Theory and practice of humanitarian intervention. When theory becomes policy

Theory and practice of humanitarian intervention. When theory becomes policy Elizabeth Prado Pérez Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de O...
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Theory and practice of humanitarian intervention. When theory becomes policy Elizabeth Prado Pérez Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Occidente Departamento de Estudios Sociopolíticos y Jurídicos ISA 2010 New Orleans, LA Despite de fact that humanitarian intervention has been a feature of International Relations since the end of the Cold War, there seems to be a significant discrepancy between the theory and practice of this type of intervention. Whilst some theoretical approaches have highlighted the role played by morality and ethics when states are confronted with the reality of massive human rights violations abroad, no accurate explanation of the decision making processes by which humanitarian interventions are decided has been provided. When the theory comes to practice there are other factors that play a significant part for deciding when, where and how to intervene. This paper explores the decision-making process of humanitarian intervention identifying some key factors that may determine the likelihood of humanitarian interventions, which emerged during the policymaking. The first part looks at the theoretical explanations of humanitarian interventions; on the second part the empirical record on this type of intervention is assessed and, on the final part, the politics behind the selectivity process is examined to illustrate the factors that influence the decisionmaking process of humanitarian intervention.

Understanding Humanitarian Intervention What is humanitarian intervention? This question could be answered in rather different and even opposite ways, depending on what one chooses to look as well as the approach one decides to use. Hence, this type of intervention has been studied through the lenses of political science, international law, philosophy and even ethics. But unlike other disciplines dealing with it, there is a lack of agreement among international relations theories over what the key issues of humanitarian intervention are. As a result, the socalled humanitarian intervention has remained a problematic feature of international politics. For international relations scholars, what seems to be at stake is the issue of state sovereignty, one of the main pillars of the relations among states. If certainly there has been a comprehensive debate around the issue of how to respond to massive human rights violations and the threats to peace and security that these violations may pose, there has been a focus on whether states should or should not intervene on those cases. The framework traditionally used in the study of humanitarian intervention derives from the international society approach to the discipline of international relations, mainly related to Pluralism and Solidarism (Wheeler 2000). This approach takes state boundaries to be the primary determinants of international politics, and consequently focuses on states, their borders and the norm of non-intervention. Hence, the international society 1

approach usually sees humanitarian intervention as the “use of armed force by one state against another to protect the nationals of the latter from acts or omissions of their own government which shock the conscience of mankind” (Jones 1995: 228). For international relations practitioners, leaders, diplomats and government officials, the focus has rather been on when and when not to intervene. In this sense, Wheeler argues that intervention should be triggered by what he called a supreme humanitarian emergency since this concept “captures the exceptional nature of the cases under consideration” (2000:34). However, there are not objective criteria for evaluating when a humanitarian emergency becomes supreme or when a supreme emergency becomes humanitarian. Therefore, the best defining way of a supreme humanitarian emergency is, as Wheeler puts it, “when the only hope of saving lives depends on outsiders coming to rescue” (2000: 35). This is what, supposedly, gives the intervention its humanitarian character. The problem with this argument is that under that criterion all the situations that fit into the definition would incite intervention. There are, however, some practical considerations that are left out of the analysis when it comes to deciding when, how and who intervenes. The empirical evidence suggests that this type of intervention has rarely been humanitarian in nature. This paper examines the international responses to humanitarian emergencies beyond the good intentions to protect human rights abroad. My main aims is to examine how not all humanitarian emergencies actually develop into humanitarian interventions by assessing the question of what factors determine different international responses to similar humanitarian emergencies. To do so, the paper highlights the differences between those cases where international intervention was undertaken and those that did not receive serious attention.

Humanitarian emergencies now and before Influenced by the horrors of the Holocaust, the international community after World War II, through the newly created United Nations (UN), started developing a body of human rights which forbid states to ill-treat individuals, including their own nationals. However, at the same time the UN developed a body of rules restricting the right of states to use force to cases of self-defence (Akehurst 1984: 95). There were some unfruitful attempts to legitimise the use of armed force for humanitarian purposes, but the lack of agreement over the rules that would regulate it, or more precisely, the risk of abuse it posed to the sovereignty and non-intervention principles, persuaded states not to recognise, let alone accept, its practice. Hence, when the General Assembly was debating the definition of ‘aggression’ in 1954, the Greek and Netherlands delegates argued in favour of humanitarian intervention in cases where there were ethnic ties between the intervening state and a racial minority suffering persecution in another state. However, the Israeli, Chinese and Panamanian delegates disagreed (Akehurst 1984: 95) and, as a result, the use of armed force to save foreign nationals from the savagery of their own governments was ruled out (UN Charter Art. 2(4) and Art. 51). 2

Despite the discarding of humanitarian intervention as a way of addressing complex humanitarian emergencies in political turmoil, there were several Cold War examples of interventions by foreign countries in situations of widespread humanitarian suffering. The three most cited examples in the literature are the Indian intervention in Pakistan (1971), the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia (1979) and Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda (1979).1 There were, however, some other cases where humanitarian interventions can arguably said to have been undertaken. Two oppressive governments in Africa were also overthrown in 1979, and in each case there were suggestions that a foreign state had helped overthrow the government in question. Nevertheless, none of the alleged intervening states justified its actions on humanitarian grounds. First, French troops overthrew Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Empire, but France tried to pretend that its troops arrived at the request of the new government after Bokassa had been overthrown (Annuaire Française de Droit International 1979: 909). Similarly, Spain denied to have intervened in Equatorial Guinea to overthrow the bloody regime of President Macias Nguema (KCA 1979: 29885). There were other extreme humanitarian disasters and foreign interventions in Africa during this period (i.e. by the U.S.A. and Belgium in Congo, 1965), but openly accepted state intervention was not contemplated. One of the most important cases of interventionist humanitarianism was the catastrophe in Biafra (1968), which, despite not being a state intervention, set a significant precedent regarding the work of NGOs in humanitarian catastrophes and had implications for the practice of humanitarian intervention. Challenging state sovereignty for humanitarian reasons, NGOs decided to operate in Biafra without the Nigerian government’s consent or more precisely against its will, initiating the academic debate about humanitarian intervention.2 Even though the NGOs’ work in Biafra represents an extraordinary achievement, it has also been recognised as “an act of unfortunate and profound folly” in that it is estimated that it prolonged the war for a year and a half and contributed towards the deaths of some 1

Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda in early 1979, which ended the eight-year dictatorship of Idi Amin, is an arquetypical case of intervention in a situation of extreme human rights violations. During Idi Amin’s government, Ugandans lived in fear for their security, and there was a complete breakdown of the rule of law as government forces killed and tortured civilians with impunity. According to Amnesty International, some 300,000 people died at the hands of the regime (Hassan 1981: 893). However, African governments, with exception of Tanzania, failed to condemn Amin’s atrocities. Tanzania’s president, Julius Nyerere, had been a critic of Amin since his arrival to power in a military coup and had repeatedly condemned his humanitarian atrocities. It was as a response of Uganda’s invation of Tanzania after a territorial dispute over the Tanzanian territory of Kagera (Observer, 19 November 1978) when Tanzania’s mobilised its army to repeal the aggression an overthrew Amin’s regime. Whatever Tanzania’s motives were, however, its intervention in Uganda was positive in humanitarian terms because the atrocities stopped. The enormous effort that Tanzania had by forcing Uganda’s troops to withdraw and its commitment towards a positive outcome by overthrowing Amin, deserves to have this case be considered as a humanitarian intervention. This is again an archetypal case of what may be called non-humanitarian humanitarian intervention. 2

Initially food supply into the Nigerian war zone was organised by the Red Cross and UNICEF and supported by a wide range of NGOs. An agreement had been made with the Nigerian government to provide equal amounts of relief to both sides in the conflict. But in the spring of 1968, the government withdrew approval for the airlift to Biafra, as a part of an attempt to force the rebels into negotiation. It was asserted that 3000 babies were dying every day (Wiley & Sons 2000: 829). 3

180,000 people (Smillie 1995: 102). Even more important to Biafra than the food and drugs in which were flown was the hard currency provided by the relief operations. Millions of US dollars were exchanged with the worthless Biafran currency or paid to the Biafran government in the form of landing fees and other taxes (Allen and Styan 2000: 830). Despite the different ways in which complex humanitarian emergencies were dealt with by foreign countries, during the Cold War, the constraints imposed by the logic of bipolarity resulted in humanitarian issues being relegated to a secondary place. When the Communist threat dissipated, however, optimism seemed to have emerged alongside the belief that, without the dangers of the East-West confrontation, a new humanitarianism was possible. The emergence of the humanitarian challenges posed by civil wars and internal conflicts that broke out at the beginning of the 1990s opened the possibility of efficiently addressing humanitarian emergencies. In this sense, a document produced by the General Secretary entitled UN Peacekeeping in a New era, A New Chance for Peace optimistically described expanded peacekeeping with new and more ample responsibility in the area of human rights protection, such as the repatriation of refugees, assisting with reconstruction and providing aid for humanitarian delivery (UN 1993: 67). Mayall (1996) has called this time the New Interventionism era, a period when humanitarian intervention as we generally understand it was shaped by a reinvigorated idealism towards human rights protection abroad. However, by 1993, Roberts warned that a danger existed that “internal conflicts could drag the UN down” (1993: 10). The numerous conflicts and civil wars by far exceeded the UN’s capacity and the world’s willingness to address and solve humanitarian emergencies. Robert’s statement turned out to be prophetic, and the optimism that characterised the first years of the post-Cold war period came to an end. Two questions remained at the center of the analysis of humanitarian intervention. First, if there are more humanitarian emergencies around the world than states willing to intervene and resources to do so, what factors determine different international responses to similar humanitarian emergencies? Second, since not all humanitarian emergencies actually develop into humanitarian interventions, there must be a selectivity process behind the decision to intervene in which different kinds of motives interplay and therefore the question is what is the role of national self-interest in humanitarian interventions? International Responses to Humanitarian Emergencies In general, four types of international reaction have characterised the response to humanitarian emergencies. The first one is inaction. Since humanitarian considerations are usually not crucial in the decision to intervene, intervention is not necessarily performed in those places where the worse emergencies are unfolding. As a consequence, there are cases where violence against civilians is shocking in the number and extent of 4

the people it reaches, and no humanitarian intervention is ever considered. Chechnya, Ethiopia, Angola and more recently Sudan are examples of neglected humanitarian emergencies. In contrast, there are other cases where intervention was pursued but for clearly nonhumanitarian reasons. The Indian intervention in Pakistan (1971), Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda (1979) and Vietnam intervention in Cambodia (1979) are cases of this kind. Significant refugee flows and a border dispute respectively provided a strong motivation to address the humanitarian crises. A third type of response is that which combines humanitarian and non-humanitarian motives. In this case, humanitarian concerns as well as strategic considerations interplay in the decision to intervene. A combination of mixed-motives is highly desirable because while non-humanitarian motives encourage a response to the crisis, humanitarian goals are also prioritised. These mixed-motives influenced the creation of the “safe heavens” in Iraq to protect the Kurds and NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. The final possible type of response to a humanitarian emergency is that of humanitarian intervention predominantly for humanitarian reasons. This kind arguably produced disastrous interventions in Somalia and Rwanda. These are interventions where humanitarian motives are said to have produced the intervention, and yet a poor humanitarian outcome came as a result. While this typology led us to believe that humanitarian intervention results out of an interplay of both humanitarian and non-humanitarian reasons, it makes evident the difficulties of assessing state motives to explain its behavior. It is therefore convenient to identify the factors that play a part in the decision-making process surrounding the intervention in a given humanitarian emergency. But, before proceeding to examine what other factors, besides the humanitarian motives, play a part in the decision-making process out of which humanitarian interventions are decided, it is important to assess a central concept for the study of state behavior in international relations: self interest. ¿Self-interested humanitarian intervention? For Realists, since most interventions are usually justified on moral grounds, the declared aims of an intervention could hardly serve as uncovering its true intentions. Realists therefore believe that humanitarian intervention is not necessarily humanitarian in its aims. As in any other intervention, Realists would argue, non-humanitarian considerations are the underlying cause of humanitarian interventions, and in fact, it is the nonhumanitarian character of the motives behind the intervention that will determine its particular features, such as how is the decision to intervene made, when and how is intervention undertaken and what the intervening state expects to get out of it. Consequently, interventions of this kind remain consistent with a broad definition of

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intervention as an act of interference in the domestic issues of another state. 3 The only significant difference is that this type of intervention takes place in a humanitarian emergency, sometimes even in the context of failed states. A central Realist concept for explaining intervention, including the so-called humanitarian intervention, is self-interest. According to Realists, it is the pursuit of self-interest that guides the international behaviour of states, or in Morgenthau words, “interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed” (1954: 9), and therefore, the “objectives of a foreign policy must be defined in terms of the nationalinterest” (1954: 528). Hence, from a Realist view, there is no reason to believe that when a state decides to get engaged in evolving humanitarian catastrophes abroad, facing significant risks, assuming high costs and compromising national resources; it does so for reasons other than self-interest. What is not clear, however, is what constitutes the selfinterest of a state. The concept of self-interest is used both in political analysis and political action, referring to what is “best” for a state and therefore deeply rooted in values. Morgenthau attempted to elucidate this by arguing, “the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated” (1954: 528), and these contextual factors are defined in terms of power (1954: 8). However, while analysts have found it difficult to use the concept of self-interest as a tool for rigorous research, actors have amply used the term as a way of thinking about their goals and for mobilizing support for them. Not only do political actors tend to perceive their goals in terms of self-interest, but they also claim that their goals are about selfinterest (Rosenau 1980: 283). Its different uses reflect how problematic the concept of self-interest is. Applied to humanitarian intervention, self-interest can be understood as the strategic considerations that lead a state or states to believe that they are better served by getting involved in certain humanitarian crises abroad than by not doing so. Although this is a broad approach to self-interest in humanitarian intervention, it has several implications. First, it implies that the intervening state perceives intervention as being in its best interest rather than not intervening. Second, the intervening state decides how to 3

The literature provides three ways of defining intervention. One is by reference to the type of activity involved: a classic definition by Oppenheim (1905 in Hoffman 1996: 9) restricts intervention to those acts which constitute ‘dictatorial interference’. However, it narrows the subject too much. After all, the purpose of intervention is the same as that of all other forms of foreign policy; it is to make you do what I want you to do, whether or not you wish to do it. But the way in which I try to achieve this can take an enormous variety of forms. Some are explicitly coercive interventions, through the use or threat of force. A second way of delimitation is by reference to the type of actor. I prefer to limit it to the acts of states, groups fighting for statehood, and groups of states such as international organisations. The third kind of delimitation is by the type of target. This is the most important since I propose to restrict the concept of intervention to acts which try to affect not the external activities, but the domestic affairs of a state (Hoffman 1996: 9-10). 6

intervene based on what it is best for itself and not on how the humanitarian emergency might be better addressed. In other words, intervention is planned based on careful costbenefit calculations for the intervening state. Third, the intervening state establishes the goals of the intervention based on what its own expected aims are, rather than on what would be required to solve the humanitarian emergency. This in turn suggests that the extent to which the intervention’s outcome is positive in humanitarian terms is not necessarily a priority for the intervening state, unless it set it up as such. While all these implications reveal the importance of self-interest during the whole process involved in humanitarian interventions, they also make evident the lack of clarity, and consequently inability, of using self-interest as an analytical tool. To identify selfinterest as an unavoidable component of humanitarian intervention does not bring enough clarity to the features of humanitarian intervention in international relations. What it is thus needed is a comprehensive framework able to systematically assess what the role of self-interest in humanitarian intervention is. This is not a simple task. Selfinterest is a rather inaccurate term, which is often criticised for its broad and vague meaning upon which even Realists disagree about (Hoffman 1995). Thus, to place national self-interest at the core of a theory poses serious difficulties, the first one being how to define it. The problem with this argument is that it assumes that since nations would do whatever they needed to do in order to maximise their self-interest, basically all that nations do could be considered for their self-interest. Thus, self-interest loses leverage as an explanatory factor of international relations because as regarded by Realists, self-interest is arguably not an objective truth that prevails whether or not it is perceived by the members of a nation, but rather as a pluralistic set of subjective preferences that change whenever the requirements and aspirations of a state change (Rosenau 1980: 286). In other words, self-interest is what states decide it to be. Along that line Hoffman categorises self-interest into two sorts of goals. Some are imperatives that result from the nature of the international system, such as survival, security against attack and economic security. But states, big and small, have other kinds of aims termed chosen preferences. For instance, some states desire the expansion of values such as democracy and human rights (Hoffman 1995: 36). Humanitarian intervention would fit into both categories. While it is evident that humanitarian intervention would be imperative in case of a threat to survival, predominantly humanitarian emergencies do not pose such a threat to the intervening state. Yet in terms of chosen preferences, states would generally prefer to live in a world where order and justice prevail, and therefore, self-interest could still allow for intervention. This conception of self-interest reveals its significant limitations as an analytical tool in the discipline of international relations. Among these limitations is the difficulty of specifying whose interests are encompassed and, consequently, in clarifying the procedures for cumulating those interests once they have been identified (Rosenau 1980: 286). 7

Recognising that many groups in a nation have different and sometimes conflicting views on what is in the best interest of the state gives rise to many conceptual and methodological difficulties. One way of dealing with the conceptual problem of self-interest is by relying on a procedural rather than substantive definition of self-interest (Rosenau 1980: 290), that is to say, on a decision-making conception in which the foreign policy goals that it sets for itself are considered to result from bargaining among the various groups claiming satisfaction of their needs and wants (Rosenau 1980: 291). The decision-making framework developed by Snyder (1951) is based on the notion that political action is undertaken by concrete human beings and that to comprehend the dynamics of this action requires viewing it from the perspective of these identifiable actors. To facilitate the reconstruction of these actors’ world, Snyder suggested that all their activities can be examined in terms of one main form of behaviour, the decision to pursue one course of action rather than many others that could be pursued (Snyder 1951: 85). To reconstruct the world of decision-makers, Snyder outlined and categorised the main factors that operate on them, which give structure and content to their choices. The categories are: internal setting, which subsumes not only such standard political phenomena as public opinion, but also major common-value orientations; major characteristics of social organisation; group structures and functions; major institutional patterns and basic social processes; external setting, which comprises the action and reactions of other states; and the decision-making process, which Snyder divides into three subcategories: spheres of competence, communication and information, and motivation (Snyder 1951: 67). Taken together, these subcategories include the roles, norms, goals and functions within both the government and the particular unit making the decisions and are subjected to analysis (Rosenau 1980: 301). It is this particular way of looking at self-interest that makes decision-making analysis a useful tool for examining the role of self-interest in humanitarian intervention because it encompasses the processes and sources of influence out of which the intervention emerges. That is to say, an analysis of decision-making makes it possible to account for the motivational factors that produce the intervention. Hence, one can conclude that self-interested considerations account for the different international responses to extreme humanitarian emergencies. That means that what has become known as ‘humanitarian intervention’ would perhaps be better termed as interventionist humanitarianism. However, the analytical power of this conclusion is rather limited. It is too broad as an assumption aiming at bringing clarity to the study of international intervention in humanitarian emergencies. In any case, the conclusion set grounds for analysing

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humanitarian intervention from a different perspective, which contributes towards a better assessment of the questions posed on this paper. The down side is that to acknowledge self-interest as a key factor in humanitarian intervention does not tell much. Since national self-interest can take a variety of forms depending on the different factors that shape it, this finding does not bring much clarity to the features of humanitarian intervention. However, it strengthens the argument that humanitarian impulses by themselves could hardly account for the decision to intervene, and instead it is a combination of factors which produce an intervention.

The intervening factors Applying Snyder’s model to humanitarian intervention, the external setting can be identified as one of the factors that have proved influential for the practice of humanitarian intervention during the post-Cold War period. While before 1989 the possibility of humanitarian intervention occurring was seriously undermined by the dangers of a bipolar world order, the end of the Cold War has provided the environment for this type of intervention to flourish, producing a larger number of interventions. Hence, in contrast to the interventions by India, Vietnam and Tanzania during the Cold War; after the end of the Cold War, leaders and decision-makers have openly justified and even manipulated - interventions on humanitarian grounds. This means that, as it was before, the practice of humanitarian intervention can potentially be constrained and/or encouraged by the international system. And therefore, this factor is to be kept in mind when analysing humanitarian intervention in general and specific cases in particular. As much as the international system, the internal setting, determined by the domestic politics of the intervening state are particularly useful as explanatory variables of humanitarian intervention. Hence, there are a number of factors that have played a significant role in making intervention particularly during the post-Cold War period possible. For instance, media coverage, which mobilises public opinion - mainly important in democratic countries- to push the government into addressing a humanitarian emergency, is believed to have influenced the establishment of the no-fly zones in Northern Iraq. Similarly, some writers have endorsed the personality of decision-makers to potentially produce intervention, as may have been the case in Somalia. Equally, domestic factors can potentially determine where not to intervene, where humanitarian emergencies are simply too risky, too costly or too challenging. All these nonhumanitarian considerations are unavoidable. This leads us to believe that what is understood to be a typical humanitarian intervention, in the idealistic sense, is rather atypical. It is interesting to observe that the vast majority of the cases that for one reason or another could be - or indeed have been - considered in the literature as humanitarian intervention do not fully fit into a traditional conception of humanitarian intervention. Hence, there are cases where intervention was undertaken for 9

non-humanitarian reasons, but a positive humanitarian outcome may have deserved to give them this term. Are these the kind of humanitarian interventions we are condemned to have? Or for the sake of humanity, are we prepared to have cases where arguably humanitarian motives produced intervention, but which disastrous outcomes undermine the very ideal of humanitarian intervention? If we are to understand humanitarian intervention in International Relations, then we need to start by reconceptualising the term. More emphasis should be placed on the overall intervention, outweighing the extent to which the motives can influence a positive humanitarian outcome. After all, this type of intervention is about alleviating the humanitarian suffering, not about testing the altruistic capacity of the states. The credibility of the motives should rely on its capacity to compromise and achieve positive humanitarian results. A systematic way of dealing with decision-making analysis is by using a model developed by Rosenau (1966) that categorises the different sources of influence in foreign policy decision-making process. The model accounts for five sources: external or global, which refers to the attributes of the international system and to the characteristics and behaviours of the state and the non-state actors comprising it; societal, which include those characteristics of the domestic social and political system that shape its orientation toward the world; governmental, which refers to those aspects of a government’s structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers (Rosenau 1980: 303); individual, which refers to the personal characteristics of decision makers, such as skills, personality, beliefs, and psychological predispositions among others; and role sources, which refer to the structure of the government and the roles that people occupy within it. These sources help explain state behaviour by examining the process in which self-interest is shaped. To apply the model to the particular case of humanitarian intervention, I add one more source, the characteristics of the humanitarian emergency to be addressed, which include considerations regarding the risk of casualties, costs and challenges posed to the intervening state. By assessing all the components of the decision-making process surrounding humanitarian intervention, I believe it will be possible to understand how self-interested humanitarian interventions come to exist. Hence, building upon the aspects of self-interest described above, my aim in the following section is to develop a framework which not only incorporates the concept of self-interest to the study of humanitarian intervention, but is also capable of clarifying its role.

From theory to practice: is there a policy of humanitarian intervention?

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If we understand policy as a coherent set of decisions with a common long-term objective (or objectives) it is clear that we can hardly talk about a policy of humanitarian intervention since all the factors that play a part in determining whether intervention is performed are considered on a case-by-case basis. The unforeseen characteristics of each complex humanitarian emergency, and the challenges that each one represents for the intervening state as well as the role played by self-interest, makes it difficult for states to develop a policy. However, it is possible to identify the factors that might determine a government’s position when is confronted with extreme human rights violations above. It is therefore possible to develop a decision-making framework useful to understand the lack of a well defined policy of humanitarian intervention. As mentioned above, there are five main sources of influence regarding the decision to intervene. In that sense, the obvious starting place of what might be considered a Realist theory of humanitarian intervention is the influence that the international system exerts on state behaviour. The empirical evidence of the last fifty years clearly illustrates that the international system has been a key factor in influencing the practice of humanitarian intervention in both ways: by constraining it and allowing it. Thus, this unmistakably Realist element differs from other views in that it takes into account the structure of the international system to explain the basis on which humanitarian intervention is possible in international relations. As a consequence of the atrocities committed during the Second World War, the international community witnessed an unprecedented effort in creating mechanisms for establishing universal human rights (1948) and setting up minimum standards of internationally recognised human rights protection.4 Since then, human rights values have been considerably advanced, and in recent times, international and domestic pressure for enduring human rights systems within the state has achieved a prominent place in international relations. Considering the progress made on this area, humanitarian intervention could be regarded as the product of the international human rights system evolution. However, far from determining state behaviour, human rights values have been constrained by the international system itself. This explains why during the Cold War an intervention openly justified on humanitarian grounds would have been improbable. Selfinterested considerations built around the East-West confrontation clearly exceeded even the most important legal instrument for human rights protection. The end of the Cold War - when the international community witnessed an increase in the number of forcible and non-forcible interventions with the declared aims of stopping extreme human rights abuses - led some to believe that human rights protection could then be truly universal.5 But almost a decade and a half later, the reality of power politics have sadly remained crucial in explaining why states intervene in humanitarian emergencies abroad. 4

For example the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (1966). 5 This view was formalised in Boutros Gali, UN Peacekeeping in a new era. A new chance for peace, (1993). 11

Thus, after the optimism of the post-Cold War had dissipated, disappointed Solidarists like Mayall concluded that “it is the ungoverned nature of the state system and the deep attachment to the principle of state sovereignty... that explains the resistance of the international society to improvement (i.e. to any progressive evolution towards a Solidarist community of mankind) rather than any particular configuration of power” (Mayall 1994: 5). According to Mayall, “the idea that there could be an international humanitarian order, somehow divorced from strategic considerations, was an illusion”, as became abundantly clear when the states of Yugoslavia and Somalia collapsed (1994: 67). Besides the international system, another factor that produced the optimism of the postCold War regarding assistance in case of widespread human rights abuses was the substantial expansion of democracy over the world. A dramatic global shift away from rigidly autocratic regimes and towards democracy began in the mid-1980s and continued into the mid-1990s. The third wave of democratization, as it was called, accounted for almost the double number of democratic countries in 2002 in comparison with 1985 when there were 42 democratic countries in the world (Marshall and Gurr 2003: 17). The type of government that a state has will also influence its behaviour, and in that sense democracy appears ideal for preserving humanitarian values. In theory, because democratic regimes have to respond to their public, they should insure that citizens will enjoy human rights and civil liberties (Russett and Oneal 2001: 44), and it would be expected accordingly that democracies would tend to defend human rights values abroad. For this reason, it was thought that the post-Cold War era with the proliferation of democracy would make way for freedom and human rights. Even if liberal democracy is the type of government which is most concerned with human rights, the belief that democracies would act before numerous humanitarian catastrophes happened around the world has not rendered the dividends it was expected to, perhaps because it is not only the type but also the structure of the government which constrains or enhances the ability of state leaders to make decisions. The factors that would prompt a democracy to intervene are the same factors that may persuade state leaders to do so. Other forms of government should not be disqualified de facto in the quest for human rights protection, and certainly not when it comes to humanitarian intervention. It is interesting to note that while some authoritarian countries may not hold good records on domestic human rights, they occasionally may get involve in interventions justified on moral grounds. Hence, one should carefully consider the type of government’s influence on the decision to intervene with the particular circumstances of the case. At the same time, the type of government of a state determines its social system to a great extent. Hence, while democratic states allow for individual and collective freedoms

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to flourish, authoritarian regimes have rather closed societies with limited public participation, constraining the society’s capacity to influence decisions. The factors conforming the societal system of a state are those non-governmental aspects of a political system that influence its external behaviour, such as value orientations, its degree of national unity and the extent of its industrialisation among others (Rosenau: 1980). In general, the characteristics of a nation’s society play a significant role in shaping its relations with other nations and its stance towards issues such as human rights. In contemporary cases of humanitarian intervention, societal factors have certainly been of important influence to decision-makers, but whether or not their influence could determine intervention is difficult to know. Among this type of factors, the media, public opinion, NGOs and interest groups exert perhaps the greatest influence in humanitarian intervention. The power of media coverage has increasingly been recognised as an important source of influence for governments. The CNN coverage of the coalition assault on Iraq became identified in subsequent debates, with the role of the media in the Kurdish refugee crisis and the creation of the Save Havens, as an emblematic of the media’s role in international politics today (Shaw 2000: 35). Although what has been called “the CNN effect” has been more the subject of media studies rather than international relations, it is undeniable that the media coverage has become an issue to be considered by international relations scholars. Humanitarian intervention is a clear example of it. But the strength of the media for influencing decisions probably resides in is its capacity to mobilise public opinion, which in turn may influence the government to intervene or to “bring the boys home” when things go wrong. The weight of public opinion, however, can vary significantly depending, to a great extent, on the capacity and willingness of each government to take it into account. Other societal factors are interest groups and NGOs. Interest groups are also capable of influencing policy choices, but in the case of humanitarian intervention, they become important when they have specific links with the victims of the humanitarian atrocities. NGOs for their part have considerably increased their presence in many countries. Domestic humanitarian NGOs are linked to or are branches of international NGOs and can potentially pressure the government towards intervention. However, not all of these actors are equally influential. There is a vast discrepancy between the ordinary citizen who contributes vague feelings to a public mood, and the President who makes the final decision. Thus, individual decision-makers are relevant actors in policy-making, and their ability to influence policy choices should be carefully considered. In general, approaches focusing on individual decision-makers6 have looked at 6

Example of these theories are: Operational Code, which attributes to a decision-maker a set of interconnected beliefs about political life which influence the actor’s behaviour (George 1991); and Belief System and National Images, which argue that a decision-maker acts upon his image of 13

psychological and cognitive factors for explaining behaviour. By analysing specific aspects of individuals, these approaches have been able to bring clarity to decision-making analysis, particularly in situations of crisis. Hence, a close look at decision-makers’ personality, belief systems, operational code, and skills is one of the sources of influence that this thesis considers when analysing a decision to engage in humanitarian intervention. Yet another advantage of using decision-making analysis is the possibility of evaluating the extent to which state leaders perceive – or misperceive – situations which may lead them to make a particular decision. Examination of the actual humanitarian intervention almost always reveals the influence of a particular individual or individuals who, for reasons perhaps special to themselves, committed their nation’s resources to intervention in the name of humanitarianism (Garrettt 1999: 109). But of course the capacity of individual decision-makers is in turn determined by his or her position within the government and the structure of the government itself. For this reason, one would need to look at the particular role that the decision-maker has within the government. Hence, role sources refer to the impact of the office on the behaviour of its occupant. Because the positions that policymakers hold affect their behaviour, policy outcomes can be influenced by the kinds of roles existing in the policymaking arena more than the particular individuals who happen to be in authority at any given moment (Wittkopf and Kegley Jr. 2003: 23). Since humanitarian intervention requires the involvement of different ministries and institutions, top officials are likely to be influenced by their positions within the particular branch of the government in which they work when confronted with the cost-benefit analysis of intervening. Particular government branches have particular understanding of what is best for the state and for them. The sources examined above are able to influence not only the decision to intervene, but they also highly determine the intervention itself, how is it handled, by what means, and generally the whole strategy for intervening (Elman 1996: 26). However, at this time the dynamic of the process is highly influenced by the situation on the ground and by the risks and costs the situation brings. As a result, the decisions initially made and the expected goals could change.

Sources AKEHURTS, Michael, “Humanitarian Intervention”, in Hedley Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics, Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 95-118. the past, present and future that include the accumulated, organised knowledge that the individual has about himself and the world (Boulding, 1956; Frestinger, 1957; Ray 1961; Miller 1960). 14

__________, M., “The Use of force to protect nationals abroad”, International Relations, No.5 1977, pp. 3-23 ALLEN, Tim and STYAN, David, “A Right to Interfere? Bernard Kouchner and the new Humanitarianism”, Journal of International Development, Vol. 12, 2000, pp.825-842. GARRETT, Stephen A., “Doing good and doing well. An examination of Humanitarian intervention”, Praeger Publishers, 1999. GEORGE, Alexander L., “Case studies and Theory of Development: The Theory of Structured, Focused Comparison”, in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy, New York: Free Press, 1979 pp. 43-68. _______, Alexander L., The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13m Num. 2m June 1969, pp.190-221.

JONES, Bruce, D. “Intervention without Borders: Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda, 1990 -1994), in Millennium, Journal of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1995, p.225 - 249 MAYALL, James, “The new interventionism 1991 – 1994”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996 ________, J. “Non-intervention, Self-determination and the New World Order”, International Affairs 67, Num.3, 1991

ROBERTS, Adam, “Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights”, International Affairs, Vol. 69, no. 3, July, pp. 429-449. ________, “The UN and International Security”, Survival, Vol.35, no.2, summer 1993. ________, “The Road to Hell. Humanitarian Intervention”, in Current, June 1994, pp.24-28 SMILLIE, “The Alms Bazaar”, IT Publications, London, 1995.

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STANLEY, Hoffman, “Out of the Cold: Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990’s”, in Harvard International Review, Fall 1993. WHEELER, Nicholas, “Saving Strangers. Humanitarian Intervention in International Society”, Oxford University Press, 2000. ________, “Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on humanitarian Intervention”, in Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol. 21, No.3, pp. 463-487, 1992. ________, and MORRIS, Justin 1996, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the End of the Cold War”, in International Society after the Cold War, Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds.), St. Martin’s Press, New York, pp. 135-171

________, “Agency, Humanitarianism and Intervention”, in International Political Science Review, Vol. 18, No.19, 1997, pp.9-25 ________, and Dunne, Tim, “East Timor and the New Humanitarian Intervention in International Affairs, Vol. 77, Num. 4, October 2001, pp. 805 - 827 _________, N., “Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo: Emergent Norm, Moral Duty or the coming Anarchy” in International Affairs 77, No. 1, 2001, pp.113-128 Annuaire Française de Droit International, 1979

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