Journal of Human Rights, 8:1–36, 2009 Copyright © 2009 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1475-4835 print / 1475-4843 online DOI: 10.1080/14754830802701200

Towards an Understanding of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications AUDREY R. CHAPMAN

Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights enumerate a right to the benefits of scientific progress, but science is rarely addressed through a human rights lens. Nor has the human rights community systematically addressed the requirements of this right. This article seeks to stimulate the process of conceptualizing the right by offering some initial thoughts. It first reviews the right to the benefits of scientific progress in international human rights law and its historical background. The article then defines the key terms of science, scientific progress, and access to the benefits of science. The next section considers the human rights principles relevant to a human rights approach to the benefits of science. The article then considers what it means to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research. Three sections follow exploring the obligations to respect, to protect, and to fulfill in relationship to the conservation, development, and diffusion of science. The article goes on to explore the international components of the right. The final section is a brief conclusion.

We live in a world in which science and technology play a central role but can and should access to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications be considered a universal human right to which all people are entitled? And if so, how should we understand the scope of its content and the correlative duties it imposes on states? Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR or Universal Declaration; 1948) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR or the Covenant; 1966) enumerate a right to the benefits of science. Nevertheless, this right is so obscure and its interpretation so neglected that the overwhelming majority of human rights advocates, governments, and international human rights bodies appear to be oblivious to its existence. As the human rights community has learned from years of experience, the stipulation of a right in international human rights law does not necessarily guarantee that the right in question will be universally viewed as an obligation for states to fulfill. Furthermore, the lack of a consensus as to what the right entails makes implementation far less likely. Audrey R. Chapman is Professor of Community Medicine and Healthcare and holds the Healey Memorial Chair in Medical Humanities and Ethics at the University of Connecticut School of Medicine. Prior to coming to the University of Connecticut in July 2006, she served as the Director of the Science and Human Rights Program at the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). She is the author, coauthor, or editor of 16 books and numerous articles and reports. Her publications include Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver? (with Hugo van der Merwe), Designing Our Descendants: The Promises and Perils of Genetic Modifications (with Mark Frankel), and Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (with Sage Russell). Address correspondence to Audrey R. Chapman, Department of Community Medicine and Healthcare, University of Connecticut Health Center, 263 Farmington Avenue, Farmington, CT 06030 USA. E-mail: [email protected]

1

2

Audrey R. Chapman

There are particular difficulties with conceptualizing the right to the benefits of scientific progress because science is so rarely addressed through a human rights lens. Traditionally science has been viewed as an area of study or research dedicated to seeking knowledge or truth about the world. More recently, science, particularly applied science or technology, has been identified as an instrument to stimulate economic growth or to promote other national goals. Some applications of science, like weapons development or improving international competitiveness, can conflict with a human rights approach, and others, like promoting economic development, still fall short of the requirements of human rights. The United Nations Millennium Project provides an example of the latter, in this case for fostering the admirable goal of overcoming poverty and its deprivations in the world’s poorest countries. One of the several Millennium Project’s expert task forces— the Task Force on Science, Technology, and Innovation—issued a report that emphasizes the potential contributions of science and technology to achieving all of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) seeking to overcome poverty and its deprivations in the poorest countries: “Science, technology, and innovation underpin every one of the [MDG] Goals. It is inconceivable that gains can be made in health and environmental concerns without a focused science, technology, and innovation policy. A well-articulated and focused science, technology, and innovation policy can also help make progress in education, gender equality (which is often tied to education and health care), and living conditions” (Juma and Yee-Cheong 2005: 16). The report attributes much of the improvement in human welfare over the past century to technology, specifically innovations in public health, nutrition, and agriculture (Juma and Yee-Cheong 2005: 17). Nevertheless this report does not treat scientific advancement or its benefits as a human right in and of itself. When science has been explicitly linked with human rights within the United Nations system it is usually within the framework of the relationship of science and technology to the realization of other human rights or, alternatively, the dangers that scientific developments and technologies can or do pose to the protection of human rights. But science is rarely, if ever, dealt with as a substantive human right. The main drafting of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights took place during the 1950s; a time when the relationship between science and human rights was viewed quite positively (Haugen 2008: 225). During the 1970s, however, science came to be seen as a threat. The Secretary-General of the United Nations and staff of several specialized agencies prepared a number of substantive reports on scientific and technological developments and their impact on human rights for presentation to the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights. The reports addressed such topics as the potential impact of electronic communications and computer data systems on privacy rights and the risks to human rights of advances in biological and medicine, including artificial insemination, the use of psychotropic drugs, and the introduction of chemicals into food production (Claude 2002b: 264). In the mid-1970s, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), encouraged by several of the socialist countries, took the initiative to draft a “Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind” (United Nations General Assembly 1975) that was adopted by the General Assembly. This declaration presented science as a resource to promote the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind 1975: Art. 7). However, it additionally expressed concerns that science not be used to the “detriment of human rights and freedoms and the dignity of the human person” (Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind 1975: Art. 8). The 1993 World Conference on Human

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

3

Rights noted similar concerns that certain advances in the biomedical and life sciences and information technology may have adverse consequences for human dignity and rights (World Conference on Human Rights 1993: para. 11). The human rights community has not systematically addressed the requirements of the right to the benefits of science. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the human rights treaty monitoring body that oversees compliance with the provisions of the ICESCR, has not yet focused on this right through the two mechanisms it typically uses to do so. It has not held a day of general discussion in which experts and members of the human rights community are invited to participate and present their views. Nor has it drafted a general comment setting forth its interpretation of the right. At the time of this writing the Committee has not announced specific plans for dealing with the right to the benefits of science. It dealt peripherally with the subject of agricultural technology in its General Comment No. 12 interpreting the provisions of article 11 (2) on the right to adequate food (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1999b). The Committee has also issued a general comment on the content of the intellectual property provisions of article 15, but this general comment does not offer much in the way of an understanding of the right to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications. Added to these limitations, the academic literature in English conceptualizing the scope of Article 15 (1) (b) of ICESCR on the right to the benefits of scientific progress and the related obligations of states parties is quite sparse. Most of it will be cited in the analysis in this paper. Like the statements within United Nations circles, the academic literature tends to focus on the problems that science and technology pose for the protection of human rights rather than a substantive interpretation of the requirements of the right to the benefits of science. Recently UNESCO has taken an interest in the right, and hopefully its efforts will stimulate some needed foundational work.1 Therefore, at this point in time there is not an international consensus as to what a human rights approach to science entails, let alone specification of the kinds of obligations this right imposes on states. This article seeks to stimulate the process of conceptualizing the right by offering some initial thoughts. It first reviews the right to the benefits of scientific progress in international human rights law and its historical background. The article then defines the key terms of science, scientific progress, and access to the benefits of science. The next section considers the human rights principles relevant to a human rights approach to the benefits of science. The article then considers what it means to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research. Three sections follow exploring the obligations to respect, to protect, and to fulfill in relationship to the conservation, development, and diffusion of science. The article goes on to explore the international components of the right. The final section is a brief conclusion.

The Right to the Benefits of Scientific Progress in International Human Rights Law International human rights law enumerates a substantive right for everyone to have access to the benefits of scientific advancement or progress and its applications, i.e., through the development of technology. When the Universal Declaration was drafted 60 years ago, it stipulated such a right. Article 27 of the UDHR has two paragraphs related to science, one addressing the right of everyone to share in scientific advancement and the other the right of scientists to the protection of their moral and material interests in their discovery or invention:

4

Audrey R. Chapman 1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts, and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which he is the author.

Building on the UDHR, Article 15 (1) (b) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the major international human rights instrument addressing these issues, directs states parties, which are the countries that have ratified or acceded to this instrument, to “recognize the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.” Because the ICESCR is legally binding on those nations that become states parties, the text also enumerates a series of mandates that were absent from the Universal Declaration in the format of “steps to be taken.” These are outlined in paragraphs two through four: (2) The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture. (3) The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity. (4) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts and cooperation in the scientific and cultural fields (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966). Like article 27 of the UDHR, article 15 of the ICESCR links the right to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications with two other provisions, one dealing with intellectual property and the other with cultural participation. The intellectual property language recognizes the right “to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author” (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966: Art. 15 [1] [c]). The third component of Article 15 recognizes the right of everyone to participate in cultural life (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966: art. 15 [1] [a]). Other provisions of the Covenant also deal with science and technology. Article 12 (2) on the right to be free from hunger links realization of this right with the improvement of methods of production, conservation, and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge. Both articles 2 (1) and 23 of the ICESCR identify the need for technical assistance from other countries for many states to be able to achieve the rights enumerated in the Covenant. While article 12 regarding the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health does not explicitly discuss science, many of its components have scientific dimensions.

Historical Background Why is there a right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress, and more specifically why did the drafters of article 27 of the UDHR and article 15 of the ICESCR decide to include this right? And how did they conceptualize the right to the benefits of science? At first glance the three components of article 15 seem to be a strange combination. So why is the right to the benefits of scientific progress linked with the right to participate in cultural life and the recognition of the intellectual property claims of authors, creators, and scientists?

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

5

Is it accidental that these three such different rights were placed in the same article or did the framers understand these rights to be intrinsically interconnected? The enumeration of the right to share in scientific advancement and its benefits in the UDHR seems to reflect a confluence of three factors. The first of these is the awareness of the destructive potential of science. Like other provisions of the Universal Declaration, the context for drafting article 27 was the widespread reaction to the Nazi genocide and the brutality of World War II. Science and technology had played an important role in the war and served as an instrument of the Holocaust. Therefore it is not surprising that some eminent scientists took an active part in the public debate after the war about the development of a code of universal human rights norms, including Julian Huxley, the British biologist and writer who served as the first director of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the American chemist W. A. Noyes, and J. M. Burgers, a member of the Netherlands Academy of Science. The discussion within the UN Commission on Human Rights during the drafting process alluded to the misuse of science and technology by the Hitler regime and the need for safeguards to protect science from such harmful pressures (Claude 2002b: 250–252). The second is the role of UNESCO in the drafting process of the texts of these articles. UNESCO representatives participated in the meetings that framed the Universal Declaration, and later the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The purview of UNESCO includes science as well as education and culture. It is not surprising therefore that its representatives lobbied for the UDHR to have a paragraph that recognized parallel subject matter. And the third factor is the precedent set by the provisions of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948), which was completed about six months earlier than the UDHR. Article 13 of that instrument states that Every person has the right to take part in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts, and to participate in the benefits that result from intellectual progress, especially scientific discoveries. He likewise has the right to the protection of his moral and material interests as regards his inventions or any literary, scientific or artistic works of which he is the author. (American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 1948: 38–45) Latin American delegates to the drafting committee advocated carrying over the language of the American Declaration into the UDHR (American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 1948). According to Johannes Morsink’s account of the drafting history of article 27 of the UDHR, there was not much disagreement over incorporating a right to share in scientific advancement (Morsink 1999: ch. 6.3). The discussions about its wording focused on two issues. The first was a proposal by the Soviet delegate to “recognize and proclaim the people’s right to enjoy the applications of science mobilized in the service of progress and democracy” so as to prevent science from being primarily used for the development of weapons, which the Soviet Union accused the United States of doing (Claude 2002a: 33). In response, the proposed amendment was criticized by the United States and several Western European delegates as politicizing science, and opposition from the Latin American delegates ensured its rejection on a roll call vote (Claude 2002a: 33). In contrast, a proposal by the Chinese delegate to add the phrase “share in its benefits” so as to clarify that the

6

Audrey R. Chapman

right was meant for everyone, not just members of the scientific community, was supported (Claude 2002a: 35–36). A review of the traveaux pr´eparatoire of the ICESCR indicates that the text that became article 15 of the Covenant was first proposed by the US representative, incorporated an amendment by Lebanon and was then adopted by the Commission on Human Rights. Interestingly, when the Third Committee initially received the draft Covenant from the Commission on Human Rights, it lacked the language of what was to become article 15 (1) (c) recognizing the rights of authors and creators. This omission was pointed out by the Israeli delegation and was then discussed. Representatives of Costa Rica and Uruguay moved to amend the Covenant to reinsert this provision of the UDHR. The USSR and the Eastern bloc, reflecting their socialist interests and the dynamics of the Cold War, strongly objected to incorporating the provision on intellectual property. They argued that the people’s right to benefit from science should not get intermixed with property rights. The socialist bloc’s opposition to property rights had already played a major role in the decision of the Covenant’s drafting committee to omit the text of article 17 of the UDHR recognizing the right to tangible forms of property in the Covenant. A key argument to retaining the intellectual property provision was that the three rights were substantively interrelated so that each was instrumental to the realization of the others. The rights of authors and creators to prevent others from altering their compositions, and by extension scientists as well, were understood as essential preconditions for cultural freedom and participation and scientific progress (Chapman 2002: 312–316).

Definition of Terms Science and Its Applications One beginning point to conceptualizing a human rights approach to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications is to consider what science, scientific progress, and access to the benefits of its applications mean. Since these fundamental terms are not defined in the text of the Covenant, it is helpful to refer to works on the sociology of science in the prewar and post- World War II period that both reflected and influenced the milieu in which the Universal Declaration and Covenant were drafted. Robert Merton’s classical collection of essays in The Sociology of Science, many of which were written in this era, characterizes science as a public enterprise advancing fundamental knowledge about the world. Merton associates science with (1) a set of characteristic methods by which knowledge is certified; (2) a stock of accumulated knowledge stemming from the applications of these methods; (3) a set of cultural values and mores governing the activities termed scientific; or (4) any combination of these (Merton 1973: 268). He identifies the ethos of science as characterized by four basic norms that together maintain its purity and autonomy: disinterestedness, universalism, communism, and organized skepticism. Disinterestedness is the principle that scientists should be motivated exclusively by a search for truth; they should not conduct research to promote personal interests, agendas, or for personal benefit. Universalism conveys that scientific validity is not relative to or conditioned by a particular culture, race, gender, or society. Communism is the idea that the fruits of scientific investigation belong to everyone. Organized skepticism refers to the need to critically examine all scientific beliefs and assumptions (Merton 1973: 270–278). Science has been distinguished from other domains of culture and knowledge by its progressive character. This characterization reflects several considerations. The first is that science is seen as a collective enterprise of researchers in successive generations who

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

7

build on each other’s knowledge base and findings. In this cumulative view of scientific knowledge, methods of science are produced that are used to create scientific theories, which are then tested and evaluated enabling them to become the basis for more new knowledge. Additionally, it is argued that clear standards or normative criteria exist for identifying improvements and advances in science in contrast to art, philosophy, religion, morality, and other fields of knowledge and culture (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2007). Interestingly, the text of article 15 (1) (b) refers to the applications of science rather than to technology as we would be more likely to do today. Here it may be relevant that Merton, like many others in this period, draws a sharp contrast between basic science and applied technology. Applied technology, according to Merton, is a private enterprise pursuing proprietary solutions to practical problems. While applied technology draws freely on the pool of public scientific knowledge, it does not contribute to it. Instead, the goal is to solve practical problems in the hope of earning profits (Merton 2007: 191–203). Vannevar Bush, President Truman’s science adviser, had a similar approach to distinguishing between science and technology. He claimed that investments in basic research would build a general knowledge base and scientifically trained labor force that in turn would facilitate applications of science to the development of technology and the solutions to practical problems. Bush argued against government investment in technology because he assumed that private companies, which he characterized as not interested in basic research, would do so (Bush 1945). This rationale played an important role in the rising governmental support for basic research during and after World War II ( Resnick 2007: 171–72). The post-World War II period in which the Universal Declaration and the Covenant were drafted had a great deal of optimism about scientific progress and its contributions to human betterment. Notably, article 15 (1) (b) refers to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, and the steps to be taken by states parties to implement article 15 do not explicitly direct states parties to protect everyone from the harms or misuse of science. This is curious because the very effort to draft the Universal Declaration and the subsequent international human rights instruments derived from it were motivated in large part by the genocidal practices of the Nazis, some of which involved the misuse of science. Moreover, arguably the greatest scientific feat during the World War II was the development of the destructive power of the atomic bomb, and the cold war milieu in which the Covenant was drafted raised the specter of another war fought with nuclear weapons. Many contemporary interpreters of science take issue with the “traditional account” of science outlined above, specifically its idealized portrayal of the objectivity and purity of science, the sharp distinctions made between basic science and applied technology, and the assumptions of likely human benefits from basic scientific research. Since the 1970s there has been much academic discussion among philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science about these issues and the role that science can and should play in a democratic society (Kitcher 2001; Koertge 1998). Leaving aside the “scientific wars” about epistemic issues related to the objectivity of science and its homogeneity or divisions into disciplinary orientations and practices, the principles of scientific inquiry are more likely to be understood as normative ideals or guidelines and not descriptive generalizations of the way science is actually conducted ( Resnick 2007: 38–43). There is also greater sensitivity to the manner in which the social context in which science functions bears on outcomes: that science has its own norms and values fails to insulate scientists from the influence of political, social, cultural, moral, and economical factors or the siren call of career advancement. Additionally, there is acknowledgement that scientific progress does not necessarily promote human well-being (Kitcher 2001: 200). By its very nature basic scientific research is generally directed toward the pursuit of knowledge and not the goal of human betterment.

8

Audrey R. Chapman

Peer review mechanisms used to distribute government research grants generally evaluate innovativeness and scientific merit and not the potential benefit of applications. Even when discoveries, for example in the biomedical field, have likely therapeutic applications, there are often formidable obstacles to their translation into specific therapies and their dissemination into clinical and public health practice. Changes in the Scientific Enterprise Significantly, the nature of science, its perceived role in society, and the government’s role in sponsoring scientific research have changed in the past half century since the Universal Declaration and ICESCR were drafted. Fifty years ago the significant government investments in basic research and the development of science in most industrialized countries made it possible to argue that the conduct of scientific research, including the maintenance and distribution of scientific data, was a public good. According to the then dominant model of science, scientists engaged in research were motivated primarily by the desire to advance basic knowledge, receive professional recognition, contribute to human welfare and in the process further their careers. To do so, they pursued dissemination of research results through publication but were disinclined to patent their discoveries or to use them for other economic considerations (Carroll 1995: n. 24). Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, however, the profit motive increasingly found its way into science and medicine. Modern science, even within academic settings, has become a big business, and like any other business, science is now deeply influenced by economic forces and financial interests (Resnick 2007: 1). The 1980 adoption of the Bayh-Dole Act in the United States, which allowed scientists to patent research that was developed with government funds, served as a watershed. This policy change facilitated more extensive collaboration between academic institutions and private industry. The manner in which several new fields developed, particularly biotechnology, computers, and electronics, also resulted in more basic research being funded by or conducted within the private sector. The subsequent commercialization of research eroded the distinction in many areas of scientific research between basic research, where scientists are primarily concerned with the attribution of ideas and findings, and applied research, where proprietary intellectual property rights predominate (Committee on Issues in the Transborder Flow of Scientific Data of the National Research Council 1997: 133–134). There is a growing literature on how commercialization affects the objectives, norms, research process, and outcomes of science. Most of these studies are critical of the manner in which monetary considerations have affected problem selection, research design, subject recruitment, collection and recording data, the analysis and interpretation of data, designation of authorship, publication, and data sharing. Various studies document the detrimental effect of pervasive conflicts of interest in the research process resulting from the corporate sources of funding; the direct financial interests of scientists related to their research, such as ownership of stock, consulting contracts, honorarium, and royalties from patents; and universities promotion of intellectual property claims and commercialization (Committee on Issues in the Transborder Flow of Scientific Data of the National Research Council 1997: 77–108; Krimsky 2003; Angell 2004). In addition, corporate funding may provide incentives for the selective publication of research findings to block disclosure of data about a product’s ineffectiveness or harmful effects thereby violating fundamental canons of evidence-based science (McHenry 2005: 35). One central consideration affecting the human right to benefits of scientific progress is the role of money in the determination of research priorities and areas of investment.

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

9

Contemporary scientific research and technology development tend to be expensive. Social and political considerations that do not necessarily correlate with calculations of human benefit often play an important role in setting the government’s research agenda in many countries. Historically defense- and military-related research have been accorded a priority. In the private sector, the profit motive drives research rather than scientific curiosity or the determination of human need. Corporations select project and allocate their funds in terms of their potential profitability. People with low incomes do not present an attractive market opportunity. With market-driven science, important areas of research are neglected, and promising research findings may not be translated into new products or, even if they are, brought to market. The commercialization of science and technology also affects the costs of products with significant implications for their affordability and accessibility. For example, the prices of prescription drugs in the US market reflect the vast corporate expenditures for marketing, advertising, and political lobbying that together exceed research investment by a large margin.2 The effective monopoly that corporations wield as long as their product is under patent also enables them to set high prices.

Enjoy the Benefits The wording of article 15 (1) (b) recognizes the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of science and its applications. An analysis of the travaux preparatoires for this right indicates that the term benefits is to be understood as material benefits that every person should be able to enjoy in everyday life. States parties were therefore obligated to distribute the applications of scientific progress to everyone because there was a universal right to share in the benefits of scientific advancement. This entitlement pertained regardless of whether individuals had contributed to scientific progress (Haugen 2008: 232). According to the UNDP 2001 on Making New Technologies Work for Human Development, technological innovation can contribute to human development in two ways. First, they can directly enhance human capabilities, can improve living standards and can enable people to participate more actively in the life of their community through such products as drought-resistant plant varieties for farmers in uncertain climates, clean energy sources, Internet access for information and communication, and vaccines for infectious diseases. Second, technological advance can be a means to human development through its impact on economic growth through the productivity gains it generates (UNDP 2001: 28). Reflecting on the importance of science and technological innovation for agricultural development, The World Development Report 2008 emphasizes the potential of science to address poverty in both favored and less-favored regions. It also points out that science will be critical in adapting to and mitigating climate change and tackling environmental problems more generally (World Bank 2007: 176). The wording of this right—to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications—is ambiguous, however, as to whether the right pertains only to the dissemination of the fruits of scientific progress or more fundamentally to its development as well. This is a very important matter on which there needs to be further discussion. The interpretation in this paper is that it requires both, especially given the current bias against investment in areas of scientific and biomedical research and technological development that are targeted to meet the needs of the poor. That said though, it is a very difficult goal to realize. If science and technology are to be of benefit to everyone, they need to be broadly disseminated. Recent general comments interpreting the provisions of specific rights enumerated in the ICESCR adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

10

Audrey R. Chapman

set forth four relevant criteria that are applicable to science and technology as well: availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality. Availability refers to the extent to which the facilities, goods, and services required for the fulfillment of a specific right are available in sufficient quantity for the population within the state. Accessibility has four dimensions: (1) nondiscrimination, whether the facilities, goods, and services are accessible to all without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds; (2) physical accessibility, the extent to which the facilities, goods, and services are within safe physical reach for all sections of the population, especially vulnerable and marginalized groups; (3) economic accessibility, whether the goods, services, and facilities related to the rights are affordable for all, including socially disadvantaged groups; and (4) information accessibility, whether the population has the right to seek, to receive, and to impart information relevant to the right. Acceptability is a measure of whether the facilities, goods, and services are culturally appropriate and respectful of ethical standards. Quality entails whether the facilities, goods, and services are scientifically appropriate and of good quality (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2000: General Comment 14, para. 12). That it is more characteristic for there to be major inequalities in the fair development and diffusion of technologies within and across societies raises major issues for a human rights approach to science and technology. Scientific research, invention, innovation, and product development are concentrated in high-income OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) countries and to a lesser extent a handful of middle-income countries in Asia and Latin America (UNDP 2001: 39). Access to new and old technologies is also unevenly distributed within countries. Many “vintage” technologies have been unevenly disseminated despite their enormous value as instruments of human progress, apparently due to the limits of income, infrastructure, and institutions. These include such basic inputs as electricity, the telephone (with the availability of cellular technology making a difference), agricultural innovations, and medical advances (UNDP 2001: 40–42). There is obviously a great need for more attention to the development, delivery, and distribution of simple and inexpensive technologies appropriate for the majority of people who live in impoverished rural villages. The development of the treadle pump in Bangladesh, a simple foot-operated device for pulling water up to the pump level, provides one such example of a simple, low-cost technology. Later they were adapted in Kenya for irrigation in East Africa ( Treadle Pump 2008). Another is the development of oral rehydration therapy at Bangladesh’s International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research. Described by the Lancet as possibly the most important medical discovery of the twentieth century, oral rehydration therapy provides a simple and inexpensive (about 10 cents a dose) replacement for the standard therapy of providing sterilized liquid through an intravenous drip (at a cost of about $50 per child). Similarly, new technologies for immunization that do not require sterile conditions and a reliable chain of well-maintained refrigerators and cold transport facilitated mass immunization campaigns for polio and other killer communicable diseases like measles, rubella, whooping cough, diphtheria, tetanus, and tuberculosis (UNDP 2001: 28).

Human Rights Principles Relevant to a Human Rights Approach to the Benefits of Scientific Progress Like all human rights, the human right to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications imposes a different set of obligations on states than promoting or using science

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

11

for other purposes, even noteworthy goals. Specifically, it requires that science be seen as an instrument for human benefit. It also necessitates that the process of doing scientific research and the development of applications from that science be consistent with fundamental human rights principles. These principles include the following.

Consistency with Human Dignity All human rights are said to derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. A human rights approach therefore requires that governments evaluate the implications of developing and making available areas of science and technology on human dignity. While science and technology have the capacity to benefit human lives, some developments also pose potential challenges to human dignity. In the 40 years since the publication of Jacques Ellul’s pioneering work The Technological Society (1964), an increasing number of thinkers have called attention to the inimical impact of the ethos of technology for human dignity and its potential to erode moral values. According to some analysts, Albert Borgmann among them (Borgmann 1990: 335), modern technology encourages us to treat an expanding range of human relationships as well as things as commodities whose utility we measure and consume. Others, such as Ian Barbour, recognize the subtle danger of extending technological attitudes to all of life until human beings and other creatures are treated as objects to be exploited (Barbour 1993). Barbour points out that technologies frequently bring an inequitable distribution of costs and benefits: one group benefits while other groups bear the brunt of the risks and indirect costs. He notes that technology, which is both a product and an instrument of social power, also tends to reinforce the concentration of wealth and political power in existing social structures. Two recent international documents address the potential impact of new scientific and medical developments on human rights and dignity. The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, prepared by UNESCO and then adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1999, emphasizes that genetic research and applications should fully respect human dignity, freedom, and rights and prohibits all forms of discrimination based on genetic characteristics. Article 2 states that “Everyone has a right to respect for their dignity and for their rights regardless of genetic characteristics” (Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 1993). The Declaration affirms freedom or research related to the genome, which is necessary for the progress of knowledge and freedom of thought (Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 1993: Art. 12b), but with the caveat that researchers respect principles of caution, intellectual honesty, and integrity in the conduct of research and the presentation and utilization of their findings (Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 1993: Art. 13). The document assigns responsibility to states to take appropriate measures to foster the intellectual and material conditions to foster freedom in the conduct of research on the human genome and to safeguard respect for human rights in the process (Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 1993: Art. 14–16). The Declaration further recommends that benefits from advances in biology, genetics, and medicine, concerning the genome, should be made available to all (Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 1993: Art. 12a). In addition, it states that practices that are contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive cloning of humans, should not be permitted (Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 1993: Art. 11). A 1997 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, the result of five years of

12

Audrey R. Chapman

discussions and negotiations between member states of the Council of Europe, constitutes another effort to address technological developments from a human dignity perspective. Parties to this Convention make a commitment to protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and to guarantee respect for their fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine 2000: 259–266). A central principle of the Convention is that the interests and welfare of persons shall prevail over the interest of society or science (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 2000: Art. 2). Recognizing that there is no alternative of comparable effectiveness to research on humans in the field of medicine, the Convention specifies a series of conditions to protect persons undergoing research (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 2000: Art. 16–17). It also specifies a number of limitations, particularly in relationship to the types of interventions on the human genome that are permissible (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 2000: Art. 13) and prohibiting the creation of human embryos for research purposes (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 2000: Art. 18[2]). That said, the goal of using human dignity as a standard for scientific research and development is complicated by the vague nature of the concept. Policy documents and legal instruments, such as the two mentioned above, that enjoin states to promote and protect dignity, rarely provide an explicit definition of dignity or articulate how human worth might be degraded by a given technology or scientific activity. This failure to “operationalize” human dignity makes it difficult to assess the potential human dignity implications of specific technologies with a view to avoiding infringements. To further complicate matters, there are two opposing approaches to human dignity in the literature. In some documents, the concept of human dignity is used to emphasize the right of individuals to make autonomous choices. This is most apparent in the context of research ethics documents and informed-consent policies. This conception treats human dignity as a means of empowerment, but a limited means. Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that this is the only appropriate normative use of dignity (Macklin 2003: 1419–1420). An alternative conception, dignity as a means of constraint, is increasingly common in the realm of science policy. Citations of human dignity in documents and science policy discussions usually come in the context of concerns that some activities, such as human cloning or the commodification of human tissue, infringe on some basic understanding of dignity (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001). The prohibition against human cloning in the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights represents an example. Likewise, in the controversy about human embryonic stem cell research, concerns with violations of human dignity are often cited as a rationale for limiting destruction on human embryos. When used in this manner, dignity is meant to reflect a broad social or moral position. It is not used as a grounding for individual rights, but as a justification for a policy response—usually a policy that is intended to curtail a given activity. The practical problem with the constraint approach to human dignity is that modern societies are often pluralistic making it difficult to form a consensus on values (Childress 2001: 157–165). There may not even be agreement about the foundation of human dignity— whether it is faith based or secular—let alone what human dignity entails. In the debate on embryonic stem cell research, for example, the lack of agreement on the moral status of the embryo precludes reaching agreement on the degree to which the creation of new stem cell lines from surplus human embryos left over from fertility treatment challenges human dignity.

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

13

Nondiscrimination and Equal Treatment As interpreted through a human rights lens, a right of access to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications at a minimum entails that the freedom and opportunity to benefit from scientific and technical advancement be broadly diffused within a nation “without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966: art. 2 [2]). It also requires governments “to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment” (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966: art. 3) of the benefits. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights interprets these nondiscrimination clauses as requiring states parties to eliminate both de jure and de facto forms of discrimination that adversely affect the realization of the rights covered by the Covenant. These obligations have also been interpreted as requiring both negative measures to prevent discrimination and positive “affirmative action” type initiatives to compensate for past discrimination (Alston 1991: 47). To fulfill these requirements, the UN Committee places considerable emphasis on the realization of the human rights of women, minorities, the poor, and other disadvantaged groups both in their reporting guidelines and in their review of state party reports. What, then, does this mean for interpreting the right to benefit from scientific progress? It certainly imposes a different standard from the current tendency to favor the interests of large corporations or to promote the abstract principle of scientific competitiveness. It also mandates correcting and compensating for the tendency of investments in science and technology to favor the affluent and the technologically sophisticated. When making choices and decisions, it calls for particular sensitivity to the effects on the poor, the disadvantaged, racial, ethnic and linguistic minorities, women, and rural residents. Given the commitment to ensure the equal rights of men and women, a human rights approach to science underscores the need to adopt a gender approach in order to rectify existing gender imbalances in science and technology. Doing so entails greater efforts to assure equal educational opportunities at all levels of scientific training to overcome the male domination of many fields of science and technology in most countries. It also requires overcoming impediments to women’s professional advancement after they succeed in completing advanced degrees. Unequal educational and labor force opportunities, limitations in access to formal and informal training, and a lack of social and professional support are all social issues susceptible to remediation through policy initiatives (American Sociological Association Council 2005). Beyond training and career issues, a gender-based approach to science requires greater sensitivity and commitment to making certain that the identification of priorities for and investments in scientific research and development attempt to meet girls’ and women’s particular needs. Several of the Committee’s general comments bear on this requirement. For example, its general comment on the right to health recommends that states integrate a gender perspective in their health-related policies, planning, programs, and research and develop and implement a comprehensive national strategy for promoting women’s right to health throughout their life span. According to this document, a gender-based approach should include interventions aimed at the prevention and treatment of diseases affecting women as well as policies to provide access to a full range of high-quality and affordable health care (Committee on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights 2000: para. 20 and 21). The Committee’s general comment on the right to water notes the importance of ensuring sustainable access to water resources and management systems for disadvantaged and marginalized farmers, including women farmers (Committee for Economic, Social and

14

Audrey R. Chapman

Cultural Rights, 2002: para. 7). The general comment specifies that state parties should give special attention to individuals and groups who have traditionally faced difficulties in exercising the right to water, including women and, to that end, should take steps to ensure that women are not excluded from decision-making processes concerning water resources and entitlements (para. 16).

Focus on the Disadvantaged A human rights approach focuses on the status of the most disadvantaged rather than some societal average or the interests of the most advanced and affluent communities. Applied to the right to the benefits of scientific progress, this requires a form of affirmative action, that is, specific investments in science and technologies likely to benefit those at the bottom of the economical and social scale. In undertaking the determinations of the benefits that are likely to accrue from investments into specific areas of science and technology, potential profits to investors and improvements in the living standards of the affluent should count for much less than improving the status of the vulnerable and bringing them up to mainstream standards. In poor countries this commitment also means giving priority to the development, importation, and dissemination of simple and inexpensive technologies that can improve the life of the disadvantaged rather than the more complex and high-technology state-ofthe art innovations that disproportionately favor the educated and economically affluent individuals and regions. The much discussed digital divide provides an example. Internet and advances in digital information technology are creating new opportunities in a wide variety of fields. Electronic publishing, the digitalization of a wide variety of resources, and the creation of sophisticated search engines are making scientific data more widely accessible and offering new economic and academic opportunities. A number of studies, however, document the existence of major gaps in computer use and access between groups defined by income, education, gender, and geographic area within and between countries (The Century Foundation 2000). It is estimated that only 11 percent of the world’s population has access to the Internet, 90 percent of whom are in industrialized countries (UNESCO 2005: 29). To avoid leaving poor and minority communities behind, advanced countries, like the United States, need to undertake intentional efforts to expand access to information technologies in underserved communities. This may involve, for example, providing computers for libraries in poor communities and training staff and communities members to use them. It may also warrant the distribution of computers to all students in poor neighborhoods. In addition, widespread use of digital technologies in low-income areas may require differential and subsidized pricing of connection costs. There are many examples of how electronic and communications technology can be adapted for poor countries and communities. To overcome cost barriers, the Indian Institute of Science and Engineers at the Bangalore-based design company Encore Software designed an Internet appliance, the Simputer, to sell for less than $200 that can provide Internet access and e-mail in local languages (UNDP 2001: 35). The Hole-in-the-Wall Project, which installs refurbished computers in underprivileged communities in urban India to provide residents, particularly children, with free access to the Internet, represents another exemplary early stage effort (Mitra 2008). In many localities community-based financing of cell phones has enabled farmers to research market trends, linked health care workers with better-trained and more experienced professionals, and ended the social isolation of families. A mobile phone application called EpiSurveyor recently played an

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

15

important role in containing a polio outbreak in Kenya (Science and Development Network 2008). E-mail has also proven to be an important tool for political organizing and mass mobilization to hold governments accountable or to displace corrupt and authoritarian regimes.

Facilitating Participation and Transparency in Decision Making The human rights and democratic principle of self-determination enumerated in the ICESCR and the various civil and political rights defined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996) emphasizes the right of all members of society to participate in a meaningful way in deciding on their governance and common future on those issues they themselves consider important. Empowerment translates into a right to societal decision making on setting priorities for and major decisions regarding the development of science and technology. Applied to science and technology, this principle requires that at least major decisions about priorities and policy be made with input by diverse communities within the society, including and particularly representatives of the disadvantaged, and not solely by scientists, other experts, civil servants, or even political leaders. Otherwise, science policy is unlikely to pose or to be informed by a meaningful and appropriate answer to the question as to what is the collective good that it is trying to promote. Nor is it the scientific agenda likely to represent the interests and needs of the diverse groups (Kitcher 2001: 117–136). UNESCO’s Towards Knowledge Societies offers a vision of a participatory democracy model of governance for the sciences. In contrast with the traditional model of linear decision making, in which industry and government have a near monopoly on direct dealing with scientific establishments while civil society and the public have a largely passive role, UNESCO proposes a triangular relationship. In the triangular model, made possible through new communications technology, particularly the rise of the Internet, the relationship is no longer hierarchical. Instead there is the public realm of discussion, concerted action, and/or confrontation (UNESCO 2005: 120–122). However, their report is unspecific as to how to establish and maintain the conditions and arrangements for a participatory and inclusive “knowledge society.” While the need for democracy in the formulation of science policy is easy to affirm in principle, the active and informed participation of lay individuals and communities is very difficult to achieve in practice. As science and technology have advanced, the capacity to understand them has required levels of increasing education and specialization that few members of society have. Even scientists in one field may not understand the benefits and risks of policy alternatives in areas unrelated to their specialty. The complexity of science and technology imposes problems for a participatory approach particularly in societies whose citizens are not well educated or where the majority of people have refrained from studying science. In addition, political institutions have not kept up with technological change, even in advanced industrialized countries. In the early 1980s, C. G. Weeramantry wrote a book entitled The Slumbering Sentinels, which examines the implications of unfettered technological advance ( Weeramantry 1983). He commented then that the speed of technological change had left social and political institutions unprepared with the result that technology was leading rather than being shaped by governmental policy (Weeramantry 1983: ch. 10). He also identified various power shifts related to technological change, particularly the concentration of power in transnational corporations and these corporations’ ability to find a common interest with personnel in government departments at the expense of the

16

Audrey R. Chapman

democratic process. Further contributing to the inadequacy of political structures in the face of technological changes, Weermantry pointed out that decisions of major importance involving the use of technology are often taken at the highest legislative and executive levels, to which public interest groups often have little access. The counterside to inadequate public representation is the growth of the power of lobbyists and their ability to undermine socially beneficial measures. All of these trends have been further accelerated in the past 30 years. Weeramantry advocated the need to undertake broad reforms to reorient the political process so as to assure that science and technology policy not be dictated from the top or shaped by a few powerful interests, but this has not taken place. Instead the rapid development of science and technology and the pressures imposed by economic globalization have shifted the balance even further away from citizens’ control. And for less developed countries globalization and the power shifts it has engendered have often removed decision making from within the country to various types of transnational institutions and actors. This has led to claims of scientific imperialism. A recent article on public-private partnerships, nongovernmental collaborations across borders that aim to address specific scientific hurdles through a “hybrid” set of activities, including focused drug development, advocacy, and capacity building, concludes that they have not been able to change the prevailing imperialist paradigm or involve African researchers as equally empowered participants and leaders. Even when developing country researchers receive research funds from public sector funding bodies, most of the funding has been channeled through host country institutions located in the host country and staffed predominantly by males of Caucasian background. It is argued that this creates dependency relationships and perpetuates research disparities and power inequities (Tucker and Makgoba 2008: 1017).

Accountability for Policies and Performance States are obligated to realize the human rights to which they have made commitments through adopting and ratifying human rights instruments. To hold them to these obligations, there must be mechanisms of accountability. Accountability mechanisms come in many forms, including judicial review, national human rights institutions or ombudspersons, and administrative arrangements such as the preparation and publication of assessment reports. However, few states, even advanced industrialized countries, have effective and accessible mechanisms for greater accountability for science and technology policy.

Freedom for Scientific Research and Creative Activity Advances in science require freedom of inquiry and the free circulation of ideas and research findings. Recognizing the importance of these preconditions, article 15 (3) of the ICESCR directs state parties to respect the freedoms indispensable for scientific research and creative activity. To provide an environment of freedom and to promote a culture of free inquiry requires that states not interfere with the basic human rights norms recognized in the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR; 1966). Of particular importance are the rights enumerated in ICCPR protecting the freedom of thought (art. 18), to hold opinions without interference and to express, seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds (art. 19), to have liberty of movement both within and outside of one’s country (art. 11), to associate and form professional associations (art. 22), and to take part in the conduct of public affairs (art. 25).

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

17

Any limitation of or interference with these basic rights would constitute a violation of the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress as well as a fundamental violation of human rights. As Richard Claude observed, “The scientific freedom embedded in Article 15 of the ESC Covenant is like a ship’s anchor on which scientists daily depend, a mainstay for freedom of information, association, and inquiry. Sometimes taken for granted, when captains of state ‘haul anchor,’ setting scientific freedom adrift, its impact is quickly felt in democratic countries as well as those under authoritarian regimes” (Claude 2002a: 63). Respect for academic freedom is another important precondition. Although academic freedom is not specifically mentioned in the ICESCR, the Committee’s general comment interpreting the right to education recognizes that academic freedom for faculty and students is a component of this right (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1999a: para. 38). According to the Committee, members of the academic community, individually or collectively, should be free to pursue, to develop, and to transmit knowledge and ideas, through research, teaching, study, discussion, documentation, production, creation, or writing. The conceptualization of academic freedom in the general comment is broad. It includes the liberty of individuals to express opinions about the institution or system in which they work, to fulfill their functions without discrimination or fear of repression by the state or any other actor, to participate in professional or representative academic bodies, and to enjoy all the internationally recognized human rights applicable to other individuals in the same jurisdiction (para. 39). The general comment also states that the enjoyment of academic freedom requires the autonomy of institutions of higher education, consistent with systems of public accountability, especially in respect of funding provided by the state (para. 40). Here it is relevant to note that scientific freedom is not absolute. It must be balanced with the canons of scientific responsibility and accountability to society, including responsible research practices. Ideally the practice of science encompasses values that include honesty, objectivity and collegiality. Scientists do not have carte blanche to proceed in areas where the process or outcomes of the research may be of harm to individuals or communities. Scientific societies in many developed countries have adopted codes of professional ethics to achieve the goal of responsible research. Many of these codes, however, are primarily concerned with the ethics of individual conduct and do not place the scientific enterprise in a broad social context. Moreover, scientific societies, like other professional associations, vary quite considerably in their attitudes toward and capacities for effective self-regulation. Under the best of circumstances, scientists would be sensitive to the ethical implications of their work and adjust their goals and research practices accordingly, but few scientists, engineers, or technologists are trained in the field of ethics and even fewer have either the skills or the inclinations to evaluate the broader implications of the impact of their research. In addition, some are reluctant to accept limitations on where free inquiry and research may take them despite the potential harmful social consequences. Governmental regulation of science has increased in the past 50 years, in part because of greater public investment. Another factor is that society has become more sensitive to concerns about the potential danger of some research, both to research subjects and to the broader society. Is this trend contrary to scientific freedom? I would agree with the following statement made by the (US) National Bioethics Advisory Commission in its report on human cloning: “Because science is both a public and social enterprise and its application can have profound impact, society recognizes that the freedom of scientific inquiry is not an absolute right and scientists are expected to conduct their research according to widely held ethical precepts” (National Bioethics Advisory Commission 1997: 6). The report goes

18

Audrey R. Chapman

on to observe that limits on freedom of inquiry must be carefully set, must be justified and should be reevaluated on an ongoing basis (National Bioethics Advisory Commission 1997: 6).

Obligations to Respect International human rights law sets forth three obligations in relationship to specific recognized rights: to respect, protect, and fulfill them. State parties have the obligation to respect human rights by assuring that their laws, policies, institutions, and means of implementation are consistent with their human rights commitments. Or to put it in another way, governments are required to take precautions so that their laws, policies, and actions do not interfere with the enjoyment of human rights, in this case the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications. The preceding section discussed some of the elements related in respect to article 15 (3), the freedom indispensable for scientific research, but clearly there are other dimensions of the right that must be respected as well. Article 15 (4) recognizes the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts and cooperation in the scientific field. Policy commitments or legal barriers that interfered with such contacts would be in violation of the obligation to respect. It is difficult, however, to outline the failure to respect the steps to be taken for the conservation, development, and diffusion of science until there is greater international consensus on the content of those initiatives. One dimension of respect for the right to the benefits of science is for the state not to interfere with the freedom of scientists to undertake research, to report the results, and to collaborate both within and across country boundaries. As this author knows from her previous experience directing a science and human rights program, many states fail to do so. For years the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) published a Directory of Persecuted Scientists, Engineers, and Health Professionals and operated an electronic human rights alert system to notify members about individual cases. The violations identified derived both from the persecution of individual scientists and from states interfering with the conditions necessary for the free pursuit of scientific inquiry. Human rights abuses directed at individual or groups of scientists resulted from a variety of causes. In some cases the infractions reflected broader violations of human rights norms by authoritarian regimes, such as their closing universities because some academics or students were critical of the government or university administration. In others it was motivated by attempts to prevent the release of information deemed embarrassing or deleterious to state interests. For example, in 1992 Mexican scientists and environmentalists were dismissed from research positions and an environmental center was closed to block disclosure and criticism of environmental problems during the debate on the North American Free Trade Agreement (World University Service 1993: 7). Governments, particularly authoritarian regimes, nervous about the international standing and contacts of scientists have also sought to restrict their international travel. Soviet bloc countries frequently did so during the cold war. But even democratic governments, including the United States, have refused to provide entrance visas for scientists and academics who are citizens of unfriendly regimes or who are deemed to hold dangerous views thereby preventing them from attending meetings, speaking, or visiting research installations. In some cases, governments have imposed obstacles to scientists leaving their own country to participate in scientific meetings elsewhere, particularly if their governments are viewed negatively, as for example US scientists often have problems attending meetings in Cuba. That some scientists advocate

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

19

on behalf of human rights and democracy in repressive regimes has also been a frequent factor in their dismissal, harassment, or imprisonment. Forms of censorship, such as restrictions on access to the Internet or on the importation and distribution of scientific literature and journals, also comprise a barrier in some countries. In most places where the barriers exist they reflect the political concerns of the regime, and scientists are just one of several communities that are affected. In a few cases though the deemed sensitivity of a specific scientific publication, Web site, or topic may motivate governments to selectively censor particular scientific documents. The nature of intellectual property laws, a policy area that is of increasing significance to scientific progress, has been identified as a potential obstacle. At the time of the drafting of the Covenant the three dimensions of article 15—the rights to cultural participation, the benefits of scientific progress, and intellectual property—were viewed as intrinsically interrelated to one another. The rights of authors and creators to the benefit from the protection of their moral and material interests were understood as essential preconditions for cultural freedom and participation and scientific progress (Chapman 2002: 314). In contrast, in the past decade the UN human rights apparatus has expressed increasing concerns about the implications of intellectual property norms for the realization of human rights, but it has not specifically addressed the subject of the impact on science and technology. By its very nature intellectual property, whether in the form of copyright (which is called authors’ rights in most European countries) or patents, vests the holders with monopoly control for a specific period of time. This enables the patent holder to define the terms and costs for others to have temporary access or to prevent them from doing so. The process of commercialization of science noted above has altered the role of intellectual property from a means to provide incentives to authors, researchers, and inventors to a mechanism to encourage investment and to protect the interests of investors. This development, in turn, has stimulated pressures for new and broader forms of intellectual property rights to protect economic investments in science and technology. There is widespread concern in the scientific community that commercialization and intellectual property restrictions will restrict scientists’ access to data needed for their research (Committee on Issues in the Transborder Flow of Scientific Data 1997: 111). Some countries have extended the scope of patenting to include some types of basic scientific knowledge. For example, the United States Patent and Trademark Office has permitted the patenting of genes and genetic sequences requiring researchers to acquire licenses for the application of this information (Doll 1998: 689–690). The European Union’s Database Directive requires all members to provide a form of intellectual property protection for databases (European Union Directive No. 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases 1996). Increasing intellectual property protection has also imposed constraints on science’s tradition of open publication. In many scientific fields, particularly the life sciences, some scientists are delaying publication and withholding data so as to secure intellectual property rights (Marshall 1997: 525). In 1998, a working group convened by the US National Institutes of Health reported that a "serious threat" to science was being posed by patent holders who were making onerous demands on those who wanted to use their tools for research (Dunn 2000: B3). The UN human rights bodies have been particularly concerned with the impact of the increased global protection of intellectual property under the World Trade Organization’s 1995 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that prescribes strict minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property making it difficult for individual countries to have the flexibility to protect human rights and to

20

Audrey R. Chapman

promote economic development. Noting that actual or potential conflicts exist between the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of economical, social, and cultural rights, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights adopted resolutions on this subject at its August 2000 (Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 2000) and August 2001 sessions (SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 2001). At the request of the Sub-Commission, the High Commissioner for Human Rights prepared a report on the human rights impact of the TRIPS Agreement identifying ways in which patents affected the development of and inhibited access to pharmaceuticals (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner 2001). The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has issued both a statement seeking to clarify the relationship between intellectual property and human rights (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2001) and a general comment to interpret the provisions of the Covenant relevant to protecting the rights and interests of authors, artists, and inventors (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2005). It is not possible here to review all of the issues raised by the Committee’s documents, but it is particularly relevant to note several. The documents underscore that the intellectual property protections for authors, artists, and inventors in article 15 (1) (c) of the Covenant are very different in the origin and nature from the intellectual property regimes that states adopt to provide incentives for innovation and creativity and to preserve the integrity of scientific, literary, and artistic productions: intellectual property rights, unlike human rights, are conditional and not absolute (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2005: para. 1 and 2). One central criterion is that intellectual property standards must be consistent with the realization of rights under the Covenant (para. 11). Moreover, state parties should prevent the use of scientific and technical progress for purposes contrary to human rights and dignity by excluding inventions from patentability whenever their commercialization would jeopardize the full realization of human rights (para. 35).

Obligation to Protect against Violations of Human Rights States also have the obligation to protect against the violation of human rights, including the responsibility to regulate the behavior of third parties to prevent them from violating human rights. International human rights law makes clear that violations can occur both through acts of commission and acts of omission (Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1997). Surprisingly, in view of the misuse of science during World War II, the text of article 15 does not specify the need of state parties to protect these rights in order to prevent violations. One way to do so would be to institute laws and mechanisms to prevent harmful or dangerous use of scientific progress (Haugen 2008: 233). Although the obligation to protect often focuses on specific acts or problems resulting from the initiatives of third parties, it can be extended to apply more broadly to categories of subject matter, such as the harmful impacts of science and technology. The United Nations Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind (United Nations General Assembly 1975) has a number of relevant provisions regarding the need of states to protect their residents against potential violations of human rights resulting from science and technology:

r All States shall take appropriate measures to prevent the use of scientific and technological developments, particularly by the State organs, to limit or interfere with the

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

21

enjoyment of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights and other relevant international instruments (Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress 1975: Art. 2). r All States shall take measures to extend the benefits of science and technology to all strata of the population and to protect them, both socially and materially, from possible harmful effects of the misuse of scientific and technological developments, including their misuse to infringe upon the rights of the individual or of the group, particularly with regard to respect for privacy and the protection of the human personality and its physical and intellectual integrity (Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress 1975: Art. 6). r All States shall take effective measures, including legislative measures, to prevent and preclude the utilization of scientific and technological achievements to the detriment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the dignity of the human person (Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress 1975: Art. 8). Another example of a related requirement appears in article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that states that “No one is to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation” (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966). The phrasing of this article indicates that involving human beings in research without their free and voluntary consent can be equated with inhuman or degrading treatment. A general comment issued in 1992 by the Human Rights Committee, the oversight body for the ICCPR, makes this clear: “Article 7 expressly prohibits medical or scientific experimentation without the free consent of the person involved” (Human Rights Committee 1992). It goes on to express concern that the reports of states generally provide little information on this point and recommends that more attention needs to be paid in order to ensure observance of this provision (Human Rights Committee 1992). To promote the welfare of research participants through attention to risks, benefits, and informed consent and to avoid exploitation of vulnerable individuals and populations, international guidelines and the laws of several nations require research oversight by independent ethics committees. In the United States these committees are called institutional review boards (IRBs), and their roles and procedures are defined in federal laws. Among the provisions, IRBs are required to ensure that informed consent is sought from each prospective subject or her/his legally authorized representatives (45 CFR §46.103). Many, perhaps most, developing counties lack such oversight bodies. The limited available research suggests that where they do exist research ethics committees in developing countries tend to be weaker than counterpart bodies in industrialized nations (Kass et al. 2007). That corporations and sometimes academic institutions from industrialized countries often conduct medical research trials in developing countries raises many issues about the protection of research subjects. Sometimes the research cannot be conducted in their home countries for ethical reasons. The attraction of developing countries is that the research can often be done there more quickly, with less oversight, and significantly lower costs than in developed countries. Another advantage is that research subjects in developing countries have been exposed to fewer drugs than patients in industrialized countries. This means that they are likely to yield more reliable results (Macklin 2004: 6–8). However, procedural mechanisms for protecting the rights and welfare of human research subjects in

22

Audrey R. Chapman

poor countries are usually significantly weaker than the protections available in the United States and other developed countries. In addition to the fragile regulatory systems, the population has high illiteracy rates and the medical infrastructure tends to be weak—all factors making it more likely that recruitment, the standard of care offered to subjects, and their protection will be problematic and possibly exploitative. One case where harms occurred was a clinical trial conducted in 1996 by Pfizer of the antibiotic Trovan on children during an epidemic of meningitis in Nigeria. Eleven children who received the experimental drug died and 200 others became deaf, blind, or lame (Macklin 2004: 99). Many years later in a rare effort to seek legal redress from a multinational corporation, authorities in the Nigerian government brought criminal charges against Pfizer for the company’s alleged role in the deaths of children who received the unapproved drug during the meningitis epidemic (Stephens 2007: A3). Some public interests groups have advocated that governments should use the “precautionary principle” as a standard for protecting their populations from the harmful impacts of science and technology. The precautionary principle is most often applied in the context of the projected impacts on human health and the environment. It stipulates that “if an action or policy might cause severe or irreversible harm to the public, in the absence of a scientific consensus that harm would not ensue, the burden of proof falls on those who would advocate taking the action” (Wikipedia 2008). In some cases, however, the precautionary principle is interpreted more stringently to require that proponents of a potentially harmful new technology must show that it will be without major harm before the new technology is approved for use (Wikipedia 2008). One study identified 14 different interpretations of the precautionary principle that disagreed in the levels of certainty about safety required, in whether the burden of proof rests on the producers and importers of the technology or its critics, and where they vest the locus of decision making (UNDP 2001: 70–71). While it seems appropriate for a human rights approach to entail caution and to require scientific evidence of the safety of new technologies, particularly those with significant potential human risks, doing so is often complicated. First, both obtaining relevant data and analyzing its implications may be difficult. Many African countries, for example, are struggling with the formulation of policies on agricultural biotechnology. Although biotechnology has the potential to solve many of Africa’s food problems, policymakers worry about its effect on the environment and for people’s health. As they seek to make these determinations, they frequently don’t have access to sufficient scientific literature; they often don’t have the scientists and engineers, and technical professionals trained in the relevant subject matter; and they encounter international disagreement, particularly among policymakers in the United States and Europe (Steffens 2007). Second, technologies frequently have uneven impacts. The risks, as well as benefits, of using a particular technology often vary within and across societies. It may assist some communities or groups, have a predominantly neutral effect on some but disadvantage still others. Third, the assessment of the risks of technologies may differ depending on a society’s level of development. The evaluation of the risks and benefits around the use of DDT to control malaria is one such example. Conservationists in developed countries have documented that Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichloroethane (DDT) is a persistent pollutant with substantial environmental impacts leading most industrialized societies to cease using DDT as an agricultural pesticide so as to protect birds and wildlife. However, DDT is also an affordable and effective tool for controlling malaria; a disease that kills more than one million people, mainly children, a year in poor, tropical countries. Thus the cost-benefit assessment of using DDT may differ in the two settings (Steffens 2007: 69).

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

23

Fourth, in democratic systems public opinions about risk trade-offs may play an important role in decision making, but informed public debate on science and technology is difficult to achieve. The subject matter and risk trade-offs of complex scientific and technological choices are difficult to understand, even for a scientifically literate population. The public may be influenced by such factors as advertising and lobbying by vested economical and political interests or by distrust of regulators because of their poor management of previous health and environmental crises. In such cases, determinations may be driven by public fear and commercial interests and not be based on objective scientific data (Steffens 2007: 68). Fifth, problems with some technologies may only emerge years after they are developed and sometimes result from unanticipated applications. Ultrasound imaging is a case in point. When this medical technology was introduced few could have foreseen that it would be widely used in societies with strong preferences for male children, like China, India, and Korea, to identify and then to abort female fetuses thus imbalancing the societal sex ratio. On another topic, it has taken nearly two hundred years for scientists to realize that carbon-based technologies have major climate change implications imperiling the web of life on our planet. It is only in the past 20 years that it has been widely acknowledged that the application of the precautionary principle requires the phasing out of coal- and petroleum-based energy and transportation systems and the development of alternatives. Poor countries face especially difficult challenges in attempting to protect against harms to their population. In many cases these countries are importing technologies developed in other countries, and it may not be possible to acquire the data needed for a thorough assessment of the product or to anticipate the potential risks when used in a very different environment from which they were designed. In addition, most poor countries have weak regulatory systems. Even middle-income countries with considerably greater capacity, such as Argentina and Brazil, generally lack appropriate regulatory frameworks with sufficient skilled personnel and adequate resources to conduct adequate technology assessments. The lack of sufficient levels of scientific literacy and the absence of effective communication channels also mean that public awareness of the potential dangers, particularly if the technologies are not used correctly, is low. For example, the failure of countries with poorly educated farmers to prohibit the importation of high-risk pesticides requiring special applicators and safety measures has resulted in deaths and injuries through pesticide poisoning. Finally, protecting their populations often requires states to regulate the multinational corporations operating within their borders, something that is problematic for many countries to do. Moreover, many governments seem to place higher priority on attracting and retaining foreign investment than on regulating their responsible conduct. Globalization and the development of international supply lines and distribution systems further complicate the regulation and protection of the safety of products in all countries. Counterfeit and tainted products or ingredients have become a global problem. The World Health Organization, for example, estimates that 25 to 50 percent of medicines consumed in developing countries are counterfeit (United Nations 2007: 3). China, which has become the largest supplier of the raw ingredients and chemicals for producing pharmaceuticals in the world, has a regulatory system characterized by someone familiar with it as “a black hole” (Bogdanich and Hooker 2007: 1, 24, 25). Diethylene glycol, an industrial solvent and prime ingredient in antifreeze, was added into a wide variety of medicines made in China—cough syrup, fever medication, injectable drugs—and figured in mass poisonings in Haiti, Bangladesh, Argentina, Nigeria, India, Panama, and China during the past two decades. Efforts to trace the source were routinely blocked by the Chinese government (Bogdanich and Hooker 2007: 1, 24, 25). More recently, deaths and severe allergic reactions

24

Audrey R. Chapman

in patients in the United States and Germany taking a critical blood thinner, heparin, were traced to raw components produced in China that contained a counterfeit ingredient (Harris and Bogdanich 2008: A6).

Obligations to Fulfill The provisions of article 15 (2) and (4) of ICESCR impose two sets of specific obligations on state parties: to undertake the steps necessary for the conservation, development, and diffusion of science and culture and to recognize the benefits to be derived from encouragement and development of international contacts and cooperation in the scientific and cultural fields. The scope of these obligations is, however, unclear. How should a state balance scientific advancement and human benefit? Does the ICESCR require states to promote the conservation, development, and diffusion of science in general or does a human rights approach have the further dimension of favoring areas of science that are most likely to be of human benefit, and if so, to what extent? Further, does a human rights approach necessitate a kind of affirmative action initiative that directs the development and diffusion of science to benefit specific communities and groups, particularly those communities and individuals deemed vulnerable and disadvantaged? These issues need further discussion within the human rights community. In considering the obligation to fulfill, it should also be kept in mind that the contemporary environment in which states address the requirements of article 15 is significantly different today from the landscape in which the ICESCR was drafted a half century ago. The classic human rights model envisions a strong state as the protector and promoter of human rights. Economic globalization, the strengthening of global institutions, and the rise of large and powerful transnational corporations have reduced the policy space available to the state and in some cases its capabilities as well, particularly in smaller and less developed countries, making it more difficult to implement these human rights obligations. The conditions imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund on applicants for loans play important roles in setting the parameters of these states economic policies. Their terms typically limit social investments and weaken public sector infrastructure. As states become members of the World Trade Organization, they become subject to its rules and the requirements of the international Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in setting their intellectual property laws and regulations. The public-private partnerships that have provided significant resources and scientific expertise for medical and agricultural sectors research geared to the needs of poor tropical countries constitute yet another instance of international actors setting priorities and policy directions. Further complicating efforts to promote the development and diffusion of science for human benefit, the private sector dominates many fields of science and technology making it far more difficult for those governments who are so inclined to attempt to direct scientific research and development so as to encourage access to the benefits of scientific progress. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the private sector was financing 50 to 60 percent of research and development in most industrialized countries. In North America, the private sector was financing 59 percent of technology creation and implementing an even larger share of its applications, 71 percent. The comparable figures for the European Union were 53 percent and 62 percent (UNDP 2001: 37). In contrast, in poor countries much of the funding for science and development remains in the public sector. To begin a discussion about what the obligation to fulfill the benefits of science and technology entails, this article proposes the following set of functions:

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

25

r Explicit commitment to the development of science and technology for human benefit;

r Setting policies and establishing institutions to promote the development and diffusion of science in a manner consistent with fundamental human rights principles;

r Setting priorities for and channeling sufficient investment in a purposive development r r

r r r r r

of science and technology that brings potential societal benefits, particularly to poor and disadvantaged groups; In the absence of a strong scientific base, at least having the capacity to evaluate discoveries and technologies developed elsewhere for purposes of directing the importation for the benefit of their populations; Developing laws, institutions, and policies conducive to the monitoring and regulation of science and technology, including an adequate process of review to anticipate the potential harmful effects of science and technology and using that data to inform the public; Providing a strong science education program at all levels, particularly in the statesponsored school system, leading to a critical mass of skills necessary to develop and adapt science and technology; Undertaking ongoing public outreach and educational efforts that will better enable individuals to understand the significance of developments and participate in decision making about priority setting; Providing opportunities for meaningful public engagement in decision making about science and technology; Having or creating distribution systems through which the benefits of science and technology can widely reach groups and communities, particularly those who hitherto have been disadvantaged in access to these benefits; Developing a national plan of action with a timetable and goals to rectify existing inadequacies and a monitoring strategy to evaluate the extent to which these milestones are being realized.

Few states fulfill these obligations. The majority of countries lack the essential capabilities, infrastructure, resources, and/or the political will to do so. In 2001, the UNDP developed a composite technology achievement index that assessed the ability to create technology and to diffuse both old and new innovations and a country’s human skill profiles. Utilizing the scores from the evaluation, it divided countries into four categories: leaders, potential leaders, dynamic adopters, and marginalized. As might be anticipated, developed countries dominated the first two categories. The dynamic adopters included a range of middle income countries in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East, with India, China, Thailand, Brazil, and Egypt among them. The vast majority of poor countries in Africa and Asia were placed in the marginalized category (UNDP 2001: 45–46). While the status of particular countries may have changed in the past seven years, these divisions remain, and they are likely to be very similar in most fields of science. A central issue therefore is whether the human rights obligations expected of countries in different categories should be the same. It seems unlikely that most developing countries can aspire to be leaders or potential leaders of science and technology. A 2003 report of the InterAcademy Council (a collaborative agency created by the national academies of science of 18 countries), Inventing a Better Future, observes that the gap between “have” and “have not” nations in science and their capacity to apply scientific advances and new technologies is growing. According to the InterAcademy Council report, the science and technology lagging countries are falling farther and farther behind the industrialized

26

Audrey R. Chapman

countries. The report anticipates that without major interventions the disparity is likely to grow even wider as the industrialized states continue to master the tools of science and invention. It emphasizes the importance of developing local science and technological capacity and warns that leaving the task of scientific and technological breakthroughs to the highly industrialized nations and expecting the rest of the world to benefit is “illusory and unproductive policy” (InterAcademy Council 2003: ch. 1, 17–51). In view of this situation, the report emphasizes the need of developing countries to strengthen their science and technology capabilities (InterAcademy Council 2003: ch. 6). In the past the human rights community has associated the inability of poor countries to achieve economical and social rights primarily with the scarcity of resources. And while the lack of resources undoubtedly is a factor, the problems in realizing complex human rights, like the right to benefit from scientific progress, are far more complex. Recently there has been greater appreciation of the challenge of capacity development as a critical issue effecting development and by extension the ability to implement and realize complex human rights obligations. A paper written by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Development Co-Operation Directorate defines capacity “as the ability of people, organizations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully” (Development Co-Operation Directorate: DAC Network on Governance 2006: para. 7). The capacities of a country directly affect its performance in delivering basic goods and services and providing a suitable policy and regulatory environment (Development CoOperation Directorate: DAC Network on Governance 2006: para. 8). The phrase capacity development is understood “as the process whereby people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time” (Development Co-Operation Directorate: DAC Network on Governance 2006: para. 9). Far from capacity development being a technical process involving the simple transfer of knowledge or organizational models from North to South, the paper emphasizes the importance of the broader political and social context within which capacity development takes place. It also puts forward the view that capacity development is primarily an endogamous process, with donors playing a supportive rather than a leading role (Development Co-Operation Directorate: DAC Network on Governance 2006: para. 24). The DAC identifies three analytical levels on which capacity-development objectives need to be pursued: 1. Individual: education and training leading to the availability of a sufficient number of appropriately trained skilled and committed individuals. 2. Organizational level: ability of institutions to perform, its efforts to undertake ongoing capacity development and monitoring of outcomes. 3. Enabling environment: the broader political context that determines the level of political will, formal and informal power structures, the type of incentives the environment offers for the behavior of organizations and individuals creates. The DAC capability model helps illuminate the difficulties of many countries in realizing the right to the benefits of scientific progress. In many countries, particularly poor countries, there is a great need for capacity development on all three levels: 1. In terms of the availability of sufficient appropriately trained skilled and committed individuals, few poor or middle-income countries educate and train sufficient numbers of highly skilled scientists and health professionals. There are few, if any statistics on the numbers or global distribution of scientists. In terms of health professionals, the World Health Organization estimates that on a global level there is

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

27

an overall shortage of four million health professionals (The World Health Report 2006: 12). Moreover, there is often an inverse correlation between the disease burden of a specific country and the availability of health professionals (The World Health Report 2006: 9). 2. Organizational and institutional level: Poor and middle-income countries, with the exception of a few like India, China, Brazil, Thailand, and perhaps South Africa, often lack the basic institutional and infrastructural components to have the capacity to engage in scientific research; to evaluate scientific, medical, and technological developments created in other countries as the basis to selectively import and to invest in them; to protect their population from the potentially hazardous dimensions of new technologies and/or the continued use of old technologies with harmful side effects. New forms of international cooperation might be able to compensate for some of these deficiencies. 3. Enabling environment: Several reports highlight the importance of creating an enabling environment that encourages innovation. Some of the elements the UNDP 2001 identifies are the development of a technology policy to help create a common understanding among key actors about the centrality of technology; reforms to give people and organizations better access to information and communications technology; and stimulation of technology-oriented research through promoting links between universities and industry and by providing fiscal incentives for private firms to conduct research and development (UNDP 2001: 79). These recommendations, however, are not predicated on a human rights approach that is likely to be even more complex and require the implementation of a wide range of human rights provisions.

International Components Article 15 (4) of ICESCR mandates that state parties recognize the benefits from encouragement and development of international contacts and cooperation in the scientific and cultural fields. Because science is one of the most international of all activities, advances in science require the full and open availability of scientific data on an international basis and open publication of results. Modern advances in communications technology make international scientific collaborations more feasible and enable scientists that are geographically apart to work together. The Internet offers a vehicle for cost-effective and rapid dissemination of new research. Electronic technologies can make resources, journals, and databases, even entire libraries, widely available almost any place in the world. “Open access” to scientific and medical literature allows anyone anywhere with a connection to the Internet to read published research articles online at little or no cost. However, the potential of open access to scientific information and technology has yet to be realized (Juma and Yee-Cheong 2005: 168–170). In theory, globalization should strengthen the international cooperation in science to the benefit of all countries. In the best of all worlds the global system would distribute scientific research so that states with high-capacity conducted research and developed products for the benefit of countries that have great needs but limited capabilities. However that is not the way the global system functions. Instead, it favors those who are affluent and have resources and neglects the needs of the poor and developing countries, even in critical fields such as medicine and agriculture. Despite increasing levels of investment in pharmaceutical research and development during the past 30 years, only one

28

Audrey R. Chapman

percent of new compounds marketed have been for developing world diseases (Shetty 2005). Recent research has identified some increase in innovative activity related to diseases specific to poor countries, though this activity remains low relative to pharmaceutical research overall (Lanjouw and MacLeod 2005), and has resulted, in large part, from increased public research and development funding from public donors and foundations for global health (Moran 2005). Similarly, private-sector agricultural research has been far more likely to focus on specialty crops of interest to developed countries than on staple crops that are important to resource-poor farmers in developing countries (PIPRA 2008). Because globalization has led to greater mobility and freer movement of the work force, it has also accelerated migratory flows of engineers, health personnel, and scientists from poor and middle-income countries to richer ones. This phenomenon has further aggravated the severe shortages of trained professionals, many of whom were educated at state expense, in the exporting countries. High demand for scientists, engineers, doctors, and nurses in industrialized countries has led countries, such as Australia, Canada, Britain, and the United States, to create temporary visas and to expand the availability of work permits. The pull factor of these opportunities is compounded by push factors within poor countries—low remuneration, heavy workloads, and poor infrastructure and working conditions. For example, large numbers of trained health personnel have left Africa in recent years, the continent least able to absorb such losses, with significant negative consequences for the health sector in the countries experiencing losses (Dussault and Fanceschini 2006).

Refraining from Erecting Barriers One way governments can contribute to international cooperation in science and technology is to refrain from erecting barriers to scientific communication and collaboration across borders. This has both a positive requirement—that the countries in which knowledge, resources, and products originate allow them to be freely exported—and a negative requirement–that receiving countries have the interest and capabilities to take advantage of such possibilities. It also necessitates a commitment on the part of all states to the free circulation of scientists and to facilitating international projects. There are many policies that can potentially inhibit scientific collaborations across borders. On this latter point it is worth noting, as discussed above, that historically some countries have restricted their own scientists from leaving and other governments have refused to grant visas to permit scientists from some countries or with specific political beliefs from entering their countries. Forms of censorship, such as restrictions on access to the Internet or on the free availability of scientific literature and journals, also comprise a barrier in some places.

Intellectual Property as a Barrier to International Contacts and Cooperation It would appear that intellectual property regimes, particularly the strict requirements for comprehensive intellectual property protection the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement) imposes on members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), constitute a potential barrier to the encouragement and development of international contacts and cooperation in the scientific field in conflict with the terms of article 15 (4). Most developed-industrialized countries have maintained that strong intellectual property provisions promote economical growth and technical innovation. While

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

29

it is claimed that such stronger intellectual property protection will contribute to increased investment in research and development, there is little empirical evidence, even in industrial countries, that this is necessarily the case. The patent system appears to have stimulated the development of new products and technologies in a few sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, but in other sectors patents are often considered to have anticompetitive effects and may even slow the pace of innovation (Tansey 1999: 4–5). In contrast poor countries generally do not believe that it is in their present economic interests to implement stronger patent laws. This is because the benefits of an intellectual property system tend at best to be long-term and tenuous while in the short-term, intellectual property protection increases the cost of development, especially since in the globalized economy the patents awarded and resulting payments for the use of these technologies go primarily to foreign multinational corporations. Industrial countries currently hold 97 percent of all patents worldwide. More than 80 percent of the patents granted in developing countries belong to residents of industrial countries, usually multinational corporations from the most advanced economies (UNDP 1999: 68). This means that under strict enforcement of intellectual property law that the patents awarded and resulting payments for the use of these technologies will primarily benefit foreign multinational corporations. Moreover, few of these countries have the requisite infrastructure to uphold strong patent systems (Carroll 1995: 2464–2466). As noted, the UN human rights apparatus has expressed increasing concerns about the implications of intellectual property norms, particularly the strict provisions of the 1995 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, for the realization of human rights, but it has not specifically addressed in any depth the subject of the impact on science and technology. The Committee’s 2001 statement on human rights and intellectual property recognizes that states at different levels of development have different technological needs. To meet those needs, the statement underscores that it is essential that intellectual property regimes not necessarily be uniform if this might lead to forms of protection inappropriate for development goals. To this end the Committee specifically encourages the adoption and implementation of effective international mechanisms for special and differential treatment of the intellectual property protection for developing countries. Additionally, the statement proposes that international rules concerning intellectual property should facilitate and promote development cooperation, technology transfer, and scientific and cultural collaboration (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2001: para. 15).

International Assistance, Aid, and Transfers of Technology The requirements of article 15 (4) should be interpreted in conjunction with other obligations enumerated in ICESCR, particularly the language of article 2 that directs each state party to undertake “steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized.” Several general comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights note the important role of international assistance in the total pool of resources and expertise available to poor countries in order to enable them to realize their human rights obligations. The general comment on the right to the highest attainable standard of health, for example, has several paragraphs on international obligations directing states parties to facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods, and services in other countries and to provide

30

Audrey R. Chapman

humanitarian assistance (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1999: para. 38–40). Presumably then there is a comparable obligation on the part of the developed countries to furnish assistance in the fields of science and technology and to enable access to essential knowledge and technologies. What that assistance should entail and what those products should be though needs to be specified. Going one step further, are there specific technologies that are so essential to the welfare of the inhabitants of particular countries that their people should be considered to have a collective right of access from the international community? This issue was raised in a commentary on the magnitude of death and destruction wrought by the December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. The article points out that the tragedy could have been avoided by greater investments in science and technology, such as relatively inexpensive water-level sensors needed to identify and track a tsunami. It discusses the greater vulnerability of the poor in developing countries to natural and environmental calamities and the magnitude of their toll on people, fragile social structures, and environmental systems. And it asks an important question: “Should it not be axiomatic that there is a human right to knowledge and technology that can benefit all?” ( Lerner-Lam et al. 2005). The corollary of recognizing such a collective human right is the demands it would place on the international community and multilateral institutions, like the UN Development Program and the World Bank both to transfer vital knowledge and technologies to countries where they are needed and to make preemptive investments in critical and long-lasting infrastructure, such as water and sanitations systems, transport and telecommunications networks, and healthcare systems. The InterAcademy Report mentioned above calls on the more advanced scientific countries to provide assistance to improve the capacity of developing countries both directly and through networking among national academies of sciences, engineering, and medicine. The report recommends that science- and technology-lagging countries join with scienceand technology-proficient countries and participate in regional centers of excellence that address issues relevant to its population. It also discusses the need to strengthen global funding mechanisms to provide greater resources for these efforts (InterAcademy Council 2003: ch. 6). One such example is a recent agreement between the European Union and the African Union to develop a partnership for science. The African Union Commission selected 19 priority projects that would be of benefit to countries in Africa; one of which was a partnership for science, information technologies, and space. At a joint meeting officials identified six “early deliverables” to receive support from a wide range of public and private sources at the regional, national, and international levels. The hope is that research cooperation between Africa and Europe become more substantial more focused and more relevant.” The first objective of the research and scientific awards project is to establish a research program to “promote sustainable science and technology research for Africa’s technical, economic, and social development” ( European Commission and African Union Commission 2008).

Conclusion Should the right to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications be considered to be an international human right on the ground that this right is enumerated in the Universal Declaration and the ICESCR? And if so, should the same obligations apply to all state parties regardless of their level of development? I think that full human rights status involves more than inclusion in international human rights instruments—although that is

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

31

an important starting point. I suggest there are two other preconditions: the ability to set forth the scope of obligations to states and other actors and the capacity of states at all levels of development to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, to progressively achieve the full realization of the right. This paper has shown that it is possible to begin to conceptualize content for this right and to propose obligations for states parties. But it is far more difficult to fulfill the second of these preconditions. The principle of universality imposes the same obligations on state parties to achieve the full realization of enumerated rights, if not immediately, at least progressively as resources become available. However, as noted in the article, many of the obligations related to the right to the benefits of science are likely to be beyond the capabilities of whole groups of states to implement, even progressively. For the reasons discussed poor countries and many middle-income countries lack the capacity to conduct scientific and technological research, to translate findings into useful applications, to evaluate and regulate their potential harmful effects, to distribute them widely, and to make them affordable and accessible across geographic and population boundaries. Nor do they have the capacity to protect their population from the potentially hazardous dimensions of new technologies and/or the continued use of old technologies with harmful side effects. The limitations go beyond the availability of resources and reflect a variety of structural issues that are far more problematic to overcome. Would it therefore be appropriate to set more modest goals for poor and middleincome countries that lack a scientific infrastructure? One option would be to identify different sets of obligations applicable to countries depending on their level of economic and scientific development. Doing so, however, would compromise the principle of universality and be contrary to current approaches to interpreting human rights obligations. And if it is not possible to expect that poor countries can make meaningful progress toward the requirements set by this right, can we still claim that the right to the benefits of science is a human right in the same sense as others? The goal of this article is to raise and stimulate discussion of these complex issues. The implications both for interpreting this right and for the international human rights system are too significant for one analyst to unilaterally propose an answer. Hopefully the UNESCO meetings about the right will provide an initial forum. It is also possible that the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights will convene a day of general discussion on the components of this right in the not too distant future. Focusing on a human rights approach to science may provide an appropriate interim response. A human rights approach would entail the application of the human rights principles enumerated earlier in the paper to science policy: consistency with human dignity, nondiscrimination and equal treatment, a focus on the disadvantaged, facilitating participation and transparency in decision making, and assuring free and informed consent to participate in research. A human rights approach to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications would be able to bring many of the benefits of a human right without imposing unfair demands and expectations.

Notes 1. In June 2007 UNESCO sponsored the first of an anticipated series of workshops dedicated to conceptualizing the right to the benefits of scientific progress. Each of the papers presented at the workshop focused on the interrelationship between this right and another right recognized in the Covenant. This author attended and gave a paper on the interrelationships between the rights to health and to the benefits of scientific progress. This approach, however, lends itself more

32

Audrey R. Chapman

to seeing the right to the benefits of scientific progress as subsidiary to other better recognized rights rather than a right in itself. A second meeting will take place in November 2008 addressing aspects of the right itself. 2. Commissioned by the WHO Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health, 2005, http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/stats/en/index.html. The authors found an increase in indicators of innovative activity (patenting and bibliometric citation) related to some diseases specific to developing countries between 1980 and 2002, but only the subset still in need of better, low-cost treatments. The authors found a downtrend in innovative activity among the subset for which treatments already exist. The authors suggest that although the increase in innovation coincides in part with the introduction of stronger patent protection in developing countries, increased public R&D funding for global health and political developments are likely to have made significant contributions over the same interval. Still, drug innovation targeting developing countries remains a tiny fraction of drug innovation overall.

References ALSTON, Philip. (1991) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In Manual on Human Rights Reporting, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/91/1. AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN. (1948) Approved by the Ninth International Conference of American States. Bogota, Columbia, Resolution XXX. Final Act of the Ninth Conference, 38–45, Washington, DC. AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL. 2005. Statement on the Causes of Gender Differences in Science and Math Career Achievement. [Online]. Available: gender differences science www.asanet.org/cs/root/..../asa council statement on causes of and math career achieve [12 February 2009]. ANGELL, Marcia. (2004) The Truth about Drug Companies (New York: Random House). BARBOUR, Ian. (1993) Ethics in an Age of Technology (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers). BEYLEVELD, Deryck, and BROWNSWORD, Roger. (2001) Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press). BOGDANICH, Walt, and HOOKER, Jake. (2007) From China to Panama, a trail of poisoned medicine. The New York Times, May 6, 1, 24, and 25. BORGMANN, Albert. (1990) Communities of celebration: technology and public life. In Frederick Ferre (ed.), Research in Philosophy and Technology (Greenwich, Conn. and London: JAI Press). BUSH, Vannevar. (1945) Science: The Endless Frontier — A Report to the President (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office). CAPLAN, Arthur L. (2005, January-February) Indicting Big Pharma. American Scientist, 93 (January-February), 68–70. [Online]. Available: http://www.americanscientist.org/ template/BookReviewTypeDetail/assetid/39097:jessionid [12 February 2009]. CARROLL, Amy E. (1995) A review of recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Comment: not always the best medicine: biotechnology and the global impact of U.S. Patent Law. The American University Law Review, 44, 2433–2494. CHAPMAN, Audrey R. (2002) Core Obligations Related to ICESCR Article 15 (1) (c). In Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Audrey R. Chapman and Sage Russell (eds.), (Antwerp and Oxford: Intersentia), pp. 305–331. CHILDRESS, James. (2001) An ethical defence of federal funding for human embryonic stem cell research. Yale Journal of Health Policy Law and Ethics, 2, 157–165. CLAUDE, Richard Pierre. (2002a) Science in the Service of Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press). CLAUDE, Richard Pierre. (2002b) Scientists’ rights and the human right to the benefits of science. In Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Audrey R. Chapman and Sage Russell (eds.) (Antwerp and Oxford: Intersentia), pp. 247–278.

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

33

COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. (1999a) General Comment 13: The right to education. U.N.Doc. E.C.12/1999/10. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. (1999b). General Comment 12: The right to adequate food (art. 11). UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. (2000) General Comment 14. The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Twenty-second Session, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1000/4, 2000. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. (2001) Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Statement of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 27th Session, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/15. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (2002). General Comment 15: The Right to Water. UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. (2005) General Comment 17. The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which He is the author. E.C.12/GC/17. COMMITTEE ON ISSUES IN THE TRANSBORDER FLOW OF SCIENTIFIC DATA, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. (1997) Bits of Power (Washington, DC: National Academy Press). CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN BEING WITH REGARD TO THE APPLICATION OF BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE. (1997) Council of Europe, ETS no. 164. [Online]. Available at: cpmvemtopms.coe.int/treaty/ EN/Treaties/Html/164.htm [16 February 2009]. DECLARATION ON THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND FOR THE BENEFIT OF MANKIND. (1975) General Assembly Resolution 3384 (XXX). DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION DIRECTORATE: DAC/ NETWORK ON GOVERNANCE. (2006) The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice (Paris: Organization for Economic and Cooperation and Development). DOLL, John J. (1998) The patenting of DNA. Science, 280, 689–690. DUNN, Kyla. (2000) Must researchers pay so research pays off? The Washington Post, October 1, B3. DUSSAULT, Gilles, and FANCESCHINI, Maria Christina. (2006) Not enough there, too many here: understanding geographical imbalances in the distribution of the health workforce. Human Resources for Health, 4, 12–28. ELLUL, Jacques. (1964) The Technological Society, Trans. Johns Wikinson (New York: Vintage Books). EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION. (2008) Joint Statement on the Importance of the EU-AU Partnership for Science, Information Society and Space. [Online]. Available at www.Euroafrica-ict.org/downloads/EU-AU Joint Statement Final EN Eu.pdf [16 February 2009]. EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE. (1996) No. 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases, O.J. (L077) 20. HARRIS, Gardiner, and BOGDANICH, Walt. (2008) Blood thinner linked to China and 19 deaths had a contaminant, F.D.A. Says. The New York Times, March 6, p. A6. HAUGEN, Hans Morten. (2008) Human rights and technology—a conflictual relationship? assessing private research and the right to adequate food. Journal of Human Rights, 7, 224–244. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE. (1992) General Comment No. 20: Replaces general comment 7 concerning prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment (Art. 7). Forty-fourth session. [Online]. Available: http://www.unhcr.ch/tbs/doc [12 February 2009]. INTERACADEMY COUNCIL. (2003) Inventing a Better Future: A Strategy for Building Worldwide Capacities in Science and Technology (Amsterdam: InterAcademy Council).

34

Audrey R. Chapman

INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. (1966) 999 U.N.T.S. G.A. res 2200A (XXI0, 21 U.N. GAOR. Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316. entered into force 23 March 1976. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. (1966) 993 U.N.T.S. 3, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316). entered into force January 3, 1976. JUMA, CALESTOUS, and CHEONG- YEE, LEE (Coordinators). (2005) Innovation: Applying Knowledge in Development: UN Millennium Project, Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation (London: United Nations Development Programme). [Online]. Available: www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/Science-complete.pdf [12 February 2009]. KASS, Nancy E., Hyder, Adnan Ali, et al. (2007) The Structure and Function of Research Ethics Committees in Africa: A Case Study. PLOS Medicine, 4, e03. KITCHER, Philip. (2001) Science, Truth, and Democracy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press). KOERTGE, Noretta (ed.). (1998) A House Built on Sand: Exposing Myths about Post Modern Science (New York: Oxford University Press). KRIMSKY, Sheldon. (2003) Science in the Private Interest (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield). LANJOUW Jean, and MACLEOD, Margaret. (2005) Statistical Trends in Pharmaceutical Research for Poor Countries (Geneva: WHO/ Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health). [Online]. Available: http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/ studies/stats/en/index.html [12 February 2009]. LERNER-LAM, Arthur, SEEBER, Leonardo, et al. (2005) Vital technology as a human right. Christian Science Monitor, January 9. [Online]. Available: http://www/csmonitor.com/ 2005/0103/p09s01-comv.html [12 February 2009]. MAASTRICHT GUIDELINES ON VIOLATIONS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. (1997) [Online]. Available: www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ Maastrichtguidelines .html [12 February 2009]. MACKLIN, Ruth. (2003) Dignity is a useless concept. British Medical Journal, 327, 1419–1420. MACKLIN, Ruth. (2004) Double Standards in Medical Research in Developing Countries (New York: Cambridge University Press). MARSHALL, Eliot. (1997) Secretiveness found widespread in life sciences. Science, 276, 523–525. MCHENRY, Leemon. (2005) On the origin of great ideas: science in the age of pharma. Hastings Center Report, 35, 7–19. MERTON, Robert K. (1973) The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations (Chicago: University of Chicago). MITRA, SUGATA. (2008) The Hole in the Wall Project. [Online]. Available at: norberto.bottani. free.fr/spip/spip.php?article 269 [16 February 2009]. MORAN, Mary. (2005, September 8) A breakthrough in R&D for neglected diseases: new ways to get the drugs we need. PLOS Medicine, 2, 302e. MORSINK, Johannes. (1999) Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press). NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION (NBAC). (1997) Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (Rockville, MD: NBAC). PIPRA (PUBLIC INTERLLECTUAL PROPERTY RESOURCES FOR AGRICULTURE (2008). [Online]. Available: http://www.pipra.org/purpose.htm [12 February 2009]. RESNICK, David B. (2007) The Price of Truth: How Money Affects the Norms of Science. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press). SciDev.Net. (2008) Weekly Update, February 25–March 3. [Online]. Available at: desertification. wordpress.com/2008/03/04simple-treadle-pumps-for-irrigation-mmc-fao/ [16 February 2009]. SCIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT NETWORK. (2008) How Mobile Phones Contained Kenyan Polio Outbreak. September 29. [Online]. Available: http://www.scidev.net/en/features/how-mobilephones-contained-kenyan-polio-outbreak.html [12 February 2009].

Human Rights and Scientific Progress

35

SHETTY, Priya. (2005, May 3) More Creative thinking needed on Drug R&D,” editorial, SciDev.net. [Online]. Available: http://www.scidev.net/content/editorials/eng/more-creativethinking-needed-on-drug-rd.cfm [12 February 2009]. STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY. (2007) Scientific Progress. [Online]. Available: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-progress/ [12 February 2009]. STEFFENS, Maryke E. (2007) Agri-Biotech in Africa: Safety first? SciDev.Net. [Online]. Available: http://www.scidev.net/features/index.cfm?fuseaction=printarticle&itemid+617&language [12 February 2009]. STEPHENS, Joe. (2007) Nigerian officials bring charges against Pfizer. The Hartford Courant, May 30, p. A3. SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. (2000) Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights. Fifty-second session, agenda item 4, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/7. SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. (2001) Intellectual Property and Human Rights. Fifty-third Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/ 21. TANSEY, GEOFF. (1999) Trade, Intellectual Property, Food and Biodiversity: A Discussion Paper (London: Quaker Peace and Service). THE CENTURY FOUNDATION. (2000) Bridging the Digital Divide (New York: The Century Foundation, Idea Brief No. 12). TUCKER, Tim J., and MAKGOBA, Malogapuru W. (2008) Public-Private Partnerships and Scientific Imperialism. Science, 320, 1016–1017. UNITED NATIONS. (2007) Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2006 (New York: United Nations). UNDP (UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME). (1999)Human Development Report 1999 (New York: Oxford University Press). UNDP (UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME). (2001) Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies Work for Human Development (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press). UNESCO (UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION). (2005) Toward Knowledge Societies (Paris: UNESCO Publishing). UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. (1975) Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind. General Assembly Resolution 3384 (XXX). UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER. (2001) The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, Report to the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Fifty-second session, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. Code of Federal Regulations CFR. Title 45 Public Welfare: Part 46.103/ Protection of Human Subjects/Registration of an Institutional Review Board. Effective June 23, 2005. [Online]. Available: http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/45cfr46.htm [12 February 2009]. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. (1948) Adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217A (III). UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON THE HUMAN GENOME AND HUMAN RIGHTS. (1993) GA resolution 53/152 of 9 Dec. [Online]. Available at: ww2.ohchr.org/english/law/genome.htm [16 February 2009]. WEERAMANTRY, Christopher G. (1983) The Slumbering Sentinels: Law and Human Rights in the Wake of Technology (Ringwood, Victoria, Australia and Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books). WIKIPEDIA. (2008) Precautionary Principle (San Francisco: Wikipedia Foundation). [Online]. Available: http://en.wikipedia.org-Precautionary principle-Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia [12 February 2009].

36

Audrey R. Chapman

WORLD BANK. (2007) World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank). WORLD CONFERNCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS. (1993) Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/23. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH. (2005) Public health, innovation, and intellectual property rights. [Online]. Available: http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/stats/en/index.html [12 February 2009]. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION. (2006) World Health Report 2006: Working Together for Health (Geneva: World Health Organization). WORLD UNIVERSITY SERVICE. (1993) Mexico dismissal of professor monitoring environmental projects. Human Rights Bulletin, 11, 7.