THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN A CONFESSIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE LEBANESE CASE MICHAEL W. SULEIMAN Kansas State

University

PAPER EXAMINES the role of political parties in Lebanon, a country with a type of democratic system not familiar in the democratic West. The -M- first task, therefore, will be to present a brief account of how &dquo;confessional democracy&dquo; operates in Lebanon and to arrive at a definition of &dquo;political party&dquo; suitable for the purpose. After stressing the minority characteristic of all parties in Lebanon, a distinction will be made between &dquo;Lebanese&dquo; and &dquo;trans-national&dquo; parties. This will facilitate the differentiation between the functions performed by each group on the Lebanese scene and their comparison with functions performed by parties in other countries. It is assumed that, apart from certain basic exceptions, the functions political parties perform depend on the kind of political system in which they are found and on the needs of the particular public. The Lebanese case will be utilized to test certain hypotheses concerning the number, usefulness and role of parties in a political system. Confessional democracy, as it operates in Lebanon, assures each religious sect a share in parliamentary, governmental, and civil service offices which is proportionate to that group’s numerical strength in the country’s population.’ The Lebanese government recognizes seventeen religious sects, all of which are minorities anxious to safeguard and enhance their status. As a consequence, freedom of worship, speech, and assembly has been much coveted and generally observed. It is obvious that this arrangement is democratic in the sense that it provides representation for all minorities in the population. Majoritarian democracy, where a party or a group of representatives acts on behalf of the whole population and for the public welfare, remains an alien concept in Lebanon. Lebanese confessionalism is not restricted to governmental institutions. Indeed, confessionalism on the governmental level is to a great extent a reflection of the breakdown of society into numerous self-conscious religious communities anxious to maintain their identity and separate status. It is not the place here to discuss the origins and causes of Lebanese confessionalism.2 Sufhce it to say that it exists, permeates every governmental agency, and envelopes every social structure in the country, including political parties.

HIS

NOTE: This article is a revision of three chapters in Michael W. Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1967). The material which is printed here is with the permission of Cornell University Press. 1 For a good survey of the workings of Lebanese confessional democracy, see Ralph E. Crow, "Religious Sectarianism in the Lebanese Political System," Journal of Politics, 24 (August 1962), 489-520; Malcolm H. Kerr, "Political Decision-Making in a Confessional Democracy," in Leonard Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 187212 ; and Pierre Rondot, "The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy," ibid., pp. 127-41. 2 For a good historical treatise, see K. S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (New York:

Praeger, 1965).

682

683

political party to be defined? In view of the fact that Lebanon is not a Western-type political democracy and inasmuch as what pass for political parties in that country differ in their functions from &dquo;modern political parties,&dquo; some deviation from, or alterations of, more conventional definitions are necessary. Ranney and Kendall’s definition,3 for instance, specifically relates to parties in Western democratic systems. But if, following the Ranney-Kendall definition, this study is restricted to &dquo;autonomous&dquo; parties and those which seek power through the electoral process, then many parties operating in Lebanon today would have to be ignored. Such parties happen to be of far greater importance in Lebanon than are their counterparts in an established Western democracy, however, and should, therefore, be But how is

included. A more suitable definition is that of Sigmund Neumann,

namely that a political

party is &dquo;the articulate organization of society’s active political agents, those who are concerned with the control of governmental power and who compete for popular support with another group or groups holding divergent views.&dquo;¢ Yet it is useful to deviate from this definition also, and count as parties the two religious organizations, Ibad ar-Rahman and the Moslem Group. The deviation is necessitated by the fact that these two Moslem groups do not differ much from political parties in the role they play on the Lebanese scene. Thus, while all nineteen organizations in the country formulate alternative policies from which political leaders may choose, their primary function appears to be the &dquo;education&dquo; of the public in their particular point of view. This particularistic political socialization inculcates or intensifies already existing differences. No aggregation of interests on a national level is attempted or thought feasible. Furthermore, both the political parties and the two Moslem groups influence the decision-making process only indirectly, through criticism of policies and officials and the stirring of public opinion. They have never exercised much direct influence in shaping Lebanese domestic or foreign policy. Most of them, in fact, began as movements or youth organizations, with many still existing outside the political system. Consequently, Lebanese parties are not in the main electoral organizations but ideological groupings, primarily interested in gaining converts to their various causes. They do not really compete for power in the Western sense. The real center of power in Lebanon lies in the presidency and the president is assumed to be &dquo;above parties.&dquo;5 Many parties have long decided that the electoral process is not their road to power. But even among those which have been interested in parliamentary representation, no party or combination of parties has ever captured enough seats in the Lebanese legislature to be able to mold or direct the country’s political are autonomous organized groups that make nominations and contest elections in the hope of eventually gaining and exercising control of the personnel and policies of government." Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 85. 4 Sigmund Neumann, Modern Political Parties (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 396. Another appropriate definition is provided by E. E. Schattschneider, "A political party is first of all an organized attempt to get [political] power," Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1942), p. 35. ’ Bishara el-Khoury, for instance, boasted that from the moment he was elected president of the republic he ceased to be head of his own Constitutional Bloc. See his Haqa’iq Lubnaniyya (Arabic), Lebanese Truths, II (Harisa, Basil Bros. Press, 1960), 16.

3 "Political parties

684

destiny.6 Even in 1960 and 1964, when the parties began to campaign seriously for parliamentary ofhce, some eight to nine parties held a total of only 34 and 27 seats (out of 99) respectively (see Table I ) . The other seats have been held by feudal leaders, landlords, financiers, etc., mostly organized in fairly well-defined blocs. TABLE 1 PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERSHIP OF PARTIES

IN

LEBANON*

(1951-1964)

*

Party membership before 1951 is either indeterminate, flexible or non-existent. fi Ghassan Tweini was a member of Parliament from 1951 to 1957 but not as a PPS representative. He had already left the party although he might have continued to sympathize with some of its views. t Dashnak, pro-Dashnak or Dashnak-supported. Source: Michael W. Suleiman, &dquo;Political Parties in Lebanon&dquo; (Ph.D. dissertation, U. of Wisconsin, 1965), p. 298.

It is evident that all parties in Lebanon are minor ones. According to Duverger, such minor parties are &dquo;led into demagogy by the very nature of the system.&dquo;? The fact that they cannot hope for governmental control renders them irresponsible, making extremist and unrealizable demands &dquo;in order to reserve for themselves as 6 This was also true when Bishara el-Khoury was in power. His first elevation to the presidency was pretty much dictated by outside forces (the British), and the second time he found willing agents to renew his mandate. The Constitutional Bloc was never strong enough by itself to uphold el-Khoury and/or his policies. These observations emerge even from el-Khoury’s own accounts of the above events. Ibid., I, 255-65; III, 121-26. 7 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, trans. Barbara and Robert North (London, Methuen and Co., 1955), p. 285.

685 wide a field of retreat as is possible&dquo; in arriving at a compromise. But this argument surely reversible and it can just as convincingly be suggested that the extremist and demagogic nature of the parties leads to their minority status and exclusion from governmental participation. Indeed, the very fragmentation of Lebanese society and the resultant multiplicity and diversity of the organs of political socialization in the country strongly support the latter suggestion. Nevertheless, undoubtedly there is a good deal of feedback here which provides for an interplay of both factors. Parties in Lebanon, in addition to being minor ones, are also confessional. Almost in every case, some religious group constitutes the predominant element in the party. Also, since the various religious groups happen to congregate in large numbers in particular areas of the country, political parties in Lebanon end up being sectional as well as confessional. Thus, apart from Beirut in which almost all religious groups are represented, each party has a regional stronghold. The confessional, sectional, and minority characteristics certainly have a bearon ing the role of Lebanese parties. While these traits are common to all parties in Lebanon, there are distinct differences between two types of parties found in the country differences which influence the functions performed by each group. Parties in Lebanon may conveniently be divided into (1) those which are exclusively of Lebanese character, i.e., acknowledge the independence, integrity, and well-being of the country within its present borders, and (2’) those which advocate and work for a new and different trans-national entity in which Lebanon would be absorbed or fragmented.&dquo; Thirteen parties or groups belong to the first category and six are included under the second.9 is

-

&dquo;LEBANESE&dquo;

AND

TRANS-NATIONAL PARTIES

Although the parties in both categories are to a great extent confessional, they differ as to the cause of confessional composition of their membership. The exclusively Lebanese parties cater to and solicit a confessional audience and champion its causes; whereas trans-national parties actively attempt to do away with confessionalism altogether but are frustrated in their attempt because some of their aims and programs appeal to certain confessional groups and are opposed by others. Consequently, they are reduced to primarily confessional membership against their will. Another distinguishing feature is that all trans-national parties denounce and call for the repudiation of the confessional electoral-governmental system. The others, however, either desire to impose their own religious system (Moslem groups) or frankly admit the usefulness of the confessional set-up. The Najjada, for instance, denounces confessionalism not because it is basically bad but because the particular Lebanese arrangement allegedly underrepresents the Moslems. Only the Progressive Socialists of the &dquo;Lebanese&dquo; parties actually denounce the confessional system while 8 This is

a better arrangement for my purpose and a more meaningful one in the Lebanese case than a distinction between "mass" and "patron" parties, which was made by Ruth Schachter in her "Single-Party Systems in West Africa," APSR, 55 (June 1961), 294-307. 9 The six trans-national parties are the Communists, PPS, Ba’ath, ANM, Tahreer, and Moslem Brethren. The three Armenian parties (Dashnak, Hunchak, and Ramgavar Azadagan) may not be nor are they classified as trans-national although they do have branches in other countries, because they do not aim to transform Lebanon into an Armenian state nor to merge it into any union.

686

displaying pact.10

a

great lack of decisiveness

on one

particular aspect of

it: the national

Personalismo, &dquo;the tendency of the politically active sectors of the population follow or oppose a leader for personal, individual and family reasons rather than because of the influence of a political idea, program, or party,&dquo;&dquo; is a trait characteristic of Lebanese as well as Latin American politics. But because of the ideologicaldoctrinaire character of the trans-national parties, personalismo is almost non-existent and charismatic leadership is more evident. Thus, Khaled Bakdash 12 (Communist), Antun Saadeh (PPS) and Gamal Abdul Nasser~3 (Arab nationalist groups) are all charismatic personalities. The exclusively Lebanese parties, however, apart from the Armenians, are mostly divided on the basis of which leader or clan to follow. For many years, the followers of the Constitutional Union and the National Bloc were known simply as &dquo;Khourys&dquo; and &dquo;Eddes,&dquo; after their leaders. The National Liberals’ party is indistinguishable from Chamoun; whereas the PSP is nothing without Kamal Jumblatt. All trans-national parties in Lebanon are illegal because they call for the dissolution of the country into a different whole or entity of some form. Thus, the ANM and the Ba’ath want Lebanon to be part of a greater Arab world, the PPS advocates a greater Syria, etc. Though banned, they are tolerated and unofficially allowed to operate, publish their own newspapers and even hold meetings. The government cracks down on them, however, in times of crisis or when they present a serious threat to the constituted authorities, e.g., the PPS in 1949 and 1961/62 and the Tahreer in 1964. Though it is maintained here that the trans-national parties are in essence declared illegal because of their extremist ideologies, the fact that they are denied the privileges and duties of public office does nothing to moderate their views. Nevertheless, the main factor contributing to their extremism does not appear to be the denial of political power since they reject partial victories and wait for the day when they can be the sole rulers. All exclusively Lebanese parties advocate reform rather than revolution or violent change. They accept the Lebanese political system albeit tentatively and seek to change some of its features to suit their purposes. Trans-national parties, however, are of the ideological-doctrinaire-totalitarian type, all of them originating as movements or extra-parliamentary groups. They despise the political element as bad, opportunistic and unethical. They are not concerned with mere change of rulers but in introducing a revolutionary transformation throughout society and the to

-

-

10 The "national pact" of 1943 was an informal agreement between the leaders of two major factions in the country: Bishara el-Khoury, the then Maronite President, and Riad es-Solh, the Sunni Premier at the time. The pact stipulated that Lebanon had an "Arab face" but that it would seek whatever was good in Western culture. In order to please the Arab-Moslem faction, it was agreed that Lebanon would be "neither a station nor a pathway for imperialism" in the Arab world. To reassure the Maronite-Christian sector, the pact served as a legalization of the concept of "Lebanon as an end" instead of "Lebanon as a step along the road" to a bigger Arab or Moslem world. See el-Khoury, op. cit., I, 199-200, II, Appendix, 289-99; and the Republic of Lebanon’s Al-Jarida ar-rasmiyya (Arabic), Official Gazette (September 23, 1943), p. 13. 11

George I. Blanksten, as quoted in Arthur S. Banks and Robert Survey (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 102.

12

Bakdash, a Syrian, dominated the Communist party in both Syria and Lebanon. Most Arab nationalist groups consider the Egyptian president their leader.

"

B.

Textor,

A

Cross-Polity

687

body politic. They attack not only abuses but the very system as corrupt and inherently exploitive, which is another reason why they are banned by the Lebanese authorities. Among the exclusively Lebanese parties, there are some which are ideological while others are not, being primarily interested in winning elections. It is interesting to note that only four parties in Lebanon (Constitutional Union, National Bloc, National Appeal and National Liberals) had their beginning as parliamentary groupings, all the rest being mass movements or youth organizations when founded. All the trans-national parties show little or no interest in local Lebanese issues, rather concentrating on grandiose economic and foreign policy questions such as socialist theories, Lebanese-Syrian-Arab relations, East-West conflicts, etc. They ignore local issues because they have already disposed of them by wholesale rejection. The exclusively Lebanese parties, on the other hand, show their primary interest to be in local, especially confessional issues, e.g., the census and education.~4 They &dquo;ignore&dquo; the foreign policy issues because they are aware that they cannot solve them and that they have to live with them, faring better generally if they keep quiet about them. During crises, however, foreign policy issues are almost always major factors which have to be faced. Indeed, it is quite often the case that a major public disagreement on some foreign issue actually generates the crisis. 15 The next characteristic is peculiar to the exclusively Lebanese parties and not to be found among the trans-national groups both because of the latter’s extremistdoctrinaire character and because they are not allowed to run candidates for parliamentary office under a party label. The characteristic is a by-product of the Lebanese-style confessional system which allocates a pre-designated number of seats to each religious sect. This arrangement shifts the conflict from an inter- to an intraconfessional fight. Consequently, each confessional group is split into two or more factions of varying &dquo;political orientations&dquo; or simply of the following of some influential clans or leaders. As the leaders fight for the stakes of political office, either in forming lists for parliamentary elections or in jockeying for the highest positions in the state, they find it convenient and sometimes necessary to ally themselves with leaders from sects other than their own. Thus, Bishara el-Khoury (Maronite) was in alliance with Riad es-Solh (Sunni), Sabry Hamadeh (Shiite) and Majid Arislan (Druze). His Maronite opponent, Emile Edde, on the other hand, was in association 14 The census is

a confessional issue because the distribution of seats in Parliament (6 Christians Moslems) is theoretically based on the supposed ratios of the Christians and Moslems in the population as a whole. The Moslems now contend that an impartial census (no official census has been taken since 1932) would show that the Moslems constitute a majority and hence are entitled to more parliamentary seats and perhaps to the presidency as well. The Maronites argue that a census would have to include Lebanese emigrants, who are predominantly Christian. Education has been a confessional issue because private schools, run mainly by Western missionaries, outnumber the public ones which are also neglected. The Moslems, who prefer public schools, wish to lessen the influence of private educational institutions if not do away with them completely. 15 A foreign policy issue is believed to have been a primary factor in the 1958 civil war. The Moslem-Arab community feared that Chamoun had abrogated the national pact by accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine. Also, they suspected that he planned to amend the constitution to provide for the possibility of his re-election. See Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961).

to 5

688 with Khaireddine el-Ahdablfi (Sunni) and the Jumblatts (Druze) . The &dquo;Lebanese&dquo; parties, realizing the usefulness of this approach and desiring to dodge the charge of &dquo;confessional&dquo; applied to them, follow the same procedure. But the resultant lack of confessionalism is restricted to the leadership level, for though the leaders of any party may be representatives of many sects, the rank and file remain predominantly of one

particular sect. FUNCTIONS

OF

PARTIES

IN

LEBANON

Studies have been made on the role of parties in democratic multiparty (or twoparty) states of the developed nations, of those in the totalitarian systems, and of the one-party and no-party systems in the developing areas. 17 But the Lebanese case does not fit conveniently under any of these categories. For though Lebanon is a multiparty state, its democracy is not of the conventional type and its political parties are, so far at least, not effective on the governmental level. Still, this does not mean that there are no functions common to all parties in any political system. What it does mean is that the political system imposes upon the political parties certain functions which, if not performed, cause the eventual demise of those parties.:&dquo; What functions, then, are common to all political parties under whatever system they operate? The primary function is the one included in the definition of what a political party is, namely the competition for control of political power. In the Lebanese case, the parties have not succeeded, singly or collectively, in controlling political power, though some of them have been in existence for thirty or forty years. Another common function is that of political socialization. All parties under any political system perform this function, albeit with different emphases and varying results. They define political issues and attempt to &dquo;educate&dquo; their followers and the public at large concerning their point of view. Recruitment of personnel to government office is not a function common to all parties, despite the fact that it is an apparent corollary to the primary function of competition for power. For only &dquo;democratic&dquo; competition for power and genuine acceptance of the basic tenets of the political system provide the parties the opportunities to recruit personnel and nominate candidates to office. Hence, this function 16 Bishara el-Khoury has claimed that, in 1935, Khaireddine el-Ahdab left the Constitutional Bloc and joined the Edde group for the expressed reason that his chances of becoming premier were better with the latter since el-Khoury had two prominent Sunnis in his Bloc. See el-Khoury, op. cit., I, 190. 17 For a bibliographical essay on political parties, especially in the developed areas, see Frederick

Englemann, "A Critique of Recent Writings on Political Parties," Journal of Politics, (August 1957), 423-40. See also Neil A. McDonald, The Study of Political Parties (New York: Random House, 1955). On parties in the developing areas, see Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961); Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1960); James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U. of California Press, 1964); Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1957) ; and Robert L. Hess and Gerhard Loewenberg, "The Ethiopian No-Party State: A Note on the Functions of Political Parties in Developing States," APSR, 58 (December 1964), 947-50. For a study of the Communist party outside the communist world, see Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952). 18 Myron Weiner, "Traditional Role Performance and the Development of Modem Political Parties: The Indian Case," Journal of Politics, 26 (November 1964), 830-49. C. 19

689 is denied to any political party believed to be a threat to the constituted regime, be that regime democratic, &dquo;nationalistic&dquo; or communistic. In Lebanon, only the exclusively Lebanese parties are permitted to run for public office. But, because they are weak and since all public ofhces are distributed on a confessional basis, recruitment of personnel is not an important function for them.’9 Parties in Lebanon do not meaningfully represent the interests of the population, a function which parties in a democratic system are supposed to perform. 20 Because they are sectional-confessional in their strength and composition, they are not capable of aggregating interests on a national level. They are generally too doctrinaire and the population is too fragmented to allow for adjustment and balancing of divergent views. Nor can they meaningfully link public demands to public policy since they are not in control of political power and some of them are opposed to the existing regime. But, while representation of interests is not one of their functions, they are not in a position to impose direction or induce solidarity among the various ideological factions, functions which totalitarian parties are supposed to perform once they are in power.21 While it is not possible to classify Lebanese parties with regard to their functions as either democratic or totalitarian, neither is it possible to think of them in terms of the one-party or one-party-dominant states characteristic of underdeveloped countries. In the latter, in addition to the functions common to parties everywhere, the ruling party has acted as an agency for consolidating diversified interests, creating popular support, managing societal conflicts, expediting requests of party followers, and being a private welfare organization to provide for the needy.22 Having worked for independence from a colonial power and achieved it, the party has turned to the establishment and consolidation of the legitimacy of the new authorities, the recruitment of the new political elite to replace the discredited old guard, and the organization and expression of the new interests.23 In the Lebanese case, however, such functions would most likely be performed by any of the trans-national parties if such were to seize power and rule single-handedly. The fact that they are denied this privilege, that they are weak, inconsequential, confessional, numerous and tolerated on &dquo;good&dquo; behavior only, substantially changes their functions. Trans-national parties in Lebanon are still working to create an &dquo;independent&dquo; state in a manner which corresponds to their exact specifications, since they do not recognize the legitimacy of the constituted regime. They are helping organize and express the new interests, which are quite diverse and are made more so by the multiplicity of such parties. They are recruiting a new political elite, almost exclusively from among the frustrated intelligentsia who, however, remain politically ineffective. ,

19 In this

sense, the Lebanese political system resembles a regime without parties, a situation which "ensures the permanence of ruling elites chosen by birth, wealth, or position .... A regime without parties is of necessity a conservative regime .... [I]t is further removed from democracy than the party regime." Duverger, op. cit., pp. 425-26. 20 See David E. Apter, "Political Parties — Introduction," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (eds.), Comparative Politics (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 327-31.

21 p. 330. Ibid., " Schachter, op. cit.,

p. 698; Gwendolen M. Carter (ed.), African One-Party States (Ithaca : Cornell U. Press, 1962), pp. 1-9; Weiner, op. cit., p. 848. 23 Almond and Coleman, op. cit., passim; Hess and Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 947.

690

Unlike the trans-national parties, the exclusively Lebanese ones attempt to drum up popular support, if not for the regime at least for accepted policies. They nominate candidates for political office, albeit on a minor scale, and manage societal conflicts both within and among the confessional sects.24 Their leaders do not feel that it is beneath their

dignity to help followers find a job, resolve a conflict, or regrievance against the government. In fact, in this as well as in their philanthropic activities, they are merely transferring to the party functions traditionally performed by the clan chief or the sect leader. The Lebanese example, then, constitutes a unique case. Its unique status stems from the fact that the country’s political system is a confessional democracy in which numerous political parties exist but are almost hopelessly divided on basic issues, such lieve

a

the type of government, the size of the country, and the confessional system in These divisions render them weak and ineffective. Yet, though &dquo;the ineffectiveness of political parties has been an important factor in the collapse of many parliamentary regimes in the developing areas,&dquo;25 almost the opposite is true in the Lebanese case. The very ineffectiveness of political parties has been an important factor in the preservation of the &dquo;parliamentary&dquo;26 regime and the democratic system. Politics in Lebanon is characterized by a dispersion of power among various religious sects, regional factions, economic pressure groups, and political parties. No group is powerful enough to impose its will upon all others. This fact is well realized by most if not all participants and, though some or all may not be happy with the system, they reluctantly tolerate it. In other words, &dquo;Lebanon’s political system rests upon a tradition of non-legitimacy and dispersed, balanced power. 1127 New political forces have been accepted only if they conformed to the system’s basic requirements. Thus, all trans-national parties have been banned. But it should be noted that no government has seen it as beneficial or feasible to clamp down on these &dquo;subversive&dquo; organizations unless and until they make a move to topple the regime. Indeed, the very existence and diversity of such political groupings have acted as a stabilizing factor in at least two ways. In the first place, their competition with each other and jealousy at maintaining their position vis-a-vis one another make it almost impossible for any one group to win out and dominate all the rest. Secondly, they act as a check upon the other political-social-economic groups in the country and enhance the maintenance of a free and liberal democracy through discussion of issues which paras

operation.

24

Since the exclusively Lebanese parties are in the main confessional groupings headed by clan and sectarian leaders, they have continued to perform the necessary function of resolving societal conflicts. Needless to say, they are most successful at resolving intra-confessional

disputes. Still, an effort is made to contain inter-confessional disagreements. In 1951, instance, the Kataeb (predominantly Maronite-Christian) and Ibad ar-Rahman (Moslem) concluded a pact of friendship which specified resort to negotiations in times of serious discord. During the 1958 civil war, both sides lived up to and benefitted from the

for

agreement.

25 Weiner, op. cit., p.

830.

26 Lebanon really tends toward the presidential system and may be termed quasi-presidential. See Rondot, op. cit., p. 13; and the views of Lebanese politicians as recorded in Samia J.

Bikhazi, "The Lebanese Chamber of Deputies," (Master’s thesis, The American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon, 1962), pp. 93-99. 27 Michael C. Hudson, "Pluralism, Power and Democracy in Lebanon," paper read before the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 12, 1964, p. 4.

691 liament finds convenient to bypass.28 Whether they recognize it or not and regardless of whether or not they approve of the result, political parties in Lebanon have served the important function of upholding the existing regime. FUTURE ROLE

OF

PARTIES

IN

LEBANON

What makes for multipartism in Lebanon? Will a reduction in the number of parties influence the functions to be performed by the remaining ones? Duverger has contended that the single-member, simple-plurality election system works in the direction of bipartism, whereas proportional representation oar the two-ballot system tends to favor multipartism.29 The Lebanese case seems at first glance to disprove or invalidate this hypothesis. Lebanon used the two-ballot system up to 1952, when beginning with the 1953 election, the simple-plurality single-ballot system was introduced. But instead of a reduction in the number of parties, three more (Tahreer, National Liberals, and the Moslem Group) 30 appeared on the scene. Yet it could be argued that, irrespective of the single- or two-ballot procedure, Lebanon does have and has always had (since its formation within its present borders in 1920) proportional representation. Confessional representation in Lebanon predetermines the number of deputies to be chosen from each sect, and all that remains to be decided at any national election is the particular individuals to represent those sects. Such a set-up, it is often claimed, favors a multi-partite division on a confessional basis. This assertion is, indeed, well substantiated in the Lebanese case. Nonetheless, it is not &dquo;proved&dquo; until the reverse is shown to be true if the country abandons its confessional arrangement. The evidence suggests that, while confessional (proportional) representation does enhance confessional &dquo;thinking&dquo; and perhaps some confessional isolationism, scrapping the system is not likely to produce a two party set-up.31 This is due to the fact that Lebanese society is quite heterogeneous and that the country’s political culture is fragmented. Despite Duverger’s claim that the influence of the electoral system in producing minor parties is incontestable,32 the factors peculiar to Lebanon appear to out-weigh the general factor of the electoral system in this case. In support of this view, it should be recalled that most political parties in Lebanon came onto the scene to advocate a certain ideology or execute some revolutionary change, and not necessarily to win seats in the legislature. In fact, political parties as vehicles of support and organization to help win elections are just beginning to be acknowledged as necessary. Up to the 1964 election, corruption, bribery, and strong arm methods, in addition to public apathy, obviated the need for well-organized

political parties. It is more fruitful to investigate the functions performed by the parties to test whether or not they undergo complete change if the electoral system is modified. 28 See Basim el-Jisr, "Democracy and the News Media," ad-Dimoqratiyya fi Lubnan (Arabic),

Democracy in Lebanon (Beirut, al-Misri Press, 1959), Part II, p. 81.

29 Duverger, op. cit., pp. 204-5. 30 Tahreer began its operations in Lebanon in 1959, the National Liberals’ party was founded the same year, and the Moslem Group was founded in 1964. 31 It is interesting to note that, under the present confessional system, it is believed by some observers that the single-member constituency favors multipartism. See George Skaff, "Conclusions," Al-Jarida (Beirut Arabic daily), March 22, 1961, p. 2, and Basim el-Jisr, Al-Jarida, March 24, 1961, p. 8. 32 Duverger, op. cit., p. 296.

692 Weiner has shown that the success of the Congress party in India is due in large part to its capacity to adapt to the needs of government and society and the fact that it has continued to perform certain traditional roles in a new setting.33 In the Lebanese case, it is difficult to see how a change in the electoral system will effect a change in the parties’ functions and, consequently, in the number of parties. Apart from the electoral system, what influence have other factors had or will have on political parties and their role in Lebanon? The emergence of the country as a sovereign independent state in 1943 certainly changed the Christian-Moslem relationship and resulted in a realignment of old positions. The Moslem-Arab elements were thrown into disarray, splitting up into numerous groups advocating different positions. Some (the National Appeal, the PSP and the National Organization) have generally accepted the status quo and thought it best to organize themselves in such a way as to further their interests within it. Others (the Moslem groups) have been working for the establishment of a unified Moslem state; whereas still others (the Ba’ath and ANM) have called for the incorporation of Lebanon into a greater Arab world. The Najjada falls somewhere between the last two positions. The Christian groups have continued to support the regime while fighting among themselves for political power. With independence fairly secure, the Kataeb has turned its ambitions towards political office in order to play more effectively its role as defender of Maronite-Christian interests. The Communists, the PPS and the Armenian parties were hardly affected by the change, and their role and aims have remained the same as those advocated before independence. In recent years, particularly during Shehab’s tenure as president (1958-64), it was becoming more and more evident that the presidency, the state, the administration and the army were increasing their power considerably.34 The question arises, therefore, as to what will be the fate of political parties if such a trend continues. If it is assumed that the army’s influence will decline or be restricted now that Shehab has left the scene, how will the parties be affected by increasing governmental control ? Even under such circumstances and with a guarantee of fair elections, it is difficult to imagine that the number of parties will be reduced considerably or that truly aggregative, broadly-based pragmatic parties will emerge. The fragmentation of Lebanese society into numerous religious sects and several claimed ethnic groups render the establishment of &dquo;national&dquo; political parties most difficult. If it is assumed that Lebanon remains an independent state and that the trans-national parties continue to be banned, then the only foreseeable change would concern the role of the &dquo;Lebanese&dquo; parties. In addition to the functions they now perform, it is both likely and feasible for them to take on recruitment and nomination of government personnel. Nonetheless, they are most likely to remain numerous and unable to control government effectively, if at all. CONCLUSIONS The identification of power is 33 34

accepted

as an

Weiner, loc. cit. See Leonard Binder,

political party as an organized attempt to secure political adequate general definition. This has the value of describing

"Political

Change

in

Lebanon,"

in

Binder, op. cit.,

pp.

283-327.

693

parties by stating the function common to all of them under any political system. But this general definition would have to be modified whenever there is need to study parties or some aspect thereof in a particular country. Thus, Ranney and Kendall specifically excluded non-autonomous parties from their study of the relationship of the party system to democracy in the United States. Similarly, in this study, two groups which do not meet with the general definition of a political party are, nevertheless, treated as parties because they perform the same functions which other parties perform on the Lebanese scene. The Lebanese case provides evidence that a simple and straight differentiation between &dquo;democratic&dquo; and &dquo;totalitarian&dquo; parties is not completely adequate, since it tells us little about the behavior or functions of such parties under different political systems. In Lebanon, the meaningful distinction is between the &dquo;Lebanese&dquo; parties (whether they are democratic or totalitarian) and trans-national ones. Furthermore, studying party functions provides better insight into the factors leading to multiplicity of parties or lack of such in a particular state. In any case, it seems to be a better guide than the type of electoral system, which is primarily a reflection of the state of homogeneity or heterogeneity in the country. Sigmund Neumann’s claim, tacitly and generally accepted, that &dquo;only where the specific interests of parties are imbedded in a common whole does the political struggle not lead to disintegration of the entire group,&dquo;35 is not substantiated in the Lebanese case. Rather, a negative statement of this assumption appears more accurate. Though the various parties do not have their interests &dquo;imbedded in a common whole,&dquo; and despite the fact that many deny legitimacy to the regime, the political system survives in the absence of one group powerful enough to change it. Lebanon, then, provides an interesting case where the balance of power operates internally to maintain the precarious peace and stability. Political parties have played an important role in the maintenance of that balance.

35

Neumann, loc. cit.