The Winston Churchill Memorial Trust of Australia.

Report by Inspector Ken Ashworth, Victoria Police.

2006 Fellow. The Donald Mackay Churchill Fellowship to investigate and study how major sea ports in Europe, North America and Asia manage port security, relative to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) requirements (ISPS Codes introduced in 2004) including strategies utilised to tackle organised crime (drug & people smuggling).

I understand the Churchill Trust may publish the report, either in hard copy or on the internet or both, and consent to such publication. I indemnify the Churchill Trust against any loss, costs or damages it may suffer arising out of a claim or proceedings made against the Trust in respect of or arising out of publication of any report submitted to the Trust and which the Trust places on a website for access over the internet. I also warrant that my final report is original and does not infringe the copyright of any person, or contain anything which is, or the incorporation of which into the final report is, actionable for defamation, a breach of any privacy law or obligation, breach of confidence, contempt of court, passing off of contravention of any other private right or of any law.

Signed: Ken Ashworth.

Dated: 4 October 2007.

INDEX

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INTRODUCTION. .................................................................................................................................3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ...................................................................................................................6 UNITED KINGDOM. ...............................................................................................................................6 THE NETHERLANDS. .............................................................................................................................6 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ......................................................................................................6 ASIA. ....................................................................................................................................................7 HIGHLIGHTS – AS PER PLACES VISITED....................................................................................7 UNITED KINGDOM – ..........................................................................................................................9 PORT OF DOVER POLICE. ......................................................................................................................9 KENT POLICE & MARINE UNIT.............................................................................................................9 FOLKESTONE POLICE STATION. ............................................................................................................9 THE NETHERLANDS. .......................................................................................................................12 RIVER AND CANAL POLICE – DORDRECHT. ........................................................................................12 SEA AND HARBOUR POLICE - ROTTERDAM.........................................................................................14 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA............................................................................................18 NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT (NYPD) – HARBOUR UNIT. ..........................................................18 UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG) – WASHINGTON DC. ..........................................................21 MIAMI, FLORIDA. ...............................................................................................................................25 Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) – Intergovernmental Bureau / Underwater Recovery Unit - Miami..................................................................................................................................25 LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA. ...............................................................................................................28 Los Angeles Port Police Department (LAPPD)............................................................................28 Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). .....................................................................................28 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA. ..................................................................................................................33 San Diego Harbour Police............................................................................................................33 HONG KONG.......................................................................................................................................36 HONG KONG POLICE DEPARTMENT (HKPD) – SPECIAL DUTIES UNIT ...............................................36 HONG KONG – MARINE UNIT .............................................................................................................38 SINGAPORE POLICE DEPARTMENT...........................................................................................41 POLICE COAST GUARD. ......................................................................................................................41 RECOMMENDATIONS. ....................................................................................................................44 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. ................................................................................................................47 AUSTRALIA. .......................................................................................................................................47 UNITED KINGDOM:.............................................................................................................................47 THE NETHERLANDS:...........................................................................................................................47 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ....................................................................................................47 NEW YORK:........................................................................................................................................47 WASHINGTON DC: .............................................................................................................................48 MIAMI: ...............................................................................................................................................48 LOS ANGELES:....................................................................................................................................48 SAN DIEGO:........................................................................................................................................48 HONG KONG:......................................................................................................................................48 SINGAPORE:........................................................................................................................................49

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Introduction. Following the terrorist attacks in New York on the 11th of September 2001, the World changed dramatically. Further terrorist attacks in Bali, Madrid, Jakarta and London further transformed our way of life. New issues, threats and challenges face all of us in our daily lives. The increased “security mesh” that confronts us each time we travel by air is obvious and typifies these changes. A flow on effect of increased security was inevitable for the maritime sector. In 2004 the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Codes were implemented world wide. These new codes became maritime law by virtue of decree from the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). In short, failure to comply with the codes could see the defaulter having their international trade severely reduced if not discontinued. As most of the world’s food and general cargo is still transported by sea, the economic and social implications are obvious. Whilst the focus of these new codes was directly aimed at ship owners, operators, coupled with port owners and operators, a very direct implication for law enforcement agencies (police) was realised. In Victoria, traditionally the role of the Water Police Squad (WPS) was marine Search and Rescue (SAR), with little other policing roles being performed. Since September 11, 2001 and the introduction of the ISPS Codes in 2004, staffing levels have increased along with technical and tactical capabilities. These increases were realised following the investment by the State Government of funding specifically for the increase of a capability to respond to countering terrorism and port security. Many of these developments have been implemented following consultation with and visits to other water police operations in both Australia and Hong Kong. Victoria’s development was also assisted by police working alongside members of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in the lead up to the 2006 Commonwealth Games. As there is no “text book”, as such, to refer to for such an increase in capability, I relied on 30 years of policing experience, colleagues, intra and interstate and research to enhance our capabilities. I was concerned with travelling a path that may have previously been travelled and proved unsuccessful by others. Learning by others mistakes would provide a valuable library for me to refer to for further development in relation to port security and general maritime law enforcement. The Port of Melbourne is vital not only to Victoria but Australia. It is of national significance as it is Australia’s largest and busiest container port. In terms of economic trade and contribution, Victoria relies on between 92 to 98 per cent of the Port's trade, handling nearly $70 billion in trade annually. Any disruption to the Port would result in a most significant disruption to Victoria's economy. The port is positioned on key international trade routes and offers direct shipping services to most key international destinations.

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The Port is in close proximity to transport operators and container parks and has direct links to Victoria’s extensive freeway network, as well as country and interstate rail networks. It, like many other ports, is unique and has its own influences, directly and indirectly. Each port policing operation that I visited was unique in itself. For example the Port of Dover (POD) in England has been managing the threat of terrorism, traditionally from the IRA, for decades. Daily the port transports all forms of cargo, trucks and people. It has a private police force, as well as falling under the jurisdiction of Kent Police. French police are also performing duty in the port. The Port of Rotterdam is the largest container port in Europe and has sea and canal connections throughout Europe. Some port operations are fully automatic. The Sea and Harbour Police patrol and respond to all incidents on the water and in the port. A separate River and Canal Police manage the rivers and canals. A very strong focus of The Netherlands Police is on safety and the environment. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) administers the ISPS Codes in the USA. The Coast Guard (CG) are the primary agency for ship boardings at sea and have specific powers not available to local port police. Local police have jurisdiction within port waters for a number of issues, including port security. East and West coast operations differ. The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach combined are the biggest in the USA and like Melbourne, are critical to the economy of the United States (US). Two police departments share the policing of the ports, Los Angeles Port Police Department (LAPPD) and Long Beach Police. Both are assisted on a needs basis by Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and all are supported via a “fusion centre” or Joint Regional Intelligence Centre (JRIC). The Port of Miami is home to many cruise ships as well as general cargo vessels. Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) has primary responsibility for the port. Many of the waters are shared with other jurisdictions and multi-agency responses are a common occurrence. Miami’s close proximity to Cuba sees it as a prime location to smuggle people and drugs into the USA. San Diego’s Port is strongly focused on military support, as it is the home of the United States 3rd fleet. The Coast Guard also have a strong presence in the port. As Miami has its Cuban issues, San Diego has its Mexican issues. Drug and people smuggling is prevalent via the sea into San Diego. Local strategies are deployed to detect such activities. These strategies consist of a combination of state and federal officers supported with state and federal funding. The port of Hong Kong is a busy bustling operation with major container operations to the west side of Kowloon and further along the north coast. New container ports are opening on mainland China which will create an economic challenge for Hong Kong. Hong Kong Police Department (HKPD) is constantly vigilant for smugglers of goods and people. Drugs are smuggled from mainland China into Hong Kong’s jurisdiction which comprises Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and The New Territories.

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Alternately, white goods and technical equipment such as computers are smuggled from Hong Kong to the mainland. The smuggling of females for the purposes of prostitution from China to other areas is also of concern. The Port of Singapore is constant and the harbour is full of transiting ships, day and night. Singapore Harbour is locally described as “the gate way to the rest of the world”, via Asia. The port perimeter is some 156 kilometres with 528.91 square kilometres of water. Many national interests are located either in or near the port and authorities consider these to be a terrorist threat. Singapore’s Police Coast Guard (SPCG) constantly addresses smuggling issues. Smuggling is conducted predominantly to avoid taxes and levies. The fellowship enabled me to travel to Europe, The United States of America and Asia to see first hand local police operations, speak with management and officers on the ground as to how they manage port security and tackle policing issues relevant to drug and people smuggling. I was keen to examine exactly what works, what does not and what has failed. Prior to travel I formulated a document comprising of 63 questions for each jurisdiction. These questions were compiled in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies in Australia. The questions were forwarded some months in advance to allow the other agencies time to respond. The majority of those responses can not be publicly aired or made available for security and operational reasons. Interested parties are encouraged to contact me to discuss specific issues. A substantial amount of confidential information, apart from the questionnaire, was afforded me and for security reasons can not be reproduced in this public document. Matters relative to response, tactics and some security operations can not be published. Persons and organisations that operate in this field are invited to contact me for further information or disclosure. I emphasise that each port and police agency is unique and different therefore it is important not to compare these agencies or operations. This has never been the intention of this fellowship nor is it intended in this paper. No one agency or operation is seen as better or worse. Each faces differing influences and responds accordingly. As is the case in most aspects of policing, local factors tailer and shape the service delivery and methods.

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Executive Summary. Inspector Ken Ashworth – Victoria Police, Australia. Officer In Charge of Water Police / Search & Rescue Squads, 100 Nelson Place, Williamstown, 3016. (Melbourne, Victoria) Bus: + 61 3 93997505 Mob: 0409 417 302 International Cell: + 61 409 417 302 E-mail: [email protected] The fellowship travel was for 8 weeks and allowed me to travel to ports in Europe, The USA, and Asia. The aim, coupled with the diversity of the travel, provided me with an understanding on a global basis as to how various police jurisdictions manage port security obligations relevant to the new ISPS Codes (2004) including issues relevant to drug and people smuggling. My learning’s will assist Victoria Police to further enhance maritime operations and port security. The focus was on police operations and not those of port operations. Travel was between the months of May and August 2007. This time frame also included 5 weeks recreational leave. Ports and Police Departments visited were; United Kingdom.

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Port of Dover – United Kingdom. Port of Dover Police. Kent Police. Tunnel Police Station at Folkestone.

The Netherlands.

• • •

Port of Rotterdam – The Netherlands. National Police Agency – Water Police, Dordrecht. National Police Agency – Sector West, Rotterdam.

The United States of America.

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New York City. New York Police Department HQ. New York Police Department – Harbour Unit.

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Washington DC. United States Coast Guard. Pentagon.

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Port of Miami.

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Miami-Dade Police Department – Intergovernmental Bureau & Underwater Recovery Unit. Miami-Dade Police Department – Special Patrol Bureau, Marine Unit. Miami Police Department – Marine Unit. Miami-Dade Port Police Unit.

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Port of Los Angeles Los Angeles Port Police. Los Angeles Police Department – Major Crimes Division / Anti Terrorist Port Liaison. Homeland Security. Joint Regional Intelligence Centre.

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Port of San Diego. San Diego Harbour Police – Homeland Security Unit.

Asia.

• • • •

Port of Hong Kong. Hong Kong Police, Special Duties Unit – Counter Terrorism Boat Unit Hong Kong Police, Special Duties Unit – Fanling. Hong Kong Harbour Police.

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Port of Singapore. Singapore Police Department – Coast Guard – Brani Base.

Highlights – as per places visited. ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ

Dover – observing the operation of technical equipment including the use of xray for detection of persons and contraband. Dover – observing the use of number plate recognition technology with photographic identification methods. Dover – learning about the operations of a private police force. The Netherlands – observing the magnitude of the river and canal system. The Netherlands – observing the size and capacity of inland barges. The Netherlands – observing Rotterdam Sea & Harbour Police at work and boarding vessels in the Port of Rotterdam. The Netherlands – observing the size of the port and some of its fully automated systems. New York – observation and learning of NYPD’s Maritime operation. New York – observation of weapons & equipment carried by NYPD including Radiation Detectors and Gas Masks. New York – observation of tactics and strategies referred to as Operation Atlas and Operation Hercules.

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Washington – USCG role in Maritime Security and compliance. Washington – Tour of the Pentagon.

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Miami – observation of diving operations. Miami – learning of under water security measures – Operation Safe Port. Miami – learning of “user pays” system within the port. Miami – reverting back to basics of policing – Marina Watch.

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Los Angeles – learning that funding is via the port and seen as good business. Los Angeles – observing magnitude of the port. Los Angeles – strategic vision re increased technical equipment, including use of cameras, including consideration of mammal unit. Los Angeles – reverting back to basics of policing – Marina Watch. Los Angeles – use of LAPPD Sea Marshals. Los Angeles – visiting intelligence sections - Fusion Centres / JRICs. Los Angeles – learning Homeland Security Operations.

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San Diego – observation of US 3rd Fleet Base. San Diego – observation of USCG Base. San Diego – understanding of the role of the port. San Diego – floating barriers - types and uses. San Diego – learning of Joint Harbour Operations Centre (JHOC)

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Hong Kong – observation of C/T Special Duties Boat Drivers Hong Kong – tour of Hong Kong “Boarder of Administration” in an interceptor vessel. Hong Kong – learning of magnitude of operations. Hong Kong – tour & observation of Special Duties Unit at Fanling. Hong Kong – presentation of operations at Headquarters.

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Singapore – learning of training methods and facility Singapore – learning of issues facing operations such as closeness of other boarders and high speed vessels. Singapore – Special Task Squadron contained within the SPD Coast Guard. Singapore – Joint training and MOU’s with foreign Governments.

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United Kingdom – Port of Dover Police. Kent Police & Marine Unit. Folkestone Police Station.

Below is a brief synopsis of interviews with Stephen J Masters – Chief Officer of Port of Dover Police (PODP). The Port itself is around 400 years old. King James the 1st decreed a charter for the port which established a board of operation. Port Police were established in 1993. Prior to this Dover Borough Police patrolled the area. Local council rates funded local police operations and still do across England. The Aviation Maritime Security Act of 1990 decreed port to provide security. The Port of Dover Police (PODP) is a private police force and fully funded by the Port of Dover (POD). Whilst the Port of Dover Police operates within the port and to a limited kilometre outside of the port, its area of operation also falls under the jurisdiction of Kent Police. As a result, interaction with Kent Police by way of information and intelligence sharing is not only required but is seen as vital. The Port of Dover Police operates autonomously and has on occasions been at odds with the Port Board. Both the Port Board and the Port Police acknowledge their respective roles of law enforcement and commercial operations. There are seven other private police forces in the UK. Officers are “sworn in” as police under port legislation, not Home Office legislation. They have full powers as police would in any other part of the country. The Port of Dover Police is a small operation, compared to Kent Police. For security reasons numbers of officers is rarely referred to in this report. Counter Terrorist Security Advisers (CTSA) are located at Kent Police Department. Whilst these advisers are civilians, they generally are former police members with 30 years plus police experience. CTSA follow up on security tapes re Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). This is often the first line of enquiry for investigators. Around two million cars per year travel through the port. The port forms part of the international traffic route from Northern England to Calais in France. Many local businesses and residents complain about the increased traffic to the port as it often backs up and congests the city centre. The terrorist bombings on September 11 2001 (New York) and July 7 2005 (London) were seen as wake up calls to security authorities. Security services across England now communicate more openly than before these dates. There is now more of a concentrated effort to communicate and more joint operations.

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Communications (radios) have increased and developed. All major operations across England utilise new radio communication technologies, which are reserved for emergency services operatives only. Risk Assessments are used to target vehicles and cargo for inspection. The Port does require a percentage to be inspected. Vehicles and passports are all screened. There are around ten thousand vehicle movements each day through the Port of Dover. Deputy Chief Officer Paul Wilczek is a former member of Kent Police with some 30 years experience. Recently he transferred across to The Port of Dover Police. The following is a brief synopsis of an interview conducted with him. The nature of the call or incident will dictate the response in the port. As the Port of Dover Police is smaller than the Kent Force, their resources are quickly used up, thus often requiring assistance from Kent Officers. Jurisdictional lines exist between the two Forces. The more serious taskings are performed by Kent officers. Daily issues are handled by the Port Police who are savvier to the needs and commercial operation of the port. A new initiative adopted by PODP is a border patrol with customs and immigration officers; this sees a sharing and maximum use of resources. A major exercise takes place every 3 years and is conducted by Kent Police involving all other local government departments, including the port. Stakeholders would like to conduct this major exercise more frequently however this is somewhat difficult given the nature and size of the exercise. Each 12 months the PODP must exercise with the port and often do so by way of a table top exercise. There a various scenarios. At entrance lanes to the port are located various “detectors” for detection of various chemical substances. The Port also has “heart beat” monitors for detecting heart beats in a trucks cargo or about the body of the vehicle. This is a pro-active anti people smuggling strategy. Also located within the boundaries of the Port are members from Kent Police. Their operation is referred to as “Frontier Operations”. The following is a brief synopsis of interviews conducted with Detective Inspector Charlie Stokes, Officer in Charge of Operations and Detective Sergeant Paul Bratten. Frontier Operations work very closely with Customs and Immigration Officials. All work in teams. The most common aspect of the officers’ work is focused towards “suspect” persons. The officers utilise various forms of technology and intensely interrogate suspects. Brian Devlin, a technical expert works with Frontier Operations and has expertise in number plate recognition systems. I was fortunate enough to be shown the workings

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and linkages of this system. For security reasons I can not discuss this any further, suffice to say that it is an impressive operation. Members of this unit (Frontier Operations) work closely with Port of Dover Police. The operation is overseen by Detective Chief Inspector Andrew Lyttle who also oversees various other areas within the Kent Police. There is a Marine Unit within the Kent Police Force which covers the tidal coastline around the county of 585 miles, from the border with the Metropolitan Police ‘Thames Division’, sharing the Thames estuary with the Essex Police Marine Unit, and then stretching out to the national 12 mile limit around the remainder to its border on the south coast with the Sussex Police. This unit responds to the navigatable sections of the county’s rivers, providing a water search facility to all wet areas. It cannot however provide a sub-aqua response – this facility is now bought in under contract from adjoining Forces, following the decision to disband the Kent Underwater Search and Recovery Unit in the mid-nineties. Kent Police, including the Marine Unit, is intent on conducting a multi agency, cross channel operation (Operation Badge 3) later on in 2007 to combat terrorism, people trafficking and facilitation offences across The English Channel The Kent Police and Marine Unit are supportive of ‘Marinewatch’, a network of water users around the main River Medway area. Representatives are on committees for both the Thames and the Medway River Users. There is an on-going commitment to support a National Internet-based site recording stolen marine property (linked across Europe). The “Marinewatch” concept was one I was to find very active in the United States and one I would like to develop in Victoria. Detective Sergeant Paul Bratten (Kent Police) took me to the Tunnel Police Station at Folkestone where I met Inspector Tony Golding and Sgt. O’Donohue. This complex manages the Tunnel / Chunnel security as well as other security matters, of which I am not at liberty to discuss. Trucks and some vehicles accessing the tunnel systems travelling to France are subject to X-ray analysis without warning. Trucks are examined in X-Ray sheds. These sheds can accommodate full semi trailer combinations. The systems are very explicit. Identification of hand guns as well as stow a way felines have been detected. Whilst visiting the Police complex I was fortunate enough to inspect access tunnels to the Tunnel / Chunnel system and inspect emergency response procedures and speciality vehicles. When enquiring about a whole of government approach to port security, I was advised that the government had provided Kent Police and Immigration Officers, DSP’s or Dedicated Security Posts. These are posts or offices used by the police and other authorities to operate within the Ports.

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The Netherlands. River and Canal Police – Dordrecht.

In Dordrecht I met with Chief Superintendent Peter R van den Berg whose title is Senior Adviser Policy and Development. I also met with several other officers who describe their roles as “police advisers”. The KLPD is the police authority for the Netherlands. KLPD translates to Korp of National Police Services. There are 25 regions in The Netherlands and each one is commanded by a Chief. The Specialist area of the KLPD is similar to VicPol in that they have traffic, air wing and water police units but also include specialist criminal investigation sections. KLPD perform no rescue function. Sea rescue is performed by Coast Guard and all of these operatives are volunteers. Police can and do assist when required, however sea rescue is not seen as a police function. Police focus on enforcement across the board and patrol to around 12 nautical miles (nm) off the coast. Reproduced below is a brief synopsis of interviews conducted. As discussed earlier in this paper, some methods of operation and security are not disclosed. The Water Police, of the river and canals, cover 360 miles of coast line. They are quite often referred to as the Dutch River Police. The Rotterdam Harbour Police are separate and are part of the City of Rotterdam Police Department. All water operatives from both areas work together. All police in The Netherlands wear the same uniform. River police operate on the water and only deal with the river ports, not the coastal sea ports; this is Rotterdam’s Sea and Harbour Police’s responsibility. Along the vast rivers and canals are sea ports that ocean going vessels can reach. The deepest inland port is some 70 miles from the sea and to access this port a vessel must travel through a number of locks. Generally travel is restricted for ocean going vessels due to the depth of the rivers and canals so they must unload their cargo to river barges. The rivers and canals are described locally as “the gate way to the rest of Europe”. Following 9/11 the river and canal police have been focused more toward security. The general consensus in The Netherlands is that they do not see themselves as a direct terrorist target, per se, but more fear the consequences of dykes failing and the importation of contraband from the “old eastern block” countries. More of a counter terrorism focus is taken by the Harbour and Sea police in their operations. Peter Schaafsma is the intelligence expert for the Water Police (river & canal). Each department has its own Intelligence Cell. In September 2005 District Intelligence Centres were established to obtain and disseminate intelligence. These centres are also designed to handle Intelligence from Belgium and Germany.

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Holland has 6 ISPS related ports and formerly located near each port was an intelligence cell. Previously these cells never communicated nor shared information. This is no longer the case. It is now through the development of District Intelligence Centres that information is shared and distributed. The collective view in The Netherlands is that the sharing of both Intelligence and Resources should be conducted across the board. As it is a small country one government should fund all of operations, therefore careful resource allocation and joint operations obtain the best results for investment of taxpayer’s money. Following 9/11 and the introduction of the ISPS Codes readouts are conducted each shift and are more professional in approach. Tasking comes from the Intelligence holdings and is distributed daily. Daily operations are more “task” orientated than ever before. River and Canal Water Police operate in excess of 26 vessels. Some of these are up to 18metres in length. River patrols operate generally 12 to 13 metre vessels and several high speed 6 to 7 metre vessels. Trafficking of illegal drugs come via the east. Whilst River and Canal Water Police detect many traffickers they have little faith or confidence in their counterparts across adjoining boarders. Issues of different standards, corruption and a lack of funding and commitment to stop such issues directly affect them. It would also appear that land boarder controls are poor. The Netherlands focus toward Intelligence for the direction of operations. Customs Officers are separate as to is the Immigration Department, these areas fall under the Finance Department. X/Ray facilities are owned and operated by Customs. The amount of river traffic is enormous so intelligence holdings dictate what will be searched and or scanned. Economical delays and cost effectiveness is considered. Generally selection is by risk assessment and authorities have a scale or matrix compilation methodology. This risk assessment is widely used around the world. Police divers fall under Specialist Support as too do criminal investigations. Divers regularly dive on vessels searching for attachments to the hulls of ships. Again risk assessed and passage of vessel dictates course of action by KLPD. A feeling within the River and Canal Water Police is that a cultural change is needed across boarders to gain faith and confidence. More finance needs to be placed into operations by the old eastern block countries. There is a need to establish a trust to effectively share information and intelligence holdings. The International Association of Air and Sea Port Police have been established and meet each year to discuss contemporary issues. AquaPol has been established within Europe and operates the same as Interpol, except dealing in maritime issues. Ship boarding is performed by Immigration Officers, not police.

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A high priority is to keep the environment clean, rivers and canals especially. The Netherlands authorities are very much aware of global warming and the impact of rising waters, considering 70% of NL is below sea level on reclaimed land. Good clean water ways are seen as important for all aspects of life. The Netherlands are encountering problems with rivers flowing from other countries with pollutants. Port Committees are incorporated in local committees similar to the Local Priority Policing (LPP) philosophy in Victoria. A second phase for ISPS introduction in The Netherlands is to assess inland ports, currently only sea harbours and designated ports are ISPS regulated. With various changes to the ISPS Codes occurring clarification as to responsibilities to be borne either by operators or government will be required. Police do not provide security but respond and proactively patrol and intercept vessels. A strong emphasis on port security is on port operators. River vessels size is a maximum of 135m. Sea ships meet river ships to exchange cargo. Vessels come along the rivers and canals from Russia, Germany, France and Belgium. Sea and Harbour Police - Rotterdam.

After meeting with the River and Canal Police at Dordrecht I arranged a meeting and interview with officers from the Rotterdam Sea and Harbour Police. I was most fortunate enough to inspect their offices, which are located a short distance out of Rotterdam City at Neckarweg and to accompany the officers on an afternoon shift around the Port of Rotterdam. The vessel was bullet and bomb proof, 27 metres in length and 90 tonnes in weight. It is most capable of travelling well into the North Sea. Four officers crew the vessel, which was extremely well appointed and impressive. Water cannons are mounted font and rear which could be operated by way of a harness inside the vessel’s cabin. Sgt. Michel Kloet of the Sea and Harbour Police was my host. The following is a brief synopsis of my conversations with Sergeant Michel Kloet, the crew and of my observations during the patrol shift. The Skipper is Hank, Michel is host, and assisting crew are Koos (Kosch) and Wilhelm (Bill). The Sea and Harbour Police at Rotterdam have 3 ocean going vessels, each one having a rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) on rear for rescue of crew. Each ship contains immersion suits for the cold water. There are two divisions of the Rotterdam WPS. There are the River and Canal Police in Rotterdam Central and the Sea and Harbour Police. The coastal patrol area is only 50 kilometres long. Sea rescue is provided by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard in The Netherlands is a voluntary agency. If called upon the police may assist.

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Vessel boarding and port security in general is based on risk assessment and intelligence holdings. The Sea and Harbour Police work closely with Customs. Customs will extensively search a vessel utilising powers of search and seizure which inturn assists police who will be present. Joint operations have great advantages for all the agencies involved. Some joint operations have seen up to 30 officers from various organisations board a vessel and conduct an extensive search. Police will secure the bridge and engine room and arrange for divers to search and clear the hull of the vessel. This is very similar to that of VicPol operations. Forming part of the Risk Assessment is the composition of the crew. Immigration enforcement is seen as part of the WPS function. There is also a strong emphasis on the carriage and storage of “dangerous goods” along the water ways. As we were discussing the approach and rationale of “dangerous goods” enforcement, Bill was referencing a very large manual on requirements for transport across Europe of such materials. This was being undertaken as were approaching several large vessels which were carrying an array of materials. It was explained to me that the manual covers all inland water ways and is the universal standard. The manual does not relate to sea vessels or vessels transiting sea lanes, only inland water ways. A code referred to as IMDG covers sea lane transport. As the Police work with Customs I canvassed the operation with other government agencies and touched on border protection. Michel explained to me that the border patrol function is performed by Royal Marshals or KMAR. They also perform ferry security. The Royal Marshals also perform immigration duty at the Airports as well as border patrols. Rotterdam WPS have over 350 operational members, including an immigration wing and investigations section there is a large section of uniformed officers for patrol and general duties operations. The Netherlands actively reclaim land and as a result members of the Sea and Harbour Police patrol both on water and land. Currently around 70% of the Netherlands is reclaimed land. Whilst most of the western world saw an increase in counter terrorism spending following the 9/11 attacks the Netherlands did not, relative to water side security. The increase to policing the water ways has followed, generally, the reclamation of land. The Netherlands do not see them selves as a “high risk” target for terrorism compared to other countries and cities within Europe. The thought process appears to see more of a risk to their way of life coming from the old eastern block countries in ways of corruption, vice and contraband. One influencing factor following the 9/11 attacks was that officers are now more heavily armed in public, and this can be easily seen when visiting the airport.

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Local Marshals focus more on counter terrorism activities at the Airport and at boarder and check points. A positive for water operations is that it tends to free Water Police Officers for other taskings. The Netherlands is one of the few operations I visited that required police to have a maritime security (MARSEC) card. As the Port of Rotterdam has been vital to the nation for many years preceding both 9/11 and the introduction of the ISPS codes, little has changed by way of security, on the face of it. The ports have always been seen as a risk area and have been well secured. It was described to me that since the ISPS introduction there was “a tightening up a little” and “the ISPS provided clear guidelines for operations and security on the land”. New changes to local laws did follow, for example recreational vessels were no longer permitted in certain areas of the ports. Water taxis were banned form the ports and their surrounds. An issue identified following the ISPS introduction related to immigration and person smuggling. With all the water ways in The Netherlands and the amount of small craft and water taxis operating the access to larger vessels was extremely easy. If a captain permitted someone to board their ship from one of these craft either prior to or post berthing pre ISPS would have seen them go undetected. Now with tighter controls, these persons are detected as not being on crew registers. Generally post ISPS introduction has seen the police interact more with companies and other agencies than previously. Police receive more calls re suspects as more people are security conscious and willing to report incidents. Skill maintenance is basically on the job. Minimum level for maritime operations is 4 to 6 members for manning vessels but can use up to 8, dependant upon the task. Mobile police car patrols are 2 up. A new initiative in the preparatory stage is a new group who will focus on boarder crossing and be more pro active as opposed to response. This will relate to specific matters of human trafficking across The Netherlands borders. The Water Police operations have an extensive Mission Statement which covers areas as: 1. Professionalism, 2. Knowledge and Safety of criminal matters around the port. 3. Security and Safety is good for business. 4. Know your area and understand how criminals can exploit it. 5. Intelligence driven – the focus. 6. Awareness that the Port is open to terrorism. 7. Partnership policing with ports and other jurisdictions. 8. Awareness of international law. 9. Identification of targets with partners and assist in making them stronger. 10. Share intelligence to become a learning organisation and use technology.

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Often vehicle patrols identify “suspect” vessels and deploy via the land to intercept and inspect the vessels at the various harbours and locks that are common on the waterways. As part of their intelligence sharing an exchange occurs via AquaPol. Members perform exchanges with Belgium Police. All are trained in maritime pollution issues. The business expectation is that the Water Police are not just seen as security but the enforcer of rules and regulations, including enforcement of “dangerous goods” transport, signage and pollution issues. Port of Rotterdam has Security Council and this council meets in a similar fashion to that of The Port of Melbourne. It includes representatives of the Fire Brigade and other port users. Random searching is a strategy also used if intelligence is lacking. Police must have “reasonable grounds” to search. Whilst it was mentioned earlier that no major changes had occurred since ISPS introduction it is obvious to see that more funding has been injected into maritime security. All police described the ports as being “tighter” than pre 2004. Considering that Rotterdam is the largest container terminal in Europe (ECT – European Container Terminal), that is not surprising. Operational methods, tactics and training were extensively discussed. The Marines will become involved in operations if called upon or directed to by the government. Marines and the police work closely together regarding counter terrorism matters. There are special arrest teams, negotiators and an observation section in the police for serious barricaded incidents. Marines will take over as it escalates or becomes prolonged.

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The United States of America. New York Police Department (NYPD) – Harbour Unit.

My hosts from New York Police Department were Lieutenant Edelle James and Detective Carlos Cruz. Whilst in New York I was honoured and privileged to be an invited guest to NYPD’s Medal Day for 2007 at 1 Police Plaza. I was present when Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly presented the following awards; ƒ Medal of Honour ƒ Police Combat Cross ƒ Medal for Valour ƒ Purple Shield (Posthumously x 2) ƒ Unit Citations The following day I was invited on board a police vessel. On board I spoke with the Commanding Officer of the NYPD Harbour Unit, Deputy Inspector David Driscol. Also on board were two sergeants and four officers. The following is a synopsis of my interview with Deputy Inspector Driscol. Staffing levels fluctuate with vacancies and alike (staffing figures withheld from publication). There is no independent Intelligence Unit for the Marine Division. Intelligence is relayed via the Intelligence and Counter Terrorism Departments of the NYPD. Operational need or direction is driven by what comes from the intelligence holdings within NYPD. Harbour patrol police work closely with the US Coast Guard (USCG). The USCG does not have as many assets as NYPD in the area so they perform the major role. USCG operates very much on a Risk Assessment approach. Larger vessel boardings are conducted by the USCG with NYPD focusing on recreational vessels; however they (NYPD) can perform both. A number of ferries operate across the water ways carrying tens of thousands of people each day. No individual screening of passengers takes place however the ferries do not carry cars or other cargo. The main ISPS compliance focus is performed by the USCG with some assistance from state police. As it is a Federal issue it is managed by the Federal Agencies and in the US that is the US Coast Guard. The Harbour Unit operates two helicopters and these are used for air and sea operations, this is in addition to the other helicopters operated by NYPD. Each vessel has radiation detectors on board for the detection of “dirty” bombs. Portable radiation detectors are also being introduced for operations in the NYPD jurisdiction. 18

Presently the NYPD Harbour Police are researching sonar capabilities. Clearance and checking of vessels is performed by divers physically sighting and by touch. A recent acquisition of a remote operated vessel (ROV) has been of assistance. The Harbour Unit is one entity with three satellite bases around NYC, for ease of operations the area is divided into 3 sectors. At any one time there will be multiple vessels on the water and this is a 24/7 operation. Operatives are sought from solid operational areas or backgrounds. The focus is more towards experienced street police who will subsequently be trained in the marine field. By virtue of legislation, exclusion zones are in place surrounding military ships and designated infrastructure such as bridges. As with Victoria, training is a huge liability that must be maintained. It was anticipated that at any one time NYPD would have around 65% of the work force fully qualified. A strong focus of training is towards heavy weapons. Police have the main response role in all areas together with the recovery of persons and exhibits from the marine environment, similar to that of VicPol. There are various committees interacting with ports and port stakeholders. Again, the USCG appears to take the lead and police advise as needed. NYPD conduct joint training and operations with all agencies and jurisdictions. These training exercises are increasing in number. The NY Harbour is crucial to the nation’s economy so it is recognised as vital, that all agencies and jurisdictions work together and understand each others capabilities and roles. Exercises are to be conducted at least once a year and this is mandated by congress. Various scenarios are tested including terrorists taking over a vessel. Any investigation of a terrorist incident is managed by the FBI. The FBI takes the lead role with NYPD as the first responders. Command & Control is managed under a system called the National Incident Management System (NIMS). At a lower level is the Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS). National Incident Management System (NIMS) is best described as follows; while most emergency situations are handled locally, when there's a major incident help may be needed from other jurisdictions, the state, and the federal government. The National Incident Management System provides a consistent nationwide template to establish Federal, State, tribal and local governments and private sector and nongovernmental organizations to work together effectively and efficiently to prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size or complexity, including acts of catastrophic terrorism. NIMS benefits include a unified approach to incident management; standard command and management structures; and emphasis on preparedness, mutual aid and resource management. – http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/faq/compliance.shtm.

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Post 9/11: Response activities and planning increased. Critical Infrastructure protection is now given a high priority. Providing a high visible police presence including saturating areas and structures is seen and “being seen to do this”, is a strategy adopted by NYPD. High profile, man power and weaponry are used to ease the public’s mind and show the public that NYPD are prepared for any incident. Future: Trialling new technology, i.e. sonar and alike. Purchase of faster boats, jet boats and interceptors. NYPD receive federal funding for C/T operations. Following 9/11 the focus towards C/T became more prevalent and day to day work changed. “Cobra Training” is weapons and equipment training. Marine Security (MARSEC) levels which operate world wide are administered differently in NY as they see themselves more at risk than other cities or ports. I was advised that NYC always operates to a slightly higher security status. This is completely understandable given the cities history, economic status and symbolic role in American democracy. US MARSEC levels are set by the Commandant of the US Coast Guard, commensurate with the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) which is how the remainder of the country operate. NYPD has around 37,000 uniformed officers. The main focus of operations is to reduce crime, enhance quality of life, and defend NYC from the threat of global terrorism. There are 76 Precincts with special commands including the Harbour Unit. Sworn officers are supplemented by 14,000 civilian employees. Some roles performed by these civilians include school education and traffic enforcement. Priorities are the three C’s – Crime, Counter-Terrorism and Community Relations. NYPD have a Counter Terrorism Bureau which is the main Intelligence holding area for operational security matters. This is in addition to the current Intelligence Bureau which is being restructured. Operation Atlas is a pro-active and overt operation which provides increased visible patrols and heavily armed officers around land marks, places of worship, bridges, tunnels etc. Operation Hercules or Hercules Teams is also a proactive strategy of providing teams of officers who patrol sensitive sites on an irregular basis. These officers also provide a heavy display of weaponry. Both operation Hercules and Atlas work on high visibility. Police cars including police vessels will patrol with lights on. Cars and vessels will stop, police will be visible and lights will continue to flash to indicate presence. NYPD sends intelligence officers overseas to capture intelligence and to network. All sworn members of the NYPD are trained in various matters relevant to counter terrorism and terrorism response.

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The NYPD are also active in educating the community by dispelling myths and rumours and focusing on what to look for and report. This strategy is designed to prevent hysteria within the community.

United States Coast Guard (USCG) – Washington DC.

In June I met with Lieutenant Paul Casey, Commander Mike Cunningham and Lieutenant Scott Muller of the United States Coast Guard (USCG). The meeting had been arranged with the assistance of Lieutenant Commander Mark Vlaun, who unfortunately could not be present on the day. Commander Mike Cunningham works in the Deployable Operations Unit; Lieutenant Paul Casey is a legal student as well as a CG Maritime Safety Team Leader, with experience as an operative in New York and Miami. Lieutenant Scott Muller works in domestic compliance and international regulation compliance. I found that the US Coast Guard members were extremely knowledgeable in the IMO ISPS Code and its application. The US Coast Guard fulfils the function that the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DoTARS) do in Australia, in that sign off and compliance of the codes is undertaken by the USCG. The US Maritime Transport Act mirrors that of the International Ship and Port Security Codes. The following is a brief synopsis of the meeting at USCG HQ, Washington DC. Historically the CG stem from the old Cold War days and before that WW1. Following 9/11 the Department of Homeland Security was established. Countering terrorism is law enforcement, which flows across directly into CG operations. The USCG is a military, multimission, maritime service within the Department of Homeland Security and one of the USA’s five armed forces. Its core roles are to protect the public, the environment and the US economic and security interests in any maritime region in which those interests may be at risk, including international waters and America’s coasts, ports and inland waterways. The five fundamental roles of the USCG are; ƒ Maritime Safety; Eliminate deaths, injuries and property damage associated with maritime transportation, fishing and recreational boating. The USCG motto is “Semper Paratus” or Always Ready. ƒ Maritime Security; protect America’s maritime borders from all intrusions by: (a) halting the flow of illegal drugs, aliens and contraband into the US through maritime routes; (b) preventing illegal fishing and (c) suppressing violations of Federal maritime law. ƒ Maritime Mobility; Facilitate maritime commerce and eliminate interruptions and impediments to the efficient and economical movement of goods and people, while maximising recreational access to and enjoyment of the water. ƒ National Defence; Defend the nation as one of the US Armed Forces. Enhance regional stability in support of the National Security Strategy, utilising the Coast Guard’s unique and relevant maritime capabilities.

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Protection of Natural Resources; Eliminate environmental damage and degradation of natural resources associated with maritime transportation, fishing and recreational boating.

Mike Cunningham – Vessel ISPS / Law Enforcement / Homeland Defence are now all branches of Homeland Security and no longer under the military. Regulation compliance and the law enforcement aspect were all brought together under Homeland Security. A short rule of thumb is “if it floats or is associated with a port or port facility” then the USCG has responsibility for it. A number of functions performed by the USCG relate to safety and protection of national assets or key asset protection, not necessarily assets declared as critical infrastructure (C/I). An example provided was that of a baseball field with fifty thousand people in attendance and that field was close to the water. The CG will patrol that waterway and advise the public on security and safety issues accordingly. Whilst it is not their specific role they see it as a pro-active strategy relevant to countering terrorism and relative to matters of public safety and security. The USCG also bears the responsibility of protecting military assets when they are in port, being loaded or being prepared for deployment. The USCG approves ISPS plans. Ship plans must be based on security assessments and then submitted to CG for approval. Field inspectors assess plans. This is almost identical to DoTARS roles in Australia. Port facilities plans are compiled and submitted to the Captain of the Port, who is a serving member of the USCG. The Captain of the Port is very similar to a Harbour Master in Australia and has similar powers. The Captain of the Port approves the ISPS Plans for the Port Facility. Officers of the USCG visit other countries, by invitation to assess ports on standards associated with ISPS compliance. Merely because a state or nation advise they are compliant may not mean they are, this is why USCG are pro-active in this area. A flow on effect is risk assessment of vessels visiting those ports before the reach US waters. Another plan, an all encompassing one if you will, called Area Maritime Security Plan is written by the Captain of the Port in consultation with the local Port Security Council. These plans can vary in size and are designed to be all inclusive, not only security but safety and emergency response. The local area Commander approves this plan. There are two area commanders, one east and one west. Ship boarding is law enforcement which is a flow on from regulation compliance. Targeting which ships are to be boarded is by risk assessment. Specific CG members are trained in vessel boarding tactics. Not all USCG officers are trained in this field. Furthermore specific officers are trained in the use of technical / operational equipment including teams qualified in CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) detection and handling.

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Boarding’s are threat and risk based whereby a target score is tallied to make the decision. I.e.: Yemen as a previous port is awarded so many points, composition of the crew some more points, other ports and history are all added in to provide a final score. USCG is able to board anywhere but must have a reason outside their 12nm limit. Generally directions are given to vessels to remain outside the 12nm limit and if ships wish to enter they must submit to a boarding. The request is transmitted to the Flag Administration of the vessel requesting the vessel be boarded. Experience has taught the CG that this is the best way to obtain compliance. The USCG work with Customs up to 24nm off shore. Conditions of entry or protocols relate to Financial, Immigration, Sanitation and Customs assessments and all are valid reasons to request a boarding. An Operational Law model or framework has been established to assist USCG officers in their roles. There are four key points, namely; 1. Authority to do what you are doing, 2. Competencies in what you are doing, 3. Capabilities to do what you are doing or intending and 4. Partnerships – is there a unit or other body that can assist. Other considerations in the operating environment are; • Refine risk based decision making model. • Keep communications open with other jurisdictions and offices, let them know what you have done or intend to do, share the information. • Do not operate in isolation. • Where possible, train well in advance. • Know your legal operational status – what can you do legally. Following a Federal Government direction and Presidential Directive, there has been an increase in working together in partnerships and the sharing of intelligence and resources with other agencies, nation wide. Maritime Operations Threat Response is a Presidential Direction which outlines roles and responsibilities of all agencies involved in Maritime Operations – Federal Directive 33 CFR 101-1-6, sub Chapter H. Intelligence is collected and shared between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA). Intelligence officers work at Naval Intelligence in Washington DC. Intelligence officers will also participate in boarding vessels where it is deemed necessary or to gather intelligence first hand. Boarding USCG Officers have specific questions. Questions are directed to Captains and Masters of vessels and relate to the last port of call. Often issues relative to security and actions undertaken in that port are sought. This intelligence is fed back to naval intelligence.

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Currently the USCG fleet comprises some 225 Cutters, 12 high endurance vessels similar to Naval Frigates, 30 x 110 foot Patrol Boats, 60 to 70 smaller Patrol Boats, 90 Dauphine Helicopters, 30 to 40 J – Hawk Helicopters and various smaller vessels and barges. The maintenance of the fleet is generally outsourced except for systems and confidential equipment. Basic “scrape and paint” is performed by CG staff. Training Liability: Since Port Security responsibilities were assigned to the USCG training has had an enormous impact on USCG operations. There is very little down time as officers are either training or deployed. Similar to current military status, that is they are either deployed, returned from deployment or training for deployment. Currently the USCG comprises around 40,000 full time paid officers with around 28,000 part time volunteers. It is the part time volunteers who generally perform the roles relevant to rescue, and safety on the water, similar to Australia. The current head of the Department of Homeland Security is Michael Chertoff. The USCG utilise advanced technology and use dog teams for sniffer capability. Joint operations are conducted. As with NYPD the NICS model – National Incident Control System is utilised. MARSEC (Marine Security) level is currently level 1. Following the July 7 bombing in London the level increased to level 2 for a short period of time. This was decided upon by the Commandant of USCG for transport security reasons. Following 9/11 and ISPS implementation an increase in both staff and budget obtained. Stow A Ways is not seen as a core function and is generally referred to the Department of Immigration. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) prosecutes drug matters. Overall the main focus of the USCG has shifted to that of security for the homeland.

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Miami, Florida. Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) – Intergovernmental Bureau / Underwater Recovery Unit - Miami.

My host was Sergeant Nelson Rodriguez who is also in charge of dive operations within Miami-Dade County jurisdiction. Nelson’s right hand man and my escort into the field was Police Officer Oscar “Rocky” Roque. Officer Roque is an experienced police officer and diver with some 23 years experience with Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD). Officer Roque has experience in general patrol, homicide, training (varied disciplines) and general water operations. Their office is located in West 117 Avenue next door to the Kendall Police Complex. The following is a brief synopsis of my interviews and observations. The MDPD have around 3000 sworn officers for the Miami-Dade County area. The Police Department was formulated from the Sheriff’s Department. Five or six other municipalities sub-contract Miami-Dade to patrol or police their area. MDPD have over 300 miles of waterways including canals, lakes, rock pits and the coastal area. MDPD divers are a support unit not only to MDPD but other Government agencies such as the Environment Protection Agency (EPA), Customs, CG, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). On the morning of my first visit to the work place the divers were briefed and tasked with underwater vehicle recovery from one of the many canals located through out Miami-Dade County. This, like most other jurisdictions, is a core function of dive units. Miami-Dade County are keen to keep the canals clear for environmental reasons and to permit an uninterrupted flow of water through the systems, especially given the climate and rainfall of Miami. Areas of Miami are similar to that of Rotterdam in that they are below sea level. Along the vast array of canals are pumping stations which regulate the flow of water. These pumping stations are vital pieces of infrastructure, for without them flooding would occur. A steady flow of water through these systems is required, including the Everglades. The MDPD have a standing plan for security at the Port of Miami, Operation Safe Port (OSP) which was compiled some years ago and has been invoked on several occasions. A copy of that plan was provided to me. Naturally for security purposes I can not provide further details in the public domain. Following the 9/11 terror attacks extra funding was made available and updated plans were devised for port security. Pro active patrolling including air patrols with a focus towards a “high visible police presence” were commenced. Police divers actively “cleared” wharfs, walls and ship hulls.

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Many of these tasks were performed on an indiscriminate or random basis. Random selection of “targets” was seen as a strategy as the Port of Miami is very busy with cruise ships. It is acknowledged that the USCG is responsible for security along the ports and at sea. The boarding of vessels in and around the port is conducted by the USCG. As it is the County’s area, the County also have an obligation to provide security and maintain a capability to respond within the port. In discussing funding issues with several officers I sensed a degree of frustration within the ranks as to the allocation of funds. There was a general view that following the 9/11 attacks and the introduction of the ISPS codes there was an influx of funding, however that seemed to have decreased in recent times. A common theme I found was that there were too many police departments and other government agencies all competing for the Federal funding. Counter Terrorism funding is administered primarily via the Federal Government. Put simply, there was not enough funding to go around. The MDPD divers utilise technical equipment such as under water remote operated vessels (ROV) and Side Scan Sonar (SSS). As is the case with most police departments they would like more technical equipment, divers and intelligence officers. It is via a priority assessment methodology hat MDPD divers can meet all their demands and set priorities. There is a strong working relationship with other agencies. Table top exercises are conducted. The cruise ships and main port is located on Lumus and Dodge Island. The cruise ships berth on the north side and freighters on the south side. Freighters load 24/7, 365 days of the year. The cruise ships can be nose to tail and five in length. All cargo is K9 checked and passenger’s entry is via x-ray machines, similar to that of airport operations. Responding to an incident on water can have a degree of frustration in the early stages due to the number of agencies operating in the area. MDPD should be the Command and Control agency however first responders could come from not only MDPD but Miami PD, Miami Beach PD, USCG and Florida Office of Wild Life etc. Whilst visiting the Port I was introduced to Sergeant Mick Santos. Sergeant Santos is currently on secondment to port policing activities and provided the following information. MDPD supplies 35 police officers to the Port of Miami. Under the “user pays” system, their salary is paid for by the port, however the officers still report and are answerable to MDPD Command, not port authorities. A strategy adopted by the police in the Port is a high visible police presence, even to the extent of parking unmanned police cars at entrances. They are very keen to work on the deterrence factor.

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In my travels I visited the Miami Police Department, Marine Unit and spoke collectively to a number of officers one morning. This is a relatively small marine unit. I found there to be great diversification of roles, the members were not just boat operators or divers, half the Marine Unit were Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) trained and had just returned from that training. A concern over Command and Control at multi-jurisdictional incidents was again raised by some of the staff I spoke with. The feeling was that there appears to be a failing in this area at a Command or higher level. Most agreed that a dedicated effort in joint training should alleviate such matters. Officer Ray Rodriguez is an experienced marine Officer with the Miami-Dade PD and works at the Special Patrol Bureau from Pelican Harbour, Miami. I spent a morning with Ray discussing a variety of issues including my fellowship subject. Below is a synopsis of that interview. Area of operation or coverage is around 580 square miles of Dade County. Pre 9/11, the focus was towards water safety issues, immigration and drug smuggling from Cuba, now it is more port and general security focused. The general patrols provide support to the USCG and generally remain within the 12 nm limit to assist. Pre 9/11 and ISPS the unit performed many drug and immigration related tasks due to the closeness of Cuba, Haiti and Dominican Republic. In the 70’s and 80’s marijuana was the main drug being smuggled in via the water ways. Cocaine later came via Columbia and was being imported by land and sea. Generally the main law enforcement operation targeting these smugglers is mounted by the USCG. MDPD do conduct boat stops and detect narcotics and illegal immigrants. Ray describes the type of person involved in such operations, from first timers and professional people to organised crime groups. In the late 80’s a general cultural change in the USA saw a shift to Cocaine importation and use. Smugglers used fast boats to out run authorities. The issue became so large that the Federal Government built Custom’s Offices in South Florida to tackle the problem. It is still a big problem today for law enforcement. The USCG generally handle the main shipping and shipping lanes whilst local areas are managed by the MDPD in conjunction with other local agencies such as Fish & Wildlife Conservation, or Florida Marine Patrol. There is a strong and positive relationship with the Customs Officers. Customs established a Marine Unit specifically to tackle the drugs issue which took the pressure and responsibility off local Miami-Dade police resources. MDPD were then able to focus on inland and coastal waters and traditional WPS roles and not just the drug trade from Cuba and alike.

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Intelligence is shared openly with other jurisdictions and Ray advises that the sharing works well. Normal patrols see Officers responding to all general law enforcement issues including accidents, fishing enforcement and Search and Rescue (SAR) taskings. Post 9/11 sees more active sea port patrols, Miami River patrols and patrols around container areas. Post ISPS implementation saw extra Federal funding and an increase of officers and vessels. Following ISPS implementation Officers were afforded more insight and knowledge as to what ports and operators have to do or are required to have, eg; gates closed and security officers to be present etc. Officers now have a greater awareness of their operating area. Port Security Meetings are held regularly with the Lieutenant attending. A strong signage strategy is used around the ports and waterways of Miami requesting the public to call in and report any suspicious behaviour. Ray produced a number of these signs, which I photographed. Feedback to date suggests the “Marina Watch” philosophy is working across the southern and western side of the USA. MARSEC (Marine Security) levels were raised temporarily following the London bombings on 7/7/05. Officers perform missions with Customs and Immigration. Jointly they conduct general law enforcement and tailored operations. MDPD Marine members conduct cross training with Customs in relation to vessel chasing and vessel containment, including surveillance techniques. Larger scale arrests are handed to the DEA or Narcotics Bureau. breaches are referred to Immigration Officers.

Immigration

The USCG maintains its own anti-smuggling unit in the area.

Los Angeles California.

Los Angeles Port Police Department (LAPPD). Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).

My host for the visit to police operations at the Port of Los Angeles was Sergeant Kevin McCloskey of the Los Angeles Port Police Department (LAPPD). Kevin provided me with a brief overview of the port as patrolled by Los Angeles Port Police. The port itself is huge and divided in two, LA Port and Long Beach Port. One side is the jurisdiction of LAPPD and the other is the jurisdiction of Long Beach Police Department.

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The Port of LA has some 700 to 900 employees. The Port maintains its own infrastructure. It has a landlord tenant arrangement with the state of California. The state deeds the land to the City to manage in the states interests. All money earned must go back to the port for land management and land use. The Port has 27 major facilities and each has to comply with ISPS regulations. The port is governed by five persons. All are appointed by the Mayor. All revenue must go back into the port development or amenities in the local area. It is a Harbour Commission and can make by laws as necessary. The Board is comprised of a Director, Regional Directors and Assistant Directors down to Divisional Heads. There are 43 miles of water front and it is of national significance. There is 1 mile of cruise ship berths, 30 cargo container berths, and 1 car ferry terminal. The Port rates among top 5 ports of the world and contained within its area of operation is a Federal Prison housing male and female prisoners. Los Angeles Port Police Department is fully funded by the Port of LA and as such are well equipped. I also found their members to be forward thinking, in that they were ken to learn of new methods of operation and technology. The Long Beach Police Department is not as large as LAPPD. The Long Beach Port Authority employ armed guards as opposed to sworn police. Interestingly there are arguments for and against such a strategy considering the guards have no specific powers and they are still required to call police to incidents. Commercially it is cheaper to employ guards than maintain a police presence. The port police conduct operations on both land and water and have clearly marked zones of responsibility. Vehicle and vessel patrols operate 24 hours per day. The following is a brief synopsis of my interviews. Sergeant McCloskey provided me with an orientation tour of the port facility and advised of plans for a portable x-ray machine acquisition. Due to space issues it would be difficult to have a permanent structure such as the Dover operation. LAPPD utilise under water technology such as ROV’s (Remote Operated Vessels) and Side Scan Sonar (SSS) Units which are owned and operated by the port. Police request the deployment of this technology via the port. The liaison appears to work effectively. After my orientation of the port I met with Lieutenant Michael Graychik of Special Operations. Mike also specialises in and manages the Dive Team, Air Operations and Counter Terrorism portfolios. I also meet with Nathan Ewert, an expert in the field of Physical Security, i.e. cameras and access control. I was briefed by Nathan on the new complex for the port and its proposed security features, including advanced CCT feeds and recordings. It is proposed to have over two hundred (200) cameras and real time video. This feed can be directed to Officers on the ground to assist with identifying persons and locations whilst en route to a call. It is also proposed to establish a Threat Detection Centre.

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I was advised that the relationship with other port stakeholders is exceptionally good. As referred to earlier the port itself operates underwater scans which regularly sweep and survey below the waterline. Scans look at such things as debris, depths etc, but also for abnormalities from previous scans. Port operations are very much aware of security and police operations and vice versa. An interesting strategy Kevin advised me of is that LAPPD are reverting back to basic policing methods and sending officers back out on foot to the marina areas, talking to people and seeking assistance. This strategy is to regain the confidence of the local community and tap into a line of information and maintain it. Whilst it is accepted that minor incidents will be brought to their attention the reporting of more serious issues is likely to be encountered as well. Similar in philosophy to that of Miami-Dade Police is the “Marine Watch” programme. Again there are signs and telephone numbers displayed openly around marinas and ports. The strategy is very well accepted by local users of the port. The LAPPD provide Sea Marshals who travel out and board cruise ships with the sea pilots. These Sea Marshals remain with the vessel the entire time it is in the port. The Marshals liaise with the Captain of the vessel and others in authority and provide a conduit for police operations and general security. Sea Marshals also oversee the screening of luggage by the K9 units screening of passengers, similar to that of airport operations. Pre 9/11 security was seen as some what of burden and police numbers dwindled to a point where the police operation was described by many as “dysfunctional”. Immediately post 9/11 staff was working 12 hour shifts, consecutively for 8 months. Federal Port Security became an issue and the focus on increased security at ports commenced, along with Federal funding. Like The Port of Dover, the Port of Los Angeles has installed radiological detectors (portals) at various locations within the port. This is a matter of public record however I will not disclose locations or further details. Whilst visiting the dive operations at the port I spoke generally to many officers involved in security diving. The manner and approach taken by the dive officers is very similar to that of VicPol. Ship and hull clearances are primarily based on risk assessments with intelligence being provided by Customs and Federal authorities. California law enforcement agencies are trialling a new initiative whereby all intelligence is channelled through the one location. This is to ensure capture, collation, action, dissemination and tracking of all intelligence. These operations are referred to as Fusion Centres or Joint Regional Intelligence Centres (JRIC). Each jurisdiction provides representatives in the JRIC. The beauty of this initiative is that each agency has “a man on the inside” and direct line in and out of the operation.

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Information is cross checked and actioned either by referral to the relevant law enforcement agency or sent to one of the Task Forces which operate from the JRIC. The JRIC is manned by Detectives and Analysts. The entire operation, including the Task Forces, is conducted under Federal auspices and the JRIC is headed by a Director, FBI. It literally is a “one stop shop” for intelligence holdings. The LAPPD provide Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO) who act as a conduit to the community, advising on matters of terrorism as well as dispelling rumours regarding it. The following is a brief synopsis of a meeting with Mr. George P Cummings the Director of Homeland Security for the Port of LA. Mr. Cummins is a Former Captain of the Port and USCG Officer. When I asked him what his role is with the port it was described as, “Supporting local authorities in their expansion to better protect the port”. The office acts as a support system, including communications and interoperability capabilities. The local Office of Homeland Security is the Federal link for State matters and builds on infrastructure protection. The Director and staff assists with projects embarked on by the port and compilation of applications for Federal Grants to Washington. US Customs and Border Protection manages the inspection of containers and alike. Police are more law enforcement and crime strategy focused, coupled with safety enforcement considerations. I was advised that there are many projects on the drawing board and that the Office of Homeland Security acts as a co-ordination role in some of these. The Office is not only focusing on matters of terrorism but also Emergency Management issues, preparation, response and recovery issues and Business Continuity plans. The ISPS regulations addressed land based operations. Pre 9/11 and ISPS implementation saw minimal security and most of this related to loss prevention. Now with new standards to restrict access across the port, security as a whole is somewhat tighter and more easily maintained, despite earlier thoughts that it was to be a huge impost and cost to the port for many years. As it has now shown, it is not the huge impost and cost many believed it would be. Union involvement in security is strong with the Longshoreman’s Union being quite vocal and active. They are keen for strong security. There have been delays in the introduction of Terminal Workers Identification Card (TWIC) which is the equivalent to Australia’s MARSEC Card. It is anticipated that issues between the Union and the authorities can soon resolve this issue. During my visit to Los Angeles I spent considerable time with Lieutenant Mike Graychik and accompanied him around the port, inspecting various areas and operations. My synopsis of interviews continues.

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The Port Police conduct multiple exercises and also exercise with the Navy and Fire Brigade. There are many agencies around the port which are required to conduct regular exercises. LA Port Police exercise practical Command and Control and operate an Emergency Operation Centre or EOC. Tsunami drills are also exercised. There are five Fire Stations in the port, four on water and one on land. Rescue is a Fire Department task and police assist where requested. Once the chance of life has been lost the operation reverts to police as a recovery task. Both agencies will continue to assist each other. Training standards across the department are set by the State of California, all officers are trained the same and to these standards, including Sheriff Officers. Detective Bob Arzuman of the Major Crimes Division, Anti-Terrorist Port Liaison of Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) hosted me on visits to intelligence centres and some LAPD operational areas. Bob has completed 30 years with LAPD and is very experienced in most operational and investigative fields. Below is a synopsis of my discussions with Bob. LAPD work with Customs and Border Protection Officers and utilise a risk assessment methodology for all visiting vessels. Considerations are previous ports of call, crewing nationalities and the ships manifest. Some specific vessels are targeted and some are randomly selected for thorough inspections. I was fortunate to be taken to the JRIC for the southern California area, which is located in Norwell, California. I inspected the lay out and operations of the JRIC and spoke with Lieutenant Bob Fox of the LAPD. Lt. Fox is the Co-Program Manager of the JRIC and is second in charge under the FBI Director. The JRIC is not all terrorism or crime related. It includes public safety issues, matters of health and fire issues. All these agencies are represented within the JRIC. The JRIC is pro-active in strategic analysis – what is the threat to the region? Follow world trends, i.e. English bombings, effect on California if it followed suit. They assess and determine targets. There is a very strong focus on disseminating the intelligence holdings and ensuring the end user has up to date accurate information. Fire and Health Department analysts look at “Consequence Management”. This involves the analysis of impacts upon the community as a result of attacks or incidents. This strategic approach relates to man made and natural incidents. The JRIC is active in training other agencies officers in what to look for in relation to matters of national security as well as general crime. An example cited was the awareness training provided to health department officials when visiting people’s homes, i.e. bulk storage of chemicals. There is a whole of agency/government approach to safety and security

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Note: The area serviced by this JRIC is larger than the population of Australia. The NSW Police are to provide an officer to work in the JRIC in late 2007. Whilst visiting the JRIC I spoke with Officer Al Carbonara, a surveillance specialist, who advised me of a strategy code named Operation “Ark Angel” which looks at Predictive analysis. Security issues prevent further discussion of this strategy within the public domain. The philosophy and approach of the Fusion Centre or JRIC is one I am most keen to explore further within Australia. Prior to leaving Los Angeles I was fortunate to meet with Ronald J Boyd, Chief of the Los Angeles Port Police. Chief Boyd and I discussed contemporary maritime security issues and the purpose of my scholarship.

San Diego, California.

San Diego Harbour Police.

Lieutenant Kirk Nichols of the Homeland Security Unit of San Diego Harbour Patrol was my host for my visit to San Diego. When I first met Kirk he was in company with Officer Randy Benton. I was hosted to briefings at Headquarters and was most fortunate to meet with Police Chief Kirk Sanfilippo and Captain Don Claypool. Interesting to note is that the San Diego Harbour Police was formed initially from Fire-fighters within the Port. Still today the police are the fire fighters and train accordingly. Below is a synopsis of my briefings with San Diego Harbour Police. The Port of San Diego’s Maritime Operations reported cargo tonnage and revenues surpassing last fiscal year’s. Revenue from maritime operations was $35 million in the past fiscal year, eleven million over previous fiscal year. Shipments of steel windmill parts, lumber, auto imports and produce helped spur the increase. Total cargo tonnage for fiscal year 2006 was 3.5 million metric tons. Brake Bulk is the main product handled and these items are not containerised. Large ship building operations are located within the port and support the military (US Navy). An enormous amount of repairs are conducted for military operations. The Port of San Diego is home to the US 3rd Fleet. At any one time there are around 37 vessels from aircraft carriers to smaller amphibious operations in the harbour, including nuclear powered submarines.

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The National City Terminal mostly deals with car transport. Cars are imported from Korea, Japan and Germany. Minimal exporting takes place. A large distribution process commences from the port and is connected via the rail network. Chula Vista houses the Port Operations Centre. The Port of San Diego funds the police and all operations. There are in excess of 140 sworn Officers and civilian staff which support the sworn members. The police operations are on land and water as well as providing a policing service at the airport. Tidal areas are deemed port property. The Port of San Diego is made up of 5 cities, namely; 1. San Diego 2. Coronado 3. National City 4. Chula Vista and 5. Imperial Beach. The Port is administered by Board of Port Commissioners with three representatives from San Diego and one from each of the other cities as outlined above. The USCG has a large presence and Sector Headquarters within San Diego Harbour. The USCG deal with all Federal issues. Local police deal with state issues and violations within the Port of San Diego. With nuclear submarines in the port security is intense. Large screens are erected around facilities prohibiting sight seeing and picture taking. There are floating barricades which seal off areas. Some of these floating barriers have the ability to disable vessels that may attempt to breach them. There is also a Naval security presence on the water and on the land. Contained within the area is a Joint Harbour Operations Centre (JHOC) whereby all closed circuit television (CCTV) feed runs. The centre is manned day and night by staff from the USCG, the military and the police. As per legislation, the 29 Major Ports must have a JHOC. Cameras are focused on launch ramps and key terminals. Cruise ships are calling more frequently to the port with around 275 ships and 900K passengers per year. One cruise ship is permanently based in San Diego the “Carnival Cruise Elation” and cruises to Mexico every few days. Mike Rich - Captain of the Harbour Police Maritime Task Force representative, deals with trafficking of people and drugs. This task force is specific to the San Diego area. It is operated under the auspices of the Federal Government. Mike provided me with a valuable insight into smuggling from Mexico. Following Mike’s presentation we discussed methods of operation and intelligence. The USCG is responsible for marine SAR however Port Police will assist as required.

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Police vessels are on the on water 24/7 and in multiples. Police Officers are trained to Californian Police standards the same as in Los Angles and as referred to previously in this report. San Diego is very similar to Melbourne in that it is a condensed and concentrated city which abuts the dock area. Hotels, convention centres and museums are all located around the dock and promenade, including the cruise ship terminal. Prevention and protection strategies are very active with Officer in schools conducting lectures and advising of telephone numbers to report suspect activities. There is a move towards a “Marina Watch” program similar to Miami and Los Angeles. San Diego refers to a “Harbour Watch” program. The response post 9/11 has seen the purchase of faster vessels. The police have now developed a canine response for general duties and for explosive detection work. Canine teams also work at the Airport and through out the region. The police have also developed a Hazardous Device Team since 9/11. Pre 9/11 dive teams would conduct standard dives and evidence recovery, now they are trained in underwater improvised explosive device (IED) detection. Training is accredited by Naval authorities. Information relating to transponders and other encrypted communications and systems were afforded to me. Communication lessons have been learned since 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. Since these two incidents many agencies and departments have integrated systems that can talk to each other, including the military. Exercises are conducted with differing scenarios. conducted and these involve all port stakeholders.

Table Top exercises are also

Memorandums of Understanding (MOU’s) exist with the various companies at the port and partnerships are seen as strong. Naval commanders in the Port of San Diego are able to raise the MARSEC levels for their assets dependant upon world happenings. An example was when levels were increased following the London 7/7 bombings in 2005. Mike Rich briefed me on the ICE Task Force, which comprises Officers from Immigration Customs and Excise who tackle air and maritime smuggling. Asset seizures and forfeitures are directed back to the agencies or departments responsible for the seizures and this provides another income stream for maintaining operations. Following 9/11 smuggling became more difficult at airports so detections increased via sea ports, San Diego in particular. San Diego police are faced with smugglers of illegal contraband and aliens with offenders utilising large and small powered vessels as well as jet skis and surf boards.

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A number of fast vessels are operated by the ICE teams. Alien detections are around 1 to 2 per week in San Diego. Many are Iranians who seem to pay a fee of around $4,500 (US) per person to cross the boarder. The Port Police operate multiple stations and are assisted by volunteers, who are retired persons. These people act as Community Liaison persons and provide a valuable service. This saves sworn Officers time and increases efficiency in operations. With so many agencies and departments sharing the waters of San Diego occasionally agencies experience minor Command and Control issues. These are addressed through joint operations and exercises. These issues are certainly not unique to the United States and are experienced all over the world. Post 9/11 and ISPS implementation sees a stronger focus on active patrols and being seen by the public and port stakeholders, learning new strategies and acquiring tools to investigate suspect activity. There is also a very strong focus on interacting with the community and talking to people, enhancing interpersonal skills. A valuable lesson from the San Diego experience is that differing agencies have differing jurisdictions and each need to know and understand how they can all work together. As a result staff duties are rotated (land, water & airport) so they can learn how other jurisdictions work thus creating relationships and or partnerships with them.

Hong Kong. Hong Kong Police Department (HKPD) – Special Duties Unit

Victoria Police has a strong association with the Hong Kong Police Department (HKPD). My two squads, Water Police and Search and Rescue, cross train with the Hong Kong Police, including maritime tactical training. Acting Inspector Paul Hobson of the Special Duties Unit hosted my visit to the marine tactical arm of the Hong Kong Police. I was also greatly assisted by Inspector Dominic Hibell who is In Charge of Maritime Counter Terrorism Boat Teams. During my visit to the marine units I met with Inspector Sunny Tong of the Special Duties Dive Team. Following a tour of the facility in Kowloon and a high speed tour of Hong Kong’s water ways I was hosted by Senior Inspector Mark Hayman at the tactical training complex in Fanling. NB: All the above work under the department known as “Special Duties Unit” (SDU). Maritime Counter Terrorism Boat Team members work for and with assault teams. The divers can perform covert operations as well as a sniper function. Maritime or Water Police is a completely different division to the SDU operations. All ISPS regulation issues are dealt with by the Marine Police.

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SDU operations are support services, similar to that of VicPol support services and their deployment is generated often by other units or groups such as detectives or crime squads. There is no military assistance available to Hong Kong Police. Historically this is how the HKPD have developed and explains the highly developed capability held by them. Hong Kong Police has around 29,000 police, 25,000 sworn officers and 4,000 support staff. Geographically around 40% of the area is deemed “Country Park” and can not be developed or built due to the high angled cliffs and mountains. Due to density of population it appears police are more overt which is seen as a good thing. The following is a synopsis of my interviews. Many matters relevant to operational capability and tactics can not be published in the public domain. Interested parties are encouraged to contact me for further if required. Boat Teams cover around 1000 kilometres of coast line and border the various oceans. Hong Kong itself is divided into three areas, 1. Hong Kong Island 2. Kowloon and 3. New Territories. There are around 7 million people in the area and it is predicted to increase to around 10 million within 20 years. The container port is located on the west side of Kowloon and further up the north coast. New container ports are opening on mainland China as the labour is cheaper there. This will pose new issues for the mainland in the coming years. The SDU operate a number of different craft for a multitude of functions. Some of the vessels are High Speed Assault vessels, Yankee boats, Interceptor Vessels and aluminium RHIBS (Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats). The members are dedicated boat drivers and are highly skilled in that field. A higher degree of skill is required to operate in the Hong Kong environment and in the manner in which they do. It is estimated that there are around 50 to 60 vessels a day smuggling between Hong Kong and mainland China. The preferred freight is new electrical items and computers etc, to avoid tariffs. The smuggling craft can be any type of vessel from fishing boats to pleasure craft, including the designed fast boat to out run customs and police vessels. A number of Land Based Radar Stations (LBRS) scan the waterways to detect possible smuggling craft. It is from these detections that intercept craft are despatched. These operations are also supported by aerial patrols.

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Future operations will be assisted by distance cameras mounted in remote areas to observe suspect vessels. This is seen as necessary due to the amount of islands around the coast of HK. Training is on going and never ceases. Training with each other is a big focus as the skills are unique and above the level required by other operational police. The SDU are extremely active with the boarding of vessels in the harbour. This is generally done by consent following radio calls to harbour control and the intended vessel. Harbour Control broadcasts via marine radios to all shipping the intention of the SDU patrols. Vessels visiting Hong Kong Harbour can expect to be boarded by the police at anytime. Dive Teams comprise numerous members and can be overt and covert. Specialised use of equipment such as re-breathers is utilised. Insertions can take many hours and travel long distances. The divers conduct security sweeps for VIP’s and vessels, surveillance and sniper functions. Prior to Hong Kong being handed back to mainland China in 1997 operatives commenced cross training with US Navy Seal Teams and Special Forces units including GSG9 (Germany). Cross training and interchanges duties still continue. Post 9/11 has seen the operational focus more toward terrorism issues. Hong Kong is seen as a target due to the amount of foreign investment and interests within the province. Hong Kong Police maintain a unit with the Department that manages Counter Terrorism issues, similar to that of VicPol’s Counter Terrorism Co-ordination Unit (CTCU). I visited the training complex located at Fanling and re-acquainted myself with a colleague, Senior Inspector Mark Hayman of the SDU. I was privy to a number of training scenarios and toured the complex discussing various aspects of their operations. Again I can not discuss many of these issues in the public domain, suffice to say that it was of great benefit. Below is a very brief synopsis of discussions. We discussed assault teams, snipers, training teams, roping, demolition and methods of entry for both land and vessel operations. We also discussed the use of technical equipment and some operating practices. Generally HKPD have been proactive as there has been no military assistance provided to the area. Since 9/11 there has been more of a focus on world trends and the changing face of terror. The units are now more flexible and operate differently to tackle different trends.

Hong Kong – Marine Unit

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My host was Inspector Sunny Chan of the Small Boat Division. I had previously met Sunny when he visited our operations in 2006. Sunny introduced me to his superior, Superintendent Terry Fung of the Marine Region HQ. Following interviews with these gentlemen I was taken to the control centre for all maritime operations where I met with Chief Inspector “KC” Leung Kwok Chun of the Marine Region Control Room. My visit to the Marine Units operation was most exciting and helpful. Below is a synopsis of my interviews and learnings. Hong Kong marine operations cover approximately 1651 square km area. Within this area are 262 islands. The 191 kilometre long boundary is referred to as BOA or the Boarder of Administration. The main issues faced are with illegal immigrants and high speed smuggling operations. Currently the marine unit’s fleet comprises around 142 vessels. The unit has divisional command launches, divisional patrol launches, divisional patrol vessels, inshore patrol vessels, tenders and high speed interceptors. They also operate (2) Barges and 3 training launches. The unit is soon to obtain a further 23 fast speed RHIBS and 17 medium patrol launches. Total staff for marine division is in excess of 2300 sworn officers. Hong Kong has 31 ISPS regulated ports. The Marine Department is the designated authority which oversees compliance however HKPD are the operational audit team and inspectors in general. ISPS plans are submitted to police for comment and recommendation to the Marine Department for approval. It is envisaged that in the future the HKPD will have specific audit teams on a full time basis. Sunny’s small boat division comprises around 300 staff. Most of the units work is focused on smugglers and illegal immigrants from the mainland. Illegal’s are not prosecuted but deported back to mainland China. If they are repeat offenders, commit serious crimes or resist apprehension then they are prosecuted. Anti smuggling strategies comprise of assistance by the Government Flying Service (GFS) which detects and directs police to suspicious craft. The use of radar and Intelligence is also utilised. Most narcotics are imported from mainland China to Hong Kong. The death penalty does not seem to be a deterrent on the mainland. There is a specific Narcotic Bureau, similar to a DEA to tackle larger and complex operations. The Marine Police work joint operations with this department. The Marine Division do conduct vessel boardings and like most police jurisdictions require some form of “reasonable grounds or suspicion” to board. This is not always required where cases of regulation enforcement conditions, i.e. a licence are required.

Regional Traffic Centre (RTC) is the Shipping Management Control of HK.

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The Marine Division will have multiple vessels on the water at any one time in any one of the five divisions. This equates to a substantial police presence on the water in and around Hong Kong. The five divisions are divided into Outer Water Districts and the Port District. Each is commanded by a Senior Superintendent. Superintendent Terry Fung advises me that the BOA (Boarder of Administration) is their absolute area of operation and that they can not go outside of it. For the local marine units there are three main issues, 1. People smuggling for prostitution from the mainland, 2. Poaching any type of sea item and 3. The illegal harvesting of Buddhist Pine Wood. This grows in the HK area and is very desirable for a multitude of purposes. Due to the smuggling issue the Marine Division now have an independent Smuggling Division. Smuggling is big business as the avoidance of taxes and tariffs in China is highly profitable. Currently there is a 17% export tax and 17% tariff on item = 35% profit for the smugglers if they avoid same. There is a Customs / Border Defence Bureau which is a paramilitary type operation. This is designed to tackle the organised smugglers. There is a 45 minute travel time in high speed vessels to and from the border with the mainland in some areas. Previous organised smuggling operations have seen 50 + high speed vessels racing toward the border at anyone time. Counter Terrorism Policy is generated from central headquarters and is executed by the SDU in the field. Search and Rescue is managed by the Marine Department, a separate government department and is managed from a Regional Marine Rescue Co-ordination Centre. Versatile Marine Policing Response (VMPR) was a tactic deployed prior to new technology developments. In short HKPD would ring their area with vessels, almost with a line of sight to each vessel surrounding their area of operation. With the use of cameras, radar and aerial support this is no longer seen as the best option. The Control Room for Marine Operations was impressive and similar to our D24 operation. I was shown the operation of Digital Radar Security Systems which cover all areas and are in real time. These systems are recorded and can be used in evidence. The whole system is backed up off site. The technology used in the control room can identify vessels, their speed and proposed direction (tracking). Like VicPol’s D24, there are specific operating communication pods for each of the regions. An operator can communicate direct to police vessels via radio, phone and e-mail. This area manages all marine operations for the police; however, it does not receive emergency calls as such. Those calls are patched through from the normal police communications centre.

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There are video linkages with all regions. Located to the side of this operations centre is a separate major event room called “HICOM”. The water operations of the Hong Kong Police Department are very impressive. Their operations are conducted like a naval force. Considering the size of the fleet and staff it is probably larger than some countries naval forces.

Singapore Police Department. Police Coast Guard.

The Singapore Police Department (SPD) Cost Guard operation I visited was located at Brani Way near Sentosa Island on Singapore Harbour. My hosts for the visit were N. Shanmuganandam, an Assistant Superintendent of Operations Management and Nor Affendy Bin Jaffar, Staff Sergeant of Operations Management and Vincent Lee a Senior Staff Sergeant attached to the Planing Branch and Corporate Communications. All previous communications and arrangements had been by way of e-mail with Superintendent Marilyn Tan of the Public Affairs Department. I was afforded a presentation at the unit’s headquarters. The following is a synopsis of that presentation and of discussions. In 1866 the Marine Branch commenced and remained till 1993 when it officially became Police Coast Guard. The usual focus of operations has been traditional law enforcement but in more recent times, post 9/11 and ISPS introduction, have realised more towards security of state. Singapore Port Perimeter is some 156km with an area of port waters totalling 528.91 square kilometres. The Coast Guard operates a number of different vessels together with specific interceptor craft. The maritime force strength is just over 1000 officers and includes an intelligence section and investigators section. At anyone time there will be in excess of 30 police vessels on Singapore waters. There are four Regions under one central marine command. There is also a Coastal Patrol Squadron. In Singapore all men once they attain 18 years must undergo National Service either in the military or with the police. Initially this is for 2.5 years. PNS = Police National Service. Currently the SPD have 2,500 reserve officers under this scheme. To maintain competency these officers must return every year for a two week competency training course. These officers remain active on reserve until aged 40. Total staff comprises 6.3% females. The initial Maritime Training Course (MTC) is 10 weeks with a Coxswains component of 6 weeks. A Boarding Officer’s Course is 3 weeks in duration. The majority of work conducted is searching for contraband and illegal immigrants.

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Specific legislative power under penal codes requires suspicion or intelligence for boarding vessels at sea. Large ships are requested to lower ladders. In the training area SPD have a mock ship for training. This training tool is very impressive and can be used 24/7 each day of the year. This allows the members to practice pilot ladder climbing, boarding and search techniques, tactical procedures and defensive tactic training. SPD also have a STAR Force (Special Tactics and Rescue). The Police Coast Guard also have a Special Task Squadron. Some of these members are qualified to drive large ships. In discussions with my hosts they identified countering terrorism and smuggling as their greatest challenges. Goods are smuggled into Singapore due to high tax rates. An example provided was cigarettes at 50 cents in Malaysia and sold in Singapore for $11.00. As can be seen, there is a huge increase and profit margin with the avoidance of taxes and tariffs. The same applies to alcohol; it can be purchased cheaply in Malaysia as opposed to Singapore. Firearms are illegal in Singapore and some offences carry life imprisonment. Persons found trafficking 10 grams or more of drugs face the death penalty. Most illegal immigrants arrive from Malaysia and Bangladesh. Middle Eastern countries do not feature highly as opposed to Australia’s illegal immigrants. When I asked about illegal immigrants from Africa and Russia I was advised that they do not receive any. Singapore views countering terrorism as a regional problem and not just specific to Singapore. Local groups were discussed including Jemaah Islamiah (JI). Singapore authorities understand they could be a target due to western interests, the same as Hong Kong. Globalisation and life style also makes them a target. As a result they have revised their tactics since 9/11 and approach to countering terrorism. Tactics used include a deterrent factor in that they like to create the perception that offenders will be caught and harshly dealt with, which they are, as compared to Australian standards. Prevention through media and high visible patrolling and detection all assist in mitigating the threat of terrorism. The use of surveillance systems is very strong both physical and by watercraft, this includes technical and radar. SPD have access to state systems, port systems and their own mobile systems for areas with black spots or no coverage for mounting specific operations. Police vessels have cameras with zoom and infra red capability. Coast Guard Police are very active with ship boardings. Similar to Hong Kong, they adopt the strategy that “if you come to Singapore – expect to be boarded”. Police board Ferries, Tugs and all types of vessels. The Coast Guard like to highlight that Singapore is hard to illegally enter. Vessels are specifically tasked for critical infrastructure protection duties.

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Fences on the northern part of island between Singapore and Malaysia are at some points 500 metres apart and are designed to prevent swimming aliens and smugglers. These areas are patrolled daily for breaks and cuts and must also be cleaned of rubbish. Singapore Police Coast Guard has established strong partnerships with The Republic of Singapore Navy, Maritime Port Authority (MPA) and Immigration Checkpoint Authority. Foreign Counterparts that they train with or have MOU’s with are Japan CG, Korean CG, USCG and the HKPD. Joint operations are conducted with the Korean CG, and both share intelligence. Recently a forum was held in Japan to further examine the sharing of intelligence and strengthening of maritime operations within the region. An exchange with other countries for training is common and encouraged. The ISPS compliance is managed by the Maritime Port Authority (MPA) as too is Search and Rescue. This Authority issues approvals and has their own Security Unit assess and audit ISPS plans. ISPS regulation has had more of an affect on the private sector at ports and on shipping companies. It is believed that Singapore’s ports were always reasonably secure and restricted for taxes and security issues. Post 9/11 has specific vessels and teams dedicated to patrol islands and look for an array of concerns. There are also more joint exercises with other government departments. Work load increased after 9/11 as opposed to ISPS implementation. Following 9/11 an injection of funds occurred as well as an increase in staff numbers. ISPS implementation did not really change marine police operations as much as the influence of the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States. Canine Units can be utilised from general police operations. The port has X-Ray facilities which can be used by the Coast Guard if required. The Port of Singapore has various detectors for chemicals and alike, similar to Los Angeles and Dover. All small harbour craft must have transponders fitted and operating together with panic buttons. Security for cruise ships is the same as an airport whereby passengers and luggage are screened by various detectors. Should air support be required the military will respond. Both organisations work together in a “combined operations room” which is operational 24/7 each day of the year. The Singapore Port has an Auxiliary Police Force, separate to that of the Singapore Police Department. The Auxiliary Police are armed and have limited powers to conduct port security operations and investigate minor crimes including thefts in the port. Major crimes or more serious crimes are handled by the state police. Singapore’s operation appears similar to that of Hong Kong and is like that of a small Navy also.

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Recommendations. Recommendation 1.

That the State Government, jointly comprising Victoria Police, the Departments of Justice, Infrastructure and Treasury and Finance, establish a 24 hour Maritime Operations Centre to manage all maritime policing and emergency management response for Victorian waters including policing the land on which Victorian ISPS Regulated Ports operate.

Comments. The above recommendation takes into account policing on a day to day basis on both water and the land. All land operated or owned by port authorities would become the jurisdiction of “Water Police” It would also incorporate criminal investigations on the water and in the port, including investigation of organised crime operations which currently go unchecked. At present the only land based police patrols occur from local police stations and information suggests that the ports are generally not patrolled. Currently in Victoria, Water Police only operate on the water and have no landside responsibility. The above would be supported by an analytical arm comprising of representatives from all key stakeholders. This could be a test case for further development of an “all of Government”, Joint Regional Intelligence Centre (JRIC) concept as referred to in this report. All emergency response co-ordination including marine and land search and rescue, would occur from this complex and consideration could be afforded to housing other emergency response operators such as Fire and State Emergency Service personnel. It is also envisaged that the police Search and Rescue Squad would be housed within the same complex. This complex should be a “whole of Government” approach and be managed by the states emergency response co-coordinators, the police and centrally located to the Port of Melbourne. Funding could be sourced by minor increases in container handling processed through the Port of Melbourne. On a world scale these costs are currently below that of other ports. Whilst most benefits would be to the Port of Melbourne not all costs for the complex including ongoing costs should be borne solely from the Port of Melbourne. A ratio of Officers and services could be established to determine costs.

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Following the channel upgrade in 2008/2009, more vessels will be visiting the port. Demands for all services will increase. A strategic view should be adopted to tackle future demands. This includes security and emergency response. It is acknowledged that a substantial amount of work is required in preparation of such a complex. A project commenced sooner rather than later would be beneficial to the Port, The State and ultimately Australia.

Recommendation 2.

That Water Police operations in Victoria, when expanded into land side/port operations, is made its own police division, similar to overseas police departments and that of Marine Area Command (MAC) in New South Wales.

Comment. With continued yearly increases in vessel registration, use of water ways and shipping the demand for increased policing services will follow. In the previous four years staff has increased at the Water Police to meet current demands and expectations. Following the current trends and indicators should dictate that a separate maritime policing division be established, a stand alone Division within the current Specialist Support Department of Victoria Police. Staffing numbers and areas of responsibility are commensurate with existing staffing policy.

Recommendation 3. That Victoria Police consider expanding its maritime policing focus to Asia, Europe and the United States by seeking involvement in conferences such as the AquaPol meetings in Europe, Air and Sea Port Police Officers Conferences in the USA and possibly establishment of a South East Asian Water Police Council.

Comments. As shipping traverses the world so should policing knowledge and trends. By attending such conferences Officers in Victoria can continue to expand networks in the field and understand contemporary issues relative to maritime policing. Further expansion of existing cross skilling and training of staff would evolve.

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The separate establishment of a South East Asian Water Police Council may be preemptive however this could be further assessed in time. Certainly Victoria could take the lead in establishing an Australian Council of Water Police Officers.

Recommendation 4. That Victoria Police, Water Police Squad consider establishing a similar concept to that of “Marina Watch” in the State of Victoria.

Comments.

Lessons learned from Neighbourhood Watch and Crime Stoppers programmes can readily be reverted to such a proposal. Existing resources and knowledge could see this concept developed and brought into operation with relative ease. Liaison with local marina authorities and councils, combined with local police, should bring this concept into reality in a timely and efficient manner.

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Acknowledgements. Australia.

The Winston Churchill Memorial Trust – Staff of National Office, Canberra. The Winston Churchill Memorial Trust – Staff of Victorian Regional Office, Victoria. Mr. Ray Mead - Rotary Club of Griffith, New South Wales. Rotary Clubs of Griffith, New South Wales. Mr. Max Phelan, Melbourne Victoria. Chief Commissioner Christine Nixon, VicPol, Melbourne. Assistant Commissioner Bob Hastings, VicPol, Melbourne. Det. Superintendent Richard Grant, VicPol, Melbourne. Inspector Mathew Anderson, VicPol, Melbourne. Mr. Leo Van Der Toorren, Department of Premier and Cabinet, Melbourne, Victoria. Mr. Warwick Bull, State Security Manager Vic/Tas Department of Transport and Regional Services, Melbourne, Victoria. Mr. Frank Mensforh, Qantas.

United Kingdom:

Chief Officer Stephen J Masters – Port of Dover Police. Deputy Chief Officer Paul Wilczek – Port of Dover Police. Detective Chief Inspector Andrew T Lyttle – Kent Police. Detective Inspector Charlie Stokes – Kent Police. Detective Sergeant Neil Care – Port of Dover Police. Detective Sergeant Paul Bratton – Kent Police. Detective Constable Lee Kidd – Kent Police. Inspector Tony Golding – Folkestone Police Station Sergeant Osborne – Folkestone Police Station. The Netherlands:

Mr. Edmond Messchaert – City of Rotterdam. Ms. Mirjam Otten – City of Amsterdam. Commissioner Peter van Haasteren – Chief Water Police, Dordrecht. Chief Jan van Heertum, Netherlands Police Agency, Special Intervention Department. Chief Superintendent Peter R. van den Berg, Dordrecht. DIC Peter Schaafsma – KLPD – C/T specialist. Inspector Bouke Jansma – KLPD River & Canal, Dordrecht. Sergeant Michel Kloet, Harbour & Sea Police, Municipal Police - Rotterdam. Koos Luitjens- Harbour Police Rotterdam, Neckarweg 50 Rotterdam. Brett & Phyllis Randal, The Hague. The United States of America: New York:

Lieutenant Edelle James – NYPD HQ. Deputy Inspector David Driscoll – NYD Harbour Unit. Detective Carlos A Cruz – Commissioner’s Liaison Office.

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Washington DC:

Lt. Commander Mark Vlaun - USCG. Lt. Paul Casey – USCG. Commander Michael T Cunningham – UCG. Lt. Commander Scott Muller – USCG. Officer Martin Hungate - Pentagon. Officer Chris Hale – Pentagon. Miami:

Sergeant Nelson Rodriguez, Miami-Dade Police, Underwater Recovery Unit. Officer Oscar “Rocky” Roque, Miami-Dade Police, Underwater Recovery Unit. Officer Ray Rodriguez, Miami-Dade Police, Special Patrol Bureau. Sergeant Mick Santos, Miami-Dade Police – Port Patrol. Dive & SWAT staff Miami City Police Department. Police Assistance Officer Ray Lopez. Los Angeles:

Chief of Police Ronald J Boyd, LAPPD Lieutenant Michael Graychik, LAPPD Special Operations. Sergeant Kevin MClosky, LAPPD. Officer Nathan Ewert, LAPPD, Security Specialist. Detective Bob Arzuman, LAPD, Major Crimes & Anti-Terrorism Unit. Lieutenant Robert V. Fox, LAPD – Joint Regional Intelligence Centre. Ralph Torres, Analyst - Joint Regional Intelligence Centre. George P Cummings, Director of Homeland Security – Port of LA. Mr. Hugh Tate, Training and Recruitment, Costa Mesa Police Department. San Diego:

Chief Kirk M. Sanfilippo, Diego Harbour Police – Homeland Security Unit. Lieutenant Kirk Nichols, San Diego Harbour Police – Homeland Security Unit. Captain Don Claypool, Diego Harbour Police – Homeland Security Unit. Officer Randy Benton, Diego Harbour Police – Homeland Security Unit.

Hong Kong:

Superintendent Wai-kin, Terrence Fung, HKPD Marine Headquarters. Chief Inspector Leung Kwok Chun “KC”, HKPD Marine Headquarters. A/Chief Inspector Paul A Hobson, HKPD, Tactical Unit. Inspector Dominic Hibell, HKPD Tactical Unit. Inspector Siu-kau Sunny Tong, HKPD Special Duties Unit – Dive Team Snr. Inspector Mark Hayman, HKPD, Special Duties Unit. Inspector Sunny Chan, HKPD, Marine West Division.

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Singapore:

Superintendent Marilyn Tan, Singapore Police Department HQ. Assistant Superintendent Shanmuganandam, Operations Management. Snr. Staff Sergeant Vincent Lee, Planning & Corporate Communications Staff Sergeant Nor Affendy Bin Jaffar, Operations Planning.

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