146 'THE ODD ,PHILOSOPHER'

This ,is not the occasion to return 'to ,to the details of the anthropology/ philosophy issue, but Tennekes'mention of the 'odd philosopher' (1971138) points to an important differenc,e between,:the',two between,:the',tw6 books under review'.' Put bluntly, Tennekes does not think much of the philosophioal phil'osophioi:l1 perspeotive whereas IVIacIntyre, at'l3randeis MacIntyre, ~ow Professor of tne the Histbry,of Ideas at' Brandeis University,' gOIltintially pringa' his ea.rliertraining to bear on the gOlltintially 'bringa' conceptual problems raised by sci~l1tists. by the activities of social sci~~tists. Acoording to Herskovits, the 'cult~~ai involves According 'cult~~ai relativism' thesis involves

'a far-reaching re-examination of pre-ex;j,;sting real' pre-ex;l,;sting commitments, a very' real'

struggle between the intellectual and emotional components in attitudes

attitudes long accepted and convi,ctions held I '(1958:,266). ' (19513: ,266) • This pertains to

to convictions lon,g lon.gh~ld' the questions which are raised by juxtaposing Tennekes against ~~cIntyre:

lVIacIntyre: should our re-examinat~on, of re-examinat~on, our Iprogr~mm.~' 'progr~mm~' in, the paradigmatic sense of

that word, involve 'philosophical'investigation ?

? . .. ." .. . For present purposes, we can accept Winch's Vvinch's condensed formulation of

of the programme which relates a philosophical sta!ic::e to the activity of

of 'empirically' 'examining social phenomena. He distinguishes between

between "'. 'empirical enquiries which must wait ilponexperience upon experience for their solution' and the examination of how concepts work (1958: 16). Since it is taken to be the case oase that 'in discussing language philosophically we are in fact discussing what counts as belonging to the world' it is one of the jobs of philosophy to show that much, if not all empirical enquiry raises conceptual questions. If anthropologists aocept this view, then it inevitably follows that they engage in 'philosophy'. ~~o things follow First, anthropology of the Radcliffe-Brownian variety stands from this. First. at a further remove from (linguistic) philosophy than does that of the Evans-Pritchard species. This is because the two varioties apply different types of concepts; linguistic (philosophical) examination of participant discourse is more directly associated with the 'anthropology of meaning' than it is to the 'anthropology of general scientific laws'. It is the difference between the anthropologist who concentrates on working through native categories and the one who treats sui-generis 'meaning' as but a step on the path of applying such scientific concepts as can facilitate the techniques of comparative functionalism. Further, the 'philosopher', especially if he takes a Winchian view as to the nature of social science, can (so to speak) help Evans-Pritchard, whereas his linguistic perspective will probably mean that his relations with Radcliffe-Brown ~rurdock) will be directed through critically destructive channels. (or ~rurdock) ".:

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Such considerations are important because they point to the selective

selective impact of (linguistic) philosophy in purely beneficial respects. Thus

Thus since Tennekes regards anthropology in some sort of Radcliffe-Brownian

Radcliffe-Brownian sense (ibid: 78), the role of the Winchian philosopher will be relegated

relegated to criticism. In other words, if Tennekes extends the component of

of 'empirical enquiries' (as defihed above), then he is (from his own,

own, view) quite entitled to cast out certain

albeit mistaken, point of View) certain analysis.

aspects of linguistic, conceptual, analysis.

MY second introductory remark is of a more general order. It assumes that the impact of (linguistic) philosophy is selective, and asks, who should we call philosophers ? skirting the issue as to whether philo­ philosophy can make substantive as opposed to analytical contributions, it is common-sensical that any analytical examination of social phenomena must rest on a set of procedural and interpretative assumptions. So far as I can make out, Tennekes applies the word 'methodology' to cover this stock of ideas. He suggests, 'It is feasible ••• to remain as much as possible within the boundary-zone between philosophy and empirical science

that is called methodology'. To my mind, this so:ct of ot' assertion is phi;Losophe,rl3 are solely cO?:,cerned co:,cerned with absurd. ,It implies tha.t phi;Losophe,r13 que'~tions ul1d are attempting to deve;:Lop a spepifically philosophical que'~tions sU'bs:taritive body of knowledge by,' non-experimental (or' empirical' ) su'bs:'taritive ap~rt fro~ 'methodology'.: In fact, severals~at:tered severals~at:tered methop.s which stand ap~rt relllarks show that this is indeed Tennekl3s has in mind (see hi,s' hi,s, " , •, remarks i!ldeed vi-hat' Tenilekes Oriega y Gasset Gasset, and: Vr-pPeursen). Vap:Peurs~n). HeJ;'skovi He J:'skovi ts ts, ~+so veers yeers refere;nces to, ortega 'm!ll3ter~,scient~~1:;',p'o~i·tiop. •. Wha,t at lei;lst Tennekes does, towar,ds the 'm!ll3.ter~.scient~~t',p'o~i·tiop. ph;i.l,oso,phy' is' not of this, order, not realise. is thi3..t much modern, ph;i.l,oso.Vhy' order" ,and that desighed lo,broach'the t'o,broach'the type ofconc~pt;ual ofconc~pt;ual di;fficu'1;ties much is'specifically designed q.i;fficU'1;ties characteristic;of the 'methodological' which are patticularly characteristie;of 'methodological.' seotor of sO!J~alsCi~nce". ' ' ' sO!J~alsCi~nce,. , "" ", , " .

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It isi complet~ly r'.n anthrepolo~st,an

complet~ly futile to' argue,:' I,l;tm I,!;tm ".n anthropolo~st,an 'einp~rical'i investigator; it is not my job 'to examine conceptually my

my 'einp~rical

'me,thod610gy'. For,a:hd this is the whole 'point of my argument,s, there

there 'me,thod61ogy,'.For,a:hd are'not philosophers and anthropologists. ' Instead, Instead" there are those who

who raceived a training which allOws'. allOws', them to take a

a 'are luckY lUCkY enough to have received perspective,. thos,a Wll0; ve" and ther,e, are thea,e w!].o, like Tennekes, retain ".. philosophic,a;l. philosophic,a;J. p~rspecti tb' in the, '~mpirlcal' '~mpirlcal' (s;e~"\nri:9f1 (.s;e~"\nri:9f1 ;i.bfd:15-16) • Look at the . their fai faith' collection Rationality (1970)' and' try distinguishing ,philosophers from, competence. anthropologists on any other criteria than that of c6mpetence.

, 'Before det?iling det~dling a comparison of Tennekes T~mnekes and N~cIntyre~ NJacIntyre, it is ,Before sOlpa further indication of whlcl;J.anthr9Pologicalproblems whlcl;1anthr9Pologicalproblems useful to giye sOlpe susceptiple, to (linguistic) (linguistic ) phiJ,.osophicalexaIIlination., Unless are most susceptiple _tibut, thi$ point is cleared up, the defender of Tennekes could retort _ti but , given his proplematic he has no need to turn, to Philosophy.HWe Philosophy.'~We can imagine im~gine a hierarchical feedback system. Thus Nuer Religion can cem be examined, at the procedural :Level; from a conceptual vantage point ( see Winch 1967). At the same time, no,philosopher, exception of Gell!ler, no, philosopher, with the possible possibieexception Gell:t;ler, would deem it necessary to make the actual 'empirical' examination of this aspect of Nuerlife_ Nuerlife. Thus the practising 'empirical' anthropologist anthropolOgist is hierarchicaily related to the phi:j.osophicalstandpoint. In the sense that no philosopher coul 'empii-ical' 'conclusions 'cross;"cul -rural unity (see his discussion of ;the ' ," to the na.ture of 'cross;,.cultural , 'biotic', ,"psychic' -"psychic' a.nd 'social:). subi:rtrates ) have much relevance' for signifi .. , the, conceptual examination of relativism arid have'a procedural signifi.. "that .thetrlte' .the,trUe' context

context , cance, but 'our hierarchical model demonstrates .tha.t of relevance' cannot be distingUished from :'philosdphy' • 'Empiricism ' ' b'eexainined can never be pure; resting upon assumptions asSUmptions which should b'eexainined

thi's enteTprise in turn provides more data for the logically, this ' ' at 'philosophical' perspective which then generates new ways of looking at

the facts.' ' , , ' Thus Tennekes does philosophy even as he denies it. Or at least,

least, partIally denies it,for relevance part'iallydenies it, for at several poiritshe has to' a&nitthe relevance

(ibidl 39t 39, 43, 58, 197). And at' refusal (ibid: at- other suggestive moments his refusal

,; to develop this orientation showsthr'ough like: a sore thumb (ibid: ,; Chptj~Vespec'ial1y p~ 191";204). . In fact, ma.ny ma:riy of the contradictions which Chptj~Vespec'ial1y 'ca.sts:side' Herskovi ts' scheme weaken his argument' would be resolved it he 'ce.sts:side' framework~ 'This is tosey-,: to say,: his to work instead with a'more suitable framework~ 'I will philosophy is poor~ pobr~ And it is not difficu'lt to see why: 'largely limit myself 'to American cultural"'anthropologicalstatements cultural""anthropologicalstatements •••

••• i,t is especially in the United' United, States that the case for cultural

cultural since i·t relativism has been presented by cultural anthropologists ' (ibid:2)~

culturalanthropblogists' (ibid:2)~ This is 'factually incorrect,in incorrect, in that Amerioa'is the context of the 'odd

'odd philosopher'., Since Bincemany many British philosophers' have 'discussed 'diScussed the problem,

problem, Tennekes summary blockade 'is of the'order the'oriler of: a geographical 'Gltickm8.n.

'Gluckm9.n. • ,Perhaps this is not being fa.irto fair to Gluckman:xegional Gluqkman:xegional naivety is e'ven more vulgar than inter-disciplinary igndrance,and i'gnbrance,and Tennekescombines the two. How can this possibly be the case for one who is probably primarily interested in the problem of evaluati'on ? (ibid':' (ibid':· 145, 206)~SuJ:'ely 206)~Surely Winoh' et alhavesomething , alhavesome'thing to offer'? " , Al1 A11 this indicates that· that, the anthrbpologistisnot anthi'bpologistisnot advised to 'read Anthropology, Relativism and-Method and· Methbd except for one end. " Shambling through a series Of of quotations,: this "'fOot":stool'scholar merely presents us with a reflection of' current American anthr'opolog1.cal thought on ' relativism. His classifications, wEi have seen, are as poor 'as theirs. poor'astheirs. At least, he tells us what work is' being done. In this oontext,itis particularly dnteresting dnMresting to 'realise that the group attending to cross­ cross9ultural' universalsdonot,as universals donot,as su'mmarisedby m:immarisedby Tennekes~' Tennekes~' realise the' relevance of linguistic and kinship studies. Yet ,the former is preoisely the 'former precisely the field of which Ardener can say, 'the intuition that a total relativism isunproductivehasbeensupportedb1 the evidence from comparative study' study.' (197lLxXi)., It is indeed curious that just at the justati momentwheri' anthropology anthropology: is preparing itselfsysteniaticallyto itseli'systenfaticallyto re1ate rela.te the formal examination of universals to the Sapir...Whorf,and'corttext Sapir...Whorf,and'corttext of situation' problematics, TenriekesShould Tenriekesshould come along and blurr the impact ­should soarcely even distinguish between ' 'structural' and, 'functional' universals.

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MacIntyre's conclusions cannot be mentioned in detail, but as a summary: a) 'Vlhat is at stake in these arguments (over the explanation of action? Not only philosophical ,clarity, but also the question of the nature of the human sciences' (op cft: 204), b) human action can be terms,. c), c),, The.$oqial The,soqial scientist cannot evade the, explained ill causal terms.. what ,types 6f ar~ments ar~ments and evidence are logically task of deciding what.types appropriate in different areas; he must be able to decide what a.,sQient:i,t'ic belief, or a moral belief, constitutes the rationality of a"sqientiJ'ic belief •.' But to dQ' this is. to do philosophy' (ibia ': 259) ~ or a religious belief. d) it is valid to distinguish between irrational and rational modes of two, ty}?es have tp pe explained d:i,fferently, f) and such thought, e) the two. characterisations"areobviousiyevaluative. g) Waismann YJaismann is incorrect­ incorrect criteria, which transcend the divisions between there a,re a.,re 'expressions and criteria. strata' (ibid: 250).'.A:dditionally, 250). 'Additionally, MacIntyre Maclntyre has sotne some .' his language strata''(ibid: j,nteresting things things. to say to the anthropologist anthropologist, interested in most ~nteresting morality(i3e9 especiaI1Yp.141) ,ar].dhis essay oricomparative politics morality (see especiaI1Yp.141),arJ.dhfs proves to be far more subtle than such remarks as are typically addressed to the comparative method,. ' l\flaclntyre ca.se that 'Happily or W~cIntyre shows most of us up. If it be the case cannot,be rE?stricted unhappily, the philosophers cannot.be r~stricted merely to interpreting the social sciences, the point of their activity is to change them' "., (ibid: 259),: then without an adequate background we are left as counters. iI),sianqe, the anthropology of religion is, iri many respects, 'within': 'within'" For iI).sianqe, the rationality debate. So unless MacIntyre's remark, '(I can) find no reason to suppose that my investigations of Prichard's claims (he is a moral philosopher) and of the social background of these claims ought to investidiffer radically from an anthropologically minded historians investi­ gation of eighteenth-century Polynesia (i.e. the notion 'taboo')' is demonstrably wrong, we have no option but to widen the scope of our reading (ibid: 166). Maclntyre bears a moral Prima facie, to juxtapose Tennekes against MacIntyre manipUlate the ~~at should we do ? - manipulate which should not be ignored. What counters of bald and shallow assertions made in the past, or move on into more sophisticated domains? Lead the reader into an unnecessary '1, (does Tylor have to morass of details concerning the notion 'culture '1· be quoted in the course of concluding 'man is not only determined culturally, but also biotically, psychically, and socially' ? (op cit: 105)), or get on with the job in an economic fashion? Paradoxically, it is the economic MacIntTre who has to be read and re-read; Tennekes, unless one tries to sort out his confusions, makes light reading. But is this not to be expected? Is it not MacIntyre who thinks, and Tennekes, at best, who recapitulates? Finally, I must admit that I am not at all sure that I have properly Hm'lever, whereas understood Anthropology, Relativism Relativi~m and Method. Hanever, MacIntyre can profitably be criticised, the tensions in Tennekes work between judgment/no judgment and anthropology/philosophy are such that we just do not know where we stand. Further, how much faith are we to have in a figure who can dogmatically distinguish between 'cultural' and 'social' anthropology then to assert, 'Culturology still is ••• in its infancy' (ibid: 49-50)? Or again, for someone who is prepared to make self'short shrift' of several certain issues, Tennekes is remarkably self­ assured as he drifts from the free will problem to the nature of social science, to the nature of science ••• (ibid: 191). In my opinion, the reader who can (perhaps) sort out Tennekes contentions might just as well think out the arguments for himself - or read MacIntyre and the rest. PAUL HEELAS. 1.

This is not to deny that the conceptual scheme as centred around the notion 'culture' is not of some relevance.

,,152 BIBLIOGRAPHY Ardener, E. Herskovits,

.r4~H. .r4~H.

Langer, S.'"

1971 ,

Introductory Essay: Social Anthropology and Language, in A.S.A.10.

1958

Relativism, Some Further Comments on Cultural Relativism,

vol~60 in A.A. vol~60

1962

Philosophical' 'Sketches. Philosophica~Sketches.

Se;t.f-I~ageS of the Age. Age., Duckworth. Against 'the the Se~f-I~ageS Duckworth.

MacIntyre, Maclntyre, A.

'1971

Tennekes ,: J •

1971

Anth~oPolOfiA Relativism and,Method. and,fJlethod. Anth~oPolOEiA ,,

VanGorcum L • ' ,

lrJinch, Hinch, P.

1958

The Idea of a Social Science. Paul. and Kegan Paul.

1960

Neeting Aristotelian Society Meeting

1967

in Understanding a Primitive Society, in

(ed) Religion and Understanding D.Z. Phillips (ed)

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. 11

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Royal Royal

Routledge, Routledge,