INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, 30 May 2013
Partai Aceh now controls the executive and legislative branches of Aceh’s provincial government to the point that it can ensure the passage of almost any legislation it wants. It also controls the governments of its most populous districts (with the exception of Banda Aceh); the KPA, the organisation of former GAM commanders; the election commission; much of the bureaucracy; and the new institution of the Wali Nanggroe. What does this mean for governance; for relations with Jakarta; and for the maintenance of peace?
Photo@AFP
MOU, Article 1.2 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION Understanding the aspirations of Acehnese people for local political parties, GOI will create […] the political and legal conditions for the establishment of local political parties in Aceh in consultation with Parliament.
2005 Helsinki MoU; Malik Mahmud (right) signed for GAM
Spelled out in Chapter XI of UU 11/2006, the Law on Governing Aceh
Formed in October 2005 to oversee demobilization and reintegration
Head: Muzakkir Manaf
Structure mirrored that of TNA
Used KPA structure to get out the vote in 2006, then political backing to secure contracts
The diaspora leadership backing Humam Hamid and Hasbi Abdullah received 16.6% of the vote
The independent ticket of Irwandi and Nazar received 38.20%
Feb 2007: Partai GAM with GAM flag formed June 2007: Tries to register, rejected :TRIGGERS PP77 April 2008: Registers as Partai Gerakan Aceh Mandiri (GAM) , rejected again April 2008: With mediation from Helsinki, registers as Partai Aceh, accepted.
Founder: Malik Mahmud Chair: Muzakkir Manaf Sekjen: M. Yahya Mu’ad
Took part in 2009 as one of 6 local parties, got 33 out of 69 seats, later built 42-member fraksi.
Muzakkir Manaf, Malik Mahmud, Zaini Abdullah
PA helped produce a 92.3% sweep for SBYBoediono
Use of KPA to get out the vote
Key DPRK in Partai Aceh hands
Split between Gov. Irwandi and PA camps deepens PA, with Jakarta support, forces delay in election until Irwandi is out of office. Widespread intimidation April 2012 election produces 55.7% vote for PA, 29.1% for Irwandi
Also produces PA victories in 10 districts, plus PA-backed bupati in Pidie Jaya
KAB/KOTA controlled by Partai Aceh as of 2013
Formed in October 2005 to oversee demobilization and reintegration Head: Muzakkir Manaf Structure mirrored that of TNA Used KPA structure to get out the vote in 2006, then political backing to secure contracts
KPA (2005), Partai Aceh (2007-8) and provincial government (2012) become interlocking directorate
Founder of PA Now effectively heir to the sultanate Shadow government with cabinet and security force? Gigantic budget No important meetings take place without him Wali for whom?
Fusion at district level
Fraksi DPRA selects new members April 2013
Control over the civil service as Zaini installs 422 new officials in Feb 2013
Qanun No.3 2013 on the provincial flag Rejected by Home Affairs as violating PP 77 of 2007 banning separatist symbols.
2013 budget also includes Rp.40.1 M for disseminating flag, symbol and hymn – Also rejected by Home Affairs.
“Just get rid of a stripe….” Malik Mahmud and Gamawan Fauzi, with Gov Zaini bringing up the rear
Exploiting ethnic tensions Supporting ALA/ABAS Exacerbating intraGAM rivalries
And in the meantime, Aceh falls further behind economically. Governance at all time low.
One alternative proposed
Truth and Reconciliation Commission?
Security force for Wali Nanggroe?
The fact is that PA can get any qanun it wants; only checks are common sense and desire to keep the money flowing.
PA is now a giant conglomerate that it will be difficult to dislodge through the ballot box. One of the controversial elements in the provincial budget was Rp 12 M for KPA
Aceh remains one of the poorest provinces in the country, 29 out of 33
On the one hand, what does autonomy mean if Aceh can’t even have its own flag?
On the other, how can Jakarta concede without raising questions about Papuan flag-raising?
I f Jakarta does not want to challenge PA frontally, it could choose covert means, not just exacerbating internal divisions but using radical networks (Islam as the answer to separatism).
At what point does defiance become actionable?
Tensions could produce unwanted consequences Could lead to more intimidation of those opposed to PA and decline in civil liberties more broadly. Governance could continue to deteriorate, making most Acehnese poorer as the PA elite grows richer. Could lead to conclusion in Jakarta that any negotiations are a mistake
