Project no. 019788 CURACAO Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues Coordination Action Thematic Priority: 1.6 Sustainable Development, Global Change and Ecosystems, 1.6.2 Sustainable Surface Transport

Deliverable D3: Case Study Results Report

Due date of deliverable: 2009 Actual submission date: 2009

Start date of project: 1 April 2006

Duration: 3 years

Lead contractor for this deliverable: ISIS

Version 3.1

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

CURACAO DELIVERABLE 3 Work Package 3 / Version 2.2 /March 2009 Classification This report is: Draft Final Internal Public

x x

Contributors The production of this report has been coordinated by ISIS. Contributions were made by the project partners: ATAC; BCC; Goudappel Coffeng; NPRA; SESTRAN; SINTEF; TIE; TTR; WSP.

Editors This report was edited by ISIS and quality controlled by TTR.

Issue Date Version 3.1

Date: 2009

CURACAO Project Office Transport & Travel Research Ltd Arundel House 6 Portland Square Bristol BS2 8RR UNITED KINGDOM Tel: +44 (0) 117 907 6520 Fax: +44 (0) 117 907 4146 Email: [email protected] Web: www.curacaoproject.eu

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 2

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The aim of CURACAO is to support the implementation of urban road user charging (URUC) as a demand management tool in urban areas. The project does this by working with a User Group of cities interested in pursuing road user charging to identify the barriers to their doing so, and providing evidence on ways of overcoming those barriers. This is done by continually identifying user needs and delivering products which can satisfy those needs. Working closely with particularly European cities in this way establishes a positive cycle of knowledge growth and development amongst the decision makers and technical experts in these cities. In contrast to earlier URUC projects the focus differs in that the main deliverables are products and events, rather than demonstrations and evaluation reports. CURACAO aims at reviewing the complete process of setting up a RUC scheme. This includes setting objectives, designing the scheme, selecting the appropriate technology, predicting impacts and achieving acceptability. Its target audiences range from cities where road user charging schemes are already in place to those engaged in a fact finding exercise. The Case Study Results Report is based on the collection of case studies from real life in the leading cities in the field of urban road user charging. The good practices gathered concern three types of involved cities: i The “core” case study cities represented by project partners: Bristol, Edinburgh, The Hague, Rome, Oslo, Trondheim and Stockholm. i The CURACAO User Group cities, including for example London and Cambridge, whose progress has been monitored throughout the project and whose representatives have been invited to attend workshops. i Other cities that have begun to study or to actively develop road pricing schemes, such as Milan and Manchester. Based on the structure of the State of the Art Report, the Case Studies Report focuses among other things on pricing objectives, scheme design, implementation process and scheme results. In order to assist the comparative analysis of case studies, an assessment framework was developed containing a wide range of performance indicators. Tables with data collated for the six core cities are presented as an Appendix to D3 Case Study Results. Unfortunately, sufficient data does not exist in the core cities to give a comprehensive indicator analysis, but the list of indicators provides a framework for future assessments and evaluations of urban road user charging schemes. Moreover, care must be exercised in using the available data to make comparisons between schemes, due to wide differences in scheme design, the baseline situation, and data collection dates. Rather, the figures should be used to give an indication of the general scale of the impacts that can be achieved with URUC. There are seven key ‘headline’ impacts that can be drawn out from an analysis of the case study data, showing that URUC is a demand management tool which can deliver the following benefits: Traffic Network: i A reduction in the number of vehicles entering the zone, of 14-23%. i A reduction in delays in the zone, of up to a third. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 3

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Environment: i A reduction in CO2 emissions in the zone, of 13-21%. i A reduction in pollutant emissions in the zone, of 8-18%. Safety: i A reduction in the number of accidents in the zone, of 14% in the one city which recorded reliable results. Financial and Economic Impacts: i Additional finance for investment, of 50 M€ and 140 M€ per year in the two cities which recorded reliable results. i Despite the difficulty in evaluating the impact of URUC scheme on urban economy, we can state that no negative effects can be generally related to road charging implementation. In conclusion, cities that have pursued or are considering the introduction of road user charging have, as their dominant objectives, to improve the efficiency of transport system, to improve the urban environment, and to generate revenue to pay for infrastructure improvements. The evidence from cities with implemented schemes is that all of these objectives can successfully be achieved by road user charging. The urban road user charging schemes that have been implemented in Europe have demonstrated substantial reductions in private car trips and levels of congestion, increased use of public transport, and improved environmental conditions. However, some urban areas (notably Edinburgh and Manchester) have tried but failed to introduce schemes. Therefore it is clear that pure economic arguments are not enough.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 4

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Table of Contents

1

INTRODUCTION ___________________________________________ 11

2

THE CASE STUDIES _______________________________________ 13

2.1 British case Studies______________________________________________ 15 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.1.4 2.1.5 2.1.6

Bristol ___________________________________________________________________17 London __________________________________________________________________20 Durham __________________________________________________________________34 Cambridge _______________________________________________________________39 Manchester _______________________________________________________________46 Edinburgh ________________________________________________________________54

2.2 Dutch Case Studies ______________________________________________ 65 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3

The Hague/Spitsmijden______________________________________________________67 Dutch National Case Study___________________________________________________77 More pilots in preparation of the national kilometre charging scheme__________________80

2.3 Italian Case Studies ______________________________________________ 81 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.3

Rome____________________________________________________________________82 Milan___________________________________________________________________108 Bologna_________________________________________________________________126

2.4 Norwegian Case Studies _________________________________________ 135 2.4.1 2.4.2 2.4.3 2.4.4

Oslo____________________________________________________________________136 Trondheim ______________________________________________________________150 Bergen__________________________________________________________________170 Nord-Jæren ______________________________________________________________176

2.5 Swedish Case Studies ___________________________________________ 181 2.5.1

3

Stockholm_______________________________________________________________182

THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF SOME CURACAO CASE STUDIES 203

3.1 Introduction ___________________________________________________ 203 3.2 Data collection: the original methodology in brief ____________________ 204 3.3 Traffic Network_________________________________________________ 208 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3

Reduction in the Number of Vehicles Entering the Zone ___________________________208 A Reduction in Delays in the Zone____________________________________________209 Traffic Network: Lessons Learnt _____________________________________________209

3.4 Environment ___________________________________________________ 210 3.4.1 3.4.2

A Reduction in CO2 Emissions in the Zone _____________________________________210 A Reduction in Pollutant Emissions in the Zone _________________________________211

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 5

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

3.4.3

Environment: Lessons Learnt ________________________________________________211

3.5 Safety ________________________________________________________ 212 3.5.1 3.5.2

A Reduction in the Number of Accidents in the Zone _____________________________212 Safety: Lessons Learnt _____________________________________________________212

3.6 Financial and Economic Impacts __________________________________ 213 3.6.1 3.6.2 3.6.3

Revenues Raised for Investment______________________________________________213 Urban Economy __________________________________________________________213 Scheme Finances: Lessons Learnt ____________________________________________217

3.7 Conclusions ___________________________________________________ 219

4 ANNEX A - THE URBAN ROAD USER CHARGING ACTIVITIES IN OTHER EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES _________________________ 223 5 ANNEX B – EUROPEAN URBAN ROAD USER CHARGING SCHEMES TIMELINE ___________________________________________________ 224

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 6

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Index of Tables

Table 2-1 – Case Study Table of Contents................................................................................................13 Table 2-2 - Key year on year changes in traffic entering the central London charging zone during charging hours (07:00 – 18:30) . ..............................................................................................................26 Table 2-3 – Traffic leaving the western extension zone across all outbound roads. (Charging hours, 07:00 – 18:00, 2005 to 2007) ...................................................................................................................27 Table 2-4 - Principal changes to emissions of NOX, PM10 and CO2.........................................................28 Table 2-5 - Principal changes to emissions of NOX, PM10 and CO2 in relation to the western extension. Percentage change, 2007 compared with 2006. Annual average day, all road traffic emissions. ...........29 Table 2-6 – Total reported personal injury toad traffic collisions by time period. (March 2005 – February 2007).........................................................................................................................................32 Table 2-7 – Collisions involving personal injury by pedestrian involvement, 07:00 – 18:00. (March 2005 – February 2007)......................................................................................................................................32 Table 2-8 - Population and Employment 2000-2015................................................................................54 Table 2-9 – Consultation results 1999......................................................................................................60 Table 2-10 – Impacts of the Central LTZ Implementation......................................................................104 Table 2-11 - Correspondence between Euro Category and European Directive ...................................112 Table 2-12 - Correspondence between vehicle Euro Category and pollution class ...............................113 Table 2-13 - Daily Ecopass charges for different pollution classes .......................................................114 Table 2-14 - Multiple Daily Reduction Tariffs........................................................................................115 Table 2-15 - Optional Yearly Ecopass for LTZ Residents ......................................................................116 Table 2-16 – Variation of commercial speed of public transport ...........................................................119 Table 2-17 – Increase in passengers using the metro for travelling towards and within Ecopass area.119 Table 2-18 – Ecopass revenues (1st January – 31st December 2008) .....................................................122 Table 2-19 - Statistics of the city of Bologna .........................................................................................126 Table 2-20 – Statistics of access reduction in LTZ during the period 2004 - 2006 ................................132 Table 2-21 - Financing plan for Oslo package 2, 2002-2011.................................................................137 Table 2-22 - Fare levels in the Oslo toll ring Oslo package 2 and Oslo package 3 ...............................140 Table 2-23 - Prices per Passage (2004) for Light Vehicles in the Trondheim Toll Ring System............154 Table 2-24 - Time Profile of Inbound Car Driver Trips Through the Toll Ring 1990 and 1992. Weekdays ................................................................................................................................................................157 Table 2-25 - Number of Vehicles Passing the Toll Stations 1992-2005 .................................................161 Table 2-26 - Trondheim Package Financing, 1989-2005 .......................................................................167 Table 2-27 - Trondheim Package Investments, 1989-2005.....................................................................168 Table 2-28 - Fare structure toll ring, 2007 (1 EURO =approx 8 NOK) ...............................................173 Table 2-29 - Planned financing source and revenue use for the Bergen Programme (Source: St.prp. nr 76 (2001-02) ...........................................................................................................................................174 Table 2-30 – Fare structure Nord-Jæren toll ring, 2008 (1 EURO =approx 8 NOK)...........................178 Table 2-31 - Planned financing source and revenue use for the Nord-Jæren Package (Source: St.prp. nr.14 (1998-99)) .....................................................................................................................................179 Table 2-32 - Effects on road transport emissions (various pollutants) from the Stockholm congestion charging trial. .........................................................................................................................................192 Table 3-1. List of Key Indicators ............................................................................................................205 Table 3-2 – Overview of indicators collected .........................................................................................207 Table 3-3 – Change in number of vehicles entering the zone .................................................................208 Table 3-4 – Reduction in Delays.............................................................................................................209 Table 3-5 – Reduction in CO2 Emissions................................................................................................210 Table 3-6 – Reduction in Pollutant Emissions........................................................................................211 Table 3-7 – Reduction in Accidents in the Zone .....................................................................................212 Table 3-8 – Additional Finance for Investment ......................................................................................213

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 7

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Index of Figures

Figure 2-1– Map of London......................................................................................................................20 Figure 2-2 - Central London Congestion Charging Zone (including the Western Extension) .................22 Figure 2-3 - Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) technology ..................................................23 Figure 2-4 - Businesses citing transport difficulties as a major problem facing the organisation, by business sector (2006) ..............................................................................................................................31 Figure 2-5 – Charging Scheme map. ........................................................................................................37 Figure 2-6 - Modelling of possible measures ...........................................................................................40 Figure 2-7 - Proposed Transport Improvements in Cambridge ...............................................................41 Figure 2-8 - Artist’s impression of technology to be used in the proposed scheme in Cambridge...........42 Figure 2-9 – Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) technology..................................................43 Figure 2-10 – Proposed Congestion Charging Scheme in Cambridge.....................................................44 Figure 2-11 - Manchester’s proposed Congestion Charging scheme ......................................................47 Figure 2-12 –Edinburgh Proposed Charging Cordons ............................................................................56 Figure 2-13 – Opinion research 2003 ........................................................................................................1 Figure 2-14 – Overview of the test area (source of map: Google Maps) .................................................67 Figure 2-15 – Overview of locations of the EVI-beacons (source of map: Google Maps).......................69 Figure 2-16 - Distribution of commutes by time and transport method for the various monetary rewards ..................................................................................................................................................................72 Figure 2-17 - Distribution of commutes by time and transport method for the various Yeti rewards ......72 Figure 2-18 – Description of the technical system ...................................................................................78 Figure 2-19 – The Rome context...............................................................................................................82 Figure 2-20 - Urban Planning and Traffic restriction Polices.................................................................83 Figure 2-21 – Rome areas defined by PGTU............................................................................................84 Figure 2-22 - The daily LTZ Scheme in Rome ..........................................................................................86 Figure 2-23 - The nightly LTZ Scheme in Rome .......................................................................................87 Figure 2-24 – LTZs in central Rome.........................................................................................................88 Figure 2-25 - The last electronic gate ”closing” the central LTZ............................................................89 Figure 2-26 - The Communication System (e-gate – car – control centre) ..............................................91 Figure 2-27 - Automatic plate number recognition process (Municipal Police user interface) Characters reliability support to operators.................................................................................................................92 Figure 2-28 – The integrated Trastevere scheme .....................................................................................93 Figure 2-29 – The new vertical signalling system ....................................................................................93 Figure 2-30 - Comparison between before (year 2000) and post (years 2001-5) of the central LTZ scheme ......................................................................................................................................................95 Figure 2-31 – Number of accesses in the city centre LTZ during the period 2006-2008 .........................96 Figure 2-32 - Trend of the fines for access violation................................................................................97 Figure 2-33 - Mean values of benzene concentrations (2001 – 2005) in Central Rome, Trastevere and San Lorenzo. .............................................................................................................................................98 Figure 2-34 – CO values comparison between the three air quality measurement stations considered ..99 Figure 2-35 – PM10 values comparioson between the three air quality measurement stations considered ..................................................................................................................................................................99 Figure 2-36 – PM10 concentration values of the three air quality measurements stations compared to UE threshold.............................................................................................................................................99 Figure 2-37 – Access Control System Acceptability ...............................................................................100 Figure 2-38 - Acceptability of a full road-pricing scheme (without access control) ..............................101 Figure 2-39 – Total traffic flow within historical centre LTZ between 5.57 p.m. and 6.00 p.m. during the period 9th-18th September 2003 (without mini-VMS) with respect to the period 9th-18th September 2008 (with mini-VMS)......................................................................................................................................102 Figure 2-40 – The ATAC mobile Infomobility tool .................................................................................103 Figure 2-41 - Tridente fully pedestrian 24h............................................................................................104 Figure 2-42 – two and four powered wheels vehicles circulating within LTZ of city centre ..................105 Figure 2-43 – EU-countries PTW accidents ratio in 2001 and 2006 .....................................................106 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 8

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-44 – Two-wheelers fatalities and injured time series of eSUM cities. .....................................107 Figure 2-45 - The “Cerchia dei bastioni” Limited Traffic Zone ............................................................109 Figure 2-46 - Milan operation headquarters..........................................................................................110 Figure 2-47 – The Ecopass system .........................................................................................................111 Figure 2-48 - Different Ecopass Tickets .................................................................................................111 Figure 2-49 – Distribution of frequency classes about number of accesses within Ecopass Area during the first twelve months ............................................................................................................................117 Figure 2-50 – Vehicle fleet composition .................................................................................................118 Figure 2-51 – PT patronage trends between years 2000-2008 ..............................................................119 Figure 2-52 – Total PM10 emissions reduction from road traffic within Ecopass area (January – December 2008)......................................................................................................................................120 Figure 2-53 - Total NOx emissions reduction from road traffic within Ecopass area (January – December 2008)......................................................................................................................................120 Figure 2-54 - Total CO2 emissions reduction from road traffic within Ecopass area (January – December 2008)......................................................................................................................................121 Figure 2-55 - Total NH3 emissions reduction from road traffic within Ecopass area (January – December 2008)......................................................................................................................................121 Figure 2-56 – Average distribution of Ecopass tickets sold by type of initiation fees ............................122 Figure 2-57 – Variation of traffic congestion within Ecopass Area during peak hours .........................124 Figure 2-58 – Accidents trends within Ecopass area during charging hours (January to December 2008) ................................................................................................................................................................125 Figure 2-59 – Modal split in the city of Bologna....................................................................................127 Figure 2-60 – Cars ownership trends .....................................................................................................127 Figure 2-61 – Motorbikes ownership trends...........................................................................................128 Figure 2-62 - Public transport usage trend ............................................................................................128 Figure 2-63 – Daily “Pay-To-Access” Ticket ........................................................................................131 Figure 2-64 - Number of Access Trends during working days in LTZ after electronic enforcement by considering an average day of February................................................................................................132 Figure 2-65 – The LTZ Area in Bologna ................................................................................................133 Figure 2-66 - The toll plazas of the Oslo toll ring (Source: Fjellinjen AS) ............................................138 Figure 2-67 - Examples of toll plazas (number 5 and 11) ......................................................................139 Figure 2-68 - Positive attitudes towards the Oslo toll ring (percentage of sample) Source: Prosam (2006)......................................................................................................................................................144 Figure 2-69 - Attitudes towards the Oslo toll ring. (Source: Prosam 2006) ..........................................145 Figure 2-70 - Attitudes towards the Oslo toll ring. (Source: Prosam 2006) ..........................................145 Figure 2-71 - The probability for politicians and public administration employees to recommend different measures, N=304. (Source: Nossum and Norheim (2004). The question asked were; “How probable is it that you would recommend such a measure.”).................................................................147 Figure 2-72 – Trip distribution during workdays Oslo. (Source: TØI report 677/2003) .......................147 Figure 2-73 - The 1991 Trondheim Toll Ring.........................................................................................151 Figure 2-74 - The 1998 Trondheim Zone Based Tolling System ............................................................152 Figure 2-75 - The 2004 Trondheim Extended Tolling System ................................................................153 Figure 2-76 - Operation of DSRC Technology .......................................................................................154 Figure 2-77 - Average Daily Volumes January-June 2005 and 2006 for Moholt, Nardo and Nidarvoll158 Figure 2-78 - Average Hourly Volumes for Working Days January-June 2005 and 2006 for Moholt, Nardo and Nidarvoll...............................................................................................................................158 Figure 2-79 - Average Changes in Volumes Between 2005 and 2006 for Time Intervals During Working Days January-June for Moholt, Nardo and Nidarvoll............................................................................159 Figure 2-80 - Trip Purposes by Time Intervals for Car Drivers during Working Days Inbound Across the Bypass Road from the 2001 Travel Survey .............................................................................................160 Figure 2-81 - Gross Annual Charging Revenues (millions NOK) 1991-2005........................................162 Figure 2-82 - Retail Market Share and Volumes by City Sector 1987-1997 ..........................................163 Figure 2-83 - Retail Market Share and Volumes by City Sector 2000-2006 ..........................................164 Figure 2-84 - Public Attitudes to the Trondheim Charging Scheme.......................................................165 Figure 2-85 - Attitudes to the Trondheim Charging Scheme after Being Reminded About the Use of Revenues .................................................................................................................................................166 Figure 2-86 - The toll plazas of the Bergen toll ring (Source: Bro & Tunnelselskapet AS) ...................171 Figure 2-87 - The toll plazas of the Nord-Jæren package ring ..............................................................177 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 9

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-88. Average daily (6am – 7pm) passages over the charging cordon.......................................189 Figure 2-89. Relative delay in AM peak (excess travel time relative to free flow travel time) for different types of streets. Average values. .............................................................................................................191 Figure 2-90. Do you think that it is a good or bad decision to carry out the Stockholm trial? Proportion responding Very or quite good. By area. ................................................................................................194 Figure 2-91. How would you vote, if today you were to vote in a referendum on a permanent implementation. Proportion responding Yes, definitely or Yes, probably. By area ................................194 Figure 2-92. Attitude poll in Stockholm, opinion on congestion tax after re-installment. ......................194 Figure 2-93. Net effects for households by discretionary income and revenue use................................197 Figure 2-94. Predicted and actual change in traffic flow (morning peak) .............................................199 Figure 2-95. Predicted and actual average daily effects on different types of links...............................200 Figure 2-96. Forecast and outcome of time distribution. .......................................................................200 Figure 3-1. Retail traffic (footfall) indicator, western extension zone, central London charging zone and Greater London. Weekly data. 2005 to 2007. .........................................................................................216 Figure 3-2. Retail traffic (footfall) indicator, western extension zone. Weekdays and weekend. 2004 to 2007. .......................................................................................................................................................216

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 10

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

1 Introduction

The aim of CURACAO is to coordinate research and monitor the results of the implementation of road user charging as a demand management tool in urban areas. The project is doing this by working with cities interested in pursuing road pricing to identify the barriers to their doing so, and providing evidence on ways of overcoming those barriers. The D3 – Case Study Results is based on the collection of case studies from real life in the leading cities in the field of Road User Charging. The good practices gathered concern 3 types of involved cities: 1. The “core” case study cities that are represented by project partners: Bristol, Edinburgh, The Hague, Rome, Oslo, Trondheim and Stockholm; 2. The CURACAO User Group cities, including for example London and Cambridge, whose progress has been monitored throughout the project and whose representatives have been invited to attend workshops; 3. Other cities that have begun to study or to actively develop road pricing schemes, such as Bologna and Manchester. This document is organized around the resulting case study collection. After a brief overview on how the case study structure has been developed in order to harmonize information and allow easy comparison between cities, the second section concerns the description of all the case studies collected. Each sub-chapter considers the major elements of each case study in the following order: i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

v.

British Case Studies a. Bristol b. London c. Durham d. Cambridge e. Edinburgh f. Manchester Dutch Case Studies a. The Hague b. Proposed National Scheme Italian Case Studies a. Rome b. Milan c. Bologna Norwegian Case Studies a. Oslo b. Trondheim c. Bergen d. Nord-Jæren Swedish Case Study a. Stockholm

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 11

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Of course not all the examples presented have reached the same results because they are characterized by different implementation levels. The third section contains a comparative impact assessment of the main results. There are six key ‘headline’ impacts that can be drawn out from an analysis of the case study data, showing that URUC is a demand management tool which can deliver benefits to the traffic network, environment and safety, and provide additional finance for investment. Annex A gives a brief description of urban road charging activities in other European Union countries, and Annex B shows a schematic timeline of road user charging schemes in Europe.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 12

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2 The Case Studies

The initial phase of pre-screening of the CURACAO case studies aimed at gathering an inventory of: • • •

Priority objectives of the local Urban Road User Charging schemes; Readily available data, to be used for the establishment of a baseline; Already planned rounds of data collection, as part of regular monitoring by the local authorities.

Following discussion between the partners, the structure of Table 2-1 was agreed to analyse the case studies. The same structure is to be used for the online database. Table 2-1 – Case Study Table of Contents

Topic CONTEXT DESCRIPTION PRICING OBJECTIVES SCHEME DESCRIPTION Type of scheme Technology used Charging scheme IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS Barriers Drivers SCHEME RESULTS Network Environment Economy Acceptability Equity Liveability REVENUE USE IMPACTS PREDICTABILITY CONCLUSIONS ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 13

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

In the following paragraphs there will be the description of the case studies collected and updated during the project, subdivided by country. Each city where RUC schemes were applied will be illustrated by trying to follow the same structure, as described in the table above. This ensures a comprehensive approach to each case study and permits an easy and more rapid comparison between different cities. Case studies do not always have the same composition, but a standard set of headings is used for each case study with an indication where no information is available.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 14

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.1

British case Studies

During the course of the CURACAO project the situation with road pricing in Great Britain has been (and continues to be) very fluid, with a number of cities studying road pricing as a tool to combat traffic congestion and the government considering a national scheme. However, the future of road pricing in Great Britain at the end of December 2008 is very unclear. The capital cities of Great Britain (London, Edinburgh and Cardiff) have all considered road pricing as a possible solution to their congestion issues. So far, London is the only case where a scheme has been implemented. The city of London introduced a congestion charge in the central area in February 2003 and added the Western Extension in February 2007. A package of measures, including improvements to public transport, has been introduced as a result of revenue raised. After the introduction of the congestion charge in 2003, congestion levels were reduced in that year by 30%, and by 26% in 2004 and 22% in 2005, compared with the figure for 2002. Furthermore, results indicate that Congestion Charging has not had a direct adverse impact on the local economy. In Edinburgh, a plan for transport improvements was developed that included a congestion charging scheme. The plans were decisively rejected when put to a public referendum in 2005 and no scheme is likely in the foreseeable future. There are however a number of useful lessons to be learned from the Edinburgh experience. In Cardiff the Chamber of Commerce reported widespread support for a charging scheme among business leaders and transport professionals in late 2007. Such a scheme could raise the funds necessary for investment in the region’s transport infrastructure in order to improve the movement of people and freight. A decision has not been made on its future thus far. Outside of the capitals, many city and county councils in England have used government funds to help investigate their options. The Department for Transport gave funds to ten Transport Innovation Fund (or TIF) pilot areas, in order to bring forward proposals for transport improvements which included a road pricing component. Durham County Council currently operates a very small scheme charging scheme on one street in the city centre, and has decided not to proceed with a wider congestion charge after spending two years assessing transport options for the city, using TIF pump-priming. In some areas councils have worked together towards a common solution since congestion is a regional rather than a local problem. For instance the councils of Bath and North East Somerset, Bristol City, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire are preparing a proposal as Greater Bristol, while the cities of Nottingham, Leicester and Derby and the surrounding counties collaborated as the East Midlands. The East Midlands bid for TIF funding did not proceed, since some counties did not support the concept of a congestion charge. Instead a Workplace Parking Levy is being considered for Nottingham. The large conurbations of Greater Manchester and West Midlands submitted bids in 2007. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 15

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The Government gave approval for the Manchester congestion charge scheme to proceed in June 2008, drawing on resources from the TIF. A 2-ring scheme was planned to become operational from 2013, with a maximum daily charge of £5 (€6) helping to fund a £2.8 billion (€3.36 billion) package of public transport measures. However, the referendum result announced in December 2008 was overwhelmingly against the TIF proposals, leading to the congestion charge proposals being abandoned by the passenger transport authority. In this document we have collated some of the early media commentary that followed the outcome of the Manchester referendum result in early January 2009. We have not been able to cover the fuller conclusions that are likely to emerge from internal reviews and external studies of the Manchester proposals during 2009. In other areas of the UK schemes have either been considered and put on hold or rejected, including: • • • •

Tyne and Wear (on hold); Cambridgeshire (on hold); Norfolk for Norwich (not proceeding at this time); West Midlands (not proceeding).

Plans for a national road pricing scheme, announced by the UK government in June 2005, have effectively been shelved until more locally-based schemes are in place. It is evident that in all cases a robust package of measures, with road pricing as one component, is a prerequisite for schemes to be accepted. In almost all cases where schemes have been rejected or are on hold, it would seem that politicians have either encountered problems in gaining sufficient public support or acceptance for road pricing in isolation or have struggled to gain peer support from fellow councillors. In what follows we summarise progress with planned schemes in Bristol, London, Durham, Cambridge, Manchester and Edinburgh.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 16

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.1.1

Bristol

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION The West of England sub region is made up of Bath and North East Somerset, the City of Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire. An all-purpose unitary council governs each of these four areas. The four councils are working together as the West of England Partnership to tackle transport and other major strategic issues in the sub region. Around one million people live in the West of England, with Bristol being the biggest major urban centre. The population of the sub-region is set to grow by 19% and the number of jobs by 26% by 2026. The prosperity and growth of the west of England has lead to greater car ownership and increasing road congestion is a cost to the economy and is set to worsen over time with the expected rise in region’s population. Despite economic growth the region also contains significant pockets of deprivation and disadvantage, which suffer from poor transport links. It is estimated that, in the West of England, at least €430m is lost to the economy each year due to time spent in congestion, and this is expected to rise to almost €750m by 2016. The real problem hotspots are central Bristol and Bath, where poor air quality, delays and unreliable journey time are placing a huge amount of pressure on existing infrastructure and services. The impact of increased traffic levels in the central Bristol area has caused public transport to be badly affected, impacting mainly on reliability and journey times. This has a direct effect on confidence and willingness to use public transport and acts as an impediment to promoting modal shift. PRICING OBJECTIVES The document ‘Our Future Transport’, published in October 2007, sets out the approach of the West of England sub-region to developing its TIF bid.1 Demand management measures in the form of congestion charging are just one part of a large package of transport measures which taken together aim to: • • • • • • •

Tackle congestion Improve road safety for all road users Improve air quality Improve access to job opportunities Help people to get to work and school efficiently Strengthen the local economy Improve quality of life

1

http://www.westofengland.org/media/73351/our%20future%20transport.pdf ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 17

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

SCHEME DESCRIPTION The proposed means to addressing congestion and providing high quality public transport alternatives to car use is a road user charging scheme for central Bristol and Bath. The operational arrangements are still to be confirmed, but a weekday morning road user charge during the peak period (possibly 7am – 10am) could be implemented, with a daily charge of around £4 (€4.80). Outside of central Bristol and Bath, the North Fringe area of Bristol also suffers from acute congestion. The dispersed nature of the key employment hubs in the Greater Bristol area, and the mix of businesses, housing and other land uses, makes the North Fringe area of Bristol less well suited to a cordon or area-licence-type road user charging scheme. However it is recognised that these congestion ‘hotspots’ needs to be addressed and the suitability of a workplace parking levy has been investigated as part of the TIF development work. REVENUE USE The bid for TIF funding in the Greater Bristol area is part of a wider aspiration to implement a large package of improvements to the region’s transport network, including: −

− − −

−

− − − − − − − −

The Greater Bristol Bus Network (GBBN) – a package of bus priority and other improvements on ten sub-regional corridors. It is hoped that scheme implementation will commence in the near future; The Bath Package – a range of measures aimed at improving alternatives to the car by providing a modern, integrated and easy-to-use public transport system; South Bristol Link Road Phases 1 and 2 – improved orbital access in South Bristol and to Bristol International Airport, and to support regeneration and deal with traffic growth; Weston-super-Mare Package Phase 1 – a range of measures aimed at supporting sustainable development, including improved interchange facilities, car parking and improving to town centre bus routes. A new park and ride is also planned; 3 new Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) routes – starting with a scheme linking Emerson’s Green and Ashton Vale, the BRT routes will feature segregated bus lanes on parts of the routes to provide fast and reliable journey times; Improved rail services across the sub region; Park and Ride – Expansion of existing and development of new park and ride sites serving Bristol and Bath; Bus enhancements in addition to the GBBN package, incorporating better orbital routes, concessionary travel for young people and increased home to school bus provision; Highway improvements and traffic management measures; Improvements to walking and cycling routes, information and facilities; Public Realm – Significant improvements to open spaces in Bath and Bristol; Freight – Expansion of existing freight consolidation scheme in Bristol and extension to serve other areas; Smarter choices – Substantial increase in the support for travel plans, provision of car clubs, travel awareness campaigns, personalized travel marketing and other smarter choices measures.

IMPACT PREDICTABILITY No information available. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 18

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

CONCLUSIONS In October 2007 a document entitled “Our Future Transport” was submitted to the UK Government Department for Transport (DfT). This document outlined the sub region’s 20 year transport vision and the part that the Transport Innovation Fund could play in realising this vision. Since this submission, consultation has been conducted with a range of stakeholders and extensive further technical work undertaken in developing the detail of the proposals. In January 2008, the TIF project received a big boost when it was awarded an extra €850,000 by the UK Government to continue with the technical work needed to develop the proposals. Subject to political approval by the four authorities, the proposals would be submitted to the UK government as an outline business case for the €1 billion package from the Transport Innovation Fund. Once, and if, this bid is submitted, extensive community and stakeholder consultation is to be carried out. A further three years technical refinement of the proposed transport measures and ongoing engagement will then follow.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 19

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.1.2

London

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION London is a major global business, financial, and cultural centre. The city is one of the most popular tourist destinations in the world and its popularity has increased over the years due to continued economic growth. The population living within Greater London was estimated to be 7,512,400 in 20062. An estimate of the population living within the original central London Congestion Charging area is 136,0003. Central London covers approximately 10 square miles (26 square kilometres). Figure 2-1– Map of London

source: Shaw Communications

2

Office for National Statistics (2007) Mid-2006 Population Estimates estimated resident population Selected age groups for local authorities in the United Kingdom. 3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_congestion_charge#cite_note-1 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 20

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

PRICING OBJECTIVES In 2007 Transport for London (TfL) reported4 that the congestion charge had made a direct contribution to achieving four of the Mayor of London’s transport priorities, as set out in the Mayor’s Transport Strategy of 2001, which were to:

• • • •

Reduce congestion; Make radical improvements to bus services; Improve journey time reliability for car users; and Make the distribution of goods and services more efficient. These were the key objectives and underlying strategic principles for introducing Congestion Charging in 2003. SCHEME DESCRIPTION Congestion Charging was introduced in Central London on 17th February 2003. The Western Extension was implemented on 19th February 2007. Capita Group is currently responsible for certain operational aspects of the scheme under contract to TfL. In late 2009 the functions undertaken by Capita Group will pass to IBM. The central London Congestion Charging Zone covers a total area of approximately 42 square kilometres. The ‘original’ 2003 zone covers approximately 22 square kilometres and the Western Extension covers a further 20 square kilometres5. Figure 2-2 shows the Congestion Charging Zone implemented in 2003 – that includes The City of London, most of City of Westminster and parts of the boroughs of Lambeth, Southwark, Camden, Islington, Hackney and Tower Hamlets and the Western Extension, introduced in 2007 – that includes Kensington & Chelsea, further parts of the City of Westminster and a small part of Hammersmith & Fulham.

4

Transport for London (2007) Central London Congestion Charging Western Extension – Early Results. Transport for London (July 2007) Central London Congestion Charging – Impacts monitoring Fifth Annual Report, P.10. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 21 5

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-2 - Central London Congestion Charging Zone (including the Western Extension)

Source: Transport for London

At a strategic level the London Congestion Charge is a traffic management scheme. Its clear intention is to control traffic flow in the Central area of London. It is the largest fully operational existing Congestion Charging scheme in the United Kingdom. Users pay a daily charge to enter the Charging Zone. They can then exit and enter as many times as they like during the day. The charge is operational between the hours of 07:00 and 18:00 Monday to Friday. The first stage of Congestion Charging was introduced in Central London on 17th February 2003. The charge was originally set at £5 (€6) per day which rose to £8 (€9.60) per day in July 2005. This assumes payment in advance of travel. The system uses Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) technology. The CCTV cameras record the vehicle registration (number plate) of all vehicles that enter the charging zone between 07:00 and 18:00, Monday to Friday. The ANPR technology converts the details captured in the image into text which can be compared to the database of valid payments, exemptions and discounts. A typical ANPR image is shown in Figure 2-3. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 22

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-3 - Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) technology

RUC Technology - ANPR

source: Atkins Ways to pay The charge can be paid in a number of ways:

• • • • • •

Via the world wide web6; By telephone - through a contact centre; In some retail outlets and petrol filling stations; At self-service machines located in major car parks; By post; and Users can also register to pay the charge using their mobile phone - SMS text messaging.

The daily charge The Congestion Charge in London is currently an £8 (€9.60) basic daily charge for driving or parking a vehicle on public roads within the zone between the hours of 07:00 and 18:00,

6

http://www.tfl.gov.uk/roadusers/congestioncharging/ ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 23

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Monday to Friday7. Payment of the daily charge allows drivers to drive within, exit and re-enter the charging zone as many times as desired in one day. The £8 (€9.60) charge is applicable if paid before or after the journey on the day of travel, by midnight on the day of travel. If there is a further delay in paying the charge the fee rises to £10 (€12) if paid by midnight the following charging day. If the charge remains unpaid, a £120 (€144) penalty charge is sent to the registered keeper of the vehicle, which is reduced to £60 (€72) if paid within 14 days. Advance payment discounts There are further discounts for payment in advance of travel for monthly and annual trips - £136 (€163.20) per month and £1,696 (€2,035) per year and for vehicles registered on the Transport for London (TfL) ‘fleet scheme’. Residents’ discounts Residents within the charging zone receive a 90% discount on vehicles registered at an address within the charging zone8. Exemptions Transport for London lists the following automatic (100%) exemptions from charging:

• • • • • • •

Two-wheeled motorbikes (and sidecars), mopeds and bicycles

• •

Vehicles for more than one disabled person (e.g. Dial-A-Ride) exempt from road tax

Black cabs licensed with the Public Carriage Office (PCO) Minicabs licensed with the PCO Emergency Service vehicles - e.g. ambulances / fire engines NHS vehicles that are exempt from road tax Breakdown recovery vehicles Vehicles used by disabled people that are exempt from vehicle excise duty (road tax) under the 'disabled' class Public transport vehicles with nine or more seats that are listed within the taxation classes Buses or Reduced Pollution Buses

TfL also list 100% exemptions, subject to registration and a £10 (€12) administration fee, for electric, and bio-fuel vehicles. The Congestion Charge is enforced through a network of cameras located at all entry and exit points to the charging zone, as well as at key locations within the zone. These were until recently supplemented by mobile camera units and on-street patrols. Vehicles observed within the charging zone for which a valid payment, exemption or discount is not found are subject to enforcement action. Keeper details are obtained from the appropriate 7

Weekends and public holidays are not included, and between 25 December and 1 January inclusive. http://www.tfl.gov.uk/roadusers/congestioncharging/6735.aspx ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 24 8

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

vehicle licensing authority and a Penalty Charge Notice of £120 (€144) is sent to the registered keeper of the vehicle. IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS The key barriers to the scheme were opposition prior to implementation. This included local authorities and some retailers. Fear of the unknown was perpetuated by the media who considered the idea flawed until Congestion Charging became operational. It is testament to the strong leadership of the Mayor of London and a dedicated team at TfL that the scheme was launched in 2003 despite a number of barriers. BARRIERS

•

Westminster City Council and the Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea opposed the scheme and challenged it in the High Court;

•

Some retailers, notably John Lewis, opposed the scheme and through their own research concluded that charging had led to an estimated sales reduction of 7.3% at their Oxford Street store; Transport for London maintains that there is no evidence that the charge has had a detrimental effect on business performance within the zone.

•

The introduction of the scheme in February 2003 coincided with a temporary economic slowdown.

DRIVERS The following drivers provide a chronological outline of some of the support that TfL consider enabled the introduction of Congestion Charging in London:

• •

The scheme had political support at the national level – as early as 1998;

•

In May 2000 Ken Livingstone was elected Mayor of London – his manifesto included a commitment to consult on road user charging;

•

In January 2001 a strategic plan for the delivery of congestion charging in Central London was presented to the Mayor and subsequently adopted;

•

An extensive public information campaign helped to launch the scheme successfully.

In March 2000 the ROCOL working group published a feasibility report that supported the introduction of an area-wide scheme;

SCHEME RESULTS The following scheme results outline the measured impact since the introduction of the Central Zone Charging Scheme in 2003. This includes a first set of results for the Western Extension which was implemented in February 2007. In most cases the evidence has been sourced from either the Transport for London (July 2007) Central London Congestion Charging – Impacts monitoring fifth Annual Report or the July 2008 Sixth Annual report. This includes data before implementation – 2002 and annual as well as cumulative figures up to 2006.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 25

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

NETWORK TfL acknowledges that it is difficult to separate out the direct impact of the Congestion Charge itself on the function of the road network. Improvements to the road network can be attributed to the impact of a wider package of measures, including major projects such as the pedestrianisation of Trafalgar Square, which removed traffic from the northern side of the square in order to improve the urban environment. Table 2-2 observes the key percentage changes year on year in traffic entering the central London charging zone between 07:00 and 18:309. The column 2003 vs 2002 shows the immediate impact of the introduction of Congestion Charging in 2003. The gradual variations year on year are also shown as well as the overall change in the last column of the table that compares 2006 with 2002. Table 2-2 - Key year on year changes in traffic entering the central London charging zone during charging hours (07:00 – 18:30)10. 2003

2004

vs 2002 -14% -18% -27% -33% -11% -11% +18% +17% +23% +12% +19%

vs 2003 0% 0% -1% -1% -1% -5% +1% -1% +8% -3% +8%

2005

2006

2006

Vehicle type All vehicles Four or more wheels Potentially chargeable - Cars and minicabs - Vans - Lorries and other Non chargeable - Licensed taxis - Buses and coaches Powered two-wheelers - Pedal cycles

vs 2004 vs 2005 vs 2002 -2% 0% -16% -3% 0% -21% -3% +1% -30% -3% 0% -36% -3% +2% -13% -4% +6% -13% -4% -1% +16% 0% -3% +13% -4% +3% +25% -9% 0% 0% +7% +8% +49% Source: Transport for London

Statistics of note in the above table include the number of cars and minicabs entering the central London charging zone. During charging hours in 2006 this was 36% lower than 2002 i.e. before charging was introduced. Alternatives to car travel such as pedal cycles have become very popular – a 49% increase between 2002 and 2006. In terms of network speed, TfL notes a fluctuation over time since the introduction of Congestion Charging in 2003. The figure in 2003 was approximately 17 km per hour, compared to 14 km per hour in 2002. More recently, observed charging hour speeds have fallen to 16 km per hour in 2005 and 15 km per hour in 2006. TfL say that modeling suggests that had charging not been introduced, average speeds would have worsened from the 14 km per hour figure in 2002, to approximately 11.5 km per hour by 2006.

9

The hours of operation of the Congestion Charging Zone changed to 07.00 to 18.00 after the western extension was launched in February 2007. 10 Source: Transport for London (July 2007) Central London Congestion Charging – Impacts monitoring Fifth Annual Report, P.21. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 26

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The effect of the western extension on traffic volumes and traffic composition is in line with Transport for London’s expectations. Their July 2008 impact monitoring report11 records that traffic entering the extension zone during charging hours in 2007 (vehicles with four or more wheels) was down by 14%. This level of reduction has been preserved in 2008, and compares with TfL’s expectation for reductions in the range 13 to 17%. Details of modal split are contained in the table below. Table 2-3 – Traffic leaving the western extension zone across all outbound roads. (Charging hours, 07:00 – 18:00, 2005 to 2007) Vehicle type All vehicles Four or more wheels Potentially chargeable - Cars and minicabs - Vans - Lorries and others Non chargeable - Licensed taxis - Buses and coaches - Powered twowheelers - Pedal cycles

2005 average (000s) 255

2006 average (000s) 257

2007 Percentage Percentage Percentage average of total 2005 of total 2006 of total 2007 (000s) 224 100% 100% 100%

233

234

200

91%

91%

89%

183

184

152

72%

72%

68%

138

139

110

54%

54%

49%

36

37

33

14%

14%

15%

9

9

9

4%

4%

4%

72 40

73 39

72 38

28% 16%

28% 15%

32% 17%

10

10

10

4%

4%

4%

12

13

13

5%

5%

6%

9

11

11

4%

4%

5%

Congestion After the introduction of Congestion Charging in 2003, TfL expected a reduction in congestion of approximately 20 to 30%. A 2002 baseline value of 2.3 minutes per kilometre was established. Surveys of the Central London charging zone in 2003 indicated average delays were about 1.6 minutes per kilometre - a reduction of 0.7 minutes per kilometre, compared with the 2002 baseline, a reduction of 30%. Subsequent years recorded a 30% (2004) and 22% (2005) reduction, compared with the 2002 pre-charging baseline. During 2006 congestion reduction fell to 8%, while in 2007 congestion returned to the levels experienced in 2002. This was not due to a rise in traffic levels, which remain relatively unchanged. It is thought the increase was caused by other factors, in particular a notable rise in the street works projects that have affected capacity on the road network and thus traffic flow. Public Transport network Buses

11

: Transport for London (July 2008) Central London Congestion Charging – Impacts monitoring Sixth Annual Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 27

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Bus patronage figures for passengers entering Central London increased year on year between 1999 and 2002 – from approximately 70,000 passengers in 1999 to just below 88,000 passengers in 2002. There was a significant increase in 2003 to approximately 104,000 passengers and a further rise to 116,000 in 2004. Patronage stabilised at around 116,000 in 2005 and 2006. The Underground The Underground has seen less of a significant impact on patronage since 2003. A recorded average of approximately 516,000 passengers exited stations in and around the central charging zone during the morning peak period in 2002. This rose to 523,000 in 2006 having been 498,000 in 2005. ENVIRONMENT The impact of the Charging Scheme on the environment is arguably best measured by changes in vehicle emissions and measured air quality. It is challenging to attribute the direct impact of the Charging Scheme on either in isolation. There have been a number of factors, unrelated to Congestion Charging, which have had an impact on air quality, not least technology changes to vehicles and most recently the introduction of the London Low Emission Zone. However, the improvement in air quality – reducing emissions to air – has been due in part to less traffic moving within central London and that which remains in the area moving more efficiently. Table 2-4 summarises the key percentage changes between 2002 and 2003 - before and after the introduction of the Congestion Charge in Central London. Table 2-4 - Principal changes to emissions of NOX, PM10 and CO212. Change Flow change - motorcycles Flow change - taxis Flow change - car Flow change - bus and coach Flow change - light goods Flow change - rigid goods Flow change - articulated heavy goods Traffic volume change Speed change Traffic volume and speed change Vehicle stock change Overall traffic emissions change 2003 versus 2002

NOx 2.3 -4.5 2.9 -0.1 -1.6 -0.4 -1.4 -6.5 -7.9 -5.5

PM10 0.4 3.8 -4.6 1.0 -0.1 -1.0 -0.2 -0.8 -5.5 -6.3 -9.2

CO2 0.2 2.4 -11.2 1.2 -0.1 -0.7 -0.2 -8.4 -7.3 -15.7 -0.7

-13.4

-15.5

-16.4

12

Source: Transport for London (July 2007) Central London Congestion Charging – Impacts monitoring Fifth Annual Report, P.66. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 28

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Change Additional ‘background’ change from technology improvement (fleet turnover) 20032006

NOx

PM10

CO2

-17.3

-23.8

-3.4

Source: Transport for London Former London Mayor Ken Livingston had proposed to introduce a higher daily levy - £25 (€30) compared to the current £8 (€9.60) charge – for high emission vehicles in the Autumn 2008. With the recent change in administration in May 2008 and new Mayor of London, Boris Johnson taking charge, this proposal has now been abandoned. Table 2-5 summarises the key the percentage changes to emissions inside the Western extension zone between 2006 and 2007. Table 2-5 - Principal changes to emissions of NOX, PM10 and CO2 in relation to the western extension. Percentage change, 2007 compared with 2006. Annual average day, all road traffic emissions13. Change Flow change – motorcycles Flow change – taxis Flow change – car Flow change – bus and coach Flow change – light goods Flow change – rigid heavy goods Flow change – articulated heavy goods Traffic volume and composition change Speed change Traffic volume/composition and speed change Vehicle stock change 2007 versus 2006 (without WEZ)

NOx 1.9 0.0 -10.6 1.5 -4.1 0.0 0.0 -2.5 -2.7 -5.2 -7.2

PM10 2.0 0.0 -10.6 1.4 -3.3 0.0 0.0 -4.2 -1.4 -5.7 -6.9

CO2 2.0 0.0 -10.9 1.4 -4.4 0.0 0.0 -6.5 -2.8 -9.2 -2.0

Source: Transport for London ECONOMY There are a number of externalities that have had an impact on the UK and thus central London economy, both of which are closely aligned. TfL list these as:

•

The closure of the Central Line, owing to the Chancery Lane derailment, and the beginning of the war in Iraq in 2003;

• •

The central London terrorist bombings in 2005; The Bank of England interest rate increases in 2006.

TfL reported in their Central London Congestion Charging – Impacts monitoring Fifth Annual Report that there was “no general evidence of any clear differential impact of the central London congestion charging scheme on business activity.” It is clear that it is difficult to quantify the economic impact of Congestion Charging in London. However, it is worth noting a number of observations about the ‘health’ of the economy in 13

Source: Transport for London (July 2008) Central London Congestion Charging – Impacts monitoring Sixth Annual Report, P.106. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 29

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

London since this indicates, even if it does not quantify, that Congestion Charging has not had a positive or indeed negative impact. We can note the following: −

−

− −

During 2005 business performance within the charging zone (at that time without the Western Extension) was significantly better than in the rest of London, notably in terms of profitability and productivity. Analysis of comparative trends for various indicators of business performance continues to show no evidence of serious differences between the charging zone and comparative locations outside that might be indicative of a congestion charging effect either positive or negative on overall business performance in central London. Trends in business VAT registrations follow this trend and do not indicate a significant congestion charging impact on central London businesses. Businesses within the charging zone continue to recognize the decongestion benefits in terms of the area having become a more pleasant place to work and less problematic in terms of accessing work locations.

One of the key success factors for implementation of the Congestion Charging scheme in London, identified by TfL in their fifth annual monitoring report, July 2007, has been robust and far-reaching stakeholder and public consultation. TfL states that consultation has been a ‘consistent element’ of the scheme from the development of the Mayor’s Transport Strategy in 2001 to the introduction of the Western Extension in 2007. A large number of formal and informal public and stakeholder consultation exercises have been held, some examples of which relate to:

• • • • •

The Western Extension; The introduction of the Pay Next Day facility; Removing anomalies relating to resident discounts; Providing incentives to apply for discounts; and Changes to the original Central London zone.

ACCEPTABILITY Business Attitudes in the retail sector TfL has carried out an annual survey with businesses in Central London since the Congestion Charge was introduced in 2003. This has included both businesses within the zone and those on its periphery. The reason for this research is to assess business attitudes to congestion charging and its impacts on business activity. It is noted that retailers have been the least supportive of the scheme. However, it is acknowledged that transport is a key issue for retailers and the challenges of congestion and access are important problems that affect day to day operation and trading. The most recent TfL Business Survey of Autumn 2006 suggests that nearly two-thirds of the surveyed retail sector businesses in the charging zone say that transport and travel difficulties affected their business ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’. This is shown in Figure 2-4. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 30

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-4 - Businesses citing transport difficulties as a major problem facing the organisation, by business sector (2006)

25%

Retail

27%

Restaurants

Other leisure

22%

Wholesale & Distribution

21%

0%

34%

26%

30%

36%

A great deal

Quite a lot

Hardly at all

13%

1%

2%

23%

60% Not at all

1%

17%

31%

40%

2%

12%

14%

34%

27%

20%

13%

32%

33%

19%

Other

23%

33%

13%

Financial

38%

80% Don't know

EQUITY No information available. LIVEABILITY No information available. Road Safety Recent years have seen significant reductions to reported personal injury road traffic collisions, reflecting wider TfL and borough road safety initiatives. TfL estimated that the charging scheme had contributed to an additional reduction of between 40 and 70 collisions involving personal injury per year in the central London charging zone and on the Inner Ring Road over and above what would have been expected from these wider background trends. There was no evidence of disproportionate change to the number of collisions involving two-wheeled vehicles in or around the charging zone that might have been attributable to the traffic impacts of the scheme, with increases to numbers of these vehicles following the introduction of charging. Perhaps reflecting the lower-than-usual 2005 figures, collisions within the original charging zone in 2006 increased by 6 percent overall, with the largest increase seen during weekends – a 17 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 31

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

100%

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

percent increase. On the Inner Ring Road, total collisions fell by 6 percent during charging hours but, again, rose at weekends by 9 percent. Total reported road traffic collisions in Greater London were down by 6 percent on average during 2006, or 8 percent during charging hours. Given effectively stable traffic conditions in the original charging zone these recent changes would appear to largely reflect non-scheme related factors. Table 2-6 – Total reported personal injury toad traffic collisions by time period. (March 2005 – February 2007)

2005 Weekdays 07.00 – 18.00 Weekdays 00.00 – 07.00; 18.00 – 24.00 Weekends all day Total 2006 Weekdays 07.00 – 18.00 Weekdays 00.00 – 07.00; 18.00 – 24.00 Weekends all day Total

Original Charging Zone 891 431 307 1,629 925 443 359 1,727

Note: The reporting year runs from March to February.

Inner Ring Road 308 177 147 632 289 172 160 621

Greater London 13,585 6,544 6,137 26,266 12,554 6,068 5,981 24,603

Source: Transport for London

As Table 2-7 illustrates, the proportion of road traffic collisions involving a pedestrian in the original charging zone remained unchanged from the year before; and pedestrian involvement collisions on the Inner Ring Road were down as both a number and a proportion of all collisions. Within Greater London the proportion of reported collisions involving pedestrians remained steady. Table 2-7 – Collisions involving personal injury by pedestrian involvement, 07:00 – 18:00. (March 2005 – February 2007)

2005 Pedestrian Non-pedestrian 2006 Pedestrian Non-pedestrian Note: The reporting year runs from March to February.

Original Charging Zone 312 (35%) 579 (65%) 321 (35%) 604 (65%)

Inner Ring Road 64 (21%) 244 (79%) 52 (18%) 237 (82%)

Greater London 3,188 (23%) 10,397 (77%) 2,922 (23%) 9,632 (77%)

Source: Transport for London

REVENUE USE As with other existing Congestion Charging schemes, the use of revenues has been considered key to the acceptability of the scheme. TfL reported in 2007 that the scheme generated net revenues of approximately £123 million in 2006/07 which is being spent on improvements to transport across London, with an emphasis on improving bus services. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 32

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

IMPACTS PREDICTABILITY Prior to the start of congestion charging, the impact on the city (particularly from the point of view of businesses) was largely unknown. There was a great deal of uncertainty and fear about the impact on business margins, particularly in the long term. Business-related trade associations including the Freight Transport Association have been longterm opponents of the charge, arguing that the scope to organize delivery schedules outside of charging hours had already been exploited to the full and that all existing operations would need to continue using the network at chargeable times. CONCLUSIONS The London Congestion Charging scheme has been operational for almost 6 years. Extensive monitoring and data is now available14. In the Central zone the overall conclusion is positive. Many of the fears, prior to implementation, amongst key groups such as the business (retail) sector have been allayed. TfL report that analysis of business performance (sales and profitability) and business start-up (VAT registrations) shows stronger – both absolute and relative – growth in the original central London charging zone post charging than prior to the introduction of charging in 200315. Furthermore in the Central Zone bus service reliability and patronage both appear to have steadily improved over time, compared with pre-charging conditions, although there has been some indication that increased traffic congestion was beginning to impact on service performance, both within the charging zone and more widely across London. Again increased congestion in 2006 is considered by TfL to be largely due to a rise in the number of road-works in Central London and not the Congestion Charge. Early results from the Western Extension are mixed. For example TfL on-street surveys found that over 90% of shoppers and diners in the western extension said that they had not changed their trip patterns since the introduction of charging16. In terms of business performance, TFL believe that particularly in terms of profitability and productivity, any negative changes that have taken place have been due to externalities and are not as a direct result of the Congestion Charge. For example the retail sector has faced variable and challenging trading conditions throughout 2008. It remains a challenge to disaggregate such results and measure the direct impact of the Congestion charging scheme in isolation. There is also some uncertainty about the continuing operation of the Western Extension. The Mayor of London announced in November 2008 that he has initiated the process to remove the Western Extension. This is in response to results from a non-statutory public consultation exercise.17

14

Transport for London (July 2007) Central London Congestion Charging – Impacts monitoring Fifth Annual Report. Transport for London (July 2008) Central London Congestion Charging – Impacts monitoring Sixth Annual Report. 16 Transport for London (July 2008) Central London Congestion Charging – Impacts monitoring Sixth Annual Report. 17 th BBC News 27 November 2008. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 33 15

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.1.3

Durham

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION Durham city has a unique character and contains many fine buildings. The quality of the landscape surrounding the city centre affords it a unique setting amongst the historic cities of England and it is now a major tourist attraction. Durham contains a number of major national and regional employers. It has remained a centre of economic activity in an area that has experienced decline of its traditional mining industries. Major road building project in Durham in the late 1970’s have been followed by a continuation of land use patterns. As Durham has continued in largely the same fashion, the problems of its existing city centre structure have compounded year on year for access and parking requirements of the many different users of the transport system. Durham is a historic city facing the issue of rising traffic levels into the historic centre, much of the activity being generated by tourist traffic. In order to manage the level of traffic entering the centre of Durham, local decision makers decided to introduce charging for those vehicles wishing to access the historic core, in essence the Market Place, cathedral and castle. The scheme is designed to resolve the conflict between vehicles and pedestrians when accessing the historic centre. Following the UK Government’s legal provision for Local Authorities to introduce congestion charging, Durham County Council was the first authority in the country to implement a charging scheme in 2002. Durham has also looked at expanding the current scheme via the Transport Innovation Fund (TIF) scheme. Two of the most likely charging options considered were:

•

The implementation of a point charge on the through road with traffic potentially being diverted onto improved infrastructure;

•

Introduction of an increased cordon charge with a reliance on improved Park and Ride and public transport.

The current traffic situation in Durham is as follows: − − − −

Lack of road space. The historic nature of the city and the river valley topography mean that road widening is not an option The provision of bus and cycle lanes – has been limited due to the lack of road space to make this feasible All the main radial routes are congested in the morning and evening peak periods Total gridlock is only avoided in the very central area because the traffic is held back and stored on the approach routes.

PRICING OBJECTIVES The broad aims of the Durham charging scheme were: ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 34

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

• • • •

Improve pedestrian safety Improve access for the disabled Enhance a world heritage site Sustain the vitality of this part of the city centre

SCHEME DESCRIPTION Durham’s congestion charging zone is one depicted by a cordon-based scheme, where drivers must pay to enter a fixed zone. Essentially the scheme covers just one road, Saddler Street, which provides access to Durham’s World Heritage site on Durham’s peninsula. The road provides access to the Market Place, Cathedral and castle, but was also being used as a temporary car park by shoppers, with the driver staying in the vehicle while the passenger visited the shops. The £2 (€2.40) charge is payable on exit from the area between 10:00am and 4:00pm Monday to Saturday. Entrance and exit from the area is free at all other times. There are a number of categories of road users who are exempted from the charge: • • • • • •

Residents Students Public Transport Vehicles Security and Postal Vehicles Emergency services Disabled Drivers

Exit during the restricted period is controlled with an automatic bollard, which is linked to payment and permit detection apparatus. The pay machine will accept £2, £1, 50p, 20p and 10p coins. No change is given from the machine. Drivers wishing to access the peninsula will be faced with a charge on exit. Drivers must stop at the stop line and red traffic indicator located alongside the payment machine. Following a successful transaction, the bollard will lower and, when fully retracted, the traffic signal will change to green and the driver can proceed safely out of the charged zone. Moreover:

•

Drivers who fail to meet the charge will be permitted to proceed through the bollard system. However, a £30 (€36) charge notice is issued to the vehicle owner.

• •

Vehicles will be recorded on the CCTV system and owners traced through the DVLA.

•

This is monitored by the CCTV system and appropriate action will be taken against them.

Drivers attempting to avoid the charge through driving out of the uncontrolled entrance will be committing a traffic offence.

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS Essentially the Durham charging scheme is active along one road (Saddler Street) and has not created any problems such as boundary issues or traffic displacement on to other routes. It ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 35

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

would appear, therefore, that the scheme is broadly non-controversial and therefore there was not a high level of opposition to the scheme being implemented. As a historic city with a great deal of heritage, it is not hard to see why a road pricing measure was well received in Durham. The general public can acknowledge that the restraining of traffic in the centre is helping to preserve the city’s heritage and therefore a charge to protect this has been well received. Additionally, because the charge only affects one street, there is little financial disbenefit to residents wishing to access the main part of Durham’s city centre. SCHEME RESULTS NETWORK The introduction of the scheme achieved an 85% reduction in vehicular traffic (from over 2000 to approximately 200 vehicles per day). ENVIRONMENT No information available. ECONOMY No information available. ACCEPTABILITY It has been reported by businesses that the majority of businesses (83%) have not altered their servicing arrangements following the introduction of the charge.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 36

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-5 – Charging Scheme map.

The map above shows the charging scheme. The route shaded in red is Saddler Street which is the scheme’s only charged road. There was a significant improvement in the public perception of the scheme since its introduction – 70% (a 21% increase from before the scheme was introduced) now believe that the charge is a good idea. In broader terms, there has been a rise to 78% in those who consider Durham City Centre to be a safe place to visit. EQUITY No information available. LIVEABILITY There appears to have been a re-distribution from cars to pedestrians – the big fall in the number of cars appears to have been replaced by the expansion in the pedestrian activity, suggesting that the area has now become a more accessible, safe and pleasant place to visit on foot. Therefore, pedestrians in Durham are within a definite group of winners as a result of the implementation of charging in Durham. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 37

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

REVENUE USE The revenues raised have been used to support a frequent bus service to and from the charging area i.e. the World Heritage Site. IMPACTS PREDICTABILITY No information available. CONCLUSIONS The introduction of congestion charging in Durham has on the whole been well received by the local population. The charge to access Saddler Street has been successful in reducing traffic levels by 85%. Durham County Council has received funding under the Transport Innovation Fund (TIF) for further transport modeling work, including the option of introducing a wider congestion charge in the city and building a northern relief road. However, in December 2008 Durham County Council announced that it would not be pursuing a bid to the Transport Innovation Fund, effectively ending its interest in an expanded congestion charge zone in the medium term.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 38

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.1.4

Cambridge

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION Cambridge is situated approximately 50 miles (80 kilometres) north-east of London. It is arguably best known for its university but the high-technology centre known locally as “Silicon Fen” is also a key centre of employment. Cambridge’s population in 2001 was 108,863 (that included 22,153 students), and the population of the urban area which includes parts of South Cambridgeshire district is estimated to be approximately 130,00018. Cambridgeshire County Council, in their Local Transport Plan (LTP) 2006-11, set out a series of objectives, transport targets and programmes for addressing the challenges the county faces. The plan identifies 2 key tools, “widening choice” and “managing demand” to achieve their aims. The LTP sets out a package of measures that include improvements to bus services, demand management measures that include road pricing and funding mechanisms to realise their aims such as the Transport Innovation Fund (TIF)19. To date, TIF funding has given Cambridgeshire County Council the opportunity to explore and develop an innovative proposal for a £500 million (€600 million) transport investment package of measures that would complement a road pricing scheme. 61,800 new homes will be built in the Cambridge sub-region in the 20-year period between 2001 and 2021. This is part of a national government requirement for new homes across the UK. This is locally supported through development plans. This will inevitably add pressure to the road network and necessitate demand management measures to alleviate congestion. PRICING OBJECTIVES Traffic Impact Assessments/Transport Appraisals suggest that there will be an additional 20,350 ‘new’ trips (all modes) in the morning peak period by 2021, an increase of approximately 20% compared to 2006 figures. This is predicted to cause increased delays on major routes in the county. In the city of Cambridge city itself, increased levels of congestion are predicted to cause:

• • •

84% increase in junction delays; 30% increase in distance travelled; and 46% increase in travel time.

Figure 2-6 illustrates the results of traffic modelling and the predicted number of trips given various scenarios.

18

Office for National Statistics (2001) “United Kingdom Census - Key Statistics for urban areas in England and Wales”. TIF is a Central Government – Department for Transport – pump priming funding mechanism. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 39 19

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

In a ‘do nothing’ scenario, the number of car journey trips is predicted to increase to over 300,000 by 2021 from a baseline of approximately 275,000 in 2006. This is shown in the ‘Projected 2021 journeys’ column in Figure 2-6. The predicted impact of a ‘combination of improvements’ or measures, indicates a fall in the number of car journeys to approximately 260,000, if substantial public transport, walking and cycling and highway improvements are introduced. This package of measures is considered an important component of the proposed scheme.

Figure 2-6 - Modelling of possible measures

Number of trips

350000 300000 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 0

Car journeys Non car journeys

Substantial Public Transport Substantial walking & cycling Substantial highway improvements Combination of improvements

Projected 2021 journeys

2006 car journeys

Type of improvements

In support of the package of measures already mentioned there are a number of improvements that are planned and these are shown in Figure 2-7 below. The proposals, as illustrated, include:

•

Restricted Access to Cambridge along the key roads entering the city to the north and south;

•

Junction improvements at 4 key locations in the central area of Cambridge;

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 40

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

• o o

• • •

Highway improvements: On part of the orbital road network to the east of the city (access from the A14); On the main route into the city from the M11 to the west of Cambridge. Public Transport Improvements along a number of key routes into the city; Cambridgeshire Guided Busway to the north and south of the city; and Improvements to a number of Park and Ride sites at strategic locations around Cambridge.

Figure 2-7 - Proposed Transport Improvements in Cambridge

SCHEME DESCRIPTION The Transport Innovation Fund (TIF) Cambridgeshire has been awarded a total of £2.4 million (€2.9 million) of TIF funding to date20. Cambridgeshire also submitted a further bid for £500m (€600m) in October 2007 for a TIF Congestion Charging Scheme. Investigation and public engagement continues.

20

Cambridgeshire has been awarded £1.4 million (€1.7 million) (pump-priming) for study work and £1m (€1.2m) support work to date; (Robert Tuckwell’s presentation 25th February 2008). ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 41

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-8 illustrates the various components of the technology that would be used in the proposed scheme in Cambridge. The vehicle would be fitted with an ‘on board’ unit that would register the vehicle passing or entering the charging zone. The Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) transceiver and vehicle receiver unit would log entry. This is backed up by Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras mounted on the same pole and outrigger, as shown in Figure 2-8. Spatial matching would take place between the image read and recorded by the ANPR camera and the DSRC transaction. Figure 2-8 - Artist’s impression of technology to be used in the proposed scheme in Cambridge

Figure 2-9 shows an example of an image caught by an ANPR camera as a vehicle passes a pole and outrigger into a charging zone.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 42

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-9 – Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) technology

RUC Technology - ANPR

The proposed charging scheme in Cambridge would have the following criteria:

• • •

It would be a one-off charge for anyone driving into, out of, or within Cambridge; It would operate between the hours of 7.30-9.30am (Monday-Friday); The proposed charge would be in the range of £3-5 (€3.60-€6).

The intention of the proposed charge would be to reduce traffic entering the city by 10% when compared to today’s figures. Figure 2-10 shows the proposed congestion charging scheme in Cambridge.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 43

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-10 – Proposed Congestion Charging Scheme in Cambridge

ACCEPTABILITY Consultation activities Public acceptance is considered to be an important part of any proposed scheme in Cambridge. To that end a number of consultation activities have either taken place or are programmed, including:

• • • • • • • •

Road shows across the county; Online survey; Stakeholder workshops (Cambridge x 3, Huntingdon, March, Ely, Sawston); Breakfast briefings; Special meetings – including Parish Councils, transport operators, the elderly, the disabled; Hard-to-reach groups; Engagement with schools – February 2008; and Member and MPs – meetings and briefings.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 44

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

By February 2008 approximately 1000 people had visited road shows and approximately 2,240 people had completed an online survey. The key issues arising from the consultation activities to date are that designers should consider:

• • • • • • •

Discounts and exemptions of any proposed scheme; Outbound trips should be thought about as well as inbound trips; The cost of alternatives to car-borne travel; The need for alternatives to be in place before any charge; The extent of the charging zone; Timescales; and The need for action to reduce congestion.

It is evident that the local authority should think about all these issues in any proposed scheme. EQUITY No information available. LIVEABILITY No information available. CONCLUSIONS In June 2008 Cambridgeshire County Council reported that there has been a mixed reaction during public consultation to the TIF proposals. This has led to the County establishing a commission of stakeholders that will assess the plans before moving forward. A timetable of review has not been established to date. Cambridgeshire, like many UK local authorities, faces the many challenges of establishing a road pricing programme. Public and media pressure, mostly fear of the unknown and viewing road pricing in isolation and not as part of a package of demand management measures, do not help. This, combined with fears of a national recession and the rise in the cost of living in the United Kingdom in the last 12 months, adds to the problems of considering a charging scheme. It remains to be seen whether Cambridgeshire will progress with their Congestion Charging package scheme. At this time the proposal is on hold.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 45

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.1.5

Manchester

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION Manchester has a population of approximately 452,00021 and is situated within the wider Greater Manchester Urban Area, which has a population of about 2,240,23022. It is the United Kingdom's third largest conurbation. Greater Manchester consists of ten metropolitan boroughs: Bolton, Bury, Oldham, Rochdale, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford, Wigan, and the cities of Salford and Manchester. In a poll of British business leaders published in 2006, Manchester was regarded as the best place in the UK to locate a business23. A report commissioned by Manchester Partnership, published in 200724, showed Manchester to be the "fastest-growing city" economically. The UK Department for Transport (DfT) approved “programme entry” for the package of measures associated with the introduction of a proposed Congestion Charge on 9th June 2008. The aim was to draw on resources from the Government-backed Transport Innovation Fund (TIF). A 2-ring scheme was planned to become operational from 2013, with a maximum daily charge of £5 (€6) helping to fund a £2.7 billion (€3.2 billion) package25 of public transport measures. However, the scheme was overwhelmingly rejected26 in a referendum on 12th December 2008, leading to the proposals being abandoned by the Passenger Transport Authority. On Friday 19th December 2008 the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) officially agreed to stop proceeding with the TIF proposals. For illustration, Figure 1.1 shows the extent of the original proposals for an inner and outer ‘ring’ or cordon in relation to Manchester and its neighbouring metropolitan boroughs. It should be noted that modifications were made to both the outer and inner charging boundaries as a result of the consultation. In particular the optional boundary on the inner charging ring was removed.

21

Office for National Statistics (2007) “Mid-2006 population estimates for the United Kingdom”. Office for National Statistics (2001) “United Kingdom Census - Key Statistics for urban areas in England and Wales”. OMIS Research (2006) “Britain's Best Cities 2005–2006” Executive Summary. 24 Manchester City Council (2007) “Manchester – The State of the City”. 25 Approximate conversion based on 1 GBP = 1.11664 EUR, January 2009. 26 On a turnout of just over half the electorate (53.2%), more than three quarters (79%) rejected the proposals. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 46 22 23

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-11 - Manchester’s proposed Congestion Charging scheme

PRICING OBJECTIVES Congestion It is Manchester’s economic success that has become its ‘Achilles’ heel’ in that the prosperity of business and economic growth in the area is the main cause of one of its greatest problems and future challenges: congestion. It is argued that if left unchecked, congestion in Greater Manchester will not only result in greater pollution, poor air quality and higher carbon emissions but will also damage the local economy. It is estimated that congestion could cause the loss of around 30,000 jobs in the next 15 years27. Public Transport It is considered that the numbers using public transport to commute into Manchester have risen by approximately a third since 200028. Overcrowding is a recognised problem on the local rail and Metrolink networks.

27

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/the-big-question-does-manchester-need-a-congestion-chargeand-will-it-spread-elsewhere-843568.html ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 47

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Improvements and extensions to the public transport system included the further development of Metrolink (the light rail / tram system) and were part of the planned £2.7 billion (€3.2 billion) public transport investment package. It should be noted that in the case of Metrolink this was in addition to a £0.6 billion (€0.7 billion) funding package that was confirmed during 2008. SCHEME DESCRIPTION How would it have worked? The proposal for the Manchester Congestion Charging Scheme was to charge motorists to enter the city during the morning (0700 to 0930) and leave in the afternoon (1600 to 1830) peak period. Unlike the London all-day congestion charging scheme, the Manchester plan was intended to target motorists on the busiest routes at peak times during weekdays. It comprised two orbital rings or charging points or zones around the city centre. Motorists would only be charged if their journey took them across one of the charging points. If you crossed a charging point outside the pricing times, you would not be charged. How would the revenue have been used? One of the conditions for funding any proposed scheme was that any revenue raised would be re-invested into public transport schemes. The TIF investment package would have been made up of £1.5 billion (€1.8 billion) grant from the Government’s TIF together with £1.2 billion (€1.4 billion) borrowings which would have been paid back over 30 years from congestion charging and public transport revenues. In addition, the Department for Transport would fund additional train carriages and there would be a further £100 million (€120 million) from other sources. Exemptions The TIF proposal did not include any exemptions; all motor vehicles were to be subject to a charge under the scheme. However, 100% discounts would apply to; • • • • • •

Blue Badge holders; All emergency vehicles; Motorcycles; Buses, coaches and registered community transport services; All Taxis – Licensed Hackney Carriages and private hire vehicles; and Patients who attend hospitals or specialist health facilities within the M60 for regular treatment

Following the summer 2008 consultation, AGMA also agreed: •

A 100% discount for registered vehicle recovery services; and

28

Greater Manchester Future Transport – approximation. NB no actual number supplied. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 48

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

•

All charges for HGVs (3.5t and over) would be deferred for 12 months pending the outcome of a study on journey time savings and other benefits in relation to costs.

It was also proposed that vehicles would only pay once to cross a ring in each charging period regardless of how many times they had crossed that ring. This meant that the maximum daily charge would be £5 (€6) per day (at 2007 prices). AGMA also proposed that, until public transport improvements could be put in place (expected to be 2016) workers based at the Trafford Park industrial area would receive a 100% discount for any outer ring charges. Proposals to support low income workers with a discount, including public transport, were considered in public consultation. Following the consultation AGMA proposed that low-paid workers (based on statutory minimum wage) would receive a 20% discount on the congestion charge for a minimum period of 2 years when the impact of these proposals would be evaluated. Low-paid workers would also receive a 20% discount on public transport fares at peak times. Consultation activities The AGMA always maintained that it would not go ahead with Congestion Charging unless it had the support of the public and business community. Before the public referendum three out of the ten local Metropolitan Borough Councils (Trafford, Stockport and Bury) had made clear statements that they opposed the planned scheme. A leaflet including details of the proposed Congestion Charging plan was sent to every property in Greater Manchester during the consultation period which ran for 14 weeks from 7th July to 10th October 2008. The technology proposed included both “tag and beacon” and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (APNR) for vehicles without tags. Where possible, vehicles would be fitted with a special tag which would be read automatically as the vehicle passed into and out of the charging zone. Regular users would register to a franchised agent and payment would be debited as the car passed the active charging point. The toll reader would be placed inside the car's windscreen and would have a slot for a smart card (much like London's Oyster card). For occasional users, drivers would be able to pre-pay before passing active charging points. The following information is an outline of the proposals for charges: Charges would vary dependent on: • •

Time of day; and Where the journey started and finished.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 49

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The following describes the various charges in outline: 1. Morning peak period inbound (between the hours of 0700 and 0930, Monday to Friday) £2 (€2.40) to cross the outer ring (M60 orbital motorway) and £1 (€1.20) to cross the inner ring (Manchester city centre); 2. Evening peak period outbound (between the hours of 1600 and 1830, Monday to Friday) £1 (€1.20) to cross the inner ring (Manchester city centre) and £1 (€1.20) to cross the outer ring (M60 orbital motorway); 3. Morning peak outbound (between the hours of 0700 and 0930, Monday to Friday) – no charge; 4. Evening peak inbound (between the hours of 1600 and 1830, Monday to Friday) - no charge; 5. Off-peak times - no charge; 6. Weekends and Public (Bank) Holidays - no charge; and 7. Travel within the inner ring or outer ring boundaries – no charge at any time, peak or offpeak. For example, the estimates were that the cost to a commuter who wished to travel at peak times from outside the M60 (the outer ring or cordon) into Manchester city centre between 0700 and 0930 and return home between 1600 and 1830, would have been no more than £5 (€6) a day. Indeed this was the maximum any user would have paid regardless of the number of trips made. There was also a proposal to ‘cap’ charges for any user, e.g. delivery vehicles, who would cross the charging rings repeatedly during any given day. Users of the system were to be asked to register before use and vehicles that did not pay the charge or have a valid tag would be captured by ANPR enforcement cameras. The registered vehicle owner would then be responsible for paying the charge, an administration fee and a fine. The fine was not determined. IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS BARRIERS • • • •

The ten Metropolitan Boroughs of Greater Manchester were divided in their opinion about the introduction of the scheme from its initial stages; Anti congestion charging lobby groups such as the Greater Manchester Momentum Group and Manchester Against Road Tolls gained support amongst the business community; UK / national media coverage of the announcement to introduce the scheme was mixed; Public polls asking whether or not the people of Manchester wanted the charging scheme were used by anti-charging lobby groups to further their argument. However, in many cases the poll questions did not ask about the package of measures, including the public transport investment, but simply asked if the public wanted a congestion charge. The danger was that public opinion would be influenced by ‘results’ from these polls.

DRIVERS • •

The scheme would have been part of an investment package of £2.8 billion (€3.4 billion) in public transport schemes and improvements in the Greater Manchester conurbation; Despite anti congestion charging lobby groups emerging, a business lobby group “United City” established itself in support of the investment package that included road pricing;

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 50

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

•

Some media coverage, including local newspaper the Manchester Evening News, presented a positive message about the ‘package’ of public transport measures that were to accompany the proposed congestion charging scheme in Manchester.

REVENUE USE Part of the funding conditions prior to the scheme being rejected by referendum in December 2008 was that money would be re-invested in public transport schemes and used to pay for operating costs. IMPACTS PREDICTABILITY No information available. CONCLUSIONS The UK Department for Transport (DfT) approved “programme entry” for the package of measures associated with the introduction of a proposed Congestion Charge on 9th June 2008. The next stage, prior to the public rejection of the scheme in the referendum in December 2008 would have been to secure Conditional Approval for the scheme. The proposed large investment package of £2.7 billion (€3.2 billion) that would have been made to the area’s public transport system before the scheme was operational was considered an important factor in the scheme proceeding. There were a number of preconditions that were established by the AGMA for proceeding with the TIF bid – known as the AGMA tests – which were: 1. There had to be significant investment in public transport improvements including Metrolink. Crucially, enhanced capacity would have been in place prior to the introduction of any traffic restraint measures. 2. Measures had to complement the competitiveness and inclusion priorities of the City Region and would not have been allowed to undermine the competitiveness of the Regional Centre or the town centres in the area. 3. Any (proposed) measures would have had to have been acceptable to both the public and business community. 4. Measures would have been relevant to where congestion existed or where it would have emerged in the future, notwithstanding the advent of public transport improvements. THE REJECTION OF THE MANCHESTER SCHEME – THE ARGUMENTS ‘FOR’ AND ‘AGAINST’ THE PROPOSAL It is difficult to quantify the argument ‘for’ and ‘against’ the proposed congestion charge in Manchester. However, in the following paragraph we list not only why its supporters believed it could succeed but also some of the arguments against its introduction that may start to explain why the scheme was rejected. ARGUMENTS FOR THE CONGESTION CHARGE IN MANCHESTER The context for the introduction of a Congestion Charge

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 51

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

• • •

•

Car ownership has increased by about 25% over the last decade in the Greater Manchester conurbation. Building more roads is not considered to be financially possible or environmentally acceptable. Local transport officials agree that if left unchecked, congestion in Greater Manchester will not only result in greater pollution and air quality and higher carbon emissions, but will also damage the local economy. This is also the view supported by United City – a group representing transport/property consultants and a number of developers. It is claimed that less congestion would create 10,000 new jobs in Greater Manchester and provide a major boost for the local economy.

The proposed benefits •

• • •

The congestion charge would have been offset by £2.7bn (€3.2 bn) of public transport improvements. The charge would not have been introduced until there were significant improvements to bus, tram and rail services such as extensions to the Metrolink network to parts of the Manchester conurbation, bus priority measures, extra rail capacity and creating more public transport interchanges at rail stations. The congestion charge would not be in place until 2013 at the earliest. It was considered that access to key services and jobs would have been improved for the 30% of households in Manchester who do not own a car. Proposals to support low income workers with a potential discount of up to a fifth of the charge were highlighted in the public consultation.

ARGUMENTS ‘AGAINST’ THE CONGESTION CHARGE IN MANCHESTER Identifying the need •

Those opposed to the scheme questioned the need for the charge. Figures produced by the Urban Traffic Control unit show that congestion in 11 of the 14 centres in Greater Manchester had fallen since 2001. Increasing the costs of motoring

•

Opponents of the scheme have pointed out that it would cost motorists up to £1,200 (€1,440) a year to enter and exit the congestion zones. This was seen as an extra motoring cost.

Identifying the true costs of the scheme •

•

Many of the actual costs of running the scheme were unknown and the technical details of the scheme were to be outlined after the referendum. This led to some misunderstanding of the actual proposals. The level of borrowing to match the £1.2bn (€1.4 bn) TIF investment in public transport was considered by opponents to be high. The £180m (€196 m) per year projected profit to repay that loan over a 30 year period was considered optimistic. The main comparison in this regard was the London scheme.

Fear of the unknown ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 52

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

•

•

The Greater Manchester Momentum Group (a group representing 125 businesses and organisations) was against the proposed congestion charge. They believed it was bad for the economy at a time of rising fuel prices and falling house prices. Hauliers were reported to be opposed to the charge, claiming that plans to install bus lanes on 25 routes into Manchester would halve road space.

THE REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME It is difficult to categorically state the reasons for the negative referendum result in December 2008 at this stage but some practitioners and commentators29 have offered the following as possible reasons: • • •

• •

• • •

The public misunderstood the proposals and thought that the congestion charge would apply anytime, anywhere. The debate never focused on public transport improvements, just on the congestion charge. The public did not believe that public transport would get better after Government Minister Alistair Darling withdrew Government funding from the Metrolink ‘Big Bang’ project in 2004. People therefore thought they would get the tax but not see the benefits. The current economic climate means that people are less likely to vote for something that is perceived as another tax. Greater Manchester’s governance structures did not assist with the prospect of delivering an ambitious transport project as a number of councils would have to agree on the proposals before they were accepted. Assurances to the business community were not given as fully as they should have been and thus many were against the charge. Campaigners for the congestion charge did not fully focus on the health benefits of the congestion charge. It appears that campaigning was not at a local level and therefore did not touch on the issues that really mattered to the public. Benefits/costs should be defined on a community by community basis.

This does provide a number of considerations rather than direct lessons for other cities who may be considering urban road user charging, not least the apparent lack of confidence in the proposed scheme and how it was perceived. In time, there may be more defined arguments and reasons presented for the resounding public rejection of the proposal in the referendum, not least that the public were asked to decide on a hypothetical scheme before they could see the benefits of a ‘real life’ scheme.

29

The comments noted here were recorded in Local Transport Today. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 53

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.1.6

Edinburgh

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION Edinburgh is a world-famous city. To some it is known for culture: the major International Festival every August, the Fringe festival, or the more recent Hogmanay events. To others it is associated more with history: the Castle, the Royal Mile, pipers and tartan. It has a unique cityscape and urban heritage: the medieval old town and the 18th century ‘new’ town have been designated by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site. It is a tourist city on a world scale with a unique setting. But it is also a very modern city, with a vibrant and growing economy. The (re)establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 has renewed its role as a capital city. The financial services sector is booming, and it has a world-wide reputation for research and innovation. Population and employment in Edinburgh and its surrounding region are increasing, in contrast to the rest of Scotland. Some economic indicators illustrating the success of the economy include30: • • • •

Average disposable income in Edinburgh is amongst the highest in the UK Edinburgh identified as the city with the fastest growing economy in the UK; Edinburgh is the UK’s second most important financial centre, after London; Edinburgh is the UK’s second overseas tourist destination after London.

Population within the Lothians – Edinburgh and its immediate hinterland – is forecast to grow by 50,000 over 15 years, while employment growth is focused very much on the city itself, with an extra 35,000 jobs over the same period (see Table 2-8). These substantial increases reflect the city’s success. The consequence is an expected shortfall in labour supply in and around Edinburgh, which will inevitably mean more in-commuting over longer distances. Travel in the city’s wider catchment area will increase, adding to the pressures already faced by the road network and rail services. One of the contributory factors to Edinburgh’s success is undoubtedly the quality of life and environment it offers to its residents, workers and visitors. To attract key financial services staff, and tourists, these factors count and the city must maintain its competitive edge against global comparators. Transport is one area on which the city is benchmarked by investors and visitors. Table 2-8 - Population and Employment 2000-2015 Indicator: Population - Edinburgh - the Lothians Employment - Edinburgh - the Lothians of which: % in financial & business services

2000 453,400 783,600 287,100 405,400 23.8%

2015 469,500 832,100 321,900 451,200 23.3%

30

EDINBURGH AND THE LOTHIANS STRUCTURE PLAN JOINT COMMITTEE, Edinburgh and the Lothians Structure Plan 2015: Supporting Statement, Edinburgh, 2003. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 54

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Indicator:

2000 % in distribution, hotels, catering 19.1% Source: Edinburgh and the Lothians Structure Plan Joint Committee31

2015 20.5%

Social concerns are also driving the need for action. An important objective for the city is to improve access to employment and other facilities for socially excluded groups. Despite a very low rate of unemployment overall, deprivation and social exclusion are still to be found in some areas and amongst certain groups. PRICING OBJECTIVES The following objectives were identified in Edinburgh’s Local Transport Strategy: • • • • • • •

to make it easier to live without the car, or use the car less; to reduce the amount of car use; to encourage and facilitate walking, cycling and public transport use; to reduce the adverse impacts of travel including road accidents and environmental damage, particularly for those worst affected by these impacts; to enhance streets as ‘civic spaces’, where priority is given to people rather than cars; to improve the ability of people with low incomes or mobility impairments to use the transport system, especially by public transport, as pedestrians or by bicycle; to maintain the road network, and any other facilities for the movement of pedestrians, cyclists and bus users, to a standard suitable for safe and comfortable movement.

For the Integrated Transport Initiative (preferred strategy) the key objectives were defined: • •

To reduce congestion in and around Edinburgh To achieve significant progress towards the LTS and RTS objectives and targets

And for the charging scheme specifically: • • •

To reduce congestion directly; To fund projects necessary to achieve the objectives of the LTS and RTS that are not fundable from existing sources; To distribute the benefits from the charging scheme fairly in respect of people paying the charge.

SCHEME DESCRIPTION The final charging scheme consisted of two cordons at which a charge would be levied for vehicles travelling inbound, towards the city centre. There would be an outer cordon around the edge of the built-up area of Edinburgh, just inside the outer city bypass, and an inner cordon around the centre of the city, broadly encompassing the World Heritage Site (Figure 2-12). The outer cordon would operate between 7am and 10am only; the inner between 7am and 6.30pm, Mondays to Fridays in both cases. The finish time of 6.30pm was amended from 7pm following early stages of consultation, and proposed charges at the outer cordon in the evening peak period were also dropped following consultation. 31

EDINBURGH AND THE LOTHIANS STRUCTURE PLAN JOINT COMMITTEE, Edinburgh and the Lothians Structure Plan 2015: Supporting Statement, Edinburgh, 2003. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 55

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The charge was to be £2 (€2.40), levied no more than once per day on any single vehicle. If a vehicle were to cross both cordons, or to cross either cordon a number of times during the day, the charge would still only be applied once that day. In this sense, the scheme resembles an entry permit scheme. Arrangements for payment of the charge and enforcement of the scheme by ANPR cameras would be similar to those in place for the London congestion charging scheme. A number of exemptions were proposed: emergency service vehicles, buses, powered twowheelers, licensed taxis, and vehicles belonging to an approved ‘city car club’ scheme. Approved recovery vehicles were also to be exempt. An exemption added at a late stage by the Council was that residents of the administrative area of the City of Edinburgh who live outside the outer cordon would not be liable for the outer cordon charge. It was justified by the Council on the grounds of fairness for all Edinburgh residents. However, it gave rise to considerable concern from residents of neighbouring Council areas. Figure 2-12 –Edinburgh Proposed Charging Cordons

1 km

3 km

The scheme was intended to operate for 20 years. It could directly have funded around £35m£40m (€42m-€48m) of transport investment each year after deduction of collection and financing costs, providing a total package of £760m (€912m) at 2002 prices IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS Throughout the development of the initiative, it was always clear that the charging scheme in particular was risky, and might fail at one of the decision-making stages. The Council therefore put forward two alternative strategies in its Local Transport Strategy (LTS) documents produced in 2000 and 2004. Each LTS included a ‘Base Strategy’ comprising measures fundable from expected conventional funding sources, and a ‘Preferred Strategy’ adding in the congestion charging scheme and associated investment.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 56

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Two pivotal decisions have influenced the evolution of the scheme, and arguably affected the eventual view taken by the public. The first decision, in autumn 2002, was to hold a referendum prior to making any final commitment to the congestion charging scheme. This decision32 was made at the same time as agreeing to submit the scheme to Ministers for approval in principle. The Council view was that “the recent, independently analysed, public consultation showed very mixed opinion on the congestion charging proposals. There was not sufficient public support to reach a final conclusion on a single preferred scheme” and “To recognise therefore that before any finalised scheme could be agreed, there needed to be a further test of public opinion and that test should be in the form of a referendum.” The Ministerial requirement for ‘clear public support’ to be demonstrated, although coming after the referendum decision, reinforced the Council in its view that this was the right approach to dealing with this controversial measure. However, Ministers gave no guidance (and still have not) as to how ‘clear public support’ should be demonstrated. The second pivotal decision relates to the ‘package’ being put forward as the Preferred Strategy. Prior to approval in principle the Integrated Transport Initiative package being proposed to Ministers incorporated the congestion charging scheme, a package of transport improvements including a three-line tram network, and a request for an additional allocation of public funding amounting to £375m (€450m). The additional central funding was considered to be a justifiable element of the package in recognition of the Council’s willingness to take a serious political risk by promoting congestion charging, an important policy tool for government to be able to achieve national transport objectives. A parallel was drawn with Norway, where income from the toll rings introduced in Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim was matched by additional government funding for the linked investments. However, the approval in principle by Ministers in December 2002 was followed in March 2003 by a further announcement33 that the Scottish Executive would make £375m (€450m) available to the City of Edinburgh Council to fund “at least the first tram line” regardless of any eventual introduction of congestion charging. In fact, £375m (€450m) was the estimated requirement for the first two lines. Accordingly, the Council determined that it would pursue the development of these two lines independently of congestion charging. The effect of this decision was to move the two highest profile projects in the Preferred Strategy into the Base Strategy. This changed the scheme not only from a presentational point of view, but also in terms of its appraisal outcome. In particular, this affected the definition of the scheme examined at public inquiry in Spring 2004. The decision to hold a public inquiry was taken at an early stage in the process: not only was the possibility of an inquiry built into the legislation, but it could be called by either the Council or the Scottish Executive. The Council decided to hold an inquiry itself both to demonstrate its willingness to submit the scheme to in-depth scrutiny, as well as to minimise the possibility of unplanned delays to the overall timetable if the Scottish Executive were to require an inquiry at an unknown future date.

32

CITY OF EDINBURGH COUNCIL, Minute of Council Meeting, Edinburgh, 17 October 2002. SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE, Press Release: Funding Secures Edinburgh’s New Tram Line, Edinburgh, 4 March 2003. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 57 33

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

In spite of the changed nature of the strategy being examined the report of the Inquiry34 generally supported the proposals, recommending that the Council should ‘proceed with caution’ in taking the scheme forward, but also recommending some changes. The Council accepted many of these proposals, but not the recommended abandonment of the ‘outer Edinburgh’ residents’ exemption referred to earlier. It agreed to proceed with the referendum preceded by an information campaign. BARRIERS The public inquiry of 2004 did not identify any significant barriers to the implementation of the scheme. In hindsight, the timing of the referendum in one sense created a barrier to be overcome, in terms of the need to win a large enough share of public support at a time when public support for the scheme was likely to be at its lowest. DRIVERS The main driver for the congestion charging scheme was the Local Transport Strategy. Over a period of time, starting in the early 90’s, this strategy had been tracking trends in transport, identified the growing problem of increasing traffic growth and brought forward congestion charging as part of a preferred strategy going forward. The evolution of the scheme broadly followed the guidance on development of an Integrated Transport Initiative (ITI) issued in August 2001 by the Scottish Executive35. This included a twostage decision-making process, with “in-principle” and “detailed” approvals required from Ministers for an ITI. As well as requiring technical appraisal (STAG36), the guidance sets out four policy criteria that Ministers require a charging scheme to meet: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

the charging scheme must reduce congestion and/or noise and emissions; the net revenues from charging will be additional; there is fair treatment of those who pay the charge (and/or suffer the congestion or environmental problem) and those who benefit from the scheme; a range of public transport improvements are in place before charging is introduced, with further improvements to follow.

Separately from this guidance, Ministers also indicated when giving approval in principle to the scheme in December 2002, that they would expect “clear public support” for a scheme to be demonstrated at the detailed stage. SCHEME RESULTS The results described below are those presented to the Public Inquiry. NETWORK • •

Significant reduction in traffic levels and delays within the city centre. An increase of 5% in total journeys terminating in the city centre by all modes.

34

REPORTERS TO THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE EDINBURGH CONGESTION CHARGING SCHEME, Report and Recommendations, Edinburgh October 2004. 35 SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, Delivering Integrated Transport Initiatives through Road User Charging – Consultation and Approval Process: Guidance for Local Authorities, Edinburgh, August 2001. 36 SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE, Scottish Transport Appraisal Guidance (STAG), Edinburgh, September 2003. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 58

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

• • •

A small reduction in overall traffic levels and delays between the inner and outer cordons, and only small changes outside the outer cordon. Slight increase in orbital traffic between the cordons, with some localized changes that would require mitigation measures. An increase in public transport use of around 10%.

ENVIRONMENT The investment package would have had further impacts on achievement of transport strategy objectives. These include environmental improvement (for example through grants for clean engines in buses and taxis, and city centre environmental enhancement); social inclusion, through the substantial improvement to public transport; and safety and residential amenity (more funding for 20mph zones and safe routes to schools). It would provide the ability to maintain higher standards of safety and comfort for road, footway and cycleway users through increased maintenance funding. ECONOMY • •

A very marginal impact on the Lothian economy – in terms of value added and jobs this is marginally negative. A redistribution effect within the area of both jobs and population: population would be slightly higher in the city centre and outside the city; there would have been some movement of jobs out of the city into the surrounding areas.

ACCEPTABILITY Based on the early consultation with stakeholders described above, the City of Edinburgh Council decided to start the development of a “New Transport Initiative” (NTI) in May 1999. Its aim was to take an imaginative approach to providing Edinburgh with a ‘world-class’ transport system that could sustain and facilitate the potential for economic growth, as well as being appropriate to its role as a major international city and Scotland’s capital. In so doing, the transport strategy would support Council aims of: • • •

Promoting a healthy and sustainable environment Developing the local economy Tackling poverty and disadvantage. The NTI was initiated at a time when national government policy on transport was going through a significant stage of development. Legislation was introduced at this time which, amongst other matters, proposed powers allowing local authorities to introduce road user charges. In Scotland, this was enacted in the Transport (Scotland) Act 2001. The NTI study examined the options for achieving a step change in transport quality. Funding issues were a key focus of the initial stage of the study, which included examination of road user (congestion) charging as well as a wide range of other potential funding sources. Alternatives ranged from tourist taxes to bus quality partnerships, from parking charges to the Private Finance Initiative. At the same time, the Council started to develop an integrated and consistent set of transport policies, linked with an appropriate project portfolio. The biggest component was a proposal to ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 59

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

develop a light rail network for Edinburgh. This would form the core of an upgraded public transport system, integrating with improved rail and bus services, as well as linking with Park and Ride sites around the edge of the city. The investment strategy also included significant enhancement of the city centre environment to maintain its attractiveness as a shopping and tourist destination. Public views were always seen as a key issue in the development of the initiative. A major consultation was undertaken in 1999, including the distribution of a questionnaire throughout Edinburgh. The questionnaire sought views in relation to three strategic transport policy options, as well as testing key objectives and components of the transport strategy. Around 19,000 responses were received with high levels of support (62%) shown for the strategic option including the concept of congestion charging (Table 2-9). In addition to the public consultation, there was also extensive consultation with stakeholders. Table 2-9 – Consultation results 1999 Option 1

Option 2 Option 3

Support Don't know Oppose

62% 6% 32%

Based on workplace parking levy 51% 9% 40%

Preferred (all) Preferred (business)

58% 51%

22% 18%

Based on road user charging

None of these Status quo 28% 8% 64%

-

15% 24%

5% 6%

The conclusions drawn from the consultation and an initial technical appraisal were that congestion charging was feasible, would reduce traffic levels, could generate substantial revenue for transport investment and would have no or very limited adverse economic impact if the charge was set at an appropriate level. In addition, there was a high degree of acceptance provided that the overall package was right. This gave the Council confidence to develop the proposals in more detail. The Scottish Executive agreed to match fund the development studies, with some further funding provided by an EU research project “PRoGR€SS”. The evolution of the scheme between this point and the referendum in February 2005 broadly followed the guidance on development of an Integrated Transport Initiative (ITI) issued in August 2001 by the Scottish Executive37. This included a two-stage decision-making process, with “in-principle” and “detailed” approvals required from Ministers for an ITI. As well as requiring technical appraisal (STAG38), the guidance sets out four policy criteria that Ministers require a charging scheme to meet:

37

SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, Delivering Integrated Transport Initiatives through Road User Charging – Consultation and Approval Process: Guidance for Local Authorities, Edinburgh, August 2001.

38

SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE, Scottish Transport Appraisal Guidance (STAG), Edinburgh, September 2003. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 60

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

the charging scheme must reduce congestion and/or noise and emissions; the net revenues from charging will be additional; there is fair treatment of those who pay the charge (and/or suffer the congestion or environmental problem) and those who benefit from the scheme; a range of public transport improvements are in place before charging is introduced, with further improvements to follow.

Separately from this guidance, Ministers also indicated when giving approval in principle to the scheme in December 2002, that they would expect “clear public support” for a scheme to be demonstrated at the detailed stage. To meet these requirements and ensure effective delivery if eventually approved, the development of the scheme from inception to the detailed, charging order, stage had to consider and balance technical, organisational and acceptance issues. Accordingly the main work streams were: • • • •

public and stakeholder attitude research; design and technical appraisal of alternative scheme configurations; business case development linking the charging scheme with an appropriate transport improvement package; and examination and establishment of organisational structures and procurement arrangements for implementation. Consultation with the public and stakeholders was essential to assist scheme design and aimed to maximise the acceptability of the proposals. It also provided the opportunity for informing the public about the objectives of the scheme. A comprehensive programme of consultation and market research was developed for the Council by the University of Westminster39. The programme built on the initial consultation undertaken in 1999 and was supplemented by direct discussions with key stakeholders. Neighbouring local authorities were particularly important in this respect, particularly in regard to their concerns about the impact that an outer cordon would have on their citizens. The most recent market research illustrated in Figure 3 was carried out in Autumn 200340.

39

UNIVERSITY OF WESTMINSTER, PrOGR€SS project: Public Consultation Strategy – Phase II: Preparatory Market Research, London, July 2001. 40 UNIVERSITY OF WESTMINSTER, PrOGR€SS project: Edinburgh’s Integrated Transport Initiative – Phase V: Market Research, London, January 2004. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 61

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-13 – Opinion research 2003 Question 11a: “If there was a referendum in your Local Authority area on the proposed Edinburgh congestion charging scheme and the associated package of improvements, how would you vote?” 70 60 Percentage

50 40 30 20 10

C

la ck

m an n

an s

Fi fe

hi re

lin g St ir

lk irk Fa

s

an hi W es tL ot

de r Bo r

an th i lo M id

Lo st Ea

Ed in

bu r

th ia n

gh

0

In favour

Against

Don't know

Would not vote

No response

The technical assessment on which early decisions were based was supported by the central Scotland transport model developed for the Scottish Executive. To provide more robust estimates of the impacts of the scheme, a more appropriate strategic transport and land use modelling package was commissioned in December 2000. In addition, a methodology to forecast the impact of the initiative on the local economy – already highlighted as of key importance to city stakeholders – was required. An approach based on accessibility change linked to the transport and land use model described above was selected. The models were used to examine the impacts of the charging scheme and its associated transport investment package41. EQUITY No information available. REVENUE USE A ‘Preliminary Business Case’ linked charging revenues with estimated costs of collection and the implementation of a transport investment package. The objective was to identify the scale of investment that could be funded, and any further funding requirement. It also provided an indicative timetable for the implementation of the constituent projects. The capital and operating costs for the charging system itself were of crucial importance, especially given the relatively low congestion charge being proposed, and a detailed cost model was developed. The question of procurement strategy, and appropriate organisational and financial structures to deliver such a major project was also considered at this time. The scheme was intended to operate for 20 years. It could directly have funded around £35m-£40m (€42m-€48m) of transport investment each year after deduction of collection and financing costs, providing a total package of £760m (€912m) at 2002 prices.

41

DAVID SIMMONDS CONSULTANCY in collaboration with MVA, Edinburgh Integrated Transport Initiative: Economic Impact of ECCS/ITI Package, Cambridge, March 2004. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 62

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

IMPACTS PREDICTABILITY Inevitably the focus now is on why there should be such an overwhelming rejection of a scheme that had been under development for over five years. A number of possible causes are suggested below, based on earlier consultation and views expressed in the media and elsewhere at the time of the vote. These are unlikely to be comprehensive, and the outcomes of current research on public attitudes to congestion charging in Edinburgh post-referendum will be required before the issues are fully understood. A major area of uncertainty is the extent to which this was a vote against the principle of congestion charging, a vote against the particular scheme proposed, or a vote against the Council for wider reasons. All these factors seem likely to have been in play. For example, the Conservative opposition (13 out of the 58 Council members) opposed the principle of congestion charging in Edinburgh outright while the Liberal Democrats (15 Councillors) opposed the specifics of the scheme, in particular its timing. They took the view that more public transport alternatives should be in place first. The Labour administration, the only other party represented on the Council, were therefore left as the only supporters of the scheme. The administration’s overall majority of just 2 seats will have had the effect of politicizing the issue, with opposition parties taking the opportunity to seek potential future electoral advantage. No charismatic champion of the scheme who would have the confidence of the public, emerged to build support. Neighbouring authorities, also all Labour controlled, particularly opposed the outer cordon and the exemption for Edinburgh citizens living outside it, while indicating their support for the principle of congestion charging. Although only residents of Edinburgh could vote in the referendum, the opposition from surrounding areas affected the publicity about the scheme, and may well have influenced opinion within the city. A range of issues appear to have influenced voting behavior, ranging from serious errors of fact, to issues of fairness, to perceptions about taxation. Some key points are suggested to be: • • • • • • • •

Mistrust of Council motives (illustrated, for example, by a perception by some that the Council’s bus priority and traffic calming measures are designed to ‘generate congestion’); Some aspects of the proposals being seen as ‘unfair’, in particular the outer Edinburgh exemption; Errors of fact about the charging proposals, including by the media Insufficient connection between up-front investments and the charging scheme; Lack of understanding/definition of the associated long-term investment proposals; Lack of obvious benefits for motorists; A belief that improvement of public transport (agreed by most to be necessary) will on its own reduce car use; Belief that government would/should pay for transport investment – from the ‘excessive’ taxes already paid by motorists.

These issues might suggest that the Council and promoters of the transport strategy were unsuccessful in their communications strategy, not only in the referendum campaign but also more generally in their promotion of integrated transport policies over a period of time. A major information campaign was mounted prior to the referendum, which sought to present information about the strategy in a balanced way. However, legal requirements about the use of public money in the period leading up to the referendum meant that great care had to be taken ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 63

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

about how the issues were presented, limiting the creativity that could be employed in attracting the attention of the public. The £600,000 (€720,000) available for this campaign, while substantial by Council standards, is not a very large sum for a major marketing campaign. No public funds were made available for ‘yes’ and ‘no’ campaigning groups, something that has been done in other referenda and is recommended42 by the Initiatives and Referenda Institute (IRI), an international referendum ‘think-tank’. This leads on to the issue of the referendum itself. The IRI report highlights a number of issues about the referendum, both positive and negative. A key point is that there is limited experience of such tests in the UK, and little in the way of a legal framework or good practice guidelines. Indeed the Edinburgh referendum had no legal status; in legal terms it was simply ‘a test of public opinion’. Nevertheless, a substantial effort was made to manage the process fairly and avoid the risk of legal challenge, limiting resources for dealing with the substantive issues. Many lessons remain to be learnt about the referendum process and the promotion of a major policy at a referendum. CONCLUSIONS In spite of the referendum rejection, there are some positive aspects to the development of Edinburgh’s charging scheme. Many challenges were overcome, not least achieving a positive outcome from a public inquiry. The work undertaken demonstrated a clear public view that congestion is a problem and public transport needs improvement. The experience of Edinburgh in meeting the statutory requirements for introducing a congestion charging scheme should be of some comfort to other cities considering a similar scheme, as should Edinburgh’s success in developing cost-effective business systems for implementation.

42

IRI-EUROPE, A Preliminary Assessment of the Transport Edinburgh Referendum, Edinburgh/Stockholm/Brussels, 1 March 2005. (www.iri-europe.net) ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 64

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.2

Dutch Case Studies

During the course of CURACAO project in The Netherlands Spitsmijden and Paying Differently for Mobility have been the main studies/initiatives developed. The Spitsmijden experiment project was set up to study the feasibility of a reward scheme to encourage commuters not to drive during morning rush-hours. The experiment has provided scientifically base insight for demonstrating the effects of positive stimuli on the participating drivers. Various techniques and rewards were combined in one unique experiment. The idea behind Different Payment for Mobility is not a new one for The Netherlands. Different options for introducing a form of pricing have been researched during the last thirty years:

•

The idea of a price policy was introduced in the Traffic and Transport Structural Plan (1977-88). Unfortunately due to a lack of urgency no concrete plans followed.

•

During the second Structural Plan (SVV2), in the late 1980s, there was another discussion for introducing a pay-as-you-drive system, but there was insufficient political and societal support.

•

Between years 1991 and 2001, there seemed to be a sufficient political support to develop plans for toll plazas, peak vignettes and toll gateways, but every effort encountered a lack of support in practice.

•

A measure for charging per kilometer to replace fixed taxes was prepared by the second Kok government, but the project stopped because of the government fall in 2002.

In 2004 the Minister of Public Works, Transport and Water Management invited sixteen administrators and local governments to participate personally in a National Platform on Different Payment for Mobility, led by Paul Nouwen. They were asked to express an opinion about a form of pricing that could expect to be supported and contribute to get accessibility better. In May 2005 the Platform presented its recommendation: the introduction of a price per kilometer differentiated by time, place and environmental characteristics with a disappearing act of fixed charges.43 The 2005 Mobility policy document aimed at increasing transport reliability and a predictable and acceptable travel time, reducing door-to-door travel time and traffic jam severity in respect to 1992 levels. These ambitions could be achieved by a combination of new roads building, better use of existing ones and pricing. To configure the pricing aspect, the government took the Platform’s recommendation as a starting point. When the Mobility Document was discussed, a motion promoted by members Hofstra and Van Hijum stated that the introduction of a charge per kilometer should have been considerably lower than the estimated value of Platform’s recommendation and that the implementation and enforcement costs should have been properly related to revenues, namely as low as possible and no more than 5 per cent. It was also decided that revenues should only benefit from the Infrastructure Fund exclusively. A 2005 market consultation indicated that GPS (Global Positioning System), that uses satellite technology, was the most suitable for recording vehicles trips by time and place. The same consultation, however, indicated also that the technology was still under development and that

43

Different Payment for Mobility Platform, 2005. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 65

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

the cost was still so high that the 5% requirement would not be fulfilled. A costs monitoring carried out in 2006 showed the same results, but also a declining trend of costs44. In the coalition agreement, the 4th Balkenende government aspired to introduce a system of charging per kilometer during its mandate, trying to use a step by step approach. This represents an acceleration of the Mobility policy document time plan, which was aiming at introducing the price per kilometer in 2012. There is only a question: is an accelerated introduction possible at once or is it better to use a step by step approach?

44

Cost Monitor, 2006. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 66

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.2.1

The Hague/Spitsmijden

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION The word “Spitsmijden” is a Dutch idiom stating the intention to avoid peak traffic. The Spitsmijden experiment in The Netherlands is not about a regular road pricing scheme, but about rewarding car drivers for avoiding to drive during peak hours. During the 50 working days experiment, 340 frequent drivers looked at alternatives for driving during morning peak hours over the stretch of the Dutch A12 motorway from Zoetermeer towards The Hague. On weekday mornings, this segment of motorway is heavily congested with vehicles being heading for The Hague, which constitutes the centre of a daily urban system, with Zoetermeer as one of its suburbs. There are few alternative routes or ramps along this stretch of motorway, which made the trial relatively easy to control. The trial was launched on 2 October 2006 and ended on 24 January 2007. Figure 2-14 – Overview of the test area (source of map: Google Maps)

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 67

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The participants were rewarded if they succeeded to avoid driving during peak hours and it worked. The number of participants driving in peak morning traffic was halved. This was a promising result for an experiment that used a traffic management new technique unique for The Netherlands. A close cooperation with scientists, industry and government made this possible. Currently, three Dutch universities and Goudappel Coffeng are investigating stated and revealed participants behaviour, in order to estimate the benefits on society, the reasons for participation and the strategies to gain a reward. The second phase of Spitsmijden will focus on long-term operations, probably with an experiment between the cities of Gouda and The Hague. In the meantime, some organisations use the success of Spitsmijden to implement rewarding schemes in case of road works. PRICING OBJECTIVES On the A12, and in The Netherlands in general, traffic congestion is a growing problem not only with respect to accessibility, but with increasingly with respect to air quality and climate change. In the reference period prior the experiment, the average reported free-flow time on this motorway segment was 20 minutes, the average congestion delay 16 minutes. The purpose of the experiment was to study whether reward stimulus could be a possible control instrument to influence mobility behaviour. In this way, congestion could be reduced at relatively low cost and in quite short time. As a secondary outcome, the negative effects of new infrastructure could be prevented. The experiment provides scientifically based insight into the effects of positive stimuli on the participating drivers. Until now, researchers could have only made predictions based on surveys and models. Now they have their first practical experience, where different techniques and rewards have been combined into a unique experiment. SCHEME DESCRIPTION Instead of a congestion charge, the Spitsmijden project aimed at measuring the effect of positive stimuli on commuters’ behaviour. In total, 340 drivers accepted the challenge to try to avoid driving during peak hours (7.30 a.m. – 9.30 a.m.). 98% of them lived in Zoetermeer and 56% of them worked in The Hague. After subscribing and filling out several forms about personal characteristics and preferences, the participants were able to choose from two variants: a monetary reward varying from €3 to €7, or the right to become the Yeti smart phone owner after the experiment.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 68

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-15 – Overview of locations of the EVI-beacons (source of map: Google Maps)

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 69

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

EVI beacons were positioned along the main exit roads of Zoetermeer (see map) together with camera systems for number plate registration. If a participant had passed under one of these check points between 7:30 AM and 9:30 AM on working days, the period with the highest traffic densities, no reward would have assigned. The main rules of the trial were the following: ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ

ƒ ƒ

The participants had to commute at least three times a week from Zoetermeer towards The Hague. They should have had an Internet access for checking e-mails. They were asked to complete questionnaires and travel logs periodically. Their participation had to be voluntary (although they were required to sign a contract listing the rights and duties of both parties). They would have received a reward only for the times they avoided the morning rush-hour by travelling outside the rush hour period, using another mode of transport or working at home. The frequency of rush hour avoidance would be determined in relation to each participant’s usual commuting behaviour during the reference period. The participants of the so-called Yeti variant had to switch on the Yeti smart phone during each car trip. The participants should have used the car in which an On Board Unit (OBU) had been installed.

In order to measure the participants’ normal behaviour, short reference periods before and after the test were inconspicuously added to the experiment. The main idea was to apply and test existing and new traffic detection techniques. In brief, the technical side of the project consisted in: ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ

Detecting car movements (OBU devices and camera systems); Storing, filtering and accessing information about car movements, participants, bonuses, etc. (data structure and database); Providing information to participants as well as to project groups, and communicating within the project and with the participants (website design); Collecting information about the participants’ travel decisions (logbooks); Providing the participants with traffic information (travel times on the A12 from Zoetermeer towards The Hague, using Yeti smart phones).

An EVI (Electronic Vehicle Identification) system was implemented for the first time in The Netherlands in order to signal and register the participating vehicles. The EVI system performed very well: a score of 99.81% was achieved on a total of 31,585 EVI readings. A number plate recognition camera was installed at every EVI location to record the number plate of each vehicle passing by. The camera compensated for any unsuccessful EVI registrations and thereby reduced the chance of missed registrations to nearly zero. Moreover: ƒ

ƒ

The cameras detected all vehicles passing along the road. In order to avoid participants to use family second car and thus collect a reward while travelling during rush-hours, also the number plate of all the others family cars were registered. The cameras detected all traffic and thus also measured the volumes of total traffic, which, as an additional analysis, could be used to calibrate the participants’ behavioural changes.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 70

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Because the EVI registration covered only four possible routes, it was necessary to identify other alternative routes from Zoetermeer towards The Hague. One of the solutions was to place additional number plate recognition camera systems on these routes and to identify participants trying to evade the EVI detection system. The Spitsmijden website was used for both the internal and the external communications and was therefore an essential part of the trial. On this website, each participant had to fill in a logbook daily. The logbooks were used for analysis and compared with the detected movements. Participants with a Yeti smart phone disposed of a website that had been customized for the trial. In this way, they were able to see the actual travel times in minutes between Zoetermeer and Prins Clausplein in The Hague. The idea was that they would have to use this information for their travel decisions. The maximum number of rewards per week derived from the comparison with the rush-our travel frequency during the reference situation. In the monetary variant, the participant was rewarded with a daily amount of €3 or €7 for not being registered between 07.30 and 09.30h. Also a varying scheme was conducted: ƒ ƒ ƒ

not registered between 07.30 and 09.30h > 7 Euros registered between 07.30 and 08.00h > 3 Euros registered between 09.00 and 09.30h > 3 Euros

In the Yeti variant, the participant was rewarded with the right to keep the smart phone Yeti, which was put at his/her disposal during the experiment. In this case the participant needed to avoid rush-hours for a certain given number of times. Also a so-called Yeti-variant was conducted; in this case the participant received only traffic-information on his smart phone. IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS BARRIERS Politicians may ask themselves: why pay for good behavior? “We do not reward people that do not steel.” Also, congestion charging can include fundraising for new infrastructures. Finally, the recommendation to only reward a selected group can face practical equity problems. DRIVERS Drivers participated on a voluntary basis. It is not clear to what extent this fact should influence expectations of a larger rewarding scheme. The first volunteers may be easily able to (or interested in) adjust(ing) their behavior. Implementing a rewarding scheme seems the best solution to be pushed and led by private parties, funded by government, and evaluated by universities. SCHEME RESULTS During the second phase of this project, more information will emerge. At this point, only the changes in commuters’ behavior are known in details. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 71

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

NETWORK To what extent participants’ behavior changes reduced overall congestion between Zoetermeer and The Hague is not (yet) clear. However, the changes themselves are described in the following figures.

Figure 2-16 - Distribution of commutes by time and transport method for the various monetary rewards

Figure 2-17 - Distribution of commutes by time and transport method for the various Yeti rewards

A reduction of rush-hours car trips by about 50% was observed. This reduction was obtained mainly by rescheduling trips to earlier or later points in time. A shift to public transport occurred, but with a moderate percentage. One special circumstance was the delay of public transport project RandstadRail. The original reason to schedule the trial during Autumn 2006 was the redesign of the local rail network between The Hague and Zoetermeer during Summer 2006. The plan was to convert the local heavy-rail loop into a light rail operation and to link it to the existing light rail system of The Hague. As the start of the trial approached, however, it became clear that construction planning had gone off track and that the trial would have to start with reduced rail operations (mainline rail only). A roughly scheduled bus replacement service continued to operate after the summer. However, this bus service was not sufficient to substitute the traditional local rail service: during rush-hours, in fact, there were always delays. ENVIRONMENT ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 72

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

At this point, no environmental effects are known. ECONOMY At this point, no economic effects (costs as well as benefits) are known. ACCEPTABILITY 43% of the participants had some troubles in changing their behaviour. The same number found relatively easy to do it. Some causes of difficulty in adjusting mobility behaviour frequently mentioned were work- and family-related requirements. Lack of alternative transport means was mentioned by 5% of the participants, while 7% mentioned the delay in RandstadRail service as the reason for their difficulty in adjusting their behaviour. But after all, 86% per cent of the participants indicated that they would participate in a similar trial if they had the chance. Only 5% said that they would not participate. EQUITY One of the recommendations is to avoid extending Spitsmijden to all road users on a voluntary basis; rewarding too many people may cause negative effects instead of positive ones. Therefore, in case of any follow-up it will have to determine who may participate, and who not. Why should residents of The Hague, who live quite near their jobs, not be rewarded? Why are commuters in remote areas not rewarded? And if not, will this difference lead to mechanisms on the estate market? What statement is being made when a government financially rewards its citizens for certain behaviour? Will it seem like a polluting activity being stimulated? And the alternative, establishing new roads, can be used by many more (than only commuters around rush-hours). These and other difficult questions are likely to come up when starting a follow-up of Spitsmijden (not being a second trial). LIVEABILITY Air quality and accessibility are expected to have been improved during the trial, but have not been investigated. A secondary effect of the reduction in congestion Spitsmijden may cause is the availability of more free time (for non-participants). REVENUE USE When there are rewards instead of charges, there are no revenues. IMPACTS PREDICTABILITY (MODEL RESULTS) Based on the available information, it seems that no predictions of effects were made. However, in the following paragraphs the elaborated predictions of adjusted and/or larger Spitsmijden follow-up are described. One model is based on economic welfare theory and was used to determine the optimal reward level. The second model is a traffic model that allowed the simulation of different reward levels and an assessment of the global impact of the corresponding reward schemes. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 73

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

THE INDY MODEL The macroscopic dynamic traffic model, named INDY, was used to forecast the traffic conditions that would result from the introduction of a Spitsmijden reward scheme. The main aim was not to forecast what would happen during the pilot phase, but what would have happened if (a) a different reward scheme would have been used and/or (b) a larger number of people would have participated. This model calculates an equilibrium state via an iterative process, taking into account that the congestion decrease due to behavioural adjustments of rewarded drivers is (partly) compensated by other drivers: the return-to-the-peak effect. The INDY model shows that a participation level of 10% and 100% both lead to travel time savings, while a participation of 50% generates travel time losses. The latter effect is caused by the fact that a small number of participants changing their departure time can alleviate the congestion for many, but if too many people change, they cause congestion for themselves and for others. Changing the level of rewards causes a similar effect as changing participation level. A high level of participation with high rewards will probably lead net travel time losses for the whole network. In practice, this combination of high reward and high participation would also be very expensive. The greatest travel time savings can be achieved by shifting a number of travellers low enough to not cause congestion for themselves or others, while decreasing demand during rush-hours and solving bottlenecks. An interesting question would then be what the best combination of participation and reward levels would be, given a certain budget. THE BOTTLENECK MODEL The main function of the bottleneck model, an economic model, is its use as a complementary tool for traffic analysis. The complexity of the INDY model – which provides a much more detailed picture of traffic congestion in the relevant area than the bottleneck model does – complicates the determination of optimal tolls. The model calculates an equilibrium in which all drivers can reach the same utility: the disutility of having to spend some time in the queue for those who arrive at work exactly on time is equal to that of those who arrive earlier or later and have to spend less time in the queue. The four road segments between the inflow from highway A4 (junction Prins Clausplein) and the Voorburg ramp act as a bottleneck because of the relatively large amounts of weaving traffic here. The optimal fine toll is estimated to be € 2.25 for passing the bottleneck at the beginning or at the end of rush-hours. Drivers who pass through the bottleneck between the beginning and the end of rush-hours receive a lower reward, and drivers who pass through exactly at the time for arriving at work at the preferred time, do not receive anything. It is clear that in this case the toll is in fact a reward: nobody has to pay, and all except the drivers who arrive at the preferred time receive some money. The optimal toll, whose value does not change over time, equals to €1.28 between 8:05a.m. and 9:24 a.m. This toll can be easily transformed into an equivalent reward. This reward equals to

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 74

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

€0.84 and is given to drivers who pass through the bottleneck between 7.24a.m. and 8:05a.m., or between 9:24a.m. and 9.36a.m. No reward is granted outside this period. TARGET GROUP ANALYSIS Moreover, a target group analysis was carried out using a logistical regression model. This showed that the amount of reward has no influence on the probability of displaying a certain reaction, but probably more effect on the frequency of behavioural adjustment. Well-educated participants were more likely to choose to work from home (monetary variant) and to travel before rush-hours (Yeti variant). Men were more likely than women to avoid traffic. CONCLUSIONS A preliminary conclusion of Spitsmijden is that rewards, whether monetary or in the form of a Yeti, lead to substantial decreases in number of car trips during rush hours. Both variants result in halving the total number of car trips. One important observation is that a relatively low reward (€ 3) results to be the most significant effect for avoiding traffic. The additional value of higher rewards is relatively slight. The participants who had chosen the Yeti variant also drove considerably less during peak traffic periods: 43% of them were observed to drive daily, and only 15% of them gained the reward. Half of participants had little trouble in avoiding driving during peak traffic periods. Those who did find it difficult claimed that it was due to obligations at home or work. Many participants had made agreements with their employers about their work times or for asking to work at home, and at home they had made agreements regarding household chores and scheduling. The majority of participants resumed their old behaviour patterns after the conclusion of the experiment. The reduction of traffic trips was largely realized by delaying or advancing departure times, as well as by a slight increase in the use of public transport. The majority of people who adjusted their behaviour chose to apply the best single option based on their personal circumstances (instead of a combination of options). More than half of participants found it relatively or very easy to adjust their behaviour. However, many specific individual circumstances can influence behavioural adjustment, and it is important to gain more understanding of them. When a reward is offered for avoiding rush-hours traffic, two new traffic peaks arise: just before and just after the given rush-hours. RECOMMENDATIONS The models used should be further elaborated in order to define optimal rewarding schemes and amounts. Given the experimental phase in which the model application finds itself, it is not yet possible to deliver precise judgements regarding the extent of gains during travelling time.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 75

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The results achieved during the experiment, i.e. halving the number of rush-hours trips, will probably be impossible to realise during a large-scale version of the experiment with an identical set-up. Before transferring Spitsmijden to another region, it should be noted that a too high reward and/or too many participants may lead to net losses in travel time. If these elements are set at the right level, however, significant gains in travelling time can be achieved along with a positive effect on traffic circulation. The concept and the technology proved to work quite well. SECOND PILOT In November 2008 the organisation started a new pilot ‘Spitsmijden’ which will run until December 2009. The difference between the two pilots is a longer route and the use of cameras and partly of GPS technology (some of the participants will receive a Rabo Mobile). The EVItechnique is currently not part of the pilot. They may approach participants during the pilot to participate in additional investigations, for which a different technique, such as EVI, will be used. Of course, the participation in an additional investigation will be entirely on a voluntary basis. Another difference is that incentives are setup to promote the use of the train as an alternative way of mobility. To make the shift to train mode as easy as possible, NS-Business Cards will be offered via internet and a trip could be booked by phone. The research questions for this pilot project are:

• Can we achieve long-term behavioural change? • At what point is a change in trips of individual users realistic on the basis of possible reward: When and where do we measure effects?

• Does Spitsmijden lead to unwanted effects elsewhere, and if so, when and which is the effect?

• To what extent is the public transport in general, and specifically the train, a realistic alternative?

• Has the concept similar effect in other circumstances, instead of the daily situation on the road? What would happen in case of road works?

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 76

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.2.2

Dutch National Case Study

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION Since 2005 (Parliamentary approval), the Netherlands government is working on a system to introduce a kind of road pricing nationwide, for lorries and private cars alike. The first start is scheduled in 2011 for lorries and in 2012 for private cars up to 2016. At the same time, taxes now collected for car ownership, will be lowered and finally abolished in 2018. PRICING OBJECTIVES The choice made for the new way of paying for mobility is based on four principles: 1. 2. 3. 4.

fairness, because motorist as a group should not be paying more support, because broad societal support is essential to such a major change of system affordability, because operating costs must not escalate accessibility, because the instrument must contribute to better accessibility

SCHEME DESCRIPTION In the present situation people are paying for car ownership and car use in six ways: • • • • • •

Luxury taxation by buying car (BPM) V.A.T. on car purchase (over initial value plus BPM) Road tax (MRB) Surtax for provincial authorities on national road tax V.A.T. on petrol Excise on petrol

In the preferred final situation after introducing “Paying for use of the road” there will be a very low car tax. The luxury taxation (BPM), road tax and surtax for provincial authorities are abolished. Other taxations remain as they are now. The principle of the system is based on paying per kilometre on all Dutch roads, differentiated according to time, place and environmental factors. The level of charge is unknown yet. There will be exceptions for: fire-brigade, police, (animal-) ambulance, motorcycles and cars that do not pay taxes now. The Parliamentary requires cost constraint of 5% operational costs.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 77

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-18 – Description of the technical system

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Registration of car use Sending information to back office Back office for making, sending and collecting bill, client contact for questions and complaints Enforcement, supervision and for equality of rights.

Organizational model and Value Added Services (VAS). Market parties and government agree that the preferred model should be a multi service provider model (MSP). It is understandable that the government has to organize a fall-back scenario with a dedicated back-office to prevent risks. This will imply extra costs. It should be financially appealing enough for providers to offer an ABvM service in an open (certification) or closed (concession) model. VAS does not cross-finance the business case for the government. Advantages from VAS are considered as a customer relation management tool, and so different from competition or marketing tools. The customer, in fact, would be the beneficiary of revenues from VAS due to a competition. Customers should have access to the basic service without VAS. There is a tension between mandatory customer acceptance and targeting on a special user-group, for instance lorries. Market parties do not give the same answer to the question on the number of providers available at the start of a MSP model. More than one is to be expected. Enforcement and debt collection are not included in an end-to-end solution but will be the responsibility of the state. Interfaces with enforcement should be the same for all providers. The national charging scheme will eventually consist of, as stated in the advice of the Platform Anders Betalen voor Mobiliteit (and the national document on mobility policy, the Nota Mobiliteit): -

Phasing out (most of) the fixed car taxes; A fixed price per kilometer, depending on the environmental characteristics of the vehicle; A congestion charge.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 78

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Introduction of the system in the year 2011 is achievable (if procurement is timely) and will allow market enough time to come up with a design on the given specs. There is a change that the planning will be influenced because there are still many uncertainties on certification and specs especially on the On Board Unit (OBE) and the whole plan is still in need of Parliamentary all over approval. Talks with the industry about the specs will start in November 2008. The Parliamentary requirement of cost constraint of 5% operational costs should be clearly defined. The minister of Transport has promised the Dutch Lower House on November 18th last, that this information will be sent to the Lower House as soon as possible. IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS For the national system, the Cabinet aims to start with freight transport in 2011, which entails an acceleration of the legislation and tendering processes in terms of the critical time path ending in 2012. This will require intensive technical and policy-related cooperation with Belgium, France and Germany. Passenger cars will follow a year after the launch of freight transport. The complete system roll-out will be scheduled for 2016 and beyond. Government should define the rules and specs on privacy. Since the on board functionality (OBF) is linked with a contract this means when a customer wants to change from one provider to another either he receives a new OBF or the identification part should be changed (like a SIM-card in a mobile phone). The Cabinet has announced an 'irreversible and significant step' towards a fairer system of payment for mobility. This decision includes several irreversible steps. During this Cabinet period, the legislation will be completed, major progress will be made for converting fixed vehicle taxation (motor vehicle tax, purchase tax and the Euro Vignette for freight vehicles), the implementation organisation will form, the technology will be tested and a start will be made with freight vehicles under the conditions stated. The system is still waiting for Parliamentary approval. As soon the authorization will be given the first pilot schemes will be implemented within Amsterdam area by using some components of the future system. REVENUE USE The revenues will be used to finance new roads, and the maintenance of existing ones. IMPACTS PREDICTABILITY No information available. CONCLUSIONS The introduction of AbvM is still on track in the Netherlands, and is running fast ahead, towards the goals 2011 (lorries) and 2012-2016 (personal cars). The system is still under restriction of Parliamentary approval. Soon there will be the first pilots in the Amsterdam area, using proposed parts of the future system.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 79

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.2.3

More pilots in preparation of the national kilometre charging scheme

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 80

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.3

Italian Case Studies

Italy has a long tradition of toll roads (motorways, tunnels and bridges), but these do not extend into the urban road networks. However, Italian municipalities have for some years explored access control methods in city centre Limited Traffic Zones (LTZ). The controlled zones usually cover the historic centers that suffer from serious pollution caused by congested traffic. Only residents of the area and a limited number of permit holders are allowed to access the zones. The city of Bologna pioneered the policy in the mid/late 1980’s, and despite initial difficulties, this prompted a widespread adoption of the measure. In other towns and cities the policy is gradually evolving to a hybrid form of road pricing by requesting LTZ permit holders to pay an annual fee. To achieve this, a government directive45 was introduced that allows Municipalities to charge motor vehicles a fee when entering or circulating inside the LTZ. A Presidential Decree 250/99 approved the installation and operation of automatic access control systems in historic centers and LTZs. The following cases record the experiments carried out in some Italian cities in order to establish the political and public acceptability required to implement a full-scale scheme and the technological advances from the early manual access control to the modern electronic on-board transponders.

45

D.L. 285/92 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 81

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.3.1

Rome

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION In the last 35 years in the metropolitan area of Rome there was a threefold leap in terms of kilometers travelled, due to the increased length of trips and number of vehicles (+650%). This growth has not been matched by a parallel development of the public transport system that has only recorded a 90% increase in terms of kilometers travelled during the same period. Consequently, the public transport modal share, holding 56% of total motorized trips in late 70s, has sharply decreased and today accounts only for 24% of motorized trips. Presently the city of Rome has a population of 2.8 million inhabitants, 1.96 million cars and more than 550,000 motorcycles and motor scooters circulating in Rome. The modal choice for travel in Rome is split in 52% on private vehicle, 24% for public transport and the rest is constituted by two wheels and walking/cycling. The pressures of so many people and vehicles have created two interrelated problems, traffic congestion and environmental degradation. The Rome context is described in the Figure 2-19. Figure 2-19 – The Rome context

To reverse this trend, the municipality has set few clear goals aimed at achieving a sort of equilibrium between transport demand and supply. Therefore Rome's General Traffic Master Plan includes a strategy to improve mobility, modify modal split in favor of public transport and sustainable modes, increase traffic safety, decrease air and noise pollution, safeguard health, and preserve Rome's historical and architectural ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 82

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

heritage. The strategy is to restrict or limit private car use in the city centre and gradually relax these restrictions outside, as shown in Figure 2-20. At the heart of this strategy is mobility demand management, in keeping with the EU policy on sustainable transport. The scheme is accompanied by complementary restrictive measures on traffic regulation and management, such as the implementation of the Limited Traffic Zones, accompanied by different parking fares depending on city areas, and innovation and improvement of local Public Transport systems.

Figure 2-20 - Urban Planning and Traffic restriction Polices

zone

Municipality Area 1285 skm External Ring (GRA) 344 skm Green Belt 154 skm Rail Ring 48.4 skm LTZ 5.5 skm Pedestrian 0,5 skm

constraints No Constraints Tourist Coaches Regulation

Pollution emergencies Multi-modal nodes Park&ride

Emission Constraints Pay parking schemes Stop to All Vehicles (permission concession) Zero Emission Area (walking & electric)

The Urban Traffic General Plan (PGTU) thus tried to tackle the mounting problem of public transport, mobility, and transport related emissions. The key elements were: -

Road classification updating according to the relative function (i.e. pedestrian, local traffic, main traffic) Definition of transport demand policies (i.e. controlled access zones, parking pricing) The administration adopted a collaborative approach that brought the PGTU to be envisaged as an element of a broader plan including the Master Plan, the Transport Plan, the Urban Parking Plan (PUP) and other regional and local plans. The PGTU divided the metropolitan area into five, as shown in the figure below, and namely:

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 83

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

-

-

-

-

The historical centre (A), corresponding to the Restricted Access Zone (LZT), has an area of about 6 km2 and shows the highest concentration of business activities (21 thousand workers/km2): less than 1% of the municipal territory hosts 13% of the total workers, while population amounts to only 2% over the total; The central area (B) borders internally the historical centre and externally the railway ring. The area is densely populated and presents a great deal of business activities; The semi-central area (C) borders internally the central area and externally is approximately identified by the inner ring road. The area is characterized by a medium business density and the highest population density (about 11 thousand inhabitants/km2); The peripheral area (D) covers the rest of the urban settlement within the GRA (Great Ring Road). Business and residential density are lower than in the previous cases; Finally the suburban area (E), located externally to the GRA, presents the lowest business and residential densities. During the Seventies, there has been a change in the trends of the natural balance and the migratory balance, which contributed to the doubling of population after the Second World War. Figure 2-21 – Rome areas defined by PGTU

The road pricing scheme in Rome was not introduced under specific legislation but rather evolved from access control zones originally implemented in historical urban center.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 84

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The history of access control in Rome began in 1989 when restrictions were placed on vehicle entrances for the historical centre. These restrictions were not enforced in a systematic way until 1994 when municipal police were used to block the entrances into the area. Permission to enter is given free of charge to residents within the LTZ. Other users may obtain permission to circulate and park in the LTZ area if they fall into certain categories (i.e. doctors with offices within the city centre, artisans). In 1998 this authorization became more complicated, since allowed non-residents were required to pay yearly the equivalent of 12 months public transport passes in order to obtain a permit for the access control area. Furthermore, parking was free for residents (near their home or within their designated neighborhood) but destination parking is burdensome for both residents and authorized non-residents. Because of difficulty in enforcing this restriction of vehicles by the municipal police, Rome, from October 2001 the electronic full scale Access Control System and flat-fare Road Pricing scheme (ACS+RP) called IRIDE was switched on with the use of 23 entrance gates and a complex control centre located in STA (local transport agency nowadays called ATAC). PRICING OBJECTIVES The overall goal is to produce a mechanism that encourages modal shift away from private transport to public transport. This shift will occur by reducing the current number of private trips to the centre, both destination and through trips, on-street parking management, adjustment of PT supply and PT tariffs, according to the pricing scheme proposed. The reduction of congestion and lowering of pollution through road pricing is expected to improve the health conditions of residents and visitors to the restricted area. Currently, the historical centre suffers from high pollution – in particular benzene, CO, NO and PM10 – which are potent health risks, especially for children. In addition, these reductions in disbenefits from transportation can lead to improved attraction to the historical centre and, subsequently, economic growth. Rome’s fiscal objectives for road pricing are to dedicate all revenue to mobility related projects. The pricing policies in place in Rome include both payment for on-street parking and payment for accessing certain areas of the city. The main objective pursued since the beginning of the Access Policies in Rome, going back to the late 80’s, has been the protection of the unique cultural heritage of the city from the dangerous effects of traffic pollution. The turning point was the implementation of the LTZ system with “electronic gates” in October 2001. Limited Traffic Zones (LTZ) are used to restrict vehicle access to residents and essential users (many of whom must pay a yearly charge) and are supported by paid parking schemes in surrounding areas. The general idea is to forbid access to cars, increase the supply of Public Transport and increase the number of parking pricing slots along the LTZ cordons. The revenues have to be used to recover the environmental externalities rising from the traffic pollution and to invest on new PT infrastructures.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 85

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

SCHEME DESCRIPTION Rome has implemented a complex Access Control System. The first scheme, supported by electronic gates, was implemented in 2001, in order to safeguard the central area of the city (“ZTL centro” in Figure 2-22). After two years since the implementation of the central LTZ scheme, once the automatic system had been tested and fine tuned, other “sensitive areas” and “sensitive time bands” have been identified and a decision to limit car traffic has been issued and implemented according to a daily and night scheme (Figure 2-22 and Figure 2-23).

Figure 2-22 - The daily LTZ Scheme in Rome

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 86

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-23 - The nightly LTZ Scheme in Rome

These schemes are summarised in the table below: TIME AREA TECHNOLOGY BAND/ENFORCEMENT 23 Electronic Access gates with Monday to Friday: 6.30am4.15 vertical signalling (IRIDE) with CENTRAL LTZ (day) 6.00pm 2 km Saturday 2pm-6pm ANRP 23 Electronic Access gates with Fridays and Saturdays: CENTRAL LTZ (night) vertical signalling (IRIDE) with 11pm – 3am ANRP TRASTEVERE LTZ Monday to Saturday: 6am12 Electronic Access gates with (day) 10.30am 0.97 vertical signalling and ANRP 2 TRASTEVERE LTZ Friday and Saturday: 9pmkm (IRIDE2) 3am (night) SAN LORENZO LTZ Fridays and Saturdays: 9pm 0.26 7 access roads, Electronic gates (night) – 3am km2 TESTACCIO LTZ Fridays and Saturdays: 9pm 0.45 11 access roads controlled by (night) – 3am km2 the Police Fridays and Saturdays: 9pm 4 access roads, Electronic gates MONTI LTZ (night) – 3am AREA

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 87

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

AREA VILLA BORGHESE

TIME BAND/ENFORCEMENT 24 hours (public park)

AREA

TECHNOLOGY

2

1.5 km 3 access roads, Electronic gates

In the following picture all LTZs are represented on the Rome map as well as the other two internal PGTU zones: the Rail Ring and the Green Belt.

Figure 2-24 – LTZs in central Rome

The latest achievements: After a long and demanding discussion between the Administration and the National Body supervising cultural heritage (Sovrintendenza ai Beni Culturali), a suitable solution has finally been found to implement the 23rd electronic gate that completes the central cordon in Rome. As shown in Figure 2-25, a modern electronic access gate has been situated in the core of the historical centre of Rome, Via dei Fori Imperiali, replacing the previous system of supervision by the police.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 88

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-25 - The last electronic gate ”closing” the central LTZ

Further to this a new LTZ night scheme has been implemented in “Rione Monti” (Figure 2-23). All the latest developments of pricing in Rome have been implemented, and in particular:

• In San Lorenzo and in Villa Borghese the electronic poles have been installed; • The LTZ information system has been optimized, so that now all the electronic access poles are equipped with information panels (see Figure 2-25), informing citizens on the status of the LTZ (active or not active)

• The experimentation of the Testaccio LTZ (night) has been successfully carried out during summer 2007 and has become effective. The scheme implemented in Rome in first instance is geographically located in the central area of the city and in the neighbouring areas (Figure 2-20).

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 89

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The scheme foresees that in principle people or residents working inside the LTZ areas can have access by car, upon specific request, registration and payment of a permit, through ATAC offices. There are a number of exemptions: LPT (Local Public Transport), taxis and disabled people have free access; institutions, freight carriers, public utility vehicles, etc that are included in the “authorised” category have the right to a permit if they pay specific tariffs. A “White List” of authorised users is defined and updated every day (in order to take into account any temporary permit for weddings, movies and a range of specified special cases), so that non-authorised vehicles that access the LTZ during the enforcement times are detected by the ANPR system and automatically receive a fine of 68 €. The historical city centre LTZ subsystem, operating from October 2001, includes the use of 23 gates implemented on access roads to the city centre that optically detect the plate of vehicles by APNR (Automatic Plate Number Recognition) techniques. All the electronic gates installed within the city centre use short-range radio technologies (DSRC) for communication. In this case vehicles are identified through an information exchange via radio between the gate (RSU – Road Side Unit) and a device called OBU (On Board Unit) which is on the vehicle. This OBU was given to residents and disabled people, but was not utilized during the implementation of new LTZ areas (Trastevere and San Lorenzo) because of the new camera technologies together with the need to reduce system complexities for citizens. For that reason the OBUs are now reaching the point of exhaustion. Figure 2-26 and Figure 2-27 show the basic technologies at the heart of the system in Rome.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 90

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-26 - The Communication System (e-gate – car – control centre)

Rome, the ACS+RP system: technological solution

All the gates installed around Rome are integrated with cameras working twenty-four hours a day: as the camera on the e-gate detects a car, a picture of the plate is taken and sent to the control centre. The ANPR allows comparing each plate number to the “White List” database. If there is a mismatch a fine is automatically issued to that plate.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 91

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-27 - Automatic plate number recognition process (Municipal Police user interface) Characters reliability support to operators

With the implementation of the system in Trastevere, called IRIDE2, the computer interface has been improved (Figure 2-27) and optimised; besides a specific effort has been spent to improve the information on the service, by including the vertical signalling combined with the e-gate (Figure 2-29). This mini-VMS (Variable Message Signs) system, providing real-time information on the gate status (active or not), is now present in all the gates to support a better comprehension of city’s rules from citizens and tourists. These new LTZ schemes are further supported by some side-measures like the Trastevere LTZ situation, as shown in Figure 2-28. In that case, during the enforcement, a dedicated shuttle service operated by electric buses connects the LTZ area with 221 slots parking.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 92

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-28 – The integrated Trastevere scheme

Figure 2-29 – The new vertical signalling system

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 93

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The charging scheme was modified in January 2007, according to the following data: Category Disabled: Freight distribution Private taxi

Before 2007 15 € 32€ 20€

Residents

20€

Non residents (private) Taxi Public Transport Public Utilities Coaches Daily Permits

340€ 20€ 32€ Daily charge Not allowed

From 1st January 2007 15€ (5 years) 55€ (5 years) 55€ (5 years) 55€ (5 years), 300€ (2nd plate 1 year), 550€ (3rd plate 1 year) 550€ 55€ FREE 550€ 20€/day (max 560€/year)

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS Rome decided to implement new clean zones with a complex series of actions, according to the guideline provided by the Urban General Traffic Plan (PGTU). Besides, there are in Rome serious reasons to apply “clean zones”: congestion and environment as well as a strong need to preserve the historical and archaeological city. BARRIERS Even though the Urban Traffic Plan included such measures, the implementation of electronic access control schemes in Rome had a complicated initial set-up. The full-scale deployment of the automatic access control systems in Rome was a demanding process which had to overcome a number of issues, ranging from technical ones, to the management issues of such a system, and finally to a variety of bureaucratic and institutional issues. Rome issued the first request in Italy to implement an Access Control System (ACS) and a Recognition Plate (RP) scheme and the government Bodies examined it carefully, establishing the parameters for its operation. Due to the complexity of the procedures related to the use of such automatic equipment being made operational on large scale for the first time in Italy, the Decrees dictated a pre-implementation period, to be jointly operated with the Urban Police at each gate to endorse the violations. DRIVERS The London implementation gave support to Rome, which was previously alone within the largest European cities to apply an electronic enforcement system. Support comes also from new restrictive air quality Directives recently approved and obliging further restriction of private cars to comply with them. An added value of access control schemes is the comprehensive requalification of urban areas obtained with the implementation of the e-gate system. They created the opportunity to limit the ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 94

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

space for private cars, giving back areas to pedestrians. Besides, the integration of ACS, RP and clean zones in “Sustainable Mobility” policies can support the matching of the new limits on air quality. Surveys and continuous contacts with all the stake-holders and definition of the needs of all the social categories are necessary and it is important to integrate this kind of measure in Sustainable Mobility policy with PT integration and introduction of pedestrian areas. SCHEME RESULTS The majority of results come from the ACS+RP scheme of the Central Zone, implemented in 2001 with the support of the electronic Gates. The other schemes are too recent for a lot of data, but generally the registered trend is the same. NETWORK In general, modal split was influenced by all the changes in the city, but the Access Control and Road Pricing Schemes played major roles, as already highlighted. Before and after data show that, in 2002, modal split in the central area was 30% public transport, 27% private cars, 23% motorbikes/mopeds and 20% pedestrians. The 2005 data revealed that these proportions had switched to 31%, 22%, 24% and 23%, respectively. The most important result is the decrease of private cars in favour of three point increase (percentage) for walking, thus suggesting that citizens reduced their use of the car for trips of short distances. The benefit of the Access Restriction is also evident when traffic flows and illegal through-traffic are considered: the former decreased by 20% during the restriction periods and by 15% in the morning peak hour (8.30-9.30). The proportion of illegal accesses decreased from 18% to less than 10% of the total traffic flows, during the four years of the gates implementation (even though, currently, still about 20.000 vehicles/week illegally access the area).

Figure 2-30 - Comparison between before (year 2000) and post (years 2001-5) of the central LTZ scheme

Before

Reference period: Octobers

100000 90000 80000 70000 60000

October 2000 October 2001 October 2002

50000

October 2003 October 2004

40000

October 2005

30000 20000

After

10000

Strike effect 31/10/2001 me

29/10/2001 lu

30/10/2001ma

27/10/2001 sa

25/10/2001 gio

26/10/2001 ven

24/10/2001 me

22/10/2001 lu

23/10/2001 lma

20/10/2001 sa

19/10/2001 ven

17/10/2001me

18/10/2001 gio

15/10/2001 lu

16/10/2001ma

12/10/2001 ve

13/10/2001 sab

11/10/2001 gio

10/10/2001 me

08/10/2001 lu

09/10/2001 ma

06/10/2001 sab

04/10/2001 gio

05/10/2001 ven

03/10/2001 me

01/10/2001 lu

02/10/2001 ma

0

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 95

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Data analysis performed during the period between 2006 and 2008 confirmed this trend and, as shown in Figure 2-32, also the number of accesses during the same period is resulted quite stable (around 70,000 vehicles/day), except during Christmas time (10th – 20th December) when different ZTL rules have changed the access rate.

Figure 2-31 – Number of accesses in the city centre LTZ during the period 2006-2008

The benefit of access restriction is also evident when considering traffic flows and illegal through-traffic: the former decreased by 20% during the overall restriction period and by 15% in the morning peak hours (8.30 – 9.30). Since e-gates were implemented, the proportion of illegal accesses decreased from 18% to less than 10% in respect of total traffic flows. Despite of that still now 20,000 vehicles per week illegally access the LTZ area. The analysis of 2008 data on access violations confirms that about 4,000 fines are emitted during every working day and during the whole year roughly one million of sanctions have been issued.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 96

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-32 - Trend of the fines for access violation 2003

2002 18000

I trim

II trim

III trim

IV trim

I trim

II trim

III trim

2004 IV trim I trim

2005 60%

II trim

III trim

IV trim

I trim

II trim

III trim

16000 50% 14000

12000

40%

10000 30% 8000

6000

20%

4000 10% 2000

0

0%

Valore assoluto degli accessi sanzionabili nel periodo di esercizio

Valore percentuale degli accessi sanzionabili rispetto alla domanda di accesso

Hence, the general objective of reducing the impact of traffic on the environment and increasing the level of protection of the city centre can be considered achieved. ENVIRONMENT An appreciable reduction in air pollution was measured: the comparison, in terms of concentrations, between the annual mean values, recorded in 2001 and the mean values in 2004 showed a reduction of CO concentration of about 21%, PM10 of 11% and Benzene of 37%. In particular, results concerning benzene concentrations seem to be particularly relevant since, if just 2005 is considered, a 27% decrease was recorded at about 50 sites. Also emissions strongly decreased and exceeded expectations. The number of polluting vehicles decreased e.g. non-catalysed mopeds reduced by about 45%, private cars by 37% and commercial vehicles by slightly less than 35%. However the main influence on this was a ban on diesel and gasoline fuelled vehicles not meeting Directive 91/441/CE requirements from circulating in the Rail Ring area, which came into force in January 2002. Regarding the Trastevere and San Lorenzo ACS+RP schemes, pollution concentrations surveyed in the central LTZ and in two districts (see Figure 2-33) with passive sampler campaigns are in line with the decrease observed at urban level; the most positive outcomes were recorded at Trastevere rather than at S.Lorenzo, but the different morphology of the two districts along with other factors such as the differences of time of implementation can contribute to such discrepancy.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 97

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-33 - Mean values of benzene concentrations (2001 – 2005) in Central Rome, Trastevere and San Lorenzo.

Even more significant, in the San Lorenzo district, are the results for noise pollution. During the monitoring of area, after the implementation of the measure, in zones without commercial activities a reduction of noise pollution of 8-9 dB(A) was observed. In zones with commercial activities such as restaurant or pubs, the reduction of noise pollution was slight and was about 3-4 dB(A). A complete analysis was carried out on the basis of the annual mean values in three significant air quality measurement stations of the Regional network, namely: -

A station located within the historical city centre LTZ (Arenula); A station situated outside the LTZ but in a congested area of the city (Via Magnagrecia); A station placed within a green area outside the LTZ (Villa Ada).

Carbon monoxide (CO) values metered during last ten years show a constant decrease in all three stations considered (see Figure 2-34). This is mainly due to cars engines technical improvements and also to mobility management activities introduced.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 98

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-34 – CO values comparison between the three air quality measurement stations considered

On the contrary, PM10 value metered during last ten years show a substantial difference between the readings of the city centre station with respect to the other two considered. While these last two had a constant trend during the period between 1998 and 2001, the Arenula station registered a decrease of more than 30% in PM10 concentration between the same period (see Figure 2-35). Figure 2-35 – PM10 values comparison between the three air quality measurement stations considered

This is mainly due to the coming into force of the e-gates in 2001 and it is clearly reflected in the decrease of number of days in which the PM10 concentration overcomes the UE threshold value reached by the Arenula readings with a decrease of more than 50% (see Figure 2-36 ). Figure 2-36 – PM10 concentration values of the three air quality measurements stations compared to UE threshold

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 99

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

As a preliminary conclusion and by considering that NO2 concentration values do not evidence any definitive behaviour, we could state that the introduction of the LTZ scheme controlled by egates has anyway supported Rome Municipality environmental policies. ECONOMY The ACS+RP schemes are a success in economic terms. The better liveability inside the zones has increased the value of all the buildings and commercial activities. At the beginning of implementation, residents tend to be in favour and retailers/shopkeepers are against. After some months of application of the measure, normally an equilibrium point is found, with common satisfaction. ACCEPTABILITY Within PROGRESS project, in fact, the city of Rome performed two surveys: the first addressed to a fixed panel of users to be interviewed in two steps on traffic-related problems and attitudes towards road pricing (Oct- Nov 2000 and Oct-Nov 2003) and the second oriented to car users currently authorised to access the Limited Traffic Zone to be interviewed on road pricing acceptance (Oct- Nov 2003). To evaluate the level of user acceptance of the system, residents’ and shop owners’ perception of the system were analysed. As expected, residents were more in favour of the access control than shop owners.

Figure 2-37 – Access Control System Acceptability 70%

Definitely

Possibly

Just a little bit

Not at all

60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 2000

2003 Residents

2000

2003 Shop owners

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 100

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Another interesting indicator was the acceptability of a full road-pricing policy (without access control). Neither residents nor shop owners are in favour of the removal of the access control and its replacement with a full road-pricing policy (Figure 2-38). However, the percentage of residents who think that a full road-pricing scheme is not a good idea is greater than that of shop owners. Moreover, this percentage increased from 44% to 51.2% for residents, while it decreased from 44.5% to 38.0% for the shop owners.

Figure 2-38 - Acceptability of a full road-pricing scheme (without access control)

70%

Definitely

Possibly

Just a little bit

Not at all

60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 2000

2003 Residents

2000

2003 Shop owners

Awareness raising activities in Rome took a rather ‘soft’ form up to 1 October 2001, when the system was implemented. The reasons for the low public profile given to the initiative during its development phase can be partly ascribed to local culture and – once more – to the strong political component and, therefore, the embedded risk of promoting an initiative, which faced the initial opposition of a consistent part of the urban population. The situation changed substantially once the citizens began to understand the positive effects on the liveability of the city centre. Besides, the huge impacts given by pollution and environmental issues are pushing the people to support the scheme. In conclusion, starting from an initial diffidence, the acceptability of these ACS+RP schemes is continuously growing and these schemes are becoming more and more popular. Besides, ATAC with the support of the Italian Ministries of Environment now investigating the level of citizens’ acceptance. It has been noticed mini-VMS at the gates has been appreciated by city users and there careful understanding of LTZ rules. A good example is given by the

and Regional Affairs is that the introduction of has also been a more decrease of violations

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 101

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

during the last three minutes of the afternoon restriction during working days (between 5.57 p.m. and 6.00 p.m.) as illustrated in Figure 2-39. Figure 2-39 – Total traffic flow within historical centre LTZ between 5.57 p.m. and 6.00 p.m. during the period 9th-18th September 2003 (without mini-VMS) with respect to the period 9th18th September 2008 (with mini-VMS)

Another interesting feature implemented by ATAC is the ATAC Mobile Infomobility application on mobile devices. The smart phones, in fact, become a direct communication channel between ATAC and citizens completely free of charge (only the service provided by the TLC operator should be paid). Once entered the site http://atacmobile.it, the user can choose the language (currently English and Italian) and then consult the section of pertinence. Among the current services offered, the most useful is the “Bus waiting time” that provides the estimated arrival of the bus line of interest at the stop bus selected by the user. The information is generated by an Automatic Vehicle Monitoring (AVM) system, installed on most of buses. Another helpful service is the socalled “Traffic Restrictions in ZTL” which gives information on timetables of the different LTZ in Rome. The information on timetables is grouped according to the day of the week or to LTZ different areas, providing real-time information on the status of each individual gate (whether or not in the moment of query it is active).

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 102

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-40 – The ATAC mobile Infomobility tool

EQUITY The equity problem was solved in Rome by the City Council which decided, with a Council Act, who is permitted to access the zone and what is the right tariff for the allowed category. In Rome such discussion isn’t easy, due to the aim of reducing the access in the central area to an increasingly fewer number of private cars. As a consequence, the equity issue has been in a way outweighed by the will to increase the cost of the “year permit” for the allowed categories, excluding the public transport and the disabled people. LIVEABILITY The establishment of new access gates and the extension of the access control system to the Trastevere and Testaccio districts and the Villa Borghese Park, mean that the whole interconnected central area of Rome is now covered, creating the most extended access control system in Europe. The results expected for these implementations were positive impacts both for transport and environment. What is unexpected is the modified approach of people towards their city, in fact in the process of “participated democracy” before the definitive approval of the plan, the pedestrian mode has been privileged especially in the city Centre, introducing for the first time the concept of “environmental island”, where the maximum speed will be limited to 30 km/h and the bicycle mode will be promoted. Now, a number of pedestrian areas have been established in the city centre, with the large TRIDENTE zone closed from 10 am to 8 pm. It is now possible, at least in some hours of the day, to stroll around the whole city centre without the presence of private traffic, except at some crossings.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 103

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-41 - Tridente fully pedestrian 24h

Table 2-10 – Impacts of the Central LTZ Implementation Reduction of car access flows +15÷20% Increase of the average speed (in LTZ) + 4% Increase of public transport average speed (in +5% LTZ) Increase of PT users (local) : + 5% Night car access peaks in leisure areas: part of historical City Centre, Trastevere, San Lorenzo Two wheels (accesses): +10÷15% Residual violating transit: 20,000/week

Road Safety A relevant issue is that of the increasing traffic congestion due to the high number of twowheelers. The current road pricing scheme has exacerbated the problem. In order to tackle the phenomenon, Rome assessed the Best Available Technology (BAT) to detect two-wheelers access but the conclusion was to limit access only on the basis of emission criteria (Euro 0 twowheelers are not allowed to enter the Rail Ring area, and some restriction are also applied to Euro 1 two-wheelers).

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 104

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

On the other hand, road safety problem is increasing. Motorcycles circulating in Rome are 360,000 (55,000 pre-Euro) and mopeds 155,000 (70,000 pre-Euro). Within the city centre it can be estimated a volume of circulating two-wheelers equal to 250,000. The powered two-wheelers have positive aspects, like having the possibility to access any city zone and parking without problems. On the other way round there are more driving risks, they cause pollution and noise and they often improperly use the public space. As a result, during LTZ restriction period, the number of circulating two-wheelers is higher than of four-wheelers.

Figure 2-42 – two and four powered wheels vehicles circulating within LTZ of city centre

Results in terms of road safety show that the ratio between the number of powered two wheels accidents (PTW) and total accidents has increased during the last years, as shown in Figure 2-43.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 105

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-43 – EU-countries PTW accidents ratio in 2001 and 2006

The improvement of PTW road safety can be achieved not with the implementation of road pricing schemes for two-wheelers. Nevertheless is necessary to create a “Motorbikes Road Safety Working Group” within the Municipalities in order to have a better comprehension of motorbike accidents (reconstruction of accidents dynamics, causes, drivers behaviour); to develop different actions for reducing “Risk Spots” by removing holes and glittering stones from the asphalt; to envisage a better education and training courses for drivers, to use awareness campaigns and Urban Police road safety campaigns, as well as the multiplier effect of the networks like IMPACTS, that has a dedicated motorbike working group (Paris, London, Barcelona, Madrid, Geneva). Last but not the least, it has to be mentioned the so-called eSUM (European Safer Urban Motorcycling) project, co-financed by DG TREN, that should permit a constant reduction in PTW accidents achieved by addressing PTW safety with an integrated European approach. The cooperation is expected to be performed between Cities (Barcelona, Paris, London, Rome) and Industries (BMW, Piaggio, ACEM). eSUM best practices will then be transferred to cities across Europe. In Figure 2-44, the time series of PTW accidents and fatalities in the mentioned European cities (including Rome) are shown.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 106

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-44 – Two-wheelers fatalities and injured time series of eSUM cities.

REVENUE USE The city of Rome in 2007 had 15M€ of revenues from charges and 74.8 M€ from fees. The objective is to invest revenues from this “Area Charging” to improve and enhance Public Transport infrastructures. IMPACTS PREDICTABILITY No information available. CONCLUSIONS Further road pricing related activities will concern the access control of coaches. To date, their access is detected by the ANPR system, but after an early check they are left free to use the urban space independently from the permit they bought. A feasibility study on new technology application is being carried out by MIRACLES, and CURAÇAO will follow up by analysing a pilot application for the introduction of specific per-time road pricing policies. Road pricing is supported by a comprehensive investment in parking pricing which will increasingly see the use of flexible parking fees and innovative payment systems (e.g. transactions though mobile phones “Pagososta” for parking fee payments, implemented on October 16th, 2006).

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 107

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.3.2

Milan

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION Milan, the capital of Lombardy, has a population of 1.3 million people. It is the biggest industrial city of Italy with many different industrial sectors. It is a magnetic point for designers, artists, photographers and models. Milan has an ancient city centre with high and interesting buildings and palazzos, which is why so many people from all over the world want to see the city of glamour. Milan has the third-highest concentration of particle matter (PM10) among large European cities, both in terms of average annual level and days of breaching a European Union limit of 50 micrograms per cubic meter, according to a 2007 study of 26 European cities by the environmental group Legambiente and the research institute Ambiente Italia, and sponsored by Dexia SA. Particle matter pollution mainly originates from traffic, heating, and industry. In Lombardy each day 5.7 millions of people are going to move towards urban areas, 95% inside the region itself. 75% of daily transits are made by private vehicles, 14% by public transport system. About 54% of daily transits are for work, and among these roughly 48% are directed to Milan urban area. Finally, we have to consider geomorphology and climate of the valley (Pianura Padana) of Lombardy, with the Milan urban area placed in the centre of it. Northern Alps range is a sort of barrier that makes difficult to clear the air from pollutant emissions. So one of the key issues leaded by the actual major of Milan, Mrs. Letizia Moratti, during last campaign for local elections, was focused on the goal to start up for the very fist time an experimentation of road pricing in Milan, aiming to reduce pollution and congestion in the urban area. That’s why in a bid to reduce pollution, the City of Milan has introduced a Toll charge similar to London’s Congestion charge, known as Eco Pass for all polluting vehicles entering the main city centre of the Cerchia dei Bastoni area. Ecopass came into effect on 2 January 2008. It is an innovative way of improving mobility and safeguarding both public health and the environment. Ecopass will help to heighten awareness of the effects of peoples’ behaviour on the environment and to build a more eco-friendly city. PRICING OBJECTIVES Ecopass aims to: • • •

make the air cleaner by reducing PM emissions in the Cerchia dei Bastioni by 30%, with a positive fallout on the surrounding areas of the city as well; relieve congestion by reducing the number of incoming cars by 10% and thereby speeding up public transport in the area; boost public transport by reinvesting all Ecopass charges in sustainable traffic and a sustainable environment.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 108

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Thus, using CURACAO terminology, the objectives are: • • • •

to reduce the environmental impacts of travel; to improve city comfort and cleanliness; to support the local economy; to reduce the health impacts from local transport emissions.

SCHEME DESCRIPTION Ecopass started on 2nd January 2008 and consists of a charge applied to vehicles circulating within the city centre area during working days (Monday to Friday) from 7.30 a.m. to 7.30 p.m. (7.00 a.m. to 7.00 p.m. from 15th April 2008). Figure 2-45 shows the Limited Traffic Zone that includes the area within the city walls. This zone has been chosen because within it are 12% of daily car trips of the whole municipality; secondly, it is the area most served by public transport; and thirdly, it is easily managed due to the low number of possible access points (43 in total). Figure 2-45 - The “Cerchia dei bastioni” Limited Traffic Zone

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 109

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The Ecopass Area has 43 entrance points, each equipped with CCTV (Closed-Circuit Television) cameras designed to record vehicles entering and exiting the zone. Cameras can record licence plate numbers and pollution class with a 90% accuracy rate through automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) technology.

Figure 2-46 - Milan operation headquarters

Each Ecopass gate has 2 built-in cameras: the first one takes pictures of all incoming vehicles, while the second identifies car plates through an OCR (Optical Character Recognition) system, for vehicle classification.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 110

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-47 – The Ecopass system

The Ecopass ticket is required for: • • • •

private and commercial petrol cars Euro 0, Euro 1 and Euro 2 Diesel cars Euro 0, Euro 1, Euro 2 and Euro 3 Diesel commercial vehicles Euro 0, Euro 1, Euro 2 and Euro 3 Diesel buses Euro 0, Euro 1, Euro 2, Euro 3, Euro 4 and Euro 5

Figure 2-48 - Different Ecopass Tickets

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 111

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Each vehicle has its registration book for the European Directive and with the information inside this document it is possible to identify the Euro Category and the corresponding pollution class. After having recognised the pollution class of the vehicle, the user will pay the charge (from 2€ to 10€ for daily entrance) corresponding to a certain level of PM10 emissions his vehicle is characterised by. Table 2-11 - Correspondence between Euro Category and European Directive

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 112

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Table 2-12 - Correspondence between vehicle Euro Category and pollution class

Types of Ecopass and Ecopass charges DAILY ECOPASS With a daily Ecopass the user can enter the Ecopass Area all day as many times as he/she pleases. The charge can be paid on the first day of entry or until midnight on the following day.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 113

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Table 2-13 - Daily Ecopass charges for different pollution classes

MULTIPLE ECOPASS There is also a multiple Ecopass, worth €20, €50 or €100, which entitles the holder to enter on different days, without having to pay a daily Ecopass charge. The multiple entry Ecopass allows the holder to enter the Ecopass area on 50 – not necessarily consecutive – days, with a 50% reduction on the daily Ecopass charge and for a further 50 days with a 40% reduction. There are no multiple entry reductions from the 101st day onwards. Moreover reductions only apply to passenger vehicles, while buses, multi-purpose vehicles and goods vehicles are excluded.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 114

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Table 2-14 - Multiple Daily Reduction Tariffs

OPTIONAL YEARLY ECOPASS FOR “CERCHIA DEI BASTIONI” LTZ RESIDENTS Residents of the Cerchia dei Bastioni LTZ – Ecopass Area can apply for a yearly Ecopass at reduced rates for their own vehicles. The charge can be paid at any time until midnight on the day after the first entry. The yearly Ecopass is valid for the whole of 2008 and gives residents access to the Ecopass Area. Application and payment are subject to a check on vehicle ownership and residence via the applicant’s Tax Code. Residents of the Cerchia dei Bastioni LTZ - Ecopass Area include: •

•

the inhabitants of properties situated within the Ecopass Area who are either owners of such properties or tenants with duly registered rental contracts and with domestic utility contracts in their name; the inhabitants of properties situated outside the Ecopass Area who have garages or parking spaces within the Ecopass Area.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 115

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Table 2-15 - Optional Yearly Ecopass for LTZ Residents

The Ecopass can be obtained at authorised ATM (Azienda Trasporti Milanesi) shops, tobacconists, newsagents. To pay the Ecopass charge it is enough to follow the instructions on the back of the card, or call a free phone number (from 7am to 8pm, Monday to Saturday), or use Mastercard, Moneta and VISA credit cards by going on the Ecopass website (www.comune.milano.it/Ecopass), or utilize an automatic cash dispenser of the Intesa-SanPaolo circuit, or, finally, opt for a current account payment. Penalties If someone drives in the Cerchia dei Bastioni Limited Traffic Zone - Ecopass Area without having paid the corresponding Ecopass charge by midnight on the day following entry, or if the user pays a lower pollution class than the one corresponding to the vehicle, or if he/she is not authorized to circulate, the penalty charge will range from 70 euros to 275 euros. The same penalty charge is applied to any vehicle over 7 metres long entering the Ecopass area. There is no Ecopass charge for: ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 116

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

• •

mopeds, scooters and motorbikes vehicles carrying disabled passengers and/or bearing a disabled passenger badge.

In the first week of the Ecopass drivers had difficulty finding and/or paying for the necessary ticket, which can be purchased in various denominations at dispensers throughout the city, at some banks and over the internet. However in the second week, when business returned to normal in the city after the Christmas festivities, the major problems seemed to have been overcome. After almost a year it seems that citizens have got acquainted with Ecopass. IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS No information available. SCHEME RESULTS NETWORK During the period between January and December 2008 the number of vehicles entering the zone have been 1,382,946, of which 12% were commercial vehicles, 78.7% were occasional users (less than 10 accessing days out of 233 days) and 2.1% were systematic users (more than 50% of the 233 days).

Figure 2-49 – Distribution of frequency classes about number of accesses within Ecopass Area during the first twelve months

The decrease in vehicles accessing the Ecopass Area was - 56.7% of Euro 0, Euro 1 and Euro 2 vehicles, while the number of Euro 3, Euro 4 and electric/hybrid vehicles increased by 5.5% ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 117

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

on average. The traffic reduction, both private and commercial, within Ecopass area during the enforcement was 14.4% and 3.4% outside the zone. By evaluating the available data and the results from modelling the vehicles reduction can be imputed to: • • •

A 35% of change in route by charged vehicles for circulating without entering the Ecopass area; A 17% of car fleet renewal with less polluting vehicles; A 48% of modal shift with an increase of 5.7% of public transport patronage.

Figure 2-50 – Vehicle fleet composition

Effects on commercial speed of Public Transport Another important result deals with the effects on the commercial speed of public transport. In fact the analysis on all the lines passing through the Ecopass Area between 7.30 a.m. and 7.30 p.m. of working days has shown that, in respect to a mean reference value metered before Ecopass implementation, the speed of public transport has increased by 6.7%.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 118

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Table 2-16 – Variation of commercial speed of public transport Reference metered speed value January – December 2008 mean value Variation %

8.67 km/h 9.25 km/h + 6.7%

Effects on modal shift A first estimation of modal shift towards the metro lines has been carried out by ATM (Azienda Trasporti Milanesi) and shows that the number of outbound passengers at metro stations located inside the Ecopass Area has increased by 5.7%. Figure 2-51 – PT patronage trends between years 2000-2008

The Table 2-17 shows the increase of passengers using the metro for travelling towards and within Ecopass area. Table 2-17 – Increase in passengers using the metro for travelling towards and within Ecopass area Reference daily value January - November 2008 mean value Variation %

259,645 pass/day 275,820 pass/day + 6.2%

ENVIRONMENT After one year since the Ecopass scheme has become effective the evaluation of traffic emissions before and after the implementation reveals that within Ecopass area there has been a reduction of total PM10 emissions from road traffic equal to 14%, 11% of NOx, 9% of CO2 and 37% of NH3 (ammonia). ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 119

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-52 – Total PM10 emissions reduction from road traffic within Ecopass area (January – December 2008)

Figure 2-53 - Total NOx emissions reduction from road traffic within Ecopass area (January – December 2008)

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 120

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-54 - Total CO2 emissions reduction from road traffic within Ecopass area (January – December 2008)

Figure 2-55 - Total NH3 emissions reduction from road traffic within Ecopass area (January – December 2008)

ECONOMY During the period between January and November 2008 the revenues from Ecopass tickets have been as shown in the following table:

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 121

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Table 2-18 – Ecopass revenues (1st January – 31st December 2008) Type of Selling Channel Papery Tickets Web Tickets Automatic cash dispenser Tickets Current Account Payment Total

Revenues [€] 8,473,144 2,084,443 24,878 1,479,339 12,061,804

As shown in the table above the 71% of revenues comes from the paper tickets sold by authorised shops. That’s because of the high percentage of occasionally users with a consequent relevant percentage of daily tickets sold (93% of the total). Also the tickets bought on the internet are quite significant (17% of total tickets sold), while just 12% of users employs the current account payment system. The operating costs of system during 2008 have been equal to 6.5 M€ and the whole net revenues will be invested in PT improvements. Figure 2-56 – Average distribution of Ecopass tickets sold by type of initiation fees

ACCEPTABILITY After almost a year of Ecopass implementation, people now begin asking to the Municipality whether or not making definitive the measure. Some associations like Legambiente, Genitori Antismog, Ambiente Milano and VAS Lombardia have supported a survey about a possible extension of Ecopass. The first results (the survey is still open) showed that 38% of respondents were in favour of an expansion of LTZ, the 31%, instead, was satisfied with the actual road pricing scheme but they would like to enlarge the charging also to the most polluting motorcycles and mopeds, just 18% would like to charge also Euro3 gasoline and Euro4 Diesel ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 122

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

cars today exempt from Ecopass charge, and finally the 7% would like to increase the tariff in force. The fact that no one was against the Ecopass is because the survey aimed at understanding people’s opinions, but in the meantime all the questions were formulated in a way that when answering the interviewed could only comment upon how realize the most effectives charging modalities to reduce private cars use. There was not a direct question on whether or not continue to charge the city center access. EQUITY No information available. LIVEABILITY After Ecopass implementation the traffic congestion within the charged area during peak hours has decreased. By considering the ratio between flow and capacity of roads46 an average decrease of 4.7% has been calculated during the period between January and December 2008. Moreover it has been noticed a decrease of 25.1% of km of congested roads.

46

The flow/capacity ratio indicates the usage extent of the capacity offered by the road network in respect of the total of vehicles circulating on these roads. It has estimated as the ratio between the sum of km travelled and the sum of roads capacity multiplied by the length of each road. The length of congested network is given by the sum of roads where the traffic volume exceeds the 90% of road capacity. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 123

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-57 – Variation of traffic congestion within Ecopass Area during peak hours

As a consequence the average vehicle speed has increased by 4% during morning peak hours, while the total time saved expressed as hours/day of trips by private vehicle has been equal to 750 hours within Ecopass area and 2,550 hours outside the area. By taking into account an economic value of time saved equal to 8 €/hour for private vehicles and 42 €/hour for commercial vehicles, the economic value of time saved is of 9.2 M€/year. Road Safety From data analysis of the first year of Ecopass it has been noticed a decrease in accidents within Ecopass area with a total accidents decrease of 14.4% (- 4.6% outside the areas) and of 14.2% (- 6.7% outside area) of accidents with injured people both in respect of year 2007.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 124

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-58 – Accidents trends within Ecopass area during charging hours (January to December 2008)

REVENUE USE By local law, all net revenues have to be invested in providing urban sustainable mobility and public transport. IMPACT PREDICTABILITY No information available. CONCLUSIONS The Ecopass initiative will be accompanied by other important interventions like: • • • • •

increase of bus lanes growth of regulated parking zones creation of new bicycle paths increase of green zones implementation of initiatives on energy efficiency (e.g. heating systems control, solar panels and district heating)

Some of these are already being implemented as demonstrated by the strengthening of public transport service which connects 32 municipalities of the urban area to the city centre with an increase of bus-ride frequency of 13% up to 20% depending on the line, and an increase of metropolitan lines equal to 27% during peak hours and 51% during off-peak hours. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 125

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.3.3

Bologna

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION Bologna, the capital town of the Emilia Romagna region, is a very important traffic hub. The city may be classified as medium sized – as there are about 380.000 residents - however, considering the surrounding small municipalities, it is more appropriate to see Bologna as a metropolitan area with about 650.000 (inhabitants + users). The following table gives some data about the city of Bologna:

Table 2-19 - Statistics of the city of Bologna Numbers Global demographic size Daily movements Internal Daily movements

650’000 2 millions

PT Car (passenger + driver) Modal Split (of internal components)

Percentage

Motorbikes Bikes

950’000

45%

242’000

26%

336’000

36%

100’000

11%

65’000

7%

201’000

20%

Pedestrians

The modal split in the city of Bologna is characterised by a slightly equal percentage of PT and cars (26% and 35% respectively) while motorised two-wheelers share is 11%. As shown in the following figures, the car ownership (54 cars/100 inhabitants, one of the lowest of Italian cities) is decreasing, while two-wheelers (13 motorbikes/100 inhabitants) is raising rapidly; finally, also PT usage is increasing.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 126

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-59 – Modal split in the city of Bologna

Figure 2-60 – Cars ownership trends

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 127

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-61 – Motorbikes ownership trends

Figure 2-62 - Public transport usage trend

LTZ (Limited Traffic Zone) To keep integral and to protect the attractiveness of the historical city centre, and also to improve urban air quality, in 1989 the municipality introduced a Limited Traffic Zone, which covers an area of 3.2 km2 and basically matches the historical centre. The aim of the progressive introduction of traffic restrictions is to reconcile mobility demand with the low capacity of the mediaeval city centre (for traffic circulation and parking) which, in the ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 128

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

past, has often led to such heavy congestion that it distorts both architectural and environmental values and thus produces a very negative impact on the quality of life of the whole historic centre. The LTZ access is based on authorising system and since 2005 the Municipality has activated an IT-based pricing system called “SIRIO”. So 10 cameras were installed at the main LTZ access points. Between 7.00 a.m. and 8 p.m. every day except Saturday, the system automatically issues fines to car drivers not authorised to enter the LTZ. In parallel another IT system called “RITA” (14 cameras) has been put into action for controlling bus lanes 24 hours a day to avoid unauthorised cars driving in PT dedicated lanes and within the historic centre when forbidden. All the streets which give access to the city centre and the bus lanes are currently equipped with cameras in order to check if the vehicles accessing in the city centre are authorised. The cameras are able to read all car plates, check them with those contained in the database of authorised vehicles and, in case of violation, send the transgressor’s data to the Municipal Police Dept which will issue a fine. Inside the LTZ there is another area called “T” (see the yellow line in Figure 2-65), very important for public transport; in this area the restriction are higher than in LTZ and also here the access is controlled by IT system. People not allowed to access the LTZ can buy a daily ticket for 5€ or a 4-days for 12€ (in this second case the days of use should be consecutive). In addition to access restriction for non authorized vehicles, the deployment of these IT systems has the following 2 key goals:

• •

the improvement of Urban Public transport (UPT); the introduction of pricing policies to reduce existing access permissions as foreseen by the new Freight City delivery Plan.

PRICING OBJECTIVES Due to the small size of the LTZ and its narrow streets that are unable to support a strong mobility demand, the access control scheme in Bologna is mainly based on an authorisation process (for PT, residents, freight operators, etc.) and not on a general road pricing model. However, in order to give some flexibility to the road users, the road pricing scheme was inserted in the context of the City Freight delivery Plan (approved on the 6th March 2006) that has been the key instrument through which the City of Bologna has rationalised the freight delivery in the city area. It is strictly connected with the existing and future IT systems. The overall goal is to decrease the number of vehicle km while providing the same level of service and to deploy less polluting “clean” vehicles. Thus, beyond the deployment of “clean” vehicles, the rationalisation of the freight deliveries will allow to maximise the load of each lorry or truck directed to the city centre. Through such rationalisation, a higher number of goods will be delivered with the same pollution impact as before, or a lower pollution will be generated to satisfy the current freight demand. The Freight Delivery Plan has 4 main objectives: 1. Rationalisation in the management of city access permission and new rules for those operators that normally access the city centre for their business; 2. Conversion and/or introduction of new “low emission” vehicles to reduce the environmental impact; 3. Decrease of accessing vehicles through a rationalisation of truck loads and freight delivery paths; ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 129

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

4. Rationalisation of road occupation and deployment of load/unload specific areas. SCHEME DESCRIPTION The scheme actions have been foreseen for both freight operators by implementing access rules depending on pollution categories and pricing policies for permanent permits, and all citizens with a pay to access ticketing system. The Freight Delivery Plan promotes a step-by-step approach. The first step concluded with the introduction of faster procedures in the release of access permissions, new pricing policies and the enforcement of new policies related to city centre access (i.e. during late 2008 and first months of 2009, specific time slots will be identified to access both the T and LTZ area) in order to increase efficiency in freight transport and decrease the unauthorised use of permits granted for freight transport. The new tariffs plan for annual delivery permits, according to pollution level norms, as follows: a) “single car plate” permits (only 1 vehicle associated to the permit) • • • •

“pre-euro norm” vehicles: 100 €/year “euro norm” vehicles: 80 €/year methane / LPG: 25 €/year operators located in LTZ: 25 €/year

b) “multi car plates” permits (2 or 3 vehicles associated to the permit) • •

if “eco” vehicles: 120 €/year if “non eco” vehicles: 150 €/year

c) “no car plate” permits (more than 3 vehicles associated to the permit), vehicles are considered by default “non eco” and the permits costs 300 €/year. Only 1 vehicle at a time can access the LTZ and the enforcement is performed by the IT camera system. The second step was the launch of the “pay-to-access” LTZ area service. Tickets were introduced to allow people not permanently entitled to enter the LTZ area to access it occasionally. In this sense, they represent a flexible way to grant everybody (even if with several restrictions) to access the city centre. To avoid an increase in overall accesses to the LTZ area, such tickets are sold in small numbers. There are two types of tickets: • •

daily (5 euro) 4-days ticket. It is valid for 4 consecutive days (12 euro)

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 130

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Each month, only 3 daily tickets (or just one 4-days ticket) can be validated for the same vehicle. These tickets can be bought by operators and citizens. For validation of the ticket the holder sends a secret code and car plate number via sms, web or call centre: if the process is valid, the vehicle is authorised to cross the IT camera control. Figure 2-63 – Daily “Pay-To-Access” Ticket

“PAY-TO-ACCESS” TICKET 1 - VALIDATION OF THE TICKET 2 - SENDING SECRET CODE AND CAR PLATE NUMBER, VIA: SMS WEB CALL CENTER 3 - IF OK, AUTHORISATION RELEASED

The third step (in progress) will be centred on the set up of a “Technological transit point” (i.e. lorry sharing) which will be initially tested in a specific area of the LTZ zone. Besides the physical transit point, a new IT platform will be developed and deployed to analyse freight transport flows and rationalise routes, loading procedures of the involved vehicles and management (i.e. booking) of specific parking slots for loading and unloading. IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS Access enforcement systems All the streets which give access to the city centre and the bus lanes are currently equipped with cameras in order to check if the vehicles accessing in the city centre are authorised. The cameras are able to read all car plates, check them with those contained in the database of authorised vehicles and, in case of violation, send the transgressor’s data to the Municipal Police Dept which will issue a fine. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 131

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

SCHEME RESULTS NETWORK Since the IT system was installed, the number of accesses has reduced by 25% in the L.T.Z., by 3% in the three main streets of the city centre and by roughly 70% for unauthorised use of bus lanes. Moreover, thanks to the introduction of these new pricing initiatives, a reduction of 27% of freight operators permits and 10% of total permits (operators plus citizens) to access in the LTZ has been achieved.

Figure 2-64 - Number of Access Trends during working days in LTZ after electronic enforcement by considering an average day of February

Table 2-20 – Statistics of access reduction in LTZ during the period 2004 - 2006

Working days Saturdays Sundays

From 7.00 to 20.00 - 22.7% - 27.8% - 35.5%

0-24h - 24.0% - 26.2% - 30.9%

Inside the LTZ there is another area called “T” (see in yellow in the Figure 2-65), very important for public transport; in this area the restriction are higher than in LTZ and also here the access is controlled by IT system.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 132

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-65 – The LTZ Area in Bologna

In addition to access restriction for non authorised vehicles, the deployment of these IT systems has the following 2 key goals:

• •

the improvement of Urban Public transport (UPT); the introduction of pricing policies which will reduce existing access permissions as foreseen by the new Freight City delivery Plan. ENVIRONMENT No information available. ECONOMY No information available. ACCEPTABILITY ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 133

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

A good acceptability of the scheme has been expressed by the citizens. EQUITY No information available. LIVEABILITY No information available. Road Safety There is no evidence of road accidents trend except for a short period between March and October 2005 when it was observed – compared to 2002-2004 mean value – a decrease in road accidents of 19.5%, in total number of injured of 16.7% and in pedestrians run over of 16.4%. REVENUE USE The revenues will be use to finance the building of news roads, for maintenance of the existing ones, and for improving public transport network. During the year 2007 108,000 € were earned from “pay–to–access” permits sold. IMPACTS PREDICTABILITY No information available. CONCLUSIONS Due to the success of Urban Traffic the city of Bologna is now going to extend the LTZ for 14 hectares more (+4.4%) and install new “SIRIO” and “RITA” cameras.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 134

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.4

Norwegian Case Studies

Norway has a long tradition of financing public road infrastructure through tolls, dating back to 1929. Today, three of the four largest cities in Norway, as well as several smaller cities, have toll cordons. More than one third of the investment in public roads is currently financed by tolls. Most of this comes from the urban toll cordons. Traditionally, tolls were related to isolated projects, such as bridges and tunnels. This followed from the Road Act of 1963 (§27) and subsequent regulations. This law was changed with the introduction of the first European toll cordon around a city centre, in Bergen in 1986. This change allowed tolls also on roads with no alternative route making the toll rings viable. Bekken and Osland (2004) have named this the first generation toll package. The second generation of toll packages came in the early 1990s and introduced the possibility to impose differentiated fares at different times, but on condition that the differentiation would not negatively influence revenue. At the same time, the possibility to use some road investment funds alternatively for public transport purposes was introduced. This significantly increased the flexibility of the packages. This generation saw the introduction of toll rings in both Oslo (Oslo package 1) and Trondheim. The third generation of the toll packages are characterised by a significant use of revenue for public transport (PT) infrastructure. This includes railroad, tram and metro investments as well as stations. Oslo package 2, the Nord-Jæren package and the Bergen programme are good examples. All of these have heavy public transport infrastructure investments. In 2001, a new major legislative change came, when road pricing was accepted in the Road Transport Act. This has made it possible, in principle, to introduce road pricing, and a more flexible use of revenue. The initiative however must be local. As of today, local authorities seem reluctant to introduce road pricing. As a response to the lack of interest in road pricing and the need for increased funds for PT operation, the Ministry of Transportation and Communication (MoT) proposed changes in the Road Act concerning the legislation for toll roads, allowing toll revenue to be used for PT operation as well. The proposal was presented late 2007 and passed Parliament and was amended to the Road Act as from April 4. 2008. The new law was a prerequisite for Oslo package 3. The Norwegian law on road pricing states that road pricing is different from toll roads in the sense that the purpose of tolls is solely to finance investment, whereas road pricing is intended to internalise externalities (primarily congestion). Furthermore, the law also states that road pricing revenue must be split between local authorities and the State, whereas revenue from tolls is intended for the local project/package only. The laws also state that road tolls and road pricing cannot exist in the same area at the same time, and indirectly defines these as distinct tools. The usual definition of road pricing is that it is a generic term for charging for the use of roads. In that sense, congestion charging is a better word for the Norwegian law of road pricing.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 135

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.4.1

Oslo

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION The Oslo metropolitan region is the smallest of the Scandinavian metropolitan regions. Just over 1 million people currently live in the two counties of Oslo and Akershus, which cover a total of 5,400 square kilometers. The region is the national centre of administration and distribution, and the hub of Eastern Norway. Eastern Norway has two million inhabitants, almost half of Norway's total population, and geographically makes up one quarter of the country. Population densities vary within the region, the highest densities found along the four railway lines out of Oslo. Both Oslo and Akershus experienced strong population growth during the 1990s. Efficient, safe and environmentally friendly transport is considered to be essential to growth and development in the Oslo-region. From 1970 and towards the end of the 80’s the number of cars increased significantly in Oslo. The investments in new road capacity did not reflect the increase in traffic and the results were deteriorating conditions on the roads and for the environment. The general lack of public funds for road investment in Oslo forced the politicians to consider other options. A new initiative was required to raise money for investments, the Oslo toll ring (Oslo package 1). The Oslo toll ring (Oslo package 1) started in 1990. It was initially planned as an ordinary toll road to finance tunnels under the city centre. However, before it was established, the municipality of Oslo joined forces with the neighboring county, Akershus, and opted for a package to finance several other projects as well. Later in the process, it was also decided to earmark 20 per cent of the revenue for public transport infrastructure investments. A few years after the toll ring introduced, and following extensive road investments in the region, there was a growing concern about car traffic increasing more rapidly than expected, as well as a lack of infrastructure investments in the public transport infrastructure system. In 1996, the Norwegian parliament invited the local authorities in the Oslo region to develop an enforced public transport plan based on national and local co-financing, to meet this challenge. This plan (Oslo package 2) was launched in 1998 and approved by Parliament and the local authorities in 2001. Oslo package 2 is a supplement to the existing Oslo package 1 and consists of an increase in the toll of approximately €0.25 per trip making the single fare NOK 15 (approx €1.9). The increase is earmarked for public transport infrastructure investments. In addition, the package includes an increase in the public transport fare of approximately €0.10 per trip, earmarked for rolling- stock investments. The planning of Oslo package 2 involved two counties and several different authorities and organizations. Investment in public transport was expected to double as a result. The main elements in the first four-year period (2002-2005) were railway investments (60% per cent of expenditures), a new metro ring (20% per cent), terminals/stations (11% per cent), and priority measures (9% per cent). The co-financing plan for Oslo package 2 also involved extraordinary national funding and public-private partnership funds from the redevelopment of the old Oslo airport. In Table 2-21, the status quo (ordinary funds) is compared with the extraordinary funds raised by Oslo package 2.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 136

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Table 2-21 - Financing plan for Oslo package 2, 2002-2011 Billion Euro Ordinary Ordinary public funding (national and local) 0.95 Toll ring revenue Increased public transport revenue Public-Private-Partnership-funding (privateentrepreneurs) Extra national funding Additional financing requirement Total 0.95

Extraordinary 0.19 0.20 0.02

Total 0.95 0.19 0.20 0.02

0.41 0.12 0.95

0.41 0.12 1.90

Source: Bekken and Norheim (2007) The Oslo toll ring was due to end in 2007. As the end of the toll ring came closer, two alternatives were examined. Either the toll ring could be removed, as happened in Trondheim at the end of 2005, or a new toll scheme, “Oslo package 3” could be introduced. The politicians opted for the latter. Because the planning started late, it was decided to continue the original toll ring (“Oslo package 1”) until a new scheme was in place. The plans for Oslo package 3 were presented by a working group in May 2006. Most political parties accepted the general concept of the package after long negotiations. The final scheme will be presented to the Parliament in two steps. The first step focused on increased fares, new toll plazas and the possibility to use some of the revenue for public transport operation. The new system for urban road user charging passed Parliament in March 2008 and collection started in two steps in July and October the same year. The second part will be presented to the Parliament in march/April 2009 and will focus on the organization of the package and the plans for investment. Oslo package 3 will run until 2027 making 20 more years of urban tolling in Oslo. PRICING OBJECTIVES The objective of Oslo package 1 is to finance investments in infrastructure. This includes both road infrastructure and, to an increasing extent, PT infrastructure investments. Future use as a means for traffic restraint is also an open possibility, but congestion relief was not an objective per se. Oslo package 2 is a plan for new and upgraded infrastructure and rolling stock for public transport in Oslo and Akershus. It is financed by an increase in tolls and a fare increase in public transport. Thus, the objectives are still the same – to raise revenue to be used for infrastructure investments. The objective to raise revenue for investments is reflected in several ways. First of all the toll plazas were located with this as a purpose. As a result they are placed on the main roads into Oslo and located so that they form a “water tight” ring, catching most traffic with the least adverse effects and operational costs. With this location, only a few local roads had to be closed with as few toll plazas as possible. Furthermore, the toll is only collected on the inbound traffic. This significantly reduces the operating costs. The pricing objective is also reflected in the fee structure. There is no differentiation between peak and off-peak. Furthermore, the fee is also collected at weekends and nights. To make the ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 137

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

toll ring more acceptable, heavy users may purchase monthly or yearly passes limiting the total fee they must pay. The pricing system is far from what would have been if congestion charging was the objective. SCHEME DESCRIPTION The Oslo toll ring is located 5-8 km from the city centre. It has been in operation since 1990, with only minor changes. There are 19 toll plazas. Some of them are placed on the main roads into Oslo, whereas some smaller plazas are placed on smaller roads to create a water-tight toll ring (Figure 2-66). All car drivers must pass the toll ring when they drive in the direction of the city centre. The toll must be paid 24 hours a day all year round including weekends and holidays. There is no extra peak surcharge.

Figure 2-66 - The toll plazas of the Oslo toll ring (Source: Fjellinjen AS)

In March 2008 a new road user charging system, step 1 of Oslo package 3, passed Parliament. Fares were increased in the existing toll ring, and some new toll plazas were put up west of the existing ring. The new toll plazas started operation in October 2008. Following Oslo package 3, all toll plazas have been made fully automated. The toll ring offers electronic toll collection with the use of on-board units, the Auto-Pass system. Until July 2008 the toll ring offered both manual payment and electronic payment. The share of manual and coin box collection in Oslo decreased from 40 percent in 1991 to approx. 20 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 138

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

percent in 2008. Subscribers with on-board units could either have a seasonal pass (month or year) or a number of prepaid transits (25-350) with discounts depending on the number of tickets bought. About 50 % of seasonal passes are paid by employers. With the introduction of Oslo package 3 in July 2008 all monthly and yearly passes have been removed and the maximum discount has been set to 20% per trip. In addition, the fare has been increased by 25 per cent for passenger cars (now NOK 25/ 2.75€) and by almost 90 per cent for larger vehicles (now NOK 75/ 8.20€). In 2004 electronic toll collection was harmonized throughout Norway. Most toll roads now use the Auto-Pass system. The system will gradually be expanded further to provide for payment on ferries, for parking, etc. The Auto-PASS concept is owned and managed by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA). The concept covers all Auto PASS tags and Auto-PASS equipment at the charging points (Auto-PASS roadside equipment). The concept also covers all the specifications for the tags, roadside equipment, central systems, interfaces between the system elements, AutoPASS logo and trademark, Auto-PASS contractual framework and the Auto-PASS security architecture. The Auto-PASS Service includes both a transport and a payment service (EFC). Examples on transport services include the use of infrastructure like bridges, tunnels, motorways, road networks, road user charging schemes and ferry transport. The payment service consists of a dedicated payment system based on a user holding an Auto-PASS tag, installations at the charging points, e.g. a toll station, and a central account held and managed by the company being responsible for the payment means and contract with the user.

Figure 2-67 - Examples of toll plazas (number 5 and 11)

The public owned company, Fjellinjen AS is responsible for the toll ring. The current fees and the fees in Oslo package 2 are given in the table below. The fee is collected through 19 toll plazas in the toll ring. In addition two plazas have been put up to the west of the toll ring. Fees are only collected for inbound traffic. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 139

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Table 2-22 - Fare levels in the Oslo toll ring Oslo package 2 and Oslo package 3 Light vehicles Heavy vehicles Less than 3 500 kg Oslo package 3 (Automated lanes only) Single trip “old” ring Single trip new plazas

25 (€3.1) 12.5 (€1.6)

Three times the fare for light vehicles

37.50 (€4.7)

Single trip old+new Discount AUTOpass tags

20%

20%

Oslo package 2 20,- (€2.5) Manual operated lanes Discount card 25 trips 340,- (€42.5) 100 trips 1 300,- (€162.5) 175 trips 2 200,- (€275)

Twice the fare for light vehicles

350 trips 4 000,- (€500) Dynamic lanes Monthly pass 400,- (€50) 6-month pass 2 250,- (€281) Yearly pass 4 100,- (€512)

The fee is collected from all vehicles with the following exceptions: • •

buses in regular service emergency vehicles

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 140

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

• • •

motorcycles and mopeds electric vehicles people with a disability parking permit (must apply)

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS The main barrier in the implementation of the Oslo packages is the public attitude. The public attitude towards the toll ring has been negative over the entire period as will be discussed later. Bekken and Osland (2004) investigated the political and administrative processes leading up to the Oslo packages. The study was carried out as part of a research project for the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the EU project REVENUE. The main purpose was to understand how the Oslo packages were made possible and how compromises were fashioned. The study showed that this was accomplished through negotiations between stakeholders. Three important elements in that respect were hypothecation of the revenue for “high-profile” investments, low toll levels with large discounts for heavy users, and no time variation in the tolls. Hypothecation is regarded as a sub-optimal approach from an economic perspective, but it is an integral part of most urban road-pricing schemes. A large degree of hypothecation up front has been important to make the Oslo packages politically viable. In particular, having funds earmarked for public transport and for use within the different regions, seems to be important. The main focus of the implementation process in Oslo has been to find a compromise that is political acceptable to a broad group of political parties, rather than to select policy packages that are economically efficient. The result has been both increased investments in both public transport and road infrastructure. Furthermore, some high-profile investments (such as the metro ring) have been included to sweeten the pill. Yet surveys of the general public indicate that the Oslo packages would be turned down in a referendum. A preference survey of decision makers also supports this view. These findings highlight the challenges of implementing urban road-pricing schemes in democracies. However, the main driver behind the Oslo packages was the lack of public funds to finance infrastructure, both road and public transport. This was facilitated by the long tradition for toll financing in Norway. SCHEME RESULTS The Oslo toll rings have been evaluated by Lian (2004). Most of the findings below are collected from this evaluation. NETWORK Concerning the effects of the Oslo packages on the network, Lian (2004) puts forward the following points; •

A fully connected metro system and road lanes reserved for buses have been important and effective measures for public transport.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 141

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

•

•

•

•

During the period 1990-2002 traffic growth has been slightly lower than the national average, in spite of strong growth in traditional drivers of mobility like population, employment and income. Thus, it is hard to claim that major road investments have induced new traffic in general in the region. There is a slight reduction in travel times during morning rush hours, but no significant change in the afternoon. Increased road capacity has thus counterbalanced the growth in traffic with a small positive margin. Delays vary by corridor, western and southern corridor being the worst. Road sections 1015 km from the city centre have the largest delays. Freighters regard road accessibility to be improved. Oslo Packages 1 and 2 are generally considered to be success stories (see “bullets” above), but many important transport projects will not be financed by 2008. Furthermore dismantling the Oslo Toll Ring is in the short term calculated to increase road traffic by 8-10 %. Expected traffic growth from 2001 to 2025 without the toll ring is around 30 %. Critical parts of the trunk road system (mainly some tunnels) may be overloaded by 2015. The Inner city is already considered to receive traffic flows near its capacity, in terms of road space and environmental conditions. This development may undermine the benefits of Oslo Package 1 and 2 resulting in increased and more unpredictable travel times and more traffic in residential areas and shopping streets.

ENVIRONMENT One of the main reasons for the Oslo package was the local environmental problems caused by traffic and congestion in the late 80’s. On this aspect, Lian (2004) concludes that “Air pollution levels do not seem to be negatively affected by road investments. Noise nuisance is reduced where new roads are built as tunnels. Measures to improve local environment, like traffic management, reinforce environmental effects.” Overall, the effects of the Oslo packages on the local environment have been positive. This is not due to traffic reduction effects from the toll ring, but through the investments in road infrastructure. The investments have made the increase in traffic occur on the main roads rather than local roads. Concerning global emissions, there has been a discussion to what degree improved road infrastructure induces more traffic. This may have adverse effects on the global emissions. Lian (2004) find no strong support for induced traffic from the packages. ECONOMY Since 1990, the Oslo Packages have financed parts of the road and public transport investments in the Oslo region. Oslo Package 2 has been dedicated to investments in public transport. The Government was to finance 45 per cent of the investments in Oslo Package 1. About 40 per cent of the revenue from road user charging should be spent on public transport investments. From 1990-2001 Oslo Package 1 (funding from user charging and the state budget) financed investments for a total of 11 billion NOK (about 1.4 billion Euro). The total operating income of the Oslo toll ring was 1,248 mill NOK (156 M€). The operating cost of the Oslo toll ring was 134 mill NOK (16.8 M€). The operating costs have stayed at 1011% of the operating income for the last 10 years. Having close to 93 million registered trips through the ring in 2006, this makes the operating cost per trip to be 1.4NOK (0.2€). ACCEPTABILITY ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 142

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Attitudinal and preference surveys help to explain some of the characteristics of the Oslo packages. Currently, the toll ring scheme provides a lion’s share of funding, with an increasing share of the funds being earmarked for public transport. This is one step in the right direction from an economic point of view, but it is also rational, based on the attitudes of the politicians and the professionals in the field. There is little support for funding from other local taxation. There has been no referendum for the Oslo packages. Thus, it is important to understand how the politicians and the administrative bodies actually consider and weight the different aspects of the schemes against each other. For this purpose, both interviews (Bekken and Osland 2004) and a Stated Preference (SP) survey (Nossum and Norheim 2004) were conducted. The SP survey was carried out among politicians and transport planners with regard to different transport funding schemes and use of revenue. As discussed below the results show that it has been considered more important to find packages that are acceptable to all parties than to select an optimal package. Yearly attitudinal surveys of the general population were also carried out (Prosam 2004). These surveys provide useful insights into aspects of general acceptability of the packages and how attitudes have evolved over time. General attitudinal surveys of citizens The toll ring in Oslo commenced operation in February 1990. Each year since 1989 a survey of attitudes towards the toll ring has been carried out among the citizens in Oslo and Akershus. The sample is randomly selected among the population, with roughly 1000 interviews carried out each time by telephone. The aim has been to track changes in attitudes over time. The result is a time series of attitudes covering a period of 18 years. Figure 2-68 summarizes the general results from the survey both for the entire sample and for the part of the sample passing through the toll ring on the way to work. Respondents were asked whether they were positive, indifferent or negative to this way of collecting revenue.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 143

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-68 - Positive attitudes towards the Oslo toll ring (percentage of sample) Source: Prosam (2006)

Before the toll ring started

Oslo Package 2 48

30

34 36 33

38

41 35

41 36

43

42 42

39

46

45 45 39

41

44

49

46

45

44

41

34

60

32

36 34

40 38

38

43 40 35

50 40 30

24

20 10

Positive towards the toll ring

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

0

Passing the ring to work and positive towards it

Figure 2-68 shows that there is no overwhelming public support for the packages. Even though this survey cannot be compared with the result from a potential referendum, it is fair to say that the schemes would have a hard time being accepted in a general referendum. Acceptance has, however, increased over time since each scheme was introduced. This was also apparent in the Stockholm congestion charging trial scheme, where the public turned more positive after it was introduced (Gustavsson 2006). The introduction of Oslo package 2 in 2001, and the corresponding fee increase, reduced acceptability. However, after a few years acceptability was back to the pre-Oslo package 2 levels. In 1989, more than 60% of the people in favour of the toll ring explained their reason as reduced car traffic, and 25% explained it as providing increased funds for road investments. In 2006 this had reversed, with more than 50% being in favour due to more funds for road investments and 25% due to reduced car traffic, this situation had been quite stable since 1994, indicating that the change occurred from 1989 to 1994.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 144

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-69 - Attitudes towards the Oslo toll ring. (Source: Prosam 2006)

Reason for positive attitude towards the toll ring 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

Reduce traffic

Environmental reasons

Raise revenue for investments

Road users must pay for the use

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

0

The reasons why people are negative to the toll ring has much to do with the overall tax level of car usage. Most people explain their negative attitude towards the toll ring by this being unfair as they pay enough in taxes already.

Figure 2-70 - Attitudes towards the Oslo toll ring. (Source: Prosam 2006)

Reason for negative attitude towards the toll ring 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

Unfair, punishes car drivers The revenue also used for other purposes than roads Pay enough taxes

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

0

Expensive w ay to raise revenue Toll plazas create congestion

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 145

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Since 2001, the survey has included a question on attitudes towards Oslo package 2. About two thirds express a positive attitude towards Oslo package 2 after being informed about the contents of the package. There are no significant geographical differences. The youngest are more positive, whereas the ones with more cars per household are more negative. Close to one third agree on a question that half the revenue should be used for public transport investments (the PT share of Oslo package 1 is 20 per cent). Respondents are split equally on whether tolling should be continued regardless of how the funds are spent. However, the increased use of revenues for public transport and road investments is the main reason why the public accepts a prolongation of the toll ring (Prosam 2004). Survey of preferences among decision makers A preference survey of local decision makers in Oslo and some other large urban areas in Norway also with toll rings in operation (Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger and Kristiansand) was carried out in the autumn of 2004 (Nossum and Norheim 2004). In this study, decision makers were defined as those who take part in the decision making process in a wider context, i.e. county and municipal politicians, administrative staff in counties and municipalities and road authorities. The stated preference method was used to assess the decision makers’ preferences for alternative packages of restrictive measures, pricing policy and revenue-use options. The survey revealed strong support for a combined funding approach with contributions from toll revenues, transit fare revenues and local and national authorities. Close to 80 per cent of decision makers favoured the idea of a joint contribution between authorities and passengers to finance better public transport service. Toll ring revenue and congestion charging are both preferred to local taxes as funding sources. One goal of the survey was to reveal the different stakeholders’ inclination to recommend positive measures (increased PT frequency, reduced PT fares and car-free city centres), restrictive measures (increased road tolls, congestion charging, reduced number of parking spaces and increased parking fees) and combinations of these measures. There was also interest in determining the stakeholders’ assessment of the effects of the measures. The surveys identified a strong positive correlation between the expected efficiency of the measures and acceptability, except for car-free cities. The politicians consider car-free city centres as a very efficient measure for reducing car traffic, but they do not recommend it. All respondents expect the levels of restrictive measures to influence positively the impact of the measures, but the probability that the respondents would recommend different measures was independent of this level. This may explain why efficient measures have increasingly been implemented in the Oslo packages, but less intensively than would be optimal.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 146

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-71 - The probability for politicians and public administration employees to recommend different measures, N=304. (Source: Nossum and Norheim (2004). The question asked were; “How probable is it that you would recommend such a measure.”) Average score 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

3.9

Increased road talls

3.4

Car free centre

Politicians Administration

5.40

3.3

Increased parking fees in centre

9

5.80

3.4

Reduced parkerin in centre

8

5.80

3.8

Increased tolls in rush hour

7

5.20 4.10 6.6 6.80

Økt frekvens

6.1 6.10

Redused fare

There is no time differentiation in the Oslo toll ring. Furthermore, the toll is collected 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Thus, the fee is the same whether driving to work or for leisure. Figure 2-72 might give an insight to equity considerations.

Figure 2-72 – Trip distribution during workdays Oslo. (Source: TØI report 677/2003)

300000

Leisure travel Percentage 100 Accompanying trips Shopping trips 90 26 To/from day-care centre etc. en route 80 To/from work – shopping en route 7 70 To/from work (without stop)

Number of trips

250000

200000

60 150000

50 40

100000

20 5 10

30 20

50000

33

10 0

0 0-5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14 15 Time

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 147

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Full day

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

EQUITY Equity discussions for the Oslo toll ring are primarily related to the high number of road users which no not pay. All trips within the toll ring and outside the toll ring avoid the fee. Less than 30% of the trips in the area pay toll. The rest benefit without contributing. LIVEABILITY Traffic accident risks are reduced in the period of the toll ring, but to a smaller extent than on national level. However, the county of Oslo has experienced a larger reduction in deaths and severe injuries due to traffic accidents than the national average. Traffic growth has occurred on major roads, while local roads have experienced unchanged traffic volumes. This is in line with the aims of the investment package. The toll ring itself led only to a small reduction in car travel crossing the toll cordon (3-5 %). The liveability in urban areas has benefited from having the increase in traffic on the main roads rather than on local roads. This was also one of the aims of the investment package. REVENUE USE Toll revenue can only be used for infrastructure investments. The revenue can be used for public transport infrastructure investments if this alternative use, from an economic point of view, is better than direct road infrastructure investments. By the end of 2007, the toll ring of Oslo package 1 has contributed 13,235.4 mill NOK (2007 value) (1,654 M€) to infrastructure investments in the Oslo region. In addition the toll ring has covered all operational costs and interest. At the same time, the State has provided 7,248.5 mill NOK (2007 value) (€906 mill) in state funds to investments within in Oslo package 1. This makes the entire Oslo package 1 an investment package of 22,232 mill NOK (2,779 M€). In addition investments in the tolling system amounts to 286 mill NOK (35.8 M€). The fare hike in the toll ring from Oslo package 2 will provide another 1,169 mill NOK (2007) in infrastructure investments by the end of 2007. In Oslo package 1, 20% of the investments were allocated to public transport infrastructure. All the extra revenue raised by Oslo package 2 has been earmarked for public transport infrastructure. IMPACTS PREDICTABILITY No information available. CONCLUSIONS The Oslo toll ring has succeeded in speeding up the infrastructure investments in the Oslo region. In this way, investments in increased road infrastructure have counterbalanced the growth in traffic by a small positive margin (Lian 2004). ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 148

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The environmental effects are positive. Air pollution levels do not seem to be negatively affected by the road investments. Local noise problems are reduced by the roads in tunnel and the fact that the traffic increase has occurred on main roads, supported by traffic management. The general public view of the Oslo toll ring has been negative over the entire period. However, the attitude has changed over time. More people were negative before the toll ring was introduced compared to after. Also the price increase to finance Oslo package 3 reduced acceptability temporarily. When people are informed of the use of revenue, they turn more positive. In light of the failure to implement true congestion charging schemes in urban areas (such as Edinburgh), it is clear that pure economic arguments are not enough. We live in a democracy, where economists and car drivers have the same right to be heard in general elections. The Norwegian urban toll schemes have developed with this as a clear prerequisite. This makes it necessary, also to consider the Oslo toll schemes in a political and organisational context, and consider the acceptability of the schemes discussed. Both the charging scheme and the revenue use are far from optimal from an economic point of view. Nevertheless, the Oslo packages have contributed to a more efficient transportation system both for roads and for PT. Also the packages have created a dynamic, where both the revenue use and the charging scheme have changed in the direction of a more economic efficient system. The proposed Oslo package 3 is another step in that direction.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 149

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.4.2

Trondheim

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION During the 70's and early 80's, Trondheim experienced significant increases in traffic, accompanied by congestion and environmental problems. In particular, adverse effects resulting from through traffic in the city centre attracted much attention. The proper solution was envisaged to be a network of main roads that would move traffic away from the city centre and dwelling areas. The policy initiative concerning the toll ring originated in 1985, during the last stage of preparing a new transportation plan for Trondheim. The first milestone was a unanimous declaration in the City Council, asking for a feasibility study of a local financial contribution to road construction, provided the State would allocate additional funds. The initiation phase was inspired by a recent agreement between the central authorities and the city of Bergen on a toll ring that released such an additional financial grant. Thus, the main actors in Trondheim assumed that user fees would give an impetus to road construction that could avert congestion and environmental problems. With ordinary State funds only, completion of the new road network would probably take 35-50 years. With the extraordinary financing plan, construction could be accomplished in 10-15 years. The road investment plans were clearly linked to other policy goals: By-pass roads alleviating the environmental degradation of the city centre were considered a prerequisite for urban renewal. Increased mobility was regarded as an asset that could help attract the flourishing oil industry to the region. PRICING OBJECTIVES The objective of pricing was to raise private sector revenue to feed an urban transport investment package, initially intended to be financed 60 % by user fees and 40 % by government funds. However, the differentiated charges and the absence of seasonal passes had a secondary demand management objective. Motorists had to pay per trip (with limits) and they paid more during peak periods. Still, the pricing system was not intended to manage congestion, since the peak toll was set low, and the peak/off-peak differential was small (see Table 2-23). SCHEME DESCRIPTION The original Trondheim toll ring system, implemented in 1991, went through two major revisions. Firstly, in 1998 some charging points were relocated and 6 more were added, making it into a multi zone system comprising 18 stations. A second revision of the scheme layout was made in November 2003 by adding an inner CBD (city centre) ring. This increased the number of stations to 24. On 30 December 2005 the urban tolling system in Trondheim was turned off, nine months before the legal concession period of 15 years had elapsed. The local decision makers chose to stick to this date, even if implementation was delayed from January to October 1991. Trondheim was the third city in Norway to introduce a toll ring, following the examples of Bergen from 1986 and Oslo from 1990. So, while Bergen and Oslo have decided to continue their charging systems to finance new transport projects, Trondheim became the first Norwegian city to discontinue charging and dismantle their charging equipment. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 150

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The 1991 Toll Ring The Trondheim scheme was unique in three aspects when it was introduced in 1991, (i) it was fully electronic with non-stop toll lanes from the start, (ii) it had time-differentiated charges, and (iii) only a payment per each trip option was available. Figure 2-73 shows key aspects of the toll ring. 11 new automatic toll stations were built, of which only one had additional manned operation. In addition, one existing manned motorway toll station to the east at Ranheim completed the ring. 21 of the 35 lanes leading in to the toll stations were non-stop lanes for tag holders.

Figure 2-73 - The 1991 Trondheim Toll Ring

• • • City Centre

• • • ) !

• Unattended toll gate Attended toll gate

---- Cordon

•

Fully electronic from the start All stations had non-stop lanes 80% of transactions in morning peak by electronic tags at opening in October 1991 Only inbound crossings were charged Monday-Friday, 6am – 10am: ¾ Full charges Monday-Friday, 10am – 5pm: ¾ Reduced charges Evenings, Weekends: ¾ No charges For subscribers, a maximum of one crossing per hour and 75 crossings per month were charged for

The 1998 Zone Based Tolling Scheme In June 1996, the City Council in Trondheim decided on a revised toll charging scheme. This zone-like system was fully implemented during the first months of 1998 (Figure 2-74). Two main objectives motivated the revision of the single cordon scheme: Firstly, more revenue was needed to fulfil the transport investment plans. Secondly, a more “equitable” scheme was called for (interpreted as a system charging a higher portion of the motorists). To some extent, the revised system was designed to provide daily service facilities inside each zone. The revised fee structure included a raise in the basic charge from 10 to 12 NOK47 (1.25€ to 1.5€), extended opening hours from 5 to 6 pm, and a lowering of the maximum number of charged crossings per month from 75 to 60.

47

1 EUR = approx. 8 NOK. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 151

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-74 - The 1998 Trondheim Zone Based Tolling System

The 2004 Extended Zone Based Tolling Scheme A second and final extension involving six additional stations closer to the city centre came into operation 1 November 2003. The basic charge level had already been raised from NOK 12 (1.5€) to NOK 15 (1.9€) on 26 February 2001. With a typical discount of 30-40 % for tag holders, this implied a price per passage of around 1.2€. The layout of the scheme which now consisted of 24 stations (or strictly speaking 26 if stations located very close together to the south are counted separately) and 59 payment lanes is shown in Figure 2-75.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 152

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-75 - The 2004 Trondheim Extended Tolling System

The toll ring offered electronic toll collection with the use of on-board units and DSRC technology. Passive tags are activated by a roadside transmitter, which sends a signal to the tag that responds with its identity. This response is read by an associated receiver at the roadside, enabling a charge to be added to or deducted from a centrally held credit or debit account. Since 2004 electronic toll collection has been harmonized throughout Norway and is owned and managed by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (the Auto-PASS system). ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 153

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-76 - Operation of DSRC Technology Reader

Secured OBU ID

Central Account

Radio link 5,8 GHz

The motivation for the final revision was to cover cost overruns on a remaining highway construction project, and this solution was preferred by the politicians rather than to run the scheme for the full 15 year period until 1 October 2006, or to extend payment periods to cover evenings and weekends. Prices per passage for light vehicles during the last years of operation are shown in Table 2-23. Heavy vehicles (gross weight more than 3.5 tons) always paid twice the amounts charged for light vehicles. Disabled drivers, electric powered cars and public utility vehicles were exempted. The one hour rule was always in force: No vehicle was charged for more than one crossing within an hour. Also, a maximum limit of 60 chargeable crossings within a month applied.

Table 2-23 - Prices per Passage (2004) for Light Vehicles in the Trondheim Toll Ring System

Manual payment (basic charge) Prepayment of NOK 1000 (125€) Prepayment of NOK 3000 (375€) Prepayment of NOK 6000 (750€)

Monday – Friday 06:00-10:00 10:00-18:00 15.00 (1.9€) 15.00 (1.9€) 12.00 (1.5€) 9.00 (1.1€) 10.50 (1.3€) 7.50 (0.9€) 9.00 (1.1€) 6.00 (0.75€)

Post-payment by bank giro: 5 or less passages/week 10 or less passages/week More than 10 passages/week

15.00 (1.9€) 12.00 (1.5€) 13.50 (1.7€) 10.50 (1.3€) 12.00 (1.5€) 9.00 (1.1€)

Charges (NOK) depending on payment options

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS During the period of preparing the toll ring and the investment package, shifting political preferences influenced the plans. Especially, the environmental upswing in the late 80's/early 90's was reflected in a demand management element in the fee structure, as well as in the ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 154

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

allocation of part of the revenue to public transport, safety and environmental upgrading. Thus, the debate over the Trondheim toll ring has reflected a variety of arguments over the years. The following pro and con arguments were frequently used in the written public debate (newspaper articles and letters from the readers, information material from the public planning authorities, from 1986 - 1995): Frequent pro arguments: • • • •

The ring pays for an improved network of main roads. Funds are built for investment in traffic safety, public transport, and environmental improvement. The toll ring regulates the traffic. The toll ring is a technically advanced and efficient charging measure.

Frequent counter arguments: • • •

•

As a payment device, the ring strikes unjustly and arbitrarily. Motorists pay enough already; public roads are the responsibility of the State. The toll ring is not well designed. Various arguments criticising, e.g., too high, low, or biased regulation effects, and the possibilities for avoiding payment by crossing residential areas. The road projects are not needed; the money should be used for other purposes.

The Political Decision-Making Process The story of Trondheim's toll ring is a story of twisting and turning political preferences and compromises, and corresponding adjustments of the scheme design. Thus, a major planning challenge has been to secure sufficient agreement on the toll ring through more than a decade of numerous minor decisions. All the City Council debates concerning scheme design and adjustments, revenue disposal and road projects, provided opportunities for the opponents to contest the toll ring principle and the Trondheim Package. The planners' abilities to gain continuing support rest on an understanding of the political climate, close co-operation with leading politicians, and responsiveness to public involvement claims. (The planning and decision-making story, starting in 1985, is outlined in T. Langmyhr and T. Sager: Implementing the improbable urban road pricing scheme, Journal of Advanced Transportation 31:139-158.) Three main "areas of preference" can be distilled from the public and political debate in Trondheim. Since 1985, no single "interest coalition" has been in the position to take a City Council majority for granted. Thus, some sort of compromise had to be aimed for in planning and decision-making concerning the toll ring. The preferences concern both the charging scheme design and the revenue disposal. "The mobility interests" prefer to solve mobility problems by expanding road capacity. If road user charges are considered inevitable, the favourite solution is toll roads implying a close link between the charging and the benefit for road users. The demand management effects of charging are largely considered adverse by-products. Revenues should preferably be earmarked for road construction only. In Trondheim the mobility interests included the Conservative Party, the Norwegian Automobile Federation and major commercial actors. It is ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 155

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

easier to gain support from these actors when the arrangement is limited in time, and when the local fund raising generates transfers from the State. "The regulation interests" prefer a transportation system favouring "green" modes. Road building is tolerated as a necessary evil only where substantial environmental and safety improvements to dwelling areas or the city centre are expected. Charges on the use of private cars are considered a feasible means to reduce traffic, and to provide revenue for public transport and environmental improvements. A toll ring is an acceptable pricing system as long as the revenue spending is not too pro-car. In Trondheim, this preference cluster included environmental interest groups and left wing City Council parties. During the environmental turn phase, a major part of the Labour Party sympathised with the regulation interests. "The carrot and stick interests" house preferences revealing a belief in a transportation system which is both efficient and environmentally friendly. Promoting public transport by improving its quality is preferred to severe restrictions on car use. The demand management effects of the toll ring are nevertheless rated as positive. The revenue spending called for is a "balanced" solution, allocating resources to road construction as well as public transport and environmental improvements. In Trondheim, a couple of parties in the political centre, as well as a varying proportion of the Labour Party have revealed "carrot and stick interests". SCHEME RESULTS NETWORK Short Term Effects of the 1991 Scheme The evaluations based on 1990 and 1992 travel survey data and traffic counts, concluded that over the week as a whole, there was a small decrease in total car traffic crossing the toll ring in the inbound direction. However, this decrease was smaller than the general reduction in car traffic in Trondheim during the same period. It should be noted that the early nineties was a recession period in the Norwegian economy. For a number of years there was no increase in car ownership, and in general zero growth in traffic on the roads. Looking at time periods, inbound car traffic through the toll cordon decreased by 10% during both the high and low charged periods, and this decrease was almost offset by an 8-9 % increase in inbound car traffic during uncharged periods at evenings and at weekends. Thus, the toll ring caused a general shift in timing for car trips away from the charged hours, but the percentage reduction was not affected by the differentiation between peak and off-peak charges. Table 2-24 shows that for some trip purposes, adjustments were more substantial. The change in departure time was largest for home-based shopping trips, with a major increase in the number of trips outside the charged periods. Also for trips from work to home, the motorists adjusted their time of travel according to the charging system. The travel surveys show that the number of CBD shopping trips increased in toll-free periods and decreased in tolled periods. No significant changes in destinations for shopping trips were detected. The travel surveys indicate a slight increase in the use of public transport and cycling. However, the toll ring effects are difficult to single out because of parallel improvements in public transport and in the bicycle road network. More car sharing was not detected as a response to the charging. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 156

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Table 2-24 - Time Profile of Inbound Car Driver Trips Through the Toll Ring 1990 and 1992. Weekdays Time Period (Charges)

Home – Work

Work – Home

Home - Shopping

1990

1992

1990

1992

1990

1992

00-06 (No charges)

3%

4%

0%

2%

0%

0%

06-10 (High charges)

80%

76%

2%

1%

19%

15%

10-17 (Low charges)

10%

9%

81%

68%

54%

39%

17-24 (No charges)

7%

10%

17%

30%

27%

46%

Measured Effects after Termination of Charging When charging was discontinued at the end of 2005, the vehicle counting equipment at all stations was maintained in operation for at least three months. Automatic counting was kept running for six months at five stations, and for the whole of 2006 at only one of the closed stations. This enabled traffic changes between 2005, the last year with tolling, and 2006, the first year without tolling, to be studied hour by hour and day by day. A result for typical local traffic is shown in Figure 2-77 for three stations located along the main bypass road. Whilst traffic in the formerly charged periods increased by 11.5 %, traffic for the whole week increased by only 3.8 %, and traffic at working day evenings and at weekends decreased. The total increase for working days constituted 7.5 %. Looking at percentage of traffic within charged hours for working days, this increased to 76.5 % in 2006 from 73.9 % in 2005. This shows that motorists that were priced out during charging periods have returned back to the more preferred periods for making trips.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 157

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-77 - Average Daily Volumes January-June 2005 and 2006 for Moholt, Nardo and Nidarvoll 8000

+ 3,8 % + 11,5 %

2005

2006 6772

- 8,6 %

6000

7032

6192

- 0,2 %

5556

5329 4871 4531 4520

4000

- 3,5 % 2000 1966 1897

0 Mon-Fri 06-18

Mon-Fri outside 06-18

Saturdays

Sundays

Total

Figure 2-78 provides evidence that some drivers in 2005 started early to avoid being charged; traffic in 2006 between 05:00 and 06:00 decreased by 11 % whilst traffic between 06:00 and 07:00 increased by 11 %. In the afternoon, shifts in departure times to avoid being charged are even more evident; the last of the charged hours, between 17:00 and 18:00, has a 20 % increase in 2006, and an 8 % decrease in the following hour.

Figure 2-78 - Average Hourly Volumes for Working Days January-June 2005 and 2006 for Moholt, Nardo and Nidarvoll 2005

2006

800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Finally, Figure 2-79 shows that increases in volumes for working days were largest in the afternoon, smaller during the middle of the day and smallest in the morning. This pattern may at ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 158

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

first glance seem surprising, considering that charges were higher in the morning hours 06-10 than later in the day (see Table 2-22 showing the charge structure in the Trondheim toll ring system).

Figure 2-79 - Average Changes in Volumes Between 2005 and 2006 for Time Intervals During Working Days January-June for Moholt, Nardo and Nidarvoll

20,0 % 15,5 % 15,0 % 11,3 % 10,0 %

7,8 %

5,0 %

0,0 % -5,0 %

-3,5 %

-10,0 % 06-10

10-14

14-18

Outside 06-18

The explanation for this has to a large degree to do with how trip purposes are distributed in time during an average working day. Work, school and business trips are fairly inelastic with respect to departure time compared to other trip purposes. The split between these two groups of purposes are depicted for time intervals in Figure 2-80, for the same origin-destination segment as in Figure 2-79. For the part of the day that was charged during 2005, there is clearly a negative correlation between the shift in volumes in time periods and the share of work, school and business trips in the same time periods. The larger are the share of other trips, the larger are the changes in volumes. This indicates that the progressively larger increases throughout the day can be explained by a corresponding larger share of private trip purposes, having a larger elasticity of demand with respect to the choice of departure time.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 159

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-80 - Trip Purposes by Time Intervals for Car Drivers during Working Days Inbound Across the Bypass Road from the 2001 Travel Survey

100 % 31 % 75 % 83 % 50 %

91 %

92 %

Other Work, School, Business

69 % 25 % 17 % 0% 06-10

10-14

9%

8%

14-18

Outside 06-18

Traffic entering the city from the east is affected by the fact that the Ranheim toll plaza (Figure 2-75) is still in operation. This is a bi-directional charging station in operation 24 hours a day and 7 days a week with the purpose of providing revenues for the E6 East motorway project. When the municipal charging stations were demolished, motorists in 2006 were able to make detours using routes that were now free of charge, to avoid passing through Ranheim. The result was considerable increases between 2005 and 2006 at places like Skovgård (48 % for charged periods and 25 % for average daily traffic) and Tunga (20 % for charged periods and 16 % for average daily traffic), and corresponding decreases at Ranheim (-17 % for charged periods and – 11 % for average daily traffic). Some of the stations that came into operation close to the city centre during the last expansion of the charging system were also affected by route change adjustments. Considerable increases in traffic levels at these stations in 2006 indicate that motorists returned back to preferred routes which they had been priced out from using. On the whole, traffic in the formerly charged periods Monday to Friday 06:00 to 18:00 increased much more than traffic during other periods of the week between 2005 and 2006. For most parts of the municipality, traffic increases for the week as a whole was in line with the general traffic growth in the county. For the southern part of the municipality, it can be argued that the annulment of charging lead to traffic increases that were higher than otherwise expected. ENVIRONMENT There has been no comprehensive study to evaluate the environmental effects of the Trondheim tolling schemes. A measuring station collecting data on PM10 dust particles was in operation in one of the heavily trafficked main approach roads to the city centre since 1993 for the extended winter season (Oct/Nov – May/June). Due to the widespread use of studded tires and the weather conditions in the winter time, this period is the most interesting period to look at for air pollution effects. Dry and cold weather tends to bring the concentrations up to high levels.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 160

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Based on observations of PM10 levels, it is not possible to conclude that the toll ring had an effect on air quality. The variation in concentration is most likely a result of changing weather conditions. ECONOMY Traffic and Income Flows during 1992-2005 The number of vehicles crossing the toll stations increased from close to 21 millions during 1992, the first full year of operation, to more than 50 millions in 2005, the last year of operation (Table 2-25). Table 2-25 - Number of Vehicles Passing the Toll Stations 1992-2005 Annual number of vehicles passing the toll stations

Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Total number 20 965 761 20 792 671 21 099 409 21 434 954 22 162 491 22 952 890 31 853 376 34 884 034 35 655 190 36 235 074 36 708 675 38 836 339 49 623 413 50 177 502

paying vehicles during charging hours 10 194 785 10 347 111 10 561 013 10 709 671 11 195 076 11 768 635 18 007 096 19 751 748 20 155 562 20 419 940 20 476 902 21 774 674 28 341 011 28 638 001

% paying 48,6 % 49,8 % 50,1 % 50,0 % 50,5 % 51,3 % 56,5 % 56,6 % 56,5 % 56,4 % 55,8 % 56,1 % 57,1 % 57,1 %

Average number of paying vehicles per charging day 40 397 40 505 41 743 42 668 44 521 46 802 71 362 77 967 79 666 81 246 80 618 86 066 111 141 113 194

Some interesting findings on longer-term effects appear, when looking at the period 1992-97, during which the payment scheme was unchanged. During this 5-year period there was a slower average annual growth in total traffic crossing the toll cordon (1.8 %), compared to the general growth in the Trondheim area (2.8 %) or the County of Sør-Trøndelag (2.6 %). Most of the growth in traffic crossing the cordon occurred during the charged hours, indeed 2.9 % compared to only 0.8% during the uncharged hours. Paid crossings constituted 48.6% in 1992, but grew to 51.3% in 1997. Firstly, this indicates that the Trondheim charging scheme is associated with a slower growth in total in-bound traffic crossing the cordon, than what would otherwise have been expected. Secondly, a gradual return of traffic that initially was “priced out” of the more preferred charged time periods is evident. The 1998 revision of the scheme led to a major increase in traffic crossing the toll cordons, and also in the percentage of vehicles being charged. Compared to the previous year, the total ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 161

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

number of vehicles crossing toll stations increased by 39 % and charged traffic increased by 53%. The main reason for the large increase in charged traffic was the one hour extension of the charging period. The final extension of the scheme with six additional toll stations on 1 November 2003 is already evident in the traffic data for 2003, but the full effect came in 2004 and 2005. Compared to 2002, the total number of vehicle crossings in 2005 is up by 37% and charged crossings are up by 40%. Figure 2-81 shows how the flow of gross revenues developed during the lifetime of the charging system. The increase in 1998 is due to the introduction of the zone scheme. A second large increase came in 2001 after a 25 % raise in the basic toll level and a third large increase in 2004 is attributable to the final extension of the scheme. In total the charging scheme brought in 1,818 million NOK (227.25€) in gross revenues. Annual operation costs for the Trondheim charging scheme have been 10-11% of gross revenues throughout its period of operation.

Figure 2-81 - Gross Annual Charging Revenues (millions NOK) 1991-2005

250,0

200,0 mNOK 150,0

100,0

50,0

0,0 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

ACCEPTABILITY Short Term Impacts of the 1991 Scheme on City Centre Traders Prior to implementation, there was a lot of concern about negative effects on the attractiveness of the CBD for business activity, and great uncertainty prevailed about the possible effects on shopping trips. For instance, a shopping survey in 1990 concluded that 25% of respondents in Trondheim and surrounding areas were likely to change their shopping behaviour because of the toll ring, by moving their shopping to other destinations or times. The follow-up study in 1992 revealed that respondents had changed their shopping behaviour only modestly (10% rather than 25%). ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 162

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Trondheim Chamber of Commerce carried out a special sample survey of trade turnover in Trondheim starting September 1991 (one month before the opening of the toll ring) and ending September 1992. A sample of 40 firms representing about 25% of total turnover in Trondheim took part. The firms were located throughout the municipality (both inside and outside the toll ring) and covered the major business sectors. The conclusions from the study was that a long lasting trend of growth in areas outside and decline in areas inside of the toll cordon, levelled out during the study period. During the first months of 1992 there was evidence of some businesses located inside the toll ring losing trade. From the summer of 1992 no distortion of competition due to the toll ring could be read out of the statistics. Businesspeople located in the CBD had prior to the toll ring predicted major negative swings in trade once the toll ring came into operation. The Chamber of Commerce in its own study concluded that there was hardly any effect of the toll ring on trade at all. Longer term Effects on Retailing A study of retail sales data for the period 1987 to 1997 shows that the CBD did loose trade in real terms in the period 1987 to 1990 (Figure 2-82). Then, starting in the same year as the introduction of the toll ring, city centre trade has in real terms been on a general trend line of modest but steady growth. The loss in market share to other sectors in the municipality is simply a result of these sectors having a faster growth. It can be concluded that in spite of the toll ring, the city centre has had a modest growth in trade.

Figure 2-82 - Retail Market Share and Volumes by City Sector 1987-1997 8000000

100,0 37,9

41,7

45,7

44,8

41,9

43,5

40,9

41,5

43,5

42,7

80,0

25,6

60,0

21,1

%

21,5

40,0

23,4

21,3 21,7

21,8

22,8

26,1

26,3

27,0

44,1 41,0 36,8

36,8 32,6

34,7

TRONDHEIM

35,7

32,4

32,4

30,2

30,3

SOUTH

20,0

Annual turnover (Mill.NOK)

30,3

6000000

TRONDHEIM SOUTH/2 4000000 SOUTH/1 EAST/2 2000000

EAST/1 CBD/2

EAST CBD

0,0 1987

1989 1988

1991 1990

1993 1992

1995 1994

1997 1996

Year

0

CBD/1

1987

1989 1988

1991 1990

1993 1992

1995 1994

1997 1996

Year

Short Term Impacts of the Discontinuation of Charging

Figure 2-83 shows what happened to CBD retail trade in relation to other areas in the municipality since the turn of the century. It should be noted that CBD now has a different definition from the one used in the previous figure. The long term trend of decreasing market ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 163

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

shares has continued, even though the net sales volumes have grown modestly. However, the market share did not drop during 2005, and the drop during 2006 was smaller than in previous years. Still, the annulment of road user charging did not lead to an upswing in city centre trade during 2006. Figure 2-83 - Retail Market Share and Volumes by City Sector 2000-2006

100,0 % 27,4 %

29,2 %

29,1 %

29,5 %

28,7 %

27,4 %

27,3 %

23,0 %

22,4 %

23,6 %

26,4 %

27,7 %

28,5 %

29,4 %

75,0 %

50,0 %

OTHER EAST SOUTH

28,3 %

28,0 %

28,2 %

CBD 26,6 %

26,9 %

27,4 %

27,0 %

25,0 % 21,3 %

20,5 %

19,1 %

17,5 %

16,7 %

16,7 %

16,2 %

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

0,0 %

18 000 000 16 000 000 14 000 000 12 000 000

OTHER

10 000 000

EAST SOUTH CBD

8 000 000 6 000 000 4 000 000 2 000 000 0 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Opinion polls on the attitudes to the Trondheim toll ring indicated decreased opposition after implementation. In April 1991, six months prior to the implementation date, about 70% of the respondents objected to the toll ring. In December 1991, two months after implementation, the negative share had dropped to below 50% (Figure 2-84). During the summer of 1992 the mood was such that slightly more people were positive (37 %) than negative (35 %). However, as time went by, the negative share increased and the positive share decreased until a peak in October 2003, when four times more were negative than positive. The very low support in 2003 is related to negative publicity and discussions at that time about the immediate introduction of five new charge stations close to the city centre.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 164

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-84 - Public Attitudes to the Trondheim Charging Scheme

100 % 80 %

Do not know/No answer Very positive Positive Neither … nor Negative Very negative

60 % 40 % 20 % 0% Apr 1991 Dec 1991 June 1992 June 1993 Sept 1994 Oct 2003 Nov 2005

The November 2005 measurement can be interpreted as a continuation of the long term trend of increasing tiredness and frustration about the charging. The single group being most negative to urban tolling was daily car drivers. The most typical supporters were men living inside the original cordon and driving a car less frequently than on a daily basis. One possible explanation for the diminishing support is the lack of sufficient information and publicity about the purpose of charging, as time went on. Public relations work was taken much more seriously by the authorities prior to implementation and during the first year of operation. A strong indication of the importance of information is that when respondents were reminded about what type of projects the revenues from charging were financing, the support increased considerably. This can be seen in Figure 2-85. When respondents in 2005 were asked about their attitudes to urban tolling, taking into account the use of revenues, the negative share decreased from 47% to 38%, and the positive share increased from 19% to 30%. The most typical supporters now were men in the 18-29 years age group. What is perhaps more surprising, is the delight with which respondents in 2006 responded to the same question, when asked about their attitude to having had urban tolling in Trondheim. The negative share now dwindled to 27% and the positive share increased to 48%. Subgroups having high shares being positive or very positive to having had urban tolling were men, people living inside the old cordon and the 45-59 years old age group. Additionally, support increased with increasing income, increasing education level and decreasing car ownership.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 165

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-85 - Attitudes to the Trondheim Charging Scheme after Being Reminded About the Use of Revenues

0,0 %

2005: Considering the use of revenues, what is your attitude to urban tolling in Trondheim?

2006: Considering the use of revenues, what is your attitude to having had urban tolling in Trondheim?

25,0 %

18,3 %

12,1 %

50,0 %

19,5 %

15,2 %

Very negative

Negative

75,0 %

29,6 %

23,1 %

Neither nor

25,7 %

32,8 %

Positive

Very positive

100,0 %

4,7 %

15,2 %

Don't know

EQUITY Considerations of road pricing and equity deal with two main themes: How to allocate the burdens of charges and how to distribute the benefits. Both burdens and benefits may be allocated according to several different distributive principles, thus making equity considerations very complicated. Experience from Norway has shown a multitude of ways to approach "fair" and acceptable charging schemes. One important point is to relax on the ambition to design "optimal" schemes, in a way that responds to important con-arguments and reduces opposition. The following features were included in the 1991 toll ring: The "one hour rule": Only one crossing per hour is charged, partly due to claims that parents bringing children to kindergarten before travelling to work would be unduly hurt if charged for several crossings. Disabled drivers are allowed free crossings. A charging system with free passage after 5 pm and in the weekends. The "equity argument" was to avoid charging "social travel", e.g., visits or accompanying children to activities. The most difficult equity issue has been where to locate the toll stations in a "fair" way. The 1991 ring was a compromise between fairness arguments, practical considerations and revenue maximisation. The fairness aspect indicated that motorists benefiting from the new infrastructure should have to pay. The development of a revised tolling scheme (implemented in 1998) was propagated as more fair, by charging a higher proportion of the motorists. (Raising more revenue for infrastructure was the other main argument). The zone system implied that the number of total households in ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 166

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Trondheim that paid toll charges during one ordinary (randomly chosen) working day increased from 28% to 42%. After this revision, there was still much public debate on how to improve the "fairness" of the system. An assessment of the distributive effects of road pricing must take into account how revenues are spent. A redistribution of revenues to the car users (e.g., by lowering the car purchase tax) is not necessarily "fair" because there will be winners and losers among the motorists. Road pricing is prone to equity based opposition because high-income motorists and commercial traffic (valuing time savings higher than the fee) constitute the most likely "winners". "Losers" are likely to be found among low income, car-dependent households. The most common suggestion on how to compensate losers is to use revenue to improve public transport. In Trondheim part of the revenue is earmarked for public transport infrastructure, as well as investments in walking and biking facilities. Furthermore, city centre retailers have been "compensated" by investments improving the environmental quality. The information in this chapter is reproduced from Meland et al (2004). The Trondheim Package amounts to approximately NOK 2,100 mill for the period 1989-2005 (NOK 100 is about 12.5€) (Table 2-26). The package is financed with a combination of revenues raised from the Trondheim toll ring, and governmental funding. According to the original plans for the Trondheim package, national funding (governmental) was to amount to 40% of the funding of the Trondheim Package, and the local funding (toll revenues) had to raise the last 60% over the total 15-year concession period. Loans were taken up in advance of the toll charging, to allow road construction to start before the toll ring was established. The loans amounted to approximately NOK 440 million (55€), and are covered by toll revenues.

Table 2-26 - Trondheim Package Financing, 1989-2005

Source Government Toll revenues Loan* SUM: *

1989-1997 mill NOK % 363 37 % 176 18 % 441 45 % 980

100 %

1998-2005 mill NOK % 560 51 % 530 49 % 1090

100 %

SUM, 1989-2005 mill NOK % 923 45 % 1147* 55 % 2070

100 %

Loans are covered by toll revenues, and are included in the total “Toll revenues” figure for the 1989–2005 period.

Over the years, the ratio between national and local funding has shifted towards a larger proportion of national funding (see Table 2-26), and, by the end of the concession period, the ratio was probably close to 50/50, as additional national grants (“Storbymidler”) are included in the financing of the Trondheim package. All revenues from the toll system are earmarked for transport investment: 82% are used for funding the road construction program in the Trondheim Package; 18% are used for investment

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 167

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

in public transport and in several safety and environmental measures. Details of the total investments are given in Table 2-27. Table 2-27 - Trondheim Package Investments, 1989-2005 1989 – 1997 mill NOK % Road construction

1998 – 2005 mill NOK %

1989 - 2005 mill NOK %

570

58%

800

73%

1,370

66%

55

6%

0

0%

55

3%

Environmental measures

45

5%

85

8%

130

6%

Safety measures

130

13%

125

11%

255

12%

System investments

76

8%

40

4%

116

6%

Planning

54

6%

40

4%

94

5%

Wages and personnel

50

5%

0

0%

50

2%

SUM:

980

100%

1,090

100%

2,070

100%

Public transport

*

*

Additional public transport investments are funded via other national grants (“Storbymidler”)

LIVEABILITY No information available. CONCLUSIONS During 1992, the first year of operation of the Trondheim toll ring, inbound car traffic through the cordon decreased by 10% during both the high and low charged periods. This decrease in traffic was offset by increases in inbound car traffic in evenings and at weekends. Thus, over the week as a whole, total traffic volumes across the toll ring were virtually unaffected by the charging. For some trip purposes like inbound work-home and home-shopping, there were substantial shifts away from the charged afternoon period to the uncharged evening period. When charging was terminated at the end of 2005, traffic impacts were in many ways mirror images of the impacts when charging was introduced. Changes in departure times and route choices were the most visible responses to the annulment of charging by car drivers. In general, the Trondheim charge levels were modest, but traffic still displayed sensitivity to tolls. Model runs show that the removal of charging caused the private car to increase its modal share at the expense of all other modes. If charging had continued, increases in total number of trips would have been more uniformly distributed among travel alternatives. Some important lessons from the history of the Trondheim charging scheme, adopted from Langmyhr and Sager (1997) and Langmyhr (2001): 9

Road pricing schemes can be hooked up with several interests and objectives which are likely to be negotiated and reinterpreted on several occasions throughout the long and messy policy process, even after implementation.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 168

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

9

Compromises in the scheme design do not necessarily jeopardise the road pricing rationale or corrupt "rational" transport planning. It seems more fruitful to speak of changed emphasis responding to public attitudes and political preferences. 9 The often formulated ideal of one principal, unambiguous goal as the best way to implement road pricing or congestion pricing is not supported by the Trondheim case. Several objectives have been present, preparing some common ground for agreement and flexibility. 9 Experience from Norway clearly indicate that earmarking of revenues for specific purposes has been of major importance in securing local support for the cordon pricing schemes. 9 "Immediate" road construction to relieve bottlenecks reduced the unpopularity of user fees. (In addition, user fees have been supplemented by state funds, thus increasing the total amount of investment resources.) 9 Evidence from Norway indicates that if the range of disbursement purposes becomes wide (i.e., less biased towards road construction), the role of the County Roads Offices as road pricing promoters may be jeopardised. Thus, a strategy for building scheme support through revenue allocation must rest on an assessment of the institutional system, especially an evaluation of which actors may serve as prominent "innovation" promoters.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 169

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.4.3

Bergen

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION Bergen is located on the western coast. With a population of close to 250’000 inhabitants, it is the second largest city in Norway. The Bergen region has a population of close to 350’000. Bergen was the first Norwegian city to introduce a toll ring scheme. On January 2, 1986, toll collection was introduced on the main roads into Bergen. Due to the geographical location it was possible to make a tight ring with fee collection on only 6 locations. The fact that there had been toll roads in Bergen and the surrounding areas over a long period of time prior to the toll ring, may explain why Bergen was the first city in Norway to introduce such a scheme. At that time, only the city of Singapore had a somewhat similar system in the entire world. The background for the system was an increase in the traffic and a lack of public funds. The Local Public Roads Administration was a driving force behind this solution, both formally and informally (Bekken and Osland 2004). Two alternatives were put forward: Either the city could rely on public funds and have a suitable trunk road system within 30 years, or they could introduce a toll ring and have the same trunk road system in 12 years. One of the slogans for the tolling system was “As many as possible pay as little as possible for the shortest period as possible for a common good – a suitable trunk road system” At the same time a local political coalition between the major political parties was established. The Bergen toll ring was due to expire at the end of 2000. However, it was prolonged for two years awaiting the new Bergen program. In 2003, the toll cordon was prolonged through the Bergen Programme. This new package has one very heavy public transport infrastructure investment; a new city tram (“Bybanen”).The main supporters of the city tram were the politicians from the centrum and left wing parties. They managed to have the tram “hooked” on the planned road investments, of which almost all politicians were supporters. The broad compromise for the entire package was based on this combination of road investments and one large public transport investment. The proposal met resistance from the Public Roads Administration both locally and nationally. They were critical of the alternative use of road funds, questioning whether the city tram was a good alternative to road investments. There were also discussions of changing the toll system in a direction more in line with road pricing. However, one of the major parties in the coalition between the Bergen toll ring is an opponent to anything resembling road pricing. Some of the other parties have also been skeptical. The alternative to prolongation was to introduce a system with two rings and differentiated fares. The expected potential negative response by the voters also influenced the decision. While the city tram has been a place where the political parties were able to mobilize voters, they decided to step carefully on the issue of road pricing. PRICING OBJECTIVES The goal of the Bergen toll ring was to speed up a solution to the increasing traffic problems in Bergen. Thus, the pricing objective was to raise funds for road investment. Also with the new Bergen programme, the pricing objective is to raise funds for investments. This time, however, the use of the revenue will be split between road investment and ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 170

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

investments in public transport infrastructure, primarily a new city tram. With the introduction of the Bergen programme, road pricing has been discussed. However, the political parties have been reluctant to introduce such schemes. SCHEME DESCRIPTION The Bergen toll ring started operation with six toll plazas on the main roads into the city centre. Until 2001 the operation of the system was on weekdays from 6AM to 10PM. The hours of operation were not based on a road pricing approach, but more on a cost versus revenue consideration of a 24-7 operation. With the prolongation of the ring in 2001, 24-hour operation was introduced on weekdays. Gradually, the system has expanded to make the burden more equally split. In 2006, a second ring was introduced and later the ring was made fully automated with the use of the Auto-PASS system. All car drivers must pass the toll ring when they drive in the direction of the city centre. Tolls must be paid 24 hours a day all year round including weekends and holidays. There is no extra peak surcharge. Drivers are only charged for one trip per hour and there is a maximum payment of 50 trips per month for users of the Auto-Pass system.

Figure 2-86 - The toll plazas of the Bergen toll ring (Source: Bro & Tunnelselskapet AS)

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 171

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The toll ring offers electronic toll collection with the use of on-board units, the Auto-Pass system. Subscribers with on-board units can achieve up to a 50 per cent discount depending on the amount prepaid. In 2004 electronic toll collection was harmonized throughout Norway. Most toll roads now use the Auto-Pass system. The system will gradually be expanded further in to provide for payment on ferries, for parking, etc. The Auto-PASS concept is owned and managed by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA). The concept covers all Auto-PASS tags and Auto-PASS equipment at the charging points (Auto-PASS roadside equipment). The concept also covers all the specifications for the tags, roadside equipment, central systems, interfaces between the system elements, AutoPASS logo and trademark, Auto-PASS contractual framework and the Auto-PASS security architecture. The Auto-PASS Service includes both a transport and a payment service (EFC). Examples on transport services include the use of infrastructure like bridges, tunnels, motorways, road networks, road user charging schemes and ferry transport. The payment service consists of a dedicated payment system based on a user holding an Auto-PASS tag, installations at the charging points, e.g. a toll station, and a central account held and managed by the company being responsible for the payment means and contract with the user. The public owned company, Bergen Bompengeselskap AS is legally responsible for the toll ring. They have outsourced (after tendering) the operation of the toll ring to Bro Tunnelselskapet AS. The current fees are given in the table below. The fee is collected through 19 toll plazas for inbound traffic.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 172

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Table 2-28 - Fare structure toll ring, 2007 (1 EURO =approx 8 NOK) Vehicle registered for total weight Less than 3 500 From 3 500 kg NOK

Approx EURO

NOK

Approx EURO

15,-

2,-

30,-

4,-

10% discount, no prepayment

13,5

1,8

27,-

3,6

30% discount, 25 trips prepaid

10,5

1,4

21,-

2,8

40% discount 175 trips prepaid

9,0

1,2

18,

2,4

Without AutoPass agreement

Discounts with AutoPass

The fee is collected from all vehicles with the following exceptions: • • • • •

buses in regular routes emergency vehicles motorcycles and mopeds electric operated vehicles people with a disability parking permit (must apply)

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS BARRIERS The main barrier in the process of the Bergen programme seems to be the public attitude and the reluctance by the Public Roads Administration to accept the city tram as a solution to the traffic problems in Bergen. The public roads administration has argued that the revenue could be more usefully spent on other PT solutions. DRIVERS Bekken and Osland (2004) investigated the political and administrative processes leading up to the Bergen programme. The study showed that negotiations between stakeholders and a broad political compromise have been important. Three important elements in that respect were earmarking some of the revenue for “high-profile” investments (the city tram), low fare levels with large discounts for heavy users, and no time variation in the toll levels. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 173

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The main driver behind both the initial Bergen toll ring and the current Bergen Programme has been the lack of public funds to finance infrastructure, both road and public transport. This has been facilitated by the long tradition of using tolls as an alternative source of revenue. SCHEME RESULTS NETWORK No information available. ENVIRONMENT No information available. ECONOMY No information available. ACCEPTABILITY No information available. EQUITY No information available. LIVEABILITY No information available. REVENUE USE The revenue from the initial Bergen toll ring was only used for road infrastructure investments. The new Bergen Programme also funds PT infrastructure. The table below illustrate this.

Table 2-29 - Planned financing source and revenue use for the Bergen Programme (Source: St.prp. nr 76 (2001-02) Source of funds State

Mill NOK (2002) 1785

Toll revenue

2280

Municipality

150

City

100

Revenue use Road infrastructure Public transport infrastructure Smaller investments* Investments Bergen city centre

NOK (2002) 1585 1270 820 640

* Traffic safety measures, walking and cycling measures, environmental measures and planning ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 174

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

IMPACTS PREDICTABILITY No information available. CONCLUSIONS The Bergen toll ring and the Bergen Programme have not undergone any external evaluations. Thus, the scheme results reported below is not very detailed. •

•

One of the main reasons for the Bergen toll ring was to speed up the solution to the traffic problems in Bergen. This has been a success. Without the additional funds from the tolls and with the same level of public funds, congestion would have increased and the environmental suffered. The system has changed over time to provide a more equal split of the burden enhancing the equity of the system.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 175

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.4.4

Nord-Jæren

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION Nord-Jæren region is located on the western coast of Norway. Stavanger is the regional capital for about 250’000 inhabitants, including adjacent municipalities. The city of Stavanger is Norway's fourth largest city by population with 119’000 inhabitants. The Nord-Jæren toll ring started its operation in April 2001, a decade after the other main toll rings in Norway. However, local discussions of a toll ring had been going on since mid 80s, but never gained the necessary political support. The Nord-Jæren package was established despite the lack of political support from two of the municipalities in the region. The other three municipalities, including the city of Stavanger, and the county council supported the package. The plans for the toll ring passed Parliament. The toll period was set at 10 years, with an option to increase the period to 15 years if necessary. PRICING OBJECTIVES The goal of the Nord-Jæren package was to prepare a coordinated development of the transport system in the region with regard to all modes. The toll system was set up to co-finance this package with as low burden as possible for the inhabitants. SCHEME DESCRIPTION The toll system of the Nord-Jæren package has a regional profile in the sense that the toll plazas are dispersed over the entire region. The initially 17 plazas were placed on the major roads in the region on the borders of the municipalities. One goal was that within all municipalities no one should pay to get to the centre of the municipality. The location of the toll plazas was not watertight. In some places it was possible to make detours to avoid the toll. To cope with this, some new plazas were established. Currently, 21 toll plazas are in operation. All toll plazas are fully automated with the use of the Auto-PASS system. Initially fares were differentiated, but since 2005 toll must be paid 24 hours a day all year round including weekends and holidays. Drivers are only charged for one trip per hour and there is a maximum payment of 75 trips per month for users of the Auto-Pass system.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 176

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-87 - The toll plazas of the Nord-Jæren package ring

The toll ring offers electronic toll collection with the use of on-board units, the Auto-Pass system. Subscribers with on-board units can achieve up to a 50 per cent discount depending on the amount prepaid. In 2004 electronic toll collection was harmonized throughout Norway. Most toll roads now use the Auto-Pass system. The system will gradually be expanded further in to provide for payment on ferries, for parking, etc. The Auto-PASS concept is owned and managed by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA). The concept covers all Auto-PASS tags and Auto-PASS equipment at the charging points (Auto-PASS roadside equipment). The concept also covers all the specifications for the tags, roadside equipment, central systems, interfaces between the system elements, AutoPASS logo and trademark, Auto-PASS contractual framework and the Auto-PASS security architecture. The Auto-PASS Service includes both a transport and a payment service (EFC). Examples on transport services include the use of infrastructure like bridges, tunnels, motorways, road networks, road user charging schemes and ferry transport. The payment service consists of a dedicated payment system based on a user holding an Auto-PASS tag, installations at the charging points, e.g. a toll station, and a central account held and managed by the company being responsible for the payment means and contract with the user. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 177

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Initially, fares were differentiated over the day. In weekends and on weekdays from 6PM-6AM no fee applied. The maximum fee of 10NOK (1.2€) for small vehicles applied from 7AM-9AM and from 2PM-5PM. At other times, half the fee applied. The most frequent users could get a maximum 50% discount of the fares above. Drivers were only charged for one trip per hour and there was a maximum payment of 75 trips per month for users of the Auto-Pass system. Furthermore, trips from home to the centre of ones own municipality were free of charge. The revenue from the initial toll system was lower than expected due to the low average fee level. As a result the charging scheme was significantly changed in 2005, following a political process. Currently no fee differentiation applies and the toll must be paid 24 hours a day all year round including weekends and holidays. The public owned company, Nord-Jæren Bompengeselskap AS is legally responsible for the toll ring. They have outsourced (after tendering) the operation of the toll ring to Bro Tunnelselskapet AS. The current fees are given in the table below. The fee is collected through 21 toll plazas.

Table 2-30 – Fare structure Nord-Jæren toll ring, 2008 (1 EURO =approx 8 NOK) Vehicle registered for total weight Less than 3 500 From 3 500 kg Approx Approx NOK NOK EURO EURO Without AutoPass agreement 13

1.6

26

3.2

9.1 7.8 6.5

1.1 1 0.8

18.2 15.6 13

2.3 2 1.6

Discounts with AutoPass 30% discount, 25 trips prepaid 40% discount 175 trips prepaid 50% discount 350 trips prepaid

The fee is collected from all vehicles with the following exceptions: • • • • • • •

buses in regular routes emergency vehicles motorcycles and mopeds electric operated vehicles people with a disability parking permit (must apply) Tractors and farm vehicles Trips from own house to municipality centre

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS BARRIERS

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 178

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The main barrier in the process of the Nord-Jæren Package seems to be the political reluctance by two of the municipalities to accept the scheme. DRIVERS The main driver behind the Nord-Jæren package as well as the other Norwegian urban toll packages has been the lack of public funds to finance infrastructure, both road and public transport. This has been facilitated by the long tradition of using tolls as an alternative source of revenue. Local acceptance has been a guiding principle. One of the important drivers for the package was the opportunity to finance improvements in local rail by the toll revenue. SCHEME RESULTS NETWORK No information available. ENVIRONMENT No information available. ECONOMY No information available. ACCEPTABILITY No information available. EQUITY No information available. LIVEABILITY No information available. REVENUE USE The revenue raised by the Nord Jæren package will be used for both road, rail and cycling/walking. In addition some revenue will also be used to improve the local environment and liveability of the area. The proposed revenue use is illustrated in Table 2-31.

Table 2-31 - Planned financing source and revenue use for the Nord-Jæren Package (Source: St.prp. nr.14 (1998-99)) Source of funds State

Mill NOK (1998) 850

Revenue use Road infrastructure

NOK (1998) 760

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 179

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Source of funds Extraordinary state funds for rail Toll revenue Municipalities

Mill NOK (1998)

Revenue use

NOK (1998)

285

Rail investments

525

730 150

230 210

County

50

Other PT investments Cycling and walking paths Investments to improve environment, traffic safety etc Establishing the toll plazas

300 40

CONCLUSIONS The Nord-Jæren package has not undergone any external evaluations. However, Solvoll (2006) has looked into some of the scheme results: • • •

The package has delivered some of the important investment projects. In particular, rail improvements. The revenue was far below expected. As a result, the fee scheme was significantly changed to secure the funding scheme The cost of operating the system has been far above expected. Initially, an estimate of NOK 11.5 mill (1.44 M€) was made for the first year of operation. The actually cost of operation has been more than twice this and increasing every year.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 180

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.5

Swedish Case Studies

Different road pricing schemes are implemented around the world to finance and manage traffic. In Sweden road pricing has become a more frequent element the last decade. The Swedish government has announced to widen the perspective of financing transport infrastructure through Private-Public Partnership (PPP). PPP is used as a comprehensive term for different alternative forms of financing which includes means from both the private as the public sector as well as different toll and user charges. In year 2000 the first toll bridge was inaugurated, the Öresund Bridge between Sweden and Denmark. In 2005 the second toll bridge, the new Svinesund Bridge between Sweden and Norway was opened. As decision support to the recent national transport policy, toll financing has also been investigated for road links in four different Swedish cities. Regarding urban pricing, a Stockholm congestion tax trial was introduced in 2006 and permanently reinstalled in August 2007. The purpose of the Stockholm scheme is primarily to reduce congestion and improve the environment. The revenue is destined to finance road infrastructure investments. Also, investigations on an urban pricing scheme will be carried out for Gothenburg which is the second largest city in Sweden. The purpose of such an investigation is to analyze the consequences of different scheme designs on traffic and environment both in the central parts of the city as well as more peripheral areas in the region. In Gothenburg, the objective of the transport strategy (”K2020”) is to increase the share of public transport travel to 40 % (now approx 25 %). An important factor when introducing a charging scheme is therefore to develop a public transport system which is adapted to increasing demand. If the Gothenburg politicians decide to proceed with an introduction of urban pricing, the revenue will finance public transport improvements. Further, Sweden is part of the Eurovignette agreement which means that heavy vehicles (minimum 12 tons) must pay a charge before driving on Swedish roads. In return Swedish heavy vehicles can drive free of charge in the other Eurovignette countries, Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg. Payment is made in advance and for a calendar period of day/week/month/year. Consequently, this type of user charge is not a direct charge covering a specific distance or link. However, there are ongoing investigations in Sweden on the possibilities of introducing a kilometre based charging scheme for heavy vehicles similar to the systems already introduced in for example Germany, Austria and Switzerland.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 181

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2.5.1

Stockholm

CONTEXT DESCRIPTION Stockholm is the capital of Sweden, with about 765 000 inhabitants in the municipality and 1.9 million in the whole county. A third of the inner-city area consists of water and the townscape is framed by bridges that link the city’s islands to the mainland. High levels of traffic and a radial infrastructure network make the transport system in Stockholm very strained and vulnerable. About 500 000 vehicles pass in/out of Stockholm’s inner city every weekday. 70 % of all passengers travelling to the inner city during the morning peak period use public transport. Traffic in the Stockholm region has risen rapidly due to economic and population growth as well as increased travel. In Stockholm, a full-scale congestion charging trial took place between January 3rd and July 31st 2006, followed by a referendum on September regarding the future of the congestion charge. Following an overall ‘yes’ vote from the citizens of Stockholm city but an overall ‘no’ vote from the surrounding municipalities, the new government decided to reinstall the congestion taxes from August 2007. The purpose is to reduce congestion in and around the city centre, thereby improving accessibility and also the environment in the most densely populated areas. The charging system is designed as a toll ring, with the charges varying over the day according to the congestion levels. Car passages to and from the inner city decreased by about 20 % during the trial as well as during the initial month of the permanent system. On the surrounding road network outside the charging zone monitoring show both an increase and decrease in traffic. The congestion charge trial in 2006 was accompanied by a package of public transport improvements, where the main part was the addition of new bus lines from the suburbs to the city centre. Improvements were also made in park&ride facilities. During the trial, public transport increased by about 7 %. Public transport is also enhanced in the permanent charging scheme, but the commitment of the new government is somewhat different from that of the trial. The revenues from the charges will now be reserved for road infrastructure in the region. In Sweden, congestion charges are classified as a “tax” rather than a “fee”. This means that it is the state that collects the congestion charges, since local government bodies can only collect taxes from their own citizens. The National Road Administration is responsible for collecting the charges and administering the system, while the city of Stockholm is responsible for monitoring the impacts of the scheme. PRICING OBJECTIVES The primary objectives of the Stockholm trials during 2006 were to reduce congestion, increase accessibility and improve the environment. The purpose of the (full-scale) trials was to test whether the efficiency of the traffic system can be enhanced by congestion charges. The secondary objectives of the trials were: •

Reduce traffic volumes on the busiest roads by 10-15%

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 182

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

• • • •

Improve the flow of traffic on streets and roads Reduce emissions of pollutants harmful to human health and of carbon dioxide Improve the urban environment as perceived by Stockholm residents Provide more resources for public transport

In the permanent scheme, revenue is to finance new road infrastructure investments. SCHEME DESCRIPTION The charging scheme is formally a congestion tax for the Stockholm inner city zone. Tax is levied when entering or leaving the zone. Vehicles that only by-pass Stockholm via road E4 Essingelink are not subject to the congestion tax. When driving to or from Lidingö island, anyone who cross by any of the three control points at the Lidingö bridge as well as an additional control point in the city within 30 minutes is also exempted from the congestion tax. The reason for this is that the only connection from Lidingö municipality to the national road network runs through the city.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 183

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

No tax on the Essinge bypass

Eighteen control points are set up at Stockholm city entrance and exit roads. Vehicles are registered automatically both on the way in and out of the inner city zone. The traffic flow is not affected as drivers do not have to stop or slow down when crossing a control point. There are two ways to identify vehicles: • •

through photographing the number plates (primary source during the permanent scheme) during the trial also via an onboard unit (during the permanent scheme onboard units are only used for the Lidingö-exemption rule)

The congestion tax system architecture consists of four principal components: • • • •

roadside equipment to collect passage information pre-processors, to process the information from the control points and generate tax decisions a business process platform, to book tax decisions, handle payments, reminders and reports a web portal – with both a public website and an Intranet for the benefit of Customer Services and the National Tax Board.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 184

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Regarding road side equipment, the technical equipment at a control point is installed on three gantries above the carriageway and in a control cabinet at the side of the road. Columns are used instead of gantries at some control points. The first gantry is equipped with a ”Control Point” sign as well as a digital display indicating the tax charged at that particular time. Cameras installed on this gantry are used to photograph the rear number plates. The cameras used to photograph the front plates are mounted on the third gantry. Laser detectors and transceiver aerials for vehicle identification via the onboard unit are mounted on the middle gantry. The congestion tax is levied between 6.30 a.m. and 6.29 p.m. The tax per passage is SEK 10, 15 or 20 (€1-2) depending on the time of day. The maximum amount per vehicle and day is SEK 60 (€6). Payment can only be made retroactively, and there is no opportunity to pay at the control points. During the trial, payment was to be registered in the SRA congestion tax account no later than five days after the passage of a control point. From 1 June 2006, this was extended to 14 days. The tax could be paid in several different ways, and additional options were made available as time went along. Most people paid automatically via direct debit by using a transponder, but it was also possible to pay over the counter at Pressbyrå kiosks or 7-Eleven shops throughout the country, via the Internet using a credit or charge card, at banks or via Internet banking. No invoice was sent out and information about the amount to be paid could be obtained through Customer Services, via the full-scale trial website or when paying at a Pressbyrå kiosk or 7Eleven. Payment was/is not possible at the control points. During the permanent scheme monthly payments by invoice have been introduced, which is a good customer-oriented improvement as well as necessary to reduce transaction costs. Possibilities to pay manually at kiosks have been removed. During the trial, if the congestion tax is not paid in time, the vehicle owner receives a reminder by mail, including a SEK 70 (€7) service charge. This service charge along with the tax was to be paid within four weeks from the day of passage. If this was not paid in time the vehicle owner was sent an additional reminder with a SEK 200 (€20) surcharge. The tax, service charge and surcharges had to be paid within a month from the date on which the surcharges have been decided. Unpaid tax decisions and charges were then remitted to the Enforcement Service, which added another SEK 500 (€50) handling fee for debt collection. Now during the permanent scheme, the passages are registered in month 1, a tax decision invoiced by the end of month 2 and payment is due at the end of month 3. If payment is not made in time, a surcharge of SEK 500 (€50) is added. The congestion tax law applies only to vehicles registered in Sweden with the following exceptions: • • • • • • •

emergency service vehicles buses with a total weight of 14 tonnes or more diplomatic cars motorcycles vehicles registered abroad military vehicles vehicle used by a person with a disability parking permit (have to apply to the National Tax Board him/herself). This exemption does not apply to commercial transport vehicles.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 185

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

•

vehicle equipped with technology for running a) completely or partially on electricity or gas other than LPG, or b) on a fuel blend consisting primarily of alcohol, and registered as such at the SRA.

The charging scheme is principally the same during the permanent congestion tax as during the trial. However, some of the major changes are; • • • • • •

Monthly payments by invoice The month of July is free of charge Deductible tax Simplifications regarding automatic debits No exemptions for taxi and transportation service vehicles Exemptions for environmental cars are limited to five years.

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS BARRIERS Constitutional framework In Sweden, congestion charges are classified as ”tax” rather than ”fee”. However, this legislation was not in place when the implementation process for the trial started. Therefore in the initial process, the division of roles and responsibilities was not formally established and consequently neither the functional requirements of the system depending on whether the charge was a state tax or a local fee. In 2003 an inquiry into congestion charging found that congestion charges had to be collected as a state tax, as Swedish law says that a charge can only be levied when the payer receives something in return. Due to the fact that the payment only provided the right to use already existing infrastructure, the congestion charge was considered to be a tax. Further, as a municipal authority is not permitted to tax anyone other than its own inhabitants, the congestion tax had to be made a state tax. Congestion charges were initiated by the local municipality, but formal decisions were primarily made by the Parliament. In 2004, Parliament issued the Congestion Tax Act. As a result, the responsibility for procurement and administration of the congestion tax was transferred from the City to the Road Administration. Several alterations had to be made throughout the process of designing the business system. Legal investigation The procurement of the technical system was subjected to legal investigation. This basically concerned two issues:

• if the Swedish Road Administration had acted correctly when it took over the procurement initiated by the City of Stockholm, and

• if the awarding of the contract had been handled properly The case was tried by the Stockholm County Administrative Court, the Administrative Court of Appeal and the Supreme Administrative Court during the summer and autumn of 2004 and ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 186

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

continued into early 2005. On 30 March 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court decided to discontinue further hearings. This meant that the verdict previously issued by the Administrative Court of Appeal, i.e., that the procurement conducted by the SRA was correct, then came into force. The preparations for the full-scale trial resumed immediately in April 2005. At that time the work had been at a standstill for about two months as a result of the legal proceedings as well as earlier standstills due to appeals. In conjunction with this, the Government decided that 3 January 2006 was the date on which the trial period would begin resulting in a total trial period of only seven months. Local interest vs. regional Different kinds of charging schemes have been discussed in Stockholm over the years. The fall of the so called Dennis agreement in the 1990’s illustrates the difficulties in securing broad and stable political agreements on controversial traffic issues such as congestion charging in the Stockholm region.48 A contributing factor is also that the political majority in Stockholm often switches which undermines the pursuit of long-term issues. The Stockholm congestion charging trial was clearly defined as an issue for the municipality of Stockholm even though the whole region was very much concerned.48 There was a lot of opposition from the surrounding municipalities concerning this boundary of consent. Consequently many surrounding municipalities decided to hold their own referendums, however these were not given the same formal status as the referendum in Stockholm city. Low initial public acceptance When the political decision was taken to conduct a trial, public opinion was predominantly negative to the introduction of charges. (Further described in section 5.4.) Also the amount of media space regarding the future congestion charging trial was immense, often conveying a somewhat negative picture. From this perspective, arranging referendums regarding controversial issues like congestion charging is a rather risky political strategy. DRIVERS National political agreement The origin of congestion charges in Stockholm was somewhat different than in London with one strong political advocate in Mayor Livingstone. The Mayor of Stockholm had in fact made an electoral promise not to implement road charging. However, in order to form a national government in 2002 the Socialist party had to align with the Left and the Green parties. The Green Party held the balance of power at the national and the local levels. One of the demands from the Green party was to introduce congestion charges in Stockholm. The negotiated deal between the national parties was to carry out a full scale charging trial, which in turn the leading party in Stockholm was forced to accept. In June 2003 the Stockholm city council passed a decision to conduct a trial implementation of environmental charges in the Stockholm inner city zone. It was also decided that the trial should end before the next election. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 187

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Further, the existence of the successful forerunner case in London should not be under estimated in contributing to political courage in the Stockholm case. Trial and post referendum approach The trial approach in combination with a post referendum was an important political strategy in trying to turn public opposition into support and avoid conflict48. The Mayor of Stockholm argued that it was important for citizens to experience the charging system and thereby form a grounded opinion before voting. A referendum on the permanent implementation of congestion charges in the City of Stockholm was held in conjunction with the general elections on the 17 September 2006. Following an overall ”yes” from the citizens of Stockholm (51,3%) but an overall ”no” from the surrounding municipalities (60,2 %) the new government decided to install the congestion tax on a permanent basis. If the referendum had been held in advance, it is quite likely that the result would have been as in Edinburgh.48 Extensive communication efforts Parallel to the technical implementation, the Swedish Road Administration conducted extensive communication efforts. The idea was that if drivers were well-informed, the flow of traffic at the control points would not be disrupted, Customer Services would not be overwhelmed by calls and in the end a reliable collection of the congestion tax would be ensured. The SRA strategy for achieving this was to communicate intensively while at the same time keeping a low neutral profile. The Swedish Road Administration did not engage in a debate on why congestion tax was introduced but rather on how the system would work and how to pay. In the early stages of the project, the focus was on direct communication in the form of meetings, flyers and letters. Late in the autumn of 2005 a letter was sent to all vehicle owners in Sweden with information about the full-scale trial in Stockholm. Several activities were arranged in shopping centres and malls, such as at the Stockholm Central Railway Station and at public transport nodes. Meetings were initially also arranged for those living and working close to the control points. As the day for launching the system drew closer, the communication became more public and intensive. Contact with the media was important during the entire project period and helped spread information to individuals and decision makers. Balanced and measurable goals The design of the evaluation appears as crucial from an acceptance point of view.48 The city of Stockholm was responsible for the extensive evaluation programme during the trial. Inspired by London, the strategy was to present traffic data initially at press conferences (go-live for 10 days) as well as presenting a full evaluation report at the end of the trial. According to polls in Stockholm, people became more positive throughout the trial as they experienced the obvious effects. 48

K.Isaksson and T. Richardson, paper 2007, Building legitimacy for risky policies: managing deliberation on the frontline. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 188

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

As basis for an evaluation programme, the importance of identifying balanced and measurable goals must not be underestimated when planning and designing the scheme. SCHEME RESULTS The trial in 2006 was subject to an extensive evaluation in a multitude of dimensions, some of which represented rather peripheral indirect effects of charging (such as, f ex, the (potential) effect from charging on children’s participation in sport activities and business conditions for driving schools. The programs exhaustiveness was motivated by an intention to let basically all raised hypotheses be tested, to allow citizen’s the most informed decision possible when they were to cast their votes in the referendum. The results from the Stockholm Trials were been monitored by an expert group and has been published in the report “Facts and results from the Stockholm trial, December 2006. (http://www.stockholmsforsoket.se/upload/Sammanfattningar/English/Final%20Report_The%20 Stockholm%20Trial.pdf) Now during the permanent system August 2007, a much smaller set of effects is measured. These are almost exclusively direct traffic effects (volumes, travel times, traffic composition in types of vehicles, etc). Thus, the oncoming measurements will be a monitoring scheme (allowing for future modifications of the system), rather than an evaluation program (aiming to judge whether the positive effects of charging as such outweighs the negative). Therefore, the results presented in the following often refer to the evaluation of the trial. For most effects, evaluations refer to the trial package which consist of the combined effects of charging and increased public transport services. Generally, however, the larger parts of those effects can be attributed to the charging scheme as such. NETWORK The overall reduction in traffic crossing the congestion-charge cordon during the congestioncharge period (06.30–18.29 weekdays), was 22 % during the trial.49 This reduction was lower during the morning peak period (16%) and higher during the afternoon/evening peak (24%). The reduction stabilized quickly after the introduction of charges, and resettled at almost original levels as soon as the trial ended but not entirely (see Figure 2-88). During the permanent scheme from August 2007, traffic reductions have been almost as during the trial, but slightly lower. There are many ways for motorists to adapt in a situation with charges. During the trial approximately half of the disappearing motorists changed to public transport which increased by 6 % and the other half changed in less traceable ways like fewer trips, trip chaining and other destinations. However, motorists did not increase car-pooling, work at home or change departure times.

Figure 2-88. Average daily (6am – 7pm) passages over the charging cordon.

49

Depending on how you define the demand calculations from Stockholm show that the cost elasticity vary from 0,27to - 0,41. Elasticities for different groups have not been estimated for Stockholm. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 189

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

600 000

dashed line – 2006-2007 ”between” charging

500 000

400 000

2005 (before charges)

300 000

2006 (with charges) 2006 (no charges) 2007 (no charges) 200 000

2007 (with charges) -19%

-17%

-17%

-28%

-23%

-22%

-21%

-20%

-21%

-24%

-21%

-20%

-17%

-18%

-17%

jan

feb

mar

apr

maj

jun

jul

aug

sep

okt

nov

dec

2008 (with charges)

100 000

0

A common assumption before the trial was that the time-differentiated charges would have significant impact on time-of-day choices, so that traffic volumes would increase during periods when passage was free of charge. Surprisingly enough, though, no such compensatory increases in traffic volume were observed for any time of day during the Stockholm trial. Rather, charging seemed to have a (small) reducing effect on traffic volumes over the cordon also after charging hours. This can be explained by the inherent linkage between trips over the day: The motorist, who does not take his /her car into the city in the morning, will not drive it out from the city in the evening, either. This effect must have outweighed the effect of substituting car trips between times of day. The effect of charging is, naturally, at its largest just over the cordon. For all other types of streets, (inside the zone as well as outside) the effects were “diluted”. Only part of the car trips using those streets were subject to charges, and for other car trips no reduction should be expected50. Therefore, the total reduction of vehicle kilometres traveled (VKT) within the charging zone, will be less than the reduction in number of passages over the cordon. Based on samples of link volumes, it was estimated during the trial that the effect on daily total VKT within the charging zone was approximately 14%, and that the corresponding figure for the region as a whole was 2%. As a consequence of reduced demand, travel times are significantly reduced. These reductions are particularly large on the access (approach) roads to and from the inner City. Queuing times on these roads have fallen by one third for inbound traffic during the morning peak period (Figure 2-89), and by half for outbound traffic during the afternoon/evening peak.

50

In fact, there is reason to expect that non-charged trips may even have increased to some extent, as a consequence of reduced travel times. However, the evaluation program was not able to identify and/or quantify such rebound effects. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 190

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Also, travel time variability was reduced significantly in both AM and PM peaks. Travel time variability is known to constitute a major part of road users’ negative assessment of congested traffic conditions.

Figure 2-89. Relative delay in AM peak (excess travel time relative to free flow travel time) for different types of streets. Average values.

250%

Trial (April)

Permanent scheme

Delay time, morning peak

(October)

200%

fm apr 2005

150%

fm okt 2005 fm apr 2006 fm okt 2006 100%

fm okt 2007

50%

0% innerstad

City centre

inreinfartIN

Arterials in

inreinfartUT

Arterials out

tvarled

yttreinfartIN

Circumferentials

yttreinfartUT

Outer arterials in

Outer arterials out

In the discussions before the trial, problems with redistribution of traffic were one of the main issues since it was decided to exclude a major motorway bypass through the city, from charging. This bypass – the Essinge link – was under severe congestion already before the trial. It was feared that through traffic that previously had used the inner city network would shift route to the Essinge link to avoid charges, and thereby further increase congestion problems there. Contrary to those expectations, however, volume increases on the Essinge link during the trial were very limited. ENVIRONMENT Air quality measurements are very sensitive to weather conditions, and do vary considerably from day-to-day and year-to-year. Therefore, the larger part of the environmental evaluation of the trial was model-generated. Emissions, concentrations and immissions (health effects) of a number of pollutants were computed for the situations before and during the trial, respectively. Real measured traffic volumes were used as input to the models.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 191

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The reduction in vehicle km during the trial, contributed basically proportionally to a reduction of the pollutant emissions from road traffic. Thus, such emissions were reduced for the region with 1%-3%, and for the inner city (charging area) with 8%-14%, see Table 2-32. The reduction of Nitrogen oxides (NOx) were in the lower end of that range, as a consequence of additional bus traffic during the trial, which contributed to extra emissions. Table 2-32 - Effects on road transport emissions (various pollutants) from the Stockholm congestion charging trial51.

Est. reduction Inner city: Pollutant 1000 kg/year NO

Stockholm municipality:

Greater Stockholm:*

percent 1000 kg/year percent 1000 kg/year percent

45

-8,5 %

47

-2,7 %

55

-1,3 %

CO PM10: total PM10: from road surface PM10: from fuel and combustion VOC: Volatile Organic Compounds Benzene, C H

670 21

-14 % -13 %

710 23

-5,1 % -3,4 %

770 30

-2,9 % - 1,5 %

19

-13 %

21

-3,3 %

28

-1,5 %

1,8

-12 %

1,8

-4,4 %

2,1

-2,4 %

110

-14 %

120

-5,2 %

130

-2,9 %

3,4

-14 %

3,6

-5,3 %

3,8

-3,0 %

CO

36 000

-13 %

38 000

-5,4 %

41 000

-2,7 %

X

6

2

6

*) 35*35 km around Stockholm inner city.

Emission reductions were concentrated to the inner city, which is densely populated both day and night. Therefore, the relative effects on traffic related immissions and health problems in the Stockholm region were much larger than the effect on emissions. Based on recent estimates of dose-response relationships from several consistent international studies, it was estimated that in total for the entire Greater Stockholm area (1.44 million inhabitants, 35 x 35 km), between 25 and 30 fewer premature deaths would occur per year as a result of a reduction in long-term exposure to particles. The congestion charging system managed to press average yearly concentrations of pollutants below what is required according to environmental quality standards (legally binding by European agreement). However, also when congestion charging is implemented, there are a number of locations in Stockholm at which maximum daily levels, as defined by European environmental quality standards, will remain to be exceeded. ECONOMY

51

Source: Stockholm Trial – Effects on air quality and health. City of Stockholm, Environment and health administration ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 192

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The budget for the entire Stockholm trial package was SEK 3.8 billion52 (€380 million), or approximately SEK 2.7 billion (€270 million) after deductions for various residual values. Of this total net budget approximately two thirds were costs for investments, initialisation and commissioning of the congestion charging system, whereas the remaining third related to other parts of the package – for example public transport, improved park-and-ride facilities, information and evaluation. The Swedish Road Administration has estimated that the tested system can be run on an operating cost of around SEK 220 million (€22 million) p.a including re-investments. Initially this cost has been quite higher however. Based on this figure, the Stockholm system is relatively expensive to operate in comparison with those systems in Norway with which it share certain similarities with regard to technology, design and function. For example, the system in Oslo, which is the same size as Stockholm’s (approximately 90 million passages p.a. compared to Stockholm’s approximately 80 million passages p.a.) costs around SEK 145 million (€14,5 million) p. a. in operating costs and administrative expenses. The cost-benefit analysis (CBA) that was conducted in connection to the trial concluded that if viewed solely as a short-term trial which, once terminated, will not subsequently be resumed, the Stockholm Trial represented a disbenefit of some SEK 2.6 billion (€260 million) in socioeconomic terms. However, if congestion charging were to be made permanent, corresponding calculations suggested that the system would generate a substantial annual surplus in CBA terms of some SEK 760 million (€76 million) after deductions for operating costs. The investment cost sustained by society would then be “repaid” in the form of socioeconomic benefits within four years. This is a very quick repayment period in comparison with, for example, investments in road infrastructure and public transport, which even under relatively favourable circumstances have a repayment time of between 15 and 25 years. On the plus side of the balance sheet in the cost-benefit analysis of the congestion-charging system are, for example, shorter travel times (value: SEK 600 million p.a. (€60 million)), improved traffic safety (SEK 125 million p.a. (€12,5 million)) and the positive effects on health and the environment (SEK 90 million p.a.(€9 million) Income from the congestion tax is estimated at around SEK 550 million (€55 million) p.a. after deductions for operating costs. ACCEPTABILITY In Stockholm, as in other places where the issue has been raised, politicians were ahead of their voters in their attitudes to congestion charging. When the political decision was taken to conduct a trial, public opinion was predominantly negative to the introduction of charges. But – similar, too, to what has been experienced in a number of other cities - there was a significant change in the public opinion when the system was introduced. The change was not dramatically large (about 15% more positive during the trial than before it started), but important, since it implied a change of majority from negative to positive. Other, more frequent, polls conducted within the evaluation program indicate that the larger part of the attitudinal change occurred within the first two months of the trial.

52

1 SEK ≈0,10 Euro

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 193

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-90. Do you think that it is a good or bad decision to carry out the Stockholm trial? Proportion responding Very or quite good. By area.

60%

58% 57%

57% 55%

53%

54% 53%

60% 55%

52%

56%

49%

52%

50%

50% 44% 45%

Figure 2-91. How would you vote, if today you were to vote in a referendum on a permanent implementation. Proportion responding Yes, definitely or Yes, probably. By area

45%

48%

47% 45%

44% 45%

40%

40%

42%

39%

39%

37% 35%

36%

43%

40%

43%

34%

35%

35% 30%

30%

25%

25%

20%

20%

29%

31% 29%

30%

29% 26%

Spring 2004 Inner City

Spring 2005 Rest of Stockholm

Autumn 2005 Inner region

Spring 2006 Outer region

Spring 2004 Inner City

Spring 2005 Rest of Stockholm

Autumn 2005

Spring 2006

Inner region

Outer region

Throughout the investigated period, the proportion who thought that it was a good (or quite good) decision to carry out the Stockholm trial, was higher than the proportion who said that they would support permanent implementation of congestion charges in a referendum concerning permanent introduction. (see Figure 2-90 and Figure 2-91). The final positive outcome of this question was confirmed by the result of the real referendum in which 51.3 per cent of the inhabitants in the city of Stockholm, voted in favour of a permanent solution with congestion tax. As can be seen from Figure 2-90 and Figure 2-91 opinions were more negative in the municipalities surrounding the City of Stockholm, throughout the implementation process. In connection to the official referendum in the City, a number of other municipalities too, arranged their own referenda on congestion charging. These different referenda results can not be directly aggregated to a result “for the region”, since 1) wordings differed between municipalities and 2) one third of the inhabitants in the region live in municipalities that did not arrange a referendum. Nevertheless, referendum results generally support the impression from Figure 2-90 and Figure 2-91: while inhabitants in the City voted for congestion charging, inhabitants in other municipalities generally voted against. In an attitude poll held in the autumn of 2007 and asking among other things “What is your opinion on congestion tax now that the scheme has been re-installed?”, 48 % answered that they are positive or very positive, while 27 % said they were negative, see Figure 2-92.

Figure 2-92. Attitude poll in Stockholm, opinion on congestion tax after re-installment. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 194

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Very Mycket positiv positive

48%

Positiv Positive

Varkenor eller Neither

Rather negativ Ganska negative Very Mycket negativ negative

27%

Vet ej Don’t know

EQUITY Regarding equity, a large percentage of drivers in the county paid the congestion tax at least occasionally. During an investigated two-week period F, nearly half of all privately owned cars in Stockholm paid congestion tax at least once. However, most of them paid only small amounts. Only 4% of the county’s vehicles – which corresponds to 1.2% of the county’s residents – accumulated a total cost of SEK 200 (€20) or more during the studied two-week period. That small group accounted for one third of all revenues generated by privately owned vehicles. It is thus clear that the congestion charging in Stockholm has a potential for redistributing substantial resources between individuals. But what about average effects on a group level? Did some categories of citizens (defined by f ex household type, income, or residential area) suffer “unfairly” large negative consequences from the charging scheme? To study this issue, equity effects were analyzed in terms of how different categories of inhabitants were affected with respect to direct road-user effects of the congestion tax. Direct effects include changes in travel time, costs of paid congestion tax and costs of adaptation (sacrifices in travel due to the congestion tax).53 Looking only at the direct road-user effects – changes in travel time and increases in travel costs – all studied groups experience an economic loss (on average). Examining the level of loss for different groups on average, it was concluded that •

Residents of the inner city and Lidingö lost about twice as much as residents of other areas

53

Environmental and road safety effects were excluded due to lack of detailed information on how the effects were distributed ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 195

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

• • • •

Households with high discretionary income paid nearly three times as much as households with low discretionary income Employed people paid about three times as much congestion tax as non-employed Men lost nearly twice as much as women Households with children paid more congestion tax and households with two adults pay more congestion tax (per person)

Statistically, one was thus “hardest hit” by the congestion tax if one was an affluent, employed male living in a household with two adults and children in the inner city or Lidingö. Inner city residents gained the least travel time but paid second-highest amount of congestion tax – partly because they tend to be driving opposite (out mornings, in evenings) to the direction that benefited most from reduced congestion. It is interesting to note that inner city residents were never-the-less the most positive to the tax, as described in the previous section. This indicates that those living in the inner city experienced other benefits than those that were covered by the analysis. However, the equity effects of a congestion tax system are utterly determined by how the revenues are used. The figure below illustrates the final outcome (direct effect + revenue recycling) of three hypothetical uses of revenue for the Stockholm system: all residents in the county share the revenues equally, the revenues are used to lower taxes and the revenues are used to lower public transport fares, respectively. As can be seen from the figure the distributional effect (here by income) is determined by revenue use.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 196

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-93. Net effects for households by discretionary income and revenue use

LIVEABILITY One of the set objectives for the Stockholm trial was that the “urban environment as perceived by citizens”, should be improved. Both urban environment and livability, however, are complex and diffuse concepts. It is impossible to find a common, clear-cut definition of good (improved) urban environment. Therefore, it proved difficult to confirm or reject whether the trial had met its objective in this respect. The official evaluation of the Stockholm trial comprised a questionnaire study relating to the perception of environmental qualities in different parts of the City. On top of the definition problems introduced above, the study was also obstructed by completely different weather conditions prevailing during baseline- (spring 2005) and trial (spring 2006) measurement periods, respectively. However, the results indicate that the public had indeed experienced improvement for exactly those factors for which objective measurable changes could also be demonstrated; that is those that were linked to reductions in traffic. Significant positive changes were thus observed for three types of environmental quality: better pace in traffic, improved air quality and improved accessibility by car. The same tendencies appear in interviews made with cyclists in the inner city and with children who live in the inner city. The latter group’s experience of the city environment improved clearly, and many cyclists reported that they perceive that the number of cars has reduced, and that the traffic environment was improved. No significant effects were proven on retail or tourism during the trial. Retail within the charging zone increased by 7 %, which should be compared to a similar increase of 8 % outside the zone and also in Sweden as a whole. Disparities between different areas are most likely due to trend shifts, calendar effects or special events. An important explanation to why only marginal effects arise is that consumer behaviour has almost not changed over the past years. The Stockholm trial was heavily criticized in advance that it would change consumers shopping ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 197

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

patterns drastically. However, the trial showed that consumers overall did not shop less neither outside or inside the charging zone. Consumer studies have shown that minor substitution effects occur for example for daily purchases by inner city citizens, but this effect is so small that it cannot be observed in retail turnover. Overall no effect on the household purchasing power has been observed. Regional economic calculations show that the congestion tax amounts to 1% of the total disposable income in the Stockholm County per year. Consequently, the tax is assessed not to affect purchasing power and private consumption. Road Safety As a direct consequence of reduced traffic, road safety for motorists was also expected to improve, particularly as regards whiplash injuries. However, the trial period was all too brief to enable these changes to be measured. Evaluations of the road safety effects of the trial are therefore based on estimates and the connection between road safety and changes in traffic volumes, traffic flows and speed levels. Research shows that road safety is mainly influenced by changes in traffic volumes and speed levels. Since traffic declined as a result of the Stockholm Trial that means that even the estimated number of accidents within the charge zone in which people were injured is lower. The size of the reduction in accidents is, of course, uncertain but based on model estimates the number of accidents where people were injured should have fallen by about 9-18%. Reduced congestion should also have led to higher speeds, resulting in an expected increase in the number of accidents where people were injured. This effect, however, is not as big as the effect of traffic reductions. The total effect of the Stockholm Trial on road safety is undoubtedly judged to be positive since the positive effects of the traffic reduction are expected to be bigger than the negative effects caused by higher speeds. REVENUE USE Regarding the permanent congestion charging in Stockholm, the revenue will be used for investments in the road network. The size of the revenue from taxes paid is approximately 800 million SEK/ year (€80 million). IMPACTS PREDICTABILITY Expectations concerning the Stockholm Trial were many, as were uncertainties about how its effects would be influenced by the fact that the trial period was limited. Numerous questions centered on whether such a limited trial period would result in the large effects indicated by traffic models- road users/passengers might choose to “sit out” the trial period and not adjust their travel patterns. Even before the Stockholm Trial started, most experts were well aware that motorists are sensitive to economic incitement so expectations that the congestion tax would reduce traffic volumes were therefore well grounded.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 198

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

The reduction in traffic volume was carefully predicted by traffic modelling. Several different scenarios were tested. Other effects like emissions of carbon and particulate matter were calculated from the traffic decrease from the transport models. Volume/delay-models predicted that a decrease of 10 to 15 percent of the traffic would be enough to give substantial travel time savings. Based on the modelled predictions the expectations were that:

• traffic would decrease, but less than the forecasted 25% in the city centre o o o

speeds would increase, primarily along the north-south axis but not visibly and mostly inside the cordon

• traffic and congestion on the Essinge by-pass would increase significantly • effects during peak hours would be much larger than between peaks When comparing the outcome with the forecasts we can conclude that the overall picture was fairly correct. Figure 2-94 show the predicted and actual change in traffic flow.

Figure 2-94. Predicted and actual change in traffic flow (morning peak)

Also the average daily effects on different types of links were close to predictions, which are shown in Figure 2-95. For example the prediction of a 25 % decrease in traffic across the cordon is very close to the actual 22 %. The modelled increase on the Essinge by-pass was less than expected however. This prediction error is most likely due to that more motorists chose to go through the city centre than expected, the values of time were higher than we thought and travel time gains in the city centre were larger than predicted.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 199

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 2-95. Predicted and actual average daily effects on different types of links.

-25%

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

forecast

Minor streets inside Innerstadsgata Larger streets inside Innerstadsgata stor Arterials inside Innerstadsled

-18%

Veh.Innerstad km. inside cordon (trafikarbete)

-13%

Across cordon Avgiftssnittet

-25%

Arterials outside cordon Inre infart Arterials outside cordon Yttre far infart

-6%

Streets outside cordon Ytterstadsgata ”Ring roads” T värled

Regarding time distribution the predictions were less accurate. First, the modelling of the relative effects between am/mid-day/pm turned out completely wrong. As opposed to predictions, the actual traffic decrease was largest during pm peak hours and less during am peak. By this experience we have establish areas regarding travel times in static network models that are important for further research and development. Also the effect between peak hours was larger than expected. Figure 2-96 show modeled and actual time distribution for the trial. Figure 2-96. Forecast and outcome of time distribution. 9000

Prediction 12000

8000

10000

7000

höstvardag 2005 jan 06

Outcome

feb 06

Before trial

6000 8000

5000 6000

4000

Utan avg Med avg

Without cong.tax 4000

3000

congestion tax

During trial

2000

2000

1000

The modeled predictions missed the actual decrease in evening and night traffic as well as overestimating the changes in departure time. Furthermore, the decrease in travel time was larger than expected, more visible and occurred in a much larger area than predicted.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 200

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

23:45

22:30

21:15

20:00

18:45

17:30

16:15

15:00

13:45

12:30

11:15

10:00

08:45

07:30

06:15

05:00

03:45

02:30

01:15

0 00:00

18.45-19.00

18.00-18.15

17.15-17.30

16.30-16.45

15.45-16.00

15.00-15.15

14.15-14.30

13.30-13.45

12.45-13.00

12.00-12.15

11.15-11.30

10.30-10.45

09.45-10.00

09.00-09.15

08.15-08.30

07.30-07.45

06.45-07.00

06.00-06.15

0

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Furthermore, the revenues were overestimated before the trial. The outcome was 760 million SEK/year (€76 million) compared to the forecasted 890 million SEK/year (€89 million). This discrepancy is primarily due to an underestimation of the amount of exempted vehicles, which was assumed to be 17 % but was actually 28 % during the trial. Before the trial there were almost no data on vehicle types across the cordon. Finally, as mentioned earlier, there was no measurable effect on retail, which was according to predictions. CONCLUSIONS The congestion tax trial in Stockholm has contributed to extensive experience of planning, design, procurement, legal and tax financial framework, implementation process, enforcement, impact assessment, acceptability etc in the field of urban road pricing. The trial in 2006 was subject to an extensive evaluation in a multitude of dimensions. Major conclusions were: • • • • • • • • •

• •

• • •

Overall goals were essentially met Traffic decreased by 22 % at the cordon during charging hours, and less inside the cordon. These effects were immediate and stable. Motor traffic decreased more than expected Re-distribution of traffic with respect to time-of-day was less than expected Delays (excess travel time during the peak) were reduced by 33 % on arterials leading to the city. Traffic reductions lead to less environmental impact and better health. Vehicle emissions in the inner city were reduced by 8-14 %. Public transport was an important part of the Stockholm Trial. Public transport ridership increased by 6 %. Road safety was improved because of the reduced traffic It was difficult to determine if inhabitants experienced improved city environment Acceptability changed from a negative majority before the introduction to positive. For many citizens, the positive effects were observable by personal experience, which contributed to the change in public opinion. The technical system works The distributional effects (benefits and costs) vary among groups. Effects for disadvantaged groups were generally smaller than effects for middle and high income groups There was a marginal affect on regional trade and commerce Congestion charges are (macro)economically profitable. The yearly revenue is calculated to be approximately €80 million.

The trial and the first year of permanent congestion tax in Stockholm show that charging schemes can lead to large impact compared to other types of measures, for example traditional infrastructure investments. Another lesson from the trial is that better and/or increased public transport cannot alone reduce road traffic. Implementation of a charging scheme is unique due to local, regional and national prerequisites. However, the experience and databases from the Stockholm Trial contribute to profound knowledge in the field of urban road pricing, both as a platform for research as well as for new charging schemes around the world. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 201

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Furthermore, with a permanent introduction of congestion tax in Stockholm, we also see the need to increase our knowledge on how to operate and develop an urban road pricing scheme in a dynamic reality.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 202

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

3 The Impact Assessment of some CURACAO Case Studies

3.1

Introduction

Having collated the case studies, it is possible to produce a comparative Impact Assessment of the main results. The methodology for carrying out the Impact Assessment of the transport data collected has changed during the course of the project. In this introduction the two different approaches and the reasons for the change are described. The original methodology, as presented in the CURACAO Inception Report, was to establish a set of baseline indicators and collect data on these indicators from six ‘core’ cities (Bristol, The Hague, London, Oslo, Rome and Stockholm). The list of indicators and this methodology were presented to the CURACAO User Group in London in March 2007 and approved as an approach. During 2007 and 2008, the project partners collected the indicator data, and an initial draft of the Impact Assessment was circulated to the Steering Committee meeting in Berlin in September 2008. The outcome of discussions at the meeting was that the data collected was insufficient as a basis for drawing detailed conclusions about the impacts of urban road user charging in those cities, and in particular for a ‘compare and contrast’ exercise between the cities. For instance, out of the six case studies for which more detailed data had been collected, only four had actually implemented schemes, and there were difficulties in obtaining certain categories of data from Rome and Oslo. In addition, data was becoming available from cities outside of the original six core cities with implemented schemes, such as Milan, which was also of interest for analysis. Therefore at the Berlin Steering Committee meeting a revised approach was agreed that would better meet the requirements of the Impact Assessment. The revised methodology, rather than trying to be comprehensive, would collate available data from the 17 case studies to provide a set of key indicators. There are seven key ‘headline’ impacts that can be drawn out from an analysis of the case study data, showing that URUC is a demand management tool which can deliver the following benefits: A. Traffic Network: 1. A reduction in the number of vehicles entering the zone, of 14-23%. 2. A reduction in delays in the zone, of up to a third. B. Environment: 3. A reduction in CO2 emissions in the zone, of 13-21%. 4. A reduction in pollutant emissions in the zone, of 8-18%. C. Safety: ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 203

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

5. A reduction in the number of accidents in the zone, of 20% in the one city which recorded reliable results. D. Financial and Economic Impacts: 6. Additional finance for investment, of 50 M€ and 140 M€ per year in the two cities which recorded reliable results. 7. Despite the difficulty in evaluating the impact of URUC scheme on urban economy, we can state that no negative effects can be generally related to road charging implementation. Each of these impact areas is considered in more detail in a separate section below. Care must be exercised in using the figures to make comparisons between schemes, due to wide differences in scheme design, the baseline situation, and data collection dates. Rather, the figures should be used to give an indication of the general scale of the impacts that can be achieved with URUC. Tables with data collated for the six core cities are presented as an Appendix to D3 Case Study Results. Although sufficient data does not exist in the core cities to give a comprehensive indicator analysis, the list of indicators provides a framework for future assessments and evaluations of urban road user charging schemes.

3.2

Data collection: the original methodology in brief

CURACAO tried to adopt the MAESTRO approach already successfully employed by CUPID and PROGRESS. Within MAESTRO approach the evaluation, which is an ongoing process, was conducted in three consequential stages: I.

II.

III.

Initial evaluation, which identifies the expected impacts and their respective indicators, leads a preliminary evaluation of the project based on existing knowledge and expert opinions, and chooses evaluation method(s) for the three evaluation phases. This type of evaluation is largely qualitative in terms of expected results. Ex-ante evaluation, which estimates the likely impacts of the URUC scheme. The evaluation at this stage provides a further forecast of the expected impacts of the project against a do-nothing case. Ex-post evaluation, which analyses the actual impacts of the URUC scheme and considers whether it has met its objectives. The final analysis of the scheme will aid the comparison of data relating to URUC impacts based on observation with the donothing baseline data.

Since the majority of schemes considered were already operating or being piloted, CURACAO aimed at limiting its intervention to the ex-ante – when applicable – and ex-post evaluation. Both would have departed with the establishment of a baseline scenario (data prior to the URUC scheme), which serves as a benchmark for the ex-ante appraisal (prediction) of modelled impacts and ex-post evaluation of real life impacts. Whenever the ex-ante and expost evaluations were available in a case study, the two should have been compared. The crucial point was that the two evaluation stages should had to rely on the same dataset, ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 204

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

effectively measured through the common CURACAO indicators. As a consequence this requirement has bound the CURACAO impact assessment noticeably. The starting point was to develop a simple but solid indicator-based framework, provided that the case studies are quite diverse in nature and stage of implementation. Clearly, the goal of the Evaluation Framework, drawn from the approach used in CUPID/PROGRESS, became to identify a coherent set of data for the detection, measurement and interpretation of the main impacts of URUC. The individual nature and characteristics of the case studies, coupled with their different stages of road user charging implementation, called for a practical approach able to privilege feasibility over rigid and costly schematisation. Hence, it seemed sensible to follow the path pointed by CUPID and PROGRESS and maintain a lower profile, one which combines readily available data and information obtained with a limited use of resources. The table hereinafter, presents a selection of indicators addressed by CUPID and PROGRESS, which has been considered compatible with the constraints and the objectives of CURACAO. Table 3-1. List of Key Indicators

Indicator

Qualitative indicator Quantitative indicator

Impact area

Efficiency Change on Average vehicle speed Feeling about traffic conditions Traveller perception of RUC system reliability Change in number of vehicles entering the zone Modal split

1 2 3 4 5 Equity

Level of user acceptance Level of perception of fairness Index of opinions from the different user groups Index of opinions on ease of access Level of user awareness

6 7 8 9 10 Environment

Change on CO2 emissions Change on CO emissions Change on NOx emissions Change on particulate emissions

11 12 13 14 Scheme Finances 15 16 17 18

Investment cost Operational and maintenance system costs Revenue from charges Revenue from fees

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 205

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Indicator

Qualitative indicator Quantitative indicator

Impact area

Safety Level of perception of security condition changes

19 Health

Level of perception of air quality into the zone

20 Liveability

Level of perception of on-street liveability

21 Land Use 22 23 24 25

Change in housing location Change in activities’ locations Change in used parking places Change in trips’ destinations

The next step was to establish a baseline for providing a benchmark against which assessing the impacts of the case study schemes by collecting the common CURACAO indicators for the time period preceding the operation of the URUC schemes. Then, the second phase of data collection was performed to achieve a resulting picture of each case study characterised by a mix of quantitative and qualitative information to be used when trying to evaluate the schemes’ results. The following table illustrates the actual availability of information that ultimately induced to drop the original methodology for drawing conclusions about the impacts of urban road user charging in the case study cities, and in particular for a ‘compare and contrast’ exercise between the cities.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 206

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Table 3-2 – Overview of indicators collected

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 207

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

By considering the “core cities” the number of “usable” indicators – the blue boxes – are exhaustive only for Stockholm and partially for London and Rome, while the majority of indicators measured for Oslo are not completely reliable or too old to be evaluated. The city of Bristol, instead, constitutes a case apart because the baseline values were quite abundant but unfortunately the scheme is still not implemented so no data for an ex-post evaluation are available.

3.3

Traffic Network

3.3.1

Reduction in the Number of Vehicles Entering the Zone

The first key message to draw out from the case studies is that URUC can have a powerful impact on reducing the amount of vehicle traffic entering a delimited zone of the city during the period of operation. For example, the implementation of the London scheme had the permanent effect of removing approximately 60,000 cars from the roads per day. The CURACAO case studies show that in response to the implementation of URUC, a proportion of travellers will change their travel behaviour, either changing modes, moving their trips to times outside of the hours of operation, combining several trips into one, or foregoing travel completely. There are corresponding increases in the use of other modes of travel – public transport and cycling. Additional provision for public transport may have been made as part of the package of measures accompanying the introduction of URUC, as was the case in London and Stockholm. The changes in traffic levels entering the zone for a number of cities are shown in the following table: Table 3-3 – Change in number of vehicles entering the zone City

% change

BOLOGNA

-23%

DURHAM

-85%

LONDON

-16%

MILAN

-14%

ROME

-18%

STOCKHOLM

-22%

Notes Access reduction in LTZ during charging hours on a working day, 2004-2006. From over 2000 to approximately 200 vehicles per day. Percentage change in vehicles, 2006 figures versus 2002 figures, during charging hours (0700-1830). Decrease in vehicles accessing the Ecopass Zone (2007 versus 2008). From October 2005 to May 2008. Overall reduction in traffic crossing congestion charge cordon during charging period (0630-1829 weekdays) during the trial period.

In summary, where implemented, URUC has enabled cities to achieve reductions in traffic levels of between 14% and 23%, depending upon the nature of the scheme. The reduction in Durham was much greater, but involved a single road. As the more detailed data presented in the individual case studies shows, the traffic reduction figures are generally higher for cars - for instance, a 36% reduction in cars entering the central London congestion charging zone in 2006, against 2002 figures. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 208

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

3.3.2

A Reduction in Delays in the Zone

The second key message to draw out from the case study data is that URUC can significantly reduce traffic delays within the charging zone during the period of operation. With fewer vehicles in the zone, average vehicle speeds are increased, and journey time reliability improves. The main objective of a ‘congestion charging’ scheme is therefore met. It should be noted that the increase in speed may have the side-effect of increasing vehicle emissions, which offsets to some degree the emissions benefits from reducing the number of vehicles in the zone (see Environment chapter of SOAR). The reduction in delays recorded by the two cities where it has been measured is shown in the table below: Table 3-4 – Reduction in Delays City

% change

LONDON

-30%

STOCKHOLM

-33%

Notes Reduction in average delays in minutes per kilometre, 2002 versus 2004 figures. The largest reductions were recorded in 2003 and 2004 and average delays returned to pre-charging levels by 2007. Reduction in delay time for inbound traffic during morning peak.

In summary, in cities where it has been implemented, URUC has enabled cities to reduce traffic delays in the zone by up to a third. This reduction may be eroded over time if road space is reallocated to other purposes, such as pedestrian movement or public space.

3.3.3

Traffic Network: Lessons Learnt

The traffic network issue is strictly related to the wider economic efficiency topic, which deals – from a welfare point of view – with different dimensions such as time, money and convenience. The main reason for transport economic inefficiency is congestion, the abatement/reduction of which is one of the primary objectives of implementing a pricing scheme. Within efficiency impact area, the CURACAO indicators considered and then measured by cities were mainly the change in number of vehicles entering the zone, some indications were given on change on average vehicle speed intended as reduction in delays more than increasing the vehicle speed and only little information were collected on modal spit. The main reason for that can be attributed to both the lack of systems for traffic monitoring and the shortage of a close collaboration with traffic police. Moreover, an insufficient financial resource to be used for collecting qualitative data on people’s feeling about traffic conditions, perception of URUC system reliability, fairness and ease of access has been the main justification for the lack of information on these matters.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 209

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

When trying to compare the indicators collected among cities the major problems encountered dealt with units of measurements and geographical area considered. In Stockholm, for instance, the reduction in delay time was recorded for inbound traffic during morning peak, while London values were recorded inside the charging zone in charging hours, and finally The Hague, even not considered in the impact assessment exercise, reported the percentage of people participating to the experiment and for this reason not using their cars during peak hours. In Durham, instead, the high value of decrease in vehicles entering the zone per day was not really comparable with the other percentages because the monitored area was constituted by a single main street. Finally, which are the consequences in terms of traffic congestion in the surrounding areas have not been considered by CURACAO indicators and may be something remarkable to investigate during future exercises.

3.4

Environment

3.4.1

A Reduction in CO2 Emissions in the Zone

The third key message to draw out from the case study data is that URUC can significantly reduce carbon dioxide emissions from traffic within the charging zone. This effect is principally caused by the reduction in the number of vehicles in the zone, but other factors include a higher proportion of ‘green’ vehicles travelling into the zone, due to charging exemptions, and more efficient engine operation as traffic flows are smoothed. The reduction in carbon emissions in the zone recorded by a number of cities is shown in the table below: Table 3-5 – Reduction in CO2 Emissions City LONDON

% change -16%

MILAN

-14%

ROME STOCKHOLM

-21% -13%

Notes Change between 2002 and 2003. Change after first nine months of operation of scheme. Change in mean values between 2001 and 2004. After trial period, Jan-July 2006, Inner City.

In summary, reductions in CO2 emissions of between 13% and 21% have been achieved by cities implementing URUC.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 210

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

3.4.2

A Reduction in Pollutant Emissions in the Zone

The fourth key message to draw out from the case study data is that URUC can significantly reduce the amount of pollutant emissions measured within the zone. In common with carbon dioxide emissions, this effect is principally caused by the reduction in the number of vehicles entering the zone, and smoother traffic flows. The reduction in pollutant emissions in the zone recorded by a number of cities is shown in the table below: Table 3-6 – Reduction in Pollutant Emissions City LONDON MILAN

% change NOx -13% -17%

% change PM10 -15% -18%

ROME STOCKHOLM

-11% -8%

-13%

Notes Change between 2002 and 2003. Before and after implementation. Change in mean values between 2001 and 2004. After trial period, Jan-July 2006, Inner City.

In summary, reductions in pollutants in the zone of between 8% and 18% have been achieved by cities implementing URUC.

3.4.3 Environment: Lessons Learnt

Another primary objective when implementing a road pricing scheme is the abatement of local exhaust emissions. In this context London, Stockholm and Rome gave some useful information on how their URUC schemes have improved the air quality in terms of NOx and PM10 emissions reduction. The city of Oslo did not provide any useful environmental data because they were derived from a modeling tool and not from on field measurements. In this context the main barrier in data gathering has been the cities’ lack of environmental monitoring stations and data collection and transmission systems. An additional observation that could be useful for further evaluation exercises is that within CURACAO the evaluation of RUC environmental impacts did not consider the car fleet transition that could be come true during the scheme implementation. Often a RUC scheme by exempting green cars helps boost the market. On the other hand it must be took in mind that the larger the part of the car fleet exempt from charges, the smaller effect will charging have on vehicle mileage. Finally, which are the consequences in terms of levels of air quality in the surrounding areas have not been considered by CURACAO indicators and may be something interesting to examine during future exercises. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 211

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

3.5

Safety

3.5.1

A Reduction in the Number of Accidents in the Zone

The fifth key message to draw out from the case study data is that URUC can reduce the amount of road traffic casualties within the zone. This effect is related to the reduction in the overall number of vehicles in the zone. While increased speeds can lead to more accidents, this is offset by the overall reduction in traffic. It has not been possible to obtain reliable data from the most recent indicator data for cities such as London and Stockholm in the case study work. The reduction in casualties recorded by Milan is shown in the table below: Table 3-7 – Reduction in Accidents in the Zone

City MILAN

3.5.2

% change accidents

% change injuries

Notes

-14.4%

-14.2%

Accidents within the Ecopass area after first year of operation.

Safety: Lessons Learnt

Effects of a traffic measure on road safety are generally difficult to evaluate and when the considered period is rather short it could be even harder. The original CURACAO indicator chosen for evaluating the safety issue was the level of perception of security condition changes, rather a qualitative indicator, information on which have been provided by Bristol and Manchester, cities where unfortunately none URUC scheme was implemented. The city of London, Oslo and Stockholm, instead, provided data on reduction in accidents in the charging zone but not completely reliable and thus not used for an impact evaluation on safety; and only the city of Milan made available some useful data on accidents. In this context is extremely important that cities could provide data derived, for instance, from a road accident database with localization of road accidents in a GIS and/or improve accident reporting through GPS technology. Finally, which are the consequences in terms of number of accidents and people injured in the surrounding areas have not been considered by CURACAO indicators and may be something to analyse during future exercises.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 212

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

3.6

3.6.1

Financial and Economic Impacts

Revenues Raised for Investment

The sixth message to draw out from the case study data is that cities which have implemented URUC have achieved significant levels of revenue for reinvestment. After initial set up costs and running costs are taken into account, URUC schemes can generate significant streams of funding for public transport and other transport improvements. Indeed in many cases the provision of extra capacity in public transport is a key prerequisite before URUC goes live. It should be noted that actual scheme revenues can turn out to be less than those estimated prior to going live, due to the number of exempted vehicles (Stockholm), and the generally higher than anticipated reduction in traffic levels (London). For the Italian schemes, while data is available for overall revenues from tickets, passes and fines, it has not been possible to obtain data on net revenues after the scheme running costs have been deducted, except the case of city of Rome. The revenues raised for cities where figures are available are shown in the table below: Table 3-8 – Additional Finance for Investment City LONDON ROME STOCKHOLM

Annual Revenue €140m €51m €52m

Notes Net revenues 2006-7 Estimated net annual revenues Estimated annual revenues

The revenues available for investment in public transport are not necessarily permanently assured. In Stockholm a change of national government has meant that the revenues from the congestion charging system will now be used to fund the building of a new bypass to the west of Stockholm.

3.6.2

Urban Economy

The seventh and final key dimension considered has been the impact of URUC schemes on urban economy. Generally, it can be stated that no negative impacts were faced after the implementation of URUC schemes. Nevertheless, even if no substantial information was provided by CURACAO cities on this topic, some interesting analysis will be illustrated in the following paragraphs.

Evaluation of Urban Economy in London54

The TfL report concluded that since the introduction of the scheme, no significant consequences or variations on business activity in aggregate have so far been identifiable. The 54

Source: “Impacts Monitoring: Sixth Annual Report”, July 2008 – Transport for London. “Impacts Monitoring: Fifth Annual report”, July 2007 – Traffic for London. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 213

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

monitoring of the scheme indicates that since congestion charging was introduced, there have been no discernable significant effects – positive or negative – on businesses and the London economy that appear to be due to charging. Secondly, it is affirmed that the central London economy is particularly susceptible to trends in factors such as tourism. Any assessment of the attributable impacts of congestion charging on businesses and London’s economy is therefore a difficult task and cannot be done in isolation from wider economic factors. Quantitative assessments of business impacts are critically limited by the quality and quantity of the available input data. In general, transport costs are a relatively minor aspect of much business activity and the broad effects of congestion charging on the cost of business operations and on customer disposable income are marginal. However, it is possible that some businesses will be more than marginally affected – either positively or negatively – though attributing this specifically to congestion charging can be difficult. Given a five-year view of the scheme in the wider context of transport developments in central London, it was clear that the scheme had tended to accentuate pre-existing positive trends (eg reduced road traffic collisions) and reversed negative trends (eg increasing congestion), while having a broadly neutral impact on the London economy and on social activities. The scheme had a broadly neutral impact on the central London economy – other factors unrelated to charging having a much more pervasive influence on business performance in central London. The main findings can be listed as follows: •

• •

•

• • • •

General economic trends were seen to have been the predominant influence on the performance of central London businesses over recent years, and the central London economy had actually performed particularly strongly since the introduction of congestion charging in 2003, which itself coincided with an economic upturn. This comparatively strong relative performance in central London continued into 2007, despite increasingly difficult conditions towards the end of the year. A cost-benefit analysis of the original central London scheme, reported in the Fifth Annual Impacts Monitoring Report, suggests that the identified benefits exceeded the cost of operating the scheme by a ratio of about 1.5 with the original charge and, with less certainty, a ratio of about 1.7 with the actual charge. The four quarters of weekday retail footfall55 traffic, since the start of charging in the western extension zone in February 2007, show a continuation of the downward trend which pre-dates the extension scheme. Weekend retail footfall data show comparable declining trends. In the six months after the introduction of charging, rental value growth of office properties in the western extension zone was stronger than in the rest of inner London and ahead of comparable locations such as Bromley, Kingston and Richmond. It is important to note the financial and business difficulties associated with the ‘credit crunch’ did not materially impact the property markets until around the fourth quarter 2007. Business owners and employers in the western extension zone reported weaker sales and profitability in 2007 compared to 2006 in a TfL telephone survey of local businesses. TfL on-street surveys found that over 90 percent of shoppers and diners in the western extension said that they had not changed their trip patterns since the introduction of charging. Of the approximately 10 percent of visitors who said they had changed, the most common responses were to use public transport instead of the car or to make fewer journeys to the area.

Focus on the Western Extension Zone 55

TfL have a longstanding programme of monitoring retail traffic indicators which measure the number of people going into a representative sample of shops. This is known as ‘footfall’ and is supplied by SPSL, an independent commercial provider, on a weekly basis. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 214

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

TfL have a wide ranging monitoring programme, comparable to that of central London charging zone, examining the business and economic impacts of charging in the western extension zone. The programme uses a mix of independent ‘official’ data sources complemented by TfL surveys to increase the breadth and depth of monitoring and to provide timely coverage where publication lags delay the release of data. The latest analysis shows positive business and economic performance in the western extension zone in the run up to charging in 2006: rising business turnover and profitability; large increases in tourist visitors; and strengthening property markets. The indicators post-dating the introduction of western extension charging show mixed initial results. Six to nine months into 2007, businesses report weaker sales and profitability, while tourist visitors to museums in the western extension zone are lower. This compares with strong performances in 2006, and may predominantly mirror developing trends in the wider economy. Other indicators post-dating charging including footfall and property markets show a continuation of past trends. In contrast to previous annual reports, within the Sixth Annual report quarterly averages have been calculated to make it easier to identify trends, due to a high degree of variability in weekly data. Figure 3-1 shows quarterly averages of retail traffic, based on weekly data, indexed to 2005, for the western extension zone, the central London charging zone and Greater London between 2005 and early 2008. The shopper footfall data, as expected, reveals a degree of seasonality with peaks during Christmas (quarter 4), and troughs during spring and summer months (quarter 2 and quarter 3). Importantly, immediately following the introduction of charging in the western extension zone, in approximately quarter 1 2007, there was no marked decline in the level of weekly shopper footfall. However, there appears to be a falling long term background trend in weekly footfall in both charged and non-charged areas, and while this appears more pronounced in the western extension zone, it pre-dates the introduction of charging.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 215

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Figure 3-1. Retail traffic (footfall) indicator, western extension zone, central London charging zone and Greater London. Weekly data. 2005 to 2007.

Separating weekly data between weekdays and weekends, as shown in Figure 3-2, reveals that footfall trends in the western extension zone on weekdays are comparable to those at weekends when the charge in not applied, both before and after the introduction of charging.

Figure 3-2. Retail traffic (footfall) indicator, western extension zone. Weekdays and weekend. 2004 to 2007.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 216

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

It appears from this data that activity in the main shopping areas of the western extension zone has been in decline, but that this predates the introduction of charging. Furthermore, similar trends have been seen during weekends when charging has never been applied.

Evaluation of Urban Economy in Norwegian cities In the case of Norwegian cities, the impacts on the urban economy are difficult to discern. In Oslo the main efforts have been spent to make surveys among people by focussing mainly on users’ acceptability56 instead of understanding if there was a real influence of road charging on city businesses. In Bergen, instead, there is evidence that Saturdays were deliberately kept free from tolls in order to support the city’s shops. However, the effect on city centre shopping is not known. Moreover, the reduction in congestion is likely to have boosted productivity which may have impacted on economic growth.

Evaluation of Urban Economy during the Stockholm57 Trial In Stockholm there were concerns that retailers inside the cordon would be adversely affected (see Quduss et al. 2007 for a recent evaluation). However, studies of retail markets made during the trial were not able to show any effects of the congestion charges (see also the study by Daunfeldt et al. 2008). For example, a survey in shopping centres, malls and department stores showed that shopping for durable goods developed at the same rate as in the rest of the country. The same holds for other retail sectors. A major reason for the absence of impacts on the retail sector strong enough to be detected is considered to be that the effects of the congestion tax on average disposable income were small (around one tenth of a percent).

3.6.3

Scheme Finances: Lessons Learnt

Implementation of Road Pricing generates revenues and contributes to financing other projects and supporting other operational costs. The acceptability of the scheme is likely to be highly dependent on the extent to which it seeks to raise surplus revenues, and on the uses made of any surplus revenues. For that reason the indicators collected on city finance concerned the revenue from charges and from fees, the investment costs, and the operational and maintenance system costs. Such information has been provided by London, Stockholm and Rome, and partially obtained from the city of Milan. Also in this context the units of 56

The results showed that most (38%) of people interviewed sees the toll ring as an unfair additional tax, while a 10% perceives the system as an economic injustice, because the revenues are not used for road infrastructures improvements. 57 Source: “The Stockholm Congestion-Charging Trial 2006: Overview of Effects” ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 217

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

measurement were slightly different because while London has provided the “real” net revenues, Rome and Stockholm values were just estimations and so to be taken into account carefully. Concerning the appraisal of urban economy issue, it turned out to be difficult, and necessarily tentative, for several reasons. Firstly, the congestion charging scheme in most of case studies is relatively recent and short-term behavioral reactions may not hold in the medium-term. Some of the changes induced by the charge (for instance changes in business location) will require several years to materialize. Secondly, some of the recorded changes in transport patterns (which are often uncritically attributed to the congestion charge) may in reality be caused by exogenous events58. Moreover, in some cases the congestion charge could be the most important element, but not the only one, of the policy changes that a city might have introduced during the same period (e.g. increase of bus supply). Finally, very little information is know about what happens outside the charged zone, as a consequence of the charge and may be something to consider during future exercises.

58

A clear example could be the drop in London subway patronage in 2003, which is mostly the consequence of the temporary closure of a subway line. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 218

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

3.7

Conclusions

Cities that have pursued or are considering the introduction of road user charging have, as their dominant objectives, to improve the efficiency of transport system, to improve the urban environment, and to generate revenue to pay for infrastructure improvements. The evidence from cities with implemented schemes is that all of these objectives can successfully be achieved by road user charging. The urban road user charging schemes that have been implemented in Europe have demonstrated substantial reductions in private car trips and levels of congestion, increased use of public transport, and improved environmental conditions. In the case of London Congestion Charging of Central zone the overall conclusion is positive. Many of the fears, prior to implementation, amongst key groups such as the business (retail) sector have been allayed. TfL report that analysis of business performance (sales and profitability) and business start-up (VAT registrations) shows stronger – both absolute and relative – growth in the original central London charging zone post charging than prior to the introduction of charging in 200359. Furthermore in the Central Zone bus service reliability and patronage both appear to have steadily improved over time, compared with pre-charging conditions, although there has been some indication that increased traffic congestion was beginning to impact on service performance, both within the charging zone and more widely across London. Again increased congestion in 2006 is considered by TfL to be largely due to a rise in the number of road-works in Central London and not the Congestion Charge. Of course road pricing will be more effective if integrated with policies to promote public transport, to reallocate road space and to manage land use. These measures are also likely to reduce the adverse impacts of road pricing on those travelers who are most disadvantaged by it. However, the best combination of these policy instruments will depend critically on the city context in which they are being applied. In the city of Rome, for example, further road pricing related activities are going to be developed on access control of coaches. To date, their access is detected by the ANPR system, but after an early check they are left free to use the urban space independently from the permit they bought. A feasibility study on new technology application has been carried out by the European project MIRACLES, and during CURAÇAO a pilot application for the introduction of specific per-time road pricing policies has been analysed. Nevertheless it is worth to notice that, while people frequently complain about traffic, often the public as a whole does not think congestion levels bad enough to warrant major policy initiatives, particularly when they perceive that the costs of the initiative will be too high. In addition, many people suspect that congestion pricing is aimed at not only financing infrastructure but also paying for general policy objectives. For this reason, surveys frequently find that if the respondents are confident that revenue will be used for a specific transportation related purpose, such as public transport, they are more likely to support a congestion pricing initiative. Mistrust of government, and particularly suspicions that a commitment to use revenue for a particular purpose will be overturned in the future, can easily undermine support for any pricing program. In terms of congestion pricing in central London, the revenue generated is earmarked for transport-related projects. This is also the case for any other authority considering the implementation of a congestion pricing scheme in England and Wales in line with the Transport Act (2000).

59

Transport for London (July 2008) Central London Congestion Charging – Impacts monitoring Sixth Annual Report. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 219

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

Other public concerns, which often extend to political leaders as well, revolve around privacy and the reliability of the technology on which the pricing system relies. An examination of some experiences helps illustrate conditions that may be necessary, though not sufficient, to move from a proposed system to implementation. Among the essential ingredients are the following:

9 Severity of congestion; 9 Strategic exemptions (to underscore the program’s policy objectives and address equity

9 9 9 9 9

concerns, pricing policy usually excludes certain residents, alternative fuel vehicles, emergency vehicles, vehicles with nine or more seats, emergency vehicles, and vehicles driven by disabled people from the fee); Clarity of objectives, with an explicit line drawn to transport demand management; Proper hypothecation, or earmarking, of revenues. A pledge to dedicate revenues to public transport was a popular choice given the public’s widespread perception of its current financial needs outstripping available resources; Easily understood technologies. While it may be necessary to refine the fee collection system at a later date, a pricing system is more likely to be adopted if the initial system is simple and can be explained quickly and clearly to the public at large; Single implementing agency; Strong presentation (a clear and well-composed presentation of the problem and the proposal, and the development of first-rate communication tools, including, for example, a highly effective website).

In the case of Manchester Congestion Charge failure, it is difficult to categorically state the reasons for the negative referendum result in December 2008 but some practitioners and commentators60 have offered the following as possible reasons:

9 The public misunderstood the proposals and thought that the congestion charge would 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

apply anytime, anywhere. The debate never focused on public transport improvements, just on the congestion charge. The public did not believe that public transport would get better after Government Minister Alistair Darling withdrew Government funding from the Metrolink ‘Big Bang’ project in 2004. People therefore thought they would get the tax but not see the benefits. The current economic climate means that people are less likely to vote for something that is perceived as another tax. Greater Manchester’s governance structures did not assist with the prospect of delivering an ambitious transport project as a number of councils would have to agree on the proposals before they were accepted. Assurances to the business community were not given as fully as they should have been and thus many were against the charge. Campaigners for the congestion charge did not fully focus on the health benefits of the congestion charge. It appears that campaigning was not at a local level and therefore did not touch on the issues that really mattered to the public. Benefits/costs should be defined on a community by community basis.

60

The comments noted here were recorded in Local Transport Today. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 220

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

This does provide a number of considerations rather than direct lessons for other cities who may be considering urban road user charging, not least the apparent lack of confidence in the proposed scheme and how it was perceived. In time, there may be more defined arguments and reasons presented for the resounding public rejection of the proposal in the referendum, not least that the public were asked to decide on a hypothetical scheme before they could see the benefits of a ‘real life’ scheme. In the Scottish case, in spite of the referendum rejection, there are some positive aspects to the development of Edinburgh’s charging scheme. Many challenges were overcome, not least achieving a positive outcome from a public inquiry. The work undertaken demonstrated a clear public view that congestion is a problem and public transport needs improvement. The experience of Edinburgh in meeting the statutory requirements for introducing a congestion charging scheme should be of some comfort to other cities considering a similar scheme, as should Edinburgh’s success in developing cost-effective business systems for implementation. Finally, the Norwegian example showed that the general public view of the Oslo toll ring has been negative over the entire period. However, the attitude has changed over time. More people were negative before the toll ring was introduced compared to after. Also the price increase to finance Oslo package 3 reduced acceptability temporarily. When people are informed of the use of revenue, they turn more positive. In light of the failure to implement true congestion charging schemes in some urban areas (such as Edinburgh), it is clear that pure economic arguments are not enough. We live in a democracy, where economists and car drivers have the same right to be heard in general elections. The Norwegian urban toll schemes have developed with this as a clear prerequisite. This makes it necessary, also to consider the Oslo toll schemes in a political and organisational context, and consider the acceptability of the schemes discussed. Both the charging scheme and the revenue use are far from optimal from an economic point of view. Nevertheless, the Oslo packages have contributed to a more efficient transportation system both for roads and for PT. Also the packages have created a dynamic, where both the revenue use and the charging scheme have changed in the direction of a more economic efficient system. The proposed Oslo package 3 is another step in that direction. Some important lessons from the history of the Trondheim charging scheme, adopted from Langmyhr and Sager (1997) and Langmyhr (2001): 9

9

9

9

Road pricing schemes can be hooked up with several interests and objectives which are likely to be negotiated and reinterpreted on several occasions throughout the long and messy policy process, even after implementation. Compromises in the scheme design do not necessarily jeopardise the road pricing rationale or corrupt "rational" transport planning. It seems more fruitful to speak of changed emphasis responding to public attitudes and political preferences. The often formulated ideal of one principal, unambiguous goal as the best way to implement road pricing or congestion pricing is not supported by the Trondheim case. Several objectives have been present, preparing some common ground for agreement and flexibility. Experience from Norway clearly indicate that earmarking of revenues for specific purposes has been of major importance in securing local support for the cordon pricing schemes.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 221

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

9

9

"Immediate" road construction to relieve bottlenecks reduced the unpopularity of user fees. (In addition, user fees have been supplemented by state funds, thus increasing the total amount of investment resources.) Evidence from Norway indicates that if the range of disbursement purposes becomes wide (i.e., less biased towards road construction), the role of the County Roads Offices as road pricing promoters may be jeopardised. Thus, a strategy for building scheme support through revenue allocation must rest on an assessment of the institutional system, especially an evaluation of which actors may serve as prominent "innovation" promoters.

Thanks to the CURACAO experience we collected and compared data from different cities that experienced Road User Charging Scheme implementation at different levels. The main critical point raised on that has been the necessity of high quality data and, consequently, meaningful indicators to allow cities to perform a good evaluation and monitoring of their own RUC schemes. Therefore, without putting resources on high quality data collection there is no chance to implement a valid and fruitful charging scheme in any city context.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 222

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

4 ANNEX A - The Urban Road User Charging Activities in Other European Union Countries

Country

Czech Republic

Denmark Finland

France

Germany

Hungary

Latvia

Malta

Status Update The town of Znojmo levies a €1 toll for 24 hours of access to the town centre, plus a parking fee. Two toll machines have been installed near the entrance towers to the town walls, while residents and workers can buy an annual ticket. It is estimated that traffic levels in the town centre were been reduced by two thirds following the implementation of the scheme. Copenhagen is currently investigating options for a RUC scheme. Helsinki has set up a project team to investigate options for a RUC scheme. French national law currently prohibits the levying of urban tolls. The conclusions of the French government’s environmental round table in Autumn 2007 encourage the development of environmental taxation tools designed to reduce private car use. These conclusions recommend giving local authorities "the power to introduce urban tolls […] in order to regulate traffic […] and finance environmentally favourable actions such as public transport". 24 German cities will have implemented Environmental Green Zones up until the end of 2008, including Berlin, Cologne, and Hannover. Vehicles entering the Green Zone must display a badge related to the emission level of the vehicle (green, yellow or red). Vehicles without environmental badge may not enter the Green Zone, on penalty of a €40 fine. This requirement applies to vehicles registered in foreign countries as well. A background document on RUC alternatives for Budapest was prepared in 2008. There is a RUC scheme in old part of the city of Riga. The aim of the RUC scheme is to protect the UNESCO heritage site of the old town of Riga, to give priority to walking in this area, and to make it more attractive to tourists. To enter the zone it costs €5 for the first hour and an increasing fee for each subsequent hour. There is a working group on road charging matters that consists of members from the Ministry of Transport and its institutions and members of Riga City Council and its institutions. Valetta implemented a Controlled Vehicular Access scheme on 1 May 2007. The system makes use of dedicated cameras that are installed in twelve points around Valletta and which photograph vehicles entering and exiting the CVA boundary. The system identifies the vehicle, calculates the time the vehicle spent inside the Valletta CVA boundary and computes a fee due for access and parking. The first half hour is free and the maximum charge is €6.52.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 223

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

5 ANNEX B – European Urban Road user Charging Schemes Timeline

1986 Bergen

1989 Bologna

1990 Oslo Package 1

1991 Trondheim

1998 Trondheim revised toll charging scheme

2001 Nord-Jæren 2001 Oslo Package 2 (the Oslo Toll Ring prolonged until 2008) 2001 Rome central area 2001 Bergen 24-hour operation on weekdays

2002 Durham Saddler Street congestion charge introduced

2003 London central area congestion charge introduced 2003 Bologna cameras added 2003 The Bergen Toll Ring prolonged for 10 years (the Bergen Programme)

2004 UK government launches Transport Innovation Fund (TIF) ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 224

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2004 Swedish National Parliament takes decision on congestion charging trial 2004 Trondheim second and final extension

2005 Bologna uses IT-based pricing system 2005 Edinburgh referendum rejects scheme 2005 Netherlands proposal to introduce a national scheme 2005 Trondheim scheme ended 2005 UK government launches “debate” on national road pricing 2005-2008 Rome extensions

2006 Stockholm congestion charging trial 2006 Stockholm congestion charging referendum 2006 The Hague incentives trial 2006 Bergen second ring introduced

2007 London Western Extension introduced 2007 Stockholm permanent scheme 2007 Bristol outline proposition submitted to Department for Transport

2008 Amsterdam proposes to start Dutch system early 2008 London review of Western Extension 2008 Manchester TIF scheme receives Government approval 2008 Manchester Referendum overwhelmingly rejected the scheme 2008 Milan Ecopass 2008 The Oslo Toll Ring extended and prolonged for 20 more years (Oslo Package 3) ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 225

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development

Coordination of Urban Road User Charging Organisational Issues www.curacaoproject.eu

2009? Amsterdam trial

2012? Netherlands national scheme operational

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 226

CURACAO is financed under the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development