THE PECULIAR GENESIS OF A UTOPIAN COLLEGE

Monte Bute Metropolitan State University

Address correspondence to: [email protected] Monte Bute, Social Science Department Metropolitan State University 700 E. Seventh Street, St. Paul, MN 55106

Before Minnesota Metropolitan State College (MMSC) even opened its doors in 1971, the chairman of the prestigious Carnegie Commission on Higher Education was acclaiming the school as “perhaps the most innovative institution of higher education in the United States” (Anderson 1972). Who was that man and why was he saying these things about a newly created college? The man was Clark Kerr, former president of the University of California and one of America‟s most highly regarded educators. How did a fledgling state college gain such notoriety that the most visible figure in higher education would issue these accolades? The answer to that question is the subject of this inquiry. In 1972, the Los Angeles Times chronicled “the newest movement to hit higher education.” The article states, “It has burst upon the college scene with surprising force, and though its detractors tend to chalk it off to faddism, its supporters think it is opening a new era in higher education.” The story goes on to trumpet Metropolitan State as among the most radical of these colleges (Greenwood 1972). In a seven-year study of new experimental colleges including MMSC, Grant and Riesman report that within these schools “The utopian impulses are strong, representing a search for a more perfect union” (1978:37). Metropolitan State had no campus, no classes, no grades, no academic terms, and no lower division. David Riesman, the nation‟s foremost sociologist of higher education, was a somewhat skeptical student of these new undertakings. Despite these misgivings, he did single out the Minnesota experiment as exemplary: I do believe that the combination of enterprises on which MMSC is launched is indeed unique; nowhere else to my knowledge is a similarly

intricate effort being made. . . . What makes MMSC such a highwire act over a still invisible net is its combination of these efforts in a novel way for which there are no guidelines or precedents. (1972:5) While the college was using these innovative methods to provide higher education to non-traditional students, the charismatic founding president was simultaneously transforming Metropolitan State into a utopian community. That this new college was becoming a utopian experiment was indeed unexpected. For President David Sweet, creating heaven on earth was not just a figure of speech. Sweet was a devout Christian Scientist. When the president began an early talk to the faculty and staff with a quote from the Book of Proverbs, it is apparent that his selfdescribed “prophetic vision” was about more than just educational reform: An ancient prophet, a wise observer of mankind, noted many centuries ago, “Where there is no vision the people perish.” . . . No effort to replace what is can prosper unless one has a sense of something better, something more nearly perfect, some clearer sense of the true. And truth is not a future proposition—truth is a present possibility: a present possibility imperfectly realized. . . . I am convinced we must start, and start soon if we are to ensure the viability of our experiment. (1973:1-4) How possibly did a state school, initially sold as a package of pragmatic and expedient reforms, metamorphose into a utopian college with religious overtones? I answer that question by reconstructing the conception, gestation, and birth of MMSC

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from 1968 to 1971. In this study, I am not answering the question “why did this outcome occur?” but rather “how could this outcome have happened?” I contend that the origins of the college resulted from a rather predictable series of political turf battles, both between educational interest groups and regional power blocs in the Minnesota Legislature. The plot‟s denouement features one past and one future vice president of the United States intervening as midwives for the new college. Paradoxically, the peculiar genesis of this utopian college was only the consequence of a long process of politics as usual. The eventual outcome was one that the state‟s legislature and higher education bureaucracy had neither intended nor anticipated. THE GODFATHER TAKES CHARGE There are two plaques on the entrance archway of Founders Hall at Metropolitan State University. One commemorates the school‟s founding president, David E. Sweet. Sweet reigned from 1971-77 and is a figure of legend. Sagas about his era still circulate among faculty and staff, and he remains a contemporary presence. The other plaque acknowledges the founding chancellor, G. Theodore Mitau. In contrast with the charismatic Sweet, Mitau‟s image is of a spectral bureaucrat, an all but forgotten figure in institutional memory. Yet among the cast of characters responsible for founding a new state college in the metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St. Paul, none stood taller than the 5-foot-6-inch, “Ted” Mitau. Mitau not only initiated the idea, but also took charge of the strategy and tactics employed during the three-year campaign to pass the legislative authorization for Metropolitan State.

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Mitau was born in 1920 to a well-to-do Jewish family in Berlin. His father, an executive with a telephone company, died by the time Ted was 10 years old. His older brother died in an accident a few years later, leaving Mitau and his mother to fend for themselves. He was just 13 when Hitler came to power to 1933. Mitau wore the Star of David and attended a segregated school for Jews. Sensing his eventual fate in Germany, Ted acquired a student visa in 1937 to study in the United States. Believing that Jews would remain safe in Berlin, his mother refused to migrate to New York with her son. After arriving in the United States, Mitau supported himself with menial jobs such as washing dishes in a restaurant. Ted improved his English by frequently attending movies. Mitau eventually enrolled at New York University. A speech instructor with Minnesota connections was impressed enough with the young immigrant that he encouraged Ted to transfer to the more congenial setting of Macalester College in St. Paul. The president of Macalester took an interest in new undergraduate and arranged financing for Mitau‟s efforts to get his mother out of Germany. She never made it—Rosel Streim Mitau perished in the Thereienstadt concentration camp in Czechoslovakia (Gonzalez-Campoy 1998). His work as an undergraduate was so impressive that, upon graduation, the school hired him as a faculty member. While teaching at Macalester, Mitau attended graduate school at the University of Minnesota. He studied economics and political science, receiving an M.A. in 1942 and a Ph. D. in 1948. Ted was an extremely able scholar who wrote highly successful textbooks on state and local government. Described by former students as “intimidating” and “demanding,” Mitau was outstanding in the classroom. He

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won the college‟s outstanding teacher award so many times that the school finally refused to allow his nomination for the prize (Sweet 1975). Civic involvement at the local, state, and national levels was an important part of Mitau‟s life. He once shared an office at Macalester in the 1940s with another young instructor and aspiring politician, Hubert Humphrey. The Democratic and Farmer-Labor parties had merged in 1944. In 1948, two factions were engaged in a ruthless struggle for control of the new party. Humphrey led the bloc controlled by cold war liberals against a group dominated by the Communist Party USA. Mitau assisted Humphrey by organizing the “Diaper Brigade,” a cadre of student volunteers (likely a subtle dig at the activist “red diaper babies,” whose parents were Communist Party members). One of his own students who Mitau recruited and introduced to Humphrey was another future political luminary, Walter Mondale. Over the years, Mitau drew upon the political capital he had accrued from his friendships with these future U.S. senators and vice presidents of the United States (Gonzalez-Campoy 1998). It was therefore hardly surprising that when leaders of the Minnesota State College Board found themselves with a substantial political problem in 1967, they called upon Professor Mitau for counsel. Only the eventual outcome of the consultation was unexpected. The state colleges were normal schools from 1860 to 1921. These institutions had their status elevated to teachers colleges in 1921. They became state colleges in 1957. This college system in 1967 had campuses scattered in six small cities throughout rural Minnesota. Political pundits were predicting that the results of the 1970 census would

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afford the metropolitan areas at least half the seats in the State Legislature. This potential transfer of political power did not bode well for the Minnesota State College System. This shift would just be additional erosion of power for an organization that was already politically weak (Dunlap 1970; Mitau 1977). This new worry was just one more among a long list of old ones. Unlike the University of Minnesota, which is constitutionally and judicially autonomous, the legislature established the state colleges by statute. Therefore, state administrative rules and regulations governed the system‟s board and colleges. The result was constant interference by state agencies in college operations. The State College Board initiated a number of requests for exemptions from these administrative controls. These efforts consistently failed. In a cover letter of transmittal to the Governor and Legislature, the Board President made the case for upgrading the administrative arm of the State College System: Composed of nonprofessional citizens, the Board found it increasingly overwhelmed by issues that had become so complex that they required professional attention. The departure of the executive secretary in 1967 brought matters to a head. The state‟s other four systems of postsecondary education (University or Minnesota, private colleges, junior colleges, and vocational technical schools) were well organized and each spoke with a single voice—the same could not be said for the state colleges (Dunlap 1970).

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Such were the conditions when the Board first decided to strengthen its limited political muscle for an all-out effort to improve the system‟s stock in the legislature. The organization recruited Mitau, then chair of Macalester College‟s Political Science Department, to serve as an advisor. Shortly after the Board delineated the qualifications for the newly established position, Mitau received a phone call that “much surprised” him—the Board offered him the new position. He accepted. Their charge to the new chancellor was to take charge (Dunlap 1970; Mitau 1977). A reporter described Mitau as “a nervous, energetic, fast-paced individual with a tremendous drive to achieve,” and called him the “godfather” of the State College System. One observer described his methods as “the buzz-saw approach.” He had a clear mandate and he was not about to waste it “Patience,” the chancellor admitted, “is not one of my virtues.” Mitau believes “the waiting period between formulation of an idea and its implementation should be somewhere between 1 and 3 minutes” (Anderson 1973). One newspaper story said that Mitau “coaxes, cajoles, needles and encourages officials of the seven colleges, trying to get them to do what he and his staff think should be done—without being too pushy about it” (Anderson 1973). A good example of this new cohesion was how the system now operated at the Capitol. The chancellor now presented the Board‟s position, with assistance from his vice chancellors. The presidents could only field specific questions about their particular campuses. Mitau had his detractors at the local colleges. The chancellor later recalled the reaction of college faculties and staffs to the newly enlarged, centralized, and professionalized state office: “Inherently suspicious, if not antagonistic, to what they

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perceived to be the unwarranted bureaucratization of the academy, attacks on „St. Paul‟s power grabs‟ became a generally accepted aspect of intra-system communications” (Mitau 1977:58). An independent source later confirmed that Mitau‟s perceptions were well founded. A professor at Southwest State College recounts the faculty reaction to the chancellor‟s acquisition and exercise of power: The consolidation of line authority in the Chancellor‟s office gave the Chancellor the means to punish Southwest State for its resistance to the application of these formulas. . . . Perhaps the Chancellor saw himself engaged in gaining control over an institution which had been too independent. He probably felt it necessary to demonstrate to the legislature and to other state colleges that the emerging bureaucracy was in control of the system over which it was supposed to preside. (Grubb 1984:164) Mitau‟s tenure began in the spring of 1968. By summer, he already had in place a legislative strategy designed to enhance the political influence of the State College System. The centerpiece of this battle plan was a budget request that called for significantly increasing the state college share of Minnesota‟s higher education dollars. For the next 12 months, the chancellor conducted the Board‟s business at what he described as a “frenetic pace.” The year was one long whirlwind campaign to enhance the power and status of the state colleges. The definitive history of Minnesota would later describe the chancellor as “a vigorous and articulate advocate with a flair for publicity” (Blegen 1975:711).

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As part of this agenda, Mitau announced in August 1968 his proposal for an upper division college in the metropolitan area. He stressed that the Twin Cities would soon have thousands of junior college graduates hoping to go on for a baccalaureate degree. For a variety of reasons, they would not be able to attend a rural state college, could not afford private college tuition, and enrollment limitations might exclude them from the University of Minnesota. This public rationale for a new college provided cover for Mitau‟s political agenda. The new institution would create an urban beachhead for the State College System. The chancellor was a political realist— this was to be a power base, capable of challenging the urban stranglehold of the University of Minnesota: After all, a few small colleges dispersed through the out-state area could not begin to bring together the kind of legislative support rallyable, for example, by the University of Minnesota system and its massive urban constituencies. Nor could state teachers college alumni be expected to compete with the degree of political influence which the often so much more highly placed graduates of the University‟s professional schools . . . could exercise through their networks of contacts and associations. (Mitau 1977:49) Kenneth Wolfe, St. Louis Park Conservative, introduced a bill in January 1969 calling for $250,000 to plan a new state school. The bill called for a metropolitan-area college, and instructed the State College Board and its staff to plan the new institution. The Higher Education Coordinating Commission (HECC) almost simultaneously

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announced a proposal that was clearly an alternative to the Wolfe bill. This bill would give HECC $50,000 to assess the higher education needs of the Twin Cities and another $500,000 to implement the findings (Higher Education Coordinating Commission 1969). Legislative deliberations centered on the idea of an upper-level college that would concentrate on the junior and senior years. Disagreement arose over the site location. Regional factions of legislators were promoting three sites: Rochester (southern Minnesota), the Iron Range (northern Minnesota), and the Twin Cities. The Wolfe bill finally got a hearing on April 22. Senator Mel Hansen, Minneapolis Conservative, twice tried to move passage of the bill. The committee chair, Senator Rudolph Hanson, Albert Lea Conservative ignored the attempts of the Minneapolis Senator (those were still the days of powerful and autocratic committee chairs). Wolfe later told reporters he had the votes in committee to pass the bill. He claimed the chair was in league with committee proponents of the Rochester and Iron Range sites, who banded together to block the metropolitan location. Senators Harold Krieger, Rochester Conservative, and R.G. (Rudy) Perpich, Hibbing Liberal, moved and seconded the HECC bill. The committee passed the bill calling for the HECC to study the site location question before the next legislative session in 1971. In that era the Minnesota Legislature only met biennially in odd-numbered years. (Bormann 1969). Despite this temporary setback, the idea for a senior college in the metropolitan area had attracted considerable attention from legislators. Any anguish Mitau might have suffered over this delay was more than offset by his securing a more than 30 percent budget increase for the State College System, a visible symbol of the increasing political

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power wielded by the new chancellor. He had already “significantly strengthened the role of state colleges in Minnesota‟s program of publicly supported higher education” (Blegen 1975:711). PLAYING POLITICAL CHESS The Minnesota Legislature created The Higher Education Coordinating Commission (HECC) in 1965. The body was composed of 18 members and had a professional staff of civil servants. Eight members were citizens representing the state‟s congressional districts. The other ten members represented the state‟s five systems of post-secondary education: the University of Minnesota, the state colleges, the private colleges, the junior colleges, and the vocational technical schools. This Byzantine structure was an exclusive clubroom where presidents and chancellors played a game of political chess, which established the pecking order of the higher education community (Sweet 1970). The legislature had mandated this governmental unit to study the idea of a new state college. In a clear case of understatement, a knowledgeable observer described the deliberations: “As can readily be imagined, with the large number of „system‟ representatives on the Commission, these issues were not examined dispassionately. There was intense lobbying and logrolling by these representatives” (Sweet 1972:3). The specific language of the amendment authorizing the study is noteworthy. It stated, “The Legislature is considering expanding the state college system with one upper division college.” The rider also directs the Commission‟s staff to supply the House and Senate Committees “by May 1, 1970, with the information the staff deems necessary for

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a decision . . . and the commission is requested to make its recommendation to these committees by September 1, 1970” ([Session Laws of the State of Minnesota, 1969] cited by Sweet (1970:9). First, the amendment implicitly endorses the senior college concept. Further, it did not designate a site for the institution. It is also noteworthy that although the new school was to be a state college the HECC, not the State College Board, was to conduct the study. Finally, it is significant that the Commission‟s staff was to report to the legislative committees before the Commission was to consider the findings. The Legislature was obviously worried about Commissioners exerting undue influence on the staff. Although the Legislature was retaining control of the final decision, they seemed to recognize that the choice would alter the power dynamics between the educational subsystems—they were seeking as much information from as many sources as possible (Sweet 1970). The Commission met in June 1969 to set up the guidelines for the study. They instructed their staff to collect and to analyze the pertinent information but the Commission delicately sidestepped legislative intent by creating an “advisory committee” to work with the staff. This advisory group had one representative from each of the five sub-systems. David Sweet, Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs for the State College System, and Stanley Kegler, an Associate Vice-President for the University of Minnesota, were key members of the committee. The staff started work immediately. The advisory committee began meeting in the fall and met regularly throughout the autumn and early winter. In late November, the Commission decided to bring Dr. Robert Altman

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in for a presentation on January 5, 1970. Altman was the author of The Upper Division College (1970) and was the nation‟s foremost authority on the senior college model. The opening gambit was a surprise move. In December 1969, a news conference revealed the findings of a staff report to the University of Minnesota Regents. The chair of this staff task force was none other than Stanley Kegler (Kegler et al. 1969). Kegler acknowledged in a preface that the report was a “crash effort.” With obvious irony, David Sweet later wrote that “probably it is coincidental that it [the report] was published by the University after the announcement on November 25 that Dr. Robert Altman would be invited to address the HECC . . . but before he actually made his presentation” (Sweet 1970:15). Two other documents would later supplement this study. Sweet felt this effort “probably provides one with the most coherent public statements in opposition not only to the specific [Mitau‟s] proposal but also to the „concept‟ of upper level institutions of higher education” (Sweet 1970:16). The report‟s principal recommendation was to expand the University of Minnesota‟s enrollment by 50 percent, primarily in the Twin Cities. Further, these reports called for converting St. Paul from an agricultural campus to a multipurpose unit, and adding several thousand upper division students to the St. Paul location. Immediately following Dr. Altman‟s presentation to the HECC on January 5, Chancellor Mitau took the offensive. He told the Commission that the procedures they had instituted for the study “are very satisfactory—so satisfactory that even though this report concerns a matter very close to my responsibilities . . . I have no intention of

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attempting in any way to duplicate the work of the Commission or its staff‟ (Sweet 1970:13). His message was clear: the next day a newspaper reported, “Mitau‟s statement appeared to be a direct rebuttal to the University report” (Minnesota Daily 1970). The next challenge to the idea of a new college was not long in coming. The HECC contracted for a feasibility study with a nationally recognized expert on higher education, Dr. Lewis Mayhew of Stanford University. Mayhew published his report in April of 1970. First, he questioned the HECC projection of 234,000 higher education students by 1980. Mayhew felt the figure was too optimistic by 20,000 (history vindicated Mayhew—the head count in 1980 was 212,000). Because of these doubts, the Stanford scholar recommended against any new institutions. He did suggest a “detailed standby plan” by 1975 in case the growth rate was higher than he had projected. Mayhew recommended those existing institutions, public and private, be expanded. In particular, he called upon the University of Minnesota to expand the St. Paul campus and add a branch in Rochester. He based his case on economic feasibility; the professor argued that a new institution was twice as expensive as expanding an old one. In retrospect, the most revealing part of the report is Mayhew‟s candid remarks on the political nature of the decision. First, he speaks to a “number of issues not necessarily educational” which “contaminate” the entire discussion. He acknowledges, “The very understandable desire on the part of the officials from the University of Minnesota to maintain the historical primacy of that institution . . . and to resist developments which jeopardize continued and advancing legislative support.” Mayhew also found it an

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“equally understandable . . . desire on the part of the leaders of the State College System to expand its area of influence . . . to create a counter-force to the previous hegemony of the University of Minnesota” (1970:11-12). In May 1970, HECC Executive Director Richard Hawk released the staff report to the two legislative committees that had requested the work. The staff recommendations closely followed the Mayhew lead: to meet the expanding enrollment, they call for expansion of existing institutions. They conclude that if a new institution does become necessary, “it should be recognized that the future of an upper division college is less certain than that of a four-year institution and addition of the lower division may be required for an effective long-range development of the institution” (HECC, 1970a:37). The HECC Commissioners in late August released their own recommendations that bluntly contradicted the conclusions of its staff. They called for the creation of a new state college in the metropolitan area. However, they rejected Mitau‟s proposal for a senior college, instead endorsing a four-year institution that by 1980 would accommodate 5,000 upper-division and 3,000 lower-division students. The Commission also attempted to retain control of the process. They called upon the 1971 Minnesota Legislature to provide the HECC with funds to plan the institution, “in order that a final decision by the 1973 Legislature on establishment of the institution be based on a more complete assessment” (HECC 1970b). The chancellor‟s king was in danger but he was already deliberating his next move. Mitau belonged to the “don‟t get mad, get even” school of politics. He once told the Winona Sunday News:

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Storming the citadel is emotionally very satisfying . . . Frequently it is counterproductive and invites retaliation in kind . . . Perhaps we must search out our decision-making centers precisely, do our homework, provide the facts and find our emotional satisfaction elsewhere (Holte, 1971). ORGANIZING A CAMPAIGN With the University of Minnesota solidly serving the metropolitan area, and with seven private colleges eagerly seeking upper level enrollments, what need was there for another college, burdening taxpayers and further thinning a possibly declining future supply of students? (Mitau 1977:64) This statement was a somber but realistic assessment of the obstacles faced by Chancellor Mitau and the State College Board as they prepared for the 1971 Legislative Session. Their task was to fashion a strategy and tactics capable of neutralizing the forces that were opposing a senior college in the Twin Cities. The campaign needed to be both well coordinated and flexible. The chancellor began early on to define the terms of the coming debate. Mitau carefully described the new school as “the senior college for graduates of the six metropolitan junior colleges and six area vocational-technical schools” (Mankato Free Press 1970). In an interview in October 1970, he said, “the transfer student from a twoyear college has no institution in Minnesota established primarily to meet his needs” (Seetin 1970).

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Although, Mitau characterized the proposed institution as an “educational innovation,” it is hard to find much in the early descriptions that is innovative other than the fact it was to be a senior college (there were only eight such schools in the nation). Political expediency seems to have inspired the gradual inclusion of “non-traditional” characteristics into the college proposal. As the political climate shifted during the threeyear campaign, so too did the chancellor‟s taste for academic experimentation. Only after Metropolitan State was established did these pragmatic innovations take on an ideological and utopian flavor. Mitau also attempted to defuse the issue of inter-system rivalry: “Our aim is to enrich opportunities by complementing, not competing with each others” (Seetin 1970). In December 1970, the chancellor spoke at Mankato and again stressed the supplementary nature of the proposal, declaring the purpose was “to enlarge the educational options presently available to our young men and women” (Mankato Free Press 1970). Enrollment in American colleges and universities expanded at a record-setting pace during the l960s. Students attending institutions of higher education totaled 3.8 million in 1960. Those numbers had jumped to 8.4 million by 1970—an increase of 124 percent. A revolution over access was occurring in American higher education (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1971b). The enrollment pattern for Minnesota mirrors these national figures. In 1961, a little more than 71,000 students enrolled in postsecondary institutions in the state. This student population had risen to 161,000 by

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1970—an increase of 127 percent (Mitau 1977; Higher Education Coordinating Commission 1970b). Mitau knew the State College System lacked the political power to achieve victory by itself. Building a strong coalition was a prerequisite for legislative success. Like the other four sub-systems, the Twin Cities-area junior colleges were extremely possessive of their student market. Purely from the perspective of self-interest, the HECC proposal for a four-year institution in the metropolitan area posed a significant threat. Consequently, Mitau was able to convince them to join forces with him early in the process. On December 10, 1970, the six presidents of the urban junior colleges voted to support the State College Board‟s efforts to establish a senior college in the Twin Cities (St. Paul Pioneer Press 1970) The chancellor also realized he would need some prominent citizens to take up the cause and provide lobbying muscle. He and members of the State College Board began recruiting a broadly based group of individuals. A Vice President and General Counsel with 3M, Robert H. Tucker, agreed to serve as chair. The 31-member group included heavy-hitters from business, education, and the media. On February 10, supporters of the metropolitan college held a news conference to announce the formation of the statewide “Advisory Council” that would provide citizen support for passage of the two bills. Tucker made the announcement and, once again, emphasized that, the new school “would not be in competition with the University of Minnesota” (Rosenblum 1971).

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On February 9, five representatives introduced House File 470, a bill to establish a metropolitan senior college. Three senators introduced a companion bill, Senate File 590, on February 11. While the bill had bipartisan authorship, seven of the eight legislative authors came from the metropolitan area (Richardson 1970). The first counteroffensive came from the Minnesota Private College Council on March 1, 1970. In testimony before the House Higher Education Committee, the organization‟s executive director, Dr. Edgar Carlson said private colleges are “concerned and apprehensive” about the proposal. He argued that future enrollment probably would not be enough to support both a state college and the existing private colleges in the Twin Cities area (Minneapolis Star 1971a). The pace of legislative action was picking up speed. On the same day, Mitau‟s office released a report to the press. Dr. Garry Hays, Director of Academic Planning, was the author of “Prospectus for an Upper Level Metropolitan State College” (1971). Although little noticed at the time, this report was the first indication that Mitau and his staff were beginning to envision a college more experimental that what they had been proposing for the past two-and-half years. However, there is no evidence that these changes were any more than tactical maneuvers—further recognition that the more conventional the institution was, the less the chance of success. The specifics presented by Hays were cautiously vague but suggestive. The school might have both flexible scheduling at off-campus sites and a role for adult education in the new institution. The college also had the potential to increase the use of internship and community-based learning opportunities. Finally, the faculty would

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probably place more emphasis on teaching and less on research, and there was potential for using adjunct faculty who were practitioners in the field. An event on March 7 drew much wider attention, statewide in fact. A Minneapolis Tribune editorial endorsing a metropolitan college provided considerable encouragement to supporters of the new school. The paper even refuted the private college concerns and practically plagiarized Tucker‟s language: “a new college designed to be complementary to, not competitive with, the University of Minnesota and other educational institutions” (Minneapolis Tribune 1971). Passage of the bills seemed imminent. The first signs of serious trouble for the supporters of an upper level college surfaced on March 10 when senators introduced a bill promoting the HECC plan for a four-year institution. Supporters of an upper level college would soon suffer an even more stunning blow in the Minnesota House. “Metro College Proposal Dealt Blow in House” was the headline in the St. Paul Pioneer Dispatch on April 8. The Higher Education Committee had voted to send the state college bill on to an appropriations subcommittee without recommendation. A reporter explained the implications: “the policy-setting committee on higher education does not approve of the metro college.” He pointed out that the bill was not “stone dead” (Whereatt, 1971). Representative Rod Searle, Waseca Conservative, had managed to keep a faint heartbeat going by getting the bill to another subcommittee (chaired by Searle). Not yet heard from this session were the Iron Range legislators. In the 1969 session, they had pushed for a state college on their home turf. With the metropolitan

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senior college bill wounded and bleeding, the legislative pack from the Arrowhead region moved in for the kill. Representative Douglas Johnson, Cook Liberal, introduced a bill in the House asking for $600,000 for an upper-division college on the Iron Range (Hallquist 1971). One of the oldest techniques of legislative lobbying is to issue a report late in the session. This tactic is particularly effective if a quasi-independent organization authors the study. Rivals will then have little time to refute the findings. Back in fall 1970, Mitau had urged the Citizens League to study the idea of a new metropolitan college. The organization had a “good government” reputation and was a highly influential player in public policy circles. The chancellor could hardly have foreseen how important this overture would become. Headed by the attorney Allen Saeks, the 30 members of the League‟s Committee on Higher Education began their deliberations in late fall 1970. Initially, the group wanted only to answer the question of whether an upper-level or a four-year college was the best method of meeting the increased demand for higher education in the Twin Cities. Upon further deliberation, they realized the debate over the senior college idea raised some larger issues: “Just who is higher education supposed to serve? What is its mission? Is it doing a good job or not?” (Citizens League 1971:1). Part of the committee wanted to deal with these more philosophical issues about the direction of higher education. They wanted to answer questions about mission. Others on the committee felt erudite discussions about educational theory would not only be endless but fruitless as well. These members wanted to limit the deliberations to the

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enrollment question. “What really developed from our discussion was a clearer awareness than ever before that the major issues over expanding higher education opportunities in the Twin Cities relate to mission as well as enrollment” (1971:1). The report, An Urban College: New Kinds of ‘Students’ on a New Kind of ‘Campus’ (1971), called upon the Legislature to create a new institution in the metropolitan area, Further, the report asked that funding be provided for not only planning but also operating the college by winter of 1973. Although the Committee had heard from all the key players in higher education, it was obvious that the State College System had been the most persuasive. However, the report went well beyond anything Mitau and his staff had yet proposed. The study had three specific recommendations. 

“We must make clear that we view establishing a new institution as entirely separate from building a new institution” (1971:13). The new kind of “campus” would make use of existing facilities that were under-utilized.

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Who are these “new kinds of „students‟”? The report gives first priority to working adults. Transfer students from two-year programs were the other target group.

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Although not highlighted in the report‟s lengthy title, another important set of proposals had to do with a new kind of “mission.” “It should be primarily a teaching-learning institution” (1971:14). The authors of this report had taken a significant step along the continuum of

potential change in higher education. Hays‟s “Prospectus” had many of the same particulars but the Citizens League report was packaged with a rhetorical flourish that

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made the whole greater than the parts. For the first time, this idea of a new college had crossed a threshold from expedient and pragmatic reforms toward a more philosophical and ideological transformation. This was not yet a revolution but all the pieces were in place for the right leader to issue a call to arms. THE LEGISLATIVE ENDGAME The Citizens League released the study on April 14, 1971. The timing could not have been more fortuitous. The legislature had reached that point in the session when a preliminary balancing of the budget occurs. Senator John Olson, Worthington Conservative, and Representative Rod Searle, Waseca Conservative, were chairs of the educational appropriations subcommittees in the two chambers. On April 14, the two chairs publicly concluded that the policy committees had overspent the budget. Searle mused that it might be better if the new metropolitan college wait until the next session, in 1973. Olson reported that the budget would meet basic needs “but there‟ll be no room for frills” (Talle 1971a). It was obvious to observers that the HECC proposal for a traditional four-year college was dead for the session. However, both Olson and Searle reacted favorably to the Citizens League proposal. Political and budgetary expediency was clearly the motivating factor for conservatives like Searle and Olson. The Senate Higher Education Committee passed S.F. 590 on April 21 and sent it on to the Senate Finance Committee. On May 21, that body approved $600,000 for planning funds for a state college. H.F. 470 continued to languish in the House Appropriations Committee, where its prospects were dim. Then something remarkable happened:

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A bill to create the college was stabbed and left for dead in a House subcommittee but somewhat miraculously reappeared, alive and well, in an appropriations bill that a House-Senate Conference Committee presented on the next to last day for passing bills. (Minneapolis Star 1971b) The conference committee had attached a rider to the omnibus appropriations bill, appropriating $300,000 for planning and operating an educational program for a state college center in the metropolitan area. Because neither of the original senior college bills had passed in their respective chambers, this action by the conferees caused a furor and other legislators were highly critical. In a floor session, Searle responded to critics by reminding them that the legislature had used same method to create a state college and the entire junior college system. Besides, the conference committee had the college‟s adversaries by the throat. When an omnibus appropriations bill come to the floor at session‟s end, legislators cannot amend: they must pass or reject the bill in its entirety. If a legislative body rejects such a bill near final adjournment, legislators must then return for a special session—something politicians try to avoid at any cost. The higher education appropriations bills passed in both bodies (Talle 1971b). Ironically, a special session was still required in 1971. The Minnesota House and Senate could not agree upon a tax bill that Governor Wendell Anderson would sign. The Governor had been seeking a major revenue reform bill, later known as the “Minnesota Miracle” (legislation that would contribute to his picture being featured on the cover of

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Time magazine later in the year). The regular session adjourned without enacting this revenue bill. David Sweet recalled the crisis: That was going to be his fight—to get the kind of revenue bill he wanted. This all occurred over one weekend. In fact, I remember going home on Friday and hearing the governor make an announcement on the radio. After he had decided to sign all of the other appropriations bills, and had so announced publicly, he said he might not sign the higher education appropriations bill, and I almost drove the car right off the freeway. (Sweet 1972:120-21) Arthur Levine, a historian of higher education, wrote “Mitau realized that college enrollments were declining nationally and that if the legislation were not signed into law during that legislative session, it was likely to be killed forever.” An intense lobbying campaign by the chancellor and members of the State College Board ensued. Mitau immediately „„called upon old friends, U.S. senators Humphrey and Mondale, to persuade the governor to sign the legislation and the governor acquiesced” (Levine 1988:406). On June 7, 1971, Governor Anderson signed the legislation that authorized Minnesota Metropolitan State College. It was opportune that Rod Searle made his move in 1971 rather than wait for the 1973 Legislative Session. It was also fortunate that in his hour of need, Ted Mitau could call upon a past and a future vice president of the United States for help. Enrollment at the state colleges reached their peak in fall 1970. Soon thereafter, the numbers began to decline—dropping over 10 percent by fall 1972. A 1973 newspaper article documented

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additional enrollment declines, faculty layoffs, and program cuts (Anderson 1973). If Mitau, with a little help from his friends, had not delivered Metropolitan State at the end of the 1971 session, the school would likely have been stillborn. On June 28, 1971, the chancellor recommended and the State College Board appointed Mitau‟s Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, David Sweet, as the first president of Minnesota Metropolitan State College. The torch passed. A consummate bureaucratic politician had handed the flame to a charismatic figure with visionary propensities. What had been a prize in the game of political chess was about to become a utopian experiment of the first order (Mitau 1971). No one in 1968 could have imagined that Metropolitan State would become a utopian college. What needs explanation is how this could have happened. I have written a narrative history of that unanticipated outcome. The historian Richard Evans concisely states the rationale for my method: “Consequences are often more important that causes” (1999:115). It was only in the telling of the tale that I can make intelligible the process of how a unique constellation of events made this peculiar genesis possible. A thick description of each specific situation and the ensuring series of actions provides the analytic rigor required to explain how possibly this utopian college came to be.

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References Altman, Robert A. 1970. The Upper Division College. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Anderson, Brian. 1971. “New State College Opens Tuesday With No Campus, Courses, Grades.” Minneapolis Tribune, January, 31. ———. 1973. “Mitau‟s fervor undiminished by college problems.” Minneapolis Tribune, March 5. Blegen, Theodore. C. 1975. Minnesota: A History of the State. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Bormann, Terry. 1969. “New College Issue Sent to HECC by Senate Unit.” St. Paul Dispatch, April 23. Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. 1971. New Students and New Places. New York: McGraw-Hill. Citizens League. 1971. An Urban College: New Kinds of ‘Students’ on a New Kind of ‘Campus.’ Minneapolis, MN: Citizens League. Clark, Burton. 1970. The Distinctive College. New York: Aldine Publishing Company. Dray, William H. 1993. Philosophy of History. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Dunlap, Robert. R. 1970. “Letter of Transmittal.” Pp. 2-3 in the 1969-1970 Biennial Report, Minnesota State College Board. St. Paul, MN: Minnesota State College Board. Evans, Richard. 1999. In Defense of History. New York: W.W. Norton.

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Gonzalez-Campoy, Rebecca.1998. “The Lasting Legacy of Ted Mitau.” Macalester Today, May 1998, pp. 23-26. Grant, Gerald and David Riesman. 1978. The Perpetual Dream: Reform and Experiment in the American College. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Greenwood, Noel. 1972. “New Flexibility for New Kind of Student.” Los Angeles Times, September 24. Grubb, Charles. 1984. “Innovative Politics in Defense of Innovative Education: A Case Study of a Faculty‟s Struggle for Survival.” Pp. 153-181 in Against the Current: Reform and Experimentation in Higher Education, edited by Richard M. Jones and Barbara Leigh Smith. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman. Hallquist, Ralph. 1971. “Chronology of Minnesota Metropolitan State College.” Metropolitan State University Papers, State Archives, Minnesota Historical Society. Hays, Garry. D. 1971. “Prospectus for an Upper Level Metropolitan State College.” St. Paul, MN: Minnesota State College System. Higher Education Coordinating Commission. 1969. Proposals for Progress: Guidelines for State Policy and Comprehensive Planning of Post Secondary Education. St Paul, MN. ———. 1970a. Analyses and Conclusions Based on Information Relevant to Decisions on an Upper Division State College and a State Junior College in St. Paul. St. Paul, MN.

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———. 1970b. Recommendations of the Minnesota Higher Education Coordinating Commission on New Institutions. St. Paul, MN. Holte, C. Gordon. 1971. “Mitau Urges Colleges to „Move Ahead.‟” Winona Sunday News, April 18. Jones, Richard M. and Barbara Leigh Smith. 1984. Against the Current: Reform and Experimentation in Higher Education. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman. Kegler, Stanley B., Lloyd R. Lofquist, George M. Robb, and Duane C. Scribner. 1969. Availability of Educational Opportunity: An Analysis of Higher Education Needs in Minnesota 1970-80. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota. Levine, Arthur. 1988. Handbook on Undergraduate Curriculum. San Francisco, CA: Josey-Bass. Mankato Free Press. 1970. “Mitau Outlines New College, Doctoral Proposals.” December 4. Mayhew, Lewis. B. 1970. Analysis and Recommendations Concerning the Expansion of Higher Education in Minnesota. St. Paul, MN: Higher Education Coordinating Commission. Metropolitan State University Papers, State Archives, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, MN. Minneapolis Star. 1971a. “4-Year College Questioned.” March 2. Minneapolis Star. 1971b. “College.” May 28. Minneapolis Tribune. 1971. “A Metropolitan-Area State College.” March 7. Minnesota Daily. 1970. “Mitau Refutes U Report on Upper-Division College.” January 6.

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Minnesota State College Board. 1970. 1969-1970 Biennial Report. St. Paul, MN. Mitau, G. Theodore. 1971. “The Chancellor‟s Charge to the President of Minnesota Metropolitan State College.” Statement at the Minnesota State College Board meeting, June 28, St. Paul, MN. ———. 1977. Minnesota’s Colleges of Opportunity: From Normal School to Teachers College and State University System—A Century of Academic Change in Minnesota. St. Paul, MN: Alumni Associations of the Minnesota State University System. Richardson, Bill. 1971. “Council Formed to Promote Metropolitan Area College.” Minnesota Daily, February 11. Riesman, David. 1972. Personal correspondence to President David E Sweet, July 11. Metropolitan State University Papers, State Archives, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, MN. Rosenblum, Roger. 1971. “Metro College Bill Introduced.” St. Paul Pioneer Press, February 11. Seetin, Verla. 1970. “Chancellor Proposes New College to Assist Junior College Transfers.” Minnesota Daily, October 20. St. Paul Pioneer Press. 1970. “Upper Level College Backed.” December 11. Sweet, David. E. 1970. “Prolegomena to a Case Study on the Decision to (or not to) Establish an Upper Division College in Minnesota.” Paper presented at the International Conference on the Upper-Level University—Junior College Partnership, June 18, Pensacola, FL.

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———. 1971. Untitled remarks. Paper presented at the Conference of Non-Traditional Studies, November 17, no location cited. ———. 1972. “Minnesota Metropolitan State College: A New Institution for New Students.” Paper presented at the Southern Regional Educational Board‟s annual Legislative Work Conference, July 21, New Orleans, LA. ———. 1973. “The Past and Future of MMSC.” Paper presented at the workshop— “MMSC: An Alternative Approach to Higher Education,” November 4-6, St. Paul, MN. ———. 1975. “Introduction to the Commencement and Accreditation Ceremonies and Tribute to Chancellor G. Theodore Mitau.” Remarks at Metropolitan State University‟s commencement, October 5, St, Paul, MN. Talle, Jim. 1971a. “Support Grows for Area „College Sans Campuses.” Minneapolis Star, April 15. ———. 1971b. “Cities-Area College Voted over Protests.” Minneapolis Star, May 22.

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