International Correspondent Bank Reputation Lucy Chernykh and Robert O. Edmister Finance Department College of Business Administration Bowing Green State University Bowling Green, Ohio 43403 October 11, 2007

Abstract International reputation information is tested with a unique event, the passage and implementation of bank deposit insurance by Russia. Examining the Central Bank of Russia’s accept and reject decisions for the sample of 576 banks applying for deposit insurance, this study finds that the foreign correspondent country is a significant determinant of domestic bank quality. High income and OECD country correspondents form relationships with higher quality Russian banks. Conversely, middle income and non-OECD country correspondents form relationships with lower quality banks. Further, we find evidence of within country bank reputation effects. The probability of deposit insurance acceptance by the Central Bank of Russia is significantly related to U.S. correspondents segmented by Federal Reserve sanctions for correspondent activities infractions. Key terms: bank foreign correspondents, reputation, foreign currency transactions, and information revelation.

International Correspondent Bank Reputation 1. Introduction This research examines the reputation of banks operating in international payment transactions. Stigler (1961) theorizes that search costs induce buyers and sellers to undertake costly counteracts including institutions as devices for eliminating uncertainty in quality. Akerlof (1970) explicitly considers dishonesty by market participants and suggests institutional counter-measures including branding. Brand names convey favorable reputation on branded organizations and thus differentiate their quality. Specifically in this research, we examine the reputation of banks with respect to foreign payment transactions. The common banking practice is to process foreign payment transfers with correspondent banks in foreign countries. Correspondents usually form long-standing relationships built on confidential information disclosure and mutual trust. Some correspondent banks operate as clearing agents, allowing a domestic bank to maintain a few correspondents who process transfers with a large number of foreign countries. The reputation of the domestic bank, a Russian bank in this research, is a quality issue due to the trust required for payment completion and for compliance with money laundering laws. The primary issue examined in this research is the effect of foreign correspondents’ reputations on the domestic bank’s reputation. We posit that parties external to the correspondent relationship evaluate the domestic bank, in part, by the reputation quality of the correspondent banks. Testing such a hypothesis empirically is

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limited by the opaqueness of reputation signals and domestic bank quality. Almost all Russian banks at the time of the study are privately owned and not subject to strict public disclosure requirements. However, certification for Russian deposit insurance, an entirely new regulatory regime, creates a unique opportunity to conduct an empirical test of bank reputation. 1 Following a full-information examination of a large number of domestic banks, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) disclosed binominal quality as acceptance or rejection. 2 We relate CBR quality to correspondent bank characteristics including correspondent relationships. After controlling for fundamental risk factors, we find that quality characteristics of the foreign correspondents relate in the expected manner to the domestic bank CBR quality decision. Correspondent banks from high income countries, defined by the World Bank, indicate high quality. Further, we find that OECD country correspondent banks indicate high quality domestic banks, while middle income and non-OECD country correspondent banks are negatively related to domestic bank quality. We report results for groups of countries, as well. Finally, we undertake a test of reputation using U.S. banks receiving regulatory sanctions relating to correspondent banking. We find a negative and significant relationship between US bank reputation as measured by sanctions and Russian bank quality as measured by non-acceptance into the deposit insurance system by the CBR. Similarly, we find a positive and significant relationship between non-sanctioned US bank correspondents and acceptance into the newly created Russian deposit insurance 1

Russian deposit insurance was legislated December 23, 2003 and Russian banks submitted applications for deposit insurance by June 30, 2004. Prior to the enactment of deposit insurance, private banks were licensed but the deposits were not insured. Private banks were permitted in Russian after 1990. Prior to 1990 and during the Soviet government regime, the only bank in Russia was owned by the government. 2 The Central Bank of Russia conducted unlimited analyses of financial reports, licenses, and on-site investigations of all applicants during the year prior to announcing deposit insurance decisions.

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system. We conclude that the quality of the foreign correspondent reveals the reputation of the domestic bank. Our theoretical framework derives from the Akerlof (1970) “lemons” paradigm in which dishonest market participants disguise themselves as honest participants. The lemons depreciate the value of all goods and thus create market prices below those theorized by Stigler (1961). Akerloff concludes with observations of counter-actions taken by honest participants to mitigate the lemons induced loss. Honest participants assume brand names because brands confer their favorable reputation on the institution. Furthermore, the branding agent assumes a responsibility for rejecting the dishonest brand applicants and practitioners. We apply the Akerlof (1970) brand reputation concept to the international banking environment of foreign correspondents. Banks in different countries may assume the brand reputation of the country. We proxy country brand reputation with country OECD listing and per capita income in tests and proxy true bank quality with the outcome of the Russian Central Bank acceptance of domestic banks for initial entry it a de novo deposit insurance system. We find significant relationship with the expected coefficient signs for both country OECD standing and World Bank income levels. Further, we verify that our tests relate specifically to a correspondent’s reputation for international payments, we examine the relationship between CBR acceptance ad Federal Reserve segments defined by regulatory sanctions for correspondent bank practices with respect to money laundering. The significant, expected sign logistic regression results affirm the StiglerAkerlof theorized relationships.

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2. Central Bank of Russia Regulation of Correspondent Relations The CBR licenses Russian banks as a means of regulating foreign payment transactions. 3 CBR regulations implicitly distinguishes two broad groups of foreign banks: 1) banks in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 4 countries and Roszagranbanks and 2) foreign banks in other countries. The licensing requirements for correspondent relationships with group 1 foreign banks are less restrictive. The Roszagranbanks are reported separately to maintain a consistent definition of foreign correspondent. Roszagranbanks, all previously foreign offices of the Soviet Union State Bank during the Soviet Union era, are foreign country licensed banks directly or indirectly controlled by the Central Bank of Russia. Thus, Roszagranbanks are regulated by foreign countries, but managed by state controlled banks headquartered in Russia. The historical antecedents of Roszagranbanks account for their relatively high frequency as Russian bank correspondents, as they have a long history of facilitating business relationships with major trading partners of the Soviet Union. Also, Russian banks that are not licensed to conduct business with foreign correspondents may correspond with Roszagranbanks. 5 By the end of 2003, CBR distinguished five types of licenses in terms of direct correspondent relations with foreign banks. 6 Five types of licenses are as described below:

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Our sample contains a mixture of banks licensed and not licensed for foreign currency transactions. The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) issues separate licenses for banking operations involving retail deposits.3 As of the end of 2003, 93% of all Russian banks were considered “retail.” 4 CIS is an international alliance of the Post-Soviet states. On the sample date of December 31, 2003, CIS included twelve former Soviet Union Republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 5 As of December 31, 2003, Roszagranbanks were Moscow Narodny Bank (UK), Donau Bank (Austria), Ost-West Handelsbank (Germany), BCEN-Eurobank (France), East-West United Bank (Luxembourg), Russian Commercial Bank (Cyprus), and Russische Kommerzial Bank (Switzerland). 6 CBR Bulletin, January 22, 2004, No. 4.

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1. License for operation in rubles only (correspondent relationships with foreign banks are not permitted). 2. License for operations in any currency but without the right to establish direct correspondent relations with foreign bank (correspondent relationships permitted with CIS banks and Roszagranbanks). 3. License for operations in any currency with the right to establish direct correspondent relations with up to 6 foreign banks (correspondent relationships with CIS banks and Roszagranbanks; up to 6 correspondent relationships with other foreign banks, subject to offshore banks restrictions). 4. License for operations in any currency with no limitations on correspondent relations with foreign banks (unlimited number of correspondent relationships with any foreign banks, subject to offshore banks restrictions). 5. The so-called “General” license. This is the most advanced license for banking operations with the minimum amount of restrictions; In terms of correspondent foreign relationships, (4) and (5) are similar but the Russian bank with the general license has to meet additional criteria to qualify, including larger size of the capital (unlimited number of correspondent relationships with any foreign banks, subject to offshore banks restrictions) A separate CBR regulation identifies the list of countries in offshore jurisdictions and imposes additional requirements for Russian bank that choose to have correspondent relations with banks in foreign offshore zones. 7 The regulation relies on IMF, OECD, FATF, and Forum for Financial Stability criteria of offshore jurisdictions and classifies all offshore zones (tax havens and/or territories with loose standards for transparency of financial operations) into three groups. Group one: Russian banks with a license for foreign correspondent relations can establish correspondent relations with banks registered in these jurisdictions without limitations {not included in “offshore” in this research} Groups two and three: Russian bank with a license for foreign correspondent relations can establish correspondent relations with a foreign bank registered in group two and group three jurisdictions only if the foreign bank meets at least one of the following two criteria: – Foreign bank’s capital is at least €100 million; it has provided notarized copies of audit certification of its financial reports for the last three years and has a well-documented physical location, or 7

CBR Regulation No.1317, August 7, 2001.

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–

Foreign bank has at least Aa long-term Moody’s credit rating (or at least AA- Standard and Poor or Fitch rating) or is included in top 1000 world banks rating by the total assets based on Bankers’ Almanac (issued by “Reed Business Information”, UK)

The supplementary CBR Regulation No. 1318 determines that Russian banks have to form reserves for operations with foreign banks registered in group two (50% of the average daily balances) and group three (100% of the average daily balances). Additional regulation issued on the same date as the off-shore regulation specifying additional capital reserves of at least 50% to 100% for assets maintained in the group 2 and banks. Group 1 is defined as not “off-shore” in this study; groups 2 and 3 are counted as offshore zones. Thus off-shore correspondents in this study are located in Grenada, Nauru, Serbia, Chernogoria, UAE (Dubai), and Vanuatu. The CBR classification of all off-shore countries is listed in Appendix I. 3. Central Bank of Russia Acceptance of Banks for Deposit Insurance as Information Revelation Russia’s deposit insurance law was adopted in December 2003. It established compulsory participation in the deposit insurance system for all banks that attract retail deposits and outlined the procedures and the timeline for the system implementation. In addition to retail depositor protection, the new deposit insurance system was intended to strengthen Russian banking sector stability and prudential regulation. The law explicitly required the CBR to impose strict selection criteria to all banks admitted into the new insurance system and to exclude banks with questionable soundness, performance, and reputation. To respond to this request, in January 2004, the CBR issued the list of suitability criteria for the in-depth on-site examination and applicant bank deposit insurance

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acceptance. These criteria included five groups of performance indicators to evaluate each bank’s financial stability: 1) capital adequacy, 2) assets quality, 3) quality of bank management, including risk management, 4) profitability, and 5) liquidity. Thus, the CBR instructions for bank evaluation do not include correspondent relationships. Therefore, the banks did not have a regulatory incentive to manage their correspondent bank selections to meet CBR requirements. This reduces the potential for a recursive functional form between correspondent bank decisions and CBR bank quality decisions. In accordance with DI law timeline, the banks had to apply for admission to the DI system by June 30, 2004. During the next nine months the CBR completed intensive examinations of all applicants on a first come first served basis. The first 26 banks were approved in September 2004. Additional banks were approved weekly and by March 2005 the CBR had accepted 824 of 1,140 banks submitting applications. 8 The March 2005 acceptances are referred to as “first round” decisions and referred to as “accepted” in this study. 4. Data and Descriptive Statistics We collect information on Russian banks’ registration, geographical location, legal form, and the types of licenses from various issues of the Bulletin of Central Bank of Russia for the end of the year 2003. The data on deposit insurance acceptance come from the Russian Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) official directory. Banks that not licensed for retail deposit operations as of December 31, 2003 are not eligible for our sample. 8

Banks rejected in the first round were given a chance to address the CBR criticism and to apply for a second review. Using this appeal procedure provided by DI law, 265 banks have reapplied and 92 of them were admitted in the second round. All repeated applications were finalized by the end of September 2005. In the third, and the final round, 142 banks appealed but only 5 were accepted. By the end of 2005, the CBR has completely finalized all evaluation procedures. As of January 1, 2006, the Deposit Insurance Agency registry consisted of 931 banks admitted under the deposit insurance system.

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Our primary data source for the correspondent relationships of Russian banks is the Commercial Banks of Russia database maintained by the joint stock company Intelbridge. The company is a member of the Association of Russian Banks and provides comprehensive bank-level financial and non-financial information on annual bases. All financial indicators are also obtained from the Intelbridge dataset. Since Russian banks may have several versions of their official names, including abbreviations, we match all datasets by each bank unique CBR registration number. The list of sample banks, registration numbers, and names is in Appendix 2. The CBR and DIA sources provide information for all 1,277 commercial banks with an active license as of the end of 2003. The 2003 Intelbridge directory contains 856 banks. We screen Intelbridge data for completeness, accuracy, and consistency. We exclude banks with missing financial variables and correspondent relations information. We also exclude banks that fail to disclose their Russian correspondents assuming that this may indicate incomplete or unreliable data on foreign correspondents as well. Finally, we exclude banks with incomplete information on foreign correspondent relations. The most typical example of incompleteness is when a bank reports only the total number of its foreign correspondents without specifying their names and locations. The dataset contains only banks which disclose their information voluntarily. The study sample consists of 576 Russian commercial banks and 2,992 unique correspondent relationships with banks headquartered in 65 countries (Table 1). To account for different foreign branching regimes around the world, we identify correspondent bank country by the bank headquarter location. The sample contains 433

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Russian banks with at least one foreign correspondent and 143 Russian banks with only Russian correspondents. Correspondent headquarters are located in 65 countries geographically dispersed throughout most of the world. The five most frequent countries, measured by the correspondent count, are Germany (16.3%), U.S.A. (9.9%), Austria (7.3 %), Ukraine (6.5%), and Belarus (5.3%). (See Table 1.) The licensing and legal forms of the Russian banks are reported in Table 2. The study sample and all Russian banks are proportionately similar with respect to international payment licenses, legal forms, geographical locations, and ownership characteristics. The proportion of study banks accepted in the first round of deposit insurance is 74.5 percent. Thus, the number of study banks rejected in the first round is 147 (25.5%). Statistics for continuous variables, number of correspondents, total assets, book equity to asset ratios, and return on asset ratios are reported in Table 3. The mean and standard deviation for the number of foreign correspondents per bank is 5.2 and 10.0, respectively. The distribution is skewed by a few banks which have up to 158 correspondent relationships. The quartile range is from 1 to 6 for the number of foreign correspondents. Quartile ranges for bank assets are Rb0.3 billion to Rb 2.3 billion, book equity to assets are 14.5% to 32.0%, and return on assets are 0.4 to 2.0%. 5. Correspondent Reputation Regression Results The next sub-sections discuss logistic regression estimates reported in Tables 4 through 8. The first regression estimates fundamental bank characteristic coefficients. Significant variables identified in the first regression are retained in the second set of

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regressions which add variables identifying the headquarter countries of foreign correspondents. Based on the country findings, country and U.S. intra-country groups are created and then reported in the third set of regressions. 5.1. Regression Results for Fundamental Bank Characteristics We model the regression equation to reflect the Central Bank of Russian criterion for accepting existing (2003) banks into the newly created deposit insurance system as it relates to fundamental bank characteristics. To control for acceptance based on public information, we estimate a baseline function with significant variables. Potential variables for predicting deposit insurance acceptance are bank size, profitability, leverage, legal form, location, existing business license, and number of foreign correspondents. Consistent with the CBR, we classify domestic bank location as either in or outside of Moscow. During the study period, banks in Moscow were acquired for the purpose of laundering money used to make trade and personnel payments in the underground economy. 9 On the other hand, banks outside of Moscow were largely engaged in the transparent economy. We present logistic regression coefficients for the CBR criterion for acceptance in Table 4. The bank size (log transformed) and profitability (return on assets ratio) estimated coefficients are positive and significant, as expected. The location coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that being a local rather than a Moscow bank is a positive indicator of acceptance. License type is marginally significant. Leverage and 9

Small regional banks with very low capital are usually involved in legitimate banking operations such as spread lending. However, the activities of approximately 500 small Moscow banks with the capital below $5 million that operate in extremely competitive Moscow environment are suspicious. Regulators suspect that some of the small Moscow banks are involved in money laundering. Source: “Banking reform is delayed”, Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 28, 2003

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legal forms are insignificant. The variable coefficient for the number of foreign correspondents, in absolute value, is not significant. The important conclusion is that fundamental bank financial characteristics are significant determinates of CBR acceptance. The constant term is negative and significant. This indicates that the reference group banks, those without foreign correspondents, are likely to be in the rejected group. 5.2 Correspondent Relations Regressions for OECD and World Bank Country Groups The logistic regression coefficient for OECD country correspondents is positive and significant (α = 0.05) and the coefficient for non-OECD country correspondents is negative and marginally significant (α = 0.06) (Table 5). 10 The Russian bank variable coefficient estimates remain significant and similar to those estimated without the OECD variables, demonstrating stability. The OECD country is important in the expected manner, with correspondent relationships in OECD countries contributing to and correspondent relationships in non-OECD countries decreasing the probability of the Central Bank of Russia accepting a bank for deposit insurance. The logistic regression coefficients for World Bank country income levels (high, middle, and low) are reported in Table 6. The high income country correspondent coefficient is positive and significant (α = 0.05) and the middle income country correspondent coefficient is negative and significant (α = 0.01). 11 The low income country coefficient is insignificant. The opposite signs for high and middle income countries imply

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Logistic regression with OECD variable only is insignificant; the OECD results reported control for correspondents in non-OECD countries. 11 An alternative logistic regression (not reported) estimates the number of correspondents with high income-OECD countries; the coefficient is insignificant at α=0.05.

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that correspondent banks headquartered in high income countries contribute positively to the reputation of Russian banks. In view of the finding that the number of correspondents is insignificant, the finding reported in Table 6 regarding country income indicates strongly that the quality of the correspondent bank is recognized in assessing the quality of the Russian bank. 5.3 Correspondent Relations Regression for Russia-centric Country Groups The country groups defined by the OECD and the World Bank may not correspond to the Russian economy and culture. We create a third list of country groups and term them “Russian-centric”. The groups represent major trading partners and historical cultural patterns. Roszagranbanks and CIS correspondents, described previously, are analyzed separately. The European Union countries in this study (December 31, 2003) consist of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland (no Russian bank correspondents in the study sample), United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. The correspondent Russian-centric country set logistic regression results are presented in Table 7. The coefficient for the European Union correspondent countries is positive and significant (α = 0.05) whereas the coefficient for the Eastern Europe and Baltic correspondent countries was negative and significant (α = 0.05). These results indicate that the highly developed banking system in the European Union provides a favorable reputation effect for the Russian banks. In contrast, the correspondents in Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries are more likely to convey a negative reputation.

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The regression coefficient for Roszagranbanks, Commonwealth of Independent States, United States, offshore zones classified by the Central Bank of Russia, and “Other countries” correspondents are insignificant. In the case of Roszagranbanks, Russian banks can establish correspondent relations with relative ease. In the case of Commonwealth of Independent States, correspondent relations exist with banks having a wide range of reputations. 12 The United States bank variable coefficient is surprisingly insignificant, given the high income and OECD classification. We investigate this paradox in the following section. 5.4 Regression Results for Federal Reserve Sanctions on U.S. Correspondents The results presented in Tables 4-7 confirm the significance of correspondents in Russian bank quality determination. Furthermore, we find that quality measures of income and OECD enter the regressions with expected signs. However, common determinants may explain the observed relationships but not necessarily the reputation of the correspondents. An example of common determinants might be a high income country that creates financially strong correspondents but not necessarily organizations with higher reputations. The Russian Central Bank may have accepted some banks for deposit insurance for reasons of financial capacity rather than the reputation of the correspondent. Another example of common determinants could be that an OECD halo effect could provide misleading indicators of reputation for specific banks in countries with favorable OECD ratings. The insignificance of U.S. correspondence overall precludes the argument that it is the U.S. banks in general that are considered high quality. The next step is to segregate 12

Ukraine correspondents, for example, were found to have significant, negative coefficients in separate regressions (not reported).

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U.S. correspondents by quality. We divide U.S. correspondents into two groups based on sanctions imposed by the Federal Reserve for correspondent bank related infractions. We hypothesize that the sanctioned correspondents negatively affect and the non-sanctioned correspondents positively affect CBR acceptance. Thus, the signs of the U.S. bank group coefficients are important for testing the correspondent reputation hypothesis. With previously described control variables included in the logistic regression, we estimate the marginal effects of sanctioned and non-sanctioned correspondents. All banks in the sample are included in the regression to provide coefficient estimates for the control variables based on Russian banks in general. Coefficients for the U.S. bank sanction variables (presented in Table 8) are significant (α = 0.05). The reclassification fraction, 76.4%, for the regression with U.S. correspondent quality is 2.4% greater than the regression with only control variables and at least 1.1% greater than any other regression with correspondent groups. Importantly, the sign of the coefficient for the U.S. sanctioned bank group is negative and the sign of the coefficient for the U.S. non-sanctioned bank group is positive. Finding the hypothesized, opposite signs to be significant, in contrast to the earlier finding of insignificant coefficients for U.S. correspondents is general, provides strong confirmation that Russian bank quality is signaled by U.S. correspondent reputation as revealed by Federal Reserve sanctions. 6. Summary and Conclusions Based on our findings, we conclude that reputation has a significant impact across country borders and regulatory regimes. By combining data from banking in different

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countries in the content of inter-country correspondent banking, this paper confirms the importance of international reputations in domestic bank management and regulation.

References Akerlof, G., 1970. The market for 'Lemons': Quality uncertainly and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488-500. Demiroglu, C., James, C., 2007. The information content of bank loan covenants. Unpublished working paper. Klein, B., Leffler, K.B., 1981. The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance. Journal of Political Economy 89, 615-641. Kreps, D., Wilson, R., 1982. Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27, 253-279. Rogerson, W., 1983. Reputation and product quality. Bell Journal of Economics 14, 508516. Shapiro, C., 1982. Consumer information, product quality, and seller reputation. Bell Journal of Economics 13, 20-35 Shapiro, C., 1983. Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 659-679. Smallwood, D., Conlisk, J., 1979. Product quality in markets where consumers are imperfectly informed. Quarterly Journal of Economics 93, 1-23. Stigler, G. 1961. The economics of information. Journal of Political Economy 69, 213225. Van Horen, N., 2007. Foreign banking in developing countries; origin matters. Emerging Markets Review 8, 81-105.

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Table 1. Frequency of Correspondent Relationships in Sample The sample of Russian banks (N = 576) consists of banks with (N = 433) and without (N = 143) foreign correspondents. The sample bank columns report the number and relative frequency banks with foreign correspondent relationships by the headquarter country of the correspondent. The Correspondent Relations columns report the number and relative frequency of correspondent relationships (N = 2,992) of sample Russian banks by the headquarter country of the correspondent. Sample banks (N = 433) Number Percent Total No foreign correspondent At least one foreign correspondent, including: Roszagranbanks Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan Belarus Belgium Bulgaria Cambodia Canada China Croatia Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Egypt Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Grenada Hungary India

Correspondent relations (N = 2992) Number Percent

576

100.0

143

24.8

433

75.2

2,992

100.0

229 1 24 6 178 12 89 51 4 1 7 11 1 16 5 32 1 13 50 37 13 269 2 1 6 7

39.8 0.2 4.2 1.0 30.9 2.1 15.5 8.9 0.7 0.2 1.2 1.9 0.2 2.8 0.9 5.6 0.2 2.3 8.7 6.4 2.3 46.7 0.3 0.2 1.0 1.2

341 1 35 6 217 24 158 59 5 1 7 15 2 21 7 37 1 20 61 57 20 488 2 1 10 12

11.4 0.0 1.2 0.2 7.3 0.8 5.3 2.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.2 1.2 0.0 0.7 2.0 1.9 0.7 16.3 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.4

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Israel Italy Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Korea, Rep. Kyrgyz Rep. Latvia Lebanon Lithuania Luxembourg Moldova Mongolia Nauru Netherlands Norway Oman Poland Portugal Romania Serbia Singapore Slovak Rep. Slovenia Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Switzerland Tajikistan Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan UAE UK Ukraine USA Uzbekistan Vanuatu Vietnam

36 33 62 2 68 2 26 25 3 26 11 21 1 4 79 9 1 7 1 2 13 1 10 4 8 1 33 49 5 2 10 4 2 51 125 219 10 1 3

6.3 5.7 10.8 0.3 11.8 0.3 4.5 4.3 0.5 4.5 1.9 3.6 0.2 0.7 13.7 1.6 0.2 1.2 0.2 0.3 2.3 0.2 1.7 0.7 1.4 0.2 5.7 8.5 0.9 0.3 1.7 0.7 0.3 8.9 21.7 38.0 1.7 0.2 0.5

39 57 74 2 116 3 36 55 3 28 11 39 1 6 113 9 1 11 1 2 25 1 11 7 11 1 42 69 6 2 19 4 2 70 195 297 11 1 3

1.3 1.9 2.5 0.1 3.9 0.1 1.2 1.8 0.1 0.9 0.4 1.3 0.0 0.2 3.8 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.4 2.3 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.1 2.3 6.5 9.9 0.4 0.0 0.1

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Table 2. Frequencies for Russian Bank Sample Characteristics Russian Bank License Type, Legal Form, Location, and Ownership characteristics are reported for January 1, 2004. Russian Central Bank Deposit Insurance Acceptance (1st stage) are reported for March 27, 2005, the date that the Russian Central Bank accepted banks for deposit insurance; some of the unaccepted banks corrected deficiencies and qualified for acceptance after 2005. Source: Vestnik Banka Rossii (CBR Bulletin), No.6, 2004. Sample banks N % Foreign currency operations licenses: 1. Operation in rubles only 2. Right to establish correspondent relations with CIS banks and Rozangranbanks. 3. Right to establish direct correspondent relations with up to six foreign banks 4. No limitations on correspondent relations with foreign banks 5. Additional rights for foreign bank related transactions by large capitalized Russian banks

All Russian banks N %

7

1.2

154

12.1

34

5.9

84

6.6

49

8.5

86

6.7

262

45.5

643

50.4

224

38.9

310

24.3

Legal form Open joint stock banks (OAO) Closed joint stock banks (ZAO) Private banks (OOO)

288 166 122

50.0 28.8 21.2

482 326 472

37.7 25.5 36.9

Geographical location Moscow banks Regional banks

292 284

50.7 49.3

645 632

50.5 49.5

Ownership Foreign-controlled banks State-controlled banks

15 10

2.6 1.7

40 20

3.1 1.6

Deposit insurance acceptance in the 1st stage

429

74.5

824

64.5

Total banks

576

100.0

1,277

100.0

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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for Continuous Bank Characteristics The number of foreign correspondents is the count of correspondents for banks in the sample (N = 576). The distribution is highly skewed by two banks with 158 and 109 correspondents, respectively. Bank assets are total assets (with standard bank accounting for contra-accounts) denominated in rubles ($1 = Rb29.45). Bank equity to assets is the ratio of balance sheet common stock and retained earnings to total assets. Return on assets is the ratio of net income after taxes to total assets. Source: CBR Bulletins and Intelbridge. 75th 25th Median percentile percentile

Bank characteristics

Std. Dev.

Mean

Min

Number of foreign correspondents

10.04

5.20

0

1.00

3

6.00

158

Bank Assets (Rb million)

51,557 4,781

4

287

759

2,267

1,228,685

Book Equity to Assets

0.156

0.060

0.145

0.218

0.320

0.928

Return on Assets

0.0248 0.015 -0.158

0.004

0.010

0.020

0.288

0.258

Max

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Table 4. Bank Characteristics Regression Coefficients The standard errors (in parenthesis) and p-values are reported for the dependent variable deposit insurance (1 = acceptance, 0 otherwise) regressed on potential control variables (described in previous tables). Control variables selected for subsequent regressions are variables significant at p-value < 0.05: bank size, profitability, and location. Reclassification (in-sample) = 74.0% and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.28. Variable Constant Bank size (log of assets) Profitability (ROA) Leverage (Book equity to assets ratio) Legal form (Private bank = 1, 0 otherwise) Legal form (Open joint stock bank = 1, 0 otherwise) Location (Regional bank =1, 0 otherwise) License type (No limitations on direct correspondent relationships with foreign banks =1, 0 otherwise) Number of foreign correspondents

Coefficient Estimate and Standard Error -1.947 (0.702) 0.235 (0.091) 22.071 (8.412) -0.552 (0.681) 0.224 (0.289) -0.026 (0.265) 2.218 (0.290) 0.528 (0.315) 0.006 (0.013)

p-value 0.006 0.010 0.009 0.418 0.439 0.922 0.000 0.094 0.655

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Table 5. Russian Bank Correspondents by OECD Country Regression Coefficients The standard errors (in parenthesis) and p-values are reported for the dependent variable deposit insurance (1 = acceptance, 0 otherwise) regressed on the number of correspondents in OECD and non-OECD countries and control variables (described in previous tables). Thus Russian banks without foreign correspondent banks (N =143) are classified as otherwise for both OECD and non-OECD variables. Reclassification (insample) = 74.0% and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.29.

Variable Constant Foreign correspondents OECD countries Non-OECD countries Russian bank characteristics Size (log of assets) Profitability (ROA) Location: Regional bank (0,1)

Coefficient Estimate and Standard Error

p-value

-1.683 (0.588)

0.004

0.090 (0.045) -0.049 (0.026)

0.044

0.243 (0.090) 21.392 (8.428) 2.056 (0.264)

0.007

0.059

0.011 0.000

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Table 6. Russian Bank Correspondents by WB Country Income Regression Coefficients The standard errors (in parenthesis) and p-values are reported for the dependent variable deposit insurance (1 = acceptance, 0 otherwise) regressed on the number of correspondents in high, middle, and low income countries and control variables (described in previous tables). Russian banks without foreign correspondent banks (N = 143) are classified as otherwise for all income variables. Reclassification (in-sample) = 75.3% and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.29. Variable Constant Foreign correspondents In high income countries In middle income countries In low income countries Russian bank characteristics Size (log of assets) Profitability (ROA) Location: Regional bank (0,1)

Coefficient Estimate and Standard Error

p-value

-1.731 (0.589)

0.003

0.097 (0.046) -0.112 (0.043) 0.142 (0.101)

0.036

0.257 (0.090) 21.016 (8.378) 2.051 (0.265)

0.004

0.010 0.162

0.012 0.000

23

Table 7. Russian Bank Correspondents by Country Groups Regression Coefficients The standard errors (in parenthesis) and p-values are reported for the dependent variable deposit insurance (1 = acceptance, 0 otherwise) regressed on the number of correspondents in each country group and control variables (described in previous tables). Russian banks without foreign correspondent banks (N = 143) are classified as otherwise for all income variables. Reclassification (in-sample) = 73.3% and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.27.

Variable Constant No. of foreign correspondents Roszagranbanks Commonwealth of Independent States Eastern Europe and Baltic European Union USA Offshore zones by CBR classification Other countries Russian bank characteristics Size (log of assets) Profitability (ROA) Location: Regional bank (0,1)

Coefficient Estimate and Standard Error

p-value

-1.681 (0.595)

0.005

0.003 (0.133) -0.024 (0.033) -0.268 (0.137) 0.152 (0.069) -0.085 (0.203) 0.117 (0.256) 0.016 (0.144)

0.980

0.237 (0.094) 21.756 (8.489) 2.051 (0.265)

0.011

0.475 0.051 0.028 0.676 0.646 0.913

0.010 0.000

24

Table 8. Russian Bank Correspondents by U.S. Sanction Bank Group Regression Coefficients The standard errors (in parenthesis) and p-values are reported for the dependent variable deposit insurance (1 = acceptance, 0 otherwise) regressed on the number of correspondents within the U.S. in each sanction group, country groups, and control variables (described in previous tables). Russian banks without foreign correspondent banks (N = 143) are classified as otherwise for all income variables. Reclassification (insample) = 76.4% and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.32. Variable Constant Foreign correspondents USA sanctioned banks USA non-sanctioned banks Roszagranbanks Commonwealth of Independent States Eastern Europe and Baltic European Union Offshore zones by CBR classification Other countries Russian bank characteristics Size (log of assets) Profitability (ROA) Location: Regional bank (0,1)

Coefficient Estimate and Standard Error

p-value

-1.811 (0.616)

0.003

-0.591 (0.252) 0.919 (0.407) -0.017 (0.137) -0.031 (0.033) -0.327 (-0.149) 0.142 (0.072) 0.074 (0.241) -0.02 (0.148)

0.019

0.284 (0.099) 22.851 (8.760) 1.924 (0.269)

0.004

0.024 0.904 0.355 0.029 0.050 0.760 0.891

0.009 0.000

25

Appendix 1. The CBR classification of offshore zones: List of countries and territories (Source: Central Bank of Russia Regulation No. 1317, August 7, 2003) Group one: Russian banks with a license for foreign correspondent relations can establish correspondent relations with banks registered in these jurisdictions without limitations Groups two and three: Russian bank with a license for foreign correspondent relations can establish correspondent relations with a foreign bank registered in group two and group three jurisdictions only if the foreign bank meets at least one of the following two criteria: • Foreign bank’s capital is at least 100 million Euro; it has provided notarized copies of audit certification of its financial reports for the last three years and has a well-documented physical location, or • Foreign bank has at least Aa long-term Moody’s credit rating (or at least AA- Standard and Poor or Fitch rating) or is included in top 1000 world banks rating by the total assets based on Bankers’ Almanac (issued by “Reed Business Information”, UK) Group One 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Norman Islands (Guernsey, Jersey, Sark) and Isle of Man Ierland: Dublin, Shannon Cyprus Malta Hong Kong, Syangan Luxembourg Switzerland Singapore

Group Two 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

Antigua and Barbuda Bahamas Barbados Bahrain Belize Brunei Darussalam Antalya, Bermudas, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, Gibraltar, Turks and Caicos Islands, Cayman Islands Grenada Djibouti Dominica Macao, Aomyn Costa Rica Lebanon Mauritius Malaysia: Labuan Island Maldives Monaco Netherlands Antilles New Zeeland: Cook Islands, Niue United Arabic Emirates: Dubai Panama Portugal : Madeira Island Samoa Seychelles St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent and Grenadines USA: US Virgin Islands, Puerto-Rico, Wyoming, Delaware Tonga Sri-Lanka Palau

Group Three 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Andorra Comoros: Anjouan Islands Aruba Vanuatu Liberia Liechtenstein Marshall Islands Nauru Serbia and Chernogoria

26

Appendix 2. List of sample banks: CBR registration number, legal form, and name 2

ZAO

VIKING

3

ZAO

PREMIER

18

OOO

STROIKREDIT

23

OAO

AVTOVAZBANK

30

OAO

AVTOBANK-NIKOIL

429

OAO

430

OAO

URALSKIY BANK REKONSTRUKCII I RAZVITIYA KUBANBANK

436

OAO

BANK SANKT-PETERBURG

438

OOO

KAMKOMBANK

439

OAO

52

OAO

ENERGOMASHBANK

53

OAO

TEHNOHIMBANK

441

OAO

PROMYSHLENNO-STROITELNIY BANK TYUMENPROFBANK

55

OAO

TEMPBANK

444

OAO

BALAKOVO-BANK

67

OAO

ENERGOBANK

457

OAO

YUGBANK

77

OAO

MORSKOY BANK

459

OAO

TARHANY

OOO

MOSOBLINVESTBANK

OAO

ENISEY

84

OAO

DALKOMBANK

470

94

OOO

OPTIMUM

474

99

OAO

ZHELDORBANK

485

OAO

CHELINDBANK

107

OAO

INVESTBANK

493

OAO

CHELYABINVESTBANK

116

OAO

MONTAZHSPETSBANK

505

ZAO

MIASS

119

OAO

AGROHIMBANK

514

OAO

AGROIMPULS

121

ZAO

CENTROKREDIT

524

ZAO

VENETS

OAO

MOBILBANK FLORA-MOSKVA

138

ZAO

RUSKOBANK

532

142

ZAO

MERKURIY

533

OAO

149

OAO

NADEZHNIY BANK

537

ZAO

PRIOBIE

153

ZAO

URALPRIVATBANK

539

ZAO

REGIOBANK

155

OOO

STROYINDBANK

545

OAO

KAMCHATKOMAGROPROMBANK

548

ZAO

554

OAO

NOYABRSKIY GORODSKOY BANK SOLIDARNOST

168

ZAO

209

OOO

SEVERO-ZAPADNIY TELEKOMBANK MEZHDUNARODNIY BANK SANKT-PETERBURGA FONON

197

OAO

212

OAO

PRIO-VNESHTORGBANK

233

OAO

REGION

235

OOO

PROFBANK

241

ZAO

RYBHOZBANK

249

OAO

URALSKIY FINANSOVIY DOM

256

OAO

TVER

272

ZAO

IRS

286

OOO

ASKANIYA TRAST

307

OAO

558

ZAO

SOVETSKIY

567

OAO

AKCEPT

573

OAO

EVRAZIYA

575

ZAO

KAPITAL

579

ZAO

SVERDLSOTSBANK

588

ZAO

SURGUTNEFTEGAZBANK

594

OAO

PSKOVBANK

598

OAO

VELIKIE LUKI BANK

600

ZAO

INTERPROGRESSBANK

604

ZAO

PERVIY INVESTITSIONNIY

605

OAO

PERVOE O.V.K.

312

ZAO

BANK RAZVITIYA PROMYSHLENNOSTI VOKBANK

606

ZAO

GAGARINSKIY

316

OOO

HKF BANK

608

ZAO

ASPEKT

323

OAO

SIBAKADEMBANK

634

ZAO

POVOLZHSKIY

328

OAO

ROSSIYA

650

OAO

BEZHICA-BANK

356

OAO

VITABANK

654

OAO

VORONEZH

370

ZAO

NOVIY SIMVOL

684

OOO

SURGUTSKIY CENTRALNIY

385

OAO

SIBNEFTEBANK

695

OOO

NALCHIK

391

OAO

PUSHKINO

696

OAO

ORSKINDUSTRIYABANK

404

OOO

STROMKOMBANK

698

OAO

URALPROMSTROYBANK

410

ZAO

NOVOSIBIRSKVNESHTORGBANK

701

OAO

VOLGOPROMBANK

419

OAO

MECHEL-BANK

702

OAO

NIKO-BANK

709

OAO

PURPE

27

719 720

OAO OAO

DALNEVOSTOCHNOE OVK

1144

OAO

BRATSKIY ANKB

VYBORG-BANK

1153

OAO

VOLGA-KREDIT RADIOTEHBANK

728

OOO

TATAGROPROMBANK

1166

OAO

732

OAO

ASSOTSIATSIYA

1184

ZAO

GRINKOMBANK

735

OAO

KURSKPROMBANK

1189

OAO

OMSK-BANK

741

OAO

MORDOVSOCBANK

1194

OAO

KAMCHATPROMBANK

752

OAO

MORDOVPROMSTROIBANK

1200

OAO

MBS ORGBANK DRAGOCENNOSTI URALA

766

ZAO

AGROKREDBANK

1214

ZAO

783

OAO

DZEMGI

1218

OAO

KURGANPROMBANK

804

ZAO

SLAVIANBANK

1221

OAO

ROSINBANK-SIBIR

812

OAO

URALTRANSBANK

1234

OOO

DISKONT

817

OAO

ZARECHIE

1242

OAO

LIPECKKOMBANK

825

OOO

NERYUNGRIBANK

1276

OAO

MONCHEBANK

828

OAO

YARSOCBANK

1280

OAO

CHUVASHKREDITPROMBANK

836

ZAO

REGIONALNIY

1282

OAO

BUZULUKBANK

840

OAO

NOVACIYA

1288

OAO

STAVROPOLPROMSTROYBANK

843

OAO

DALNEVOSTOCHNIY BANK

1293

OOO

KOMNEJVABANK

1303

OOO

1312

OAO

BORSKIY KOMMERCHESKIY BANK TAMBOVKREDITPROMBANK

1319

ZAO

EKONOMBANK

1329

ZAO

KAMCHATBIZNESBANK

1339

OAO

CHITAPROMSTROYBANK

1340

OAO

KAMCHATRYBBANK LEVOBEREZHNIY

865

OOO

IPATOVSKIY

874

OOO

PROHLADNIY

875

OAO

PERM

880

OAO

YUGRA

901

OAO

902

OAO

METALLURGICHESKIY KOMMERCHESKIY BANK VYATKA-BANK

903

ZAO

VLADBIZNESBANK

1343

OAO

917

ZAO

TYUMENAGROPROMBANK

1352

OAO

NOVOBANK

918

OAO

ZAPSIBKOMBANK

1376

OAO

SNEZHINSKIY

922

OAO

BELOGORSKAGROKOMBANK

1398

OAO

BASHKOMSNABBANK

926

OAO

NIZHNIY NOVGOROD

1411

OAO

937

ZAO

KONTO

948

ZAO

MOSSTROYEKONOMBANK

1423

OOO

MOSKOVSKIY NEFTEHIMICHESKIY BANK NEFTYANOY

965

ZAO

PERVOURALSKBANK

1428

OOO

SUDKOMBANK

969

OAO

ZABAJKALSKIY

1455

ZAO

AVTOGRADBANK

971

OOO

DELNA BANK

1460

OAO

DALVNESHTORGBANK

990

OOO

DRUZHBA

991

OAO

ALFA-BANK-BASHKORTOSTAN

992

ZAO

VOLOGDABANK

1002

OAO

BUMERANG

1555

BASHPROMBANK

1557

VKABANK

1569

OOO

KRASBANK ROSDORBANK

1006

OAO

1470

OAO

SVYAZ-BANK

1481

OAO

SBERBANK ROSSII

1523

OOO ZAO

BANK SBEREZHENIY I RAZVITIYA SOLIDARNOST (MOSKVA)

OAO

VUZ-BANK

1027

OAO

1041

OOO

NEMAN

1573

OAO

1043

ZAO

PODOLSKPROMKOMBANK

1574

ZAO

KEDR

1067

OAO

BAJKALROSBANK

1581

OAO

1071

OAO

SPUTNIK

1073

ZAO

RUSSKIY SLAVYANSKIY BANK

VOLZHSKO-KAMSKIY AKCIONERNIY BANK TETRAPOLIS

1084

OAO

VERHNEVOLZHSKIY

1088

OOO

MAK-BANK

1113

OAO

DZERZHINSKIY

1125

OAO

GRANKOMBANK

1132

OAO

SOCINVESTBANK

1138

ZAO

PRESNYA-BANK

1586

ZAO

1598

OAO

LESBANK

1601

OOO

SODBIZNESBANK

1605

OAO

LEFKO-BANK

1614

OAO

KAVKAZPROMSTROYBANK

1616

ZAO

EVROPEJSKIY

1617

OOO

DONINVEST

1618

ZAO

KAVKAZ-GELIOS

28

1623

ZAO

GUTA BANK

1911

ZAO

VEB-INVESTBANK

OAO

SIBKONTAKT

1625

ZAO

OLIMPIYSKIY

1915

1626

ZAO

URALLIGA

1920

ZAO

LANTA-BANK

1637

OAO

SDM-BANK

1921

OAO

KOMI SOCIALNIY BANK

1639

OOO

METROPOL

1934

OAO

KRISTALBANK

1640

OAO

ZAMOSKVORECKIY

1942

ZAO

GLOBEKS

1661

OAO

MOSKVA

1946

OAO

AGROYNKOMBANK

1663

OAO

UHTABANK

1948

OOO

DALENA

1667

OAO

STROYVESTBANK

1950

OAO

ELLIPS BANK

1668

OAO

SAHALIN-VEST

1955

OOO

VITAS

1671

OOO

NEKLIS-BANK

1956

OOO

INVEST-EKOBANK

1677

ZAO

1966

OAO

NBD-BANK

1684

ZAO

BANK PROEKTNOGO FINANSIROVANIYA ROSTRABANK

1968

OOO

SIBIRSKIY KRESTYANSKIY BANK

1693

OAO

OMSKPROMSTROYBANK

1972

OAO

DEVON-KREDIT

1701

OAO

AKKOBANK

1978

OAO

MOSKOVSKIY KREDITNIY BANK

1704

OOO

BELON

1987

ZAO

1720

OAO

TOMSKPROMSTROYBANK

2003

OAO

MEZHDUNARODNIY AKCIONERNIY BANK METRAKOMBANK

1728

OOO

LEGPROMBANK

2011

OAO

EKOPROMBANK

1730

OAO

PERVIY RESPUBLIKANSKIY BANK TATINVESTBANK

2015

OOO

SIBSOCBANK

2037

OOO

KREDITIMPEKS BANK

2039

ZAO

BALTKREDOBANK

2048

OAO

SAROVBIZNESBANK

2050

ZAO

RSKB

2055

ZAO

KVOTA-BANK

1732

ZAO

1734

OAO

GANZAKOMBANK

1738

OAO

NOSTA-BANK

1743

ZAO

OREOLKOMBANK

1745

OAO

IZHLADABANK

1752

OAO

KS BANK

1758

ZAO

NACIONALNIY KAPITAL

1765

OAO

EATPBANK

1776

OAO

PETROKOMMERC

1777

OAO

1781

OAO

KAVKAZSKIY BANK RAZVITIYA I REKONSTRUKCII EVROALYANS

1788

ZAO

POCHTOBANK

1794

OAO

LIPECKOBLBANK

1809

ZAO

ERMAK

1810

ZAO

AMURPROMSTROYBANK

1812

ZAO

HLEBOBANK

1813

OAO

ZELAK-BANK

1824

OAO

SIBEKONOMBANK

1827

OAO

SOCGORBANK

1834

OOO

STAJL-BANK

1835

OAO

LESPROMBANK

1851

ZAO

NIZHEGORODPROMSTROYBANK

1860

OOO

PARITET

1868

OAO

BASTION

1885

ZAO

FORA-BANK

1890

OOO

MOSPROMBANK

1892

OAO

ASB-BANK

1896

ZAO

VOLOGZHANIN

1898

OAO

KUZBASSUGOLBANK

1902

OOO

NARATBANK

2057

OAO

AKA BANK

2058

OOO

MEDINVESTBANK

2065

OOO

MKB IM. S. ZHIVAGO

2083

OAO

SEVERNAYA KAZNA

2093

OAO

RUSYUGBANK

2103

ZAO

2108

OOO

MUNICIPALNIY KAMCHATPROFITBANK TRANSNACIONALNIY BANK

2110

ZAO

PERESVET

2118

OOO

FUNDAMENT-BANK

2126

OOO

DONSKOY NARODNIY BANK

2142

OAO

TRANSKREDITBANK

2148

OAO

KOR

2156

ZAO

NEFTEPROMBANK

2158

ZAO

BASMANNIY

2162

OAO

VNESHAGROBANK

2170

OAO

NACIONALNIY REZERVNIY BANK

2176

OAO

MASTER-BANK

2179

ZAO

RUSSKIY BANK RAZVITIYA

2192

OOO

RUBLEVSKIY

2208

ZAO

FORSHTADT

2210

ZAO

TRANSKAPITALBANK

2211

ZAO

ROSENERGOBANK

2216

ZAO

KMB-BANK

2223

ZAO

MDM-BANK-URAL

2225

OAO

CENTR-INVEST

29

2227

OAO

BANK24.RU

2471

ZAO

ALTAYZHILINVEST

ZAO

BANK NA KRASNYH VOROTAH

2246

OAO

PERMSKIY BANK RAZVITIYA

2472

2252

ZAO

TENDER-BANK

2475

ZAO

MOSKOVSKIY ZALOGOVIY BANK

2253

ZAO

2478

OAO

YUZHNIY TORGOVIY BANK

2254

OOO

VOSTOCHNO-EVROPEJSKIY TRASTOVIY BANK KUZNECKIY MOST

2480

OAO

ASKOLD

2258

OAO

MOSTRANSBANK

2484

OAO

ONEGO

2264

OAO

SEVERINVESTBANK

2489

ZAO

FPB

2266

OAO

BRPP

2268

OAO

2270

ZAO

MOSKOVSKIY BANK REKONSTRUKCII I RAZVITIYA AMI-BANK

2274

OOO

NOYABRSKNEFTEKOMBANK

2275

OAO

URALSIB

2285

OAO

DONHLEBBANK

2289

ZAO

RUSSKIY STANDART

2291

OAO

IMPEKSBANK

2299

ZAO

VEK

2490

OOO

GENBANK

2493

OOO

MEZHTRASTBANK

2503

ZAO

2507

ZAO

EVROPEJSKIY INDUSTRIALNIY BANK TOLYATTIHIMBANK

2508

OAO

RFG-BANK

2514

OAO

FALKON

2523

OAO

URALSKIY TRASTOVIY BANK

2529

OAO

AKTIV BANK

2534

OAO

INVESTICIONNIY GORODSKOY BANK FIA-BANK

2302

OOO

SOVINKOM

2542

ZAO

2304

OAO

TAVRICHESKIY

2546

ZAO

NOVIKOMBANK

INGOSSTRAH-SOYUZ

2551

ZAO

2552

OAO

PETERBURGSKIY SOCIALNIY KOMMERCHESKIY BANK ZOLOTO-PLATINA-BANK

2555

ZAO

YAPY KREDI MOSKVA

2557

ZAO

SITIBANK

2307

OAO

2309

ZAO

BANK KITAYA (ELOS)

2312

OAO

ROSSIYSKIY KAPITAL

2313

OAO

RUSSOBANK

2316

ZAO

GAZBANK

2317

ZAO

ETALONBANK

2324

OAO

KLIENTSKIY

2328

OOO

OGNI MOSKVY

2559

ZAO

ZERBANK

2560

OAO

TOMSK-REZERV

2562

OAO

BIN

2564

OOO

YARINTERBANK

2574

OAO

FYUCHER

2575

ZAO

FORPOST

2576

ZAO

GARANT-INVEST

2581

ZAO

MOSSIBINTERBANK

2337

ZAO

ZERNOBANK

2346

OAO

CENTRALNOE OVK

2359

ZAO

FABER-BANK

2360

ZAO

2361

OAO

NACIONALNIY PROMYSHLENNIY BANK MOSKOVSKIY DELOVOY MIR

2584

OAO

KREDIT URAL BANK

2367

ZAO

KB INVESTICIY I TEHNOLOGIY

2585

OAO

INTERUS-BANK YUNIKOR

2373

OAO

KRAJNIY SEVER

2586

OAO

2382

OAO

TULSKIY PROMYSHLENNIK

2587

OAO

AKIBANK

2384

OAO

ALEMAR

2590

OAO

AK BARS

2388

OAO

ALTAJBIZNES-BANK

2594

ZAO

ABN AMRO BANK A.O.

2392

ZAO

IMIDZH

2602

OAO

ALMAZERGIENBANK

2402

OAO

EVROFINANS

2606

OOO

SEMBANK

2409

OOO

YUZHNIY REGION

2607

OAO

KROSNA-BANK

2412

OAO

PROBIZNESBANK

2609

OAO

2419

OAO

TYUMENENERGOBANK

2433

OAO

PROMINVESTBANK

2611

OAO

INTERNACIONALNIY TORGOVIY BANK OBIEDINENNIY KAPITAL

2436

OAO

BASHEKONOMBANK

2626

OAO

OBPI

2438

OAO

GLOBUS

2627

ZAO

CERIH

2455

ZAO

DREZDNER BANK

2632

OAO

BAJKALBANK

2462

ZAO

LUZHNIKI-BANK

2640

ZAO

PETROVKA

2464

OAO

ZAO

VORKUTA

2466

OAO

RUSSKAYA INVESTICIONNAYA GRUPPA PETROFF-BANK

2644

2469

OAO

MOSKVA.CENTR

2645

ZAO

ENISEJSKIY OBIEDINENNIYBANK

2646

OAO

MOSKOVSKO-PARIZHSKIY BANK

30

2647

ZAO

2838

OOO

SINKO-BANK

2839

ZAO

EVRAZIYA-CENTR

2842

OOO

SPECINVESTBANK

2844

OAO

ZEMBANK

2856

OOO

ERGOBANK

2860

ZAO

AGROROS

2863

OAO

MOSVODOKANALBANK

2651

OAO

FEDERALNIY BANK INNOVACIY I RAZVITIYA GARANTIYA

2654

ZAO

UNIFIN

2657

OOO

STARIY KREML

2668

ZAO

2682

OOO

AVTOMOBILNIY BANKIRSKIY DOM KROKUS-BANK

2685

OAO

INKASBANK

2867

ZAO

SOFIYA

2686

ZAO

RUSSKIY BANKIRSKIY DOM

2868

OAO

KUZBASSHIMBANK

2696

ZAO

INKAROBANK

2872

OOO

IFKO-BANK

2701

OAO

2879

OAO

AVANGARD

2881

OOO

ALMAZ-INVEST-BANK

2704

ZAO

2705

OOO

RUSSKIY BANK IMUWESTVENNOY OPEKI MEZHDUNARODNIY BANK RAZVITIYA INTEHBANK

2707

OOO

LOKO-BANK

2888

OOO

BANK KAZANSKIY

2720

ZAO

SETEVOY NEFTYANOY BANK

2890

OOO

VITYAZ

2721

OAO

SEVERNIY NARODNIY BANK

2891

ZAO

KREDITSOYUZKOMBANK

2723

OAO

ZOLOTOY STANDART

2899

OOO

2731

OAO

VOSTSIBTRANSKOMBANK

2733

OAO

PRIMSOCBANK

2903

OAO

NACIONALNIY RASCHETNIY BANK UNIVERSALNIY KREDIT

2734

OOO

OPM-BANK

2905

OOO

KREMLEVSKIY

2738

OAO

DERZHAVA

2908

OAO

MEDPROMINVESTBANK

2742

OAO

MI-BANK

2921

OAO

ORELSOCBANK

2743

OOO

INSTROYBANK

2923

OAO

SODRUZHESTVO

2755

OAO

ZAO

BANKIRSKIY DOM

2932

OOO

NOVIY MOSKOVSKIY BANK

2764

OAO

NACIONALNIY KOSMICHESKIY BANK TEMBR-BANK

2928 2934

OAO

RUSSKIE FINANSOVYE TRADICII

2766

ZAO

INVESTSBERBANK

2938

ZAO

IST BRIDZH BANK

2767

OOO

ROSAVTOBANK

2944

OAO

2768

OAO

SEVERO-VOSTOCHNIY ALYANS

2771

OOO

YUNIASTRUM BANK

2948

OAO

NACIONALNIY ZALOGOVIY BANK STELLA-BANK

2772

OAO

YUG-INVESTBANK

2956

OAO

MEZHTOPENERGOBANK

2782

OAO

BASHKIRSKIY ZHELDORBANK

2960

OOO

SLAVYANSKIY KREDIT

2784

OAO

BRYANSKIY NARODNIY BANK

2962

ZAO

GRANIT

2786

OAO

OOO

LIOS-BANK

2967

ZAO

POVOLZHSKIY NEMECKIY BANK

2787

OAO

NOVOSIBIRSKIY MUNICIPALNIY BANK SIBIRSKOE SOGLASIE

2963 2968

ZAO

EVROTRAST

2788

ZAO

2972

ZAO

OLD-BANK

2975

ZAO

SVERDLOVSKIY GUBERNSKIY BANK REGIONALNAYA PERSPEKTIVA

2883

ZAO

BST-BANK

2884

OAO

SINERGIYA

2790

ZAO

MEZHREGIONALNIY INVESTICIONNIY BANK ROSEKSIMBANK

2792

OAO

FEDERALNIY BANK RAZVITIYA

2976

ZAO

2793

OAO

RUSICH CENTR BANK

2977

OOO

2795

OOO

NACBIZNESBANK

2796

OAO

VYATICH

2983

OOO

BANK KORPORACII REZERVNYH FONDOV CENTRKOMBANK

2797

OAO

AKADEMHIMBANK

2984

OAO

DONBANK

2799

ZAO

MEGAVATT-BANK

2990

OAO

KLASSIK BANK

2807

ZAO

TRANSSTROYBANK

2993

OAO

KREDITTRAST

2809

OOO

NEOPOLIS-BANK

2998

OOO

EKSPOBANK

2810

OAO

RUSSKIY ZEMELNIY BANK

2814

OAO

RUSSKIY GENERALNIY BANK

2816

OAO

SEVERGAZBANK

2820

OOO

SLAVINVESTBANK

2999

OOO

SUDOSTROYTELNIY BANK

3000

OOO

ARSENAL

3001

OAO

PRIMORE

3011

OAO

MASTER-KAPITAL

3013

OAO

VIZAVI

31

3016

OAO

ORGRES-BANK

3177

OOO

LAJTBANK

OAO

TVERSKOY GORODSKOY BANK MNIB

3027

OOO

AKROPOL

3180

3032

ZAO

ALGONBANK

3181

OOO

3036

OAO

KAPITALI-EKSPRESS

3194

ZAO

SITI INVEST BANK

3042

ZAO

SIBIRGAZBANK

3195

OOO

MIKO-BANK

3044

OOO

MOSKOVSKIY KAPITAL

3196

OAO

ALMAZZOLOTO BANK

3047

ZAO

INTERKREDIT

3204

OOO

3050

ZAO

3207

ZAO

3051

OOO

ARHANGELSKIY ZHELEZNODOROZHNIY BANK MERITBANK

ROSSIYSKIY PROMYSHLENNIY BANK RUNA-BANK

3208

OAO

KITEZH

3052

ZAO

EKSTROBANK

3209

OAO

DOM-BANK

3053

OOO

GRAND INVEST BANK

3212

OAO

GAZINVESTBANK

3054

OOO

ADMIRALTEJSKIY

3215

OAO

INTEGRO

3058

OAO

TATFONDBANK

3218

OAO

OBWIY

3061

ZAO

TRETIY RIM

3220

ZAO

3064

OAO

KVEST

3068

OOO

BFG-KREDIT

3224

ZAO

3073

ZAO

RUS-BANK

3225

OOO

KOMMERCHESKIY BANK SBEREZHENIY VESTDOYCHE LANDESBANK VOSTOK DIAMOND-BANK

3074

OOO

ARBAT-BANK

3227

OAO

PETRO-AERO-BANK

3075

OOO

MAKPROMBANK

3229

ZAO

DEPO-BANK

3084

OAO

IRDAGBANK

3235

OAO

PETROENERGOBANK

3085

ZAO

EKSPRESS-VOLGA

3236

OOO

SOYUZNIY

NACIONALNIY TORGOVIY BANK

3237

OAO

EKSPRESS-TULA

OOO

TRANSINVESTBANK

3087

OAO

3092

OOO

RIKOM

3238

3095

OAO

RENTA-BANK

3247

OAO

MOSKVA-SITI

3098

ZAO

RUBLEV

3250

OOO

OLMA-BANK

3101

ZAO

SAMARSKIY KREDIT

3251

ZAO

PROMSVYAZBANK

AUERBANK

3266

ZAO

INTERPROMBANK

OAO

ORENBURG VEGA-BANK

3105

OOO

3107

OOO

DIALOG-OPTIM

3269

3108

ZAO

MEZHSOCBANK

3270

OOO

3115

OOO

ANTALBANK

3271

ZAO

PERVIY DORTRANSBANK

3123

OOO

3272

OOO

SAHADAJMONDBANK

3133

OAO

3135

OAO

RUSSKIY MEZHDUNARODNIY BANK MEZHOTRASLEVOY PROMYSHLENNIY BANK PRIORITET

3277

ZAO

3136

OAO

TAGANROGBANK

3279

OAO

MENATEP SPB

3144

OAO

INTRASTBANK

3280

OOO

MEZHBIZNESBANK

3146

OOO

STROYKREDITINVEST

3281

ZAO

RUSSKIY KUPECHESKIY BANK

3148

OOO

3282

OOO

PREOBRAZHENSKIY

3150

OAO

3284

OOO

GAZENERGOPROMBANK

3154

OAO

EVROPEJSKIY RASCHETNIY BANK SANKT-PETERBURGSKIY BANK REKONSTRUKCII I RAZVITIYA AZIMUT

3156

OOO

3161

OAO

3167

OOO

3171

OOO

3172

3273

ZAO

EVROAKSIS BANK

3275

ZAO

GARANTI BANK-MOSKVA RESPUBLIKANSKIY BANK

3287

OAO

VBRR

3288

OOO

FINANSOVIY KAPITAL

INDUSTRIALNIY

3301

OAO

PERMKREDIT

EKATERINBURGSKIY MUNICIPALNIY BANK BANK VYSOKIH TEHNOLOGIY

3302

OOO

SENATOR

3315

OAO

BANK RAZVITIYA REGIONA

3330

ZAO

DENIZBANK BANK MOSKVA

3333

ZAO

KOMMERCBANK (EVRAZIYA)

OAO

MEZHREGIONALNIY POCHTOVIY BANK MOSKOMBANK

3349

OAO

ROSSELHOZBANK

3174

OOO

TRANSPORTNIY

3378

OOO

PRADO-BANK

3175

ZAO

IS BANK

3395

OOO

MBA-MOSKVA

3176

OAO

BALTINVESTBANK

32

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