of renewables came to a complete halt. On the contrary, it could sink despite an expansion if the electricity stock exchange price would increase.” • Factor uncertain forecasts “For 2014, the TSO calculated with an average stock exchange price of 5,1 cents/kWh. Today, however, the price is only 4,5 cents/kWh. Therefore, a decisive deficit cannot be ruled out, even though the pace of expansion of the renewables thus far complies with the TOS’s expectations.” • Factor new plants “Feed-in remunerations for new plants only account for 1,5 billion euros (of a total of 16 billion euros). That is less then ten percent of the allocation. Last year, the allocation deficit was much higher than the cost increase caused by new plants, and this could be the same in this year. This means that cost savings in this area have an important impact, however they alone cannot solve the cost problem.” • Factor “in-house production” and “captive power consumption” “Captive use of electricity from in-house production is completely freed from the EEG surcharge charge. This presently amounts to ca. 2 billion euros. Captive use increases (from eight percent of the total German energy consumption in 2006 to ten percent in 2013) because more and more companies and private households recognize and take advantage of the cost advantages. Therefore, in-house production and captive use of energy harbors enormous risks, especially for the future.” • Factor “Special equalisation scheme for electricity-intensive enterprises and rail operators (BesAR)” “The comprehensive exemptions of energy-intensive companies from the EEG surcharge accumulates to 4,3 billion euros, the trend is on the rise. Currently, 16 percent of the total German energy consumption are subsidized, compared to 13 percent in 2006. The more this share increases, the higher is the EEG surcharge. However, even a complete removal of exemptions (alone) would not have prevented an increase of the surcharge.”43 The biggest risk factor in the EEG system is the electricity stock exchange price because its development has a major impact on the differential costs. Because the EEG surcharge is a forecast with many uncertainties and TOS forecasts of the development of the 2013 electricity stock exchange price have been inaccurate, a deficit of 4 billion euros (negative EEG account balance) could show in autumn 2013. This would entail a further increase of the EEG surcharge. The environment minister confirmed the urgency to act with his own estimations: if no decisions were made soon, the EEG surcharge would probably rise to 7 cents/kWh.44 For an average private household that consumes about 3500 kWh of energy annually, that would mean additional costs of 60 euros each year for the promotion of renewable energies. The promotion cap of the Strompreisbremse could offer significant saving potential for private households. The above-mentioned household could expect reduced costs of 120 euros because the EEG surcharge would be frozen at 5,277 euros/kWh. Even though the EEG surcharge would be allowed to increase by 2,5 percent annually in the following years, because of potentially rising system costs this could still be interpreted as savings. That would mean a further increase of the promotion costs of 4 euros for the private household.

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Peter Altmaier included all stakeholders to generate these savings. In sum, the savings amounted to 1,3 billion euros, which were composed as follows: • • •

New EEG plants should contribute 500 million euros through making payments of the feed-in tariffs more flexible and abolishing the EEG bonus payments. Existing plants should contribute 300 million euros through limiting the time and amount of tariffs. The energy-intensive industries should contribute 500 million euros for the surcharge reduction through a limitation of the “BesAR”.

EEG surcharge and energy-intensive industries: the “Special equalisation scheme for electricityintensive enterprises and rail operators” The more exemption rules were made for energy-intensive industries, the more politicized they became. The Special equalisation scheme for electricity-intensive enterprises and rail operators was introduced 2003 to a relatively small circle of energy-intensive companies that were exposed to international competition. The goal was to limit the costs that resulted from the EEG surcharge for domestic companies, because foreign companies are not charged with this surcharge. Though, in an international comparison Germany has relatively high energy costs. Initially, the conditions for the share of energy costs on the one hand and the electricity reference quantity on the other were made for large consumers. For political reasons, the threshold values were made more flexible, so that SMEs could also profit from the “BesAR”. Therefore, since EEG 2012 the BesAR was regulated as follows: “Electricity consumption up to 1 GWh/a requires the full EEG surcharge. Electricity consumption of more than 1 GWh/a up to 10 GWh/a is charged with ten percent of the regular amount. • Electricity consumption of more than 10 GWh/a up to 100 GWh/a is limited to one percent of the regular amount. • Electricity consumption exceeding 100 GWh/a is charged with 0,05 cents/kWh. For companies demanding at least 100 GWh/a at each delivery point and have an energy intensity of at least 20 percent a special rule applies. Their EEG surcharge is limited to 0,05 cents/kWh for the total amount of energy at the preferred delivery point.45 • •

The extension of the exemption rules was followed by an increase of applications for exemption of the EEG surcharge payment. Thus, the development of the “BesAR” also portrayed this relation.

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Table 2: Development of the special equalisation scheme for electricity-intensive enterprises

Year 2010 2011 2012 2013

applications 595 653 822 2057

approvals 566 603 734 1800 - 1900

Privileged amount of current [GWh] 80 665 85 118 84 727 (estimation) 97 000 (estimation)

Source: Author`s Illustration based on data BMWI/ BMU (2012), p. 39

Moreover, the total liabilities of the “BesAR” rose immensely. The difference of about two billion euros between 2012 and 2013 can mostly be ascribed to higher differential costs. “The higher the surcharge costs of the EEG, the higher are the resulting “relieves” granted by the “BesAR” and the higher is the incentive to take as much advantage of these rules as possible. With other words: Even without any changes in the EEG 2012, the “relief volume” would have increased a lot, because the EEG differential costs increased accordingly.”46 Considering that the industry profits from further privileges, as for instance captive consumption, one can assume remarkable beneficial effects. “If the differential costs would be surcharged to the total electricity consumption, the EEG surcharge would currently amount to ca. 3,8 cents/kWh.”47

Total promotion costs: the one billion euro question On the 19th February 2013 – 22 days before his foray of the Strompreisbremse – Altmaier elevated the cost debate by estimating that the costs for the Energiewende “will sum up to about one billion euros in the 2030s.” This number contains two pools of costs: first, the commitments of the feed-in tariffs amount to about 680 billion euros until 2022. Second, the costs for the grid expansion, securing reserve capacities, R&D, electromobility and energy-efficient refurbishment must be added.48 With this impressive number Altmaier tried to emphasize the pressure to act and the urgent need for a Strompreisbremse. If politics remained passive it would become very expensive for the consumer in the future – especially since the future electricity stock market price is predicted to be 4,5 cents/kWh. If it continues to fall, the costs for the promotion of renewable energies will rise further. However, the one billion euro question triggered a discussion about the validity of these numbers. Especially the not exactly quantified second cost pool was heavily criticized. Further, this calculation, according to critics, was incomplete, as neither external costs (such as environmental costs) nor costs for conventional energies, which were avoided through the promotion of renewables, have been considered.49

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Altmaier, Peter (2013): Energiewende sichern – Kosten begrenzen, in: http://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Erneuerbare_Energien/eeg_strompreissicherung_20130128_bf.pdf.

43

Altmaier, Peter (2013): Energiewende sichern – Kosten begrenzen, in: http://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Erneuerbare_Energien/eeg_strompreissicherung_20130128_bf.pdf.

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Mihm, Andreas (2013): Der Strompreis wird auch 2015 wieder steigen, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nr. 95, S. 9. BMU (2013): Thesenpapier 6. EEG-Dialogforum „Ausnahmeregelungen im EEG“, in: http://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Erneuerbare_Energien/eeg_dialog_6_thesen_bf.pdf.

46

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FAZ (2013): Energiewende könnte bis zu 1 Billion Euro kosten, in: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/energiepolitik/umweltminister-altmaier-energiewende-koennte-bis-zueiner-billion-euro-kosten-12086525.html.

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