Democratic accountability and EU governance: the EEAS and the role of the European Parliament

Paper prepared for the conference “European Diplomacy post-Westphalia and the European External Action Service: Taking Stock and Looking Forward”, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Tuesday 19 November and Wednesday 20 November 2013

DRAFT Please do not quote

Kolja Raube

Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and Centre for European Studies, University of Belgium, Leuven, [email protected]

Introduction This chapter will focus on the democratic accountability and parliamentary control of the European External Action Service (EEAS). In a first step, the paper provides an overview of the academic literature on the question how democratic accountability and control relates to EU external governance. Against this overview of an on-going academic debate in the field, the chapter outlines various ways and models of how EU external relations in general, and the EEAS more specifically, can be held accountability, and what kind of parliamentary could be foreseen in it (Batora 2010; Lavenex 2013). In a second step, the paper will concentrate on the establishment of the EEAS as a permanent diplomatic service and the question how this institution, with headquarters in Brussels and EU delegations around the world, is currently held accountable and whether it is subject to parliamentary control. The chapter seeks to point to both currently existing and newly emerging mechanisms of democratic accountability and parliamentary control of the EEAS (Furness 2013; Raube 2012). With the Lisbon Treaty, we do not only see another round of empowerment and control of the European Parliament in EU governance at large, the relationship between the European Parliament and the EEAS and enables the European Parliament to gain more and more control over EU diplomacy.

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In a third step, it is argued that new mechanisms of parliamentary control emerge via incomplete contracting, and it is analysed how new mechanisms of parliamentary control match models how the EEAS could be held accountable. It shows that due to an ex-ante indeterminism of the EU treaties, the European Parliament was able to introduce informal ex-post rules of accountability which were previously unforeseen in some areas of the treaties. In other areas, Lisbon itself lays the ground for a larger influence of the European Parliament (Corbett 2012; Dimopoulos 2010; Woolcock 2012). At the same time, the empowered Parliament has a potentially larger impact upon so-called TFEU policies, for example economic diplomacy, where diplomatic action has remained in the hands of the European Commission and where the Lisbon (Woolcock 2012). While enlarged control powers of the European Parliament are strengthening the accountability of the EEAS and other diplomatic actors, like the European Commission, it needs to be questioned whether the post-Westphalian patterns of diplomacy are meeting post-Westphalian patterns of parliament-diplomacyrelations or, rather, Westphalian-like patterns. In other words, we have to explore the nature of parliamentary control vis-a-vis the EEAS and other EU diplomatic actors.

1. Democratically accountable diplomacy: the role of parliamentary control Parliamentary accountability refers to a dimension of democratic accountability, i.e. the accountability of executives through parliamentary control and scrutiny (Curtin/Mair/Papadopoulos: 936-937; Wouters/Raube 2012). According to Mark Bovens, the concept implies that decision-makers have to justify their policy-proposals and actions vis-à-vis “decision-takers”, the latter having the possibility to sanction the decision-maker (Bovens 2007, Lavenex 2013). In this respect, parliaments hold executives accountable for policy decisions and implementation. In holding executives accountable, parliaments represent citizens’ interests, sanction governments and guarantee that decisions are acceptable for those who are affected by them. In this process, executives have to justify their decisions and policy implementation by providing parliaments with sufficient information to justify their actions, taking into account parliament’s and citizens’ demands. Seen like this, parliamentary accountability is not only attached to input-legitimacy, but, indeed, to throughput and output legitimacy, too. It can be argued that parliamentary accountability adds to input, throughput but also output legitimacy of a political system (Schmidt 2013). By guaranteeing the representation of citizens in the decision-making (input), adding to the scrutiny and control of decision-making (throughput) and impacting on the acceptance and effectiveness of policies (output), parliamentary accountability becomes an important asset in legitimizing policy-making. Control and scrutiny But what does parliamentary accountability imply? At the same time, it has been argued elsewhere (Caballero-Bourdot 2012, Wouters/Raube 2012) that we can distinct between parliamentary control on the one hand and parliamentary scrutiny on the other. While

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parliamentary control “entails the power to sanction” (Caballero-Bourdot 2012), scrutiny rather refers to softer parliamentary measures to hold public officials accountable. The European Parliament’s involvement as a co-legislator in the legislative processes of the EU enables parliament to foresee sanctions vis-à-vis other legislators (Council) or the executive (Commission), i.e. to veto executive initiatives. In legislative acts in the EU’s external governance, such as the conclusion of international agreements, the European Parliament can use this ultimate control power (see Corbett 2012). Deciding over the use of force in international relations can be seen as another example of parliamentary control, especially for national parliaments (Peters/Wagner 2010). Formal legal arrangements need to be in place to carry out this parliamentary prerogative, while, across Europe, variations exist and evolve regarding the parliamentary war powers of national parliaments (Wagner 2011). Moreover, supervisory powers, like questioning high-level executive personnel and holding diplomatic representatives accountable, is another key aspect in the parliament-executive relations of external relations. In the United States, ambassadors are publicly questioned before Congress on their ability to fulfil the mandate of representing the United States in international relations. Finally, parliament´s prerogative to control the budget becomes relevant for the conduct of external governance, too. For example, continuous financing of external programmes on democracy promotion and human rights will not only need to be justified against diplomatic evaluation of programmes on external ground, but also against parliament´ support to invest in such programmes in the future. Whenever parliaments have control powers on the national or European level, “divided government” (Pahre 2006) and “legislative politics” (Hix/Hoyland 2011) have become helpful terms to understand parliaments as decisive actors that cannot only hold the executive accountable throughout policy-making, but actually shape policy outcomes in a given political system. In this perspective, taking into account parliament’s preferences (´the shadow of the future´) will be vital for effective external governance and diplomacy. Despite such far-reaching potential parliamentary powers, external relations and governance are often considered as the function of the executive. It has also been pointed out that foreign policy-, diplomacy- and security-related decisions are often need to be left outside parliament´s realm in order to secure security issues from public exposure. Relatedly, parliamentary control has remained limited in many political systems. However, often parliaments are still granted the right to scrutinise executives and their conduct of external relations. Parliamentary scrutiny falls short of such extensive parliamentary powers, as it does not include the possibility to sanction. Scrutiny still includes the right of a parliament to be consulted and heard in policymaking. Scrutiny might not include the ultimate power to sanction, but in such cases parliaments remain far from non-influential. For example, parliaments can use their rights to be heard and to be consulted to openly debate issues of their support, concern and opposition in view of executive external action. In this case, parliaments may use the power of the public to scrutinise executive acts, to legitimize or de-legitimize them in public. In fact, it may also be the case that governments seek to be scrutinised by 3

parliaments in order to legitimise their actions publicly. For diplomatic actors this would mean that their mandates and representative tasks could either be legitimized or delegitimized by public parliamentary debate.

Challenges of governance

parliamentary

accountability

in

multi-level

external

It has been argued that under the condition of multi-level governance democratic and parliamentary accountability becomes an increasingly difficult task to exercise (Lavenex 2013: 125, Papadopolous 2013: 84ff.). Understanding EU external governance as a multi-level field, made of several external policies and instruments, including its intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and affecting both external actors as much as EU stakeholders (see Schimmelfennig/Wagner 2004), the question is how such a multi-level field has affected parliamentary accountability. In the debate over democratic and parliamentary accountability of EU external governance, it has been repeatedly pointed out that both on the national and European level parliaments are facing difficulties to hold executives accountable for several reasons. First, uploading of competences to the EU level has not always been accompanied with a transfer of parliamentary accountability functions from one level to the other. For example, while the common commercial policy has been an executive competence of the European Union from early on in integration, powers of the EP to consent to international trade agreements have only been delegated to the EP since the Lisbon Treaty. While development cooperation is a competence of both the Member States and the EU, the EP has not yet been able to acquire the right to control for the European Development Fund (Vanhoonacker 2011). Second, in the case of a largely intergovernmental CFSP, it has been argued that decision about civilian and military crisis manage missions escape the control of both national parliaments and the European Parliament (Koenig-Archibugi 2002). The double-democratic deficit, as Born/Hänggi have termed it, is a consequence of the inability of national parliaments and the European Parliament to neither gain, nor to exercise ex-ante and post-control powers. Having committed itself to a military mission on the European level, it would become very difficult for a national government to be challenged by a national parliament afterwards (Wagner 2005). At the same time, in absence of formal control powers in CFSP, it is difficult for the EP to control and evaluate EU external action across policies, especially in light of the treaty-obligation that all external policies should work in a non-contradictory and synergetic way. Third, in a multi-level field of external action, in which member states and EU actors are supposed to coordinate their action, it is difficult for national parliaments to oversee developments on the European level as much as it is difficult for the European Parliament to monitor external governance developments on the national level.

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Models of controlling and scrutinizing the EEAS An important novelty in the EU´s multi-level field of external governance is the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the post of the High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission after the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty (Wouters/Van Vooren/ De Baere/ Raube et. al. 2013). The HR/VP´s task is to bring greater visibility, presence, vertical and horizontal coherence to the EU´s external governance. To exercise these tasks, the HR/VP carries several “hats”: She is (1) the High Representative of CFSP/CSDP, (2) Vice-President of the European Commission, (3) Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council and (4) head of the newly established EEAS. As a service to assist the work of the HR/VP, the EEAS has added to the institutional complexity of the multi-level EU external governance field. The EEAS assists the HR/VP on the one hand in Brussels, where its primary task is to develop policies and formulate policy action in close co-operation with the Institutions and the member states. At the same time, the EEAS includes all EU Delegations to the world and needs to coordinate the delegation of task to the EU Delegations as much as being responsive to the reported developments in the world. Jozef Batora has introduced the idea that holding the EEAS democratically accountable could follow three alternative ideal-type models (2010), which correspond with models of polity formation in the EU and beyond the EU in global governance (Lavenex 2013; Portela/Raube 2011). A first model would suggest that, as being linked to the execution of tasks of an intergovernmental international organization, accountability of the EEAS would rest with the member states. As the work of the EEAS is, for example, concerned with issues of CFSP and CSDP, such an understanding follows the idea that policies devoted to CFSP and CSDP should be controlled accordingly. Not only would member states control the EEAS via the Council, also national parliaments would exercise over policy-decisions in CSDP. In a second model of a federal state, the EEAS is seen as a diplomatic service, resembling features of foreign offices of member states with and the HR/VP resembling the office of the foreign minister. Accordingly, control could rest with a parliament on the federal level, which can fully hold accountable both actions of the HR/VP and her service. Thirdly, the EEAS could be seen as a cosmopolitan post-Westphalian organization which transcends the idea of a state-based international organisation or the idea of a diplomatic service which resembles member state organizations and focuses its actions on cosmopolitan norms and values rather than state interests. Control of such an organization would rest with the accountability functions of both a regional parliament, but also national parliaments and civil society actors (Batora 2010). Ideal-type models indeed, we need to assess how accountability mechanisms vis-a-vis the HR/VP and the EEAS resemble some or traces of the above introduced models of accountability. First, we have to how forms of controlling and scrutinizing an organization like the EEAS look like, in other words which accountability-justificationrelationship EEAS and EP have developed. Second, how we can explain forms of controlling and scrutinizing and if the relationship between the EEAS and the EP resembles features of the above mentioned models. 5

2. The Establishment of the EEAS and parliamentary empowerment Focusing on the above-mentioned questions, the focus now concentrates on the establishment of the EEAS as a permanent service and the question how this institution, with headquarters in Brussels and EU delegations around the world, is currently held accountable and whether it is subject to parliamentary control and scrutiny. In order to do so, it first looks into the empowerment of the European Parliament after Lisbon to explain the EP´s increase in control-functions in EU external governance and explores the mechanisms of control and scrutiny vis-à-vis the EEAS afterwards. It will finally have a look at if the relationship between the EEAS and the EP matches the above mentioned ideal-type models. Mechanisms of control and scrutiny In principal-agent-based literature, it is argued that the EP is not a principal vis-à-vis the EEAS (Furness 2013:113), as it does not have delegating powers over the EEAS. The delegating act based on the EU Treaties is carried out by the Commission and the Council, only consulting the European Parliament (Article 27 (3) TEU). Informally emerging control and scrutinizing powers of the EP however might contribute to our understanding of the EP as an institution that is perhaps (not yet) formally able to fully control and scrutinize all elements of EU external governance, but which is ambitiously working towards an enhanced role in EU external governance. It is in this context that it is essential to look not only into whether the EP was able to change rules on the organization and functioning of the EEAS in its initial stage (see Wisniewski 2013), but to focus what the EP added to the decision on the organization and functioning of the EEAS (Council 2010) and how the EP worked towards a larger role vis-à-vis HR/VP (Raube 2012). To this end, we will first look into what the EP added to the formal decision on the EEAS and, accordingly, how the EP has established a relationship with the HR/VP and the EEAS. Second, as the EEAS is a service to “assist” the HR/VP in her function to bring about greater coherence, presence and visibility across external policies, we need to see what the EP gains after Lisbon in terms of controlling and scrutinizing EU policies and, relatedly, the involved actors, including the HR/VP and the EEAS. The latter policies can be separated into so-called TFEU and TEU-policies (in which, by and large, either the ordinary legislative procedure or intergovernmental decision-making procedure are implied).

EEAS and HR/VP The EEAS has gained considerable influence over the functioning and organization of the EEAS by setting an example in the initial phase of the set-up of the EEAS. It has been argued that the EU became a co-legislator on the EEAS (Raube 2012) by linking the decision on the organization and functioning of the EEAS (the EP only had to be 6

consulted) to two regulations, on staffing and financing the EEAS (the EP had to colegislate). It may have not been as influential in terms of substantial changes as some would have assumed (see i.e. Furness 2013), but it was shown that the EP has been able to change the specific wordings and directions of the decision (Raube 2012; Wisniewski 2013). This is for example the case regarding the access to classified documents (see below) and gender and territoriality principles in the staffing rules of the EEAS (Raube 2012). Even more telling perhaps in view of holding the HR/VP accountable is the fact that the EP was able to win the HR/VP’s agreement to sign the so-called Declaration on Political Accountability on 8 August 2010. As it has been highlighted elsewhere (Wouters/Van Vooren/ De Baere/ Raube et al. 2013: 59), the document “clarifies mechanisms of accountability as they arrive from Article 36 TEU and the EEAS Decision” (Wouters/Van Vooren/ De Baere/ Raube et al. 2013: 59). In the DPA, the relationship between EP, the HR/VP and the EEAS has focused on four topics:





“Exchanges between the HR/VP in her function as HR and the Parliament on issues of CFSP”, “Matters of deputisation if the HR/VP […] cannot appear in the Parliament in person”, “Organisation of so-called hearings for newly appointed Heads of Delegation before they take up their posts in third countries and international organisations”, “Parliamentary access to classified documents and information in and outside the field of CFSP” (Wouters/Van Vooren/ De Baere/ Raube et al. 2013: 59)

In all four matters the EP was able to win concessions from the HR/VP, interpreting Article 36 TEU. For example, the DPA underlines the need for greater ex-ante scrutiny as the EP calls for the need to be consulted before the “adoption of mandates and strategies” (DPA, Point 1). In this respect, the EP does foresee greater exchanges between the EEAS personnel (such as the Chair of the Political and Security Committee) and the respective committees in charge (for example, AFET). In the same vein, the EP asks to be better informed about the results of the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), which is chaired by the HR/VP after Lisbon. It is in this respect of important to mention that the AFET Chairman, Elmar Brok, has been invited to the informal Meeting of Minister of foreign affairs (Gymnich) in Dublin on the 22 and 23 March 2013 (see below). At the same institutional occasion, Brok was invited to the meeting in Vilnius during the Lithuanian Presidency in fall 2013, too. The DPA also looks after political deputisation in those cases when the HR/VP is not able to appear in Parliament herself. Here, the EP explicitly asks for a Member of an EU Institution, excluding the EEAS and deputisation to senior members of the service. This leads to somewhat in-balanced situation that senior officials do represent the EU abroad at high-level occasions, but that they cannot be sent to the EP on behalf of the HR/VP. In addition, as deputisation can include the representation of the rotating presidency, rotating (rather than permanent) positions are presented. This, however, 7

does not mean that the EP is not hearing and consulting officials from the EEAS; quite the opposite is true. The DPA foresees in its point 7 that the HR/VP will foresee “the appearance of Heads of Delegations, EUSRs, Heads of CSDP missions and senior EEAS officials in relevant parliamentary committees and subcommittees in order to provide regular meetings”. For example, in regular committee meetings or joint committee meetings with national parliamentary counterparts, public officials are to report to the EP about the ongoing external governance efforts in their respective fields. In general, these meetings are open to the public and accessible via the Europarl.tv website. Moreover, the EP has agreed on a compromise with the HR/VP to scrutinize heads of EU Delegations (DPA, Point 5). Parliament’s long-quest for scrutinizing staff of delegation, even in times of the European Communities and Commission Delegations, shows Parliament’s attempt to hold accountable public officials who represent the EU abroad. However, neither do these meetings take place in public, nor ex ante. The ambassadors of the EU are only to be heard after the decision to appoint them has been taken, and in sessions take place in camera. Although initially, the EP foresaw a US Congress-style hearing of new ambassadors, the EP still gains scrutinizing powers that national parliaments do not have. Moreover, the meetings are seen as important occasions on both the side of diplomats and the side of MEPs as they guarantee for mutual information and a better understanding of each other’s expectations (Wouters/Van Vooren/ De Baere/ Raube et al. 2013: 60). Last but not least, the access to classified documents has become a crucial issue, especially in the field of CSDP. The decision on the establishment of the EEAS in 2010 foresees that the access to classified should be provided through additional arrangements (see also Wisniewski 2013). At the time, the access to classified material was foreseen through the rules of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 and has been seen as very limited in scope to access documents(Wouters/Van Vooren/ De Baere/ Raube et al. 2013: 60). Against this backdrop, the DPA foresees that potentially the access to documents should also be extended to parliamentarians working on parliamentary reports in the field of CFSP and CSDP. In the meantime, the EP was able to sign an agreement on the access to data other than in the field of CFSP, which includes access to data in international agreements (European Parliament 2012). Next to these four issues and relevant evolutions of parliamentary involvement via informal agreements, it should be pointed out that the review process of the EEAS, which was itself foreseen in the decision on the establishment of the EEAS, has made clear that decisions regarding a revision of the EEAS structure revision would not be able without the EP. Close consultations and briefings of the HR/VP and her senior officials in the Parliament have time and again made clear that a reform of the EEAS would only be possible if the EP was involved. Elmar Brok’s invitation to the Gymnich meeting (see above) can be understood against this new position of the EP. By linking the formal decision on the establishment and its reforms to other issues, such as the financing of the EEAS, the EP will continue to play a role next to the Commission and Council.

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TFEU policies The emerging role of the EP vis-à-vis the HR/VP and the EEAS is complemented by its role regarding legislative, supervisory and budgetary functions in TFEU policies, which touch not only policies which the Commission is involved in, but, after Lisbon, also upon “turf” of the EEAS. While it has been bluntly stated that “in practice, the Parliament can act as an informed public overseer, but cannot stop a decision it does not agree with” (Furness 2013: 114), we need a more differentiated perspective to understand the role of the EP vis-à-vis the EEAS. The expansion of co-legislative powers in the field of TFEU policies, especially international agreements, has been a significant “step-by-step evolution” (Corbett 2012: 249). While this right was only in place regarding Association Agreements and Accession Treaties, the Parliament is now able to consent to “virtually any international agreement” (Corbett 2012: 249). According to Article 218 (6) TFEU the EP receives a consent powers in all international agreements, which deal with issues that are internally dealt with by the new “ordinary legislative procedure”. This “amounts to a major extension of the Parliament’s power in the sphere of EU external relations“ (Monar 2010: 145). The case of the SWIFT agreement has made clear that the Parliament uses its newly won legislative powers. Indeed, with its Resolution on the SWIFT Agreement on 11 February 2010 the Parliament showed not to accept to simply consent to agreements after they are finalized (Monar 2010). Obviously, also in terms of contents the Parliament brought in a divergent position, stressing the right to consumer protection over collective security. In a later move this year, the EP has called for the Commission to suspend the SWIFT Agreement after the NSA spying scandals throughout Europe (European Voice 2013). Not only do the new powers strengthen the relationship between the EP and other actors, like the Commission, it will also strengthen the competition amongst political parties over the ideological differences in the case of international agreements. As such, the changes in Lisbon may well contribute to a politicisation of external governance. The empowerment of the EP can also be seen in the context of international trade agreements where the EP has to consent to the trade agreement negotiated with third countries (Woolcock 2012). However, there are still blanks in the current arrangement, that the Parliament likes to be filled. While it is foreseen that the Parliament will be informed at all stages of the negotiations over forthcoming agreements (Article 218 (10) TFEU), it is not pre-defined if the Parliament needs to be involved in the preparation of the negotiation mandate. In this respect, Parliament’s interest is to expand its functions to co-define the negotiation mandate with the Council. As such, the Parliament would not only be able to intervene and position itself – taking into account the plurality of various political opinions on ongoing negotiations – during the negotiation, but also in the initial phase of the mandate of the Commission. Taking into account the ‘shadow of the future’, it has been mentioned that the EP is in “a strong position to insist politically that its views be taken into account during the definition of the negotiating mandate by the Council […]” (Corbett 2012: 250). Quite clearly, these new arrangements have implications not only for the Commission, but also for the EEAS. In the field of common commercial policies, the Commission is negotiating on the international level and will have to take into account EP’s views. In other 9

agreements, which could be negotiated by the EEAS, the EP will closely focus on what EEAS’ diplomats are negotiating abroad. Regarding supervisory powers in the field of external TFEU policies, such as the common commercial policies, development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the EP can use its scrutiny vis-à-vis the European Commission and the HR/VP. Both Commissioners and the HR/VP can be scrutinized in parliament by appearing in Parliament, the EP’s right to question them and to be consulted. Obviously, the power to scrutinize is linked to some more far-reaching control powers which the EP has over both Commissioners and the HR/VP. First, both Commission President, Commissioners and the HR/VP can only be appointed based a vote of consent by the Parliament (Wouters/Van Vooren/ De Baere/ Raube et al. 2013: 58). Second, if a motion of censure of the Commission is carried out, “the HR is to resign from the duties that she carries out in the Commission, with the members of the Commission, who are to resign as a body.” (Wouters/Van Vooren/ De Baere/ Raube et al. 2013: 58). Thirdly, both Commissioners and the HR/VP will be controlled and scrutinized by means of the discharge procedure. Despite scrutiny rights, it remains open which sanction follows from a negative discharge; it has been argued that such a discharge can be understood as “testamount to a vote of censure on the Commission” (Corbett 2012: 253). As VicePresident of the Commission, the HR/VP would be effected by such a move as well. The Lisbon Treaty also foresees extensive budgetary powers for the EP with regards to TFEU policies and instruments. This implies that external governance related instruments, which fall under the budget of the EU, will have to be co-decided upon by the EP and the Council. Instruments, falling under the budget, are the Instrument for Stability (IfS), the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the Instrument for Development (IfD) or the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). As both the Commission and the EEAS are mutually-involved in the planning of thematic external governance instruments, they are effected by the power of the EP to co-decide on the budget. Moreover, the discharge mechanism allows the EP to scrutinize Commissioners and the HR/VP, wherever they are responsible. For example, the decision on the establishment of the EEAS foresees that HR/VP will grant the EP all necessary information in order to enable the EP to fulfill its role in the discharge. However, the European Development Fund (EDF), providing finances for development cooperation with regards to the ACP countries, has not become part of the EU budget in Lisbon. Against this backdrop, the European Parliament has raised its concern over the escape of the EDF from parliamentary scrutiny (see also Vanhoonacker 2011). Latest Council documents, focusing on the ongoing negotiations between the EP and the Council with regards to the instruments of the multi-annual framework show, however, that there seems to be a shift of principles ahead, making the European Parliament a responsible controller of the EDF as well.

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TEU Policies CFSP and CSDP remain policies subject to the TEU, rather than the TFEU. This implies that the intergovernmental logic of the TEU applies. It is in this context that we have to understand there is a rather limited role foreseen for the EP in CFSP/CSDP. Article 36 TEU reads as follows: “The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy and inform it of how those policies evolve. He shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. Special representatives may be involved in briefing the European Parliament. The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it and to the High Representative. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy.”

The DPA, mentioned above, can be seen as trying to fill the rather open formulations regarding the consultation and scrutiny of the HR/VP and her staff. As such, the creation of the EEAS was used by EP to anchor the relationship with the HR/VP through another informal agreement that would specify Article 36 TEU. Contrary to TFEU policies, the Parliament has however not been able to win control powers in CFSP/ CSDP. While it tries to be consulted prior to the establishment of CFSP decisions and CSDP missions (see DPA above) and create ex-ante scrutiny, CFSP remains largely beyond parliamentary control. Interactions with the HR/VP, invitations to Gymnich meetings of AFET-chairs, in camera-consultations with CSDP related staff of the EEAS or high-level officers of CSDP missions contribute to the scrutiny of CFSP/CSDP, just as much as the parliamentary diplomacy of EP delegations to CSDP missions on the ground (Herranz-Surralés 2011: 20). It has also been pointed out that overseeing the budget of CSDP missions remains limited. In fact, under the common arrangements the EP is only able to control non-military related aspects of the CFSP budget, while military budget is arranged by the so-called intergovernmental Athena mechanism. In fact, in terms of budgetary oversight and political control, national parliaments remain in a better position than the EP (Herranz-Surralés 2011: 20). It has been mentioned elsewhere, however, that parliamentary control over CSDP missions varies from one member state to another, with some member states parliaments having no power at all; in the aftermath of the Iraq War the increase of parliamentary powers has been observed in some member states as well as the limitation of parliamentary war powers other member states (Wagner 2010). Given the difficulties to control CFSP/CSDP as a multi-level governance policy and the pending “double-democratic deficit”, inter-parliamentary co-operation between the EP and national parliaments can be seen as potential way to overcome information and control deficits on both levels. Following Protocol 1 of the Lisbon Treaty, an inter-parliamentary conference, meeting two times a year, has been introduced to encourage the exchange of information between parliaments on CFSP and CSDP related issues (Wouters/Raube 2012). During all three first meetings of the conference in 2012 and 2013, the HR/VP addressed European and national parliaments and reported on current developments in CFSP/CSDP. The setting-up of the new inter-parliamentary conference has also illustrated the varying parliamentary perspectives differ over how this new body would 11

actually make a difference to parliamentary scrutiny in practice (Wouters/ Raube 2012).On the one hand, the EP has been clear that it is eager to make use of the interparliamentary cooperation to expand its scrutiny on CFSP/CSDP, especially by bringing together its own comprehensive ‘cross-pillar perspective’ and the emergence of the comprehensive approach in EU external governance (Wouters/Raube 2012). National parliaments, however, seem to be more interested in the comparative exchange of CFSP/CSDP issues across member states; some national parliaments see it as essential that the conference only touches upon CFSP/CSDP issues only (Wouters/Raube 2012). 3. Parliamentary Accountability: Post-Westphalian patterns of parliamentdiplomacy-relations? Following the overview of various kinds of parliamentary accountability, the Lisbon Treaty can be understood as a step towards empowering the EP in the field of external governance with an impact on how the EEAS can be held accountable. Towards more parliamentary accountability The TEU has neither foreseen how to build the EEAS, not what kind of organization and functions it had to have, it also left out a the role for the EP in its relationship with the future EEAS. Empowerment of EP accountability regarding legislative, supervisory and budgetary functions rests upon formal rules, informal rules and incomplete contracting (Mattli/Stone Sweet 2012; Rittberger 2003). In an attempt to explain recent developments, one can conclude that parliamentary accountability has increased due to two driving forces: the EP´s collective interest to expand its powers with a view to become a parliamentary co-legislator next to the Council and a forceful supervisor and budget control institution across external policies; on the other hand, the interest for more democratic legitimacy in order to compensate for the democratic deficit in the multi-level governance of the EU. Against the idea of complete and incomplete contracting (Mattli/Stone Sweet 2012), it can be argued that due to an ex-ante indeterminism of the EU treaties, the European Parliament was able to introduce informal ex-post rules of accountability which were previously unforeseen in some areas of the treaties. The delegation of powers to the EP is enshrined in the Treaties, which determine the formal rules and functions of the EP and its relations with other institutions. Empowerment of the parliament depends on the powers that have been delegated to the EP by the Member States. Sometimes, however, treaties like the TEU or TFEU are incomplete treaties from the outset and leave interpretations of inter-institutional relations for actors on the ground. Thus, informal rules can become essential accompanying frameworks to define the relationship between the EP and other institutions like the HR/VP and the EEAS, for example through inter-institutional agreements, rules of procedure or other mutual commitments like the DPA (see also Raube 2012). 12

In other areas, Lisbon itself lays the ground for a larger influence of the European Parliament (Corbett 2012; Dimopoulos 2010; Woolcock 2012). In other words, the EP’s interest to increase its own powers and to close the accountability deficit in EU was granted by member states ex ante. However, as we could see above, the empowerments of the EP regarding international agreements were followed by another informal inter-institutional agreement which specified the access of the EP to classified documents during treaty negotiations. What kind of accountability? In the literature it has been stated that “in most political systems the executive is given sweeping powers in the execution of foreign policy, although its actions may be subject to budget constraints or scrutinized ex post, and the signing of international treaties may be subject to international ratification and implementation.” (Hix and Hoyland 2011: 322) The question is whether such a forms of accountability are resembled in the relationship between the EP and the EEAS. It has been argued elsewhere that the EEAS does not resemble a state-like diplomatic service. In the words of Batora: “The EEAS may simply represent an aventgarde form of a diplomatic agency fitting the new environment more than any of the established diplomatic services and foreign ministries” (Batora 2013:610). Neither a part of the Parliament, the EEAS has to support the EP and its delegations towards third states and international organizations. For these ambiguous tasks and positions, which relate to several institutions of the Union at the same time, the EEAS has been termed “interstitial” (Batora 2013). On the one hand, the EEAS is related to the policy-making in TEU policies like CFSP/CSDP, in which the HR/VP has to look after the effectiveness and coherence. Accordingly, the EEAS is related to the Council through, for example, its head, the HR/VP, who chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and senior officials, i.e. the chair of the Political and Security Committee. In fact, in her review of the EEAS in July 2013, the HR/VP suggested to expand the number of Council Working Groups chaired by the EEAS (EEAS 2013). Not a part of the Commission either, it is however supporting the work of the HR/VP in coordinating external action with her Commission counter-parts and related to TFEU policies. To this end, the EEAS is for example responsible for planning of development cooperation together with the Commission. Moreover, the EEAS assists Commissioner Füle, who is in charge of the European Neighbourhood Policy, but whose staff has been integrated into the EEAS. Describing the EEAS as an interstitial organization at the fringe of other organizational fields, like the Commission, the Council and even the Parliament, implies to ask how forms of controlling and scrutinizing the EEAS currently look like. The previously introduced accountability models can be of particular help (Batora 2010). While on the one hand, the EP treats the EU often as a state-like entity and works towards mechanisms similar to the US Congress, it remains to be seen if the EP’s role resembles forms of accountability. While the forms related to intergovernmental organizations and the federal state resemble Westphalian models of diplomacy, the third option of a (cosmopolitan) multi-level organization rather relates to postWesphalian form of organization, in which the state is no longer central source of 13

legitimacy. In fact, we see traces of every model being represented by the current mechanisms of parliamentary scrutiny and control. While budgetary control powers and the involvement in international agreements of the EP does resemble national parliaments (Hix/Hoyland 2011: 322), we should be aware of the fact that other powers which the EP has not obtained, are often not in place on the national level either (see i.e. the lack to control military missions). At the same time, it is mostly in TEU-policyrelated matters that the accountability mechanism resembles mechanisms that we would expect from classical intergovernmental organizations. However, given the complex cross-policy arrangements, which also differ within TFEU policies, we saw that limitations to control the budget also exist with regards to the EDF. Hence, the control over an essential part of development cooperation escapes parliamentary control and resembles the intergovernmental accountability model, too. We also see traces of a multi-level governance accountability model (Batora 2010; Lavanex 2013). The interparliamentary assembly could indeed resemble a new form of cross-level scrutiny if properly applied (however, conflicts between the parliaments prevail over how to interprete the function of the conference). Moreover, the option for AFET chairs to participate in Gymnich meetings may only appear at times, but it does contribute as much to a new form of scrutiny. The same can be said for the EP’s role in parliamentary diplomacy which has not only led to the visit of CSDP missions abroad, but also the establishment of a permanent Liason office in Washington D.C. Conclusion While with the EEAS new diplomatic structures have emerged and transcend the Westphalian diplomatic model (Batora 2013), this paper has looked into the ways how the EP is able to hold the EEAS accountable. It has been shown that the mechanisms of holding accountable HR/VP and EEAS greatly vary between parliamentary control and scrutiny, and across TEU and TFEU policy-fields. In general, the EU has been empowered due to incomplete treaties, formal and informal rules. Moreover, the need for greater legitimacy and the EP’s interest in expanding its powers has created more accountability-options. However, the forms of accountability vis-à-vis the HR/VP and the EEAS are spanning from those associated to models of federal states, international organizations and multi-level organizations, which transcend the Westphalian models of diplomacy. Given the observation that the EEAS is more than sui-generis, but rather related to several institutional organizational fields (Batora 2013), the diversity of accountability mechanisms is hardly surprising. Depending on the context and role in which HR/VP and EEAS are taking their actions, accountability takes shape. In other words, as long as Council decision-making rules in CFSP/CSDP remain largely intergovernmental, the EP will have a difficult time to push for forms of accountability other than those of an international organization. Other fields of EEAS and Commission engagement however show accountability mechanisms beyond those of an international organization.

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