Title: Politics of Identity – Kashmiri Pandits in India Author Hrishabh Sandilya Keywords: Kashmir, Kashmiri Pandits, Forced Migration, Pandits in Exile Abstract: This paper will analyse the issue of Kashmiri Pandits in India. Focussing on their history, and forced migration from their homes in the Kashmir Valley, the paper will address contemporary concerns, as well as pass concluding remarks on what the future might hold for the community. Overview Kashmiri Pandits, long-claimed to be the original inhabitants of the Kashmir Valley, were forced out of the valley in 1990, in an atmosphere of fear and concern for their lives, as the effects of widespread secessionist violence were felt across the region. Today, only a fraction continues to remain in the Valley, while the community faces a fight for its identity and survival within Kashmir and India. Introduction Kashmiri Pandits, who claim ancestry from the Aryans, see themselves as the true inhabitants of the Kashmir region. The term Kashmiri Pandit, refers to Hindu Brahmins who originate from the Kashmir Valley in India. The specific name Pandit was thought to have been applied to the Hindu Brahmin residents of the valley during the 15th and 16th centuries, in deference to their higher education and economic status, in comparison to the Hindu Dogras & Sikhs, who were the other major non-Muslim inhabitants of the state (Dhar 2007). However, during the 19th century, it is thought, that the term Pandit was

used to describe the Hindus (not just Brahmins), who had stayed within the Valley and not migrated nor converted to Islam. By the time Kashmir was sold to the Dogra King Golab Singh originally from Jammu in 1846, by the British, in compensation for his support against the Sikhs, the Pandits in the Valley had begun their ascension to the top of the social hierarchy of the state. Under Golab Singh, land was returned to the Pandits, and they were afforded opportunities to work in the state administration. By the early half of the 20th century, a majority of the Pandit families were either land owners or gazetted officers of the state (Kilam 2003). Pandits sat on top of the social ladder, as representatives of the Dogra Rulers. They were feudal land owners, rich money lenders, Brahmin priests, and went as far as working with the Punjabi merchants who controlled Kashmir’s opulent handicrafts trade. However the Pandit’s had their fair share of difficulties over the centuries. Over the years the Pandits suffered under centuries of Islamic rule, and it seems that their lives have been characterised by migration from their homeland (Pant 2007). By the time the wave of Indian nationalism hit Kashmir in the 1920’s and 30’s, Pandit society had begun to show its reform with the establishment of the Kashmiri Pandits Sabha, which aimed to establish a common platform for the betterment of Hindu lives in the state (Kaur 1996). As the the Sabha became more reformist, it was evenly split between those who supported the Dogra monarchy, and those in favour of a more democratic setup. By the 40’s, both factions were reunited, in their opposition of the British and the monarchy in the state, finding common ground with Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference, with many Pandit leaders coming into prominence in the state under his tutelage. Post-Partition though, things changed for the Pandits, under the reforming eyes of by then Kashmiri Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah, whose initiatives, to transfer land from owners to the state, aggrieved more than a few members of the community. Many Pandits continued to be employed by the government, while others moved into trade and positions of eminence within Kashmiri society. Educated Pandits continued to remain in

the public sphere, as they soon occupied prime postings in the State administration, as in pre-Partition times, while the lower and middle class Pandits were either involved in agrarian work or were low-level employees of the state (Kilam 2003). Statistically speaking, Pandits have always been an important religious and cultural part of the social make-up of the state. The 1941 Jammu and Kashmir Government Census, which last showed them as a distinctive group, amongst the Hindus of Jammu & Kashmir, estimated their number to be close to 78000, or 15% of the Valley, in comparison to the 83% that Muslims comprised (Census of India 1943). More importantly though, a fact that has generated serious debate, is the lack of a contemporary exact census figure, since 1941, given the waves of migration, the Pandit population has seen. Mass Migration It is estimated that between 1989 and 1990, approximately 160,000 Kashmiri Pandits exited the Valley for Jammu and other parts of India1. For us to understand the magnitude of the exodus it is necessary to analyse the main events that characterised the migration. On the 4th of January 1990, Aftab, a Valley based Urdu news journal, published a warning, allegedly issued by the Hizbul Mujahideen, calling for all Hindus in the region to take flight. The warning was echoed in Al Safa and the Srinagar Times on the 16th of January (Gupta 2005). This followed the atmosphere of fear that had been created in the previous years by the Islamic secessionist movements, especially the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Force (JKLF), which had raised its call for arms as early as 1988, aided and supported by rhetoric from the Pakistani leadership that spewed venom against the nonMuslims in the Valley.

1

Due, to the fact that no exact figures are available; a range has been drawn using Government of India estimates and that of Human Rights Watch and other Interest Groups and NGO’s, based on the work of Alexander Evans.

While initially the JKLF and the other militant outfits had been selective in their targeting of several non-Pandit Government officials and those in the Public sphere in the past years, the Kashmiri Pandit world was rocked by the by the killings of high-profile Pandit leader Tikkalal Taploo and High Court Judge Nilkanth Ganjoo in September and November 1989. The threats in the newspapers only further fuelled the Pandit apprehension, and by January 1990 the exit had begun (Evans 2002). “The night of January 19, 1990 will remain the most unforgettable one in the memory of every Kashmiri Pandit child who had attained age of consciousness of surroundings, and grownup men and women. That night stands singled out as the harbinger of the terrible catastrophe which before long engulfed the panic-stricken unfortunate community” (Bhan 2005), writes Professor KL Bhan as he recollects in shock the memories of how scores of Kashmiri Muslims took to the streets, demanding freedom from India and the eviction of Kashmiri Pandits from the region. The situation seemingly deteriorated; as the months passed, killings continued, Lassa Koul the head of Doordarshan Srinagar or Indian National Television was shot outside his house (Dhar 2002), and more and more Pandits continued to move towards Jammu. The state administration too seemed to be reconciled to the exodus; the Executive had stopped functioning, as Farooq Abdullah’s National Conference government gave way to President’s rule under Governor Jagmohan, who was faced with an insurmountable task of dealing with open revolt, Pandit refugees, militant outfits and political chaos. His decision to continue to support Pandits on the state’s pay roll that had fled, and pay their salaries while in absentia, further contributed to the outflow. The fleeing Pandits, moved southwards towards Jammu, where transit and relief camps had been setup to deal with the huge inflow. Some moved to Delhi. By April 1990, it is estimated that close to 20,000 Pandits had fled the Valley in the wake of an ultimatum issued by the Hizbul Mujahideen, published in the Alsafa on the 14th of April 1990, calling for all Pandits to leave the valley in two days for other parts of India – the outward migrations continued through the year, with a few brave families daring to stay

on, in the face of socio-economic compulsions and a mistaken belief that things would return to normal in a short period (Evans 2002). How many fled and where did they go? Right-wing Kashmiri Pandit sources tend to be biased and their estimate of 300,000 (Panun Kashmir 2008) exiles seem to be on the higher side. As I have mentioned above, the range that seems to be more accurate lies between 150,000 and 160,000, as conceived by Alexander Evans who arrived at this figure, using old Census data from 1910, that split up the population ethnically – extrapolating the figures using the estimated population growth rates, Government of India data and that of NGOs and other related groups. He further estimates that before the migration there were close to 170,000 Pandits in the valley, in the period leading up to the exodus (Evans 2002). Later estimates from 2004 show that the number of Pandits who continue to remain in the valley number approximately 6500 (Trisal 2007), tallying with Evans’ figure for the Pandit population and those who left, and keeping in mind further displacement in the 90’s. Most Pandit families fled south, towards Jammu, the Hindu dominated part of the state, where the state initially accommodated them in transit relief camps. Another camp was opened by the Central Government in New Delhi as the numbers kept increasing. Reasons What led to this mass migration? A few views have emerged. The hard line Hindu and aggrieved Pandit view is that they were forced out, and that what took place was an ethnic cleansing of the population in order to ensure that Kashmir remained an entirely Muslim state, supported by Pakistan and its anti-Hindu rhetoric (Dhar 1997). Another view that many Muslim leaders, including those of the All Party Hurriyet Conference (Hurriyet) and Farooq Abdullah, the Chief Minister prior to the exodus, seem to adopt is that the State administration at the behest of the Central government in Delhi (Singh 2005), encouraged and supported the movement of Pandits, in order to have the space and freedom to deal with Muslims in Kashmir in the way that they wished. It is difficult

though to find credibility in both of the above views; though they do reflect some truth, they seem to display more bias. On further analysis, the major events of the exodus show how a volatile sociopolitical environment turned into one of great danger to the Pandits, forcing them to leave in fear. The Secessionist War and Insurgency that had gripped Kashmir, towards the end of the 1980s, was the key. An explosive combination of empowered, emancipated Kashmiri youth; Indian Government inadequacy and bungling; a Pakistan supported insurgency and deep dissatisfaction with state bureaucracy laid the perfect ground for the state to erupt (Ganguly 1996). Kashmiri Pandits, initially not the intended victims of this fury, soon suffered. A politically frustrated JKLF called for protests and violence against Delhi, and later began an armed struggle for Kashmiri independence, towards the end of 1988. It was soon joined by radical and more hard-line groups like the Hizbul Mujahideen, reducing its freedom movement to little more than callow terrorism (Ganguly 1996). Their anti-India rhetoric, and openly pro-Pakistan stance, alienated a fair proportion of the heterogeneous population of the state. As further violence led to increasing skirmishes with the establishment, most non-Muslim residents of the state, especially in the Valley, felt growing unease with the situation (Sandilya 2007). Within the Pandit community, a sense of alienation and trepidation had set in. It seemed like the state was against them: land reforms, political reform, and discrimination of majority over minority had reached their crescendo, over forty years (Bhat 2005). Things came to a boil when the Valley began to divide communally. Centuries of co-habitation ended overnight as Hindu and Muslim relations came under strain. Pandits, many of whom served in the state administration, became easy targets for militants trying to prove a point. Central rule was established, as Delhi tried to control things through a governor, and the Indian armed forces were beginning to move in, as early as January 1989. A few months later, Kashmiri Pandits started moving out. Initially they moved to Jammu, awaiting an abatement of the violence. Yet with no solution in sight, the numbers

increased, as more and more Pandit families packed their lives into suitcases, and escaped what they thought was now danger to them. The state and administration did little to assuage the fears of the Pandits, as what began as a temporary movement turned into a permanent exodus. After a thorough analysis of different views the following reasons perhaps provide the most plausible reason for the mass migrations •

Over the years, state policy had changed to one that sought to appease the majority. After a century of being on top, Kashmiri Pandits were beginning to feel the effect of reform and change that in most cases was directed against them.

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A variety of political reasons led to the formation of Islamic secessionist movements within Kashmir, which viewed Hindu Pandits with suspicion and as manifestations of Indian rule in the state.

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This in turn led to an atmosphere of fear and mistrust, where Pandits felt unsafe in their homeland. Once the secessionist movement turned violent, and targeted Hindus, the Pandits thought it most prudent to flee in order to secure their own lives (Evans 2002).

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The complete collapse of the Executive and the tacit understanding of the exodus by the State administration, which continued to pay salaries in absentia and tried to ensure safe passage of Pandits to Jammu, only ensured a further addition to refugee numbers (Evans 2002).

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Most Pandit families thought the movement as temporary, something they would be able to reverse once the situation calmed down, as they were mostly in Jammu, within the same state, still close enough to return.

Those Who Stayed It is necessary at this stage to divide and address the concerns of those Kashmiri Pandits who stayed in the Valley, and those who migrated separately. While they may share the outlying objective of the return of Pandits to their homeland, the current reality and the lives they have led since the exodus began have been very different. For the

fraction that stayed in the Valley, reports from the Hindu Welfare Society Kashmir (HWSK) (Pandit 2007), indicate that they are mainly concentrated in districts around major cities and towns like Srinagar, Anantnag and Pulwama. In her analysis, of the exodus of 1990, Nishita Trisal, finds that 20% of those who stayed did so out of financial compulsions, a similar figure stayed out of a sense of attachement to their home and surroundings, and surprisingly the remainder of non-migrants stayed for very much the same reason that a majority of the others left – that things would return to normal, in a few months (Trisal 2007). On further analysis, of the above data it is apparent that the majority of those who stayed, the lower and middle classes, did so out of financial necessity for which flight was not an option. These consisted largely of poor orchard farmers, low level Government employees – whose jobs could not be guaranteed in absentia – and families with a single breadwinner, who simply had to stay. While this meant that they suffered the brunt of having to stay back, their lower socio-economic status kept them largely off the radar of militant and secessionists (Trisal 2007). However the Upper class Pandits who stayed were constantly in the crosshairs of militants. Many of these Pandits, were people of prominence: politicians, businessman, top bureaucrats, who stayed out of a sense of necessity due to their position though most of their families have suffered from kidnappings, public humiliation and even killings of family members at the hands of militants (Trisal 2007). Presently the Pandit community in Kashmir is in disarray. With a large number of Pandit families inadequately rehabilitated and a majority of whose members are unemployed, there are consequently close to 125 Pandit families who live below the poverty line (Pandit 2007). After successive relocations, for their safety, many families are yet to receive their promised government aid packages and adequate support for rehabilitation. An example of a housing estate built in the Budgam district of the Valley for Pandits shows how skewed governmental policy has been when dealing with the Pandits who stayed behind (Trisal 2007). The state government offered these flats to

those who had fled, to tempt them to return, and as they lie unoccupied, many Pandit families in the Valley do not have permanent homes. Sociological and religious problems too have dogged the Pandit community in the Valley in the past decade. With inadequate platforms for social and religious intercourse within the community, the younger generations are starting to question their identities. With a lack of priests, temples have fallen into disarray and marriages and other ceremonies are difficult to organize. Politically the Pandits are too small and dispersed within the Valley, to have much clout at the lower levels, in order to protect their interests. Displaced Kashmiri Pandits While the Pandits who stayed have had the consolation of being in their homes, the ones who fled have had to bear the brunt of the exodus. For many, life in the years that followed their flight has proven far worse than the exodus itself. “A majority of the Pandit refugees live in squalid camps with spiralling health and economic problems. Approximately 217,000 Pandits still live in abysmal conditions in Jammu with families of five to six people often huddled into a small room. Social workers and psychologists working among them testify that living as refugees in such conditions has taken a severe toll on their physical and mental health” (Gill 2008). A large majority of the displaced Pandits, moved to Jammu and later to Delhi, where they were temporarily located in Relief camps across the region. A breakup of the movement is given as follows. From the total 53,538 registered family units, 31,490 families live in Jammu; 19,338 in Delhi; and 2710 in the rest of the country (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2002). Many families remain unregistered and live outside relief camps. For those in the camps, conditions continue to remain dismal, with disease and poverty widespread. Essentials like running water and electricity are missing, even in the best of the camps. Families of up to six or eight people live in one room. There are inadequate healthcare facilities and little or no educational facilities in any of

the camps. A report issued in 2005 entitled ‘The Impact of Migration on the SocioEconomic Conditions of Kashmiri Displaced People;’ by the Jammu and Kashmir Centre for Minority Studies, came up with some shocking conclusions about the physical and mental state of those in camps. Among others it finds that “An alarming 79% of migrants suffer from depression, while 76% suffer from anxiety disorders such as phobias and panic attacks. 8% even suffer from delusional disorders and psychosis.” Additionally it states “More than 36 per cent of women become infertile by the time they reach 40 years of age”(Jammu and Kashmir Centre for Minority Studies 2005). While the state and Central governments have made some effort to help in the rehabilitation of displaced Pandits, not enough has been done. Pandit families in these camps are entitled to meagre monthly cash payments for each member of the family, and receive a certain quantity of government food rations. However the monthly allowance and the rations are barely enough for a family of six or eight. Further, the Government of India has constantly refused to recognize the exiled Kashmiri Pandits as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The Pandits have twice unsuccessfully petitioned the National Human Rights Comission (NHRC) for the recognition, while the NHRC insists that the word ‘migrant’ is better suited to them even though Kashmiri Pandits fulfill the criteria to be recognized as IDPs according to the United Nation’s guiding principles that state “Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border”(Deng 1998). A Possible Return The question of a possible return arises next. Will the Pandits ever return to Kashmir? With the current atmosphere and chaotic political situation, it seems unlikely

that the Pandits will venture back. In fact, for a majority of those who remain in the valley, economic realities dictate that it seems they will have to move out, as unemployment rises and poverty levels rise. Upper class Pandits in the valley too are buying property and investing in Jammu and outside the state. There seems to be a lack of political willpower too, in order to secure the return of the Pandits to the valley. Both popular elected governments and centrally appointed Governors, seem to have failed to do that this far. Apart from the periodical rhetoric that calls for the return of Pandits, few concrete steps have been taken (Evans 2002). An effective system or body to redress the problems of the Pandits has still to be created within the state, to deal with major problems like rehabilitation and unemployment. It still seems though that a scattered Pandit community is not a political force that matters enough in the politics of the Valley. Militants too have played their role and continue to instill fear in the minds of those Pandits who remain in the valley (Evans 2002). In the decade that followed the exodus, there are over a dozen instances of attacks on Pandits and Hindus by militants, the worst amongst them being the massacre of 23 Hindus in Nadimarg in March 2003 (Indian Express 1998). Other minorities too have not been safe; the killings of 40 Sikhs in Chattisingpura in March 2000 (Rediffnews 2000) testifying to this. A change perhaps in the tactics of militants, as it was the first time the Sikh community was targeted since the insurgency began. Additionally the lack of political willpower combined with the widespread militancy has meant that there has been no effort made to curb the sail of formerly Pandit own lands, this despite, the Assembly passing laws forbidding this (Mayilivagnan), hardly enough reasons to tempt the Pandits to return. The community too needs to think about the feasibility of a return. After close to two decades away, what does the Valley still mean to them? An entire generation has now been born or spent most of their lives away from the Valley. Do they still feel that connection to the region and the attachment their parents did? This disconnect between

the younger generation, many of whom live abroad, and the ‘promised land’ too might make a return more difficult. Conclusions Eighteen years after the expulsion from their homeland, the plight of Kashmiri Pandits continues to be miserable. Forced out of their homes by rising violence and genuine threats to their lives and a state administration and polity that seemed content to let them go,2 a majority of the Pandit community has spent the better part of the last two decades suffering in squalid relief camps, under dismal conditions, while in their homeland their homes continue to be occupied and lands sold. For the minority that stayed behind, life has been no kinder, as they suffer economic hardship, unemployment and constant millitant threat to their lives. As for the migrants and the subject of recognition of their human rights and a betterment of their condition, the Indian government’s refusal to treat them as IDPs is unfair. While the government has taken this step in order to ensure the issue is not internationalized and it avoids international scrutiny over its treatment of Pandits and therefore Kashmir, it does mean that the Pandits continue to remain illegible for international humanitarian aid and support. While it may not serve India’s short-term interests, the Pandits are certainly entitled to this aid, and all efforts should be made to ensure this. For the Pandits to return to the valley, the situation would have to get better. The State and the Center, both responsible for their plight, need to make concerted effort in order to ensure comprehensive rehabilitation packages, guaranteed employment as well as adequate compensation for what has been lost. Additionally, the warring factions of the anarchic political system in the region would need to take due cognizance of the Pandit minority and their opinions. The onus would fall on the Executive to ensure that

2

Ashok Pandit, Islamic Terrorism in Kashmir (Mumbai, Video Documentary) http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=842219646390515565&q=kashmir+pandit

the Pandits felt safe and would be willing to participate in the political process. Violence against the Pandits would have to stop entirely and much of their lost land would have to be returned to them. Further, the overlying problem of a solution to the Kashmir dispute that involves both India and Pakistan will have no concrete solution, until the Pandits are made party to any discussion, and their basic rights and dignity are restored.

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