The Rules of the Game

The Rules of the Game A comparative case study on the conditions for the socialization of permanent representatives in the EU and NATO August Daniels...
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The Rules of the Game A comparative case study on the conditions for the socialization of permanent representatives in the EU and NATO

August Danielson

Master thesis Fall 2016 Uppsala University Supervisor: Anna Michalski

Abstract Cooperation in international organizations is to a large degree driven and sustained by socialization – the process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community. In the context of international organizations, the most influential state agents are the permanent representatives, the member states’ ambassadors to an international organization. However, systematic studies on the conditions for the socialization of permanent representatives are conspicuously absent in the literature. Instead, most previous research has focused on the conditions for socialization of “high-level officials” in the European Commission. This quite narrow perspective has led to a “N=1” problem and the generalizability of these studies have suffered as a result. In this thesis, I have aimed to broaden this perspective by testing six hypotheses on the conditions for socialization within two committees of permanent representatives in two different international organizations, the PSC (EU) and the NAC (NATO). This has been done by conducting elite interviews with 21 permanent representatives and deputies in Brussels. In contrast to previous research, the results of this thesis suggest that four of the six tested hypotheses should be disregarded, while two hypotheses – the representative’s relation to its MFA and the ambiguity of the international organization’s norms – should be given more theoretical consideration in future research. In addition, the interviews have shown that the degree of “internalization”, which can be understood as the goal and outcome of socialization, is stronger in the NAC than in the PSC. This outcome also contests the conventional wisdom that the EU is a sui generis case of socialization. On the basis of these results, I argue that the socialization of permanent representatives in international organizations is likely to occur if the organization’s norms have unambiguous, existential and materialistic consequences. Keywords: socialization theory, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, internalization, international organizations, permanent representatives

Word count: 19,852

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Table of Contents 1.

Introduction

5

2.

Purpose – to fill a theoretical gap in socialization theory

6

2.1 3.

4.

6.

7.

Constructivism in International Relations

10

3.2

Sociological institutionalism

11

Conceptual clarifications – socialization theory Socialization as an outcome

12 14

Hypotheses on the conditions for socialization

15

5.1

Limitations – what this thesis is not testing

15

5.2

Choice of hypotheses – what this thesis is testing

17

5.2.1

The properties of the international institutions that trigger socialization

17

5.2.2

The properties of the agents who become socialized

18

5.2.3

The properties of the issues or norms regarding which socialization takes place

19

5.2.4

The properties of the interaction between the socializing and the socialized

19

Background to the NAC and the PSC

20

6.1

The organizational level

21

6.2

The political level

22

Method 7.1.1

9.

9

3.1

7.1

8.

8

Previous research – the evolution of socialization theory

4.1 5.

Research Question

23

Research design

23

Mill’s methods

23

7.2

Measuring the conditions – elite interviews

25

7.3

Generalizability

28

7.4

Operationalization of variables and hypotheses

30

Analysis

31

8.1

The dependent variable – the degree of internalization

31

8.2

H1: Organizational boundedness

37

8.3

H2: Relation to MFA

39

8.4

H3: Prior work experiences

41

8.5

H4: Ambiguity of norms

43

8.6

H5: Issue intensity

45

8.7

H6: Insulation/agent autonomy

47

Discussion

49

10. Conclusion

54

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List of Abbreviations

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Policy

COREPER

Committee of Permanent Representatives

CSDP

Common Security and Defense Policy

DG

Directorate-General

EEAS

European External Action Service

EFTA

European Free Trade Agreement

EU

European Union

FAC

Foreign Affairs Council

IO

International organization

IR

International relations

IS

NATO International Staff

MFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NAC

North Atlantic Council

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PSC

Political and Security Committee

UN

United Nations

WTO

World Trade Organization

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1. Introduction The role of international organizations (IOs) is becoming increasingly significant for international policy-making.1 Whether it concerns terrorism, humanitarian crises or climate change, IOs are currently involved in every imaginable global issue. IOs have also become distinctly more organized in the post-World War II era, reflected in the upsurge of largely independent international bureaucracies.2 These “unelected bodies”, and the civil servants that work for them, are frequently put in positions of considerable political influence as a result of the often vague legal frameworks of IOs and insufficient oversight mechanisms to their member states’ disposal. Therefore, a growing number of IOs have become active supranational policymaking institutions, rather than simply acting as forums for intergovernmental policy coordination.3 In the past two decades, the scholarly interest in IOs has also shifted. Compared to the early works on European integration that mainly tried to show that institutions matter, recent research on IOs has rather focused on the mechanisms and conditions under which they matter. Within this trend, constructivist research on IOs’ ability to “socialize” state actors has grown exponentially.4 In the context of IOs, socialization can be understood as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community.”5 In international socialization research, such actors can include individual policymakers, bureaucrats and even states.6 By adopting the norms and rules of a community, socialization implies that an actor switches their “logic of action” from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness – which can be understood as acting on the basis of the type of behavior that is most appropriate in a certain context rather than on the basis of instrumental calculation.7 However, even though socialization in some rare cases can lead to state representatives completely adopting their group’s idea of the normatively “correct” version of a certain policy – instead of working to achieve the instructions given by their respective member states – socialization should not necessarily be understood as 1

I use the term “international organization” to describe intergovernmental organizations. In line with Barnett & Finnemore (2004), an IO should be understood as an organization that has representatives from three or more states supporting a permanent secretariat to perform ongoing tasks related to a common purpose. 2 Barnett & Finnemore 2004. 3 Trondal 2010, p. 6. 4 See Egeberg 1999, 2004; Hooghe 1999, 2005; Kelley 2004; Beyers 2005; Trondal 2010. 5 Alderson 2001; Checkel 2005. 6 However, this thesis will only study the conditions that affect the actions of individual state agents. 7 March & Olsen 1998.

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something wrong or harmful. Rather, the socialization of state actors can and should be understood as a fundamental cornerstone of state cooperation in IOs. It can also be argued that it is specifically the pursuit of consensus building within IOs that make states promote normdriven, global interests rather than their “materialistic” state interests.8 Since cooperation within IOs is of fundamental importance to solve global issues such as the ones mentioned above, socialization should be understood as being equally important in combating these issues. The theoretical argument behind socialization is thus quite sound. For example, it is reasonable to believe that a state actor could “go native” and completely adopt their organization’s norms after living and working in Brussels for a decade or more. However, although socialization processes may favor cooperation and consensus building, socialization does not necessarily entail a complete absence of conflicts.9 We cannot simply presume that every bureaucrat or state representative who works within an IO naturally starts sharing their organization’s norms after working in an international setting for a certain number of years. This begs the question: what actually drives socialization processes? If we are to understand how cooperation in IOs is sustained and, by extension, how global issues can better be dealt with, we must understand the conditions that enable socialization both as both a process and an outcome – the internalization of group norms and role conceptions.10 However, even though the literature on socialization in IOs has grown vastly over the last two decades, the specific conditions that can be said to produce socialization have to a large degree remained untouched by scholars within IR theory as well as EU studies.11

2. Purpose – to fill a theoretical gap in socialization theory Some significant exceptions can be made to this statement. Among those who have looked specifically at the personal and organizational conditions that can be said to “produce” or “enable” socialization are Beyers (2005, 2010), Hooghe (1999, 2005), Lewis (2005) and Egeberg (2004). However, the conditions or factors (these terms will be used interchangeably 8

It should be noted that the pursuit of norm-driven interests does not necessarily entail a switch in a state’s basis of action from instrumental calculation to appropriateness. In other words, to pursue norm-driven interests can also be a “rational” state interest. 9 Beyers 2010, p. 912. 10 I will use both “produce” and “enable” in this context to refer to how socialization is both “created” and “made possible” by the independent variables, for lack of a better word. This is in line with Checkel (2005). 11 Checkel 2005, p. 7.

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in this thesis) that these authors choose to study vary greatly. Some studies include direct controls for pre-selection, domestic recruitment and pre-socialization (for example Beyers 2005 and Hooghe 2005), while other studies do not control for any variables, but instead aim to understand the institutional or organizational context that is needed for socialization to occur (for example Lewis 2005). This methodological diversity is also reflected in the studies’ varying operationalization of socialization as a dependent variable. Some studies have operationalized socialization as the degree of internalization of group norms where a shift in “role conceptions” or “support for supranational norms” is used to measure the degree of internalization.12 Meanwhile, others have conceptualized the outcome of socialization as “prosocial” or “pro-norm” behavior.13 The variation in the choice of dependent variable can in part be attributed to the inconsistency of the literature in distinguishing socialization as a process or as an outcome.14 For example, socialization can be understood as both the process of moving from one logic to another (acting on the basis of appropriateness instead of consequences) and the end point of working within a socializing group (internalization). These two perspectives result in very different conceptions of what socialization actually is, how we can measure it and what it is caused by. In addition to this conceptual diversity, most studies on the conditions that enable socialization within IOs have also lacked comparative designs.15 For example, studies on socialization in the European Commission have been criticized for the “N=1” problem.16 One explanation as to why most studies on socialization in IOs have focused on the European Commission is an unstated premise in the literature that socialization within the EU is something unique and that the process of “European socialization” is, for some implicit reason, not generalizable to other IOs.17 For example, using “supranational norms” as a dependent variable for the outcome of socialization is far from being a generalizable operationalization of socialization for an IO that has security in the North Atlantic area as its main goal or norm (e.g. NATO). This premise is also demonstrated in how most previous research has disregarded other international institutions than the EU. One explanation to this could simply be that EU institutions are more accessible and easier to study than other IOs. As stated by Beyers, “it resembles the drunk who 12

Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005. Lewis 2005; Johnston 2005; Zürn & Checkel 2005. 14 Beyers 2010, p. 910. 15 See Hooghe 2005 and Beyers 2005. 16 Warleigh-Lack & Phinnemore 2009, p. 216; Trondal 2010, p. 23. 17 One rare exception is Johnston (2005) who has called for more comparative research on socialization processes in IOs. 13

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searches for his keys near the streetlights because this is where he can see”.18 However, simply because it is harder to conduct comparative studies on the conditions for socialization in other IOs than the EU is not a sufficient argument for not doing it. Since I believe that previous research has been built upon an erroneous assumption that the conditions for socialization within the EU are somehow non-generalizable to other IOs, I aim to test this claim. By comparing the existence of the different conditions for socialization within two similar committees of permanent representatives, the Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council, within two different IOs, the EU and NATO, this thesis will show which of the tested conditions that are more relevant and which we should rule out. By comparing these two committees, the aim of the thesis is thus to increase our theoretical understanding of how and why socialization processes develop by “narrowing down” the possible conditions that lie behind these processes. Below, the research question of the thesis will be described and motivated. 2.1 Research Question As previously mentioned, the conditions that drive socialization constitute an under-researched topic and the generalizability of previous studies have suffered as a result of non-comparative approaches. The purpose of this thesis is to fill the aforementioned theoretical gap in socialization theory by comparing the existence and level of the potential conditions that produce socialization in two comparable cases. Hypotheses that have been proposed in previous studies on socialization in the European Commission will thus be tested on two committees, the NAC and the PSC, with the goal to “rule out” hypotheses that are not applicable to both committees. Comparing socialization processes within two IOs will also allow us to highlight the key mechanisms that lie behind each condition. For example, even if the level of some variables is more or less equal in the two committees, the path to these outcomes may differ between them. The guiding research question of this thesis is thus the following: under what conditions does the socialization of permanent representatives in international organizations occur?

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Beyers 2010, p. 910

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To be able to draw conclusions as to which of the scope conditions on socialization that have been proposed in previous research should be seen as less significant, we must first establish whether or not the outcome of socialization (the degree of internalization) is equal or different between the committees. Once this is done, we can compare the existence of the possible conditions to explain why the degree of internalization is either similar or different between two comparable cases. However, to be able to accurately measure the degree of internalization in both committees we must also operationalize the concept of socialization so that it is generalizable for the socialization processes within all committees of permanent representatives in IOs. This is of course no easy task, but by conducting a short review of the literature we should be able to get closer to a more generalizable definition.

3. Previous research – the evolution of socialization theory Socialization theory can be understood as the result of two main social constructivist approaches within the disciplines of international relations, sociology and organizational theory: “IR constructivism” and sociological institutionalism.19 Both of these approaches are based on an ideational ontology in the sense that they see ideas as being the main driver of international politics and institutions.20 This ontology can be contrasted with rationalist conceptions of human action that understand the world as a result of “individual goalseeking”.21 In comparison, constructivism sees human action as the result of “collectively meaningful structures and processes”.22 Constructivism can thus be said to put larger focus on the power of concepts and ideas rather than the power of material self-interest. From a constructivist perspective, material resources “only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded”.23 Since constructivists argue that action has no meaning in itself, the implication of this perspective is that every human action is only the result of a collective understanding of the “appropriate” behavior in a specific context.24 However, even though IR constructivism and sociological institutionalism share a common ontology, they differ somewhat in their theoretical focus. Whereas both approaches

19

I use the term “IR constructivism” to distinguish the development of constructivism within two disciplines, IR and organization theory. This is consistent with previous scholars such as Adler (2002). 20 Schimmelfennig 2003, p. 68. 21 Snidal 2002, p. 74. 22 Adler 2002, p. 100. 23 Wendt 1995, p. 73. 24 Adler 2002, p. 100.

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assume that the actions of states or state agents is the result of a collective understanding of appropriate behavior, IR constructivists argue that this appropriateness is a result of an international society that is driven by norms and identity. Meanwhile, sociological institutionalists see appropriateness as the result of political institutions, which March and Olsen argue should be understood as “collections of interrelated rules and routines”.25 The difference between the two approaches can thus be understood as whether it is the power of the ideas and norms themselves or the power of the institutions in which they are allowed to grow that ultimately creates a collective understanding of appropriate behavior. 3.1 Constructivism in International Relations Both IR constructivism and sociological institutionalism have old roots in the literature. IR constructivism is essentially the result of the seminal works of Karl Deutsch (1957) and Ernst B. Haas (1958) who suggested that international institutions can create a sense of community and belonging that is distinct from the nation state. While Deutsch emphasized transnational collective identities and social communication as key factors in creating “security communities”, Haas instead focused on the spill-over effects of political integration. Towards the end of the Cold War, some of the key realist assumptions of interstate politics were criticized by neoliberal scholars such as Keohane and Nye (1977) who argued that states were becoming increasingly interdependent of each other as a result of complex transnational connections.26 This criticism led to the so-called “third debate” within IR, also known as the “inter-paradigm debate”. From this debate, the works of Deutsch and Haas were once again put in the spotlight of IR scholars. Among those who were inspired by the works of Deutsch and Haas around this period were the “modernist constructivists” Onuf (1989) and Wendt (1992). While Onuf coined the concept of IR constructivism through his ideas on the power of performative language (speech acts), Wendt instead focused on how and why anarchy in the international system is upheld.

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Through this perspective, Wendt’s inspiration of Deutsch’s theory of security

communities is very clear – they both view the collective identity formation as an essential aspect of the international system. Meanwhile, Ernst B. Haas’s son, Peter M. Haas, developed the neofunctionalist theory of regional integration through his idea of “epistemic communities”, also echoing the idea of collective social learning within Deutsch’s theory. However, while 25

March & Olsen 1989, p. 160. Schmidt 2002, p. 11. 27 Adler 2002, p. 99.

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Deutsch’s and Wendt’s theories were more state-centric, Peter M. Haas focused on the “transnational networks of knowledge-based experts” that facilitate international cooperation by institutionalizing a “shared set of normative and principled beliefs”.28 Other notable contributors to IR constructivism have been Kratchowil and Ruggie (1986) who argued that international regimes can create “shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social behavior” as well as the many scholars of the English and Copenhagen schools.29 3.2 Sociological institutionalism The second main theoretical approach that has had a large influence on the development of socialization theory is sociological institutionalism. Sociological institutionalism is a “neoinstitutional” theory that has essentially grown out of two different disciplines, organizational theory and sociology.30 During the post-World War II era, organizational scholars such as Robert K. Merton (1936), Herbert Simon (1947) and Philip Selznick (1948) argued that the “Weberian” understanding of organizations as solely rational and efficient had become far too unrealistic. Instead, they argued that institutions can become infused with a distinct set of values, “an identity”, and that they should be understood as more than simply “expandable tools”.31 Selznick’s classic study of the Tennessee Valley Authority focused on the transformation process of an organization becoming an institution and, as a result, the process of vested interests (political tradeoffs and alliances) inhibiting the formal, rational goals of an organization.32 This “old institutionalist” explanation of how and why organizations are constrained by their social environment was deemed insufficient by neo-institutionalist scholars such as Meyer, Powell & DiMaggio and March & Olsen towards the beginning of the 1980s. They argued that many of the institutional forms and procedures used by modern organizations were not adopted because they were the most efficient and rational, but rather because they were the most “legitimate” in an organizational culture. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) coined the concept of institutional isomorphism to explain institutional change in cultural terms. DiMaggio and Powell argued that institutional homogenization is the result of the “persuasiveness of cultural accounts” from other organizations rather than a common effort to

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Haas 1992, p. 2. Kratchowil & Ruggie 1986, p. 764 30 DiMaggo & Powell 1991, p. 8. However, organizational theory should not be understood as solely “sociological” since it is open to both rationalist and sociological considerations (Scott 1995). 31 Scott 1995, p. 18-19. 32 DiMaggo & Powell 1991, p. 12. 29

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increase efficiency.33 Isomorphic processes, they argued, can thus make “organizations more similar without necessarily making them more efficient”.34 An institutional/organizational culture can also have an affect on the actors within organizations. DiMaggio and Powell argued that institutions “do not simply limit options: they establish the criteria by which people discover their preferences”. In a similar vein, March and Olsen developed neo-institutionalism by viewing institutions as either the “enabler” of collective action bargaining or a set of formal and informal rules that dictate what type of action that is appropriate in a given context.35 Our choice of these two perspectives is to a large degree dependent on our view of human nature — whether humans choose to act rationally or appropriately when given the choice to act. March and Olsen described two types of such “bases of action”: the logic of expected consequences (LoC) and the logic of appropriateness (LoA). The logic of appropriateness assumes that humans are “rule followers” that assume identities and rules when put into an institutional context and can essentially be understood as the basis of sociological institutionalism.36 As will be shown in the next section, these two bases of action are fundamental in understanding how and why state actors “socialize” in IOs. As previously mentioned, the main difference between IR constructivism and sociological institutionalism is the theoretical focus on what actually creates the “rules of the game” – the set of informal rules that guide behavior in, for example, an IO. Institutions are thus seen in two distinct ways, as either the promoters or sites of socialization.37 By focusing on how and why the social context (i.e. both the actors within the institution and the effect of an institutional framework) can create senses of community and belonging, facilitate attitude change and shift role conceptions, socialization theory thus combines both of these analytical “lenses”. Below, socialization theory is reviewed in greater detail to enable a better understanding of the different hypotheses that will be tested later in the thesis.

4. Conceptual clarifications – socialization theory In a special issue of International Organization from 2005, socialization theory in the context of international institutions, and the microprocesses behind socialization, was for the first time 33

DiMaggio & Powell 1991, p. 13. DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p. 147. 35 March & Olsen 1998, p. 948-953. 36 Ibid. 37 Checkel 2005, p. 806. 34

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thoroughly fleshed out and defined.38 The authors of the issue argued that previous research on socialization theory, such as the theories and ideas proposed by the many scholars presented above, had focused too little on theorizing the mechanisms behind socialization.39 While previous IR constructivists and neo-institutionalist scholars had made a convincing case that socialization actually does happen, they had been less clear on exactly how and why it occurs.40 Taking a more positivist approach to socialization, the scholars in the issue aimed to map out how states and state agents might become socialized in international institutions. Socialization can essentially be understood as the process of individuals developing a sense of belonging with a group and adapting their behavior accordingly.41 This type of human rationality can be understood as “communicative rationality”, which Habermasian social theory defines as the outcome of successful communication.42 Socialization theory thus views state actors’ preferences as “redefinable” through the act of persuasion, which in turn can be understood as arguing for a norm or informal rule.43 Attempts at persuasion of a new group member can lead to the adoption of new norms and eventually to the “internalization” of the agent, or in other words “the sustained compliance of an agent to act in accordance to what is socially accepted in a given setting or community”.44 Internalization should thus be understood as both the end result of socialization and the conscious or subconscious goal of the group that sustains the socialization process. By adopting these norms and rules of a community, the process of internalization implies that a state agent no longer acts in conformity with the logic of expected consequences, but rather on the basis of what action that is seen as the most appropriate in a certain context or setting, for example in a working group within an IO. However, the distinction between a “rational agent” and a “socialized agent” is not completely clear cut. Checkel emphasizes that socialization should be understood on the basis of the mechanisms that lie behind an agent’s gradual shift from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness. These mechanisms are defined as “strategic calculation”, “role playing”, and “normative suasion” and which, in turn, represent three different “modes” of rationality: instrumental, bounded and communicative. In essence, the process of socialization can thus be 38

I use the terms “international institution” and “international organization” interchangeably in this section, in line with Checkel (2005). 39 Checkel 2005, p. 806. 40 Alderson 2001, p. 416. 41 Beyers 2010, p. 909. 42 Checkel 2005, p. 812. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. p. 804.

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understood as the incremental shift from instrumentality to communication as the basis of action.45 The way in which an actor gradually adopts these mechanisms is also represented by two different types of internalization: Type I and Type II internalization. Type I internalization can be understood as conscious socialization or conscious adoption of roles while Type II internalization implies that an agent fully adopts the interests of his or her social context or community.46 These two types of internalization still follow the logic of appropriateness, but the rationality behind them are vastly different. Type I internalization can basically be understood as “playing along” by the rules of the game (role playing) while still acting on the basis of bounded rationality while Type II internalization implies that the state agent acts entirely on the basis of communicative rationality (normative suasion).47 The main difference between these two types can thus be understood as whether the agent still has control over what rationality (bounded or communicative) he or she acts on the basis of. 4.1 Socialization as an outcome As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, most authors choose to see the dependent variable (DV) and outcome of socialization as the “degree or level of internalization”.48 However, depending on which socialization mechanism they choose to focus on, the authors attempt to measure this operationalization in slightly different ways. Hooghe, for example, argues that the level of internalization should be operationalized as “support for the organization’s norms” while Beyers argues that it should be operationalized as “role conceptions” – i.e. whether a state agent adopts the role of an intergovernmental state representative or that of a supranational representative of the organization. A third alternative is presented by Lewis who operationalizes the DV as “the internalization of new role conceptions and conceptions of the self in line with group-community norms”.49 As such, Hooghe, Beyers and Lewis all operationalize the outcome of socialization or the degree of internalization as the shift of a state agent’s identity and preferences after he or she has been exposed to a socializing environment. The difference between their operationalizations is 45

Checkel 2005, p. 805. Ibid. p. 804-805. 47 Ibid. 48 Checkel 2005, p. 817. 49 Lewis 2005, p. 940-941. 46

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basically what type of socialization mechanism they are measuring, either the cognitive role playing mechanism, which indicates a Type I internalization outcome, or the normative suasion mechanism, which indicates a Type II internalization outcome.50 In other words, to be able to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the degree of internalization within the study’s two case studies, the NAC and the PSC, we should measure the DV as both of these internalization outcomes. I believe that Lewis’s operationalization is the one that comes closest to this. As such, I have chosen to measure the DV as the internalization of new role conceptions and conceptions of the self in line with group-community norms. This operationalization should let us measure the outcomes of both the role playing mechanism and the normative suasion mechanism and thus the outcome of both Type I and Type II internalization. However, since it would not be very fruitful to simply ask a state agent to what extent they have adopted their group’s norms or how they see their role within the IO, we must in some sense also “operationalize the operationalization” by formulating suitable interview questions.51

5. Hypotheses on the conditions for socialization Since the purpose of this thesis is to test previous hypotheses on scope conditions for when internalization is more likely to occur within the studied committees, a discussion on the study’s choice of hypotheses is in order. First of all, however, a quick note should be made on which hypotheses this thesis is not testing. 5.1 Limitations – what this thesis is not testing While the articles in the 2005 special issue of International Organization focus on mostly the same hypotheses as this thesis, the difference in methodology between the articles and this thesis prohibits us from testing the exact same hypotheses. While this thesis employs a comparative method to test the explanatory power of the hypotheses, most of the articles in the special issue use regression analysis to test their hypotheses. For example, Beyers and Hooghe test the conditions on each individual respondent and the significance of each condition through a regression analysis based on interview and survey data. However, since a regression analysis requires an adequate sample size in order to accurately measure the relationship between the

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Checkel 2005, p. 817. A list of these operationalized interview questions can be found in Table A1 in the appendix.

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dependent and independent variable, this method was not a viable option to study the effect of the conditions in the two selected case studies – there are simply not enough member states (and thus Permanent representatives) in the two IOs.52 Therefore, this thesis is not able to test the effect of conditions that are unique for each individual and thus non-generalizable for the group(s) as a whole. For example, it would be wrong to use gender as a variable since the presupposed “socialization effect” of a person’s gender is extremely hard to estimate. If I were to test the hypothesis that gender does have an effect on socialization, I would also need to estimate the threshold effect of that condition, in other words “how many males or females in a group does it take to affect the socialization process?” Testing such a hypothesis would instead require a regression analysis on the relationship between socialization and gender for each specific state agent, which, as previously mentioned, lies outside the scope of this thesis. Other hypotheses that this thesis is not able to test are country-specific conditions. For example, Hooghe stresses the effect of how the “pre-socialization” of national norms, such as the national administrative tradition, the centralization of national authority or the ideologies of the national political parties, influence the state agent’s adoption of international norms.53 Since these variables, and other variables related to country-specific effects, cannot be measured without in-depth studies on each state agent’s country, they simply fall outside the scope of this study. Another condition that I have not been able to test is “primacy” – the effect of age and experience on a person’s susceptibility to socialization efforts. Since this effect would most likely only be noticeable in the first few months after joining a new committee, this condition would require a time-series research design. Another condition that would require a time-series research design is the effect of “self-selection”, in other words a state agent’s support for an organization’s norms prior to joining the organization. Since we have no control group that we could use to test this effect, the only way to measure it would have been to ask the state agents how they feel about the organizations’ norms prior to joining and comparing those views to how they feel today. As such, these hypotheses also fall outside the scope of the study. However, I have included all other hypotheses on the scope conditions for the socialization of state agents that I have been able to measure through in-depth interviews. In the next section I will discuss these hypotheses.

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A common guideline is n >= 30 before you can expect a statistical analysis based on the normal distribution to be valid. 53 Hooghe 2005.

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5.2 Choice of hypotheses – what this thesis is testing The tested scope conditions are based on the hypotheses presented in three articles that aim to identify the main conditions for state agent socialization in IOs. These articles are Beyers (2005), Hooghe (2005) and Lewis (2005). The scope conditions that the hypotheses in these articles are based on can also be organized into four different categories that are presented in Zürn and Checkel (2005): (1) the properties of the international institutions that trigger socialization, (2) the properties of the agents who become socialized, (3) the properties of the issues or norms regarding which socialization takes place and (4) the properties of the interaction between the socializing and the socialized. I will discuss each hypothesis within these four categories and the reasoning behind them in turn. 5.2.1

The properties of the international institutions that trigger socialization

One factor that focuses on the organizational component of the socialization process is Hooghe’s variable organizational boundedness. Based on Allison’s theory of organizational fragmentation from his seminal work on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Hooghe argues that the more “bounded”, or rather, the less “fragmented” an organization is, the less inclined state agents are to identify with their group’s interest over and above that of the IO as a whole. State representatives are thus more susceptible to norm internalization in a bounded IO since the socialization process within a working group reinforces the norms of the organization if the two share each other’s norms. In other words, the more contact different groups or committees have with the rest of the organization, the greater the chance is that an agent will internalize the norms of the organization.54 The first hypothesis is thus the following: H1 (Organizational boundedness): The likelihood of a state agent’s internalization of norms is tied to how well the international institution can reduce organizational fragmentation. The more bounded the organization, the more effectively it socializes.

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Hooghe 2005, p. 865.

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5.2.2

The properties of the agents who become socialized

Beyers emphasizes that state agents are often constricted by their “multiple embeddedness”, in the sense that they identify with different rules and expectations depending on what context (either domestic or international) they are embedded in.55 As such, Beyers argues that state agents are caught in a “representation dilemma” as they are expected to serve many different preferences and consider the views of other state representatives while at the same time stay loyal to their respective member states. However, he argues that socialization is still possible and that the more ambiguous instructions that a state agent receives from their Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) – and the more leeway the state agent has to those instructions – the easier it is for socialization to take place.56 The second hypothesis that this thesis will test is thus the following: H2 (Relation to MFA): The likelihood of a state agent’s internalization of group norms and new roles is conditioned by how they are tied to their domestic environment. The less tied a state agent is to his or her instructions, the easier it is for them to adopt new role conceptions. The second condition that relates to the properties of state agents is the effect of an agent’s prior work experiences. Beyers argues that state agents who have extensive work experience from IOs are more prone to adopt a supranational role in relation to their member state since they already know the “rules of the game”, the different types of know-how and codes of conduct that exist within most IOs.57 Beyers contrasts this with state agents who have greater domestic work experiences. Since such agents have a better understanding of their national sensitivities, he argues, they thus have a harder time to adapt to the prevailing norms of the IO and are more prone to adopt an intergovernmental role conception. The third hypothesis that will be tested is thus the following: H3 (Prior work experiences): The likelihood of a state agent’s internalization of group norms and role conceptions depends on their previous work experiences. Agents who have greater work experience in the international community have an easier time to adapt to the norms of the organization than agents who have predominantly domestic work experiences. 55

Hooghe 2005, p. 888; Beyers 2005, p. 910. Beyers 2005, p. 933-934. 57 Beyers 2005, p. 912.

56

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5.2.3

The properties of the issues or norms regarding which socialization takes place

A condition that only a handful of scholars have placed any emphasis on is the role of issue or norm properties. One of these scholars, Hooghe, argues that large, abstract values facilitate socialization since they reduce a state agent’s cognitive dissonance and thus preempt rational calculation.58 The more diffuse or uncertain a specific issue is, the lower the risk is of intergroup conflict based on the rational calculation over material stakes. In other words, the more ambiguous a concept is, the less you know about its consequences and the easier it is for socialization to occur. In the context of socialization in IOs, one could argue that it is easier to adopt the norms of a certain IO if they are large and diffuse (ambiguous). The fourth hypothesis is thus the following: H4 (Ambiguity of norms): The likelihood of a state agent’s internalization of group norms and role conceptions depends on the ambiguity of the organization’s norms. The larger and more diffuse that a state agent perceives the norms of the organization, the more likely it is for socialization to take place. 5.2.4

The properties of the interaction between the socializing and the socialized

In his article, Lewis argues that Type II internalization is mainly the result of two scope conditions: issue density and insulation. In other words, he argues that the more intense and secluded the interaction between state agents, the more likely it is that they adopt new roles and support the norms of the organization. Beyers also focuses on the effect of the interaction between state agents in his three first hypotheses. He argues that the more frequent, intense and longer lasting the interaction between state agents, the more likely it is that they internalize new roles and norms. These conditions are summarized in the following two hypotheses: H5 (Issue intensity): The likelihood of a state agent’s internalization of group norms and role conceptions depends on the intensity of the interaction with other state agents. The greater the intensity, the more likely it is that a state agent’s role conception will shift.

58

Hooghe 2005, p. 870-871.

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H6 (Insulation/agent autonomy): The likelihood of a state agent’s internalization of group norms and role conceptions depends on how private and secluded their interaction is with other state agents. The more insulated their meetings are to outside actors, such as their capitals or the media, the more likely it is that socialization will take place. To be able to test these six hypotheses, we must first understand the organizational and political context that the permanent representatives operate in. The following section thus provides a more “non-theoretical” background to this thesis’s two case studies, the NAC and the PSC.

6. Background to the NAC and the PSC The North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Committee are two of the most influential political committees in the world. They are the de facto decision-making body in the area of foreign and security policy in their respective organizations and exist to coordinate the positions of their member states and create common solutions. To gain a better understanding of how and why these committees act and look as they do, this section will describe them on the basis of two analytical levels, the organizational level and the political level. However, I will first provide a short introduction to the more formal and judicial aspects of the two committees. The NAC was first enshrined in Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty and is the principal decision-making body of NATO. The cornerstone of NATO is the principle of collective defense, which is codified in Article 5 of the treaty. It states: “an armed attack against one or more of [the member states] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”. The role of the NAC is thus to discuss and decide upon matters related to Article 5 and the other articles of the treaty. The NAC may also convene at the level of ministers or heads of state and government. The decision to create the PSC was made at the Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999 with the intent to make it the “linchpin” of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The main legal responsibilities of the PSC is to “deliver opinions” to the Foreign Affairs Council and plan, prepare and oversee all EU crisis management operations.

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The PSC thus drafts the council conclusions for all FAC meetings based on the agenda set by the High Representative.59 6.1 The organizational level The organizational aspects of the committees are relevant in order to grasp the context of the representatives’ working environments. According to Egeberg, this context has a large effect on the transformation process of state agents adapting to the norms and practices of an IO.60 Specifically, Egeberg points to the “organizational locus” (i.e. the physical location of the organization or state agents) and “organizational demography” (i.e. the state agents’ age, sex, education and length of service) as relevant factors to this process.61 This section will describe these aspects of both committees. One of the main differences between the two committees is how the delegations to each IO are spread out. In the case of the PSC, the ambassadors are stationed in their respective Permanent Representations to the EU. These delegations are spread out in Brussels, most of which are located within roughly 20 minutes’ walk of each other. In comparison, all NATO delegations (and thus the permanent representatives of the NAC) are located in the NATO HQ on the outskirts of Brussels. The demographics of the two committees are more or less similar. Both the PSC and the NAC are made up of exactly 23 men and 5 women, all of which are senior ambassadors with substantial work experience in the international community.62 Since there is little personal information about the representatives available to the public, I have not been able to ascertain the average age of the representatives in the two committees. However, based on my personal impressions from my interviews with a relatively large portion of the representatives in each committee, the difference in the average age between the committees should be negligible.

59

The Lisbon Treaty, article 38. Egeberg 2004. 61 As previously mentioned, this thesis is not able to test the effect of conditions that are unique for each individual. However, these factors are still of interest in order to get an understanding of the organizational context that the representatives work in. 62 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who_39074.htm (accessed 15/11/2016); http://europa.eu/whoiswho/public/index.cfm (accessed 15/11/2016). 60

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6.2 The political level One interesting similarity between the two committees is that while they have significant influence in the policy-shaping process within their respective IOs, this influence is to some extent dependent on how well the representatives manage to persuade certain agenda-setting actors within their respective IOs. Within NATO, the main agenda-setting actors are the International Staff (IS) and the Secretary General. The IS is composed of about 1,000 civilians who provide administrative support to the NATO delegations and in some cases implement the decisions of the NAC. The head of the IS is the Secretary General who also chairs the NAC meetings. This arrangement has given the IS considerable informal influence on the NAC agenda. One NAC representative emphasized this in the following way: You’ll find ambassadors after the NAC finishes running over to the head of the table where the secretariat sits and doing their side deals or grabbing people as they walk out of the room, the deputy secretary general, the assistant secretary general and selling them one thing or another, lobbying them for this or that. All the time.63

When it comes to the PSC, the main agenda-setting actors which the representatives must influence are the EEAS and the High Representative. Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the PSC has been chaired by a permanent EEAS official appointed by the High Representative and not, as was previously the case, by the ambassador of the rotating presidency. This change has not only led to the High Representative gaining agenda-setting influence in the PSC, but also to a situation where the PSC representatives need to actively influence low-level EEAS officials in order to have any input on the initial text proposals.64 One respondent who has work experience from both committees confirmed both the strength and similarity of the agenda-setting influence of the IS and the EEAS: They both have very strong weight of their own. So you need to be aware of what they are doing, what’s cooking, and how you can influence that. That's similar.65

To conclude, this section has shown that both the NAC and the PSC have important roles in the policy-shaping processes within their respective organizations. They are the de facto foreign 63

NAC respondent 9. PSC respondent 4. 65 NAC respondent 1. 64

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and security policy decision makers within the EU and NATO and their influence is not only informal, but permeates the formal organizational and political levels of both IOs. In other words, the NAC and the PSC should be understood as comparable cases.

7. Method 7.1 Research design As previously mentioned, the purpose of this thesis is to test hypotheses related to the scope conditions for socialization in IOs. I have argued that a fundamental aspect that has been left out in previous research on socialization in IOs is a comparative perspective. By comparing the level of socialization and existence of six different scope conditions within the NAC and the PSC, this thesis is able to test the relevance of the hypotheses presented in previous studies. However, the logic of a comparative method can not be taken for granted. As such, the research design of this study will be described in greater detail below. 7.1.1

Mill’s methods

When it comes to comparative methods there are a number of different alternatives.66 More or less all of these methods are derived from John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic (1843). In this work, Mill argued that there are two ways to conduct a controlled comparison, the “method of agreement” and the “method of difference”.67 The method of agreement is used to identify the independent variables that are similar when two or more cases share a common outcome. The method of difference uses the opposite logic and is thus used to identify the independent variables that are associated with a different outcome. The purpose of these two methods is simply to identify the factor or factors that can explain a certain outcome. The two methods are visualized in the following figure:

66

See for example “Most similar/different systems design” (Przeworski & Teune 1970) and “The comparable-cases strategy” (Lijphart 1975). 67 George & Bennett 2004, p. 153.

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Figure 1: Mill’s methods68

Method of agreement

Method of difference

Case 1

Case 2

Case 1

Case 2

a

d

a

a

b

e

b

b

c

f

c

c

x

x

x

not x

y

y

y

not y

Overall differences

Crucial similarity

Overall similarities

Crucial difference

Key: x = casual variable y = phenomenon to be explained

The use of Mill’s methods becomes fairly self-evident when our goal is to test hypotheses. Based on the outcome of the dependent and independent variables, we may use either the method of agreement or the method of difference to explain why the outcome is either similar or different between two comparable cases. Depending on the method that we use, we may thus reject either the hypotheses or conditions that differ between the cases (if we find that the outcomes are the same) or the hypotheses where the conditions have the same level in both cases (if we find that the outcomes differ).69 In the case of the NAC and PSC, we are thus not able to choose one of Mill’s two methods until we have established the level of the dependent variable, the internalization of group norms and role conceptions. As shown in the figure above, another requirement of Mill’s methods is that the cases we compare should be either completely different or completely similar in all aspects except the studied relationship (how x effects y). The logic behind this requirement is that we simply want to isolate the relationship between x and y to be able to show the effect of x, or in this case, the effect of the tested conditions on the degree of internalization. In practice, this is almost impossible to do. It is generally extremely difficult to find two cases that are comparable in all respects. As such, Mill’s methods should be seen more as ideal types that we can use to approximate the relationship between a condition and an outcome. As seen and stated in section 6, the NAC and PSC should thus be understood as comparable cases. Another issue with Mill’s methods is that they can not be used to confirm

68 69

Adapted from Skocpol & Somers 1980, p. 184. Teorell & Svensson 2007, p. 225-230.

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hypotheses, only make them more plausible.70 It is still possible that the conditions may or may not be present (depending on the chosen method) in other cases where the outcome is still either the same or different. In other words, if we were to attribute a causal significance to the conditions/independent variables that seem to be associated with either the correlation or variance of the outcomes, we could be making a type 1 error – a “false positive”.71 We can thus only falsify hypotheses, not confirm them. A third issue that is related to the use of Mill’s methods is that of multiple causation or “equifinality”. Equifinality is the condition of a social phenomena having “alternative determinants” – that the same outcome can emerge in different cases via a different set of independent variables.72 In other words, equifinality makes it a bit harder to falsify hypotheses through a comparative method. However, there is some discrepancy in the literature as to how serious the problem of equifinality is. While King, Keohane and Verba argue that equifinality does not undermine the use of comparative methods to make “probabilistic claims” (such as: “there is a high probability of poor communication among super powers during crises leading to war”)73, George and Bennett argue that a comparative method must be complemented by a process tracing method to ensure that the hypothesized causal relationship is not spurious.74 Unfortunately, to also conduct a process tracing study to confirm the results of the comparative method lies outside the scope of this thesis. Instead, the aim of the thesis is to produce plausible alternative hypotheses that can be tested through a future process tracing study. I believe that laying this groundwork strengthens the probability of the claims that this thesis makes on the basis of the comparative method. In other words, by simply formulating credible and logically consistent alternative hypotheses, the risk of making a type 1 error decreases. 7.2 Measuring the conditions – elite interviews To test the hypotheses that have been presented above, this thesis will use elite interviews to measure the existence of the conditions that lie behind the hypotheses. Elite interviews are mainly used to target actors that are personally involved in a political process and as such have

70

George & Bennett 2005, p. 156. Ibid. 72 George & Bennett 2005, p. 157. 73 King, Keohane & Verba 1994, p. 87. 74 George & Bennett 2005, p. 156-157. 71

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a unique insight into the chain of events that lead up to a political outcome.75 Since a common trait of high-level committees in IOs is that their work to a large degree goes on “behind the scenes”, elite interviews are necessary in order to gain a sufficient amount of insight as to which conditions exist in our two cases. As with every method, elite interviewing has its strengths and weaknesses. When it comes to the validity of the method, elite interviews are specifically useful to minimize systematic measurement errors, as would be the result of interviewing “non-elites”, or lower level bureaucrats, who have an inferior understanding of the “actual” way that socialization works in our two cases. One precaution that must be taken into account when interviewing elites is to not pose too sensitive questions that the respondents might not be able to answer because of confidentiality.76 Since the members of the NAC and the PSC have access to extremely sensitive information, some level of “censorship” should be expected. However, to minimize the risk of the respondents not answering the questions, the conditions have been operationalized as “non-sensitively” as possible without being too abstract or unclear. While the level of validity of the elite interview method is largely dependent on minimizing the conditions that could affect the truthfulness or correctness of the responses given, a high level of reliability is the result of minimizing non-systematic measurement errors. This has been achieved mainly by making sure that the operationalizations of the tested hypotheses and conditions, in other words the interview questions, are as concrete and precise as possible. King, Keohane and Verba argue that the best questions to ask in interviews are those that do not let the respondent “do the work for us”.77 For example, if we want to know if a certain independent variable affects our dependent variable, we cannot ask our respondent if there is a causal effect between the two, but rather ask for measures of the two variables and estimate the causal effect ourselves. The risk of letting the respondent “do the work for us” is that they could give very different answers depending on how they interpret the question.78 The way in which a researcher poses a question about a causal effect (for example implying that it is something positive or negative) can also influence the response. Avoiding these pitfalls increases the reliability of the interview data and the interview questions have thus been formulated with this in mind. Another factor that may affect the reliability of the interview data is how structured the interviews are. A fully structured interview runs the risk of not providing a completely

75

Beamer 2002, p. 86. Ibid., p. 93. 77 King, Keohane & Verba 1994, p. 112. 78 King, Keohane & Verba 1994, p. 112. 76

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accurate depiction of reality since the respondent may not freely speak his or her mind (lower validity) while an unstructured interview is more prone to unsystematic measurement errors as the respondents may interpret the questions differently (lower reliability).79 A good “middle way” is thus to conduct semi-structured interviews so that one can not only follow a prepared list of questions, but also pose follow-up questions. I have thus chosen to use this interview strategy to ensure high levels of both validity and reliability. When it comes to the sampling of respondents, I have simply chosen to interview as many representatives within the two committees as possible. One could argue that a more structured sampling method would have been preferable to maximize the generalizability of the sample (for example by ensuring that the sample consists of an equal amount of permanent representatives from Southern, Northern and Eastern European member states), but since the total possible sample size is in itself quite small (28 for each committee), it would not be beneficial to limit the sample size any further. I have thus contacted every delegation in NATO and the EU via a template e-mail in which I have specified some background information about my thesis and requested an in-person interview in Brussels. Of the 56 delegations, I received a reply from 28, 7 of which either replied that they were unavailable or did not respond to followup e-mails. As such, 21 delegations invited me to meet with their permanent representative or deputy permanent representative. Since the deputies within these committees are one rank below the member state’s ambassador, one could argue that they do not possess the exact same insight as the representatives themselves. However, as the deputies are always present during the committee meetings, take part in most (if not all) preparatory discussions before committee meetings and will fill the representative’s position if they are unable to join a meeting, their insight into the workings of the committee and the existence of the tested hypotheses and conditions should be understood as more or less the same as that of the permanent representatives. In total, I have interviewed 14 permanent representatives (7 from the NAC and 7 from the PSC) and 7 deputy permanent representatives (3 from the NAC and 4 from the PSC). This interview data is, to my knowledge, the largest of its kind on the permanent representatives of the NAC.80 Larger studies on the socialization of PSC-representatives have previously been

79

Teorell & Svensson 2007, p. 89. The only previous study on the socialization of NAC representatives is, to my knowledge, Gheciu (2005). However, of her 80 respondents, only 4 were current permanent representatives or deputies.

80

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done by, for example, Jolyon Howorth.81 The complete list of respondents can be found in figure A1 in the appendix. A few short comments shall also be made on the more practical aspects of the interviewing process. During the first week of October 2016 I travelled to Brussels to conduct most of the interviews. This was very helpful since most of the respondents preferred to be interviewed in person rather than via telephone. 18 out of 21 interviews have thus taken place in Brussels, either at NATO Headquarters or at the member state’s permanent representation to the EU. The rest (3) of the interviews have been conducted via telephone or Skype. The respondents were all informed that the interviews would be treated with anonymity and the respondents are therefore referred to as “NAC respondent 1”, “NAC respondent 2” and so on in the following sections. Of the 21 interviews, 15 have been recorded and transcribed. The combined transcriptions of these 15 interviews constitute a total of 55,342 words from 7 hours and 34 minutes of recordings.82 The rest of the respondents preferred to not be recorded and the material from these interviews is therefore limited to my own notes. The interviews have lasted in average around 30-40 minutes, with some lasting longer (2 hours) and some shorter (20 minutes). 7.3 Generalizability The generalizability of this study is limited to committees of permanent representatives in IOs. As such, this study is not interested in the same actors as the previously mentioned studies on the conditions for socialization in the European Commission. These studies focused on “highlevel officials”, i.e. mostly civil servants employed by the Commission to work in the many Directorate-Generals (DGs). A significant distinction should be made between these actors and the permanent representatives studied in this thesis. Jeffrey Lewis argues in his article The Janus Face of Brussels that there are “qualitative differences” between the expert-level working groups in the European Commission and the main preparatory body of the Council, COREPER.83 Since COREPER consists of national permanent representatives, he argues, there are substantial organizational characteristics that differentiate it from the Commission expertlevel working groups, for example in terms of the frequency and intensity of socialization 81

Howorth 2010. A redacted version of this document can be made available upon request. 83 Lewis 2005, p. 968.

82

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within the groups. Lewis asserts that institutional settings that exhibit a high level of interaction intensity and frequency will “deepen the mutual trust and introspection needed to routinize more co-operative styles of negotiation.”84 He exemplifies the outcome of such interaction with a quote by a former British deputy permanent representative: Members of COREPER describe themselves as being bound by a “dual loyalty”. It is their responsibility faithfully to represent their Member States; but it is also their responsibility to reach agreement. The Roman god Janus, facing in two directions, is thus COREPER’s patron saint, mascot, or role model.85

In other words, the generalizability of the study is limited to this quite unique group of actors who have a dual loyalty towards their committee and their member state. Just how unique this group is, however, is unfortunately very difficult to ascertain. To my knowledge, no comprehensive studies have been conducted on the socialization of permanent representatives in other IOs than the EU and NATO and, as such, it is difficult to know whether the socialization processes of other organizations share the same characteristics as the two case studies of this thesis.86 However, similar types of committees of permanent representatives do exist, for example in the WTO, EFTA, the Arctic Council and the OSCE.87 According to Alistair Johnston, there are also striking similarities between the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and COREPER in how “small group interactions” affect national positions.88 Considering the fact that similarities in socialization mechanisms can be found in two international institutions with profoundly different member states, there are strong reasons to believe that the results of this thesis are generalizable to most, if not all, committees of permanent representatives in IOs. However, a future comparative study with a larger number of cases would be needed to make a more definite claim about the generalizability of this thesis’s conclusions.

84

Lewis 2010, p. 652. Lewis 2005, p. 939. 86 One rare exception is Peck’s study on the socialization of UN permanent representatives (1979). 87 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gcounc_e/gcounc_e.htm (accessed 28/11/2016); http://www.efta.int/about-efta/efta-council (accessed 28/11/2016); https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/ac/ (accessed 28/11/2016); http://www.osce.org/pc (accessed 28/11/2016). 88 Johnston 2005, p. 1038. 85

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7.4 Operationalization of variables and hypotheses To be able to measure the conditions behind the hypotheses presented in section 5.2, they must first be operationalized. A table over these operationalizations can be found in table A1 in the appendix. Four of the interview questions are related to the operationalization of the dependent variable (the degree of internalization). As previously mentioned, this operationalization was specified as “the internalization of new role conceptions and conceptions of the self in line with group-community norms”. The hypotheses are listed in order from H1 to H6 and have been operationalized as either one or two questions. Some of the questions are also related to two conditions at the same time. For example, the question “can you describe the everyday procedure of gaining consensus on different policy positions within the committee/council?” provides an idea of both the issue intensity within the committees and the representatives’ internalization of group norms and new role conceptions. A short summary of the variables and hypotheses tested in the following section is presented in table 1 below. Table 1: Summary of tested hypotheses Common features of variables/hypotheses that enable socialization

Variables/hypotheses

Group norms, feelings of “appropriateness”. Habits that foster pro-norm behavior, sense of “we-ness”. Contact with other groups within organization

DV: The internalization of new role conceptions and conceptions of the self in line with group-community norms H1: Organizational boundedness H2: Relation to MFA

Unclear instructions and limited contact with MFA

H3: Prior work experiences

Predominantly international prior work experiences State agent perceives norms as large and diffuse Time-demanding meetings and negotiations Private, insulated settings during committee meetings and negotiations

H4: Ambiguity of norms H5: Issue intensity H6: Insulation/agent autonomy

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8. Analysis In this section, I present and analyze the results of the interviews, starting with the findings concerning the dependent variable (the degree of internalization) before examining the presence and level of each measured hypothesized condition in the two cases. 8.1 The dependent variable – the degree of internalization With regards to the internalization of group norms, the NAC and the PSC are both alike and different in some significant ways. For example, during my interviews it became apparent that the members of both the NAC and the PSC felt that three norms were essential in reaching consensus: strong personal relations, credibility and trust. One PSC member described the importance of these aspects in the following way: When you were new to the PSC, did you feel that there was a specific set of unstated norms that you were supposed to follow to be able to fit in and to better achieve your national positions? Well, yes, I mean I would say yes. You have to, when you arrive to a body like PSC (…) you have to fit in. The others have to feel that you are part of the club, so in the first moments you have to visit the older guys, invite them to lunch and so on and so forth. So you have to establish some personal relations, that's the way things operate. And then people start sharing information with you.89

One PSC member also stressed the importance of credibility and argued that it is mainly created “by saying intelligent things when you intervene, by having bilateral contacts and by making a network of good relationships and friendships”.90 This belief was echoed by other members of the committee. As one member put it: “the most important factor in reaching consensus is that we know each other well”.91 Another emphasized the importance of trust: [Trust] is the keyword for me. If in the committee there is no trust, be it in regards to procedures, be it in regards to confidentiality, be it in regards to the position of different

89

PSC respondent 7. PSC respondent 8. 91 PSC respondent 10. 90

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member states, or be it even in regards to what the working groups are doing, it's very difficult to work (…) Trust and communication is key for our work.92

A similar point of view was expressed by a NAC representative: If somebody is not, how can I say, adaptable to the others, then he or she becomes isolated. And he or she will see in a very short period of time that it would be better to do some other kind of job than this one. It's not a pressure, it is a common sense that we need to create consensus. What that means is that first of all we need to trust each other.93

These aspects (strong personal relations, credibility and trust) are basically all sides of the same coin – confidence in what your colleagues will say and do during negotiations. That does not necessarily mean that each NAC or PSC member expects the other members of the group to adapt to their position or to a common “EU position” or “NATO position”, but rather that the group as a whole expects the absence of surprises. This was also reflected in the following interview: Would you say that there are any other group norms that you are supposed to follow within the committee? Well I would say the norm that should be appreciated by all is that you stick to common rules, for example if there are deadlines by which you have to make your proposals, or you have to inform others if you are not able to agree on a compromise (…) In short, you should avoid surprising others, or bringing unpleasant surprises to others.94

In addition to strong personal relations, credibility and trust, the PSC representatives also emphasized the importance of “arguing your case” so that the other members feel confident about your position.95 This group norm was even more apparent in the NAC. When asked about the effect of being able to effectively convey ideas in the council, one of the representatives answered in the following way:

92

PSC respondent 6. NAC respondent 2. 94 PSC respondent 5. 95 PSC respondent 8. 93

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(…) yeah, it does have an influence whether someone is able to bring an argument convincingly, and sometimes I mean, ambassadors, if they are good, can also try to find consensus in a group. And then it helps if you have the skills to be convincing.96

Another NAC representative described the ability to argue one’s case as necessary if one intends to challenge the prevailing consensus without suffering a loss of “political credit”, i.e. a representative’s overall credibility in the committee: I mean there are certain unbroken rules, you don't make more trouble for others than you absolutely have to. Everybody understands we have certain national red lines. But we're very open about it. So if I need to be a pain in the ass, I need to make a case why (…) You have to build a logical, concise case and lay out why others should listen to you and take you seriously.97

Even though the NAC and the PSC share some common group norms, they also differ in some substantial ways. My main impression of the respondents’ answers to question 10 (“what is the everyday procedure of gaining consensus?”) is that the members of the PSC, to a much larger degree than the NAC members, gain consensus by negotiating and acting on the basis of instrumental calculation, such as quid pro quo negotiations (“once I will do something for you, you will do the same for me”)98, or by simply blocking another member state’s proposals if that state’s ambassador appears to be negotiating in bad faith. This was explained in the following way by a PSC representative: If you have the impression that they are just either exaggerating national positions, which I suspect some of us are doing, then you would tend to say no, and block the whole thing to the detriment of everybody.99

One PSC member even explained how one tactic to reach consensus is to “single a country out and isolate them”.100 Rather than trying to reach consensus on the basis of persuasion, the PSC representatives explained how the threat of consequences is the main tool to reach an agreement. If a representative becomes isolated (and thus has to “spend” political credit), they 96

NAC respondent 1. NAC respondent 9. 98 PSC respondent 11. 99 PSC respondent 8. 100 PSC respondent 1. 97

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ultimately lose credibility in the group and, as a result, have less influence in the discussions. However, a prerequisite for this instrumental negotiating culture is that all group members feel that not having political credit is actually detrimental to their state interests. Instead, multiple PSC representatives explained how especially two states, Hungary and Greece, no longer care about reaching a consensus “because they don’t have any [political credit]”.101 One PSC member described it in the following way: Having a consensus is not that big of a priority for all member states anymore. There is more and more questioning of the value of the EU taking a common position on this and this issue versus the national interest of some member states. So they think ultimately it can be in their national interest not to have a common EU position which gives them more leeway in their national positions.102

The way that the PSC representatives negotiate on the basis of instrumentality and political credit is in clear contrast to the group norms of the NAC. For example, one NAC representative explained that it is very difficult to challenge the prevailing consensus in the council: With major decisions we have to choose very carefully if we want to say no, and here we would have to have a very, very clear and firm position from our minister (…) And if the minister is not firm, it has to be a really political decision if we want to stop something from happening. 103

Likewise, when it comes to negotiation practices, the NAC does not share the PSC norm of trading positions on issues. As one NAC representative expressed it: “here it’s much more narrow, so there is not as much space for this kind of bargaining.”104 As to why this norm is less apparent in the NAC, he argued that it is mainly the result of having a common threat that unites the member states: (…) in the European Union the member states are fighting for their piece of cake. If somebody gets a bigger piece of cake, somebody else gets a smaller piece of cake because the cake is only so [big]... Here in NATO we are not fighting to get the bigger pieces of cake, we are here because we want to collectively protect ourselves from the 101

PSC respondent 8; PSC respondent 7. PSC respondent 5. 103 NAC respondent 4. 104 NAC respondent 6. 102

34

threat from the outside. And that makes the atmosphere here and the philosophy here different, you know. Here we are trying to protect ourselves from Russia, from ISIL, Al Qaeda or whomever. And when you have a common goal, like we have in NATO, then the atmosphere and everything is much different than when you have to fight. (…) Here we do not compete, we co-operate.105

This quote in particular illustrates the difference in norm internalization between the PSC and the NAC. Since the common norm of NATO is to protect the North Atlantic area (compared to the norm of creating a strong EU), there is a much larger “existential” risk at stake if a member state chooses to not comply with the consensus in the council. Because of this perceived greater threat, and since it is seemingly easier to obstruct negotiations and challenge the prevailing consensus in the PSC than in the NAC, there is compelling evidence that the degree of norm internalization is greater in the NAC than in the PSC. When it comes to the internalization of new role conceptions, the difference between the two committees is best demonstrated by examining the representatives’ perception of their responsibility to uphold the norms of their organization. In the NAC, this responsibility leads to a different type of bargaining than in the PSC. Rather than simply “making people happy”, the NAC ambassadors feel, to a greater degree than the PSC ambassadors, that it is their obligation to create substantial policy. Instead of strategic role playing, the NAC ambassadors thus showcase clear signs of normative suasion and Type II internalization. One representative exemplified this type of internalization in the following quote: What would you say is the main task of the NAC – to negotiate between the diverse national interests in order to make a common policy possible or to be a forum for the lowest common denominator of national positions? I strongly believe it's the first, in a way that is more true for the NAC than for the PSC. You know, and this may sound a bit pathetic, but we take the responsibility bestowed on NATO very seriously. You know, Article 5 matters, it's what keeps most of the continent at peace. And if you don't actually fill it with substance, we all stand to pay a price. So we really... we coordinate the national interests, but at the end of the day I would add “make a sensible common policy possible” (…) On the really big issues we spend an awful lot of time to make sure that we don't just get everybody on board, but we get 105

NAC respondent 6 (my emphasis).

35

everybody on board for a solution that makes sense. (…) We're happy making people not happy. At the NAC we always do it in a civilized way, but the important things should be done right. The PSC doesn't, or sometimes doesn't.106

This clear responsibility to protect the North Atlantic area was echoed by a colleague in the council: Do you feel that the NAC is able to reach consensus on policies that are sometimes above or beyond some of the member states’ positions? If so, how is this done? Always, always. By mutual trust, and by mutual responsibility. We cannot harm the image. Whenever something happens, NATO reacts first. If something goes wrong, Jens Stoltenberg is first on the spot. Always. So that is why we are on stand by. That is why we are permanent representatives.107

In contrast to this internalized role conception, one norm that is prevalent within the PSC clearly demonstrates how the committee differs from the NAC. One PSC representative explained that instead of trying to put pressure on a colleague who is blocking a “sensible” proposal, they instead compromise on their positions to reach a consensus. The representative described it in the following way: There is a very respectful atmosphere in the committee, and sometimes it can show in situations where we all agree on something, except one person, and then it can often become a sort of hate campaign against that person to press them to agree to the consensus. And that is where the respectfulness in the committee makes it so that there is almost always one person that goes out and helps that person, sometimes completely against their own position. They might say “if we do like this, would that help you?”, to try to get that person onboard for a compromise, since we all need to come to an agreement.108

One explanation to this norm could be that the PSC representatives feel that their primary objective and role in the committee is to reach consensus on a policy rather than creating

106

NAC respondent 9. NAC respondent 2 (my emphasis). 108 PSC respondent 10. 107

36

substantial or meaningful policy. When discussing this norm with a NAC representative, they implied that it might be the result of the policies created in the PSC/the EU “mattering less”: I've noticed that, and it annoys me when the PSC does it. Because sometimes they provide cover for positions that frankly shouldn't be [covered]... We actually... no, we are different. I genuinely think so. And what I'm going to say will sound terribly callous, but the things we do matter. Agreement is sometimes less important than getting it right. When you deal with issues such as deterring Russia, you don't produce a compromise that makes all 28 happy. No, you need to produce a policy that deters Russia, because that is your measure of success.109

To summarize, the conducted interviews clearly showcase how the internalization of both group norms and role conceptions are stronger and more apparent in the NAC than in the PSC. The NAC representatives exhibit signs of Type II internalization, both in terms of their adoption of the organization’s norms and their role conception as being responsible for the security of the North Atlantic area. In contrast, the PSC representatives mainly show signs of Type I internalization, which is best demonstrated by the reduced importance of political credit and their responsibility and norm to create a policy rather than “good” policy. Since the outcome of the dependent variable (the degree of internalization) differs between the two committees, we will from here on use the method of difference to “rule out” the hypotheses on conditions that are shared between the NAC and the PSC. In the following sections, the presence of these conditions in both committees will thus be analyzed and determined. 8.2 H1: Organizational boundedness The level of organizational boundedness in the two committees is essentially similar. Representatives of both committees pointed to the fact that the EEAS and the IS (NATO International Staff) have a lot of influence in preparing the decisions and discussion points for the committee meetings. Most representatives thus felt that a strong and persistent contact with these bodies was fundamental in order to influence the decision-making process. The NAC representatives described this interaction in the following way:

109

NAC respondent 9.

37

To what extent would you say that you interact with other NATO officials outside of the NAC? We interact with them all the time, all the time. You want to know before you go to a meeting what the international staff is going to present. You want to, if you are unhappy with what they are going to present, make that known already in advance so that maybe they can still take it on board.110

Another NAC representative described it as a process of lobbying: In order [for your proposal] to actually be formally approved, the secretariat then has to write its own version of it, their own official document. And of course it's at that point that everybody else tries to lobby the secretariat, and even countries that have told you that they agree with you try to then actually steer the drafting process in a way that suits them. So how much do you interact with the officials? All the time.111

The need to lobby your own secretariat was also very clear within the PSC. One PSC member explained the motive for this lobbying in the following way: Because the coalition building happens there and your ability to influence the text that is being put on the table by the EEAS or the institutions is there, you are better off in the negotiations taking place in the meeting room if you had already been able to influence which way the decision there is going to go beforehand.112

The need to constantly influence and contact the EEAS was also pointed out by another PSC representative: To what extent would you say that you interact with other EU or EEAS officials outside of PSC meetings? As much as possible, as much as possible. The crux of the function is to know everyone there and to be able to pick up the phone and explain what's your interest and why you

110

NAC respondent 1. NAC respondent 9. 112 PSC respondent 5. 111

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would have to have such and such sentence in the conclusions or such and such action. So it's essential of course. And they are open to it.113

Other representatives in both the NAC and the PSC also emphasized the need to have daily contact with the IS or the EEAS.114 Considering that the interaction (and the need to sustain this interaction) between the committee members and the secretariats of their respective organizations is equally strong in the two organizations, the level of organizational boundedness in the NAC and the PSC should be understood as similar. 8.3 H2: Relation to MFA When it comes to the hypothesis “relation to MFA”, the difference between the two committees becomes a bit more apparent. In short, the members of the NAC are, according to the respondents, kept on a “longer leash” than their PSC counterparts. Compared to the PSC representatives, the NAC representatives in general have fewer precise instructions and more leeway in relation to these instructions. One NAC representative who had previously served as as a PSC ambassador argued that the NAC representatives are given less precise instructions than the PSC representatives mostly because of the technical nature of the discussions in the NAC: In the PSC I always received instructions for every meeting and here I sometimes receive an instruction. (…) In NATO, some of the policy cycles are much slower. Some of the discussions are cyclical, some of the discussions are very technical. (…) So you do not always need instructions from [the capital], often you have a sort of framework instruction. You know more or less where you are, where everyone else wants to go, and you work on the basis of that.115

These types of “framework instructions” were also brought up by a NAC-colleague who described how they tend to receive “a general policy line”, rather than strict instructions.116 In contrast, the PSC representatives explained that their contact with their MFA was more intense:

113

PSC respondent 8. NAC respondent 4; NAC respondent 5; NAC respondent 7; NAC respondent 10; PSC respondent 11; PSC respondent 7. 115 NAC respondent 1. 116 NAC respondent 4. 114

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How much contact do you have with your MFA during PSC meetings? Daily, on a regular basis. All the time basically. We get our instructions for each PSC meeting, for each round of conclusions negotiations from the capital. (…) We have to be authorized by our capital to make agreements and take positions.117

Likewise, the contact that PSC representatives have with their MFA during meetings was also described as “constant” and “in real-time”.118 As previously mentioned, the leeway in relation to the instructions from the MFAs is also greater within the NAC than within the PSC. One NAC representative explained how this leeway exists even before their formal instructions have been formulated: “if I want the instructions to be oriented in one direction, I know to who I have to speak”.119 When asked about why this is the case, a NAC colleague argued that it is mainly the result of them “knowing the politics” better than their capitals: (…) as far as I think all of us see it, the capitals tell us what they want to get done, but how we do that is left largely to us. Because we are the ones who have the teams, meaning the eyes and the ears who can map out the politics. I am the one who sits with my colleague ambassadors several hours a day, often time more time with them than with my family. So the headquarters doesn’t pretend to know the politics better than we do, they defer to us on the politics.120

This amount of leeway in relation to the instructions was not as apparent in the PSC. For example, one PSC ambassador explained that he had to check with his MFA in case he felt that he had to go beyond his instructions: “I don't have the authority to go beyond the red lines just like that. So I need to check back.”121 A couple PSC ambassadors also described how they routinely check with their MFAs during meetings if their state’s position on a certain issue is unclear.122 In contrast, the NAC representatives receive less instructions and have more room for maneuver compared to the PSC representatives. In other words, the MFAs’ control over their PSC representative is greater than that over their NAC-representative and the level of the condition “relation to MFA” in the two committees should thus be seen as dissimilar.

117

PSC respondent 5. PSC respondent 10. 119 NAC respondent 8. 120 NAC respondent 9 (my emphasis). 121 PSC respondent 4. 122 PSC respondent 10; PSC respondent 11. 118

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8.4 H3: Prior work experiences The effect of having greater international work experience has been hypothesized as having a positive effect on the internalization of group norms and role conceptions. In the case of the NAC and the PSC, however, there is no clear difference in the extent of international work experience between the two committees’ representatives. Moreover, the findings demonstrate that the effect of such experience on the representatives’ willingness to adapt to group norms and new roles is similar between the two committees. In the interviews, representatives from both committees argued that international work experience is useful mainly because it teaches one how to argue and reach a consensus. One PSC ambassador explained this in the following way: The more international experience and experience of different cultures you have, the easier it is to reach consensus, because then you can understand that when one country or ambassador disagrees with you, it’s not because they’re stupid or because they misjudged the situation or misunderstood the question, but rather because they have a different perspective on the issue.123

Multiple PSC ambassadors also described how their international work experience has given them a better appreciation of consensus building efforts: To what extent would you say that your international work experience affects your approval towards consensus building efforts within the committee? Oh yes, most probably. (…) I very much value consensus.124

Some were even more explicit in their view on how their previous work experience has shaped their eagerness to reach a consensus: You previously mentioned your extensive international experiences, to what extent would you say that that work experience has affected your approval towards consensus building efforts within the committee? 123 124

PSC respondent 10. PSC respondent 8.

41

Yeah, of course. I'm pretty much a “multilateralist”, because I've worked, as I mentioned to you, both in the UN and in NATO, so I have some experience and I know the dynamics of the multilateral permanent negotiations, and so, and always with a view to reach consensus. So I think so, very much.125

The NAC representatives mainly stressed the importance of international experience for the ability to “argue your case”. As previously mentioned, the skill of arguing is essential also for one’s credibility in the council, which, in turn, is a necessity for reaching a consensus. I mean technically people could come straight out of Oxford or other schools and have great skills, but you probably wouldn't know enough about the subject matter to actually make a tailor-made argument for this organization. So the experience matters in a secondary kind of way. The experience forms your ability to argue a case, and it is your ability to argue your case that is possibly the key decisive measure whether you are taken seriously or not.126

In a similar vein, one NAC colleague felt that his international work experience had given him a more global perspective and, consequently, a greater responsibility to reach a consensus in the council: This brings you a much more global approach, wider horizon and much more responsibility. So your political behavior can not be a populist one. You simply need to take responsibility.127

The interviews demonstrate that representatives in both the NAC and the PSC feel that the main effect of having extensive international work experience is a combination of a greater understanding for how consensus is attained and a strengthened belief in the importance of reaching a consensus. In summary, the level and effect of international work experience can thus be understood as similar in the NAC and the PSC.

125

PSC respondent 7. NAC respondent 9. 127 NAC respondent 2.

126

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8.5 H4: Ambiguity of norms The condition “ambiguity of norms” has been understood as having a positive effect on a state agent’s internalization of an organization’s norms if those norms are large and diffuse. Hooghe argues that the more diffuse or abstract a certain norm is, the lower the risk of inter-group conflict based on instrumental calculation and thus the easier it is for socialization to take place. As with the NAC and the PSC, however, this does not seem to be the case. In fact, the results of the conducted interviews instead point to the opposite – the internalization of group norms appears to be the strongest where the material stakes of the organization’s norms are the most apparent. If we understand an organization’s norms as its underlying goal or mission, the norms of NATO (security in the North Atlantic area) should be understood as significantly more essential to the security of the European continent than the norms of the EU. The difference in the representatives’ understanding of the existential significance of these norms was also reflected in the interviews. One NAC representative explained his view on the importance of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the following way: We take it very seriously. Just to give you an example, we are willing to send forces and risk and actually have people die, not for something that matters to me, but something that matters to others. (…) This is a very effective argument that I can make with a lot of strength to my capital, if I lay out that this may not be important to us is in a sense that we are not the ones in the firing line, but our allies are in the firing line, and if we don't do something for the allies, they will not do something for us. (…) So we take that very, very seriously. This alliance has to be able to uphold Article 5, and if that means loosing lives in the name of greater solidarity, we are not just willing to do that, we have done that. We are doing that on a daily basis.128

In contrast, one PSC representative with work experience from NATO explained how the thresholds to reach consensus in the PSC are higher than in NAC, simply because the issues dealth with in the PSC are not as “real”.129 The main norm of the PSC – upholding a strong and effective EU policy – is considerably less “existential” to its nature. This was exemplified in the following interview:

128 129

NAC respondent 9 (my emphasis). PSC respondent 1.

43

The best interest of [my country] in most questions, by definition, is by having a strong EU position and an effective EU policy. For example, in many international crises, [a country like mine] does not have much say when it comes to the war in Syria, for example. Our strength and influence in those kinds of events going on in the world comes through the EU being effective.130

The goal of the EU being an “effective actor” and producing “effective policy” is in itself quite abstract. For example, there is a large chance that the PSC ambassadors have quite diverging opinions on what the most “effective policy” is to end the war in Syria or the Russian military intervention in Ukraine. In this sense, the norms of the PSC should be understood as more diffuse than the norms of the NAC. The NAC representatives also expressed a stronger sense of loyalty towards the norms of their organization compared to the PSC representatives. Multiple NAC ambassadors explicitly described how their role in the NAC is twofold, acting as both a representative of their member state to NATO and as a representative of NATO to their member state.131 One ambassador explained that it is sometimes necessary to act as a representative to NATO (rather than as a representative to his member state) in order to achieve the organization’s norms (security in the whole North Atlantic area): Sometimes you have to make the case to the capital why you support somebody else. This is about what's good for the alliance, not necessarily what's good for [my country].132

The NAC ambassadors’ sense of responsibility to act on the basis of NATO’s norms rather than on the basis of their member states’ interests was apparent also in the following interview: When the situation is serious we can decide immediately. We know what it's all about, we are permanent representatives, we are authorized to do something. (…) If we talk about ballistic defense, we have at least 16 minutes to react. And this is something completely different, compared to the EU.133

The results of the interviews thus suggest that the hypothesized effect of a norm’s ambiguity is the opposite of what Hooghe proposes in her article. While the representatives of the NAC felt 130

PSC respondent 5 (my emphasis). NAC respondent 2; NAC respondent 8; NAC respondent 9. 132 NAC respondent 9 (my emphasis). 133 NAC respondent 2. 131

44

that their organization’s norms are so clear and fundamental to the security of the European continent that they sometimes have to explicitly represent NATO instead of their member states, the main norm of the PSC is considerably more abstract – essentially supporting a strong EU and creating “effective” policies. In other words, the more concrete and materialistic the effects of an organization’s norms are, the more important it seems to uphold those norms. This perceived importance also seems to lead to a greater internalization of such norms. In summary, the norms of the NAC and the PSC clearly differ in terms of their ambiguity. 8.6 H5: Issue intensity When it comes to the effect of “issue intensity”, Lewis and Beyers argue that the more frequent and longer-lasting interactions that take place between state agents, the easier it is for them to internalize new norms and role conceptions. In the case of the NAC and the PSC, however, the level of issue intensity in the two committees is essentially the same. Representatives of both the NAC and the PSC described how they spend more time with each other than with their respective families and that the process to reach consensus is often very time-demanding. One main difference between the two committees is the usual setting for this interaction; the PSC representatives interact mostly during committee meetings while the NAC representatives spend a lot of time together during more informal meetings such as lunches and dinners. One PSC representative explained this intense interaction in the following way: [We talk to each other] on a... not even daily, on an hourly basis, informal as much as formal.134

Even though the PSC representatives explained how they felt that their committee is more like a family than a group of competitors, two representatives described how the duration of the committee discussions can to a large extent be attributed to hardening national interests in the PSC: It all depends on the negotiation. The tendency is that national interests are hardening for the moment. (…) So it happens that the text goes directly to the level above after 10 hours of negotiation without success.135

134 135

PSC respondent 11. PSC respondent 8.

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On some issues the PSC reach an agreement through several rounds of discussions where difficult decisions are being sent back and forth between our committee and working groups and these can sometimes be quite lengthy processes. (…) We usually sit in the PSC quite long on Friday nights. Sometimes we meet on weekends as well.136

This intensity was also brought up in the interviews with the NAC representatives when I asked about the “everyday procedure” on reaching consensus in the council: It's a bit like a boarding school, you know. You go to your meetings and you meet your colleagues. You go to dinners and you meet your colleagues. And you go to receptions and you meet your colleagues. So there is a lot of interaction.137

As with the PSC, one NAC representative explained how the extensive social agenda makes the representatives spend less time with their families than with their colleagues.138 This aspect was also brought up by two other NAC-representatives who described how they are required to attend a large amount of social events with their colleagues: I mean you have to be present with the many meetings of what they call the “NATO family”, that is to say we have a social agenda that is sometimes very heavy and where we have to be present simply because it is important that your colleagues know you and that you develop with them purely a personal relationship, and it helps then.139 There is a sense of camaraderie in the NAC, which is not accidental. (…) We see each other socially, at dinners, all the time.140

In summary, the intra-group interaction between the members of the NAC and the PSC should be understood as equally intense. While the PSC representatives explained how they can sometimes spend 10 hours in a meeting at a time, the NAC representatives emphasized how their intense social agenda leads to frequent and long-lasting interaction. The level of the condition “issue intensity” should thus be seen as similar in the two committees.

136

PSC respondent 5. NAC respondent 4. 138 NAC respondent 9. 139 NAC respondent 8. 140 NAC respondent 9. 137

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8.7 H6: Insulation/agent autonomy The last hypothesis that will be tested and compared between the NAC and the PSC is the effect of insulated meetings and negotiations. As previously mentioned, Lewis and Beyers argue that state agents are more likely to internalize group norms and new role conceptions if they interact in secluded settings. The interviews suggest that there is a clear difference between the NAC and the PSC in the level of insulation and agent autonomy during committee meetings. While the PSC representatives have the ability to constantly check with their MFA via e-mail or SMS if there is any uncertainty about their position, the opposite is true for the NAC representatives.141 Since all types of electronic communication devices are forbidden in NAC meetings, these meetings are considerably more secluded than PSC meetings. However, the concept of agent autonomy and insulated interactions should not be limited to formal interactions such as committee meetings. When examining the level of seclusion in the informal interactions preceding committee meetings, the distinction between the NAC and the PSC becomes less apparent. The importance of these informal discussions was described in the following way by a PSC representative: Do you ever prepare joint positions with other representatives outside of the committee? Oh yes, absolutely. (…) And it's also a sign to say you play the European games. The symbol is also important, of ganging up with others (…) if you do it with a few others, it means that you consulted, that you have a broader basis, so it's important.142

The value of consulting other representatives prior to committee meeting was also emphasized by two PSC colleagues: (…) getting in early in the decision-making process and the political process, to come up with ideas, to talk to other colleagues, “what could the PSC do?” That's not part of the formal agenda, but it’s a very important role.143

141

PSC respondent 5. PSC respondent 8. 143 PSC respondent 4. 142

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If we discuss Libya, of course we consult with two or three member states before, because then they will consult with us [on an issue that we care about], just to give you an example. (…) so there are permanently informal discussions.144

This type of secluded pre-coordinating process was also brought up in the interviews with the NAC representatives. Two representatives explained how they usually have one longer, secluded working lunch per week without any coworkers (and, consequently, without any MFA oversight): Each week we [have an informal meeting for] at least three hours, you know, discussing whatever we want, there are no notes from that. So nobody knows what we have discussed, and we prepare the atmosphere for the official debate and for the conclusions and for the directions. So we discuss everything.145 (…) in addition we have informal lunches, working lunches, and then it's only the perm reps, so no one behind us. Only the perm reps, the [Secretary General] and the [Deputy Secretary General]. So that's a very closed setting for discussing various things, putting things on the table and seeing how the land lies.146

In other words, there is in both organizations a clear practice of consulting other representatives in highly secluded settings that lie outside of the formal “control” of the member states. While there is a drastic difference between the NAC and the PSC in the level of MFA oversight during committee meetings, one could argue that the level of insulation in the informal interactions between representatives has a greater effect on the internalization of new norms and role conceptions. As has been described above, it is in these informal settings that solutions are envisaged and the decisions of the NAC and PSC are prepared. The level of the condition “insulation/agent autonomy” should thus be seen as similar in the two committees.

144

PSC respondent 7. NAC respondent 2 (my emphasis). 146 NAC respondent 4. 145

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9. Discussion The analysis above has highlighted a number of similarities and differences between the NAC and the PSC. As stated in section 7, the goal of this analysis has been to “rule out” hypotheses on conditions for socialization that are either equal or different between the committees, depending on whether the level of internalization is equal or different. The first result of the analysis is that the internalization of group norms and role conceptions is stronger in the NAC than in the PSC. On the basis of Mill’s method of difference, we thus established that hypotheses on the conditions that are shared between the two committees should be dismissed. The conducted interviews revealed that the conditions behind four of the six tested hypotheses are similar in the NAC and the PSC and should thus be understood as having a weaker explanatory power than the two hypotheses that differ between them. These four hypotheses are: organizational boundedness, prior work experiences, issue intensity and insulation/agent autonomy. The hypotheses that differ between the committees are: relation to MFA and ambiguity of norms. The table below summarizes these findings: Table 2: Conditions for socialization: evidence Common features of variables/hypotheses that enable socialization

Evidence

DV: The internalization of new role conceptions and conceptions of the self in line with group-community norms

Group norms, feelings of “appropriateness”. Habits that foster pro-norm behavior, sense of “weness”.

Dissimilar

H1: Organizational boundedness

Contact with other groups within organization

Similar

H2: Relation to MFA

Unclear instructions and limited contact with MFA

Dissimilar

H3: Prior work experiences

Predominantly international prior work experiences

Similar

H4: Ambiguity of norms

State agent perceives norms as large and diffuse

Dissimilar

H5: Issue intensity

Time-demanding meetings and negotiations

Similar

H6: Insulation/agent autonomy

Private, insulated settings during committee meetings and negotiations

Similar

Variables/hypotheses

These results have some very interesting implications on the theory of socialization in IOs. First of all, even though we cannot fully dismiss the four hypotheses that are shared between the committees because of the problem of equifinality, this thesis shows that the probability that 49

they have a significant effect on our dependent variable, the degree of internalization, is limited. This result is in clear contrast to the findings in Beyers (2005), Hooghe (2005) and Lewis (2005). Each one of these authors argue that one or two of the four hypothesized conditions have a strong effect on the internalization of norms and role conceptions. However, even though the level of internalization is dissimilar in the PSC and the NAC, the levels of these variables are more or less the same in the two committees. In other words, the probability that they have a strong positive effect on internalization of norms and role conceptions is quite low. In addition, when the hypothesis on the “ambiguity of norms” was tested, the relation between outcome and effect was found to be the opposite of what Hooghe hypothesized in her article. Rather than demonstrating that socialization is likely when an organization’s norms are large and diffuse, the interviews show that the more materialistic and existential the effects of an organization’s norms are, the easier it is for the internalization of those norms to take place. While the interviewed NAC representatives expressed a distinct understanding of their responsibility to uphold their organization’s norms (security in the North Atlantic area) the PSC representatives described their duty in the committee as much more diffuse, their main commitment being to create “effective” EU policy. Since the level of internalization has been found to be stronger in the NAC, we should rather understand the effect of unambiguous norms as “pro-socialization”. How can we explain that the properties of an organization’s norms are supposedly one of the most important factors to state agent socialization? And why is the degree of internalization greater in the NAC than in the PSC? In contrast to this study’s findings, my gut feeling when I began working on this thesis was that the degree of internalization in the PSC would be as high as or even higher than in the NAC. I assumed that since the decisions taken by the NAC to a greater extent affect member states’ national interests than the decisions taken by the PSC do, capitals would have a stronger incentive to take direct control of the decision-making process in NATO. In reality, the opposite seems to be true. The greater the existential “stake” of the decisions taken in the IO, the more leeway the permanent representatives seem to have. This is also reflected in the findings concerning the hypothesis on the relation between the representatives and their respective MFAs. One possible explanation to this could be that the member states are actually conscious of the process of socialization and that they want their permanent representatives to internalize the norms of the organization in order to reach strong policies that go beyond the lowest common denominator of national positions. I believe that this explanation, that states more or less constantly have indirect control of their representative, 50

is a crucially under-researched aspect in the literature on state agent socialization in IOs. Indeed, the relationship between a state agent and their “principal” (in other words, their MFA or member state) is in the literature almost always implicitly understood as a competition between diverging interests. This implicit assumption is most likely based on the idea that the norms and policy goals of IOs are consistently different than those of their member states. Instead of representing strictly national interests, the supranational interest of an IO is seen as something greater that reaches “above” the outcome of intergovernmental bargaining. This is clearly demonstrated by Hooghe when she argues that the European Commission and its civil servants should be understood as the “Engine of Europe”: “no other national or IO, with the exception of the European Court of Justice, represents so patently the view that supranational interest is not reducible to national interests”.147 While this may be true, it is also likely that the policy gap between what an IO wants and what its member states want can shift depending on external factors. During my stay in Brussels, I noticed some clear indications of this being the case. Multiple respondents explicitly argued that the spirit of cooperation and willingness to reach a consensus within the EU has deteriorated drastically “during the last four years”, mainly as a result of Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine and overall aggressive foreign policy, the rise of populist parties and the pressure from the recent migrant crisis.148 As previously mentioned, the increased importance of national interests has also been reflected in the PSC. As one representative described it: (…) for some governments it is no longer this feeling of solidarity and the weight of compromises and consensus that is the most important, but rather imposing your own national positions.149

One way to understand this development is that the many different crises have led to a greater policy gap between the “supranational interest” and national interests. As this sentiment was often brought up in the interviews with the PSC representatives (even though I did not pose any direct questions on the issue), I became curious to know whether the same shift had occurred in NATO. One representative who has experience from both committees explained it in the following way:

147

Hooghe 2005, p. 864. PSC respondent 2. 149 PSC respondent 10.

148

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I think in NATO, not yet. (…) I mean the willingness to come to consensus, I think, is still there, but we are very much aware, and that is maybe different in the EU, by having the threat from Russia clearly on the eastern side there is a very acute awareness that our unity is our strength. And that drives us towards finding this consensus. But it is not always easy, and it's sometimes a fight, and not always a pleasant fight. But as I said, I think everyone finds it important that we are united and that we show that strength. And that is maybe a bit less in the EU.150

I believe this quote in particular demonstrates why unambiguous norms are significant for state agent socialization. It is not necessarily become psychologically easier for a state agent to adopt unambiguous norms, but if the effects of an organization’s norms are more existential and materialistic, the more important it is for the member states themselves to push for more cooperation (which in itself fosters socialization). Consequently, the fact that the NAC representatives’ internalization of norms and role conceptions has been relatively unaffected by the last few years’ crises should be understood as the result of the NATO member states’ perception of the existential importance of upholding peace and security in the North Atlantic area. In other words, and to answer the guiding research question of this thesis, the socialization of permanent representatives in international organizations is likely to occur if the organization’s norms have unambiguous, existential and materialistic consequences. This conclusion should, however, be taken with a grain of salt. Because of the problem of equifinality, it is not certain that a high degree of internalization can not be attributed to a different variable in a different case. For instance, it is possible that the socialization within a different IO is more dependent on one of the variables that we have found to be less significant in the NAC and the PSC. However, this problem could be solved through a future process tracing study on the EU member states’ shifting support for the organization’s norms. A process tracing study could establish the intervening casual process between the properties of an IO’s norms and the degree of internalization of state agents. In other words, a process tracing could “prove” the conclusion made in this thesis. Nonetheless, the comparative method applied in this thesis does have its strengths as well. Even if we cannot say with certainty that the hypotheses on the four conditions that are similar in the PSC and the NAC should be disregarded, this study has strengthened the plausibility of this assumption. In addition, the results suggest that the effects of the properties of an organization’s norms should be given more theoretical 150

NAC respondent 1 (my emphasis).

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consideration. The comparative method has also provided us insights that would not have been possible through a single/critical case method. While the process of socialization has to a large extent been seen as something “unique” within the EU – often being described as a sui generis case of socialization – the results of this thesis suggest that this idea is false.151 The belief that the EU is a unique case is based on the notion that there is no other international institution in the world that exhibit the same level of conditions for socialization.152 However, since the degree of internalization of norms and role conceptions within the NAC and the PSC differs, this premise is evidently flawed. Given this, and considering the strong indications that previous research on state agent socialization in IOs has overemphasized the effect of multiple conditions, I believe that future socialization research should to a greater extent make use of comparative methods. In fact, I have personally been surprised by the vast insight that this method has given me. A few comments should also be made on the “real world” implications of these results and on what I believe future socialization research should focus more on. As stated in the introduction to this thesis, socialization in IOs can and should be understood as a cornerstone of international cooperation. Since the results of this thesis indicate that the role of the properties of norms is greater than what has previously been hypothesized, I believe that states and policy-makers must understand that effective cooperation in IOs is mainly driven by the materialistic and existential consequences derived from the organizations’ raison d’etre (purpose for existing). In other words, in order to increase the effectiveness – and thus also the relevance – of IOs, member states should aim to give them a larger mandate. For instance, on the basis of this thesis’s conclusions, one way of increasing state agent socialization within the EU would be to expand the function and operations of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) so that the military capabilities of the EU become as fundamental to the security of the 28 member states as NATO is today. This would most likely increase the perceived existential and materialistic importance of upholding the norms of the organization and thus also give the member states a larger incentive to create meaningful and effective policies within the framework of the EU. As previously mentioned, I believe that future research on socialization in IOs should pay greater attention to these aspects – the role of member states and how their preferences with respect to an organization’s norms influence the actions of their permanent 151

Johnston 2005, p. 1036. As Johnston states: “the conventional wisdom has it that they are the most complex, most legalistic, most bureaucratized [IO]” (Ibid.).

152

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representatives. This relationship has been implicitly understood as a rather simplistic competition of diverging interests, while neglecting the potentially immense effect of member states’ preferences. Conceptions on the socializing effect of informal rules or norms of an organization on a permanent representative may thus well be conditioned upon the representative’s member state’s approval of those norms. A future process tracing study could thus aim to prove the causal effect of unambiguity of an organization’s norms as the main factor for socialization by tracing EU member states’ support for the EU’s norms over the last 4-5 years.

10. Conclusion In this thesis, I have tried to answer the following question: “under what conditions does the socialization of permanent representatives in international organizations occur?” This has been done by measuring the degree of internalization of norms and role conceptions and comparing the presence of conditions for six different hypotheses in two committees of permanent representatives in the EU and NATO, the NAC and the PSC. To measure the degree of internalization and the level of the tested conditions, I conducted elite interviews with 21 permanent representatives and deputies in Brussels during the first week of October 2016. This interview data is, to my knowledge, the largest of its kind on the permanent representatives of the NAC and should thus be understood as this thesis’s most substantial empirical contribution. Considering that previous research has more or less systematically ignored socialization in NATO, the results of this thesis indicate that the socialization within the NAC, and most likely the socialization within committees of permanent representatives in many other IOs, is significantly under-researched. This thesis has also showcased the advantages of applying a comparative method when testing hypotheses. While we have not been able to draw any decisive conclusions because of the problem of equifinality, the comparative method has given us insights that would not have been possible by, for example, studying only one of the two cases. Using this method has strengthened the plausibility of the assumption that four hypotheses on the conditions for socialization should be disregarded while two hypotheses – relation to MFA and ambiguity of norms – should be given more theoretical consideration. On the basis of these results, I have argued that the socialization of permanent representatives in international organizations is likely to occur if the organization’s norms have unambiguous, existential and materialistic 54

consequences. In other words, I believe that more scholarly attention should be paid to the effect of member states’ preferences with respect to an IO’s norms and to their permanent representatives’ internalization of those norms. This argument, and the discussion on the potential effect of the existential and materialistic consequences that arise from upholding an organization’s norms, should thus be seen as this thesis’s largest theoretical contribution to the literature. It is my firm belief that a future study on this effect would yield some very interesting implications for the field of socialization theory.

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Appendix Figure A1: List of NAC and PSC respondents

North Atlantic Council Anna Jóhannsdóttir, Permanent Representative of Iceland to NATO Barbora Ešnerová, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to NATO Boris Grigić, Permanent Representative of Croatia to NATO François de Kerchove d’Exaerde, Permanent Representative of Belgium to NATO Gábor Marosfi, Deputy Permanent Representative of Hungary to NATO Jelko Kacin, Permanent Representative of Slovenia to NATO Marjanne de Kwaasteniet, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to NATO Sebastian Mitrache, Deputy Permanent Representative of Romania to NATO Tomáš Valášek, Permanent Representative of Slovakia to NATO Vytautas Leškevičius, Permanent Representative of Lithuania to NATO

Political and Security Committee Adrian Bratu, Permanent Representative of Romania to the PSC Alexander Kmentt, Permanent Representative of Austria to the PSC Anna Jardfelt, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the PSC François Cornet d’Elzius, Permanent Representative of Belgium to the PSC Massimiliano Lagi, Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the PSC Nicolas Suran, Permanent Representative of France to the PSC Peer Horstmann, Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany to the PSC Ricardo Diez-Hochleitner, Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the PSC Rui Vinhas, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the PSC Stephan Müller, Permanent Representative of Luxembourg to the PSC Turo Mattila, Deputy Permanent Representative of Finland to the PSC

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Table A1: Operationalized interview questions

Variables/hypotheses

Common features of variables/hypotheses that enable socialization

Operationalized interview questions

DV: The internalization of new role conceptions and conceptions of the self in line with groupcommunity norms

Group norms, feelings of “appropriateness”. Habits that foster pro-norm behavior, sense of “we-ness”.

H1: Organizational boundedness

Contact with other groups within organization

H2: Relation to MFA

Unclear instructions and limited contact with MFA

H3: Prior work experiences

Predominantly international prior work experiences

H4: Ambiguity of norms

State agent perceives norms as large and diffuse

H5: Issue intensity

Time-demanding meetings and negotiations

1. When you were new to the Political and Security Committee/North Atlantic Council, did you feel that there was a specific set of unstated norms within the group that you were supposed to follow to be able to fit in? 2. Do you feel that there is an “appropriate” way to act when you are negotiating with other committee/council members? 3. What would you say is the main task of the PSC/NAC – to negotiate between the diverse national interests in order to make a common policy possible or to be a forum for the lowest common denominator of national positions? 4. Is the PSC/NAC able to reach consensus on policies that are sometimes above or beyond some of the member states’ positions? If so, how is this done? 5. To what extent do you interact with other EU/NATO officials (outside of the PSC/NAC)? 6. How much contact do you have with your MFA during negotiations in a committee/council meeting? 7. How much “leeway” do you have to the instructions that your MFA gives you? Do you feel that you play an active part in the formation of your country’s position on the policies that you work to achieve in the PSC/NAC? 8. To what extent would you say that your prior domestic or international work experiences affect either your approval or opposition towards efforts in trying to reach a consensus within the council? 9. In comparison to what you feel is the main task of the PSC/NAC, what do you believe is your main function as a representative in the council? Serving your member state or supporting a strong EU/upholding peace in the North Atlantic area? 10. Can you describe the everyday procedure of gaining consensus on different policy positions within the committee/council?

H6: Insulation/agent autonomy

Private, insulated settings during committee meetings and negotiations

11. How often do you meet with other national state representatives outside of the committee/council meetings? 12. Do you ever prepare joint positions (formal or informal) with other state representatives prior to a committee/council meeting?



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