The state and social change in South Africa

The state and social change in South Africa H. J. Kotze´ Introduction institutions. Any discussion of the possibility of sustained democracy in Sout...
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The state and social change in South Africa

H. J. Kotze´ Introduction

institutions. Any discussion of the possibility of sustained democracy in South Africa thus During the past 10 years South Africa has been inevitably shifts to the role of the state. through a period of unprecedented change. The In a truly democratic state, citizens must process of democratisation that began in 1990 have equal opportunity to gain access to public has resulted in more political, economic, and goods. In addition to voting rights, these include social change than was experienced during the the provision of social services such as schools, period of 70 years following the establishment welfare, and economic infrastructure, as well as of the modern South Africa state in 1910. After less tangible symbolic goods including official five years of democratic rule the country rep- languages, flags, and national anthems. For resents a significant exmany countries in Africa it ample of an apparently is a major challenge to H. J. Kotze´ is Professor of Political successful democratic trandeliver these public goods. Science at the University of Stellenbosch, sition in Africa. In the light The capacity of state instiPrivate Bag X1, Stellenbosch 7602, South Africa. Email: hjk얀akad.sun. of the predictions of many tutions is therefore of cruac.za. His fields of specialisation include Afro-pessimists that the discial importance. comparative political behaviour, political integration of authoritarian State autonomy, risk analysis and comparative politics rule would not lead to stable defined as the situation with a specific focus on South Africa. His and accountable governwhere the corps of state current research focuses on the attitudes and values of the top opinion leaders in ment, but rather to state colofficials transcends these South Africa, and their significance for lapse or intensified corrupcommunal loyalties and public policy-making. tion, the role of the state obligations, is also very in sustaining democracy beimportant. In divided socicomes of pivotal imporeties like South Africa— tance. The aim of this article where partisanship tends to is therefore to explore not be ascriptively shaped and only the changes in the role of the state in adversaries tend to coalesce in relatively stable South Africa, but also to highlight the changes communities—the challenge to the state is to that have taken place since the process of demo- deliver public goods to all citizens, irrespective cratisation began.1 of ascriptive identity, communal affiliation, or During South Africa’s transition to democ- partisan loyalty. If the state cannot live up to racy one of the most important developments this challenge, the partisan ethnic state emerges was the adoption of a new Constitution, Bill of as an instrument of discrimination and domiRights, and electoral system. However, the nation, favouring certain communities in the racial characteristics of the old political system provision of public goods. are too deeply ingrained to expect a generally In cases where one social grouping controls high level of confidence in the new political the state it is possible that the distinction ISSJ 163/2000  UNESCO 2000. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

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between state and regime may disappear, as it did in South Africa during the apartheid era.2 The apartheid state epitomised a partisan ethnic state in which the then government gradually transformed state institutions into extensions of the regime. Transitions in cases such as this can be expected to be more difficult to the extent that agencies of the state continue to serve only the interests of one set of citizens at the expense of the others; the regime and its structures are inherently discriminatory in nature. In order to be successful, the process of political change in South Africa requires a twostage transition: the democratisation of the regime and the establishment of an autonomous state. To explore these two stages this article will begin with a brief overview of the period preceding the transition that was initiated in February 1990. An exploratory and descriptive examination of the changes that have taken place during the transition phase will follow. The third part of the article focuses on the impact that these changes have had on the capacity of the state, specifically on administrative and technical developments. Finally, an assessment is made of the autonomy of the state.

The context: from domination to transition A central issue that has influenced contemporary South African politics has been a fear of domination. This fear can be conceptualised in both political and economic terms: the first is for the potential economic domination of the white minority over the black majority, while the second concerns the potential political domination of the majority over the minority. These fears were entrenched in the South African state that came into being with Union in 1910. The Union was, as the name indicates, a unitary state negotiated by white political leaders who succeeded in creating a state which institutionalised white privilege (Odendaal 1984, 16–20). After the National Party’s (NP) unexpected election victory in 1948, racial segregation—or apartheid as it became known—was institutionalised on a massive scale. The unitary form of constitution made it relatively easy for the NP  UNESCO 2000.

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to consolidate and centralise power. Apartheid legislation and the hardship it caused non-white racial groups resulted in a number of primarily black organisations challenging the white-dominated state. Notwithstanding this, Verwoerd— Prime Minister during the 1960s—extended social and political apartheid further with the creation of ‘independent’ homelands for the different black ethnic groups. This stimulated increased resistance and led to the emergence of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and an invigorated African National Congress (ANC) as direct opponents of the state. Periodic legitimacy crises flared up when various contenders challenged the racist nature of the state. These have been linked to what has been termed ‘crises of accumulation’—situations where the racially exclusive capitalist base of the state was threatened. The immense mobilisation of resistance during the early 1960s resulted in one such crisis. Subsequently, the ANC and PAC were forced into exile and all organised resistance to the state was quashed. Thereafter, a fairly favourable economic climate allowed the state to redress this crisis with ease. During the 1970s, turmoil in the black townships and a series of wildcat strikes indicated that extensive socio-political and economic adaptation was necessary to ward off a potential cataclysm. This resulted in a widespread attempt at political and economic restructuring or ‘managed change’ by the government of P. W. Botha. While the racially exclusive nature of the decision-making process was adapted, the cumbersome ‘reform’ period of 1977–1984 resulted in a situation where apartheid remained intact and effective political decision-making limited to members of the dominant racial grouping (see Kotze´ 1998). During the early 1980s the political conflict assumed an increasingly violent nature. The state’s attempts at restructuring precipitated the most widespread campaign of resistance to racial exclusivism in the country’s history. While the state’s various constitutional machinations undoubtedly fuelled popular resistance, it must also be borne in mind that the process of restructuring created what Lodge (1987, 4) termed ‘legal space for the open mobilisation of resistance to apartheid’.

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Regime transition The appointment of F. W. de Klerk as State President in September 1989 heralded the beginning of a new era. Burdened by the financial cost of apartheid, increased resistance from the disenfranchised, and the socio-economic challenges posed by urbanisation, unemployment, housing, and education, the new government opened the way in February 1990 for a democratic settlement. Black resistance movements were unbanned and Nelson Mandela was released. An immediate start was also made in the dismantling of the remaining pillars of social apartheid. This period can be described as the ‘liberalisation’ of South African politics.3 The transition placed South Africa irreversibly on the path away from white domination.4 From the beginning of 1990, the political process was characterised by a series of pacts that were intended to achieve a joint set of rules for the negotiations between the leading contenders for power (see Sisk 1995). Discussions on regime models were initiated much later.5 Thus, during the period from November 1991 to late 1993, the foundations for a negotiated political settlement were laid by South Africa’s most important moderate political groupings including the dominant political parties, the ANC and the NP. During the next four years that culminated, late in 1993, with the final acceptance of South Africa’s new Interim Constitution, the most important agents in the South African transition were the political leaders. Approximately 26 parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groups negotiated together in a multiparty forum, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa). After two years of negotiations in the Constitutional Assembly, the final Constitution was adopted in 1996 and came into effect during February 1997. It is interesting to note that while negotiations on the details of the Constitution required considerable time, the parties reached agreement on the principle of constitutionalism during 1993.6 Surprisingly little difference of opinion existed on devices common to many liberal Western constitutions that protect opposition parties and individuals against repression, and maintain responsible govern UNESCO 2000.

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ment. These devices include, inter alia, the following: constitutionally guaranteed press freedom (subject to clauses which prohibit racism); a Bill of Rights that protects the fundamental rights of individuals; judicial review; a guaranteed multi-party system; proportional representation in the electoral system; the regular election of public representatives at all levels of government; and, the establishment of an Ombudsman. In addition to the political pacts there were also attempts to establish military and economic pacts. Such pacts are by definition undemocratic and conservative in nature, as they do not include grassroots participation. They represented an attempt, at leadership level, to control the transition process and maintain order. For a long time, the economic debate in South Africa was centred on the relative merits of socialism and capitalism. The policies of the ANC–South African Communist Party (SACP) alliance and the PAC were, to varying degrees, based on socialist values. These included aspects such as a state-controlled economy, the nationalisation of industries and a redistribution of wealth. On the other side, the NP incumbents preferred a market economy involving aspects such as deregulation, privatisation, and commercialisation. In essence, one group wanting to keep the state out of the economic sphere while the other group insisting that an interventionist state was necessary to encourage development and exports, to take apart the concentrated pattern of ownership in the economy, and to dismantle the structures built during apartheid. In the period 1990 to 1994 the positions of both groups changed significantly. It can quite safely be said that the economy was the subject that was most often discussed in a politically inclusive manner at conferences, scenario discussions, workshops, and indabas (informal discussions of leaders) during the transition period. New views were presented in position papers and debated in both camps. The role of the military in the transition also received considerable attention among political analysts. In this regard it is worth remembering Dahl’s (1971, 15–16) axiom that groups such as the military will support a transition when the costs of repression exceed the costs of toleration. The bottom line for the armed forces was their survival as a hierarchical

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institution and they eventually agreed to the integration of the various armed forces. Similarly, the police, judiciary, and top civil servants agreed to the restructuring of their respective bureaucracies. The patterns of party identification and support for incumbents among the elite in the armed forces and the civil service have had important implications for both the transition process and the stability of the new regime (see Kotze´ 1998, 233–234). In the first place, there had to be support for the pacts concluded by different political groupings. The fact that top leaders in the most important institutional sectors identified so strongly with the NP meant that there was little risk of their not supporting the negotiated agreements. Secondly, the challengers—those previously excluded from the political process— would have to cooperate with the state’s instruments of power—the military, police, and bureaucracy—when they moved into positions of power, both during the transition and after an election. This realisation caused both groupings to adopt more conciliatory attitudes. Finally, it took the elite nearly three years to realise that the conflict between the incumbents and the challengers did not necessarily have to be zero-sum. In the end they capitalised on this growing realisation and moved towards an outcome beneficial to both sides. To use Dahl’s term, a situation of ‘mutual security’ was created. This could only be achieved once the state had adopted a more neutral position, assuming the role of guardian of the peace. In other words, the historical fusion of state and regime had to be broken (see Kotze´ 1998, 223). The process of negotiating the transition was never easy. The state-imposed system of violence that was evident until 1990 disappeared but the ‘landscape of conflict became more fractured’ (Du Toit and Kotze´ 1997, 4). After 1990, violence increasingly found expression in the form of massacres, political assassinations, intimidation, and forced mobilisation for mass demonstrations, revenge attacks, attacks on rail commuters and minibus taxi wars. The handling of the mass action campaigns that occurred during the buildup to the 1994 elections indicated that each political party was prepared to make political capital at the expense of the other. In effect, both camps had begun campaigning  UNESCO 2000.

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before any agreement on the rules for an election had been reached.

Transforming the state The new South African Parliament was one of the most important products of the negotiated transition. Parliament consists of two houses, namely: the National Assembly (400 members) and the Senate (in the final Constitution the Senate’s name was changed to the National Council of Provinces, consisting of 90 members). The composition of Parliament represents a compromise between the ANC and the NP. Whereas the ANC had initially favoured a unicameral system, the NP proposed a second chamber in which all political parties with a certain percentage of support would have equal representation. In the NA, 200 members are elected from a national list whilst a further 200 are elected proportionally from the provincial lists. Nineteen parties competed in South Africa’s first democratic elections during April 1994. Whereas parties such as the ANC, NP, and Democratic Party (DP) positioned themselves as major catch-all parties, the PAC and Freedom Front (FF) targeted specific racial communities. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) remained ambivalent as to its specific target group. The election results came as no surprise with the ANC obtaining almost a two-thirds majority, and the NP coming second with one-fifth of the vote. The results were as follows: ANC— 62.65%; NP—20.39%; IFP—10.54%; FF— 2.17%; DP—1.73%; PAC—1.25%; ACDP— 0.45%; and, other parties (not represented in Parliament)—0.82%. The 1994 election results resemble a racial census, with overwhelming support from the African population for the historically black parties and movements including the ANC, PAC, and IFP.7 Similarly, the traditionally white parties—NP, DP and FF—garnered the majority of white support, with majority support from the coloureds and Indians going to the NP. Of South Africa’s 37.9 million inhabitants (1996 census),8 of which an estimated 21.6 million voters were qualified to vote, more that 86% of those qualified participated in the election. (Although the country has 11 official languages

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Children playing table football in Mayville squatter camp, Durban, South Africa.

the main historically designated groups are Africans 77%; Whites 12%; Coloureds 8.5%; and Asians 2.5%.) South Africa’s Government of National Unity (GNU) was established for a period of five years. The two largest political parties—or any party that received more that 20% of the vote—were entitled to nominate one of their members as a deputy president. It was also stipulated that all parties that received more than 5% of the vote could, in proportion to their support, nominate ministers to the cabinet. Of the 27 cabinet posts, the NP received six posts, the IFP received three, while the remaining positions were filled by persons nominated by the ANC. Nelson Mandela was elected President and F. W. de Klerk, leader of the NP, and Thabo Mbeki of the ANC became Deputy Presidents.  UNESCO 2000.

Alon Reininger/Contact Press Images

Parliament has had to address inequalities, exhibit responsiveness to the interests of its various constituencies and stabilise support for the new incumbents. In many instances, the policy directions that the ANC–SACP–Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) alliance—or the National Liberation Movement (NLM)—has taken can be deduced from their ideological points of departure. These can be summarised using the following three dimensions: Democracy: Substantive justice is a core feature of the ideology. In this case, the result of a political decision is of more importance than the procedures and rules that must be followed in order to reach that decision. The result is the liberation and prioritisation of the indigenous black majority. Here the assumption is that a specific group—the formerly oppressed

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African population—is the core unit of democracy, and that democratisation requires the transfer of privileges to this group. Unrestricted majority government is seen as the best method of serving the interests of the majority. As a result, the protection of minorities is low on the list of priorities. Nation: The group with the collective historical experience of discrimination is seen as the core of the South African nation. People who are not members of this group are accepted—hence the ‘non-racial’ point of departure—but only on terms defined by the majority. Nation building is actively pursued by the state by depoliticising cultural groups. Socio-economic development: In order to ensure justice for all, a policy of redistribution has to be implemented. Important strategies include affirmative action and black empowerment. Against this ideological background it did not come as a surprise that the policy priority of the GNU was defined as reconstruction, including both redistribution and reconciliation. Before the 1994 elections, the ANC took ownership of the Cosatu-designed Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), an ambitious plan for socio-economic transformation and the dismantling of the structure of the ‘two nations’ society (one black and one white) (ANC 1994, Marais 1998, 95). This document sought to balance a concern for social needs and market forces, and the principles of the programme drew support from a wide spectrum of political parties. Nevertheless, different interest groups attached different interpretations to this policy. For the rich it was a form of confiscatory redistribution, and among the poor it was perceived as an opportunity to receive free gifts. From the outset, the business community was not well disposed to the programme. Opinion polls indicated that businessmen considered the full implementation of the programme to be detrimental to economic growth. Business groupings argued that it would lead to a rise in national debt, inflation, and interest rates, a dramatic rise in taxation, and an escalating balance of payments deficit. In addition to the practical problems of coordination that the Department of Reconstruction and Development experienced, the opposition of the business sector probably explains the low profile that the  UNESCO 2000.

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government’s flagship programme enjoyed so soon after its implementation. However, the objective of significant social investment was not discarded. The so-called RDP Base Document included fixed socio-economic targets, including a million homes by the year 2001 and running water and sewerage systems to one million households. It also sought to create 2.5 million jobs in 10 years; provide electricity to 2.5 million homes by the year 2001; redistribute 30% of the agricultural land to small-scale black farmers within five years; shift the health system from curative services towards primary health care; and, restructure state institutions to reflect the racial and gender composition of the South African society. Once the RDP became the official development programme of the new government it achieved a sacrosanct status but was never really developed into a coherent strategy for transformation, proving difficult to implement in practice. Not only were there negative attitudes towards the policy in some state sectors, there were also serious logistical and coordination difficulties within the line ministries responsible for implementing the programme. In the financial year 1995–1996, more than 75% of the public funds allocated to housing were not spent. These problems multiplied at the level of provincial and local governments. However, despite these setbacks, many private sector initiatives were also launched. Overall, a number of important achievements were recorded. The following major changes were registered by the end of 1998: 쐌 An increase from 31% households with electricity to 63%. 쐌 An increase of 10% in the number of people that have access to clean water—more than three million gained access. 쐌 More than 1.3 million phones have been installed. 쐌 Over five million children are fed under the Primary School Nutrition Scheme. 쐌 Since 1994 there have been 22 pieces of legislation on land reform, and more than 53,000 people have received access to 6.5 million hectares of land under the reform legislation. 쐌 Compulsory education for pupils up to grade

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nine was introduced and a non-racial education system created. Between 1995–1998 spending on education increased by 35%. 쐌 Ten thousand new classrooms have been built. 쐌 It is estimated that the government will definitely reach the one million housing target in 2000. 쐌 Spending on health in the period 1995–1998 increased by 45%, and in the same period more than 560 clinics were built or upgraded. (For a more elaborate exposition of the changes, see South African Communication Service 1999.) Although the RDP did not live up to expectations during the period when it was classified as a separate ministry, enormous strides in selected areas including health, housing, and general welfare were made. One of the most striking indicators of the overall improvement of living conditions has been the continued decline in infant mortality rates. In the area of human rights, notably the majority status of women, major changes have also been effected. In 1996, the RDP ministry was closed and incorporated into the office of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. While the RDP still directs the government’s socio-economic planning, the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) plan, launched in 1996, is now regarded as the primary macro-economic strategy. One of the most important policy measures used to achieve redistribution is that of affirmative action, especially in the appointment of people to the public service. The RDP takes an explicit position in favour of a quota system for employment in the public sector. The Constitution provides for such measures and sets conditions for their application. Nevertheless, core state agencies including the South African National Defense Force (SANDF), the South African Police Service (SAPS), the Civil Service, and the Courts at first retained some of their incumbent personnel and essentially corporate character. Initially, it was believed that despite the new regime, the state had become more autonomous. However, from 1997 onwards, as supporters of the new regime replaced incumbent personnel at an accelerating rate, the autonomy of the state has come under increasing pressure.  UNESCO 2000.

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The Public Service Laws Amendment Act of 1997 grants the Minister of Public Service and Administration wide powers for restructuring the public service. It also makes provision for the implementation of affirmative action in the appointment and promotion of public servants. Affirmative action is prevalent in all state structures whether they are under formal or informal control. This has resulted in substantial losses of skilled people from the public service and parastatals, and has also aggravated the brain drain as numerous professionals have left the country. Transformation has weakened the capacity of the most important state structures. With the influx of new recruits into the state structures, the state has been faced with what Landsberg and Kabemba (1998, 277) have termed an ‘experience deficit’. This process has threatened the consolidation of the new democracy as the strength of the state depends on the good health of these institutional networks.

Reconciliation and nationbuilding In the five years since the 1994 elections, President Nelson Mandela has become one of the greatest assets of the new regime. With his unparalleled international reputation, charismatic personage, and carefully constructed image, Mandela has been able to lay substantial foundations for a climate of reconciliation within the country, demonstrating a distinct absence of racial bitterness. He has also succeeded in maintaining a high profile for South Africa on the international stage. The sporting successes of the Amabokoboko (national rugby football team) and the Bafanabafana (national soccer team), with which Mandela has closely associated himself, created an excellent platform for the promotion of national pride in South Africa. President Mandela’s visit to Verwoerd’s widow in Orania (a ‘homeland’ for the right-wing Afrikaners), discussions with the right-wing FF and Dutch Reformed Church officials, once described as the NP in prayer, along with other image-building initiatives across ethnic barriers has done much to create a climate of tolerance in South

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Relaxing at the sea front, Durban, South Africa.

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Moctar/Sipa Press

Africa. However, the role played by the opposition parties in the process of reconciliation must also not be underestimated. There is little doubt that there should be a high priority on reconciliation in South Africa. The number of people who have died in political violence is overwhelming. Over decades the apartheid state, along with other parties to the conflict, utilised violence as a tactic in the pursuit of specific political goals. The violence at grassroots level between the supporters of the various political movements, and the involvement of the state in some of these acts, reveals a high degree of intolerance that continues to an extent today. Some estimates of the number of deaths in the period 1984 to February 1997 put the figure as high as 23,000 persons. However, the pattern of overt political violence subsided after the 1994 elections. The TRC, established by The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of  UNESCO 2000.

1995, and its chairman Archbishop Desmond Tutu were charged with promoting national unity and reconciliation by, inter alia, investigating gross violations of human rights during the period 1960–1993; granting amnesty to persons who make full disclosures; and, compiling a report of the activities of the Commission. There was a considerable degree of suspicion among opposition parties—and among whites in particular—towards the work of the Commission. Opinion polls conducted during the term of the TRC reflected these suspicions. However, the final report was a relatively evenhanded assessment of the period, with no one group escaping criticism. Individual political leaders were criticised for their involvement in gross human rights abuses, and it is still possible that these leaders may be brought before the courts if a general amnesty is not implemented. Whether the TRC and its final report, published late in 1998, have advanced

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reconciliation in South Africa will only be established by extensive research.

Decline in state capacity The state has an inherent interest in the expansion of its autonomy. An important assumption of this autonomy is that the state be able to exercise control over social and economic interactions. In addition to determining who is in control of the state, it is important to establish whether the state is capable of exercising control (see Good 1997, 547–556.) With regard to capacity, an important question is whether the state—as currently constituted and managed—possesses sufficient capacity to meet its political and economic objectives. Capacity can be measured in terms of the effective execution of institutional, technical, administrative, and political functions. (This discussion is based on the excellent framework for capacity analysis provided by Grindle 1996.) These functions are discussed very briefly below against the current background of political, social, and economic relations in contemporary South Africa. Institutional capacity One of the most important aspects of state administration is that there should be stability and predictability. An increase, or the perception of an increase in crime, corruption, the misapplication of power and/or the jeopardizing of property rights all serve to demonstrate that state institutions are becoming weaker. Since mid-1995, there has been a consistent decrease in the percentage of South Africans who believe the country is heading in the ‘right direction’— this percentage declined from 76% in 1994 to 43% in September 1998, constituting a drop of 33 percentage points. It is interesting that when asked who was responsible for the overall direction of the country, 47% said that the government is ‘totally’ responsible whilst 12% said ‘mainly responsible’ (Opinion ’99 November 1998). As described earlier, the current regime has been able to transform state institutions, thereby effecting changes in the composition of the vari UNESCO 2000.

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ous bureaucracies at a rapid pace. The intention is to legislate similar changes in the private sector in the near future, e.g., The Employment Equity Bill stipulates ‘numerical goals’ to correct ‘under-representation’ of black people, women, and disabled people. However, a capacity problem has arisen precisely because of the rapid pace of restructuring of state institutions, and it is a problem that will remain in the short to medium term. There are also clear indications that supporters of opposition parties in particular are very unsympathetic towards the civil service, which is regarded as the most inadequate of the state institutions. This growing negativity towards state institutions over the past five years can also be traced back to the rise in crime in South Africa. Available statistics indicate the most dramatic increases in crime occurred in the post-1991 period. According to police spokespersons, there is a direct link between the deterioration of the economy and crime (see De Kock 1997). There has also been considerable controversy regarding the appointment of black judges, reduced judicial output, and the shortage of qualified public prosecutors. Furthermore, there have been numerous reports of confirmed cases of corruption—brought to light by, for example, the Heath Commission. This has resulted in an International Finance Corporation (World Bank investment arm) report in 1998 which identified corruption as the most ‘serious governmentrelated constraint on doing business with South Africa’ (SAIRR 1998, 482). These factors have intensified the impression of a capacity problem within the key institutions of the state. Empirical evidence of tax evasion in the formal sector, as well as the state’s inability to include the growing informal sector in the tax net, also indicates important institutional capacity problems. It should be noted however, that there are great differences between the opinion-leaders of the different population groups as far as perceptions of state capacity are concerned. In all surveys black respondents have a considerably more positive perception of state capacity than white respondents. The state has not remained passive with respect to this weakening of institutional capacity. However, it is extremely difficult to introduce an increase in, for example, the Safety

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and Security budget under current economic conditions. The same applies to other state departments. Institutions are important because they provide the formal and informal rules that structure political life. This means that the beliefs that the public retains of the performance or worth of these emerging transformed institutions will play an important part in the stability of the country. Institutionalisation is thus very important.9 The process of institutionalisation has much in common with the process of building a nation. According to Huntington (1968, 397), the success of a nation-building process depends in the first instance upon the successful ‘horizontal’ integration of the diverse groupings to be molded into a national unit and, secondly, upon the ‘vertical’ assimilation of economic and social classes. In South Africa, two competing views of the management of society have influenced this process and may well be at the root of the different levels of confidence and sympathy evidenced between supporters of the new regime on the one hand, and supporters of opposition parties on the other hand. As discussed earlier, the dominant view emphasises a substantive view of democracy and stresses the equality between groups and cultures. The principle of equality is also the driving force behind the implementation of a policy that is regarded in some circles as the artificial distribution of wealth—i.e., ‘equalities of income’ that have no relation to colour or culture must be created. The other view is that South Africa comprises a variety of cultures and must thus be managed as a plural state. According to supporters of this view policies enforcing the substantive view of democracy will lead to the marginalisation of minorities and the middle class in South Africa. In the final analysis, an effective bureaucracy requires not only high levels of training and talent, but also productivity and salaries that can compete with the private sector. Establishing such a system can prove to be an expensive process. Furthermore, it appears that the effectiveness of the bureaucracy and private sector has been further jeopardized by the overhasty implementation of black empowerment. Although this forms an essential element in the transformation process, rapid implementation jeopardises capacity.  UNESCO 2000.

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Administrative capacity Reductions in the budgets of the services sectors of the state can lead to capacity problems. The changing priorities of the ANC government have meant it has not yet been necessary to make drastic cuts in areas including health and education. However, the cutting of the defence budget (reduced from 4.5% of GDP in 1989 to 1.5% in 1999) (South African Communication Service 1999) could result in sustained budgetary increases to some of the most important service sectors. Furthermore, the state’s budget deficit could be kept under control by sound fiscal discipline and a conservative monetary policy. For example, in early 1999, under conditions of low growth in the domestic economy and the Asian economic crisis, the Minister of Finance only adjusted the target for the budget deficit from 3.5% to 3.9%. As indicated earlier, another plus for the government has been their successful endeavours in improving basic infrastructure services for the poorer sections of the population. The conspicuous differences between population groups regarding sympathy for the key institutions of the state are probably linked to the government’s policy of redistribution. Services formerly rendered primarily for the benefits of whites have been scaled down to benefit the poorer groups of society. In this respect, it is interesting to note that supporters of the predominantly white parties, such as the DP (about 85% white) are far more negatively disposed towards state institutions than, for example, supporters of the ANC and even the NP, which has a fair mix of support from the different population groups. At this stage it has not yet become necessary to freeze or reduce civil service salaries as a consequence of economic problems. It is likely that this would prove to be an unpopular move and subject to considerable resistance given the strength of the trade union movement at present. However, if dramatic staff cuts are not made in certain provincial governments then service provision and infrastructure will collapse entirely. In the Northern Province, for example, the salary account is already above 90% of the annual budget. There is serious overstaffing in certain state departments where staff figures are estimated to be at over 50,000 persons (SAIRR

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1998, 484). Approximately 358,000 (30.5%) are employed in state departments, with the remaining 818,000 (69.5%) employed in the nine provincial authorities. The government has likewise not been particularly successful in its attempts to maintain a strong and effective local government system. In the process of democratising local governments enormous capacity problems have developed. This failure, paralleled by a culture of non-payment for services, has led to provincial governments incurring debts amounting to billions of rands. By August 1998, the total amount was estimated to be about R10 billion (US$1.7 billion). During February 1995, President Mandela announced the Masakhane (Xhosa word for ‘let us build together’) campaign in Parliament. It was envisaged that this campaign would accelerate the delivery of basic services and housing while promoting the resumption of payment for rents, service charges and bonds. However, the Masakhane campaign has not succeeded in convincing recalcitrant inhabitants of the major cities and towns to pay for services, and there are clear indications that white inhabitants are not prepared to make up the shortfall. If the problems with the state’s administrative performance are not rectified within the next two or three years, the result could be a further decline in the rendering of basic services and another increase in unemployment levels. Technical capacity It appears that in general the capacity of the government to analyse and manage macroeconomic policy has improved considerably since 1994. The implementation of GEAR has a number of major objectives including economic growth, job creation, and the control of inflation. In spite of strong opposition to the programme from Cosatu and the SACP, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and his economic team have emphasised their confidence in GEAR. The aim of the strategy is to create sustained growth, necessitating the transformation to a competitive, export-orientated economy. This strategy aims for a growth rate of 6% per year, and to create 400,000 job opportunities annually by 2000 by building the capacity to meet the demands of international competitiveness.  UNESCO 2000.

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The most important challenge for the new democracy is to create the economic growth prescribed in GEAR under democratic conditions; the need for so-called ‘delivery’ thus places a great burden on South Africa’s fragile democracy. Under such circumstances any economic strategy is caught between the government’s confidence in its eventual benefits and the scepticism of those who experience its immediate effects. The ultimate success of the government’s macro-economic strategy will be apparent if the economy does in fact begin to grow as planned. GEAR includes a variety of reform measures aimed at stabilising the economy as well as steps to restructure (privatise) state assets. Stabilisation is intended to improve the economic position of the country whilst structural reform increases the effectiveness of resource allocation. Resource allocation is one aspect that places GEAR within the political sphere because the majority of ANC supporters believe that there are insufficient redistributive features within the strategy. In summary, the challenges that GEAR presents to the government are that it should be both economically effective and politically feasible. As far as the economic potential of GEAR is concerned, there is fairly widespread unanimity that set against the background of international demands, it is a desirable and feasible strategy. The adoption of the strategy is convincing proof that there has been a dramatic shift in the ANC’s economic policy over the past five years. In 1992, the party was still discussing guidelines for the nationalisation of industries at its national conferences. As late as 1994, the RDP White Paper placed the emphasis, under pressure from Cosatu, primarily on redistribution, social justice, and the transformation of society. All indications point to the fact that the government has created a well-designed economic strategy, although the question remains whether there is sufficient political support for effective implementation. The following are important trends in this interaction between the economic and political arenas. During the period of negotiations prior to 1994, the ANC had to take domestic business interests into consideration in determining policy decisions. Some of these views are reflected,

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for example, in the RDP. However, the real shift in the ANC’s views on economic policy came about as a result of foreign influence. The process of globalisation unleashed certain market forces that could not simply be ignored. In this way international civil society has become an important player in the South African economy, with good relationships being fostered between the government and international institutions including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Due to his long period of exile in Europe, Deputy President Mbeki, who assumed the leadership of the ANC in December 1997, understands the process of globalisation well (see Hadland and Ranto 1999). He worked behind the scenes in the tabling of GEAR, managing to convince Cosatu to accept the strategy, albeit somewhat half-heartedly. He also has had to persuade this same grouping to give their support to the 1997 budget. To some extent, therefore, he has placed his personal political credibility at stake in order to sell GEAR as a viable economic strategy. What has emerged clearly from a number of recent opinion polls is that economic issues evoke the greatest dissatisfaction among African voters. With regard to the question ‘What are the most important problems facing this country?’, the top three issues over the last five years mentioned in opinion polls remain constant, namely: job creation/unemployment (73%), crime (64%) and education (24%). (These figures are taken from the Opinion ’99 survey conducted in November 1998.) These concerns are understandable given the fact that the GEAR document forecasts that unemployment will reach 37% by 2000, and that during the period 1994–1997, unemployment has risen by nearly 20% increasing the number of jobless by 1.2 million to approximately 4.5 million (SAIRR 1998). Nevertheless, unemployment figures are controversial and many observers are sceptical about the high percentage of unemployed persons (Marais 1998, 102; Schlemmer and Levitz 1998). Recent opinion polls, however, indicate that even the very high levels of dissatisfaction with the government and its employment policies do not have a significant impact on the sense of racial solidarity among ANC supporters, with over 90% of ANC support orig UNESCO 2000.

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inating in the African population group. The vast majority (67%) of ANC and IFP supporters, for example, agree with the statement: ‘No matter how good their policies may be, I will never feel able to support parties that used to be supported by whites before 1994.’ The unions also have an important role to play in the process of democratisation. To a large extent, they monitor the growing social inequalities that pose the greatest threat to the new democracy. In new democracies that have succeeded, social movements and trade unions have provided the countervailing pressures that ensured income inequalities were reduced in the longer term. It appears from the analysis thus far that the necessary political commitment and politically mobilisable support for GEAR does in fact exist. Yet a cause for concern for the possible implementation of the strategy is what Miles Kahler terms the ‘orthodox paradox’ of economic reform (Diamond and Plattner 1995, xxi). In effect, reduction of the state’s control over the economy requires an increase in the state’s technical and bureaucratic capacity. It is an established fact that successful economic development requires state machinery that can effectively perform functions such as the supply of essential public goods, improvement of human capital, and the facilitation of effective and equitable functioning of the market. Increased tension between the ANC, Cosatu, and the SACP from 1996 onwards can to some extent be ascribed to the fact that the two latter alliance partners are increasingly being excluded from economic decision-making. Furthermore, Cosatu does not approve of the direction economic policy has taken. A job summit late in 1998 that managed to obtain the support of the most important role-players in the economy was postponed several times, owing to the fact that the government and Cosatu could not reach agreement on key issues. Technocratic decision-making and the internationalisation of economic decision-making have increased the capacity of the state at this level, but have also introduced a measure of alienation between the alliance partners (Marais 1998, 146–176). It is ironic that while technocratic decisionmaking has increased the state’s technical capacity, it could have a negative effect on developing democratic institutions. It seems as

The state and social change in South Africa

though Mbeki and his economic team are being caught up in a ‘generic dilemma’: consultation with diverse political groups leads to paralysis in decision-making, while topdown decisionmaking is sometimes impossible owing to political opposition and economic scepticism. Political capacity It is extremely important for governments to respond quickly to the demands of civil society and to encourage public participation in decision-making and conflict resolution. In this respect, the ANC-led government has done excellent work in comparison to the former regime, utilising wide consultation with and participation of interest groups on decisions concerning legislation. The trend has been to use the parliamentary portfolio committee submissions to involve extra-parliamentary institutions and individuals in the legislative process. In fact, one of the principles laid down in the RDP policy document is ‘popular participation’ in decision-making. Good contributions towards the compilation of legislation were obtained through public participation in the green and white paper phases of legislation. More recently, however, a considerable amount of legislation has been passed without sufficient opportunity being created for public participation. There have even been allegations that the government has become arrogant and is no longer open to persuasion. In a number of instances legislation has been steam-rollered through Parliament without allowing the opposition parties a suitable opportunity for debate. Among a number of minority groups there is a feeling that the government is no longer attending to minority interests. Several of these groups have complained that their languages and cultures are no longer being taken into account. The government, however, believes that these groups, more specifically the Afrikaans speakers, want to hold on to their privileged positions. The exclusion of important interest groups and minority groups from decision-making may reduce the state’s capacity to create stability, and also places the government’s legitimacy under pressure. If transformation is to be carried through in full, as spelled out in a 1998 dis UNESCO 2000.

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cussion document of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) entitled ‘The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation’ which indicates that the National Democratic revolution has not yet been completed, minorities will be further marginalised because the effect of this transformation will be similar to the situation which prevailed under apartheid, namely, diminished state autonomy. According to the NLM document, the state should not be viewed as an autonomous institution with responsibilities for the interests of all its inhabitants. On the contrary, it is clearly stated that ‘. . . political power is not attained for its own sake, but to pursue given political and socio-economic objectives. As such the state is not a neutral, non-partisan entity; but it is an important instrument that is used to pursue the interests of a class or group of classes’ (NLM 1998). It is also made clear that ‘. . . the battles around political power are in the final analysis about socio-economic resources and their allocation. Thus, at the core of any revolution is the issue of property relations: how classes or groups relate to capital in particular and resources in general.’ What emerges very clearly from the document is the efforts of the NLM to establish a partisan state, ensuring the interests of ‘ . . . black workers, the black middle strata, black business in its various ramifications, the rural poor and others . . .’ may be served. An election would mean nothing to the NLM if it did not control all facets of the state: ‘Transformation of the state entails, first and foremost, extending the power of the NLM over all levers of power: the army, the police, the bureaucracy, intelligence structures, the judiciary, parastatals, and agencies such as regulatory bodies, the public broadcaster, the central bank and so on.’ In addition to the fact that the document advocates a relaxation of fiscal discipline—a policy direction supported by Cosatu and the SACP—it is also a clear attempt to mesh two traditions in the NLM: the ideas of the proponents of a class revolution and the views of Africanists. The arguments certainly lack the overt class rhetoric found in policy documents of the ANC of some eight to six years ago, but the undertones of a class struggle remain. The writers presumably realise that a class analysis no longer appeals so strongly to all

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ANC supporters with the emergence of a rising politically and economically important black capitalist class. This is perhaps why the role of the state working for the benefit of all black people is emphasised. Such views, while not the official policy of the government, may enhance the perception of an increasingly interventionist state. Moreover, it strengthens the view that, as was the case under apartheid, state autonomy will be eroded by the new regime.

Concluding remarks The political transition in South Africa is regarded by many as a democratic revolution. Since 1990 the political process has been a model case of a pact-driven transition. The relatively peaceful transition laid the foundation for an election result that satisfied most parties. In the process the apartheid regime—which had effectively merged the ruling regime and state into a single hegemonic unit of social control— was effectively dismantled. In its place a republic has emerged with the characteristics of an autonomous state underwritten by a relatively rigid constitution. During the first two years of the GNU, problems were experienced with the formulation of economic goals making economic develop-

ment that much more problematic. During this period the RDP was posited as the best means of uprooting poverty in South Africa in partnership with the new macro-economic policy, GEAR, that was formulated soon afterwards. With the withdrawal of the NP from the GNU, the pace of transformation increased in intensity. It cannot be disputed that during the first five years of democratic rule South African society has undergone a planned political and social transformation. In the beginning the perception was that an autonomous state might be created. As the state-driven transformation grew in intensity and supporters of the new regime filled new positions, it appears that the initial impression of state autonomy may simply be an artifact of the transition. At the same time, significant capacity losses occurred in important state agencies including the police, courts, and civil service resulting in a weakened state. It is only strong states that are able to enforce their own rules of social control at the expense of the familiar phenomena of competing organisations such as warlords, drug barons, multinational corporations, and ethnically based interest groups. Thus, two of the most important challenges facing the leadership taking the country into the next millennium will be to rebuild state capacity and create a truly autonomous state.

Notes 1. Migdal’s (1998, 19) definition of the state as an ‘. . . organisation, composed of numerous agencies led and co-ordinated by the state’s leadership (executive authority) to make and implement the binding rules for all people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way’ is used in this article. 2. Dogan and Higley (1998, 20) conceptualised a regime as ‘. . . the basic pattern by which government decision-making power is organised, exercised, and transferred in a society’. 3. O’Donnel et al. (1986, Part IV, 7) describe liberalisation as follows:

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‘. . . the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal . . . acts committed by the state or third parties’. 4. For an elaborate definition of transition, see O’Donnell et al. (1986 Part IV, 73). 5. Higley and Gunther (1992, 13– 17) call this type of transition an ‘elite settlement’ characterised by features such as speed, face-to-face largely secret negotiations, formal written agreements, and the predominance of experienced political leaders.

6. Constitutionalism here refers to the doctrine that the power of government should be limited by a constitution so that human rights are formally protected from abridgement by either public officials or private individuals. 7. For an estimated distribution of the voter support from the different ethnic groups, see Reynolds (1994, 190–199). Notwithstanding the strong racial and ethnic identities found among the supporters of most parties these divisions are not necessarily ‘frozen’. 8. The census data found that there were 10% fewer people than previously estimated and a range of

The state and social change in South Africa organisations questioned the accuracy of the figures. 9. Huntington (1968, 38) defines institutionalisation as ‘. . . the process by which organisations and

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procedures acquire value and stability’. Its level is measured by the scope and strength of institutions, manifested in the ‘. . . size, number and effectiveness of its (the political system’s)

organisations’. Institutionalisation can thus be seen as the outcome of certain characteristics of organisations and procedures.

Hadland, A. and Ranto, J. 1999. The Life and Times of Thabo Mbeki, Rivonia, Zebra Books.

State: Critiquing the Critique,’ in South African Yearbook of International Affairs, Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).

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Higley, J. and Gunther, R. (ed.) 1992. Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Huntington, S. P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press. Kotze, H. J. and Greyling, A. 1994. Political Organisations in South Africa: A–Z, Cape Town, Tafelberg. Kotze, H. J. 1996. ‘The New Parliament: Transforming the Westminster Heritage,’ in Faure, M. and Lane, J. E. (ed.) South Africa: Designing New Political Institutions, London, Sage. Kotze, H. J. 1996. ‘From the old to the new in South Africa: Elite and public attitudes towards political institutions,’ in Aspects of the Debate on the Draft of the New South African Constitution, Johannesburg, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Kotze, H. J. and Du Toit, P. 1997. ‘Public Opinion on Security and Democracy after Transition,’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa 19(2), 52–75. Kotze, H. J. 1998. ‘South Africa: From Apartheid to Democracy.’ In Dogan, M. and Higley, J., eds., Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield. Landsberg, C. and Kabemba, C. 1998. ‘The New South African

Lodge, T. 1987. ‘The African National Congress after the Kabwe conference,’ South African Review 4, 1–12. Marais, H. 1998. South Africa, Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transition, London, Zed Books. Migdal, J. S. 1988. Strong States and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. National Liberation Movement. 1998. The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation. NLM. Odendaal, A. 1984. Vukani Bantu—The Beginnings of Black Protest Politics in South Africa, Cape Town, David Philip. O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. C. and Whitehead, L. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press. Opinion ’99. 1998. ‘Opinion polls conducted for the South African Broadcast Corporation and Institute for a Democratic South Africa,’ Johannesburg, Markinor. Reynolds, A. (ed.) 1994. Election ’94 South Africa: The Campaign, Results and Future Prospects, Cape Town, David Philip. South African Communication Service. 1999. Our Dreams

94 Realised, Pretoria, South African Communication Service. South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR). 1998. South Africa Survey 1997/1998, Johannesburg, SAIRR.

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H. L. Kotze´ Schlemmer, L. and Levitz, C. 1998. Unemployment in South Africa: The Facts, the Prospects and an Exploration of Solutions, Johannesburg, SAIRR. Sisk, T. D. 1995. Democratization in South Africa—The Elusive Social

Contract, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

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