Global Majority E-Journal. Volume 5, Number 2 (December 2014)

Global Majority E-Journal Volume 5, Number 2 (December 2014) Global Majority E-Journal About the Global Majority E-Journal The Global Majority E-Jo...
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Global Majority E-Journal

Volume 5, Number 2 (December 2014)

Global Majority E-Journal About the Global Majority E-Journal The Global Majority E-Journal is published twice a year and freely available online at: http://www.american.edu/cas/economics/ejournal/. The journal publishes articles that discuss critical issues for the lives of the global majority. The global majority is defined as the more than 80 percent of the world’s population living in developing countries. The topics discussed reflect issues that characterize, determine, or influence the lives of the global majority: poverty, population growth, youth bulge, urbanization, lack of access to safe water, climate change, agricultural development, etc. The articles are based on research papers written by American University (AU) undergraduate students (mostly freshmen) as one of the course requirements for AU’s General Education Course: Econ-110—The Global Majority.

Editor Dr. Bernhard G. Gunter, Assistant Professor, Economics Department, American University; Washington, DC; and President, Bangladesh Development Research Center (BDRC), Falls Church, VA, United States. The editor can be reached at [email protected].

Cover Design Based on an animated GIF available as Wikimedia Commons, created in 1998 by Christian Janoff, showing the “Globe” demonstration as it can be found on the Commodore REU 1700/1750 test/demo disk; please see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Globe.gif.

ISSN 2157-1252

Copyright © 2014 by the author(s) for the contents of the articles. Copyright © 2014 by American University for the journal compilation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing from the copyright holder. American University, the editor and the authors cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this journal. The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors and should not be associated with American University.

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Global Majority E-Journal Volume 5, Number 2 (December 2014)

Contents A Clean 5 Gallons a Day Keeps the Doctor Away: The Water Crisis in Kenya and Rwanda Kianna Billman

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Hot Times Ahead: The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture in India and Nigeria Maude M. Fitzmaurice

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Agriculture in Kenya and Uganda: Relevance, Behavior, and Performance Giorgio Zenere

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No One Wants a Baby Girl: Analyzing Gendercide in China and India Samantha Ufret

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Global Majority E-Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2 (December 2014), pp. 75-88

A Clean 5 Gallons a Day Keeps the Doctor Away: The Water Crisis in Kenya and Rwanda Kianna Billman

Abstract This article analyzes the impact of the water crisis in Kenya and Rwanda, where the lack of access to safe water increases mortality rates, especially due to exposure to water-borne diseases. The multi-faceted nature of the water crisis is discussed in relation to its impact on health and development. The five major causes of the water crisis will be evaluated, consisting of poor management of water resources, population growth and urbanization, droughts and floods that will become increasingly detrimental with future climate change, water contamination, and a lack of education about safe water consumption. The impact of these major contributors will be discussed in detail after the presentation of a brief literature review and some empirical background of both countries. The article closes with some solutions to reduce the short-term and long-term impacts.

I.

Introduction

The lack of access to clean water is one of the main perpetuators of poverty and inequality in many developing countries due to the harmful, and often fatal, implications for health, as well as the highly restrictive effects on economic growth. Kenya is a drought-stricken country of about 43 million people in which an estimated 16 million lack access to safe water and about 10,000 children die each year from diarrhea due to the lack of access to safe water and sanitation. Not only is the scarcity of water an issue in Kenya, but an unequal distribution of water sources primarily to planned urban areas and wealthy rural communities has left urban slums and poor communities in a state of constant deprivation. Recent discoveries of large bodies of underground water have given Kenyan communities hope for revival. However, the existing policy framework limits a more equal distribution of this vital resource. Although Rwanda has a smaller population of 11.5 million, it faces similar problems as 31 percent of their population, or 3.4 million, lack access to clean water and about 3,000 children die each year from diarrhea caused by a lack of access to safe water and an inadequate sanitation. Rain is not uncommon in Rwanda, so the main problem is not water supply, but the collection, 75

storage, and catchment systems to capitalize on Rwanda’s natural sources of water. Decentralization is currently a main focus of the Government of Rwanda to delegate responsibilities to communities in an attempt to increase self-sufficiency. It has also been found that an increase in water rates can be afforded by many urban payers, which could then finance measures to alleviate the lack of clean water access by poor communities. This article discusses the main causes to the water crisis in Kenya and Rwanda. Following this introduction, it begins with a brief literature review in section II. Some empirical background information on both countries is then provided in section III, followed by an analysis of the five major causes of the water crisis (section IV). Finally, closing statements are made in section V, focusing on some short-term and long-term solutions.

II.

Brief Literature Review

Given the deep and long lasting water problems in Kenya and Rwanda, there are many useful publications addressing a variety of issues, including some detailed water sector reports by the governments of these two countries.1 The following summaries cover some of the more scientific and analytical publications. Makutsa et al. (2001) provide a field action report that analyzes the impact of Kenya’s Safe Water System (SWS) that was implemented in 2001 as a part of the Water, Sanitation, and Education for Health (WASEH) Project that began in 1998. This consisted of treating water with sodium hypochlorite (chemical water treatment), a safe storage of household water in improved clay pots, and other behavioral change techniques. About one third of the communities adopted chemical water treatment and 18.5 percent adopted the use of the newly innovated clay pots for a safer water storage. The chemical treatment solutions were sold at US$0.33 and the modified clay pots were sold at US$2.53 (the equivalent to about 3 to 4 days wage for most individuals). A significant finding was the importance of marketing and promotional activities in encouraging the adoption of these new techniques. Social marketing tools were crucial such as posters, brochures, T-shirts, skits, dancing and visual art performances, athletic tournaments, health promoters, educational quizzes with prizes, and various other incentives to attract attention to the new implementations and their overall importance. Sustainability would require continual monitoring of the safe water and storage practices as well as active promotion of the new innovations, community mobilization, and constant access to the products. The results of successful implementation techniques in this project can be applied to other areas of safe water access and implementation in the future. O’Reilly et al. (2007) examine a school-based safe water intervention program that was conducted in Nyanza Province in Western Kenya in 2006 to reduce the occurrence of diarrhea and to increase knowledge about safe water and hygiene practices. Initial and final evaluations of almost 400 students and their parents were collected and utilized for determining the effectiveness of school-based health and awareness programs on home practices. Improvements were observed as there was an increase from 21 to 65 percent of students who became more knowledgeable of correct water treatment procedures and knowing when to wash their hands. There also was an increase from 6 to 14 percent of parents who claimed to be treating their water, and a reduction of absenteeism in schools by 35 percent. The data gathered from the 1

For example, the Government of Kenya, Ministry of Water and Irrigation (2006) prepared the Kenya National Water Development Report 2005, a 244 pages long document for the 2nd UN World Water Development Report.

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intervention program supports the conclusion that school-based safe water and hygiene programs are effective in improving school and home environments, increasing awareness and knowledge of safe practices, changing behavior in the home through knowledge transfer from teachers to students to parents, and reducing absenteeism. Such programs could therefore improve safe water access and practices in schools with few latrines, insufficient water supplies, poor quality of water sources, water storage containers that are susceptible to contamination, and a lack of hand washing stations. The reduction of diarrheal diseases can increase school attendance and physical wellbeing, ultimately leading to cleaner, more educated, and more prosperous communities. Sullivan et al. (2003) discuss the development and application of the Water Poverty Index (WPI) in relation to implications for local and national policymaking, interventions, and the prioritization of aid. Target 10 of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is to halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water, and the WPI is a means of providing governments and agencies with accurate and transparent information regarding the progress and problems of a country’s water needs. The WPI for each country takes into consideration resources (availability of water), access (distance to safe sources), capacity (effectiveness of water management), use (domestic, agricultural, and industrial uses), and environment (integrity and ecosystem goods). These categories can be compared a) individually as components of the WPI or b) together as a whole as given by the overall value of the WPI. In contrast to other indices, the WPI is locally rather than nationally-oriented, allowing decisionmakers to make impartial choices based on a specific and transparent framework and allowing communities to lobby for action. Reliance on the WPI can help to monitor progress towards accomplishing the water target, and external donor assistance can be targeted towards countries and communities in which their contribution will have the greatest impact. As Falkenmark and Widstrand (1992) explain in a Population Bulletin, rapid population growth in poor countries has a major impact on the water crisis in those countries. The climate, geography, soil type, latitude, and vegetation of different African countries affect water availability and distribution as well as human activities such as deforestation, agricultural practices, air pollution, irrigation, and population growth. Poor countries remain in a constant state of deprivation due to inadequate water resource management, poor sanitation, scanty hygiene, and a lack of family planning; and all these problems tend to perpetuate poverty. To improve access to safe water, there must be an implementation of better management to increase water accessibility and efficient use in the long-term, the establishment of cooperation between local and international governments and industries, and policies aimed towards reducing fertility rates to reduce the demographic forces fueling the water crisis. The changes in water supplies from 1967 to 1997 in various East African urban communities were examined by Thompson et al. (2000). Both low and high-income communities (receiving both piped and un-piped sources of water) were examined. Thompson et al. found that water supplies had deteriorated in most locations from 1967 to 1997 because they received less water per day, spent more time collecting water, and paid higher prices. Families without piping receive their water from unprotected sources such as springs, seeps, streams, rivers, and lakes and are prone to water shortages in dry seasons as well as higher rates of contamination. The average cost of water is the highest for low-income urban households that receive un-piped water due to their reliance on vendors and kiosks, which comes at a significant financial cost. The unequal distribution of piped water services leaves some areas with access to water for only 5 77

hours a day, while more affluent areas have 24 hours of service. Furthermore, there are various other inequalities that result from poor water management and a lack of effective policies.

III.

Empirical Background

Kenya became independent in 1963 through the works of the founding president, Jomo Kenyatta. Kenya has undergone political struggles from being ruled as a one-party state (by the Kenya African National Union (KANU)) to constitutional reforms in 2010 that allocated power and resources to 47 newly created semi-autonomous counties. Kenya is located in Eastern Africa and has an area of 569,140 square kilometers (sq km). According to data gathered in 2003, 1,032 sq km of that land is irrigated and about 72.96 cubic meters (m3) of freshwater per person per year are withdrawn from Kenya’s water sources (CIA, 2014a). Agriculture has been a major factor for Kenya’s economy as 48 percent of the total land area in 2009 was agricultural, contributing to 27 percent of the nation’s GDP. However, water pollution (from urban and industrial wastes, pesticides and fertilizers) and soil erosion are constant environmental issues that continue to affect Kenya today. Uneven rainfall also affects water availability because in the two rainy seasons (from April to June and October to December) the average annual rainfall varies from 5 inches in the dry regions to 76 inches near Lake Victoria (Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2014a). Rwanda gained independence from Belgium in 1962. The Hutu genocide of Tutsis in 1994 was followed by the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) gaining power in the following year. The first post-genocide elections were held in 1999 and the country joined the Commonwealth (a voluntary association of 53 independent countries) in 2009. Rwanda is located in Central Africa and has an area of 24,670 sq km, of which only 96.25 sq km are irrigated (CIA, 2014b). As of 2005, about 17.25 m3 of freshwater per person per year were withdrawn from Rwandan water sources (CIA, 2014b). Agriculture accounts for about one third of total GDP, and agricultural land constituted 81 percent of the total land in 2009 (World Bank, 2013). However, periodic droughts continue to impact agricultural production despite the two rainy seasons (from February to May and November to December), in which the average annual rainfall may vary from 31 inches to 63 inches (Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2014b). As shown in Figure 1, both Kenya and Rwanda have increased their GDP per capita (expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant 2005 international dollars), although Rwanda has made more progress than Kenya. In 1980, GDP per capita was US$1,375 in Kenya and US$805 in Rwanda, whereas in 2010 those values rose to US$1,509 in Kenya and US$1,132 in Rwanda. Hence, GDP per capita increased by only US$134 in Kenya, while it increased US$327 in Rwanda. Although increasing at a lower and more constant rate, Kenya has maintained a higher level of GDP per capita than the average low income country (LIC), whereas Rwanda started off slightly better in 1980 than the average LIC but dropped slightly below the average LIC in GDP per capita by 2010, due to the severe impact of the 1994 genocide. As Figure 2 shows, over the last 40 years, life expectancy at birth has been relatively flat in Kenya but more fluctuating in Rwanda. In 1970, life expectancy at birth was 52 years for Kenya and 44 years for Rwanda, but by 2010, both increased to 56 and 55 years, respectively. Like for GDP per capita, Rwanda demonstrated a greater net increase, but Kenya started off with a greater life expectancy. The similarity in life expectancy at birth by 2010 (the difference of which was only 1 year) could suggest that living conditions in both countries were similar enough to induce a similar outcome. 78

Figure 1: GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) in Kenya, Rwanda, and LICs, 1980-2010

Source: Created by author based on World Bank (2013). Figure 2: Life Expectancy at Birth in Kenya and Rwanda, 1970-2010

Source: Created by author based on World Bank (2013).

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Data on literacy rates for the percentage of the total population (ages 15 and above) has been sporadic in both Kenya and Rwanda, as shown in Figure 3. However, an overall trend of increasing literacy rates can be seen from 1978 to 2010 in Rwanda, where literacy increased from 38 percent in 1978 to 71 percent in 2010. In Kenya, literacy rates seem to have been stagnating around 82 percent during the mid-2000s, and increasing moderately to 87 percent by 2010. As was the case with GDP per capita and life expectancy, Rwanda displayed a greater net increase than Kenya. Figure 3: Adult Literacy Rate in Kenya and Rwanda, available years

Source: Created by author based on World Bank (2013).

IV.

Causes of the Water Crisis

In order to implement effective solutions to the water crisis in Kenya and Rwanda, the major causes must first be understood. This section analyzes the five major causes: poor management of water resources, population growth and urbanization, climate change (droughts, floods, and increases in temperature and rainfall), water contamination (particularly in urban slums), and little education about water treatment and safety. Areas of focus in implementing solutions are also outlined when applicable. IV.1. Management of Water Resources A report by the World Resources Institute (1994) demonstrated that the availability of freshwater sources has been declining in many Sub-Saharan Africa countries, including in Kenya and Rwanda. It was found that freshwater availability per capita was 647 m3 in Kenya and 843 m3 in Rwanda, as compared to the global standard of 1000 m3, and projections indicated that those levels would drop to 235 m3 per capita by 2025 if no corrective measures are taken. The lack of clear policies on water resource management has served to perpetuate the poor water availability 80

conditions despite Kenya’s 1970s government development goal to supply water to the entire population by 2000, and Rwanda’s Vision 2020 to supply water to the entire population by 2020 (Rwanda’s Management Information System, 2012). Kenya’s Water Policy of 1999 and the Water Act of 2002 brought about reforms with a renewed focus on the fundamental principles of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), and these principles identified key factors to ensure effective and sustainable water resource management. The key factors were stakeholder participation, recognition of the vulnerability of water resources, and the consideration of water as a social and economic good. Kenya’s Water Resource Management Authority (WRMA) incorporated these goals into operational use in 2005 (WRMA, 2009). Despite attempts by various organizations to improve water availability, Figure 4 shows that Rwanda has experienced a reduction from 66 to 65 percent of the population with access to an improved water source. However, unlike Rwanda, Kenya has experienced an increase from 44 to 59 percent of the population with access to an improved water source. There are significant differences in improvements between rural and urban populations from 1990 to 2010. The percentage of the rural population with improved access increased in Kenya from 33 to 52 percent and decreased in Rwanda from 64 to 63 percent. In comparison, the percentage of the urban population with improved access decreased from 92 to 82 percent in Kenya and also decreased from 95 to 76 percent in Rwanda (World Bank, 2013). Figure 4: Population with Access to Safe Water in Kenya and Rwanda, 1990-2010

Source: Created by author based on World Bank (2013). To correct failed policy reforms and water management, other challenges must also be addressed in management approaches in order to take steps toward long-term improvement (Sano, 2012). Such challenges are as follows: 

Insufficient funding and decreasing allocations of the government development budget for water and sanitation.



Funding agreements with development partners that will end in the near future.



Disparities in access to water in both rural and urban areas. 81



Low sustainability of water supply services in rural areas in conjunction with high infrastructure rehabilitation costs.



High water tariffs in rural areas and water tariffs in urban areas that do not reflect operation and maintenance costs.



Unplanned settlements in both urban and rural areas resulting in difficulty in reaching the entire population.



Rapid increase of urbanization and population growth that leads to unplanned housing with high costs for water treatment.

An evident factor in many of the aforementioned challenges is population growth and urbanization, as it affects the population proportions in rural and urban areas. IV.2. Population Growth and Urbanization Both Kenya and Rwanda have experienced large levels of population growth in the past 40 years, which has negatively impacted the water crisis. From 1970 to 2011, the population of Kenya increased from about 11 million to 41.5 million, and the population of Rwanda increased from about 4 million to 11 million, as shown in Figure 5. Figure 5: Total Population in Kenya and Rwanda, 1970-2011

Source: Created by author based on World Bank (2013). Not only have the populations grown, but each country has demonstrated active urbanization in which a proportion of the rural population has migrated into urban cities. For instance, from 1970 to 2011 the percentage of the population that lived in rural areas decreased from 90 to 76 percent in Kenya and also decreased from 97 to 81 percent in Rwanda (World Bank, 2013). The increased concentration of people in urban areas has resulted in unplanned housing in cities, raising the cost of water treatment. Population growth in general has had major implications in both rural and urban settlements because not only are there more individuals who need access to water, but unplanned settlements that account for the increasing population also lead to a greater number of areas that lack access to established water systems (African Development Bank Group, 2012). 82

IV.3. Climate Change: Droughts and Floods, Increases in Temperature and Rainfall Kenya is a drought-stricken country that experiences contrasting impacts, from extreme water shortages in the dry season to floods in the rainy seasons (from April to June and October to December). Since 1960, the temperature has increased by 1°C and is expected to increase by 2.8°C by 2060. However, precipitation may have an even greater impact as it is expected that the annual rainfall will increase by up to 48 percent in some areas. Table 1 shows the observed and future projected trends in temperature and rainfall, indicating the large-scale impact of global warming and more extreme temperatures on future generations (McSweeney, New and Lizcano, 2010). Table 1: Projected Changes in Temperature and Rainfall in Kenya, 2030s-2090s

Source: McSweeney, New and Lizcano (2010). Rwanda is dependent on rain-fed agriculture for rural sustainability and certain exports (such as tea and coffee), and half of its electricity is hydro powered. There has been a 1.4°C increase in temperature since 1970 – which is higher than the global average – and it is expected that the temperature will increase up to 2.5°C by 2050. During the rainy seasons from February to May and November to December, it is predicted that rainfall could increase by 20 percent by 2050, thus causing landslides, loss of crops, health risks, and damage to infrastructure (Republic of 83

Rwanda, 2011). Figure 6 shows the current precipitation rates in Rwanda, but larger areas surrounding regions of high precipitation could become more affected in future years by increases in flooding during the rainy season. Figure 6: Average Annual Precipitation in Rwanda (mm)

Source: Rwanda Environment Management Authority (2011), Figure 1.3, p. 4. The striking dichotomy between droughts and floods leads to severe impacts on the Kenyan and Rwandan communities because the dry season brings more extreme water shortages while the rainy season can cause floods that lead to damage and contamination of water sources. Simultaneous increases in temperature can also lead to vector-borne and water-borne diseases, leading to increased health risks for humans and animals, decreases in crop yields, and negative impacts in the export sector of the economy (Government of Rwanda, 2011). Some specific impacts of climate variability have been catchment degradation (which increases erosion and run-off), the drying up of rivers, receding lake levels, significant siltation of dams meant for hydropower and water supplies, and the deterioration of water quality (Government of Kenya, Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 2006). In order to become more resilient to climate changes, the following issues must be focused on in Kenya and Rwanda: 

Irrigation Infrastructure: Such infrastructure allocates more control of water resources to farmers, therefore reducing susceptibility to changes in rainfall. It also allows for crop diversification, efficient land and water use, and provides water to dry areas that otherwise would not receive it.



Stronger Road Networks: Poor quality roads, such as dirt tracks, contribute to loss of products while in transit and an increased vulnerability of transportation routes in extreme weather. Constructing and maintaining stronger roads that are more resilient to extreme weather and future climate changes will promote economic development.

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Center for Climate Knowledge and Development: Insufficient data about projected climate changes (especially in Rwanda) prevents the ability to plan for the future, therefore hindering adaptation to future increases in temperature and rainfall. By providing more predictions and information, a wider array of policy options will be available for decision-makers to plan for future adaptation.

IV.4. Water Contamination, Particularly in Urban Slums Although the water crisis is heavily focused on the lack of a sufficient amount of water, another key aspect is water quality. Water contamination is a major issue in many urban slums due to the close proximity of wells (from which water for household use is drawn) and pit latrines (holes dug into the ground into which excrement falls). Due to population growth and urbanization (as was discussed in section IV.2. above), increases in the percentage of the population living in urban cities results in overpopulation, unplanned housing, and ultimately the expansion of slums. Overcrowding results in the limitation of available land, and therefore wells and pit latrines are placed at distances that are too close to each other. The short distances between the wells and latrines allow bacteria and other micro-organisms to invade the water sources from the nearby latrines, resulting in contamination of communal water sources (Kimani-Murage and Ngindu, 2007). Urban slums are informal settlements that do not receive governmental drainage, water, sewerage, and waste services, and the mortality rates are therefore higher than in rural populations because rural areas have enough land to safely separate water sources from waste disposal. Human excreta can cause diseases such as cholera, typhoid, hepatitis, polio, cryptosporidiosis, ascariasis, and schistosomiasis; diseases which contribute to the one-third of deaths in developing countries that are caused by drinking contaminated water. Until governmental services and proper infrastructure are available to all residents regardless of their location of residency, certain guidelines should be followed in well and latrine placement. When coexisting, wells should be located no less than 2 meters (about 7 feet) above the water table and no less than 15 meters from pit latrines, as studies have shown that the greater the distance of separation, the lower the risk of contamination. Table 2: Distance between Pit Latrine and Wells in Langas Slum, Kenya

Source: Kimani-Murage and Ngindu (2007). In one study done in Langas, Kenya, conducted by Kimani-Murage and Ngindu (2007), 192 households were selected and 31 shallow wells were tested, along with 4 deep wells and 5 taps (nearby kiosks). The World Health Organization (WHO) defines acceptable standards for 85

drinking water as water in which there are no traces of E.coli or coliform bacteria. In this experiment, all of the shallow wells contained traces of these micro-organisms, indicating that the coliforms invaded the water sources via transport from the closely located pit latrines through the soil and into the wells. Similar studies have been conducted in Rwanda as well, showing contamination of water sources as a result of run-off from industrial and domestic waste (Namuwaya, 2012). As Table 2 shows, the contamination of the wells in Kenya was most likely due to their placement in relation to the pit latrines. However, about one-third of the children were accustomed to excreting openly on the ground and many of the wells did not have adequate coverage for protection, resulting in the contamination of the wells from run-off of the excrement in the presence of rain. There could have been additional sources of contamination, such as contact between the children’s dirty possessions and the water, withdrawing water with unsanitary containers, deposits of animal excrement near the wells, and the use of wells to wash clothes. Also, only 42 percent of wellusers admitted to boiling their drinking water, leading to the next issue of the importance of education about water safety. IV.5. Lack of Education One of the root causes of the contraction of water-borne diseases is the lack of education about clean water and water treatment. Many individuals in developing countries use whatever water sources that are available, due to the lack of adequate resources as well as the lack of knowledge about the implications of drinking unsafe water. The SWS intervention program (as discussed in section II above) is a good example of how school-based education about water treatment and safe practices can lead to increased levels of safe practices in schools as well as in home environments. O’Reilly et al. (2007) described the result of the intervention as an increase in knowledge of correct water treatment from 21 to 65 percent of students, in conjunction with an increase in the percentage of parents who claimed to be treating their water. By emphasizing the importance of water safety interventions in developing countries, rates of water-borne disease contraction can be lowered and death tolls can be reduced until permanent infrastructure and government provided services can be provided to the entirety of every population.

V.

Conclusion

Kenya and Rwanda are significantly impacted by the water crisis due to factors such as poor management of water resources, population growth and urbanization, climate change (that involves more droughts during the dry season, more floods during the rainy season, and increases in temperature), water contamination, and education about water treatment and safety. Changes in policy implementation and construction of more widespread and strengthened infrastructure can help to reduce the impacts of low water availability and poor management, but future conditions may further jeopardize the populations of these countries due to global warming. Steps must therefore be taken to create effective catchment, storage, and irrigation systems that will provide better adaptation to unexpected weather conditions. Population growth will also continue to plague Kenya and Rwanda, even though both countries have made some progress in the last three decades with reducing their very high fertility rates, which exceeded 8 children per women in the early 1970s for Kenya and during all of the 1970s in Rwanda. A renewed focus on the importance of education for girls is essential to reduce fertility rates further and stabilize the population. Services to assist in family planning will also 86

contribute to reducing population growth further, and thus heightened emphasis must be placed on the future educational and informational services for female children. Finally, until long-term management, policy, and infrastructure changes can be made, short-term solutions must be employed. Such short-term solutions consist of educational awareness about safe water drinking and treatment habits, increased availability of chemical water treatments, and an increased provision of clay pots for safer water storage along with filtration systems to clean drinking water. These relatively simple solutions will not only serve to reduce naivety to the water crisis, but they will also minimize the incidences of water contamination and contraction of harmful and fatal diseases.

References African Development Bank Group (2012). Urbanization in Africa; available at: http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-acrossafrica/post/urbanization-in-africa-10143/. Central Intelligence Agency (2014a). The World Factbook: Kenya; available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html. Central Intelligence Agency (2014b). The World Factbook: Rwanda; available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html. Encyclopedia of the Nations (2014a). Kenya Climate; available at: http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Kenya-CLIMATE.html. Encyclopedia of the Nations (2014b). Rwanda Climate; available at: http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Rwanda-CLIMATE.html. Falkenmark, Malin and Carl Widstrand (1992). Population and Water Resources: A Delicate Balance. Population Bulletin, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 1-36. Government of Kenya, Ministry of Water and Irrigation (2006). Kenya National Water Development Report 2005 (United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO), World Water Assessment Programme, prepared for the 2nd UN World Water Development Report ‘Water: A Shared Responsibility’); available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001488/148866e.pdf. Government of Rwanda (2011). Green Growth and Climate Resilience: National Strategy for Climate Change and Low Carbon Development (Kigali, Rwanda: Government of Rwanda); as posted by the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development: http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/364Rwanda-Green-Growth-StrategyFINAL.pdf. Makutsa, Philip; Kilungu Nzaku; Paul Ogutu; Peter Barasa; Sam Ombeki; Alex Mwaki; and Robert E. Quick (2001). Challenges in Implementing a Point-of-Use Water Quality Intervention in Rural Kenya. American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 91, No. 10 (October), pp. 1571-1573. McSweeney, Carol; Mark New; and Gil Lizcano (2010). UNDP Climate Change Country Profiles: Kenya; available at: http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/research/climate/projects/undpcp/UNDP_reports/Kenya/Kenya.hires.report.pdf. 87

Kimani-Murage, Elizabeth Wambui and Augustine M. Ngindu (2007). Quality of Water the Slum Dwellers Use: The Case of a Kenyan Slum. Journal of Urban Health, Vol. 84, No. 6 (June), pp. 829-838. Namuwaya, Evaline (2012). Water Experts Blame Pollution on Poor Land Use. The New Times: Rwanda’s First Daily, News story (December 17, 2012); available at: http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=15209&a=61877. O’Reilly, C.; M. Freeman; M. Ravani; J. Migele; A. Mwaki; M. Ayalo; S. Ombeki; R. Hoekstra; and R. Quick (2008). The Impact of a School-Based Safe Water and Hygiene Program on Knowledge and Practices of Students and Their Parents: Nyanza Province, Western Kenya, 2006. Epidemiology and Infection, Vol. 136, No. 1 (January), pp. 80-91. Rwanda Environment Management Authority (REMA) (2011). Atlas of Rwanda’s Changing Environment: Implications for Climate Change Resilience (Kigali, Rwanda: REMA); available at: https://na.unep.net/siouxfalls/publications/REMA.pdf. Sano, James (edited by Joanna Esteves Mills, Bethlehem Mengistu and Nshuti Rugerinyange (WaterAid), and Richard Watts (Development Finance International)) (2012). Financing of the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Sector in Rwanda: Case Study; available at: http://www.wateraid.org/~/media/Files/UK/Keeping%20Promises%20case%20studies/R wanda%20the%20financing%20of%20the%20water%20sanitation%20and%20hygiene% 20sector.pdf. Sullivan, C. A.; J. R. Meigh; A. M. Giacomello; T. Fediw; P. Lawrence; M. Samad; S. Mlote; C. Hutton; J.A. Allan; R. E. Schulze; D. J. M. Dlamini; W. Cosgrove; J. Delli Priscoli; P. Gleick; I. Smout; J. Cobbing; R. Calow; C. Hunt; A. Hussain; M. C. Acreman; J. King; S. Malomo; E.L. Tate; D. O’Regan; S. Milner and I. Steyl (2003). The Water Poverty Index: Development and Application at the Community Scale. Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 27, pp. 189-199; available at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/agl/emailconf/wfe2005/narf_054.pdf. Thompson, John; Ina T. Porras; Elisabeth Wood; James K. Tumwine; Mark R. Mujwahuzi; Munguti Katui-Katua; and Nick Johnstone (2000). Waiting at the Tap: Changes in Urban Water Use in East Africa over Three Decades. Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 12, No. 2 (October), pp. 37-52; available at: http://eau.sagepub.com/content/12/2/37.full.pdf+html. Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA) (2009). Strategic Plan 2009-2012 (Nairobi, Kenya: Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA)); available at: http://www.wrma.or.ke/images/wrma_strategic_Plan_2009_2012.pdf. World Bank (2013). World Development Indicators / Global Development Finance database (Washington, DC: The World Bank); as posted on the World Bank website: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/ (downloaded on April 3, 2013). World Resources Institute (WRI) (1994). World Resources (New York: Oxford University Press); available at: http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/worldresources199495_bw.pdf.

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Global Majority E-Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2 (December 2014), pp. 89-103

Hot Times Ahead: The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture in India and Nigeria Maude M. Fitzmaurice

Abstract India and Nigeria are developing countries that are already suffering from the negative effects of climate change. Both countries have huge agricultural sectors that are vital to their economies. India has the second largest farm output in the world. In Nigeria, 70 percent of its population is employed in the agricultural sector. This article compares and contrasts how climate change is affecting the essential food production in both India and Nigeria and the efforts each country is taking to minimize the negative effects of climate change.

I.

Introduction

India and Nigeria are developing countries in which agriculture is a staple of their economies. Both countries are highly vulnerable to climate change effects such as higher temperatures and extreme variations in precipitation, which will have drastic effects on their economies and the livelihoods of their citizens. The agricultural sector in both India and Nigeria absorbs a significant portion of their labor forces and still constitutes a considerable share of their gross domestic product (GDP). A large portion of those employed in the agricultural sector live below the international poverty line ($1.25 per day in PPP), and therefore the effects of climate change will have a serious impact on the daily lives of these individuals. With the effects of climate change worsening, India and Nigeria are anticipating declines in crop production and value, increased imports, increased debt, and ultimately a decline in GDP and a decrease in the livelihoods of the citizens of these countries. The effects will be felt by all sectors of the population as well as by countries trading with them. Efforts are being made to alleviate these effects in both countries. However, due to the urgency of this issue, more extensive projects and an increase in awareness are essential in lessening the negative impacts of climate change. This article provides first a brief review of the literature and then some empirical background on the socio-economic development of India and Nigeria. The discussion examines (1) the carbon dioxide emissions, (2) the effects of climate change on agriculture, and (3) the efforts to alleviate 89

the effects of climate change. The last section draws conclusions on measures both governments can take.

II.

Brief Literature Review

Given the severe impact climate change has had on the agricultural sectors of India and Nigeria, it is not surprising that there is an array of scientific articles and reports. Some of the more recent publications are summarized as follows: 

Panda (2009) assesses the vulnerabilities of climate change in India. The effects of climate change are severely impacting food production around the world because of its effect on natural ecosystems and socio-economic systems. In its fourth assessment report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change claimed that the global mean temperature will increase anywhere between 1.4°C and 5.8°C by 2100. This will be detrimental to many countries around the world, especially India, a developing country in which agriculture is a staple of the economy. It was calculated that a 2°C rise in mean temperature and a 7 percent increase in mean precipitation will reduce the net revenue of the whole country of India by 12.3 percent. This is a very serious issue for India, as agriculture provides employment for two-thirds of its total workforce. Climate change is also likely to cause more cyclones, monsoons, droughts, and floods, which will greatly affect India’s crop yields in coastal cities that are at or slightly above sea level. The vulnerability of India’s economy and the effects of climate change on its people need to be evaluated further.



Thaker and Leiserowitz (2014) examine the shifting discourses of climate change in India. India has 17 percent of the world’s population and is the world’s third largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs). India’s carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion tripled between 1990 and 2011; and these emissions are estimated to increase 2.5 times between 2008 and 2035. Unfortunately, developing countries, including India, have refused to sign a legally binding treaty to lower GHG emissions because of issues of equality, low per-capita emissions, and the demand that the responsibility to lower emissions first rests with the developed countries. However, in 2007, it appeared that India shifted its stance on addressing climate change issues when its prime minister created a Council on Climate Change and authorized eight national missions to address energy security as part of the Nation Action Plan on Climate Change. Two of the main issues that have been the source of debate for Indian negotiators are increasing energy access and energy security in an environmentally friendly way. However, India is a country where 40 percent of the population does not have access to electricity and where there has been a rise in economic growth and industrial demand for energy. Its leaders are desperate for a solution that will promote its development objectives of poverty alleviation and economic growth, while also yielding co-benefits for addressing climate change effectively. It is hoped that a solution will be found in renewable energy resources.



Bosello, Campagnola and Eboli (2013) reviews climate change and adaptation applied to Nigerian agriculture. Climate change in Nigeria will cause a decrease in crop production, GDP losses starting in 2025, an increase in crop prices, and a higher food dependency on foreign imports. By 2050, it is predicted that crop production will decline between 4.8 90

percent and 7.4 percent, the prices of crops will increase between 17 percent and 32 percent, and agricultural imports will increase between 13 percent and 23 percent. In order to adapt to these climate changes and to reduce their detrimental effects, a mix of “soft measures” that are inexpensive and “hard measures” that are very costly like irrigation expansion need to be implemented. However, the application of these methods needs to be highly researched and planned carefully in order to avoid creating a costly and ineffective situation. 

Apata, Samuel and Adeola (2009) analyze the perception of and adaptation to climate change among arable food crop farmers in South Western Nigeria. Nigeria as a country is very vulnerable to climate change since its economy is agriculture-based. Because of its location in Sub-Saharan Africa, which already has characteristically high temperatures, an increase in the mean temperature and varying extremes of precipitation due to global warming will have detrimental effects on the Nigerian economy. The coastal regions of Nigeria are also susceptible to severe storms and sea-level rise caused by climate change, which would drastically affect agriculture yields in these areas. The Niger-delta wetlands have experienced significant damage due to climate change already, as the salt from the coastal waters has increased soil salinity, thus making it impossible to grow crops on this land. Logit regression analysis was used to analyze how farmers in this area are adapting to climate change. It was found that multiple and mixed crop-livestock was the most common practice, diverging away from the typical mono-cropping used by most farmers. In order to enhance the current adaptation to climate change, there needs to be easily accessible information on the causes and effects of global warming, and a credit or grant facility needs to be established to empower the farmers.



A World Bank (2013a) report reviews the risks a warming climate poses to agriculture, water resources, and health in India. In India, over 60 percent of crops are rain-fed, which makes these agricultural areas very vulnerable to changes in precipitation due to climate change. With 15 percent of India’s groundwater tables already overexploited, changes in precipitation will further affect the water supply. It has been predicted that the mean temperature will rise by 2°C globally by 2040; if this happens, crop production in South Asia is expected to drop by 12 percent. This will then cause a decline in food availability, which will cause severe health problems, including an increase in childhood stunting by 35 percent by 2050. As a result, the World Bank is supporting projects to help communities conserve their watersheds better, and it is sponsoring groups that are developing environmentally sustainable hydropower in India. However, if the warming is held below 2°C, there is a chance that the worst effects stemming from climate change can be avoided. Action on climate change needs to happen fast, though, because this window of opportunity to stabilize the global warming is closing quickly.

III.

Empirical Background

India is the world’s third largest economy if GDP is measured in purchasing power parity (PPP), and it is home to nearly 1.3 billion people. Nigeria is considerably smaller; it is the world’s 20th largest economy if measured by the same parameter, and it is home to nearly 170 million people. As shown in Figure 1, Nigeria’s GDP per capita decreased from 1980 to 1984 and then stagnated during most of the 1990s and early 2000s. It is only in the last ten years that Nigeria made significant progress in increasing income per capita. India’s GDP per capita grew moderately 91

during the 1980s and more rapidly since India’s economic reforms went into effect in 1991. India’s GDP per capita in 2011 was 3.6 times its GDP per capita in 1980, while that of Nigeria has only increased 1.6 times during the same period, as seen in Figure 1 below. Although India’s GDP per capita was about half of Nigeria’s GDP per capita in 1980, today, India’s GDP per capita is about 70 percent higher than that of Nigeria. In both cases, these countries have made significant progress in increasing their GDP per capita during the last decade. However, due to the detrimental effects caused by climate change, these countries’ economies are expected to be hit hard in the coming years and it will be very difficult to maintain these high growth rates. Figure 1: GDP per capita (in PPP) for India and Nigeria, 1980-2011

Source: Created by author based on World Bank (2013b). Both countries also made progress in increasing their life expectancy, though similar to the differences in GDP per capita, Nigeria’s progress has been uneven. As seen in Figure 2 below, between 1960-2011, India increased its life expectancy by 23 years, while Nigeria’s increased by only 13.4 years. Hence, there is now a large difference between the life expectancy in India and Nigeria. Figure 2: Total Life Expectancy at Birth (years), 1960-2011

Source: Created by author based on World Bank (2013b). 92

Even though the data are very limited for adult total literacy rates, some interesting observations can be made. As shown in Figure 3, while Nigeria’s literacy rate was 7 percent higher than that of India in 1991, by the early 1990s, India’s literacy rate surpassed Nigeria’s by about 6 percent. However, the data seem to indicate that India has not made much progress in terms of literacy between 2001 and 2006 (literacy rates increased by only 1.7 percent), while Nigeria has made considerable progress during 2003 and 2010, increasing its literacy rates by 6.6 percent. In both of these countries, the total literacy rate of adults is still only about 60 percent, a little over half of these populations. Therefore, these countries still have a long way to go to improve their education systems and thus the livelihoods of their citizens. Figure 3: Literacy Rate, Adult Total in India and Nigeria Between 1981-2010

Source: Created by author based on World Bank (2013b).

IV.

Discussion

IV.1. Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions in India and Nigeria Climate change is affecting countries around the world, but it poses the greatest threat to developing countries, like India and Nigeria, whose economies are based on agriculture and to those countries already in high-temperature areas. India supports 17 percent of the world’s population and was the world’s third largest emitter of GHGs in 2010 (Thaker and Leiserowitz, 2014). India’s GHG emissions have increased since 1992, when India was ranked the world’s sixth largest emitter (U.S. Energy Information Administration [USEIA], 2011). Its CO2 emissions from fuel combustion alone tripled between 1990 and 2011, and they are estimated to increase by 2.5 times between 2008 and 2035 (Thaker and Leiserowitz, 2014). Nigeria is the world’s 44th largest emitter of GHGs (USEIA, 2011). In 1992, it was ranked as number 35 (USEIA, 2011). This reduction in emissions is due to several programs that the Nigerian Government has implemented to reduce CO2 emissions. As seen in Figure 4 below, while Nigeria’s CO2 emissions have been stagnating overall since the mid-1970s, India’s CO2 93

emissions have been steadily increasing since 1960. As shown in Figure 5, these different trends are (despite a more visible volatility for Nigeria) the same if looking at CO2 emissions per capita. Hence, if provisions and regulations on these emissions are not put in place and monitored, India’s contribution to global climate change is only expected to become more significant and problematic. Figure 4: CO2 Emissions (in thousands of metric tons), 1960-2009

Source: Created by author based on World Bank (2013b).

Figure 5: CO2 Emissions per capita (in metric tons), 1960-2009

Source: Created by author based on World Bank (2013b).

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IV.2. Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture India is very vulnerable to climate change as the average annual temperature in the majority of India is between 25°C and 27.5°C or 77°F and 87°F.1 The World Bank (2013a) has predicted that by 2040, the mean global temperature will increase by 2°C. A rise of 2°C in India would make the average annual temperatures in most areas range from 80.6°F to 90.6°F. However, according to Panda (2009), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) claimed that the global mean temperature will increase anywhere between 1.4°C and 5.8°C by 2100 in its fourth assessment report, predicting an even higher potential temperature increase. In a climate with these temperatures and varied precipitation, agriculture will no longer be able to provide the important resources for the country. Figure 6 below demonstrates the vulnerabilities of districts in India to climate change based on their adaptive capacity and climate sensitivity. A large portion has the highest possible climate change vulnerability, indicated by a reddish color in Figure 6. With 54 percent of India’s population depending on agriculture for their livelihoods, the effects of climate change will be detrimental to India as a whole (Birthal, Joshi, Roy and Thorat, 2007). Figure 6: District-Level Mapping of Climate Change Vulnerability (measured as a composite of adaptive capacity and climate sensitivity under exposure to climate change)

Source: http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxyau.wrlc.org/science/article/pii/S095937800400010X.

1

http://www.weatherbase.com/weather/city.php3?c=IN

95

The percentage of agriculture that makes up India’s GDP has declined from 40 percent in 1980/1981 to 18 percent in 2012 (Birthal et al., 2007; World Bank, 2013b). However, agriculture remains an important sector for India. The agricultural sector provides 60 percent of the labor workforce, making agriculture a very important sector to sustain (World Bank, 2011). India has 116 million farms, most of which are small (less than 2 hectares), and most of these farms belong to households below the poverty line (World Bank, 2011). As of 2007, 72 percent of India’s population lived in these rural areas, and three-fourths of these rural households rely on agriculture for their livelihoods (Birthal et al., 2007). India is among the top three global producers of a broad range of crops, including wheat, rice, pulses (chickpeas, pigeon peas, lentils, dry peas, etc.), cotton, peanuts, fruits, and vegetables. 2 In 2011-12, India produced 104 million mega-tons of rice, making up 22.88 percent of the global rice production. This is the highest rice production for India since 2001/2002 (Government of India, 2012). However, India’s food imports are expected to increase in the coming years. Figure 7 below depicts the import sensitivity of districts in India. It shows that a significant portion of India is ranked to have the highest import sensitivity (in dark purple), meaning that these places have a high competition from other country suppliers of the same goods (O'Brien et al., 2004). With the effects of climate change becoming more noticeable all over the world, the crop supply other countries are able to export will diminish and will leave countries like India struggling to find the goods they need to feed their populations.

Figure 7: Import-Sensitivity Map (measured as a composite of distance to ports, cropping patterns, and crop productivity)

Source: http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxyau.wrlc.org/science/article/pii/S095937800400010X

2

United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Service (2013).

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One key supporting fact of India’s increased food insecurity is rising food prices. As seen in Figure 8 below, the food price inflation in India has fluctuated since 1980, but it was the highest for consumers in 2010/2011, with a jump in wholesale prices as well.

Figure 8: Food Price Inflation in India, 1980-81 to 2010-11

Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Service (2012). In India, over 60 percent of crops are rain-fed, which makes these agricultural areas very vulnerable to changes in precipitation due to climate change (World Bank, 2013a). It was calculated that a 2°C rise in mean temperature and a 7 percent increase in mean precipitation will reduce the net revenue of the whole country of India by 12.3 percent (Panda, 2009). Changes in precipitation will also affect the water supply, as 15 percent of India’s groundwater tables are already overexploited. It has been predicted that the mean temperature will rise by 2°C globally by 2040 and if this happens, crop production in South Asia is expected to drop by 12 percent. This will then cause a decline in food availability, which will cause severe health problems including an increase in childhood stunting by 35 percent by 2050 (World Bank, 2013a). In Nigeria, climate change will also cause a decrease in crop production, GDP losses (projected to start in 2025), an increase in crop prices, and a higher food dependency on foreign imports (Bosello, Campagnola, and Eboli, 2013). By 2050, it is predicted that crop production will decline between 4.8 percent and 7.4 percent, the prices of crops will increase between 17 percent and 32 percent, and agricultural imports will increase between 13 percent and 23 percent (Bosello et al., 2013). It is also predicted that by 2050, the GDP of Nigeria could drop by 4.5 percent (Cervigni, Valentini, and Santini, 2013). Climate change in Nigeria is not only causing increased temperatures and less precipitation, but the poor response to these issues is causing conflicts to break out (Figure 9). As seen in Figure 8 below, the poor responses to these issues are creating resource shortages, more sickness and 97

death, more hunger, more unemployment, and low economic opportunity among many other problems. The result of this is an ever-worsening cyclical pattern, and therefore not addressing these problems only creates more problems. In order to mitigate these conflicts, dealing with the effects of climate change needs to be become a priority of the Nigerian Government (Sayne, 2011). Figure 9: Climate Change and Conflict in Nigeria: A Basic Casual Mechanism

Source: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Climate_Change_Nigeria.pdf. Nigeria was once a great exporter of agricultural goods. Between 1962 and 1968, export crops were Nigeria’s main foreign exchange earner. Nigeria was the number one exporter in palm oil globally and the exporter of 47 percent of all groundnuts, putting it ahead of the United States (Green, 2013). Unfortunately, in the 1960s, Nigeria turned to oil, causing its agricultural sector and main source of income to dwindle (Green, 2013). Since 2012, Nigeria has imported over $7 billion of agricultural food products and commodities per year, and it was the second largest importer of wheat from the United States in 2010/2011 (David, 2012; Nzeka, 2013). However, agriculture is still a staple of Nigeria’s economy, with mass production of maize, millet, rice, and sorghum (Osagie, 2013). Akinwumi Adesina, Nigeria's Minister for Agriculture, stated: “Only 2 percent of all bank lending in Nigeria goes into agriculture—a sector that is 40 percent of GDP and 70 percent of employment.”3 If the effects of climate change are not mitigated, the share of agriculture in GDP will decline from 40 percent to 15 percent, 3

Green (2013), paragraph 14.

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(Cervigni et al., 2013). However, Adesina has recently adopted reforms for agriculture, from which he is hoping to add 20 million metric tons to the domestic food supply by 2015 and create 2.5 million jobs through agriculture (Green, 2013). In October of 2013, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) warned Nigeria of an imminent food security threat (Osagie, 2013). Adesina’s reforms therefore need to be implemented as quickly as possible and in the most effective way to ensure that the circumstances in Nigeria do not escalate further. Figure 10 below shows just how much land is used for agriculture in India and Nigeria. In India and Nigeria, 60 and 80 percent, respectively, of the total land is used for agriculture. This shows how widespread the agriculture sector is in these countries and how important it is to maintain it. The land used for agriculture has remained about constant for India since 1975, indicating that India is likely using all the land suitable for agriculture. In Nigeria, the percentage of land used for agriculture has increased slightly during the 1980s and early 1990s, but has undergone some volatility since. The sharp decline during the last few years for which such data are available is certainly an alarming indicator, though further examination of the reasons for the decline is needed. Figure 10: Agricultural Land (percent of total land area), 1970-2009

Source: Created by author based on World Bank (2013b). IV.3. Efforts to Alleviate Effects of Climate Change In 1985, India introduced the Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme (CCIS) to provide insurance to farmers due to the extreme weather conditions (like droughts and monsoons) they already faced at that time. In 1999, the National Agricultural Insurance Scheme, an updated risk management tool, replaced CCIS, and now insurance is provided by the Agriculture Insurance Company of India (AICI), which is a public crop insurance firm. AICI offers insurance on food crops, oilseeds, and specific commercial crops based on an area yield. AICI is the only company providing such a service to Indian farmers (World Bank, 2011). Before 2013, India was unwilling to set forth efforts to reduce its GHG emissions because poverty eradication and social and economic development were considered to be first and over99

riding priorities (Worldwatch Institute, 2013). However, if the drastic impacts of climate change are not addressed, poverty will only become a more difficult problem to fix. Luckily, in July 2013, India announced that, along with 16 other countries, it would prevent the global average temperature from increasing by 2°C (Worldwatch Institute, 2013). India has also presented 20 initiatives to address at a domestic level, which are a part of India’s “National Action Plan on Climate Change” (Worldwatch Institute, 2013). This action plan also includes eight national missions (the solar mission, mission for enhanced energy efficiency in industry, mission on sustainable habitat, water mission, mission for sustaining the Himalayan ecosystem, mission for a “green India,” mission for sustainable agriculture, and a mission on strategic knowledge for climate change) to lessen India’s impact on climate change (Government of India, 2013). Nigeria, a large importer of agricultural products, especially wheat, is about to sign a bio-safety bill, which will allow for the managing and controlling of agricultural biotechnology in Nigeria in order to guarantee safety for the environment and human health. This bill will also make it possible to assess the risk of genetically engineered (GE) organisms before the release, including Living Modified Organisms (LMOs) like food products. In anticipation of this bill being signed, field trials are being conducted for cow pea, sorghum, and cassava varieties of wheat, in order to increase the domestic production of wheat and to decrease the country’s imports (Nzeka, 2013). Another program Nigeria has implemented is called Vision 20:2020, within which Nigeria has set out to become one of the world’s 20 largest economies by 2020 (Cervigni et al., 2013). This plan will implement irrigation systems applied to 0.6 to 1 million hectares, which will reduce the effects of climate change in the short run but will not eliminate its long-run effects (Cervigni et al., 2013). Therefore, irrigation expansion will be coupled with improving the management of 13 to 18 million rain-fed harvested areas, which will alleviate the spending on irrigation (Cervigni et al., 2013). Another project being carried out to help Nigeria with the effects of climate change is called Build Nigeria’s Response to Climate Change (BNRCC), which started as the Canada-Nigeria Climate Change Capacity Development Project (C-NCCCDP). It had a substantial effect on raising awareness of climate change effects and by gathering a group of individuals willing to work on these issues (BNRCC, 2008). The new project intends to increase the awareness by enhancing the capacity at the individual, corporate, and state levels to implement effective adaptation strategies, policies, and actions (BNRCC, 2008). All of the above initiatives that Nigeria has set fourth will aid in the effort to mitigate the effects of climate change. However, these projects and programs need to be widespread in order to make any significant changes in Nigeria’s agricultural sector. Nigeria also needs to implement a credit system for agriculture and an insurance program for farmers, such as that in India, in order to sustain its agricultural sector.

V.

Conclusion

Agriculture plays a large role in the economies of both India and Nigeria, making up a significant portion of their GDPs and labor work forces. In fact, it plays a large role around the world, as 40 percent of the Earth’s land is used for agriculture (Owen, 2005). However, due to the increasingly evident effects of climate change, such as extremes in temperature and precipitation, both India and Nigeria are now very vulnerable. Both of these countries have created programs to alleviate these effects before they become irreversible. However, between 100

2000 and 2010, CO2 emissions were the highest they have ever been. According to the IPCC, in order to not surpass the inevitable 2°C rise in global temperature, GHG emissions need to be reduced by 40 to 70 percent from the 2010 recorded emissions and to near-zero by 2100 (United Nations, 2014). There is hope, though, that new technologies combined with a new sense of global cooperation will stop, not turn back, the clock that spells disaster. This can happen, but only if countries join together and make it a common goal combined with the implementation of their own domestic programs. Providing renewable energy and reducing air pollution are only two ways to create a sustainable environment (United Nations, 2014). There also needs to be increased bank lending to the agricultural fields to enhance this sector. Not only will reducing the effects of climate change maintain India’s and Nigeria’s economies, but it will eventually improve the education, poverty, and livelihoods of the individuals in these developing countries. As stated by Hugh Sealy, Chair of the Executive Board that oversees the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), “when emission reductions come with other benefits, such as technology transfer, sustainable energy, increased household prosperity, clean air, education, or spur other types of sustainable development, then clearly this is in the best interest of everyone, in developed and developing countries.”4

References Apata, T. G.; K. D. Samuel; and A. O. Adeola (2009). Climate Change Perception and Adaptation Among Arable Food Crop Farmers in South Western Nigeria. Paper presented at the International Association of Agricultural Economists’ 2009 Conference; available at: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/51365/2/final%20IAAE%20doc..pdf. Birthal, P. S.; P. K. Joshi; Devesh Roy; and Amit Thorat (2007). Diversification in Indian Agriculture towards High-Value Crops: The Role of Smallholders. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Discussion Paper, No. 00727 (November); available at: http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/pubs/pubs/dp/ifpridp00727.pdf. Building Nigeria’s Response to Climate Change (BNRCC) (2008). Project Information; available at: http://www.nigeriaclimatechange.org/projectinformation.php. Bosello, Francesco; Lorenza Campagnola; and Fabio Eboli (2013). Climate Change and Adaptation: The Case of Nigerian Agriculture. Nota Di Lavoro, No. 35.2013; available at: http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/2013422153564NDL2013-035.pdf. Cervigni, Raffaello; Riccardo Valentini; and Monia Santini (2013). Toward Climate-Resilient Development in Nigeria (Washington, DC: The World Bank); available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9923-1. David, Michael (2012). Nigeria Agricultural Biotechnology Annual (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), USDA Foreign Agricultural Service) available at: http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Biotechnolog y%20Annual_Lagos_Nigeria_6-19-2012.pdf. 4

United Nations (2014), paragraph 9.

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Government of India (2013). National Action Plan on Climate Change (New Delhi, India: Government of India, Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change) available at: http://www.moef.nic.in/downloads/home/Pg01-52.pdf. Government of India (2012). Rice Profile (New Delhi, India: Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agriculture & Cooperation); available at: http://agricoop.nic.in/imagedefault/trade/Rice%20profile.pdf. Green, Adam Robert (2013). Akinwumi Adesina, Minister of Agriculture, Nigeria. Internet resource of: This is Africa / Analysis / Interview (July 30th, 2013); available at: http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/Analysis/Interview-Akinwumi-Adesina-Minister-ofAgriculture-Nigeria. Nzeka, Uche M. (2013). Nigeria’s Agricultural Biotechnology Update 2013 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), USDA Foreign Agricultural Service) available at: http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Biotechnolog y%20Annual_Lagos_Nigeria_9-11-2013.pdf. O’Brien, Karen; Robin Leichenko; Ulka Kelkar; Henry Venema; Guro Aandahl; Heather Tompkins; Akram Javed; Suruchi Bhadwal; Stephan Barg; Lynn Nygaard; and Jennifer West (2004). Mapping Vulnerability to Multiple Stressors: Climate Change and Globalization in India. Global Environmental Change, Vol. 14, No. 4 (December), pp. 303-331. Osagie, Crusoe (2013). Climate Change Threatens Food Security in Nigeria, Others. Internet resource of: This Day Live, News (October 15, 2013); available at: http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/climate-change-threatens-food-security-in-nigeriaothers/161641/. Owen, James (2005). Farming Claims Almost Half Earth’s Land, New Maps Show. Internet resource of: National Geographic News (December 9, 2005); available at: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/12/1209_051209_crops_map.html. Panda, Architesh (2009). Assessing Vulnerability to Climate Change in India. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 16 (April), pp. 105-107. Thaker, Jagadish and Anthony Leiserowitz (2014). Shifting Discourses of Climate Change in India. Climate Change, Vol. 123, No. 2 (March), pp. 107-119; available at: http://environment.yale.edu/climate-communication/files/Thaker and Leiserowitz_and_Leiserowitz_%282014%29_Shifting_discourses_of_climate_change_in _India.pdf. Sayne, Aaron (2011). Climate Change Adaptation and Conflict in Nigeria (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, Special Report); available at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Climate_Change_Nigeria.pdf. United Nations (2014). Brazil Kicks Off Carbon Neutral Goal for FIFA World Cup. Internet resource of: UN and Climate Change, Report of April 16, 2014; available at: http://www.un.org/climatechange/blog/2014/04/brazil-kicks-off-carbon-neutral-goal-forfifa-world-cup/. 102

United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Service (2012). Agricultural Sector. Internet Resource of: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Service, Topics / International Markets & Trade / Countries & Regions / India / Basic Information (last updated May 30, 2012); available at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/countriesregions/india/basic-information.aspx#agrisector. United States Energy Information Administration (USEIA) (2011) Independent Statistics & Analysis (Washington, DC: USEIA); available at: http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=45&aid=8&cid=regio ns&syid=1980&eyid=2010&unit=MMTCD. World Bank (2011). Enhancing Crop Insurance in India (Washington, DC: The World Bank, Report no. 61491-IN, April); available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2748/614910ESW0P1081 Technical0Report1FIN.pdf?sequence=1. World Bank (2013a). Warming Climate in India to Pose Significant Risk to Agriculture, Water Resources, Health, says World Bank (New Delhi: The World Bank); as available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/06/19/warming-climate-indiapose-significant-risk-agriculture-water-resources-health-says-world-bank-report. World Bank (2013b). World Development Indicators / Global Development Finance database (Washington, DC: The World Bank); as posted on the World Bank website: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/ (downloaded on April 3, 2013). Worldwatch Institute: Vision for a Sustainable World (2013). India Steps Up Climate Change Efforts. Internet resource of Worldwatch Institute, Eye on Earth online news service; available at: http://www.worldwatch.org/node/6278.

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Global Majority E-Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2 (December 2014), pp. 104-116

Agriculture in Kenya and Uganda: Relevance, Behavior, and Performance Giorgio Zenere

Abstract Kenya and Uganda are neighboring countries located in the great Lake Regions of East Africa. They share a substantial portion of one of the biggest lakes: Lake Victoria. They are both poor and agriculture-based countries. However, there are significant differences in the level of development, climate, contribution of agriculture to gross domestic product (GDP), agricultural behavior and agricultural performance between these two countries. This paper will focus on illustrating these differences by using the data available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. It shows that Kenya is overall more developed, uses far more fertilizers, withdraws far more water for agriculture, and uses far more tractors than Uganda. However, Uganda has made more progress during the last three decades in increasing the value added of its agriculture (in constant 2000 US$). On the other hand, Kenya has made more progress in increasing the production of food per capita.

I.

Introduction

Kenya and Uganda are sub-Saharan African, agriculture-based countries. They are considered to be among the developing world’s leaders in a variety of different agricultural productions. The countries’ politics concerning agriculture were revolutionized in the 1950s as the British colonial policy encouraged the development of co-operatives for subsistence farmers to increase their production such that the surplus can be sold in international markets. British official David Gordon Hines and his team established a co-operative bank and developed the marketing of agricultural goods of both countries. Despite the same British influence, Kenya turned out to be far wealthier than Uganda in terms of agricultural production, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, partly for being more industrialized than Uganda. However, some indicators tend to show that Uganda is catching up with Kenya’s economic wealth. This paper will analyze the changes in the relevance of agriculture for the two countries, the different agricultural behaviors of Kenya and Uganda, as well as the different performances in agriculture. It is structured into seven sections. Following this introduction, the next section 104

presents some empirical background on key human development indicators and the share of agriculture as percentage of GDP. The fourth section summarizes the relevance of the agricultural sectors, while the fifth section examines the different behaviors in the agricultural sector. The sixth section reviews the performance of the agricultural sector before the last section provides some conclusions.

II.

Literature Review

Kenya and Uganda are countries where the agricultural strategies have been studied and debated by many scholars. Although academic research on the comparison of these countries agricultural behaviors is almost inexistent, many publications discuss the countries’ agriculture individually. The following five publications discuss some of the most important agricultural strategies implemented in Kenya and Uganda and their consequences on the populations’ economic situations. 

Wenner (1983) describes how he changed Kenya’s agricultural behaviors by establishing low-cost terraces, using dead crop residues from the field into ridges across the slope. In addition, Wenner talks about educating the farmers to promote soil conservation rather than absolutely striving for the maximum yield possible. Wenner explains how he helped implementing a new agricultural law on soil conservation. Wenner blames the industrial world for implementing practices that cannot sustain agriculture in the long-run, such as “over-irrigation” and the excessive development of agricultural infrastructure that are not compatible with Kenya’s situation. Furthermore, Wenner describes how afforestation helped the country prevent the desertification of the land. Finally, the article points out that a) too little research is done on traditional agriculture and b) insufficient funds are allocated towards this type of research.



The Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) (2014) reviewed Kenya’s food security, focusing especially on the role of irrigation. The report begins with pointing out that even though 80 percent of the country can be considered arid and semi-arid, agriculture contributes about 24 percent of Kenya’s GDP. Climate change is worsening the aridity situation, as the weather’s variability is not suitable to support a sustainable production of food. The report discusses several strategies to mitigate and facilitate the adaption to the climate variability such as increasing the area under irrigated agriculture.



A report by Uganda’s National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO) (2012) discusses how a new project regarding the use and distribution of seeds was implemented and improved traditional agricultural practices in Uganda. According to the publication, farmers in the West Nile agro-ecological zone of Uganda have been growing mainly local varieties of crops whose productivity was low compared to the improved varieties. This was attributed to lack of adequate access to seeds of improved varieties and inadequate knowledge on good agronomic practices. The primary objective of the project was to make available seeds of improved varieties of groundnuts, beans, rice and cassava to farmers in the West Nile region; thereby establishing a sustainable seed delivery system. The project was executed in the districts of Adjumani, Yumbe and Nebbi, where the lack of adequate access to seeds and poor skills of growing improved crop varieties is reported to be a major cause hindering adoption of improved crop varieties and subsequently low 105

crop production. After some land preparation and training of farmers, farmers were provided with planting materials such as seeds of rice, cassava, groundnuts and beans. The report shows that the project was a success: there has been an increase in the production based on quality of the seeds but also because of the efficiency of seed distribution. 

III.

Okoboi and Barungi (2013) wrote an acclaimed scholarly article, which discusses the use of organic and inorganic fertilizer as a response to the declining soil fertility in Uganda. Uganda is among the countries with the highest-level of soil nutrient loss in the world even though the use of fertilizer in crop production in Uganda remains low. The proper use of fertilizers could lead to higher economic growth and poverty reduction through increased agricultural productivity and output. The article points out that less than onefifth of agricultural households receive extension services. The article then concludes that this inadequate access to extension services (that provide technical advice) is a major constraint for the broader adoption of fertilizer. Fertilizer use, access to credit and use of irrigation are closely linked. Therefore, any successful intervention to promote fertilizer use in Uganda will have to be accompanied with complementary inputs and services.

Empirical Background

III.1. Human Development As Figure 1 shows, 30 years ago, Uganda was a much poorer country than Kenya, if measuring poverty in terms of GDP per capita. Uganda’s GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted constant 2005 dollars) stood at $568 in 1982 (which is the first year for which such data is available for Uganda), while that of Kenya was $1,342. Hence, in 1982, Uganda’s GDP per capita constituted 42 percent of Kenya’s GDP per capita. However, as Kenya has made very little progress during the last 30 years, Uganda has nearly caught up with Kenya by 2011 (the latest available data). In 2011, Uganda’s GDP per capita had more than doubled since 1982, reaching $1,188 in 2011. Kenya’s GDP per capita increased by only 12.5 percent over nearly three decades, reaching $1,509 in 2011. As we will show below, differences in agricultural behaviors and policies have contributed to these very different developments. Figure 1: GDP per capita (in PPP-adjusted constant 2005 dollar), 1982-2011

Source: Created by author based on World Bank data (2013). 106

Despite some differences and some similarities in the evolution of life expectancy between the two countries during the last 30 years, Figure2 shows that Uganda has also nearly caught up with Kenya in terms of life expectancy at birth. In 1982, Uganda’s life expectancy was nearly 9 years below that of Kenya’s. By 2011, the difference was reduced to only three years. Mostly due the HIV/AIDS epidemic, Kenya experienced a relatively sharp decrease in life expectancy from 1988 to 2002, while Uganda experienced a relatively sharp decrease from 1982 to 1996. Due to the late and slow recovery, Kenya’s life expectancy of 2011 has actually been below Kenya’s life expectancy of 1982, while that of Uganda has overall increased by 4.1 years during the last 30 years. Figure 2: Life Expectancy at Birth, 1982-2011

Source: Created by author based on World Bank data (2013). Even though reliable data on adult literacy rates are scarce for both countries, Figure 3 shows that Kenya’s population is far more literate than that of Uganda’s. In the early 2000s, Kenya’s literacy rate stood at 82.2 percent, while Uganda’s stood at 68.1 percent. By 2010, both countries have increased their adult literacy rates by about 5 percentage points: Kenya’s increased to 87.4 percent, while that of Uganda increased to 73.2 percent. Figure 3: Adult Literacy Rates (selected years)

Source: Created by author based on World Bank data (2013). 107

III.2. Geographies and Climates of Kenya and Uganda1 Kenya's terrain is composed of low plains that rise into central highlands that are, in turn, bisected by the Great Rift Valley. There is also a fertile plateau in the west of the country. Kenya’s climate varies by location, from mostly cool every day, to always warm/hot. Along the coast, the climate is tropical, which means that rainfall and temperatures are higher throughout the year. Further inside of Kenya, the climate becomes more arid, with nearly no rainfall. Uganda is a located country in Eastern Africa, west of Kenya. It is in the heart of the Great Lakes region, surrounded by Lake Edward, Lake Albert, and Lake Victoria. Despite being on the equator, Uganda is more temperate than Kenya due to Uganda’s altitude. The country is mostly plateau with a rim of mountains. This has made it more suitable to agriculture and less prone to tropical diseases than other nations in the region. The climate is tropical; generally rainy with two dry seasons (December to February, and June to August). Only in the very north (near Sudan) is the climate semiarid. Figure 4: Topography of Uganda (left picture) and Kenya (right picture)

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Kenya and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Uganda. Though Uganda’s land area is with 197,100 square kilometer (km2) about one third of Kenya’s land area (569,140 km2), given that the percentage of arable land is much higher in Uganda (27.94 percent) than in Kenya (9.48 percent), Kenya and Uganda have about the same amount of arable land, amounting respectively to 53,954 km2 and 55,070 km2.

1

Unless otherwise stated, most of this section has been adapted from Wikipedia’s information on the geographies of Kenya and Uganda, respectively available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Kenya and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Uganda.

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However, due to the high level of poverty and resource scarcity in both countries, the land used for agriculture is far larger than what is considered to be arable land. According to the World Bank (2013), Kenya’s agricultural land amounted in 2009 (the last year such data is available) to 273,500 km2, (which represents 48.05 percent of Kenya’s total land area), while that of Uganda amounted to 139,620 km2 (which represents 69.88 percent of Uganda’s total land area) in 2009.

IV.

Economic Relevance of Agriculture

As of today, agriculture remains a major economic engine in Kenya and Uganda. In 2011, the share of agriculture in GDP amounted to 28.5 percent in Kenya and to 23.4 percent in Uganda. As shown in Figure 5, for Kenya, the share of agriculture in GDP remains almost constant at around 30 percent since 1970. For Uganda, it increased from 53.8 percent in 1970 to a maximum of 74.3 percent in 1978. After two years of volatility, it then dropped very sharply from 72.0 percent in 1980 to 53.7 percent in 1982, after which it remained around that level for most of the 1980s. Since then, Uganda’s share of agriculture in GDP experienced a slow, but almost steady decline, reaching 23.4 percent in 2011. Figure 5: Share of Agriculture in GDP, 1970-2010

Source: Created by author based on World Bank data (2013). Despite these relative small shares of agriculture to GDP, agriculture remains an important source of employment in both countries. In 2005 (which is the only year such data exists for both countries), the percentage of employment in agriculture amounted to 61.1 percent of total employment for Kenya and 71.6 percent for Uganda; see Figure 6.

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Figure 6: Share of Agricultural Employment in Total Employment in 2005

Source: Created by author based on World Bank data (2013). Agriculture also remains an important source of exports for both countries. As shown in Figure 7, while the percentage of food imports in total merchandise imports ranged between 10 and 20 percent for both countries during 1994-2010, the share of food exports in total merchandise exports was much higher. During 1994-2010, it ranged between 30 and 60 percent for Kenya, and between 60 and 93 percent for Uganda. Figure 7: Food Exports and Imports as Percentage of Merchandise Exports and Imports, 1994-2010 Food exports (% of merchandise exports)

Food imports (% of merchandise imports)

100.0

25.0

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1997

2000 Kenya

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Source: Created by author based on World Bank data (2013).

V.

Agricultural Behaviors in Kenya and Uganda

Two major agricultural behaviors that shape the productivity of agriculture are intensification and expansion of cultivation. The debate whether one should resort to intensification to produce more yield per hectare (ha) through the use of fertilizers and insecticides or if one should use expand its agriculturally used land in order to produce more has been ongoing for many years. 110

It is argued that the use of fertilizers impoverishes the soil quality and productivity over time; thus, resorting to intensification works amazingly well in the short run but is incredibly dangerous for the production in the long run (Okoboi and Barungi, 2013). Furthermore, insecticides can permanently damage the plantations, as well as having nefarious consequences on human health. However, many scholars argue that fertilizers should still be used because their advantage outstand the drawbacks. In fact, not all fertilizers have nefarious effects. There are two types of fertilizers: organic and inorganic. According to Okoboi and Barungi (2013), inorganic fertilizers generate a soil nutrient loss in the long run, whereas organic fertilizers do not. V.1.

Use of Fertilizer

Based on the World Bank’s (2013) World Development Indicators, Kenya is using at least ten times more fertilizer than Uganda. During the period of years for which such data is available (2002-2009), Kenya’s fertilizer consumption ranged between 27.3 kilogram (kg) per ha of arable land to 36.4 kg per ha of arable land. During the same time period, Uganda’s fertilizer consumption ranged between 1.0 kg per ha of arable land and 3.0 kg per ha of arable land. Despite the fraction of Uganda’s fertilizer use, Okoboi and Barungi claim that Uganda is among the countries with the highest level of soil nutrient loss in the world because farm-households are uneducated and apply both organic and inorganic fertilizers at the same time. According to their study, women are more likely to use inorganic fertilizers than men. If Uganda would use more organic fertilizers, the drastic increase in production will indirectly lead to higher economic growth and an acceleration in poverty reduction. V.2.

Freshwater Withdrawals

Similar to Uganda’s far lower fertilizer use, Uganda’s annual freshwater withdrawals due to agriculture is also a fraction of that of Kenya’s. Based on the World Bank’s (2013) World Development Indicators, Uganda’s annual freshwater withdrawals due to agriculture amounted to 120 million cubic meters in 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2011, while Kenya’s annual freshwater withdrawals due to agriculture amounted to 1,566 million cubic meters in 1997 and 2002, and to 2,165 million cubic meters in 2007 and 2011. Uganda’s far lower freshwater withdrawal is obviously related to a) the different climate of Kenya and Uganda (see section III.2 above) and b) that Kenya’s agriculture is more developed than that of Uganda. Consistent with Kenya’s much higher freshwater withdrawals is that Kenya’s irrigated land amounted to 1032 km² in 2003, while that of Uganda amounted to only 144.2 km² in 2010.2 According to the Kenyan Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) (2014), climate change is worsening Kenya’s aridity situation because the increased weather variability is not suitable to support a sustainable production of food. Although the irrigation potential for Kenya is estimated at 540,000 ha, only about 106,600 ha are under irrigation. In other words, only 20 percent of the potential area is irrigated. On the other hand, Uganda used to rely on natural precipitations for irrigation. However, the Ugandan government has now established a 25-years master plan on irrigation. According to the 2

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Kenya for Kenya and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Uganda for Uganda.

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BBC (2014), officials established the total area under formal irrigation in Uganda to be of 14,418 ha out of an estimated 560,000 ha with irrigation potential. The plan is to increase the utilization of land from 5 percent to 10 percent by 2015, to 25 percent by 2020 and to 70 percent by 2035. V.3.

Use of Tractors

Kenya also uses far more tractors than Uganda. Despite some data limitations, especially for Uganda, Figure 8 shows that Kenya had three to four times the amount of tractors per 100 km2 of arable land than Uganda during most of the 1970s. Figure 8: Tractors per 100 square km of Arable Land (all available years)

Source: Created by author based on World Bank data (2013). V.4.

Expansion of Agricultural Land

When intensification is not adopted, the other strategy to increase agricultural production is by expanding the area of land dedicated to agricultural production. Land expansion is beneficial but has limits due to urbanization as well as the overall limits on surface area of a country. Figure 9 shows that the evolution of agricultural land from 1982 to 2009, which indicates that Kenya has only marginally increased its agricultural land (from 44.94 percent to 48.1 percent of Kenya’s total land), while Uganda has increased its agricultural land from 54.25 percent to 69.88 percent of Uganda’s total land. In any case, while making these comparisons, we should also take into account that Kenya’s population was about 39.5 million in 2009, while Uganda’s population was 32.4 million in 2009. Kenya’s population growth rates stood at around 3.5 percent during the 1970s and 1980s, but decreased to about 2.5 percent in the 2000s. Uganda’s population growth accelerated from around 3.0 percent in the 1970s to a maximum of 3.65 percent in 1988, after which it gradually declined, reaching 3.2 percent in 2011. In other words, the population pressure has been slightly higher in Uganda than in Kenya.

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Figure 9: Agricultural Land (percent of total land area), 1982-2009

Source: Created by author based on World Bank data (2013). V.5.

Specialization, New Seeds and GM Crops

Kenya and Uganda have similar historical background that led to the adoption of specific agricultural behaviors, especially concerning the diversification of their production. After their independence, many commercial farms were implemented in Kenya and Uganda. These commercial farms mostly focus on opportunities in international markets and have led the countries to diversify their agricultural productions based on comparative advantage. According to Kenya’s National Irrigation Board (2013), commercial farms hold about 40 percent of the countries arable land, which shifted the agricultural production from a production focused on provisioning the populations to an agriculture focused on highly valued secondary “niche” that will be sold overseas such as tropical fruits or tobacco. The Kenyan government holds about 18 percent of arable land and produces mainly sustainable agriculture, avoiding extensive use of fertilizers (in some cases), over-irrigation and highly toxic insecticides. Finally, smallholders in Kenya hold about 42 percent of the land, providing the essential food to the provisioning of the populations; most of the time they misuse fertilizers and do not practice sustainable agriculture because of a lack of education; the lack of knowledge impedes them to properly use modern agricultural technique. Commercial farms are leading producers of coffee, tea, and mangoes, whereas smallholders specialized in the production of cabbage, onion, and mangoes (Okoboi 2013). In Uganda, commercial farms have specialized in the production of sugar and tobacco, whereas smallholders have specialized in the production of cotton, coffee, crops, tea, livestock and beekeeping. However, according to NARO (2012), Uganda has resorted to the use of new variety of seeds that are more productive than traditional seeds, especially concerning groundnuts, rice and cassava. These new seeds have allowed to reduce the cost of production and to increase the productivity of the cultivations. Another strategy implemented in Uganda but forbidden in Kenya is the use of genetically modified (GM) crops. GM crops are modified to be more resistant to insects, which increases the production of the arable land. Some GM crops were also introduced to provide more caloric and/or more proteinous food, which is very useful to overcome hunger. However, because the 113

long-term effects these crops might have are unknown, many people are skeptical regarding the safety of their use. In addition, some scientists argue that there is enough food production in the world and that the food penuries are only due to bad allocations of food. Nonetheless, it is surprising that Kenya has forbidden the use of GM crops (see Owino, 2012) when the United States only sends food aid in form of GM maize.

VI.

Performance of Agriculture

We had noted above (Figure 5) that the share of agriculture in GDP remained almost constant at around 30 percent for Kenya, while it increased in Uganda from 53.8 percent in 1970 to a maximum of 74.3 percent in 1978, after which it declined with some volatility to 23.4 percent in 2011. Neither trend does however say much about the performance of the agricultural sector as it is normal for the share of agriculture declines as countries develop. We therefore look at value added in constant US dollars and the evolution of the food production index. Figure 10 shows the value added of agriculture in billions of constant 2000 US dollars for both countries from 1982-2011. A first observation is that Kenya’s agricultural sector is much larger than that of Uganda’s. A second observation is that the value added by agriculture increased in both countries. It nearly doubled in Kenya from US$2.5 billion in 1982 to US$4.7 billion in 2011, while it more than doubled in Uganda from 1.0 billion in 1982 to 2.3 billion in 2011. Figure 10: Value Added of Agriculture (in billions of constant 2000 US$)

Source: Created by author based on World Bank data (2013). However, as Figure 11 shows, in per capita terms, the value added by agriculture shows a slightly declining trend for both counties during 1982-2011. It initially declined in Kenya from US$141 in 1982 to US$113 in 1993, after which it remained (despite some volatility) at that level until 2011. For Uganda, the per capita value added by agriculture stood at US$76 in 1982 and nearly remained at that value until 2002, after which is declined slightly to US$66 in 2011. 114

Figure 11: Value Added per capita of Agriculture (in constant 2000 US$)

Source: Created by author based on World Bank data (2013). Looking at the food production index (left hand panel of Figure 12) and the food production per capita index (right hand panel of Figure 12) provide a slightly different result than looking at value added in monetary terms. Based on food production, Kenya did slightly better than Uganda as the food production index more than doubled in Kenya (from 100 in 1982 to 239 in 2011), while it nearly exactly doubled in Uganda (from 100 in 1982 to 199 in 2011). Given Uganda’s higher population growth, Kenya’s progress is even better in per capita terms: Kenya’s food production per capita index was 4 index points higher in 2010 than in 1982, while it dropped by about 20 index points from 1982 to 2010 in Uganda. Figure 12: Food Production Index and Food Production per capita Index, 1982-2010 Food production index (1982 = 100) 260.0

Food production per capita index (1982 = 100) 110.0

240.0

105.0

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Source: Created by author based on World Bank data (2013).

VII. Conclusion Due to the similarities in terms of location, colonial past, and the influence of industrialized countries, it could be assumed that Kenya and Uganda have similar agricultural behaviors. However, when comparing the agricultural behaviors implemented in Kenya and Uganda, it can 115

be seen that Kenya uses far more fertilizer, withdraws far more freshwater for irrigation, and also uses far more tractors. On the other hand, Uganda was more successful in expanding the land used for agricultural production and is also more open to GM crops than Kenya. Overall, there is some indication that agricultural practices are more sustainable in Uganda than in Kenya. While both countries were successful in increasing the value added of agriculture in terms of constant US$ during 1982 and 2011, in per capita terms, the value added of agriculture decreased slightly for both countries, though more so for Kenya than for Uganda. However, examining the index of food production over the same time period, shows that Kenya has made more progress than Uganda. In per capita terms, Kenya’s food production index increased by 5 index points, while that of Uganda decreased by 20 index points during 1982 and 2011. Clearly, taking the future challenges (like continuing high population growth and climate change) into account, both countries need to make major investments in agriculture if they want to be able to feed their population in the future.

References BBC (2013). Kenya Aquifers Discovered in Dry Turkana Region. Internet resource of: BBC News of September 11, 2013; available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/scienceenvironment-24049800. Wenner, Carl-Gösta (1983). Soil Conservation in Kenya. Ambio, Vol. 12, No. 6, pp. 305-307; available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4312954. Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) (2014). Achieving Food and Nutrition Security in Kenya: The Role of Irrigation (Nairobi, Kenya: KIPPRA); available at: http://www.kippra.org/News-and-Highlights/achieving-food-and-nutrition-security-inkenya-the-role-of-irrigation.html. National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO) (2012). Establishment of a Farmer-based Seed Multiplication and Delivery System for Improved Varieties of Cassava, Beans, Groundnuts and Rice in West Nile Zone, Uganda (Westlands, Kenya: Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA)). National Irrigation Board (2013). Expanded Irrigation Programme. Internet resource of the National Irrigation Board; available at: http://www.nib.or.ke/irrigationprogrammes/expanded-irrigation-programme.html. Okoboi, Geofrey and Mildred Barungi (2012). Constraints to Fertilizer Use in Uganda: Insights from Uganda Census of Agriculture 2008/9. Journal of Sustainable Development, Vol. 5, No. 10, pp. 99-113; available at: http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jsd/article/view/19887. Owino, Otieno (2012). Scientists Torn over Kenya’s Recent GM Food Ban. Internet resource of: SciDev.Net (November 30, 2012); available at: http://www.scidev.net/global/nutrition/news/scientists-torn-over-kenya-s-recent-gm-foodban.html. World Bank (2013) World Development Indicators / Global Development Finance database (Washington, DC: The World Bank); as posted on the World Bank website: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/ (downloaded on February 27th, 2013). 116

Global Majority E-Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2 (December 2014), pp. 117-127

No One Wants a Baby Girl: Analyzing Gendercide in China and India Samantha Ufret

Abstract In recent years, India’s and China’s rapid economic has caught the eye of developed nations. While it confuses some and sings praises from others, India and China's rise to competitive economic powers is a sign that their status as developing nations could change sooner than many would have expected. Despite their rapid development, India and China’s neglect of gender inequality, especially the gendercide phenomenon, not only draws harsh criticisms from world governments, but also affects their ability to compete in the global economy because it perpetuates issues such as poverty, violence, and dramatically reduces human capital. This article focuses on the factors that explain gendercide in India and China.

I.

Introduction

India and China have been among the most influential countries in the world for centuries. From the early days of trade with silk, tea and spices, to their recent economic rise in the global market, India and China have continuously captivated the interest of Western powers. However, with this praise and attention comes scrutiny and even outrage at commonplace cultural norms that most would deem unacceptable by global standards. Yet, as they continue to develop their economies, little is being done to address some of the social ills. For both India and China, the most prevalent issue is the alarming levels of inequality between men and women. India and China are traditionally patriarchal cultures, meaning there is a higher value, socially and monetarily, on males. Women are subject to severe mistreatment, neglect, and abuse by not only their societies, but also by the very families that should support them. Indian and Chinese baby girls are victims of a unique, but highly alarming trend known as gendercide: the systemic annihilation of female fetuses solely for their sex in preference of their male counterpart. This systemic destruction has led to a phenomenon called “missing girls”,1 meaning 1

According to Subramanya Dehejia (2011), the term “missing women” was first coined by Nobel economist, Amartya Sen in 1990, referring to the excess mortality of women in the developing world.

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that there are as many as 200 million girls missing in the world today because baby girls are killed, aborted and abandoned simply because they are girls.2 Figure 1 shows the ratio of live births of males to females over the last six decades. The natural sex ratio is about 106 males for every 100 females born,3 although the exact value is subject to debate in the scientific community. Both, China and India were very close to the natural ratio from 1950 to 1985. However, as Figure 1 shows, the ratio started to increase in the mid-1980s. By 2005-2010, the ratio was 111 in India and an alarmingly off balance value of 117 in China. Figure 1: Sex Ratio at Birth (male births per female births), 1950-2010

Source: Created by author based on United Nations (2013). The Indian and Chinese governments have done little to address gender issues. They fail to realize that, if they made a serious effort towards addressing gender inequality, it would ultimately aid in their development by increasing human capital and employment, and end major issues like poverty and violence. This article addresses the key factors contributing to gendercide in China and India, which are discussed following a brief literature review and some empirical background. The last section provides some conclusions.

II.

Brief Literature Review

Separately for each country, there are various scholarly articles, books, reports, and documentaries on gender inequality. However, articles comparing their progress are only just emerging, and mostly focus on summaries of their overall progress as opposed to comparing specific issues related to their progress. 

2 3

In an article entitled “The Many Faces of Gender Inequality”, Amartya Sen (2001) talks about the various types of gender inequality that plague women in developing countries. The article highlights many of the key features the women of these two countries, especially women India, are currently facing in regards to gender inequality like access to

It’s a Girl (2012), Synopsis, see: http://www.itsagirlmovie.com/en/synopsis. Grech, Savona-Ventura and Vassallo-Agius (2002).

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high-paying jobs and division of household labor. Sen also notes that because gender inequality utilizes so many different facets, there is no cure-all remedy for it--and for that reason--countries can typically shift from one form of gender inequality to another when there is reform. 

In a more recent article by Amartya Sen (2011), entitled “Quality of Life: India vs. China”, Sen first addresses the recent hype surrounding India’s rising gross national product (GNP) and how it may overtake China’s. He then goes on to show how India’s rising GNP will not be important unless it can also catch up in terms of living standards. Sen states that India’s single-minded goal of strengthening the economy without reinforcing support for social issues will only allow it to grow within a certain limit.



Yuping Zhang, Grace Kao, and Emily Hannum (2007) study whether women in rural areas of China practice gender equality or conform to stricter, gender biases. Zhang et al. studied women and children in rural farmlands across China for their results. Based on their findings, they concluded that, despite what common conceptions may be, rural mothers are fairly egalitarian in terms of gender equality. While differences in terms of prioritizing education for boys and girls were apparent, there was still a decent push for higher education. They also discovered that since mothers in rural areas are the primary care givers that rear and socialize children, their individual attitudes and personal experiences with education are major factors for whether they will push their daughters to pursue higher education.



In a 2011 article in The Economist, entitled “Growth is not Enough”, The Economist analyzes how discrimination against women is independent of economic growth. While the idea of male preferences is strongly imbedded in Asian society and is reinforced by lower pay and employment rates for women, the article points out that even the richest areas of China show strong preferences for male babies, despite the fact that they have the disposable income to care for girls.



Elizabeth Vargas (2011) explores India’s gendercide based on a fact finding trip to India in June 2011. She reports that India undergoes a systematic, widespread, shocking elimination of India’s baby girls. Some 50,000 female fetuses are aborted every month in India. Among those who are born, many are killed at birth by either throwing them into rivers or leaving them to die in garbage dumps. She reports that it is estimated that one million girls in India “disappear” every year. Vargas also looks into some of the reasons for India’s gendercide.



In “Gender Differentials in Literacy in India”, Aparna Sundaram and Reeve Vanneman (2008) draw attention to a surprising trend in increased labor participation and lower literacy rates for Indian women. In an analysis conducted in over 400 districts throughout India, results showed that women in areas with higher workforce participation actually had lower literacy rates than their counterparts in areas where women in the workforce were less prevalent. Sundaram and Vanneman hypothesize that, particularly in poorer districts, families who have mothers and daughters that enter the workforce, or have traditional patriarchal family systems, are more likely to keep them out of school in exchange for higher economic returns. While Sundaram and Venneman understand that not all types of employment would hinder girls’ education, they note that allowing them to work in certain industries easily hinders their ability to receive education on par with 119

boys because they are hazardous, time consuming, or give such good pay that parents are more willing to keep them working than in school. 

III.

On the positive side, Tania Branigan (2011) wrote an interesting news article for The Guardian, in which she looked at how the shortage of brides in China has started to a) reduce the traditional preferences for boys and b) created a positive change in attitudes towards women, even though China is far from reaching gender equality.

Empirical Background

China’s and India’s gendercide stems from a collection of cultural, economic, and, population trends that ultimately hinder both national and social development. While each trend contributes to gender inequality in its own right, all are connected through overlapping factors that not only continue this vicious cycle, but also fuel worsening conditions for women in both countries. We will cover these connections in-depth in the next section. This section provides some empirical background on the evolution of GDP per capita, life expectancy, poverty gaps, and the sex ratios at birth over the last few decades. Currently, China and India are the two fastest growing economies in Asia. With average annual GDP growth rates at about 10 percent and 8 percent, respectively, over the last few decades, China and India have flourishing economies. Figure 2 shows that China’s GDP per capita (adjusted for differences in purchasing power) increased more than ten times between 1980 ($524) and 2011 ($7,418), while that of India increased nearly four times during the same time period. Figure 2: GDP per capita (in constant 2005 international $, PPP), 1980-2011

Source: Created by author based on World Bank (2013). Matching rising incomes per capita, Figure 3 shows the progress made in reducing the headcount ratio of poverty in China and India. China has seen a solid decrease in the percentage of its citizens living below the $1.25-a-day and $2.00-a-day poverty lines. Despite some spikes, the decrease has been stable and steady since the late 1990s. With about 12 percent of its population living below $1.25-a-day and about 30 percent living below $2-a-day, this makes China a developing nation with a prevalent upper middle class. Though there is much less data available for India, India seems to have made more steady progress in decreasing poverty. However, the 120

decrease has not been as substantial as China’s, considering that more than 30 percent of India’s population lived below $1.25-a-day and nearly 70 percent of its population lived below $2-a-day in 2010. While India has a growing middle class, they are mostly lower middle income. India still has a long way to go to reduce poverty. Figure 3: Chinese and Indian Poverty Headcounts at $1.25 and $2.00, all available years India: Poverty Headcount (all available years)

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Figure 4 shows that the progress made with reducing the depth of poverty (measured by the poverty gap) is highly correlated to each country’s progress made in reducing the poverty incidence. Despite some spikes, China has seen a solid decrease in the depth of poverty, while India’s decrease in the depth of poverty has been more limited. Figure 4: Chinese and Indian Poverty Gaps at $1.25 and $2.00, all available years India: Poverty Gaps (all available years)

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Source: Created by author based on World Bank (2013). 121

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Figure 5 shows the evolution of female and male life expectancies from 1970 to 2011 for both countries. As is the case in most countries, females can currently expect to live about 3 years longer than males in both, China and India. This difference in life expectancy has been relatively stable during the last three decades in China. However, in India, males were expected to live longer than females until 1981. For the subsequent four years (1982-1985), the female and male life expectancies were basically the same (the difference was less than one month). Since 1986, the female life expectancy has grown slightly faster than that of the males, reaching a difference of 3.1 years by 2011. Figure 5: Female & Male Life Expectancies for China & India (in years), 1970-2011 China: Male & Female Life Expectancies

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Despite the progress made in terms of life expectancies, Figure 6 above shows that female literacy rates still lack behind those for males, especially in India. While China has made significant progress in reducing the gap (and has also far higher literacy rates for males than India), the gap between male and female literacy rates has remained nearly stable at around 2530 percentage points in India. Looking at India’s literacy rates strongly echoes Sen’s (2011) statement that India’s rising income will not be important unless it can also catch up in terms of living standards. In terms of literacy rates, India is today about where China was in the early 1980s.

IV.

Discussion

IV.1. Cultural Reasons for Gendercide India and China’s society venerate patriarchies, meaning they favor males in family units over females. As with any society of this nature, it is expected that there will be some notable inequalities between genders. However, China and India have taken these cultural norms to such an extreme that it has perpetuated significantly conditions for women and girls now more than ever before. According to “It’s a Girl,” a documentary that discusses female gendercide in China and India, there are over 200,000 “missing” or aborted girls in India each year. In both China and India, there are as many as 1,500 sex-selective abortions conducted each hour (It’s a Girl, 2012). In interviews and discussions, Indian women have admitted to killing their baby girls because they would not want them to suffer in the dehumanizing environment they have been subjected to all their lives (It’s a Girl, 2012). Families will also abort females because they will cost the family more money in the long-run, and therefore come with a higher opportunity cost than males within Chinese and Indian cultures. Moreover, as a result of these practices, it is no coincidence that China has the highest rate of female suicide in the world (It’s a Girl, 2012). Nor is surprising that women and girls in China are more likely than women in other countries to be kidnapped and sold into sex slavery or as future brides for families with sons who fear they may not find someone marry. Since males are culturally more desirable, it is not surprising that families would choose to have a male child over a female child when presented with a choice. There are gruesome stories of mothers who had murdered their daughters. As reported by Izri (2012), the “It’s a Girl” documentary shows that some mothers crushed their baby girls’ necks, poisoned their milk or used damp cloths to suffocate them. All these mothers killed their baby girls to save their daughters from lives in poverty and violence. If cultural norms continue to push for a society that treats women as commodities and machines with no recognition of their own wants and needs, Indian and Chinese women will continue to suffer as their countries develop. IV.2. Financial Reasons for Gendercide China and India have attributed monetary values based on sex. Sons are primarily the ones that gain, property, inheritance and own land, so they represent the bulk of wealth in these cultures. Daughters, on the other hand, usually gain nothing, and when they are given away during marriage, are expected to bring a dowry with them from their families, despite the fact that the practice has been outlawed for decades. Families that bear daughters not only suffer emotional loss, but monetary loss as well, and for that reason, would rather abandon, kill, or abort girls in a part of the world whose focus at the moment is to gain financially. 123

The empirical data suggests that gender norms coupled with rampant poverty place a real value on children: males represent a potential positive financial gain for the families, while females represent a debt or loss to the household. Since men are the ones who typically inherit property, control family wealth, and take care of aging parents, they provide a net gain for the household. Females on the other hand are not considered do contribute to the household’s wealth. Instead, females are a poor investment for families as they must pay an exorbitant amount of money to her husband and lose her from their family unit once they get married. This is definitely still the case in India (and was to a lower degree also the case until recently in China). When the cultural and financial issues collide it perpetuates gendercide. There is no financial reason to have a girl child, subsequently, infant mortality rates are significantly higher for females than males in both countries (It’s a Girl, 2012).4 Looking at Figure 7 on the next page, it is quite obvious that men are the breadwinners in China and especially in India. In India, the male labor force participation rate has hovered around 80 percent for the last 20 years, while that of women has been around 32 percent until it even fell below 30 percent in the last few years. While the gender gap has been far lower in China (amounting to about 10 percentage points), the data does not indicate any narrowing of the gender gap during the last two decades in either country. Women remain to be expected to care for the household and many have no way of proving that they can be a financial benefit to their families. Figure 7: Male and Female Employment Population Ratios for China and India, 1991-2010 China: Male & Female Employment Ratios

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Source: Created by author based on World Bank (2013). IV.3. Drivers of Gendercide The main driver for gendercide in India continues to be poverty. Poverty forces families to choose what gender their children have. Unlike boys, female children are considered to come with a set of fixed costs and no returns. Among the most significant costs, is dowry, which is more or less a percentage of the families’ net wealth. Both the wealthy and the poor alike are financially burdened by dowry. While the Indian government outlawed the dowry system more 4

This claim is supported by data from the World Bank (2013), which shows that during the last ten years, female child mortality rates have been about one third higher than male child mortality rates in India. There is no such data available in World Bank (2013) for China.

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than 50 years ago, many families are still expected to provide gifts and property to their sons-inlaw (Izry, 2012). Moreover, since fewer Indian women are allowed into the workforce, women represent a financial burden throughout their lives. Arguably, if the culture did not treat this way, there would be more women participating in the economy. However, because women are at the behest of their fathers and husbands, they are yet another commodity, worth no more than their ability to produce a son. Gendercide is sustained by poverty, and gendercide keeps India from developing alongside China at the same rate. Where poverty does not act is an instigator is in the upper and middle class. Instead, culture itself acts as an instigator. The upper and middle class of India favors a form of gendercide called “sex-selective abortion” (Pörtner, 2014). Through sex-selective abortion, upper class caste families can maintain their coveted small families, guarantee male heirs, and ensure that they do not have to pay a lavish dowry (It’s a Girl, 2012). Although dowry is a key issue that fuels gendercide, there is no single cause of the problem. Instead, this issue is the product of when culture and tough economic circumstances collide. In China, while poverty still contributes to gender inequality, the major instigator for Chinese gendercide is, without a doubt, the controversial One Child Policy. The One Child Policy was originally implemented because of fears of overpopulation, but modern medical tools like ultrasound allows parents to be more selective with regards to the gender of the one child they plan to have. The Chinese authorities enforce the One Child policy through what is known as the Family Planning Police that does routine sweeps in towns and cities. If women are found “out of compliance”, meaning that they are bearing a second or third child, they are rounded up, fined, and even sent to clinics for forced abortions (It’s a Girl, 2012). Since men are more culturally more desirable, it is not surprising that families would choose to have a boy over a girl when presented with a choice. Some parents risk having a second child if knowing that it will be a son. IV.4. Social and Economic Costs of Surplus Men “Bare Branches” is a popular Chinese phrase for men who will never get the chance to make families of their own since their marriage prospects are so slim (Hudson and den Boer, 2002, p. 8). If gender ratios are not stabilized soon, there will most likely be a whole generation of Bare Branches, both from India and China that can cause detrimental damage to these economies. A critical factor to surplus men is the possibility of overwhelming dependency ratios in the future. Along with the financial strain of taking care of themselves with no spouse to add income to a household, Bare Branches are tasked with caring for elderly parents by themselves. They have no siblings to share the burden with, no spouse to aid in care, and now, no children to do the same for them in the future. This is best put in terms of supply and demand. While the demand for boys is high right now, at some point the demand for girls will go up when there is a need for brides in the future. Since the supply of girls will be nowhere near equal to that of boys, they will be in high demand; so much so, that it could eventually lead to unrest until the demand is met. It also may lead to the commodification of girls, and increased instances of human trafficking. Instead of gendercide, the scarcity of females within society may lead to poorer families selling their female children for profit to families looking for future brides. 125

V.

Conclusion

China and India are developing rapidly. However, their growth comes at the cost of millions of baby girls, who have their most basic human right (to live) taken from them. Sex-selective abortions act as both a symptom and a pathogen to this vicious cycle that prevents the Indian and Chinese economies from raising living standards at a higher rate. While both India and China have implemented policy solutions, such as outlawing dowries and sex determinative ultrasounds, these laws have been poorly implemented and are not enforced. In order to stop gendercide, these governments, especially India’s needs to get serious about carrying out the laws they put in place. If financial insecurity is such a concern among poor and rural populations, Indian and Chinese governments could possibly give subsidies to families that have girls, offering incentives for raising them and keeping them in school so that there is no need to keep them from their right to learn. Eventually, this could lead to a boom of women capable of entering the workforce, and participating in the economy alongside men. Possibly the most obvious remedy to this solution, especially in China, would be repealing the One Child Policy so that parents would not be forced to either abort or abandon their daughters. While some exceptions to the One Child Policy has been introduced recently (like if both parents are coming from single-child families), even these families may still prefer boys over girls as girls continue to be undervalued, and cannot properly grow in an environment that pressures them into believing they should not exist. Women are not commodities subject to trade, theft or destruction. Gender preference is already having catastrophic effects on China and India’s economies, and if they do not address gendercide as a serious and critical threat, it will not only ruin their development efforts, but could completely unravel the economies they worked so hard to build.

References Branigan, Tania (2011). China’s Great Gender Crisis. News Article of The Guardian (of November 2, 2011); available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/02/chinas-great-gender-crisis Das, Ranjana (2013). Violence Against Women in India, Behind the Data. Internet resource of Oxfam GB, Policy & Practice blog (November 15, 2013); available at: http://policypractice.oxfam.org.uk/blog/2013/11/violence-against-women-in-india. Grech, Victor; Charles Savona-Ventura; and P. Vassallo-Agius (2002). Unexplained Differences in Sex Ratios at Birth in Europe and North America. BMJ (formerly: British Medical Journal), Vol. 324, No. 7344, pp. 1010-1011. Hudson, Valerie M. and Andrea M. den Boer (2002). A Surplus of Men, a Deficit of Peace: Security and Sex Ratios in Asia's Largest States. International Security. Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring), pp. 5-38. It's a Girl (2012) Documentary film, directed by Evan Grae Davis. Shadowline Films; trailer, synopsis and further information available at: http://www.itsagirlmovie.com/.

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Izri, Touria (2012). It’s a Girl Documentary Explores Gendercide in China and India. News story of the Toronto Star (November 14, 2012); available at: http://www.thestar.com/life/2012/11/14/its_a_girl_documentary_explores_gendercide_in _china_and_india.html. Pörtner, Claus C. (2014). Sex Selective Abortions, Fertility, and Birth Spacing. University of Washington, Center for Studies in Demography and Ecology (March); available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1615833 Subramanya Dehejia, Rupa (2011). Economics Journal: The Economic Rationale for Sex Selection. News story of India Real Time (July 4, 2011); available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/07/04/economics-journal-the-economicrationale-for-sex-selection/. United Nations (2013). World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, Excel Tables - Fertility Data (New York, United States: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section (June); available at: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/fertility.htm. Vanneman, Reeve and Aparna Sundaram (2008). Gender Differentials in Literacy in India: The Intriguing Relationship with Women's Labor Force Participation. World Development, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January), pp. 128-143. Vargas, Elizabeth (2011). ‘All Those Little Faces’: Elizabeth Vargas Explores India’s ‘Gendercide’. ABC News Report (of December 10, 2011); available at: http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/12/all-those-little-faces-elizabeth-vargasexplores-indias-gendercide/. World Bank (2013). World Development Indicators / Global Development Finance database (Washington, DC: The World Bank); as posted on the World Bank website: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/ (downloaded on April 3, 2013).

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