This article was downloaded by: [HL Holocaust Centre] On: 12 November 2013, At: 06:52 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjms20

Fighting Words: What's Wrong with Freedom of Expression? Sindre Bangstad Published online: 11 Nov 2013.

To cite this article: Sindre Bangstad , Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2013): Fighting Words: What's Wrong with Freedom of Expression?, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.851475

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/termsand-conditions

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2013 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.851475

Fighting Words: What’s Wrong with Freedom of Expression?

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

Sindre Bangstad

In recent years, Norway has regularly been criticised by international anti-discrimination and anti-racism monitoring bodies for failing to curtail hate speech of a racist and/ or discriminatory nature. The so-called ‘racism paragraph’ of the Norwegian General Penal Code, introduced in 1970, made such speech liable to criminal prosecution. Furthermore, the formal legal penalties for such speech, as well as the range of application of the legislation had if anything been increased and extended since 2005. Nonetheless, few prosecutions under the paragraph have been brought in recent years. Racist and/or discriminatory speech on the Internet has hardly been prosecuted, even if it is in these largely unregulated media that the problem is most visible. This article traces the shifting patterns of application of the Norwegian ‘racism paragraph’, and argues that as a result of extra-legal developments, Norway has moved in a more liberal and absolutist direction in relation to freedom of expression and its limits. This article advocates a modest defence of existing hate speech legislation in Norway and in western Europe, along the lines suggested by Jeremy Waldron. Keywords: Norway; Freedom of Expression; Islamophobia; Hate Speech; Racism; Muslims Introduction Freedom of expression is a central tenet of any liberal, secular and democratic society, and so it must be. But despite public assertions to the contrary, there is no society in which freedom of expression is absolute. In this article, I adopt Jeremy Waldron’s modest defence of European hate speech laws outlined in his 2009 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures (Waldron 2010), since developed in a monograph (Waldron 2012). Waldron’s perspective seems particularly useful, in as much as debates on freedom of expression and its limits in Norway as elsewhere in western Europe are often framed by liberal academic, legal and media Sindre Bangstad is an Affiliate Researcher at the Faculty of Theology, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway. Correspondence to: Sindre Bangstad, Faculty of Theology, University of Oslo, P. O. Box 1023, Blindern, 0315 Oslo, Norway. E-mail: [email protected] © 2013 Taylor & Francis

2

S. Bangstad

elites as a ‘zero-sum game’ in which it is assumed than one must either be ‘for’ or ‘against’ freedom of expression, and in which anyone expressing the view that there are (as a matter of fact) and should be (as a normative point of view) certain limits to freedom of expression, is often cast as an opponent of freedom of expression tout court. One reason for this is that: the free speech story is as much a cultural commonplace as an explicit doctrine … it is a flattering tale for people who read and write for a living, and reporters, civil libertarians, civic teachers, among others, tell it often. (Peters 2005, 18)

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

Waldron argues that: Hate speech regulation can be understood as the protection of a certain sort of precious public good: a visible assurance offered by society to all its members that they will not be subject to abuse, defamation, humiliation, discrimination, and violence on grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and in some cases sexual orientation. (Waldron 2010, 1599)

Waldron admits that he is not making the case that ‘hate speech laws actually reduce discrimination, violence and so on’ (Waldron 2010, 1599). Instead, he contends that: The aim of these laws is more immediate. The aim is simply to diminish the presence of visible hatred in society and thus benefit members of vulnerable minorities by protecting the public commitment to their equal standing in society against public denigration. (Waldron 2010, 1600)

Or, in other words, to vindicate ‘the rudiments of their civic dignity as a necessary ingredient of public order’ (Waldron 2010, 1600). In Waldron’s view, racist and/or discriminatory speech is precisely aimed at undermining equal rights to citizenship and dignity for individuals of a minority background. Waldron’s concerns over hate speech relate to its pernicious effects on the equal rights to equal citizenship and dignity for minority individuals, rather than minority groups. His is an explicit argument for taking ‘fighting words’ and ‘words that wound’ seriously, as against the celebration of Stoicism by liberal elites who often argue that minority individuals must simply cultivate a ‘hard heart’ as the price to pay for a public life (Peters 2005, 22). Waldron’s defence of European legal restrictions on hate speech is therefore not to be conflated with restrictions on ‘offense’ (Waldron 2010, 1612) nor with restrictions on ‘permissible thought’ (Waldron 2010, 1601). This differentiates Waldron’s perspective from the view that the law (whether international or national) may be used to ‘protect’ people from socalled ‘defamation of religion’ (see Appiah 2012 for a liberal critique) in the form of cartoons or films that are deemed ‘offensive’ or for that matter, that the law may in fact be used in order to introduce a ‘thought police’ (Waldron 2010, 1612–1614). In the following, I analyse the development and application of the Norwegian legal restrictions of hate speech in the form of the so-called ‘racism paragraph’ ((§135(a))

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 3

of the Norwegian General Penal Code) since its introduction in 1970 (see Mårtensson 2014, for another perspective on Norway). I also demonstrate a linkage between the ‘fighting words’ and the ‘fighting deeds’ of right-wing extremists in Norway. Though these linkages suggest the existence of a serious and continuing physical threat against individuals of minority background in Norway, a more serious threat to the dignity and equal rights to citizenship for individuals of such background in Norway comes from the ubiquity of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim hate speech. I will demonstrate that, in line with Waldron’s analysis, existing legal provisions against hate speech in Norway have never been used to protect against ‘defamation of religion’ or feelings of ‘offense’ which may ensue as a result thereof, but have rather served as an albeit seldom used instrument to protect individuals’ right to dignity against racist and discriminatory speech. The Norwegian ‘Racism Paragraph’ In 1970, what became known as the Norwegian ‘racism paragraph’ was introduced in the form of an amendment to §135 of the Norwegian General Penal Code, §135(a) (see Bangstad 2012 for an overview). The introduction of §135(a) was a direct result of the Norwegian ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ethnic and Racial Discrimination (ICERD) from 1965. In its current formulation, it prohibits the public and pre-meditated or grossly neglectful articulation of a discriminatory or hateful expression in public. Offences against this statute are punishable by fines or a maximum of three years imprisonment. According to the statute, an expression qualifies as ‘public’ when it is expressed in such a manner that it may reach a greater number of people [større antall personer]. Significantly, symbols of a racist and discriminatory nature are also included in the remit of the statute, and participation [medvirkning] is also liable to punishment. The statute defines a discriminatory or hateful expression as one which threatens or harasses another person, or one which advocates hatred, persecution or contempt [ringeakt] against persons on account of their (1) skin colour, or national or ethnic origin; (2) religion or view of life [livssyn], or (3) homosexual inclination, way of life or orientation. §135(a) has been amended on three occasions, in 1981, 2003 and 2005. A 2009 revision of the General Penal Code adopted by the Norwegian Parliament, which as of 2013 has yet to enter into effect, also makes discriminatory speech targeting an individual’s reduced functional abilities liable to criminal sanctioning under a proposed 185 (a), set to replace 135(a) (see Bangstad 2013a). In 1981, homosexuals were protected under the law; the 2003 amendment expanded the remit to include symbols; and the 2005 amendment revised the definition of ‘public’ so that the law would also cover expressions made in private, but which reached a wider public, and were either intentionally [overlagt] or grossly negligently [grovt uaktsomt] racist and/or discriminatory. The maximum penalty for criminal offences was raised from two to three years. Furthermore, under existing Norwegian legislation, racist motivation for other crimes may constitute an aggravating circumstance.

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

4

S. Bangstad

In the wake of labour migration from countries such as Morocco, Pakistan, India and Turkey from the late 1960s and onwards (Brochmann and Kjelstadli 2008), extreme right-wing activists in Norway had already by the late 1970s and early 1980s identified Muslims as the new primary ‘enemy’. In Nazi and neo-Nazi circles, antiSemitism remained central, but anti-Semitism would for most extreme right-wing activists be eclipsed by Islamophobia1 from the late 1970s and onwards. In 1981, the Norwegian Supreme Court found Vivi Krogh of The Organization Against Harmful Immigration to Norway [Organisasjonen mot Skadelig Innvandring i Norge], guilty of offences under §135(a) for having distributed 16,000 racist leaflets targeting Pakistani immigrants. Krogh had made it clear that her main concern was to stop specifically Muslim immigration and the building of mosques in Norway. The Supreme Court found that in as much as Krogh’s leaflets were targeting individual Muslims, it qualified as an offence under §135(a), but it also found that the leaflets’ statements concerning Islam and Norwegian immigration policy in general was protected under the Norwegian Constitution’s §100. Two years later, ahead of National Day Celebrations on 17 May 1983, Sagene primary school in Oslo East was targeted by Norwegian right-wing extremists on the basis that the school had a high proportion of pupils with a minority background; they protested against minority children’s attendance in the children’s flag parades on 17 May. The school received phone calls in which the callers threatened to bomb the school unless it kept the 17 May celebrations ‘raserene’ [racially clean]. Members of the neo-Nazi National People’s Party [Nasjonalt Folkeparti, NPP, established 1980] who had been involved in the threats were reported to the Oslo police, and Sagene School marched on 17 May 1983 under police protection. Later that year, several members of the NPP were convicted of racism under §135(a) in a lower court in Oslo. Political pamphlets circulated by the Neo-Nazi Bastian Heide of the NPP, for which Heide was subsequently sentenced under §135(a) in 1985, described immigrants from ‘Third World’ countries as people ‘breeding like rats’ and ‘polluting our culture’ (Strømmen 2012, 6). Declaring a ‘Norway for Norwegians’, Heide was particularly exercised by Norwegian politicians permitting Muslims to build mosques in Norway.

The Mainstreaming of Islamophobic Speech 1987 was the year of the electoral breakthrough of the populist right-wing Progress Party [Fremskrittspartiet, PP] in Norway. During the electoral campaign ahead of that year’s parliamentary election, the PP chairman from 1976 to 2006, MP Carl I. Hagen, read-out a fabricated letter allegedly written by a Norwegian Muslim from Tøyen in Oslo, named Mohamed Mustafa. In the fabricated letter, Mustafa was cited as asserting that Hagen was ‘fighting in vain’ against an Islamic conquest of Norway, which through the ‘superior fertility of Muslims’ would lead to ‘churches being replaced by mosques’, and the ‘heathen’ cross of the Norwegian flag ‘replaced by the Islamic crescent’. From 1987 onwards, the PP’s anti-immigration and anti-Muslim

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 5

platform would be central to ‘its electoral successes’ (Hagelund 2003). Though the party was consistent in advocating democratic means in order to achieve its aims, many of the rhetorical tropes the party used about Islam and Muslims from 1987 onwards were drawn from extreme right-wing milieus (see Bangstad, 2013b, for details). Some PP MPs also had direct contacts with extreme right-wingers. In 1995, Norwegian media revealed that the PP’s spokesperson on immigration issues at the time, Øystein Hedstrøm, had taken part in a secret meeting with prominent Norwegian extreme right-wingers and neo-Nazis at Godlia Cinema in Oslo ahead of that year’s elections. In a speech to an evangelical Christian congregation in Bergen in 2004, Hagen declared that Muslims used ‘small children’ as ‘suicide bombers in order to Islamize the world’ (Alstadsæter 2004). In 2005, the PP’s then spokesperson on immigration, Per Sandberg, informed the media about a secret ‘extremist network’ consisting of ‘30,000 members of Pakistani origin’ planning to acquire mosques and training facilities to be used for ‘training in violence’ (Mosveen and Ertzeid 2005).2 And ahead of the parliamentary elections of 2009, in which the PP gained its best electoral results with 22.9% of the votes, and became Norway’s second largest party in terms of number of MPs, the PP chairwoman Siv Jensen) drew upon extreme rightwing tropes in warning against a ‘stealth islamization’ [snikislamisering] of Norwegian society. Though one cannot extrapolate directly from the effects of political, media and public discourse about Islam and Muslims to the effects on non-Muslim Norwegians’ perceptions of Islam and Muslims and their effects on the everyday lives of Norwegian Muslims, it would be hard to argue that such discourses are without consequences in ordinary people’s everyday lives. By 2010, polls suggested that Norwegians feared ‘conflicts with Muslims’ more than anything else in the future (61%) (TV2 2010). Norwegians hold more negative attitudes towards Muslims than any other minority group except the Roma (HL-centre 2012). Among immigrants reporting discrimination in various fields in Norway, those of Muslim background are over-represented (Tronstad 2009). Academic studies from recent years also demonstrate that individuals with a Pakistani-sounding Muslim name are likely to be discriminated against by Norwegian employers looking to contract new labour (Midtbøen and Rogstad 2012). Furthermore, in a representative national survey in 2009, 54% of Norwegians wanted curbs on immigration specific to Muslims (IMDI 2010). Such a policy, which had long been part of the PP’s political platform, would potentially bring Norway into conflict with international human rights conventions and refugee treaties premised on the universality of law. It is not merely ‘fighting words’ against immigrants and minorities in general and Muslims in particular that extreme right-wing actors in Norway have engaged in during the past decades. ‘Fighting words’ would at times be translated into ‘fighting deeds’ by extreme right-wing activists. It was a 19-year-old member of the NPP, Ole Kristian Braastad, who was behind the first Norwegian terror attacks against Muslims. The bomb attack on the Ahmadiyya Nor Mosque in Oslo West on 14 June 1985 left no one dead, mainly

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

6

S. Bangstad

because members of the congregation who would usually assemble in the cellar of the mosque happened to be elsewhere on the night in question (Strømmen 2011, 34–35). Muslims as a new ‘existential threat’ was absolutely central to the programme of the far more popular and influential Folkebevegelsen mot innvandring, the Popular Movement Against Immigration (FMI), established in 1987 (Strømmen 2011, 34). For its leader, Arne Myrdal, declared that he was part of a ‘resistance movement’ which was ‘fighting against the Muslim invasion of our country, and against the national traitors who assist them’ (Strømmen 2011, 34, my translation). Myrdal and the FMI were involved in a series of violent assaults on immigrants and attempts to torch asylum centres in southern Norway and established links with neo-Nazis in Norway and Sweden (Lunde 1993). But the case which perhaps illustrated the linkages between the ‘fighting words’ and the ‘fighting deeds’ of Norwegian right-wing extremists prior to the terror attacks of Anders Behring Breivik on 22 July 2011 came with the racist murder of Benjamin Hermansen in 2001.

Neo-Nazi Hate Speech and Racist Murder: The Sjølie Case On 26 January 2001, 15-year-old Benjamin Hermansen was stabbed to death in the eastern suburb of Holmlia in Oslo by three young neo-Nazis. Hermansen had been born to a Norwegian mother and a Ghanaian father. Joe Erling Jahr, Ole Nicolai Kvisler and Veronica Andreassen were eventually charged with the murder. Jahr and Kvisler were sentenced to 18 and 17 years in prison, while ‘Andreassen received 3 years as an accomplice’. Hermansen’s murderers were young Neo-Nazis with links to a skinhead organisation called Boot Boys. Boot Boys had in the course of the 1990s established a stronghold in Bøler, a traditionally working-class district in Oslo East (see also Bjørgo 1997 and Fangen 2002 for studies of Norwegian neo-Nazis in that period). Boot Boys was estimated by a researcher to have little more than 50 members in 1993 (Lunde 1993). In the summer of 2000, Boot Boys applied to Oslo Police authorities to hold a commemorative march for the German Nazi leader Rudolf Hess on the day of his death on 19 August. When Oslo Police authorities turned the application down Boot Boys moved their illegal march to the small town of Askim outside of Oslo. Local police in Askim also refused permission for the march. In Oslo, meanwhile, an anti-racist demonstration brought an estimated 35,000 onto the streets. A total of 38 Boot Boys members eventually took part in the 20–30 minutes march through Askim town centre. During this march, Boot Boys’ leader Terje Sjølie made statements for which he was later charged under the ‘racism paragraph’ of the Norwegian General Penal Code (§135(a)). Sjølie asserted to his audience that ‘every day immigrants rob, rape and kill Norwegians. Every day our country and our people are plundered and destroyed by the Jews, who suck our country dry of riches and replace it with immoral and unNorwegian thoughts’. Sjølie furthermore honoured Rudolf Hess for ‘his courageous attempts at saving Germany and Europe from Judaism’; characterised Adolf Hitler as

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 7

his ‘dear leader’; called upon the Boot Boys members assembled for the march to ‘follow in the path laid out by Hess and Hitler’; and ‘not be detracted from their principles in building “a Norway founded on National Socialism”’. The speech was rounded off by repeated chants of ‘Sieg Heil!’ (Norwegian Supreme Court 2002). At least one of Benjamin Hermansen’s murderers, Ole Nicolai Kvisler, had been present at the march. On 17 December 2002, the Norwegian Supreme Court acquitted Sjølie for offences under §135(a). The Supreme Court was divided over the case, but a majority of 11 Supreme Court Judges argued that protection of freedom of expression overrode concerns relating to protection from racist and discriminatory speech in this particular case. Engaging in what can best be described as historical revisionism, the Supreme Court majority argued that ‘acceptance of Nazi ideology’ could not be ‘assumed to include acceptance of mass extermination or other systematic and serious acts of violence against Jews or other groups’.3 Sjølie’s opinions about Jews were, in the view of the Supreme Court majority ‘in themselves absurd’, and could not be ‘subjected to a reasonable interpretation’. The Supreme Court majority thus argue by inference that as long as racist and discriminatory statements qualify as ‘absurd’ and ‘unreasonable’—to the Supreme Court—then they are not punishable by law. The majority furthermore argued that ‘one must be careful about drawing general knowledge about the behaviors of neo-Nazis in a criminal case regarding expressions’. The Director-General of Public Prosecutions, Tor-Aksel Busch, argued in the aftermath of Sjølie’s acquittal that the verdict might have the effect of diminishing minority individuals’ legal protections against racist and discriminatory speech. The following year, Tore Tvedt of the neo-Nazi outfit Vigrid stated in a newspaper interview with VG that his organisation wished to ‘cleanse out the Jews’, whom he characterised as ‘parasites, not humans’. Norwegian police initially refused to bring charges against Tvedt, pointing directly to the precedent in the Sjølie case. It took an extraordinary effort by the Norwegian Centre Against Racism in Oslo and Norwegian Jewish organisations to bring it to court. Having first been acquitted by the Borgarting Court of Appeals [Borgarting Lagmannsrett] in May, Tvedt was eventually found guilty under §135(a) by the Norwegian Supreme Court in December 2007. In June 2003, the Norwegian Centre Against Racism and various Jewish congregations appealed the Sjølie verdict to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD 2005), tasked with overseeing the implantation and application of the ICERD Convention of 1965. In August 2005, the CERD Commission issued an opinion on the case.4 The appellants claimed that the Sjølie verdict violated articles 4 and 6 of the ICERD Convention. In light of the verdict in, the appellants argued, any legal proceedings brought by them for racist and discriminatory speech ‘would have no prospect of success’. The CERD Commission found that that Sjølie’s acquittal ‘gave rise to a violation of article 4, and consequently article 6, of the Convention’ and recommended that the Norwegian state ‘take

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

8

S. Bangstad

measures to ensure that statements such as those made by Sjølie in the course of his speech are not protected by the right to freedom of speech under Norwegian law’. The then Norwegian Minister of Justice and Police, Odd-Einar Dørum of the social-liberal party Venstre promised to abide by the recommendations of the CERD Committee. Partly as a result of the pressure from the CERD Commission, the Ministry of Justice in revising the Norwegian ‘racism paragraph’ §135(a) in 2005 adopted the recommendations of a Government-appointed commission on legal protection against ethnic discrimination (Holgersen et al. 2002). The Holgersen commission had proposed to increase the maximum penalties for racist and discriminatory speech in breach of §135(a) from two to three years of imprisonment and to extend its range of application by also including symbols, and lowering the threshold for considering racist and discriminatory speech to be ‘public’ in legal terms. The impetus for the Commission’s recommendation was provided by the Beheim Karlsen case from 2000. In this case, two young Norwegian men from Naustdal were acquitted for criminal offences under §135(a). They had chased a 17year-old adopted boy of Indian origin, Arve Beheim Karlsen, into a local river, where he subsequently drowned. The two men had on repeated occasions subjected Karlsen to racist abuse in front of a number of his friends, but were acquitted. The court found that the racist abuse had not been sufficiently ‘public’ in order to be punishable under §135(a). When the Norwegian Parliament discussed amendments to §135(a) of the General Penal Code in the parliamentary sessions of 2003–2004, it was in the context of a debate in the Parliamentary Committee on Justice on a parliamentary report [a Stortingsmelding] concerning proposed changes to the Norwegian Constitution’s §100 (Stortingsmelding 26, 2003–2004), authored at the Department of Justice and Police. That debate was the end result of a series of government initiatives dating back to the early-mid-1990s, which concerned freedom of expression and its limitations. The debate of 2003–2004 pitted parliamentarians who wanted to adopt the recommendations of the Holgersen Commission, endorsed by the Department of Justice and Police, against parliamentarians who wanted to adopt the recommendations of the Freedom of Expression Commission (the Sejersted Commission) (Sejersted 1999) concerning amendments to §135(a) of the Norwegian General Penal Code. The former wanted to increase legal protections against racist and discriminatory speech, whereas the latter wanted to lessen legal restrictions on such speech. Interestingly, these divisions did not map onto a left–right political divide. In the Justice Committee of the Norwegian Parliament, MPs from the Conservative Party, the Christian-Democratic Party and the Socialist Left Party, constituting the majority, voted in favour of the proposals of the Department of Justice. A minority of MPs in the Justice Committee from the social-democratic Labour Party as well as the populist right-wing PP voted for a lessening of restrictions on racist and discriminatory speech under §135(a). From the parliamentary record of the Parliamentary Committee on Justice’s deliberations on the matter in the parliamentary session 2003–2004, it is noteworthy that the Ministry of Justice’s recommendations regarding §135(a) seem

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 9

to have been crucial to the committees’ final proposals. The Ministry of Justice had argued that ‘a new constitutional provision on freedom of expression did give room for increased protections against discriminatory and hateful speech’. In noting that there is often a power imbalance between those that take part in the public sphere and those targeted by racist speech, and that ‘serious violations’ against various minorities throughout Norwegian modern history indicates that public debate may not provide any guarantees against such violations, the Parliamentary Justice Committee also engaged in direct criticism of the Commission on Freedom of Expression. For the Freedom of Expression Commission had in its report of 1999 in fact argued—without reference to any academic literature on the topic—that ‘freedom of speech [has] in most cases functioned as a protection against discrimination’ (Sejersted 1999, 213). The new and amended law entered into effect in 2006. On the face of it, legal restrictions on racist and discriminatory speech, and legal penalties for engaging in such speech have in Norway increased in the course of the past 10 years. This has, however, not lead to any increase in prosecutions or convictions under §135(a). It has led to a situation in which Norwegian authorities have regularly faced criticisms by international monitoring bodies such as the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI 2009) for failing to guarantee legal protection against racist and discriminatory speech. In order to understand this apparent paradox, one needs to analyse concurrent developments in the extra-legal fields which arguably have had a significant impact on the situation.

The Commissions on Freedom of Expression Although Norway has at present a population of Muslim background estimated at 3.6% of the total population of 5 million (Jacobsen and Leirvik 2012), Islam and Muslims have featured prominently in Norwegian debates on freedom of expression and its limitations ever since the so-called ‘Rushdie affair’ in 1988–1989. In 1988, mobilisation against the publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses instigated by Islamist actors in the UK, followed by what popularly became known as a ‘fatwa’ against Rushdie and his publishers’, which called for Rushdie’s assassination, led to a global crisis (Ruthven 1990). The Norwegian translation of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses was the first to be brought out anywhere in the world, and Norwegian publishing editors played a central role in the defence committees for Rushdie organised in the aftermath of the ‘fatwa’ (Austenå 2011). In 1993, the prominent Norwegian publishing editor William Nygaard narrowly survived an assassination attempt. The ‘Rushdie affair’ was extremely important in framing debates on freedom of expression and its limitations in Norway, and this ‘framing’, present in ‘repeated acts of representation by politicians, the press and the media’ (Morey and Yaqin 2011, 2) was one which more often than not implicated Muslims as the imagined ‘other’ of freedom of expression; it was widely seen as affirmed by the so-called ‘cartoon crisis’ in 2005 and 2006 (Hervik 2011).

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

10

S. Bangstad

In the wake of the assassination attempt on Nygaard, a governmental commission was established at the instigation of the then Minister of Culture, Åse Kleveland of the Labour Party. It consisted of three members, two of whom had been central in the campaign in support of Rushdie. The commission’s report was published in 1994 and advanced the view that the principles of freedom of expression constitute one of ‘our’ [i. e. Norwegians’] ‘fundamental rules for ordered coexistence’ [våre grunnleggende regler for ordnet samliv]. There is arguably a trace here of what has later become an ubiquitous phenomenon across western European states, namely the ‘nationalisation of liberal values’ whereby ‘our’ de-historicised and de-contextualised ‘values’ are seen to be under threat from and extra- or sub-national ‘them.’ The report is blunt about precisely which groups in Norway threaten freedom of expression. It is Muslims, and practicing Muslims in particular (Brekke, Hagtvet, and Waage 1994, 10). From ‘a liberal and democratic point of view’, the authors contend, Norwegian society has every right to insist on ‘their own rules of freedom of expression being respected within ethnic groups in lack of this tradition of rights’ (Brekke, Hagtvet, and Waage 1994, 14). By inference, the report for all practical purposes constitutes Norwegian Muslims in particular as lacking such traditions, and therefore in need of being ‘taught its merits’ through various educational efforts. Talal Asad has argued that ‘where its task is cultural liberation, liberal reason requires the use of force whenever persuasion (the use of reason) does not work’ (1990, 464). Among the recommendations of the commission was that paragraph 100 of the Norwegian Constitution be amended so that freedom of expression would be guaranteed explicit protection (Brekke, Hagtvet, and Waage 1994, 46). The latter recommendation would become central to the Commission on Freedom of Expression which followed two years after. In 1996, a commission tasked with ‘a fundamental reflection upon the place of freedom of expression in our society’ was appointed by the Ministry of Justice and Police in Norway. The remit of the commission was to propose a new and amended text for paragraph §100 of the Norwegian Constitution (drafted in 1814) relating to freedom of expression. The 18-member commission would be chaired by a historian from the University of Oslo, Francis Sejersted. The commission would be dominated, as are most government commissions in Norway, by academics based at institutions in close proximity to the government bureaucracies in the capital of Oslo or with political networks in government bureaucracies. Ten out of 18 commission members were male, and only two had what is describable as a minority background. One cannot infer from this that its recommendations would have been significantly different had the makeup of the commission been different. But as there is reason to think that individuals of minority backgrounds in Norway are more likely than ‘ethnic Norwegians’ to experience and to be negatively affected by racist and discriminatory speech (Bangstad 2012, 2013c), the makeup of the commission does not necessarily reflect a satisfactory adherence to ‘deliberative democratic’ principles in the tradition of Habermas.

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 11

The commission contended that freedom of expression is ‘a constitutive element of democracy’ (Sejersted 1999, 24), and, pace the unranked nature of freedom of speech in relation to other human rights under international human rights conventions and treaties, that ‘freedom of expression in its essence is not a concern which may give way to other concerns. It is constitutive of society, [something] which implies that if one infringes on it, the very order of society is threatened’ (Sejersted 1999, 136). The argumentative thrust of the report is in favour of expanding freedom of expression both as a societal and legal virtue. The report enlisted decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg as an argument for a more liberal approach to freedom of expression (Sejersted 1999, 80), though in fact academic scholars on ECtHR jurisprudence on racist and discriminatory speech have argued for the opposite interpretation (Bleich 2011a, 22–23). The Sejersted Commission construes freedom of expression as an unmitigated good for individuals as well as for society, and there is an underlying assumption in the report that the ‘very few’ who set out to do harm with ‘fighting words’ will necessarily be contested and exposed. The report asserts that a ‘democratic principle’ [demokratiprinsippet], whereby publicity is the basis for checks on both public and private powers, presupposes that publication or the threat thereof, occasions decency [anstendighet] and reasonableness [rimelighet] (Sejersted 1999, 77–78). It is, according to the report, for the media to ensure such decency and reasonableness. ‘Demands for limitations to freedom of speech (including freedom of information)’, we learn, ‘is surprisingly often reflective of [an] almost irrational fear’ (Sejersted 1999, 77). The report contends that ‘our democratic system, including the right to vote and freedom of expression, is based on the conception [forestilling] that the public sphere is by and large populated by mature, adult and decent human beings’ (Sejersted 1999, 78). There is, in the view of the commission, no reason to doubt the ‘controlling and self-disciplining function’ of the media and the media consumer. More than 10 years on from this report, Norwegian readers of online newspaper commentary fields, op-ed articles, as well as followers of online social media, in which racist, discriminatory and Islamophobic statements have become quite commonplace, might have more than a few reasons to question this conclusion. It would be presumptuous to expect the commission to be able to predict future developments from the vantage point of 1999, but the report is full of praise for ‘the anarchy’ which the Internet brings with it (Sejersted 1999, 90), which ‘should first and foremost be seen as positive from the point of view of freedom of expression’. The report contends that the preconditions and possibilities for minorities in Norway to partake in ‘open and enlightened’ conversation provide a ‘test case’ for the conditions of freedom of expression (Sejersted 1999, 85 and 135). But nowhere do we find anything resembling a philosophical reflection on the limits of reason in combating various forms of racism and xenophobia when expressed in and through the public sphere, nor of the societal power differentials which at any given time define what is considered permissible and non-permissible forms of speech relating to the various ‘others’ in Norwegian society. The proposals on racist and discriminatory

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

12

S. Bangstad

expressions fall into line with the general tenor of the argument concerning freedom of expression in the report. Without any reference to secondary literature or empirical data, the report contends that ‘publicity has provided the best form of control, and the best protection for underprivileged groups regardless of who were in power’ (Sejersted 1999, 94). Freedom of expression, in the reading of the report, is basically a form of protection from discrimination. For when discriminatory attitudes are expressed in public they may be contested through public criticism (Sejersted 1999, 203). The commission does raise the possibility that ‘the public correction [of discriminatory attitudes] may not in all areas function according to the ideals referred to’ (Sejersted 1999, 204) and that it may in fact lead to such attitudes becoming more ‘widespread [alment utbredt]’ (Sejersted 1999, 204). Except for noting that there may be ‘valid reasons’ [gode grunner] for a law which may counter repeat discriminatory expressions by agitators, the report does not offer any further reflections on this problematic. While the report did not advocate the abolishment of the racism paragraph, it did advocate the abolishment of protection against racist and/or discriminatory speech based on religious ‘faith’ (Sejersted 1999, 207). In the terminology of §135(a) at the time, the term ‘confession of faith’ [trosbekjennelse] was used to protect against racist and/or discriminatory speech targeting an individual based on his or her ‘religion’. Criteria relating to religious faith, the report argued, stand in opposition to other criteria in that there is an element of personal choice or will, though on the available evidence, and pace the Sejersted Commission’s contention, one does not necessarily ‘choose’ to be born to Muslim parents, or to appear in public as a person ascribed a Muslim ‘identity’ by others (Meer and Modood 2009). According to the Sejersted Commission, the inclusion of these criteria in §135(a) is ‘detrimental to the right of free and open critique of religion and culture’ (Sejersted 1999, 207). While not seeking its abolition, the Commission did call for restricting the applicability of §135(a) to ‘extreme cases’, and revising it so that individuals targeted by racism and discriminatory speech under the paragraph could only invoke legal protection against speech relating to biological or innate sociocultural characteristics. Significantly, however, neither the Ministry of Justice, nor the Holgersen Commission of 2002 accepted the argument that faith is merely a matter of individual ‘choice’. In the final amendment undertaken in 2005, the term ‘confession of faith’ was replaced by the more inclusive ‘religion and belief’ [religion-og livssyn]. This was designed so as to also include non-religious life-stances under the paragraph’s remit.5 The Ministry of Justice argued that Norway would risk violating the prohibition of ‘religious hatred’ in ICCPR Article 20(2) if the Commission’s proposals were endorsed.6

By Way of a Conclusion: A New Norwegian Supreme Court Verdict: Lowering the Bar? As I have demonstrated in this article, there is nothing new and unprecedented in extreme right-wing ‘fighting words’ being translated into ‘fighting deeds’ by such

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 13

actors in Norwegian history. In a little-reported murder in August 2008 in Trondheim, a Norwegian-Somali taxi driver and father of five was shot and killed by a white Norwegian man who in previous years and months had spent much time on extreme right-wing websites where he had referred to immigrants and Muslims in racist and disparaging terms. In a handwritten note found by police, the murderer had listed ‘burning down of mosques and other Muslim buildings’ and ‘killing Muslims if provided an opportunity to do so’ among central ‘personal tasks’. From police investigations, it is clear that the murderer had set out from his apartment on the night of the murder with a pistol he had acquired illegally’. He was eventually declared a paranoid schizophrenic and criminally insane, and his racist motivations for the murder were therefore not explored in any detail by the court.7 In March 2012, the Norwegian Supreme Court upheld the conviction under §135 (a) in a lower court in Stavanger against a Norwegian man for racist and discriminatory speech. The case in question related to statements against a doorman of African origins made in a queue outside a bar in the city of Stavanger in July 2010. The convicted man, who had been refused entry on the grounds of excessive intoxication had repeatedly and in the presence of at least 10 people referred to the doorman as a ‘fucking Negro’ and a ‘fucking darkie’, and queried why ‘negroes were allowed to work in Norway’.8 It would be difficult to interpret the Norwegian Supreme Court’s verdict in this case, the first case under §135(a) in the Supreme Court after the Tvedt verdict in 2007, as anything but lowering of the bar for convictions under §135(a). Norwegian prosecutorial authorities and courts’ enforcement of the provisions of the so-called ‘racism paragraph’ §135(a) of the Norwegian Penal Code, have gone through significant historical shifts in recent decades. The Sjølie case in the Norwegian Supreme Court from 2002 marked the high tide of liberal and absolutist interpretations of freedom of expression among Norwegian legal, political, academic and media elites. The acquittal of Sjølie led to strong criticism of Norwegian authorities from the CERD Commission and ECRI. The seriously flawed legal reasoning in the Sjølie acquittal represents a low point for the Norwegian Supreme Court’s enforcement of §135(a). While Norwegian police have generally been reluctant to pursue prosecutions under §135(a), and Norwegian courts have generally been reluctant to convict individuals, Sjølie’s acquittal would appear, in light of subsequent convictions for racist and discriminatory speech in 2007 and 2012, not to have created a strong legal precedent. It remains to be seen, however, whether the most recent Norwegian Supreme Court verdict represents a long-term shift in this regard. The terrorist atrocities perpetrated by Anders Behring Breivik on 22 July 2011 (‘22/7’) brought public and political awareness of the amount of racist and discriminatory speech on unregulated Internet web-platforms inside and outside Norway. There is to date only one registered case in Norway in which an individual has been charged with offences under §135(a) relating to racist and/or discriminatory speech on the Internet. That case dates from 2002, when a then researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

14

S. Bangstad

Institute (Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt, FFI), Jarle Synnevåg, received a fine from his local police district at Nordre Romerike for thousands of Islamophobic web postings on open news groups on the Internet. Synnevåg, who lost his research position as a consequence of his postings, had asserted that ‘no Muslim could be trusted unless he was six feet under the ground’. No charges under §135(a) have been brought for Behring Breivik’s main ideological inspiration, the Norwegian blogger Peder Are Nøstvold Jensen (aka ‘Fjordman’) (Brown 2011), whose postings in English on extreme right-wing websites have since 2005 repeatedly called for the ethnic cleansing of Muslims from Europe, and for Europeans to arm themselves against a Muslim ‘invasion’ (Enebakk 2012). Nøstvold Jensen has continued his postings on extreme right-wing websites in Europe, and after 22 July 2011 has had unprecedented access to the opinion and letters pages of mainstream Norwegian newspapers. Mainstream liberal newspapers in Norway now carries advertisements by qualifiably racist organisations such as SIAN [Stans Islamiseringen av Norge or Stop the Islamisation of Norway], and defend these in the name of ‘freedom of expression’ (Markussen 2013). The websites frequented by Behring Breivik while he planned his terrorist atrocities, cited and referenced extensively in his 1518 pages cut-and-paste tract 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, were for the most part anti-Muslim and antiimmigration websites in which Islamophobia is ubiquitous and uncontested. The de-personalised anonymity that the Internet provides may make it particularly useful for individuals who want to engage in various forms of systematic hate speech whether directed at Muslims, Jews, gays and lesbians, or women (Levmore and Nussbaum 2010), and to create and maintain transnational alliances between likeminded people (Sunstein 2009). We are in the current era further than ever from the classical Habermasian ideals of the bourgeois liberal public sphere. As the lack of prosecution for racist and discriminatory speech on Internet platforms in Norway demonstrates, it would be an understatement to assert that countries like Norway struggle with the legal regulation of cyber-hate and extremism online (Perry and Olsson 2009, 196). Part of the reason for this state of affairs is of course that this would require a level of interstate regulation and monitoring of hate speech on the Internet which is currently a distant prospect. In this article, I have argued for a modest defence of existing hate speech regulation through law, along the lines suggested by Waldron (2010, 2012), not out of an assumption that such legal restrictions in and of themselves can ensure a societal environment in which formally equally citizenship rights and rights to fundamental dignity for all become a reality. I do so because the historical record in Norway strongly suggest that there is a linkage, though not necessarily direct, unmediated and causative, between ‘fighting words’ and ‘fighting deeds’ when it comes to the extreme right-wing speech and violence against immigrants and minorities. I hold, with Waldron, that the state has a moral obligation to signal to all citizens, regardless of their ethnic background, religious or non-religious orientation, sexual orientation and gender, that their rights to dignity and freedom from racist and/or discriminatory verbal

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 15

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

abuse in public settings will be upheld in the face of continued xenophobia, racism, homophobia and misogyny. With Bleich (2011a, 9), I furthermore hold that ‘striking a careful balance in legislation and enforcement’ between rights to freedom of expression and the right to protected from racist and/or discriminatory speech is feasible. To argue in favour of some legal restrictions against racist and/or discriminatory speech is not to be antiliberal; it is precisely the virtues of a liberal and democratic society with formally equal citizenship rights and rights to dignity for individuals of all backgrounds that such speech seeks to undermine by naturalising and legitimising hatred.

Notes [1] [2] [3] [4]

[5] [6] [7] [8]

By ‘Islamophobia’ I refer to ‘indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims’ (Bleich 2011b, 1581). As of 2004, there were 26,286 individuals of Pakistani origin in Norway (Østby 2008, 18). In their dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court minority led by Judge Hans Flock took issue with this particular interpretation of the statements. See Opinion on Communication no. 30/2003 (CERD/C/67/D/30/2003), issued on 22 August 2005. Such opinions are in principle legally non-binding for signatory states. I thank Michael Banton for information on this point. See Ot. Prop. Nr. 33 (2004–05), 2005. See Stortingsmelding nr. 26,’Om Endring av Grunnloven §100’(2003–2004), 65. See verdict in Trondheim Magistrate Court in 09–052277MED-TRON (2009). Verdict in the Norwegian Supreme Court case HR-2012-00689-A (2012/143).

References Alstadsæter, R. 2004. “Hagen angrep islam [‘Hagen Attacked Islam].” NRK, Accessed July 13. http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/innenriks/3931619.html. Appiah, K. A. 2012. “What’s Wrong with Defamation of Religion?” In The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses, edited by Michael Herz and Peter Molnar, 164–182. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Asad, T. 1990. “Multiculturalism and British Identity in the Wake of the Rushdie Affair.” Politics & Society 18 (4): 455–480. doi:10.1177/003232929001800403. Austenå, A.-M. 2011. Arven etter Sataniske Vers: Den politiske kampen om ytringsfrihet og religion [The Legacy of the Satanic Verses: The Political Struggle Over Freedom of Expression and Religion]. Oslo: Aschehoug. Bangstad, S. 2012. “Failing to Protect Minorities Against Racist and/or Discriminatory Speech? The Case of Norway and §135(a) of the Norwegian General Penal Code.” Nordic Journal of Human Rights 30 (4): 483–514. Bangstad, S. 2013a. “Diskriminerende ytringer [Discriminatory Speech].” Encyclopedia Entry for Store Norske Leksikon Online. Accessed April 30. http://snl.no/diskriminerende_ytringer. Bangstad, S. 2013b. “Eurabia Comes to Norway.” Special issue of Journal of Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations 24 (3): 369–391. Bangstad, S.. 2013c. “Inclusion and Exclusion in the Mediated Public Sphere: The Case of Norway and Its Muslims.” Social Anthropology/Antropologie Sociale 21 (3): 356–370. Bjørgo, T. 1997. Racist and Right-wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators, and Responses. Oslo: Tano Aschehoug.

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

16

S. Bangstad

Bleich, E. 2011a. The Freedom to be Racist? How the United States and Europe Struggle to Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism. New York: Oxford University Press. Bleich, E. 2011b. “What is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept.” American Behavioral Scientist 55 (12): 1581–1600. doi:10.1177/0002764211409387. Brekke, T., B. Hagtvet, and P. N. Waage. 1994. Den farlige ytringsfriheten [The Dangerous Freedom of Expression]. Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk. Brochmann, G., and K. Kjelstadli. 2008. A History of Immigration: The Case of Norway 900–2000. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Brown, A. 2011. “Anders Breivik’s Spider Web of Hate.” The Guardian 7 September 2011. Accessed October 1, 2012. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/07/anders-breivik-hatemanifesto CERD [Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination]. 2005. Opinion on Communication no. 30/2003. New York: CERD. ECRI [European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance]. 2009. ECRI Report on Norway. Fourth Monitoring Cycle. Strasbourg: ECRI/Council of Europe. Enebakk, V. 2012. “Fjordmans Radikalisering [The Radicalization of Fjordman].” In Høyrekestreme ideer og bevegelser i Europa [Extreme Right-Wing Ideas and Movements in Europe], edited by Ø. Sørensen, B. Hagtvet, and B. A. Steine, 45–101. Oslo: Dreyer. Fangen, K. 2002. En bok om nynazister [A book about Neo-Nazis]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Hagelund, A. 2003. “A Matter of Decency? The Progress Party in Norwegian Immigration Politics.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 29 (1): 47–65. doi:10.1080/13691830320000 76713. Hervik, P. 2011. The Annoying Difference: The Emergence of Danish Neonationalism, Neoracism and Populism in the Post-1989 World. New York: Berghahn Books. HL-centre. 2012. Antisemittisme i Norge? Den norske befolkningens holdninger til jøder og andre minoriteter [Anti-Semitism in Norway? The Attitudes of the Norwegian Population toward Jews and Other Minorities]. Oslo: The HL-centre. Holgersen, G., et al. 2002. Rettslig Vern Mot Etnisk Diskriminering [Legal Protection Against Ethnic Discrimination]. NOU 2002: 12. Oslo: Arbeidsdepartmentet/Ministry of Labour. IMDI. 2010. Integreringsbarometeret [The Integration Barometer] 2010. Oslo: Integrerings- og mangfoldsdirektoratet [The Directorate Of Integration and Diversity]. Jacobsen, C., and O. Leirvik. 2012. “Norway.” In Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Vol. 4, edited by J. S. Nielsen, S. Akgönül, A. Alibašić, B. Maréchal, and C. Moe. Leiden: Brill. Levmore, S., and M. Nussbaum, eds. 2010. The Offensive Internet: Privacy, Speech and Reputation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lunde, H. 1993. Aller ytterst. De rasistiske grupperingene i dagens Norge [At the Extreme Right. The Racist Groups in Today’s Norway]. Oslo: Antirasistisk Senter. Markussen, J. A. 2013. “Dagbladet og politiske ytringer [Dagbladet and Political Speech].” NRK Ytring, April 22. http://www.nrk.no/ytring/dagbladet-og-politiske-ytringer-1.10994789. Mårtensson, U. 2014. “Hate Speech and Dialogue in Norway: Muslims ‘Speak Back’.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2013.851473. Meer, N., and T. Modood. 2009. “Refutations of Racism in the ‘Muslim question’.” Patterns of Prejudice 43 (3–4): 335–354. Midtbøen, A. H., and J. Rogstad. 2012. Diskrimineringens omfang og årsaker [The Scope and Reasons for Discrimination]. Report 1/2012. Oslo: Institute for Social Research. Morey, P., and A. Yaqin, 2011. Framing Muslims: Stereotyping and Representation After 9/11. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Mosveen, E., and H. Ertzeid. 2005. “Ble tipset om muslimsk nettverk [Tipped off about Muslim Network].” Vg.no. 23 May 2005. http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/norsk-politikk/artikkel. php?artid=104767.

Downloaded by [HL Holocaust Centre] at 06:52 12 November 2013

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 17 Norwegian Supreme Court. 2002. HR-2001-01428-Rt-2002-1618 (361-2002). 17 December 2002. Østby, L. 2008. “Levekårsundersøkelse blant innvandrere – hvordan og hvorfor’ [‘Quality of Life Research Among Immigrants – the Hows and Whys].” In Levekår blant innvandrere i Norge 2005/2006 [Quality of Life Among Immigrants in Norway 2005/2006], edited by S. Blom and K. Henriksen, 15–26. Oslo: Statistics Norway. Perry, B., and P. Olsson. 2009. “Cyberhate: The Globalization of Hate.” Information & Communications Technology Law 18 (2): 185–199. doi:10.1080/13600830902814984. Peters, J. D. 2005. Courting the Abyss: Free Speech and the Liberal Tradition. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Ruthven, M. 1990. A Satanic Affair. London: Chatto & Windus. Sejersted, F. 1999. Ytringsfrihet må finde sted! Forslag til ny Grunnlov §100 [Freedom of Expression Must Take Place! Proposal for a New §100 of the Constitution]. NOU 27: 1999. Oslo: Justis- og Politidepartementet/The Ministry of Justice and Policing. Strømmen, Ø. 2011. Det Mørke Nettet [The Dark Net]. Oslo: Cappelen Damm. Strømmen, Ø. 2012. Utviklingstrekk i norsk høgreekstremisme. Notat til 22.julikommisjonen (4/12) [Developmental Features in Norwegian Right-wing Extremism. Report to the 22 July Commission]. Accessed October 1. http://www.22julikommisjonen. Sunstein, C. R. 2009. Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tronstad, K. R. 2009. Opplevd diskriminering blant innvandrere med bakgrunn fra ti ulike land [Experiences of Discrimination among Immigrants with a Background from Ten Different Countries]. Report 47/2009. Oslo: Statistics Norway. TV2. 2010. “Seks av ti frykter muslimkonflikt [Six Out of Ten Fear Conflict with Muslims].” TV2, December 6. Waldron, J. 2010. “Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate.” The 2009 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, Harvard Law Review 123: 1596–1657. Waldron, J. 2012. The Harm in Hate Speech. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.