Kenneth J. Meier Texas A&M University Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. University of Georgia Holly T. Goerdel University of Kansas

Organizational Performance

Management Activity and Program Performance: Gender as Management Capital

Kenneth J. Meier is the Charles Gregory Chair in Liberal Arts in the Department of Political Science at Texas A&M University and a professor of public management in the Cardiff School of Business, Cardiff University. His research interests include empirical models of public management and questions of equity and public policy. E-mail: [email protected].

Do men and women manage differently? Do their efforts have different impacts on public program performance? Building from a formal treatment of public management and performance, this study investigates how the interaction of gender and management strategies influences organizational performance. Focusing on several hundred public organizations and their top managers over a threeyear period, the analysis maps the gender question onto Mark Moore’s distinction among managing upward toward political principals, downward toward organizational agents, and outward toward the networked environment. Findings indicate that women and men as top managers have different performance impacts, and these impacts vary by managerial function as well.

Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. is the Margaret Hughes and Robert T. Golembiewski Professor of Public Administration in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia and head of the Department of Public Administration and Policy. Much of his research focuses on policy implementation and management in networked settings. E-mail: [email protected]. Holly T. Goerdel is assistant professor of public administration at the University of Kansas. She specializes in public management, comparative public policy and administration, and organization theory. E-mail: [email protected].

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vigorous literature has developed around the question of whether and how gender matters to the conduct and effectiveness of public management, and thus the performance of public programs. The theoretical discussion has stimulated intriguing notions and debate, along with some empirical research. Definitive conclusions about the link between gender and organizational performance have not been established. At the same time, recent developments in the empirical study of public management and governance offer the potential to inform and explore the normative arguments offered by genderand-management scholars. In this article, we draw on some well-known theoretical ideas and recent models of the behavior and impact of public managers to begin an empirical exploration of how managerial actions and the gender of managers influence program performance. The goal here is twofold: to initiate some testing of hypotheses contained in the genderand-management literature while extending our understanding of the role and potential impact of public management more generally. Our starting point is a set of normative arguments found in the literature on gender and management— in particular, that female managers effectively constitute a type of underrecognized and often undervalued management capital. These normative claims are

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inevitably intertwined with some empirical expectations: that gender–management linkages to organizational performance rest largely on organizational context—specifically, how gender is perceived as operating in interaction with overall managerial functions in an organization; and that the managerial efforts of women in particular add value to what organizations do and produce. To the extent that gender differences can be found in the management of organizations, researchers such as Duerst-Lahti and Johnson (1992) argue that these differences can be tapped for the relative advantages they offer contemporary public organizations. This idea, which is at the core of “difference feminism,” is contestable but also testable (for an extensive review, see Dietz 2003). Its empirical examination lies at the center of the current investigation. In this article, we probe the question of whether women as managers contribute in different ways to the performance of public organizations and thus constitute, in effect, a distinct form of managerial human capital, at least in the contemporary United States. To do so, we work from a model of public management that has demonstrated some utility in relating the behavior of top managers to program performance. We also distinguish three broad public managerial functions initially sketched by Moore (1995): managing upward, managing downward, and managing outward. We employ the gender-and-management scholarship inspired by difference feminism to develop a set of hypotheses about how gender interacts with these managerial functions and thereby shapes performance. The hypotheses are then tested using three years of data from a set of public organizations. Finally, the implications of these findings for theories of management and gender are discussed. Gender as Management Capital: The Theoretical Notion In recent years, feminist literature has offered persuasive reasons why women may be able to make distinct and distinctly valued impacts in institutional settings such as public organizations (Guy and Newman

2004; Stivers 1995, 2002). Case studies on gender and management indicate that managers and organizational members believe gender-neutral traits to be of greatest consequence in organizational life, yet at the same time, the stereotypes held by organization members about the preferred approaches to management are heavily tinged with characteristically masculine features. Therefore, the debate has broadened to consider the consequences of masculine gender images— specifically, how such images can influence managerial style, the structure of the workforce, and the interaction between managers and workers as well as among workers (Cann and Siegfried 1987; Duerst-Lahti and Johnson 1990; Loden 1985). In the literature of public administration, the genderand-management theme has been linked with the idea that unadulterated scientific management has been shown to be less than ideal and that the human factor is as important to organizational success as the technocratic rationalization of organizational processes (Stivers 2003). In an attempt to consider the “nature and power and the public good in [varying] administrative contexts” (Waldo 1948), Stivers deconstructs the gender images found in public administration and extends previous normative arguments asserting that women have “different personal qualities and life experiences than men, and therefore approach organizational leadership [i.e., managerial activities] distinctively” (2002, 6, 76). Furthermore, these differences are purported to benefit public organizations by helping them achieve the greater flexibility required in an age of increasing complexity. These expectations are consistent with qualitative research characterizing women managers as less hierarchical and more participatory, interactional, flexible, consociational, and multifaceted. These features stand in contrast to perceived characteristics of male managers: command and control, transactional, task oriented, and hard (Duerst-Lahti 1990; Gilligan 1982; Lunneborg 1990; Mintzberg 1973; Rosener 1990). Such an argument effectively claims that women in management can be considered a valuable form of distinctive capital that can improve the performance of public programs. These managerial claims of difference feminism (Stivers 2002), however, have been rejected by scholars who attribute perceived gender differences within organizations to power and organizational structure rather than gender (Ferguson 1984; Kanter 1977, 1980; Ragins and Sundstrom 1989). Powell (1993), for example, found no conclusive evidence that men and women manage distinctively. The normative and empirical claims among feminist scholars, therefore, have not been resolved, but the issues are important. Two questions in particular arise from the arguments reviewed here: As managers, do men and women have different impacts on the

performance of public organizations? If so, do the managerial activities of women produce demonstrably additional benefit (or, for that matter, harm) in terms of the outputs and outcomes of public programs? If women can be shown to add extra performance value through their managerial efforts, the management– capital case proposed by difference feminists would have powerful support. We turn to an empirical exploration of these issues by investigating whether the interaction of gender and management matters to organizational performance and, if so, how. We analyze these core questions by building on earlier management research. The next section offers a brief overview of relevant work on management and performance and then outlines a simple set of managerial functions that can be used to explore potential gender differences. The Role of Management in Organizational Performance A huge literature sketches and explains a variety of public managerial functions and the actions that managers take to execute them. Classics in public administration have unpacked the POSDCORBrelated needs of public organizations (Gulick and Urwick 1937). Efforts at more scientific grounding for the administrative role have emphasized an influential and expansive set of opportunities and responsibilities (Simon 1997). More recently, researchers on the interorganizational and network-based activities of public programs have documented that public managers often spend considerable effort working with other organizations and a variety of external parties to collaborate and coproduce results (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; O’Toole 1997; Provan and Milward 1995). This theme is hardly incidental if, as recent evidence documents, most public programs are handled in networked settings (Hall and O’Toole 2000, 2004). In yet another line of work, the scholarship on bureaucratic politics has emphasized that managers, at least in the United States, are frequently compelled to develop political support in settings where multiple political principals and a diffusion of power mean an unending struggle for sufficient backing to get anything done (Allison 1971; Long 1949). Demonstrating that public management in any of these forms contributes to program performance is quite difficult (O’Toole and Meier 1999). The most comprehensive efforts to gauge public management capacity across governments have provided valuable data on management but thus far, little on managerial influence on performance outcomes (Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003). Identifying and estimating the contributions of a particular managerial function or activity to such performance is possible but has been only rarely attempted (for exceptions, see Meier and O’Toole 2001, 2003). Management Activity and Program Performance

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Any comprehensive and definitive empirical assessment of the specific functional contributions of managers to program results is unlikely to be completed successfully. For one thing, managers do many things and are themselves subjected to many influences, as the foregoing summary indicates, and it can be exceedingly problematic to distinguish the multiple functions empirically. Second, some of the influence of managers may be exercised without direct behavioral evidence available (Barnard 1938). Third, some impacts of managers are likely to be appreciated in the long term rather than immediately, thus rendering efforts at careful empirical testing problematic. Furthermore, many forces shape program performance, so distinguishing the multiple managerial ones not only from each other but also from the myriad other influences is sufficiently problematic that empirical validation is fraught with difficulties. One strategy for making progress, nonetheless, is suggested by the characterization of public management and public managers offered by Moore in his widely cited Creating Public Value (1995). He sketches an extensive normative argument aimed at encouraging public managers to approach their managerial responsibilities with a particular perspective shaped by a fairly concrete notion of what the managerial task involves and how it is likely to have a positive impact on “creating public value.”1 As shorthand, we can consider this evaluative criterion to be a performancebased perspective. Moore indicates that public managers and those who research their roles should think of managerial tasks in terms of a tripartite distinction among managing upward, downward, and outward—a shorthand for involvement with sets of considerations and also stakeholders who can be expected to matter in the production of public value. In this study, we build on his approach to public management with the object of exploring the impacts of these three components of managerial activity on the ultimate production of public value and how each of them is influenced by the gender of the manager. Management upward, downward, and outward is a shorthand expression for a much longer and more complex set of managerial functions and efforts,2 but it has the virtue of parsimonious exposition while serving as an explicit reminder that managers must work in several directions and on several tasks to accomplish their objectives. Just as important, Moore’s distinctions imply behavioral features. Managing upward, or dealing with overhead political leaders, is likely accomplished at least in part—probably significantly—through the interactions of managers with their political principals. Managing outward, a way of thinking about the networked character of public programs, can also be characterized by explicit 26

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interactions. Managing downward, the most conventional and core component of public management, can be more complex behaviorally. Subordinate layers in a bureaucratic hierarchy look for managerial cues, and thus they may be regularly influenced by managers without evidence of explicit interaction. In addition, the structure of public agencies can facilitate managerial influence through communication systems, standard routines or patterns of action, the use of hiring strategies, the crafting of incentive systems, and a variety of other elements. It would be a distortion to suggest that public managers only or primarily manage downward by interacting with subordinates. Nonetheless, contact with those at lower levels in an agency does represent one component of this sort of managerial contribution. Estimating the impacts of managerial efforts in these three directions on the performance of public programs represents one (admittedly simplified) approach to getting at the difficult question of whether managerial actions shape results and, if so, which actions are most important. How the impacts of these actions are influenced by gender offers insight into the role that gender plays in public management. Gender and the Functions of Management Given the gender-and-management arguments offered by difference feminists, what might be expected with regard to management upward, downward, and outward? The literature provides some raw material for hypotheses. The literature on gender and management, however, is highly diverse: Some see gender as a causal factor (Stivers 2002), whereas others see structure as determining (Ferguson 1984), and still others take an empirical approach (Guy 1992). At times, both a hypothesis and its null hypothesis are supported by different literatures. We explore each of the three functions identified by Moore and consider the suggestions offered in the literature. For top managers in a public organization, managing upward has to do with the principal–agent relationship between the manager and the elected political leadership. Consider the previous discussion of the intersection of gender, management, and managerial activities. Stivers (2002) argues that women approach organizational management distinctively because of their different personal qualities and life experiences. Qualitative research further suggests that women managers within organizations are less hierarchical and more participatory, interactional, flexible, and consociational (Lunneborg 1990; Rosener 1990). When juxtaposed with the command-and-control, transactional, and task-oriented style associated with men (Duerst-Lahti 1990 Gilligan 1982; Mintzberg 1973), women’s management styles are more likely to be nonconfrontational. Such managerial activities, when directed upward, may obviate conflict with

superiors and thus may be more likely to lead to organizational success. Furthermore, political principals provide and constrain the resources available to top managers. Nonconfrontational, cooperative managerial interactions with political principals can create prospects for resource increases. Increasing or at least maintaining managers’ resources can improve managerial legitimacy, provide greater discretion in decision making, and offer autonomy to meet a range of organizational goals. This type of managerial activity that is attributed to female managers (Duerst-Lahti and Johnson 1992; Guy 1992; Stivers 2002) could benefit the organization. One hypothesis, therefore, is as follows: When one controls for resources and constraints in the environment, females managing upward toward political principals are expected to produce more positive performance results than males. Managing downward is interpreted as the top manager’s interaction with subordinate line managers. Here, the normative implications of arguments from gender-andmanagement scholars are less obvious, although some potential propositions are found in research focusing on leadership, gender images, and organizational success. In deconstructing gender images in public administration, for example, Stivers concludes that images of “leadership” are strongly associated with white professional males; when those with different traits (e.g., female, Latino) attain management positions, they face a continual struggle to deal with the disparity between “what people expect of leaders and what is expected of them because of characteristics like sex” (2002, 78–79). To put the point into context, it would be difficult for women, for example, to establish authority and credibility with organizational line managers who view executive organizational positions in masculine terms (see also Guy 1992). This expectation gap of male versus female managers may be worse in occupations in which members of the opposite sex are rare (Glass 1990). In the present case, it is just as common to not see females in mid- or toplevel management positions as it is to see them occupying street-level positions (teachers, aides, etc.). Each of these arguments demonstrates the difficulties that female managers face when managing downward in this type of setting. Thus, a second hypothesis can be offered: When one controls for resources and constraints in the environment, women managing downward toward line managers do not have more positive performance impacts than male managers. Managing outward can be defined as behavioral networking or interacting with key actors in the organization’s environment. Because many public organizations operate within a network of other organizations and actors who influence their

operations, goals, and reputation, the extent to which a top manager operates in the agency’s network should be related to organizational performance (Meier and O’Toole 2001, 2003). The relationship between managing outward toward the network and organizational performance, however, could be expected to be influenced by gender. Difference feminism argues that although both women and men gain and disseminate information through networking, men’s and women’s networks are arguably different (Powell 1993). For generations, men have traditionally been perceived as benefiting from informal “good old boy” connections. In fact, managers’ development and maintenance of such links seems critical to organizational success (Bacharach and Lawler 1980). On the other hand, women are less likely to have held upper-management positions or have opportunities to engage in this type of critical networking. Rather, women have been found to develop more formal networks with other women inside their own organizations—for instance, occupational associations, social groups, and breakfast clubs (Guy and Duke 1992). These problems mean that female top managers may lack skill and experience in developing and nurturing professional, though informal, connections such as the good old boy network. A performance-related result could be that women managers do not reap as many organizational results from managing outward as their male counterparts (Guy and Duke 1992; Harriman 1985; Smeltzer and Fann 1989; Stivers 2002). Conversely, it is conceivable that consociational activities by female managers enhance their boundaryspanning capabilities—a critical communication instrument in networked settings. This managerial activity (and others, such as being flexible and interactional) may in fact overcome deficiencies that female managers face in creating and maintaining good old boy networks. The literature, therefore, can be used to support hypotheses in either direction, and empirical evidence may help to clarify the relative validity of these two arguments. Under present circumstances, we hypothesize in the direction that is more fully developed in the literature: When one controls for resources and constraints in the environment, managing outward toward network actors is expected to produce lower organizational performance results for women than for their male counterparts. Public Management: A Formal Treatment These hypotheses were tested using an adaptation of a general model of public management and performance. We adopted O’Toole and Meier’s (1999) formal model of the impact of public management on public program performance—a model constructed from an analysis of the mass of theoretical and empirical (mostly case study) material on public management and performance, as well as on some of the prominent notions of how management matters in Management Activity and Program Performance

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complex or networked institutional settings (see O’Toole 2000). The model can be outlined briefly, and its application to managing upward, downward, and outward can be sketched. The general model of public management and performance is Ot = ␤1(S+M1)Ot−1 + ␤2(Xt/S)(M3/M4) + ␧t,

(1)

where O is some measure of outcome; S is a measure of stability; M denotes management, which can be divided into three parts:
M1, management’s contribution to organizational stability through additions to hierarchy and structure, as well as regular operations O
M , management’s efforts to exploit the 3 environment O
M , management’s effort to buffer environmental 4 shocks O

X is a vector of environmental forces; ␧ is an error term; other subscripts denote time periods; and ␤1 and ␤2 are estimable parameters. The two terms related to managing the environment can be combined so that M2 = M3/M4. Thus, M2 incorporates all efforts to manage the external environment, in contrast to managing the organization, M1: Ot = ␤1(S+M1)Ot−1 + ␤2(Xt/S)(M2) + ␧t.

(2)

The model is autoregressive, nonlinear, and contingent. The autoregressive component is captured by the lagged dependent variable; current performance is largely a function of past performance. The nonlinear elements are represented by various interaction effects, some of which are designated as reciprocal functions. The model is contingent simply because the stability term can be considered one end of a continuum, with fluid arrays on the opposite pole. As the stability variable moves toward zero, the model estimates how management affects programs in settings that are marked by great and unpredictable changes over time. In the model, S can be considered a composite of the various kinds of stability in an organizational setting. Stability means constancy in the design, functioning, and direction of an administrative system over time. O’Toole and Meier (2003) identified five types of stability: structural stability, mission stability, production or technology stability, procedural stability, and personnel stability. In that study, they investigated the impact of personnel stability on the performance of administrative systems and developed empirical evidence that personnel stability makes a positive contribution. The present study measured and tested four elements of management operationalized within the context of this model and found most of them to be explicitly 28

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linked to gender. First, managing outward is clearly encompassed by M2, the effort to manage the forces in the networked environment; therefore, we included a modified version of this variable developed by Meier and O’Toole (2001, 2002). Specifically, we included in our measure of M2 those externally oriented managerial efforts that include no principal–agent (hierarchically oriented) links. Second and third, managing upward and managing downward are principal–agent relationships that occur within the context of the organization and the superordinate layer of control. For managers at the apex of the organization, managing downward represents efforts to coordinate within the organization. As indicated earlier, this aspect of management may contain many components, several of which are not likely to be easily accessible through behavioral measures. Still, managerial efforts focused on downward interactions clearly contain a portion of what is summarized in the model as M1. Managing upward is also a principal– agent relationship, but in this case, the manager is the agent who reports to a political principal. Because these two aspects of M1, internal management, are expected to be distinctly different, we included measures of both. Fourth, managerial activity in any of these three directions clearly includes a quantity component but also can be considered as varying in quality. Our measures of the three managerial functions emphasize the extent or quantity of interactions, so we also incorporated a measure of managerial quality. This addition can be conceived as contributing to the various Ms in the model sketched previously. Operationalizing the entire model, particularly with a single data set, is not possible. In practice, the model has been tested piecemeal. For the current assessment of the role of gender, we essentially hold stability constant, thus dropping it from the model to produce the following: Ot = ␤1(M1)Ot−1 + ␤2(Xt)(M2) + ␧t.

(3)

Equation (3) is a relatively complex, nonlinear model with interactions. Because we are going to add complexity by incorporating gender,3 we simplified these relationships to a set of linear ones. At the same time, we divided M1 into its component parts—managing upward, Mu, and managing downward, Md—and incorporated a quality term, Mq: Ot = ␤1Ot−1 + ␤2(Xt) + ␤3(Mq) + ␤4(Mu) + ␤5(Md) + ␤6(M2) + ␧t. This linear estimation of the impact of managing upward, downward, and outward was tested by O’Toole, Meier, and Nicholson-Crotty (2005).

(4)

We move beyond that work to ask whether gender interacts with management to influence its impact on performance. That step simply requires that gender (G, coded 1 if the manager is a woman, 0 otherwise) be interacted with each of the three management terms:4

The Units of Analysis

all measures, we are interested in management at the very top level in the school districts. School districts use several levels of management, and a case can be made that a number of these are likely to be interesting (Meier, O’Toole, and Nicholson-Crotty 2004). For reasons of feasibility and importance, however, here we focus solely on district superintendents as the lead managers. Managerial quality is a notoriously difficult concept to measure. Meier and O’Toole (2002) validated a measure based on the residual from a model explaining salaries of district superintendents. The salary-setting process in Texas school districts approximates a competitive labor market with full information. As a result, management skills should be positively rewarded by the market. To isolate this quality component, they predicted logged superintendent salaries with 11 variables measuring job size, human capital factors, personal characteristics, and prior school district outputs, similar to common salary models in the literature (see Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg 1988).7 We replicated that analysis for the years 2000–02.

Our data for empirical testing were drawn from public organizations in an important and frequently occurring public managerial setting: school districts. In particular, we employed data drawn from more than 1,000 school districts in Texas, a large and highly diverse state. School district superintendents,5 the top managers, were sent a mail questionnaire on management styles, goals, and time allocation. The return rate was 55 percent, yielding 533 usable responses.6 We pooled three years of data (2000–02) on performance and control variables. Women comprised 10.7 percent of superintendents in 2000, 11.5 percent in 2001, and 12.5 percent in 2002. Missing data on some variables reduced the maximum number of cases during the three-year pool to 1,485. All nonsurvey data were provided by the Texas Education Agency.

The resulting model predicts 81 percent of the variance in salaries, thus comparing favorably to other models in the literature (and 3 percent more than the original Meier and O’Toole estimation). The objective was to remove as many “nonquality” factors as possible from the superintendent’s salary. The remaining residuals were then standardized (converted to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1) for use in the subsequent analysis as a rough indicator of management quality. This measure is clearly an untidy one, as the residual contains all factors not included in the model. The impact of this measurement error, however, attenuates any relationships between a quality measure and other variables such as organizational outputs.

Ot = ␤1Ot−1 + ␤2(Xt) + ␤3(Mq) + ␤4(Mu) + ␤5(Md) + ␤6(M2) + ␤7(GMu) + ␤8(GMd) + ␤9(GM2) + ␧t. (5) Statistically significant coefficients for any of the last three terms mean the impact of a woman manager on organizational performance is different from that of a male manager. For example, if ␤7 (for managing upward) is significant, this means that the impact of a female manager managing upward is different from that of a male manager in the same situation. A joint test of statistical significance for the last three coefficients (the difference between equations [4] and [5]) will determine whether female managers generally get different results than their male counterparts.

Although school districts are the most common public organizations in the United States, they have some distinct characteristics. School districts are highly professionalized, with elaborate certification processes for various occupations. The organizations themselves tend to be decentralized, with a great deal of streetlevel (classroom) discretion. If the findings here can be generalized, they would be applicable to similar types of organizations. Measures

Our measures, aside from gender, can be discussed in terms of the model: management (M), the vector of environmental forces (X), and program outcomes (O), or performance. These items are covered in order. Management Four measures of public management were included as potential explanatory variables in this analysis: managerial quality and the three aspects of managing upward, downward, and outward. For

A second set of management measures focused on the frequency and extent of interaction of top managers with parts of their setting. Managing outward can be defined as behavioral networking or interacting with key actors in the organization’s environment. Because school districts operate within a network of other organizations and actors who influence their students, resources, programs, goals, and reputation, the extent to which a superintendent manages in the school district’s network should be related to school district performance (Meier and O’Toole 2001, 2003). To measure managing outward—the behavioral networking activity of school superintendents—we selected four sets of actors from the organization’s environment: local business leaders, other school superintendents, state legislators, and the Texas Education Agency.8 In a mail survey, each superintendent Management Activity and Program Performance

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was asked how often he or she interacts with each actor, using a six-point scale ranging from “daily” to “never.” Superintendents with a networking management approach—that is, those who focus on managing outward—should interact more frequently with all four actors than a superintendent with an approach that is focused on internal management. A composite network management–style scale was generated using factor analysis. All four items loaded positively on the first factor and produced an eigenvalue of 1.82; no other factors were significant.9 Factor scores from this analysis were then used as a measure of network management, with higher scores indicating a greater network orientation. Managing upward deals with the principal–agent relationship between the elected school board and the chief executive officer, the district superintendent. We also asked superintendents how frequently they interact with members of their board, again on a six-point scale from “daily” to “never.” Similarly, managing downward was interpreted as the superintendent’s interaction with line managers—in this case, with the school principals who manage the individual schools within the district. Again, this was measured on a sixpoint scale ranging from “daily” to “never.” Control Variables Any assessment of public program performance must control for both task difficulty and program resources. For school districts, neither of these types of elements is under the substantial control of the districts themselves, and therefore they can be considered key parts of the vector of environmentally influenced X forces represented in the model. Fortunately, a well-developed literature on educational production functions can be used for guidance (Hanushek 1996; Hedges and Greenwald 1996). Eight variables, all commonly used, were included in our analysis—three measures of task difficulty and five measures of resources. Schools and school districts clearly vary as to how difficult it is to educate their students. Some districts have homogeneous student populations from upper-middle-class backgrounds; such students are likely to do well in school regardless of what the school does (Burtless 1996). Other districts with many poor students and highly diverse student bodies may find it more difficult to attain high levels of performance because the schools have to make up for less supportive home environments and must deal with more complex and varied learning problems ( Jencks and Phillips 1998). Our three measures of task difficulty are the percentages of students who are black, Latino, and poor. The last-mentioned variable was measured by the percentage of students who are eligible for free or reduced-price school lunches. All three measures should be negatively related to performance. 30

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Although the link between resources and performance in schools has been controversial (see Hanushek 1996; Hedges and Greenwald 1996), a growing literature of well-designed, longitudinal studies confirms that, like other organizations, schools with more resources generally fare better (Wenglinsky 1997). Five measures of resources are included. Average teacher salary, the percentage of funds received from state government, and class size are directly tied to monetary resources. The average number of years of teaching experience and the percentage of teachers who are not certified are related to the human resources of the school district. Class size, noncertified teachers, and state aid (because it is correlated with poverty) should be negatively related to student performance; teacher experience and teacher salaries should be positively related to performance. Performance Measures Finally, we introduced measures for O, performance (outcomes), for the school districts in our analysis. Although virtually all programs have multiple goals and thus are subject to multiple performance indicators, some objectives are defined as more important than others by the political environment. This study incorporated 10 different performance indicators in an effort to determine how the different functions of public management affect a variety of organizational processes. Although each performance indicator is salient to some portion of the educational environment, the most salient by far is the overall student pass rate on the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS).10 The TAAS is a standardized, criterion-based test that all students in grades 3 through 8 and 11 must take. The grade 11 exam is a high-stakes test, and students must pass it to receive a regular diploma from the state of Texas. The TAAS scores are used to rank districts, and without question, it is the most visible indicator of performance used to assess the quality of schools. Our measure is the percentage of students in a district who passed all (reading, writing, and math) sections of the TAAS. Four other TAAS measures are also useful as performance indicators. The state accountability system assesses the performance of subgroups of students, and districts must perform well on all these indicators to attain various state rankings. The TAAS scores for Anglo, black, Latino, and low-income students were included as measures of performance indicators.11 Many parents and policy makers are also concerned with the performance of school districts regarding college-bound students. Three measures of collegebound student performance were used—average ACT score, average SAT score, and the percentage of students who scored above 1110 on the SAT (or its ACT equivalent). Texas is one of a few states where both the

ACT and the SAT are taken by sufficient numbers to provide reliable indicators of both. Like statewide samples, for which there is no correlation between these scores and the number of students taking them if the proportion of tested students is more than 30 percent of the total eligible to be tested (Smith 2003), Texas scores are uncorrelated with the percentage of students taking the exams.12 The final two measures of performance, attendance rates and dropout rates, might be termed “bottomend indicators.” High attendance rates are valued for two reasons. Students are unlikely to learn if they are not in class, and state aid is allocated to school districts based on average daily attendance. Attendance, as a result, is a good indicator of low-end performance by these organizations; the measure is simply the average percentage of students who are not absent. Dropout rates, though they contain a great deal of error, are also frequently used to evaluate the performance of school districts.13 The official state measure of dropouts is the annual percentage of students who leave school from eighth grade onward. Findings Before probing the interaction of gender and management functions to determine their effect on performance, we first examined whether women generally differ from men in their reported managerialinteraction behavior. Table 1 shows the mean values of managing outward, upward, and downward by gender and the associated significance tests. Men and women superintendents are not statistically different in managing outward (to the network) or managing upward (interacting with the school board). They are, however, different in terms of managing downward, with women managers interacting less with line subordinates (school principals) than male superintendents. Finding such a difference is less important for our present purposes than for examining the performance-relevant impacts of the managerial interactions. Table 2 examines the question with program performance measured by school districts’ overall TAAS pass rate. The table reports results from two specifications, an autoregressive estimation and another without the lagged dependent variable. A lagged dependent variable often suppresses relationships that are initially small but could cumulate to a larger impact over time. The joint F tests for both equations show that gender significantly interacts

Table 1 Gender and Management Activities Management Activity

Women

Men

t statistic

Significance

Managing outward Managing upward Managing downward

–0.094 4.623 5.385

0.036 4.476 5.633

0.96 1.21 2.59

.34 .23 .01

with management activities to affect performance. The most striking differences are in managing upward and downward. For male superintendents, greater contact with the school board is negatively related to performance (except when past performance was held constant). In contrast, when women interact with the school board, school district performance increases (the total impact for women is actually the sum of the two coefficients, but that sum is still positive and statistically significant in both equations). Even in the autoregressive equation, the more women interact with school board members, the higher the level of school district performance. Managing downward shows another gender-related distinction. The amount of contact that male superintendents have with their principals is unrelated to district performance in both equations. For women managers, the results are much different. Greater contact with principals is associated with a strong negative relationship to performance.14 A third difference shows up in managing outward—contact with significant external stakeholders. For male superintendents, such activities are associated with higher performance in both equations, although they are much reduced in the autoregressive version. Women superintendents, in contrast, are associated with no relationship between networking and performance (the autoregressive estimation) or a strong negative relationship. The overall TAAS pass rate is only one indicator of organizational performance. Table 3 shows the results of the joint F tests for the nine additional dependent variables tapping other aspects of performance. The significant differences are all on the TAAS test or on low-end indicators. In none of the six significance tests for college-bound students do the coefficients for female superintendents differ from those for male superintendents. In the non-autoregressive models, the coefficients for women superintendents are significantly different from those of men in four equations; for two of those indicators (black test scores and lowincome test scores), these differences remain in the autoregressive tests. For the low-end indicators, dropouts and attendance, gender differences appear in the model without a lagged dependent variable but disappear when past performance is controlled. In these two cases, past performance is so strongly correlated with current performance that management cannot have sufficient impact in the short run to affect results. Table 3 shows an overall pattern in which gender differences in the relationship between management and performance show up in the most salient measures of performance (TAAS tests) and in low-end indicators but not in those that reflect more elite education. The joint f tests, however, convey only Management Activity and Program Performance

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Table 2 The Interaction of Gender and Management Strategies: Influence on Organizational Performance Dependent variable = Student exam pass rates Non-autoregressive Independent Variables

Slope

Managerial networking Principal–agent relationships School boards School principals Women superintendent times Networking School boards Principals Managerial quality Control variables Teacher salaries (000s) Class size Teacher experience Noncertified teachers Percentage state aid Percentage black students Percentage Latino students Low-income students Lagged dependent variable R2 Standard error F N Joint F test Probability of F

Autoregressive t

Slope

t

.9356

5.31*

.1902

1.71#

–.7974 .1211

4.09* 0.44

–.1764 –.0238

1.44 0.14

–1.6367 2.2372 –2.0379 .4508

2.76* 4.60* 4.84* 2.74*

–.0663 .8638 –.7948 .2967

0.18 2.82* 3.00* 2.88*

.5817 –.4164 .0806 –.1602 –.6326 –.1748 –.0649 –.1344 NA .44 5.84 67.92 1,485 9.44 .0001

5.64* 2.79* 0.90 5.07* 1.69# 10.26* 6.05* 9.24* NA

.1454 –.1624 –.0330 –.0286 –.2945 –.0475 –.0080 –.0389 .7218 .78 3.65 290.71 1,485 3.08 .0286

2.23* 1.74# 0.59 1.43 1.25 4.32* 1.18 4.17* 47.78*

Dummy variables for individual years are not reported. * p < .05 two-tailed test; # p < .10 two-tailed test.

information about statistical significance. They do not reveal anything about patterns of relationships and whether those patterns are consistent. To probe that dimension, table 4 reports all of the individual cases in which the specific coefficient for women managers on each item differed statistically from the coefficient for men. Some patterns can be discerned. First, for the elite performance measures, the most appropriate conclusion is that the management impacts of women are no different from those of men. There is one significant relationship (ACT scores in the autoregressive estimation), but we would expect one significant relationship in 18 to show up by chance alone.

Women superintendents consistently get better performance out of school board contacts than men. Seven of the 10 nonelite measures (including those reported in table 2) show that school board contacts are more positive for women superintendents than for men, and four of these relationships hold even with the autoregressive estimation. In contrast, in seven of 10 cases, women superintendents get worse performance from their downward contacts, and four of those results remain in the autoregressive estimation.15 Finally, men clearly get greater benefit from working the external environment. In six of the seven cases, women managers get fewer positive results from work-

Table 3 Gender and Management: Joint F Tests of Significance Autoregressive Dependent Variable Black test scores Latino test scores Anglo test scores Low-income test scores Attendance Dropouts SAT scores ACT scores College percentage

Non-autoregressive

F

p

2.86 2.09 1.33 2.13 0.76 1.81 1.71 1.85 0.49

.0380 .1027 .2657 .0267 .5177 .1465 .1666 .1391 .6996

F 6.89 8.56 4.93 9.86 8.36 3.46 1.22 2.05 0.49

Joint F tests for the interaction of gender with three management functions. All equations control for all variables included in table 1.

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Public Administration Review • January | February 2006

p .0002 .0001 .0025 .0001 .0001 .0174 .3035 .1123 .6896

Table 4 Gender and Management: Significance Differences in Impact Autoregressive

Dependent Variables Black test scores Latino test scores Anglo test scores Low-income test scores Attendance Dropouts SAT scores ACT scores College percentage

Non-autoregressive

Outward

Up

Down

Outward

Up

Down

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + 0

+ 0 0 + 0 – 0 0 0

– 0 – – 0 0 0 0 0

– – – – – 0 0 0 0

+ + + + + – 0 0 0

– – – – – + 0 0 0

+ = significantly more positive impact for women managers; – = significantly more negative impact for women managers; 0 = no significant difference at the .05 level in a two-tailed test. Note: Because dropouts are a negative factor, positive impacts on dropouts will show up as negative relationships.

ing the network (often getting negative results); none of those relationships, however, holds in an autoregressive estimation. Conclusion How does the gender of the manager interact with basic managerial functions to affect the performance of organizations? This study has offered a preliminary effort to address this question by examining several hundred top managers and their managerial activities. Although women managers’ interactions differ from men’s in terms of only one of these functions (managing downward), the impacts of managerial activities on organizational performance are unquestionably influenced by gender. A clear pattern of gender differences appears in our performance-focused analysis. Women managers are able to convert the negative impacts of managing upward (to the school board) into positive results on several of the organizational performance indicators. In contrast, women managers generally get lower results from managing downward and managing outward than do their male counterparts. In short, the expectations derived from the literature on difference feminism find support in the systematic analysis of performance in these public organizations. Resources and constraints, plus the sheer efforts of managers, are not enough to explain performance results. Rather, management and gender interact, and researchers on public management need to take such patterns into account in the development of general theory. The details of the findings, nonetheless, suggest that overly stark difference-based arguments should be viewed with skepticism. Gender matters, but it matters differently for different managerial functions. Our admittedly oversimplified distinction among three forms of managerial interaction shows that women managers consistently outperform men (or, rather,

their organizations do) in leveraging results from political overseers. On the other hand, male top managers derive more organizational performance from links used or forged in other directions. Gender may entail management capital, but neither females nor males have a monopoly on distinctive contributions. In addition, the differences that gender can make vary considerably by performance metric. The observed pattern—difference-grounded hypotheses supported for broadly salient and for low-end performance criteria but rebutted for high-end measures— was unanticipated ex ante but raises intriguing questions about the kinds of production processes and interested stakeholders that might shape the ways that gender matters in public management. Finally, although this study has shown a provocative set of patterns indicating the interaction of management and gender, it is important to note that we have not tested for the empirical determinants of these relationships. Our hypotheses derive from the notion that the perceptions of others color how the efforts of managers are seen—and therefore how performancerelevant responses are elicited—but we do not know for sure. The results observed here may derive from gender-related differences in the way that top managers themselves interact with others, thus emanating from the managers and their own behavior. Alternatively, the findings might be explained by the ways that managers’ targets of interaction respond to managerial gender. Additional studies on this question, as well as studies conducted in public organizational settings beyond Texas and outside public education, are needed to probe the issues more thoroughly. Other managerial functions not examined here are also worth assessing for their possible gender-related impacts. Still, the present study does provide clear albeit complex support for difference-based arguments. The findings, we believe, should persuade those who wonder whether Management Activity and Program Performance

33

gender questions should have a prominent place in research on public management and government performance.

nonrespondents in terms of enrollment; enrollment growth; students’ race, ethnicity, and poverty; or test scores. There were slight differences in a few other factors. Respondents had

Acknowledgments An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2004 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. This article is part of an ongoing research agenda on the role of public management in complex policy settings. We have benefited from the helpful comments of George Boyne, Stuart Bretschneider, Amy Kneedler Donahue, H. George Frederickson, Carolyn Heinrich, Patricia Ingraham, J. Edward Kellough, Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., H. Brinton Milward, Sean Nicholson-Crotty, David Peterson, Hal G. Rainey, and Bob Stein on aspects of this research program.

0.48 more students per class and paid their teachers $200 more per year but had annual operating budgets of about $100 less per student. 7. District characteristics included as predictors are the district’s total budget, tax rate, and average revenue per student; these district characteristics are logged. Four human capital characteristics are included: experience as a superintendent, tenure in the current job, age, and possession of a doctorate. Personal characteristics included are whether the superintendent is female, black, or Latino. The adjustment for prior year’s test scores is also included because we think managerial quality is affected by prior performance and that

Notes 1. Moore’s approach emphasizes “equat[ing] managerial success in the public sector with initiating and reshaping public sector enterprises in ways that increase their value to the public in both the short and the long run” (1995, 10). Again, this meaning is close to our own. 2. A comprehensive examination of the impacts of gender on performance, for instance, would need to explore the argument that women as managers contribute distinctively in the form of “emotional labor” to the organization, and thus indirectly to production (Guy and Newman 2004; Meier, Mastracci, and Wilson forthcoming). The current investigation focuses only on gender-and-management impacts that can be measured through interactions with others. Although contributions in the form of emotional labor require interaction, the measures available for the present study do not allow us to distinguish different kinds of content among the interactions between managers and others. 3. Managerial gender is treated in this article as an additional variable that may affect all three directional managerial functions (the values for the variable M. Gender, of course, is a social construction that varies by time and place. Although we use sex as a surrogate for gender, we recognize the limitations of this measure. 4. The quality measure does not interact with gender—that is, quality has the same impact for women and men. Though this may be the case partly because gender is used in generating the quality measure, even in the development of that measure, gender is not significant. In short, women, on average, score the same as men on the quality measure. 5. All superintendents in Texas are appointed by elected school boards. 6. Districts responding to the survey, which was conducted during 2000, were no different from 34 Public Administration Review • January | February 2006

quality affects future performance. In other words, over time, there is reciprocal correlation. The adjustment for this endogeneity is handled through an instrumental variables technique. Six student characteristics and district resources were used as instruments; the purged measure of prior performance was then included in the model. 8. Meier and O’Toole (2005) tested to see whether asking about additional nodes with which these top managers might interact would provide a better measure of managing outward. Interactions with three other actors were asked, along with those included here. The four-node networking measure correlated very highly (0.97) with the seven-node measure and thus seems an appropriate measure for M2. 9. The network-management factor correlates at –0.27 with time spent managing the district (in contrast to time spent in contacts outside the organization). Because the school board is external to the organization, it can be considered part of the organization’s environment. At the same time, relationships with the board are principal– agent relationships, and we interpret them as part of hierarchically oriented management in this article. Although the two measures of network management (the five-node and the four-node measures) correlate at 0.97 with each other, school board interactions correlate only at 0.40 with the current measure. In short, the school board measure by itself brings something new to the analysis because of its unique variance (i.e., the variance in school board interactions that is not correlated with the interactions with the four network actors). 10. The TAAS was replaced by a new exam in 2003. 11. The pass rates do not correlate as highly as one might imagine. The intercorrelations between the Anglo, black, and Latino pass rates are all in the neighborhood of 0.6, suggesting that the overlap is only a bit more than one-third.

12. The relationship between the percentage of students taking the tests and the test scores in Texas is actually positive but explains less than 2 percent of the variance. 13. School districts often have annual student turnover of 20 percent or greater. School districts do not necessarily know where students have gone unless they receive a request for a transcript. In addition, school districts have few incentives to find out why any given student has not returned for a new academic year. 14. One hypothesis offered by an anonymous reviewer is that female superintendents simply delegate more than their male counterparts, allowing principals wider discretion in managing their schools. Thus, when problems become apparent and female managers step in, the result is negative downward management relations with principals. Using management survey responses to the statement, “I give my principals a great deal of discretion when making decisions,” we tested this hypothesis and found no statistically significant difference between male and female managers in the amount of discretion given to principals. 15. One explanation offered by a reviewer focuses on the perceptions of subordinates toward female managers who are fast-tracked into management positions. In the present context, however, empirical evidence reveals that fast-tracking of female superintendents overall and in comparison to male managers is not an organizational reality. When comparing male and female administrative experience, age, and time in the organization, systemic differences do not surface, though subtle differences likely exist (see also Meier and Wilkins 2002).

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