The Withdrawal of Patriot Missiles from Turkey and its Aftermath

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The Withdrawal of Patriot Missiles from Turkey and its Aftermath by Nurşin ATEŞOĞLU GÜNEY Turkey’s hosting of Patriot missiles1 is not a new phenomenon. NATO previously deployed these missiles in Turkey during the 1991 Gulf war and later on in 2003 during the Iraqi invasion based on the perception of an imminent security threat. NATO’s decision to station patriot missiles in Turkey for a third time in 2013 stemmed directly from the effects of the Syrian civil war on Turkey. The stationing of these missiles came after the initiation of Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and as a result of Ankara’s request after the downing of a Turkish jet by Syrian forces and the killing of five due to shelling by Damascus in 2012. At the time Turkey was supporting the Syrian opposition against President Bashar al-Assad and Ankara had concerns about Turkey’s vulnerability to Syrian missiles, not only the those tipped with conventional warheads but also chemical weapons. In 2012 when Syria launched Scud missile attacks with conventional warheads against opposition forces in northern Syria, it revealed that Ankara had a right to be concerned. These attacks revealed that the Syrian regime was already equipped to deploy missiles in its struggle against opposition forces and to slow their battlefield gains on the ground. In 1 Patriots originally have been used as an anti-aircraft missile, however currently they are used to defend airspace by detecting and destroying incoming missiles.

the face of these rising security threats, Ankara requested NATO’s military aid and the Alliance agreed to deploy Patriot missiles in the southern part of Turkey towards Syria. The three NATO allies, namely the United States, the Netherlands and Germany agreed to provide two Patriot missiles and about 250 soldiers to supplement Turkey’s air defenses (the Dutch mission was later replaced by a single Spanish battery2). Then in mid-August 2015, through the press, the Turkish public learned of both the US and German intentions to withdraw their Patriot missile batteries from Turkey before the end of the year due to the expiration of NATO’s mandate. According to a joint announcement made by the US Embassy in Ankara and the Turkish government, ‘‘the Patriot 2 Erich Schmitt, ‘‘After Delicate Negotiations, US Says It will Pull Patriot Missiles from Turkey’’, The New York Times, 16 August 2015, http://www. nytimes.com/2015/08/17/world/europe/after-delicatenegotiations-us-says-it-will-pull-patriot-missiles-fromturkey.html?_r=1, last visted on 23 August 2015.

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The Withdrawal of Patriot Missiles from Turkey and its Aftermath

missiles will be redeployed to the United States for critical modernization upgrades’’ and that ’‘the US and NATO commitment to the defense of its allies-including Turkey-are steadfast’’3. Importantly, the announcement also mentioned ‘‘that these air-defense units could be returned to Turkey within a week if a need was to arise’’4. Accordingly, ‘‘US navy ships [that are present in the Mediterranean [would now continue to] support Turkey’s defense’’5. On the eve of the US and German decision to withdraw the Patriot batteries it is vital to re-visit the reasons as to why Turkey currently needs an anti-missile defense mechanism. Turkey’s need for missile defense has gained urgency as a result of hard security threats, including the present proliferation of ballistic missiles to the east and south of Ankara. These emanate from state or non-state actors present in Iraq, Syria and Iran. Hence, this analysis will examine Turkey’s present and future military needs as associated with missile defense capabilities in the face of the mounting security threats from the Middle East, both to Ankara’s territories as well as its critical energy infrastructure. Both the US and Germany have given legitimate sounding reasons for the withdrawal of the Patriots from Turkey. Although, it was the NATO assessment of June 2015 which stated that ‘‘the threat against Turkish territories from Syrian

3 ‘‘US Withdrawing Patriot Missiles from Turkey’’, Topix, http://www.topix.com/forum/military/ TCLD18N6FT4USF294, last visited on 20 August 2015. 4‘‘US to Withdraw Patriot Missile’’, StarTribune, 16 August 2015, http://www.startribune.com/ us-to-withdraw-patriot-missile-system-fromturkey/321990221/, last visited on 23 August 2015. 5 Ibid.

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ballistic missiles is very low’’6 and it seems to have been the crucial factor behind both Berlin’s and Washington’s decision to undertake the withdrawal in mid-August. According to a statement by American officials, the Patriots were withdrawn for repair and modernization purposes. Additionally, reports in some American media outlets also stated that the reason for the missiles being withdrawn was for potential re-deployment as deterrence against North Korea and Iran, given these nations missile capabilities. According to media outlets, the Patriots have become an already overstretched resource in the face of demands in several locations. In the case of Germany, the decision to withdraw has been associated with Berlin’s own threat perception in the region, given the comparison of the threat from the Syrian conflict with the level of threat that is currently emanating from ISIS. German authorities came to the conclusion in August 2015 that the threat emanating from Assad’s regime, both to Turkey in particular and in general to the IR community, has declined substantially. However, ISIS has become a significant and imminent threat to everyone. 7 According to the official US position, the decision to withdraw the Patriots cannot be considered an important concern, especially from the angle of deterrence. The US position is that the presence of the American Ageas forces in the Mediterranean when calculated together with the newly deployed F-16s and armed drones in İncirlik are providing a better security guarantee to Turkey than the Patriots8. Spain in contrast, as the third country to deploy Patriot missiles in Turkey in 6 Erich Schmitt, ‘‘After Delicate Negotiations…’’, ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.

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The Withdrawal of Patriot Missiles from Turkey and its Aftermath

line with NATO’s deterrence mission, has confirmed that it is for the time being going to keep its missiles in Adana province. Ankara lacks missile defense capabilities of its own. It is no secret that Turkey has since 2008,9 been working on a tender called T-Loramids in order to close the gap on the missile defense issue. Following the withdrawal of the German and American Patriots, Turkey may be provided temporary relief, a situation that cannot be guaranteed forever, especially when Ankara’s neighbors to the east and south are continuing to develop and maintain ballistic missile capability. Turkish territories currently remain vulnerable given the range of both the Syrian and Iranian ballistic missile capabilities. What is more important is that the Kürecik radar that was stationed in Malatya as part of NATO’s missile defense early warning detection program in Turkey has in effect been solely dedicated to the purpose of assuring the protection of Europe. Moreover, this radar system is not operational on a 24-hour basis. The problem for Turkey is that the current security gap is not associated with missiles in the region and their capability to strike European cities. Rather, they are linked with short and middle range missiles stationed in both Syria and Iran and their capability to strike Turkey10. Turkey will remain dependent on NATO 9 Turkey decided to acquire long-range missile defense systems in 2008, but the Project was then postponed due to the NATO’s missile defense Project. Turkish official back than thought the country would not need another defense system in Turkey. However, during the Lisbon summit, NATO than only has decided to install radar systems in Turkey. So, since than Ankara government speed up its efforts to establish its own missile defense system. Ercan Yavuz, ‘‘Defense Giants Compete in Turkish Tender for Long-range Missiles’’, Sunday’s Zaman, 2 January 2011, p. 17. 10 SETA pp.64-66.

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missile defense until it is able to afford its own anti-missile capabilities. Ankara’s anti-missile arsenal is not only required for military deterrence purposes but also to maintain the defense of Turkey’s future critical energy security supply in the form of civil nuclear reactors. Military Deterrence and Critical Energy Infrastructure Safety Turkey currently imports nearly 70 percent of its hydro-carbon energy requirements. Since it is an energy dependent country, Ankara has decided to lessen its national hydro-carbon dependency through diversification. In line with its proclaimed 2010-2014 plan11, Ankara has decided to adjust the percentages of indigenous resources and alternatives. As a result, it has given 10 percent of the energy mix to nuclear energy and 30 percent to renewables. In order to achieve the 10% target, Ankara will acquire two new nuclear reactors, one in Mersin in the Akkuyu province and another in Sinop. While trying to diversify its energy resources as part of efforts to secure critical infrastructure energy resources, Turkey is potentially creating two high-value targets for states with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Ankara currently enjoys superiority in conventional military resources compared to its neighbors in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Currently, the Turkish Air Force is capable of maintaining superiority over Turkish air space with new deep-strike capabilities via the acquisition of tanker aircraft, effective reconnaissance systems and advanced 11 The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, (2010), Strategic Plan (20102014), http://www.enerji.gov.tr/yayinlar_raporlar_EN/ ETKB_2010_2014_Stratejik_Plani_EN.pdf. Last visited 20 August 2015.

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The Withdrawal of Patriot Missiles from Turkey and its Aftermath

air to air and air to ground missiles. This newly acquired hardware in Ankara’s conventional arsenal is increasing Turkey’s overall deterrence capacity. Similarly, the Turkish Navy, in respect to Ankara’s Mediterranean coastal states, continues to enjoy superiority in regard to conventional weapons. Therefore, under present conditions Ankara is not expecting a land incursion, a naval or amphibious operation, or an air threat to Turkey’s planned nuclear energy infrastructure12. However, the current level of ballistic missile proliferation globally, coinciding with developing regional tensions, especially in places like Syria and Iraq, is forming a potential threat both to Turkey’s conventional superiority as well as to its planned nuclear energy infrastructure. Moreover, as military experts point out, if Ankara does not secure adequate safeguards to counter missile defense measures there is a high possibility that in the future, Ankara might be caught off guard with respect to the defense of its planned critical energy infrastructure if a ballistic missile attack is undertaken with little warning13. Conclusion The NATO decision to station Patriot missiles was taken at the request of the Turkish government in order to prevent potential incoming attacks from the Assad regime in 2013 after a Turkish jet had been downed and after a bomb blast killed Turkish citizens in Reyhanlı. Fol12 Doruk Ergun and Can Kasapoğlu, ‘Nuclear Energy Program: A Strategic Nuclear Security Risk Analysis’, in Nuclear Security: A Turkish Perspective, (ed) Sinan Ülgen, EDAM, 2015, pp.5-52, http://edam.org.tr/ document/NuclearBook3/edam_nucphysec2015_full.pdf, last visited 30 August 2015. 13 Ibid.

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lowing the US and German announcements concerning an imminent withdrawal of their Patriots in mid-August, in line with the expiration date of both the US and German NATO mission in Turkey, the current balance sheet of deterrence from Ankara’s perspective seems to be adequate for the time being given that the Spanish Patriots are remaining in Adana and the US military presence has been overwhelmingly increased at the İncirlik base. With the Euro-Atlantic force presence in Turkey, one can hardly expect the Assad regime to take a risk in attacking Turkey. However, on the other hand these temporary deployments only provide short-term security relief for Turkey’s ongoing security concerns, as they fail to be a remedy for Ankara’s future concerns regarding the existing ballistic missile proliferation arsenal in both Syria and Iran. On the 16th of August 2015 in the New York Times, American officials were uncertain as to whether the Syrian Army’s Scud launchers had pulled back from the border areas with Turkey or the Syrian army had run out of these missiles14. Moreover, the American armed drones and F-16’s would be effective in the creation of a psychological deterrence by their mere presence at İncirlik base. The defined mission of American forces 15 however is clearly limited in terms of both the air bombardments of ISIS as well as supporting the moderate Syrian opposition. In other words, these forces are not engaged to fight against the forces of the Assad regime. Hence, Turkey in the face of expanding Iranian and Syrian missile capabilities as well as the continuous uncertainty about the future of Syria and Iraq along with the increasing influence of the radical jihadist groups in 14 Erich Schmitt, ‘‘After Delicate Negotiations…’’, ibid. 15 Ibid.

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The Withdrawal of Patriot Missiles from Turkey and its Aftermath

her vicinity, makes Ankara’s security concerns both legitimate and understandable. Turkey, under the present unstable security conditions in its neighborhood lacks capacity in the area of missile defense. In the face of its neighbors’ growing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, Amkara needs to resolve its lack of missile-defense mechanisms for two reasons. The first relates to Ankara’s need to maintain the credibility of its military deterrence, especially in the face of the growing missile proliferation in the Middle East. The other relates to Turkey’s future energy requirements. Once its first civil nuclear reactor in Mersin-Akkuyu province is

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completed in 2023, it will potentially become a target. The security of this critical piece of national infrastructure, from state-led WMD threats will be crucial and will require Ankara to gain missile defense capabilities of its own. One can argue that Turkey may once again rely on NATO in the prevention of any likely threats to its critical infrastructure in the future. However, there is no guarantee that when Ankara makes such a request that there will be an automatic or timely response from the Alliance as historical precedent and experience demonstrates. The good news is in this regard that Turkey has time to finalize its tender before 2023.

About BILGESAM Established in 2008, the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM) is one of the leading think tanks in Turkey. As a non-profit, non-partisan organization BILGESAM operates under the guidance of a group of well-respected academics from different disciplines, retired military generals and diplomats; and aims to contribute regional and global peace and prosperity. Closely following the domestic and international developments, BILGESAM conducts research on Turkey’s domestic problems, foreign policy and security strategies, and the developments in the neighbouring regions to provide the Turkish decision-makers with practical policy recommendations and policy options.

About Author Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney is professor of international relations and head of international relations department at Yildiz Technical University in Istanbul. Prof. Güney is security and nuclear energy fellow at the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM). She has extensively published on Middle East, security studies, American foreign and security policies, EU, NATO and arms control and disarmament issues. Some of her latest publications include; ‘Turkish Nuclear Security after Iranian Nuclearization’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 33/3, December 2012 and ‘The current Stalamate on the Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Is there a way out of this Impasse?’, Ortadoğu Analiz Dergisi, Orsam, Mart 2013, Vol.5, No. 51, pp. 29-36.

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