Work-in-Progress; Please do not quote without authors’ permission

The Missing Factor: Swedish Social Democracy and Immigration Policy Andrea Spehar & Jonas Hinnfors 1 University of Gothenburg

The Puzzle Immigration policy making is full of puzzles. 2 On the 16 May 1991, the Social Democratic minister for immigration affairs, Maj-Lis Lööw, introduced a government bill to the Swedish parliament. Basically, the bill suggested refugees seeking asylum in Sweden should be granted temporary residence permits rather than permanent ones as was previously the case. Instead, refugees should be helped back to their home countries as soon as possible, the argument being that this would constitute a more humanitarian and ‘holistic’ policy than inviting the refugees to become Swedish citizens with possible future burdens on the welfare state system (Tollefsen&Altamirano 1998). However, a nonsocialist coalition, which got the upper hand in the 1991 parliamentary elections immediately dropped the bill, so it was not until SAP were back in power position in 1994, that the policy was finally implemented. Yet, the 1989/1995 stricter policies appear to have been no isolated instance. Indeed, as our overview presented in Table 1 shows, the SAP has a long and very consistent history of backing strict immigration policies. Since the late 1960s, when labour migration was first regulated, the party has continuously supported policy shifts advocating or resulting in a stricter immigration policy. These data suggest a longer-term reluctance on the part of the SAP to more open immigration policies (Lundh & Ohlsson 1994). Sometimes the party has been joined by other parties; sometimes the SAP has implemented the stricter measures against the opposition of other Riksdag (parliament) parties.

Given social democracy’s clear ideological foundation on public sector support, solidarity, inclusiveness and socialism with internationalist roots, one would have thought policies among this ‘family of parties’ were solidly in favour of more open borders and more generous support to such a vulnerable group as refugees. Instead, social democratic parties seem to have been fully able to formulate distinctly strict policies. For instance, the Nordic social democratic sister parties have often taken even stricter positions than the Swedish party (Green-Pedersen&Odmalm 2008) and the German SDP contributed to tightening German legislation long before immigration became a heated issue in the 1990s (Perlmutter 1996: 379). Indeed, earlier tightening of immigration rules by the Swedish                                                              1

 Jonas Hinnfors, PhD, Professor, tel +46 (0)31 786 46 72; Andrea Spehar, PhD, tel +46 (0)31 786 11 92; Both: Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, PO Box 711, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden, www.pol.gu.se; 2  In this paper, by ‘immigration policies’ we refer to issues about ‘who and how many should be allowed to enter a state?’ 

 

1

Social Democrats, e.g. when employment immigration was abolished in 1970, and later hesitancy in the early 2000s (Bucken-Knapp 2009) over reintroducing employment-related immigration indicate some inherent and continuous social democratic caution over immigration (Lundh&Ohlsson 1994). The Party’s policy position as well as the more generous one taken by the non-socialist parties become all the more puzzling as with very few exceptions earlier research has emphasised a relationship between strict immigration policies and right-of-centre parties. Table 1. 1968-2008 Swedish Immigration Party Policy Decisions: Restrictive or Open? Policy Decision

More restrictive or more open?*

Argument

Supporting party(ies)

1968

Non Nordic labour migration restricted (Nordic still allowed)

Restrictive

SAP + non socialists

1970

Strict application of the Geneva convention Certain groups denied refugee status

Restrictive

Immigrants a hindrance to necessary market rationalization Many refugees veiled labour market immigrants Too many immigrants from any one group harmful for integration

Family reunification regulations eased; notion of ’refugee’ widened Residence permit approval mandatory before immigration Strict application of the Geneva convention + temporary residence permits only

Open

Permanent residence permits reintroduced; notion of ’refugee’ widened Temporary residence permits reintroduced (permanent still possible) + strict application of Geneva convention Immigrants holding permanent residence permits encouraged to repatriate + family reunifications restricted to apply only to ’already established households’ Expulsion of refugee families without permanent residence permits possible even in cases where child family member8s) suffer from ’apathy stress syndrome’ Labour market immigration from non EU countries reintroduced

Open

Year

1976

1980

1980 1989

1991

1994

1997

2006

2008

Restrictive

SAP + Conservative ’Moderate party’ SAP

Non socialists

Restrictive

Protect Swedish labour market

Restrictive

Difficult to handle all the immigrants, too many immigrants might lead to xenophobia, it’s better for immigrants to stay close to their home countries Humanitarian reasons

SAP + Conservative ’Moderate party’ SAP

Non socialists

Restrictive

Difficult to handle all the immigrants, fuzzy refugee definitions

SAP + Non socialists

Restrictive

Immigrants want to return to their home countries

SAP + Non socialists

Restrictive

Children are not genuinely ill

SAP + Conservative ’Moderate party’

Open

Labour market demand

Non socialists + Greens

*Restrictive policies are those that seek to reduce the inward flow of migrants in comparison to existing rates. Open policies are those that allow for more generous inward flows in comparison to existing rates.

So, even though social democratic parties may not always opt for the same strategies they all seem to be fully capable of formulating immigration policies as strict, or even stricter, as their non-socialist opponents. How can this be understood?

 

2

Theoretical Issues in Earlier Research

Primarily three aspects are brought forward by earlier research to explain immigration policy variation in general and why countries and parties settle for strict policies: 1) cultural context, 2) right-of-centre and extreme right party activity, 3) party vote maximization. All aspects are reasonable as such. Minkenberg (2008) argues that differences in the degree of immigration legislation openness are based on underlying historically based cleavages, such as nation building and religion. However, without denying strong historic institutional influence and the importance of cultural context, these studies do suffer from their rather static character as well. Substantial policy shifts inside a country become difficult to understand. This is what has happened in Scandinavia where several parties have changed policies from more open to rather strict in spite of stable contexts. Moreover, the Nordic case in particular would rather suggest policy convergence among the countries where the political parties in fact operate in roughly similar contexts (small, 5-10m inhabitants, consensual democracies with similar welfare states and cultural, political, social and economic contexts; Nordic Council of Ministers 2005; GreenPedersen&Odmalm 2008; Minkenberg 2008). Instead, the parties have opted for rather different immigration policies. A current example of fairly stable intra-Nordic differences is the policy attitudes to asylum seekers from Iraq. In 2006 Sweden accepted 8,951 while the numbers allowed in the other Nordic countries were much lower. Denmark accepted 507, Norway 1,000 and Finland 224 asylum seekers (UNHCR 2007; Minkenberg 2008). Thus, there seems to be a case in general for focusing on parties as actors able to formulate policies and to politicise immigration as an issue independently of cultural context (Perlmutter 1996).

An array of studies (Smith 2008; Bale 2008; Green-Pedersen&Krogstrup 2008; GreenPedersen&Odmalm 2008) look into right-of-centre party (including xenophobic parties) behaviour and immigration policy to such an extent that ‘right’ or ‘right-of-centre’ has become synonymous with ‘strict immigration policies.’ No doubt the emergence of xenophobic parties has politicised immigration to an extent that was unusual forty years ago and some right-of-centre parties have been particularly firm on immigration. However, it is surprising that left-of-centre parties are almost totally absent from previous studies in spite of their key role in most party systems. The exclusion of social democracy from immigration studies in effect means one of the major party groups is missing from the conclusions offered up by earlier research. Social

 

3

democratic and other left-of-centre parties face dilemmas of balancing demands from several core voter groups Some of the unions strive to shield the labour market from possible threats from new low-paid immigrant groups (Bucken-Knapp 2009) while on the other hand other core groups demand social protection to weak sections of society, including immigrants. As the introduction to this paper indicates, social democracy has been fully able to formulate strict policies. Given the suitability of using concepts such as ‘right’ for ‘strict refugee policies’ and ‘left’ for ‘open refugee policies’ we have reason to question the very placement of social democracy as being ‘left’ on this issue. Initially, it appears rather that social democracy is more firmly lodged into the ‘right’ end of the policy spectrum.

Vote maximisation is not irrelevant. It cannot be in a democratic system where parties need votes in order to be elected. However, at least in the Swedish context, it’s still puzzling why the Social Democrats would feel particularly threatened. Polls show that among the major parties’ voters 427 per cent of Social Democratic voters ‘agreed fewer refugees should be accepted’ while the corresponding figure for the Conservative voters stood at 57-60 per cent. The figures for the three centre-right parties’ voters were all between 40-8 per cent (figures for 2005 and 2006; Demker 2007: 2). So, even though around 45 per cent of Social Democratic voters being negative to more refugees is rather a high figure as such, it’s certainly not any higher than for competing parties. Moreover, along with Centre Party voters, Social Democratic voters were among the least interested of all voters in refugee issues. Typically 10 per cent of the party’s voters expressed ‘a great deal of interest’ with other parties’ voters being slightly (Christian Democrats, Conservatives) or rather more (Left Party, Greens, Liberals) interested in these issues (Demker 2007: 5). In neither case, level of refugee resentment and interest in refugee issues, would the figures indicate any particular need for the Swedish Social Democrats compared to other parties to feel any vote maximisation concern. We have to look elsewhere for additional angles.

Vote maximisation has to be anchored to a wider strategic context and ideological considerations and not just point to cautious attitudes among the general public. Some studies do in fact include a wider

range

of

parties

and

introduce

a

more

general

strategic

analysis.

Green-

Pedersen&Krogstrup (2008) claim a decisive factor behind the Danish Conservative Party’s previous shift towards stricter immigration policies was the two social liberal parties joining the Social Democrats in a government coalition. Thus, ‘[a]ll the constraints on promoting the issues of refugees and immigrants that were in force when the two parties were last in government . . . [were] . . . gone. There was little reason to avoid a conflict with the Social Liberals, who now governed with the enemy.’ However, convincing as Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup’s argument

 

4

may be it can be challenged by exactly the same party system context having produced totally opposite results elsewhere. A decisive reason behind the Swedish Conservatives’ move to the left on welfare state issues beginning around 1970 was the recurring single issue co-operation by either one or both the Swedish social liberal centre parties with the Social Democrats. Just because the centre-right parties co-operated with ‘the enemy’ the Conservatives were clearly affected and in the end the party had to move to the left to avoid isolation and to create a viable cabinet coalition alliance alternative to the Social Democrats (Hinnfors 1992; Hinnfors 1999; Särlvik 1982).

The Conservatives’ relationship with the centre-right parties is significant as an example of the interplay between various strategic factors and ideology. The Conservatives took some considerable ideological steps to the left around 1970-73. An important reason behind the historic left shift and the ensuing co-operation with the centre parties was the Party leadership’s calculation that ideologically preferred goals would stand a better chance of influencing legislation in parliament than had the Conservatives remained isolated on the right wing. Without bloc co-operation there was a distinct risk welfare state policies had been totally dominated by Social Democratic views with support from one or both of the centre-right parties. Now at least the Conservatives could try and build support for their second best options. New party behaviour or entirely new parties could always threaten the old parties by attracting their voters. Xenophobic parties may pose such a voter threat and in 1991 a new mildly xenophobic party, The New Democracy Party, made it to the Swedish Riksdag. However, the party had been formed just ten months before the September elections and the Social Democrat’s clear shift towards stricter immigration policies was begun already in 1989, i.e. before the threat from the new party.

Obviously, parties need to win votes in elections but, in a Nordic context differences in public opinion on immigration between the countries are small and therefore cannot immediately be translated into immigration policy variation among the countries on immigration. Other factors, such as ideology, have to be involved (Green-Pedersen&Krogstrup 2008: 616). Votemaximization theory alone disregards the parties’ ability to formulate and define ideologically embedded options for the voters (Budge&McDonald 2006; Svallfors 1989: 178; Valen&Narud 2007; Hinnfors 2008). This has been underestimated by earlier research on immigration causing a gap in our understanding of a highly relevant current issue.

To sum up, earlier research has focused on cultural context, right-of-centre parties and vote maximisation. Although all may have relevancy there is a case for bringing in left-of-centre party

 

5

behaviour and ideology. The immediate aim of this paper is to discuss the Swedish Social Democratic Party’s apparent ability to formulate rather strict refugee policies.

Studying Ideology and Social Democracy Ideas and ideology as such have not been absent from earlier research. Some studies claim immigration became an issue as a consequence of fading left-right conflict and in response to new xenophobic parties during the 1980s and 1990s (Freeman 1997). Some would even hold that immigration has created new types of cleavages (Demker 2008). However, as for new cleavages it is amazing how often new contending cleavages—e.g. environmental issues—have actually become integrated in the old left-right divide (Lundqvist 2000) and in the Swedish case the leftright divide in general was rather strengthened towards the late 1980s and early 1990s when the non-socialists formed themselves into a co-ordinated coalition. Concrete policy decisions can be related to ideas and ideologies along a range of abstraction. The

fundamental point here is that ideological goals function as a frame within which the parties choose more day-to-day concrete policies. Obviously, ideology is not the only aspect parties must consider. They need to evaluate how ideological goals are possible to reach given strategic considerations regarding voter opinion, members’ views and possible coalition partner policies (Lewin 1967; Hinnfors 1992; Goldstein&Keohane 1993: 8 ff.). 3 Social democracy has been firmly rooted in ideological tenets such as solidarity, redistribution and a predilection for public sector solutions. As the epitome of strong social democracy, the Swedish Social Democratic Party has ‘preserve[d] a sense of social democratic distinctiveness in Sweden. Despite all the changes that have occurred in both the domestic and international economy over recent decades, that is, the vast majority of Swedes acknowledge and accept the SAP’s basic ideas about the virtues of social solidarity, egalitarianism, and political control over the economy’ (Berman 2006: 198-99). To some extent ‘social democracy’ is rather elusive as a concept and it is not entirely clear what it is or was (Powell 2004). However, whether in the guise of ‘old’ or ‘new’ tenets, research accounts agree on certain core aspects. There always seems to be an element of reduced status and class differences between different groups in society with a key                                                              3  Material in which principled thoughts can be traced will be used: party programmes, election manifestos, key parliamentary proposals, special issue area programmes and key speeches by leading party leadership representatives Party considerations will be described through process tracing and content analysis.

 

 

6

means for achieving this end a comprehensive welfare state with the express goal of lifting poorer sections to a better life (Giddens 1998). More concretely, social democracy has positioned itself between equality and fairness, between collective rights and individual rights, between state expansion and aiding the market to limit the ills of market capitalism and between redistribution and individual enhancement-inducing entitlements (Thomson 2000). Handling a comparatively vulnerable, exposed and by all accounts less well-to-do group such as refugees and immigrants with ‘open,’ ‘generous,’ ‘solidaristic’ means applying strong public sector measures would—on the one hand—appear to sit comfortably with social democratic ideological foundations.

On the other hand, typical social democratic ideological tenets include protection of wage levels from under paid sectors, protection of organised interests, such as unions, a focus on a welfare state with distinctly ‘national’ reach, a focus on ‘citizenship’ rights rather than ‘free market’ rights and a foundation on ‘collectives’ rather than ‘individuals’. All these traits would indicate difficulties in handling unwieldy, unorganised, under demanding groups such as immigrants who have often seemed to be content with low pay.

Moreover, in spite of its international socialist roots, it is obvious social democracy opted for national rather than international solutions long ago (Götz). The Swedish Social Democrats have had distinctly ‘national’ ideological roots with a strong emphasis on creating a ‘people’s home’ and about protecting national industries (at least rhetorically; actual practice has had strong market adapting traits) and cultural values (Lagergren 1998; Andersson 2006). An example of the Social Democrats’ sometimes clearly nationalist rhetoric is the Party’s 2000 ‘Church Policy Programme’ where the Church of Sweden is manifestly tied to ‘Swedishness’ and Swedish culture with ‘Sweden [being] a Christian country since over 1,000 years.’ The text accepts recent changes but subtly ties Sweden to a united Christian culture: ‘belonging to the Church of Sweden was long considered synonymous with being Swedish . . . Times change and thus our country and religious matters have not remained unaffected. For the Church of Sweden the changes have meant her confessional aspects have come to the foreground and her character of ’popular’ church being strengthened. [We are] convinced the church of Sweden as a popular church has an important mission in the new People’s Home Social Democracy wants to build for our time (Kyrkopolitiskt program för socialdemokraterna 2000: 6, 4). In a wider perspective, Heclo and Madsen (1987:5) detect a streak of conservatism in the seemingly modern Sweden, which, they claim, ‘is . . . deeply skeptical of any claims of individual primacy over the social group. For all its imagery of permissiveness and high-technology modernization, Sweden has a decided strain of social conservatism that carries over from the country’s relatively recent status as an agrarian nation.’ These ‘collective’ and ‘national’ roots would invite suggestions that immigrants are difficult to squeeze inside the national box.

 

7

Indeed, Appelqvist (2000) does briefly suggest the Social Democrats were hesitant to accept refugees on a permanent basis because the Party worried the ideologically sensitive generous Swedish welfare state would come under heavy pressure. However, the Swedish Liberal Party being of a particularly social-liberal version and long a firm perhaps ‘un-holy’ alliance partner with the Social Democrats on many welfare state issues, would face roughly the same ideological dilemma and still opted for generous rules. We suggest some of the conclusions made by earlier research concerning notions of ‘nation,’ the ‘individual’ and the ‘collective’ would apply equally well to social democracy. Obviously, such ideas may differ between parties and countries but, given especially the Swedish Social Democrats’ roots in notions on ‘the People’s home’ of a particular Swedish version (Lagergren 1998; Andersson 2006) it may not be farfetched to assume views on foreigners to be affected by those overarching ideas. In the following we will map these various kinds of ideas as they appear in Swedish Social Democratic official documents.

Swedish Refugee Policy and Social Democracy: Knocking on Heaven’s door? Sweden has been portrayed as a ‘bastion of open asylum politics’ (Perlmutter 1996: 385). However, Swedish generosity does not mean regulation is absent from Swedish handling of immigration be it related to refugees or employment seeking individuals. On the contrary, this issue area has been highly dynamic over the past five decades (Lundh&Ohlsson 1994; Appelqvist, Tollefsen&Altamirano 1998). Swedish immigration policy can be differentiated into separate phases, where some phases are characterised by generous policies and extensive immigration to Sweden while others have seen much stricter decision making in this policy field. After WWII, the Swedish economy went into overdrive, which soon created a demand for labour. Until the end of the 1960s labour immigration was more or less free and the use of imported labour force was extensive (Lundh&Ohlsson 1994). However, unions feared (Lundh&Ohlsson 1994: 78ff). In order to be able to keep up universal and generous welfare policies with equality as the goal, social democrats felt restrictions to immigration had to be introduced. Moreover, from the late 1960s, immigrants’ integration into Swedish society increasingly became an issue based on the presumption that immigrants came from areas where language, religion and culture were drastically different from Swedish conditions (Johansson 1995).

New stricter rules applying to immigrants from outside the Nordic region were introduced in 1967/68: around the mid 1960s criticism of the open border policies was increasingly being formulated by the central Swedish blue-collar union, the ‘LO.’ Perhaps paradoxically, belief in rapid restructuring of the economy was a central union tenet and leading union representatives felt  

8

immigration posed a threat to restructuring the industrial sector for future increased productivity. Immigrants would keep wages low and would create tensions between Swedish and immigrant workers. ‘The aim of Swedish migration policies is to guarantee the principle that alien citizens given permission to take up residence here are given the same favourable terms of employment as the native population in the Swedish labour market. Not only the terms of employment but standard of living in general should be acceptable and comparable with those applying to Swedes’ (Government bill 1968:142).

The bill stated that the national supply of labour had to be taken into account before granting anyone from outside the Nordic countries the right to work permits. Precedence should be given to handicapped, elderly and housewives. When labour force immigration other than from Nordic countries had been barred the remaining immigration was classified as either ’refugee’ of ’family reunion’ (Lundh&Ohlsson 1994). By referring to ‘Swedish’ conditions that were threatened by alien citizens the Social democratic policy makers underlined that immigrants caused problems to the Swedish model. The national perspective was further emphasised by the references to ‘national’ considerations regarding how to best handle to already in the country with special needs (elderly etc.).

As for refugees, until the mid 1970s the Social Democrats, and by extension the Government, believed only political refugees, i.e. according to the Geneva Convention, should be granted asylum and residence permits in Sweden (Lundh&Ohlsson 1994). However, this position was problematic in the sense that growing numbers of those seeking Swedish asylum fell outside the convention’s framework and some non Comvention refuges were granted asylum. In the early 1980 the then non-socialist government—a coalition of the Liberals, the ‘Centre Party’ and the ‘Conservatives’ (‘the Moderate Party’) 4 —adopted a new bill on immigration. On the one hand the bill strengthened the rights for refugees, which were excluded from the strict application of granting of residence permits (Government bill 1979/80:96). Moreover, the bill reframed the refugee status. ‘Refugee’ status could be granted to those who had refused military service, were de facto refugees or could claim wider humanitarian reasons. Moreover, family reunification was simplified (SOU 1979/80:64). On the other hand a special Parliamentary Investigation Committee (SOU 1979/80:64) presented proposals based on the position that Sweden should accept no more immigrants than the country could ‘cope with’ (SOU 1979:64) and required refugees to apply for—and receive—permanent residence status before being allowed to enter the country. This position was motivated by arguments about the need to protect Swedish employment levels and that the standard of living should be the same for Swedes and non Swedes. The policies were implemented by the 1980 Aliens Bill (1979/80:96) with full Social                                                             

4

 Four non‐socialist governments were in charge 1976‐83: a 1976‐78 three party (Liberals, Centre Party,  Conservative Party) cabinet; a 1978‐79 Liberal Party cabinet; a 1979‐81 three party (Liberals, Centre Party,  Conservative Party) cabinet; a 1981‐82 two party (Liberal Party, Centre Party) cabinet. 

 

9

Democrat approval (Spång 2008: 53 ff.). In the sense that the Geneva Convention was now made explicit as the framework for residence permits the new legislation was stricter. However, some groups, such as conscientious objectors, those with Swedish family ties and those who could claim with strong humanitarian reasons were excluded and in this sense an element of openness was preserved.

A few years later great controversy erupted over the Social Democrats’ new policy to make all Swedish municipalities share the responsibility for accommodating new refugees (housing, language courses etc.). However, many municipalities complained about severe strain caused by refugees and protests started to form (Nordin, 2005). Increasingly, the government felt a need to treat different groups in a different way. Already in 1976 the Social Democrats had applied special legislation,

which made it possible to treat refugees from different countries differently, and had barred Assyrian Turks on the grounds that too large numbers of Assyrians would make reception and integration difficult (Spång 2008: 55). The second time this legislation was applied was the so called ‘St Lucia’ (a Swedish 13 December festival related to Christmas) decision. The St Lucia decision was tantamount to a drastic tightening of the rules; only a strict application of the Geneva Convention was to be utilised. In a statement, Maj-Lis Lööw, the then Social Democratic minister for immigration affairs, held that limitations to refugee numbers were essential in order to safeguard their dignified reception in the new country: ‘We have reached the limits of how much we can cope with. If in future we will be able to keep our ability to offer a haven for those most in need we have to restrict the possibilities for others to gain residence permit in Sweden’ (Lundh&Ohlsson 1994: 91). A previous Departmental Report (A comprehensive Refugee and Immigration Policy) had laid the foundation for a new ‘holistic’ Social Democrat perspective. A subsequent Government bill (Government bill 1990/91:195) developed the new thought further and a junior cabinet minister in charge of refugee matters declared that restrictions were necessary in order to avoid public opinion to develop in a xenophobic direction (Johansson 2005: 177). Supported by the Conservatives, the party tightened asylum legislation considerably in the bill, including the demand that refugees be required to have their papers in order (Dacyl 1997), arguing that Sweden could not cope with the numbers and that a policies that would help refugees closer to their own countries would be more ‘holistic.’ The new policy became a flagstone for the later 1990s immigration policies. However, only about a year later, the never fully implemented new policies were lifted by the then new non-socialist government, inclusive of the Conservatives, to allow for large groups of refugees from the former Yugoslavia.

The Social Democrat’s decision was part of a strengthened view that immigration was problematic and caused problems. According to Johansson (1995) an essential change in the Swedish migratory discourse is that migrants were seen as both an asset and a burden during the 1960s. Later, immigrants were primarily regarded a burden. Especially views about budgetary and social burdens  

10

tend to dominate during the 1980s. These views coincided with thoughts—prevalent during the 1980s though not really politicised until the end of the decade—that many refugees were not regarded as ‘proper’ refugees but were considered ’economic migrants’ only looking for the benefits of the generous Swedish welfare state and the discourse became dominated by concepts like ‘us’ and

‘them’. In a continuation of the 1968 decision to stop employment-related immigration, the Social Democrats framed the policy in terms of how much ‘we’ can cope with. The welfare state ‘haven’ sets the standard for how many Sweden can afford to accept and the conclusion is policies have to become stricter rather than more open. In order to preserve the ideologically prioritised ‘people’s home with the key welfare state element and the regulated labour market immigration becomes a problem in the eyes of the policy makers. Alternative approaches, for instance that new groups might contribute to solve local labour shortages, to bring with them new perspectives etc never form part of the immigration rhetoric (such rhetoric is restricted to debates and policies about integration). In sum, the Social Democrats stand out as active and decisive decision makers behind the increasingly strict Swedish legislation on immigration. Strict policies do not need extreme right-wing parties or any direct influence from right-of-centre parties to become formulated and implemented. Instead, notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ has permeated Social Democratic policy making as a natural part of one strand the Party’s ideology. With the Party’s close ties to the labour movement and unions with their class-related type of organisation and policy views, immigration risks putting spanners in the wheels of how key policies should be construed.

Should They Stay or Should They Go? 1990s Policy Debate The 1990s migration policy development contains several paradoxical features. On the one hand Sweden was the No 1 European country as regards the number of Bosnian refugees granted permanent residence permits (app. 60,000). On the other hand the 1990s were characterised by hardening attitudes and tougher legislation towards asylum seekers (Abiri 2000; Appelqvist 2000; Tollefsen&Altamirano 1998). An indicator of stricter migration policies was the introduction of visa requirements for a widening number of countries and the increasing proportion of temporary rather than permanent residence permits (Tollefsen&Altamirano 1998). The latter part of the 1990s was characterised by aid to crisis areas to prevent refugee outbreaks; ‘burden-sharing’ to deal with mass refugee situations and active resettlement policies.

The 1990s witnessed a new party dimension as the New Democracy Party (Ny Demokrati) gained parliamentary representation 1991-94 and brought with it a more populist and xenophobic rhetoric (Rydgren 2005). New Democracy is usually classified as right-of-centre populist in the same vein

 

11

as a number of new parties in European countries over the past decades. At the beginning of the 1990s, New Democracy argued for increased focus on aid to refugees near war and disaster areas rather than granting refugees asylum in Sweden. The party wanted ‘economic migrants’ to be barred from Sweden wanted to place emphasis on the alleged relationship between crime and abuse of public social security and immigration (Boréus 2006). However, it is of considerable importance to note the fact that the xenophobic policies of the New Democracy Party only became a challenge to the other parties until the spring 1991 just before the September 1991 general elections. 5 The restrictive Social Democratic turn in the same direction as New Democracy (with the Social Democrats focusing on repatriation and aid near conflicts in an ‘integrated’ immigration policy) was begun several years before the existence of New Democracy towards the end of the 1980s. It comprised Temporary Protection as a key element. Internationally as well as in Sweden views were expressed that repatriation was by far the best immigration problem solution (Black&Koser 1999).

Temporary Protection was the Party’s stance at the time of the June 1993 non-socialist Government’s decision to grant permanent residence permits in one go to almost 40,000 Bosnian refugees (Appelqvist 2000; Tollefsen&Altamirano 1998; Lundh&Ohlsson 1994, 94). Other European countries, including the Nordic, already 1992 applied Temporary Protection as their way out of the Yugoslav crisis (Appelqvist 2000; Tollefsen&Altamirano 1998). As a direct result of the non-socialist government’s decision, Sweden came to accept the largest number of Bosnian refugees of the Nordic countries, about 60,000. Numbers among the other Nordic countries were more modest with Denmark accepting 19,000, Norway 10,000 and Finland 1,000. The Social Democrats argued these policies were flawed and claimed the Bosnian National Organisation wanted its citizens back for post war reconstruction. Initially this temporary permit position was shared by the Swedish Conservative Party. However, after internal non-socialist Government negotiations with the Liberals, Christian Democrats and the Centre Party, permanent residence permits became Government policy, which can be seen as a break with the earlier move towards stricter policies. The Liberal party held the Department for Cultural Affairs (which dealt with immigration issues) and was able to set its generous mark on the Governments policies (Appelqvist 2000).

                                                             5  The party was only formed late 1990 and only became an opinion poll phenomenon during the spring 1991.  

 

12

Three policy alternatives were debated prior to the Bosnian decision (Appelqvist 2000; Tollefsen&Altamirano 1998.). The first option was to bide one’s time, i.e. take no action. The second option was to grant the Bosnians temporary residence permits with later transformation into permanent residence permits should the situation in Bosnia deteriorate. Finally, the third option was to grant permanent residence permits, which became Government policy in the summer 1993. A contributing factor behind the final decision was the fact that many of the refugees had been in the country for quite some time. Security and the refugees’ right to regain control over their lives were important arguments in favour of the permanent solution (Appelqvist 2000; Tollefsen&Altamirano 1998). However, the 1993 decision on permanent residence permits was a parenthesis and the non-socialist government introduced temporary residence permits in 1994, with the express support from the Social Democrats. When the Social Democrats returned to office they re-emphasised the old policies from the late 1980s and confined refugee status to those who conformed to the Geneva Convention, dropping the earlier rights based on ‘de facto refugee conditions.’ The 1995 Parliamentary investigation ‘Refugee Policies in a Global Perspective’ held that ‘it’s a human right to be able to return to your country. Encouraging voluntary returns should constitute an important part of refugee policies’ Repatriation programmes would in fact become part of the aid and development policy briefs (SOU 1995:75, 205). International cooperation to reduce the number of refugees leaving the regions close to their own countries was encouraged. A 1996 Government bill added emphasis to the policy by facilitating making voluntary returns for all, including those who held permanent residence permits. Family repatriation was focused primarily on those who had formed ‘a household community’ with the refugee in the country of origin (Government bill 1996/97:25).

2000s policy debate: The Winner Takes it All During the 2000, refugee issues re-emerged when procedural matters were discussed. Critics had long held that decisions about granting permanent residence permits were arbitrary. A string of governments had felt that the very frequent appeals against residence permit denials were too likely to reach the final instance, the Cabinet. In order to reduce the work load and often controversial following debates a special ‘Aliens Appeal Board’ with a chairperson trained in law was introduced in 1992. However, cases of policy significance could still be appealed to the government for final decision. Initially, the new Board was widely respected but soon new criticism of arbitrariness mounted. Finally, in 2006 three new ‘Migration Courts’ were set up (with across the board party consensus) with a ‘Supreme Migration Court’ as final court of appeal. Key to the new courts’ rulings are the guidelines set out by the new Aliens Act. These state that permanent residence permit should only be granted according to the Geneva Convention. However, if, but only if, ‘there is an exceptionally strong reason’ individuals may still be granted permits on ‘humanitarian’ grounds and if

 

13

there are other circumstances making them ‘in need of protection’ (Government Bill 2004/05:170: 176ff. 185).

Finally, regarding employment immigration, in 2006 the new no-socialist government made it formal

policy (implemented in 2009; supported by the Greens) to allow non-EU citizens employment immigration. Key arguments focused on labour shortages due to demographic trends (Government bill 2007/08:149). The Social Democrats (and the Left Party) argued against the new policies. Their main arguments focused on the perils they claimed the new immigrants would pose to the Swedish labour market and welfare state models. The Social Democrats were adamant employers should offer terms of employment (wages, insurances etc) on a par with what applies for the various trades inside Sweden. The Party underlined that employers can hardly have the full picture regarding ‘national’ employment needs. As a consequence people already at the labour market’s disposal risk being neglected and out-performed by immigrants (2007/08:Sf28). Previous debates on employment-related immigration had been caused the Social Democrats and the main blue-collar union (the ‘LO’) to pit ‘Swedish born’ against ‘foreign born’ (LO 2004) and the then PM Göran Persson’s warning against ‘social tourism’and ‘abuse’ of the Swedish welfare system by immigrants to whom a Swedish child care allowance would be worth ‘three to four time as much’ (LO 2004; Persson 20XX). Moreover, immigration was described as a public sector budget burden and ‘unprofitable’ (LO 2004) The Party leader, Mr Persson argued that ‘first’ available jobs had to be given to the ‘long queue of employment seekers already in Sweden.’ Only if surplus employment existed would employment-related immigration be allowed (Persson 20XX). The restrictive policies were strongly supported by regional Party representatives.

Does party ideology matter? If ‘strict’ policies on refugee asylum legislation can be referred to as to the ‘right’ on a left-right policy continuum, then certainly the Swedish Social Democrats have consistently been favouring ‘right’ policies. Given earlier research, this is a surprising empirical result, which will contribute to lend depth to academic discussions about refugee and immigration policies. Within the overall framework of debates on refugees stable, and strict, Social Democratic views emerge (and they are mirrored in the related employment immigration policy field). After the booming post WWII years the Party has been very cautious about allowing immigrants permanent residence permits. Non-socialist arguments have emphasised core liberal ideas about the individual. These arguments have clashed with the competing Social Democratic view more based on collective rights and on economic-utilitarian arguments. During the Bosnian crisis the individualism line held that very little was pointing in the direction of improved conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it would be

 

14

unreasonable, inhuman and destructive to the individual refugees to wait for the situation to settle. The opposite, Social Democratic, view held that those who receive permanent residence permits will lose touch with their motherland. As the standard of living would be higher than in the country of origin the refugees would lack incentives to return and thus, Sweden would not contribute to reconstruction. Instead, Sweden should make returns easy and avoid creating new groups of social security dependents. Continuously, the Social Democrats have been eager to avoid any extra burden on the welfare state. At the centre, arguments about ‘national’ interest, ‘national’ considerations have been paramount. In order to care for specific groups, the government and its officials, including the unions, are regarded as legitimate guardians of Swedish national interest against which immigrants pose a threat.

A paradox is that as regards statements about immigrants per se, the Party is careful not to play any obvious anti-immigrant cards whatsoever. Rarely any xenophobic views as such are expressed. However, indirectly, arguments about the reasons behind barring immigrants from entering Sweden contain a range of judgements (‘more than we can cope with,’ ‘social tourism,’ ‘burden’), which would rather sit well with parties normally associated with anti immigration policies. Given the Party’s strong commitment to a people’s home with the emphasis on equality and fear of uneven conditions in terms of standard of living, education, political influence solidarity based on shared cultural beliefs, the policy continuity is understandable.

Previous research has been concentrating on right-of-centre parties. No doubt some of these have tried to politicise immigration on purely populist and (semi-) racist ideologies. The Swedish Social Democrats have done no such thing. On the contrary, the Party’s very foundation rests on a strong commitment to solidarity and the Party continuously tried to achieve integration of immigrants into the Swedish society. However, the means by which to reach the end has without exception been based on Sweden as a nation. Inside the realm, security could be built for ‘the Swedes’ with equality, welfare and secure labour market conditions. Those not belonging to ‘the people’ thus constituted a threat to the people’s home and somehow the flow of foreigners had to be diminished. Party ideology has been a contributing factor in understanding concrete immigration policies.

 

15

References

Abiri, Elisabeth (2000) ”The changing praxis of ’generosity’: Swedish refugee policy during the 1990s”, Journal of Refugee Studies 13(1). Altamirano, Tollefsen, m.fl. (1998) En ny flyktingpolitikk i Norden?: Utviklingen av midlertidig beskyttelse på 1990-talet, Nordiska ministerrådet, Köpenham. Berg, Berit, Schierup Carl-Ulrik, 1999, Integration-retorik, politik, praktik, Nordiska ministerrådet, Köpenhamn. Björklund, Tor and Andersen Goul, Jörgen (1999) Anti-immigration Parties in Denmark and Norway: The Progress Parties and the Danish People’s Party. Alborg University. Coleman, David (2006) “Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low-Fertility Countries: A Third Demographic Transition” Population and Development 32(3). Bale, Tim (2008) ‘Turning round the telescope: Centre-right parties and immigration and integration policy in Europe,’ Journal of European Public Policy 15(3). Demker, Marie (2007) ‘Flyktingpolitik; viktigt för vem?’ in Holmberg, Sören&Lennart Weibull (eds.) Det nya Sverige, SOM-rapport nr 41, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Göteborgs universitet, Göteborg. Freeman, Gary (1997) Immigration as a source of political discontent and frustration in Western democracies. Studies in Comparative International Development 32 (3):42-64. Goldstein, J. and R. O. Keohane (eds.) (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Green-Pedersen, Christoffer and Odmalm, Pontus (2008) “Going different ways? Right-wing parties and the immigrant issue in Denmark and Sweden” Journal of European Public Policy, 15:3, 367. Green-Pedersen, C., Krogstrup, J (2008) 'Immigration as a Political Issue in Denmark and Sweden', European Journal of Political Research, 47(5)610-634. Hall, Peter A (1984) Governing the Economy. The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hansen, Peo (2008) EU:s migrationspolitik under 50 år. Ett integrerat perspektiv på en motsägelsefull utveckling. Studentlitteratur. Hinnfors, Jonas (1992) Familjepolitik. Samhällsförändringar och partistrategier 1960–1990. Stockholm: Almqwist&Wiksell International. Hinnfors, Jonas (1999) “Stability through change: The pervasiveness of political ideas”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 19 No. 3. Hinnfors, Jonas (2008) “The Puzzling Lack of a Social Dilemma”, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol 31, 2008:1, sid. 69-90. Johansson, Christina (2005) Välkommen till Sverige? Svenska migrationspolitiska diskurser under 1900-talets andra hälft. Lund: Bokbox. Migrationsverket (2008) http://www.migrationsverket.se/

 

16

Minkenberg, Michael (2008) “Religious Legacies, Churches, and the Shaping of Immigration Policies in the Age of Religious Diversity”, Politics and Religion vol 1. Lahav, Gallya (1997) ‘Ideological and Party Constraints on Immigration Attitudes in Europe’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 35(1)377–406. Lundh, Christer&Rolf Olsson (1994) Från arbetskraftsimport till flyktinginvandring. Stockholm: SNS. Lundqvist, Lennart J (2000) “Capacity-building or social construction? Explaining Sweden’s shift towards ecological modernisation”, Geoforum, Vol. 31 No 1. Schierup, Carl-Ulrik, Hansen, Peo and Castles, Stephen (2006) Migration, Citizenship and the Welfare State. A European Dilemma, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

European

Smith, Julie (2008) Towards consensus? Centre-right parties and immigration policy in the UK and Ireland’, Journal of European Public Policy, 15(3) 414-430. Spång, Mikael (2008) Svensk invandringspolitik i demokratiskt perspektiv. Current Themes in IMER Research, Malmö. Steiner, Niklaus (2000), Arguing about Asylum – The Complexity of Refugee Debates in Europe, St.Martin, New York. Svallfors, Stefan (1989) Vem älskar välfärdsstaten? Attityder, organiserade intressen och svensk välfärdspolitik. Lund: Arkiv. UNHCR: http://www.unhcr.se/en/News/news_Iraqis_stat_en.html (2007)

 

17