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The “New” U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Its Implications for Russia V. Kozin In tHe SeCOnD HALF of June 2013, the United States announced some adjustments to its nuclear doctrine. Its main provisions were summarized in the politico-military part of the speech of president barack Obama at berlin’s brandenburg Gate on June 191 as well as in the report on nuclear employment Strategy of the United States, prepared by the pentagon in conjunction with other U.S. departments and agencies, which came out in the same month.2 the individual elements of the “adapted” nuclear strategy were also commented on in a special White House Fact Sheet appearing on the same day.3 the “renewed” strategy received unanimous approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Strategic Command, as well as from the Department of State and the Department of energy. thus, the White House has undertaken a third post-Cold War modification of U.S. nuclear strategy and its first adaptation after 2002, when the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Abm treaty, having for many years called it the “cornerstone of strategic stability,” and initiated a large-scale deployment of global infrastructure to intercept ballistic missiles, particularly in the immediate vicinity of russia. What Did Barack Obama Suggest? AGAInSt tHe bACKDrOp of the announcement in berlin of “additional steps forward” in limiting nuclear arms and of the vibrant phrase that the United States is not truly safe “so long as nuclear weapons exist,” _______________________ Vladimir Kozin, Consultant to the Director of the russia’s Institute for Strategic Studies, member of the expert Council at the Interagency Working Group on bmD Issues with nAtO under the executive Office of the president of the russian Federation, Corresponding member, russian Academy of natural Sciences; [email protected]

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the 44th president voiced strong determination to continue relying upon a “strong and credible nuclear deterrent,” which covers the entire globe. His speech, meanwhile, contained a provision to maintain the strategy of “extended nuclear deterrence,” by which the American militarypolitical leadership understands the possibility of the U.S. use of nuclear weapons in certain regions in order to protect allies from the threat to use force by “hostile states.” In accordance with such “regional” projection of the global nuclear strategy the group of states to which Washington extends the umbrella of its strategic offensive arms (SOA) and tactical nuclear weapons (tnW) includes all the countries belonging to nAtO as well as Japan, Australia, South Korea, and some middle eastern countries, primarily Israel. the key provision of Obama’s berlin speech was a proposal to reduce American and russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to onethird from the level established in the new StArt treaty, signed in prague in 2010. that is, the warheads mounted for delivery and on high combat alert. the realization of such a formula outwardly appears to be attractive. Should an appropriate agreement be reached, it would cut each side’s deployed strategic warheads from 1,550 to 1,000-1,100, which would in any case allow them to retain the capacity to prevent major outside aggression, as well as being consistent with the concept of maintaining strategic stability at lower levels of strategic offensive numbers. but the formula only to reduce the strategic warhead levels may again lead to the U.S. retention of a large reserve stockpile of non-deployed strategic nuclear warheads which, if desired, could be remounted on delivery systems and put on operational duty in quite a short time in the form of the so-called upload potential. Calculations made using data on U.S. strategic offensive arms as of July 1, 2013, indicate that the Strategic Command by then had in its possession a total of 514 non-deployed delivery vehicles in the form of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICbms), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLbms) and heavy bombers (Hbs), as well as 792 deployed delivery vehicles of the said categories. thus, the ratio of non-deployed delivery vehicles to deployed delivery vehicles was 64.9%. this is a very high figure. In our opinion, to maintain the strategic balance between russia and the United States in terms of strategic nuclear weapons it is sufficient to have a lower non-deployed to deployed ratio, for example at no more than 10-15 percent.

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Symptomatically, the U.S. strategic nuclear forces, as indicated in the report on nuclear employment Strategy of the United States, will indefinitely retain a ”significant” stockpile of “non-deployed weapons.” Furthermore, non-deployed warheads can be uploaded from one to another vehicle within the strategic nuclear triad “in response to geopolitical or technological surprise.” A more detailed update on From the U.S. point of view, this allows it to flexibly the American strategy of regroup the nuclear warheads using nuclear weapons was of all three legs of the triad, set out in the Pentagon i.e. to rearrange them, reinforcReport on Nuclear Employing one element at the expense ment Strategy of the United of others. but from the viewStates. Unfortunately, some point of the logic of real reductions and the possibility of foreign and Russian reensuring a greater degree of searchers were quick to predictability, that line appears comment on this nuclear inadequate. stance in a positive way. It seems no coincidence that the former head of the russian delegation in the new Start treaty negotiations, Anatoly Antonov, admitted in his book “Arms Control: History, Status, prospects,” published last year, that this treaty neither provided a definitive solution to the problem of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCms) nor contained a ban on non-nuclear strategic offensive arms; “I would have liked more on the upload potential” and a harder emphasis on the link between strategic offensive arms and missile defenses; the signed treaty should be in general “more qualitative and comprehensive.”4 It is obvious that without solving all these problems further progress along the road of reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms of russia and the U.S. appears inexpedient. the denoted U.S. approach to the problem of deployed and non-deployed strategic warheads should be duly considered in the possible continuation of negotiations with Washington to limit such weapons, insisting by all means on the counting of the nuclear missile weapons in active and passive reserve when determining a formula for future reductions. In his brandenburg Gate speech, the American president also broached the theme of national tactical nuclear weapons, but somehow with regard to europe only, as he articulated a long-winded formula that

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“we’ll work with our nAtO allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and russian tactical weapons in europe.” by the way, the president somehow dropped the word “nuclear” in this context – did it happen by accident or did he just misspeak? Let us assume he simply misspoke. the viewpoint on tnWs expressed by Obama shows Washington’s desire to approach solving this problem from a position disadvantageous to us, because the United States will (if it does will) embark on somehow reducing its tnWs on foreign territory, that is, in europe, while expecting the same from russia in its european part, since russia withdrew its tnWs from the three respective former Soviet states as early as the first half of the 1990s. Also, it turns out that, according to Washington’s logic, American tactical nuclear weapons in Asian turkey will not be covered at all by any future agreement. Why so? especially considering that the turkey deployments already encompass not only U.S. nuclear gravity bombs, but also intelligence and information means of missile defense (the radar in malatya), and several patriot missile batteries in some areas of the country, which are able potentially to cover the military facilities on turkish soil where these bombs are placed. In berlin, barack Obama promised to build support in the country’s political circles to ratify the Comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, opened for signature way back in 1996. Its ratification in the U.S. Congress has already failed once. but the president didn’t mention, even approximately, when the issue would pass in national legislative structures. It will be recalled that the United States is on the list of 44 countries that are needed for this treaty to enter into force. the words of the American president about the possibility of approval of an international fissile material cut-off treaty (FmCt), the idea of which was put forward by the Soviet Union back in 1989, just hung in the air. the best way of bringing the treaty to its logical conclusion would be to discuss it at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, and not by a group of experts – even the most authoritative. but nothing concrete and reassuring was said by Obama about this either. So, the part of the speech of the American president on politico-military issues in berlin was more propagandistic in character since it did not contain a realistic and acceptable plan of a gradual and well balanced reduction of nuclear arsenals on a global scale. In fact, these pronouncements were not much different from his previous public statements on the subject.

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Is the Nuclear Strategy Really New? A mOre DetAILeD UpDAte on the American strategy of using nuclear weapons was set out in the pentagon report on nuclear employment Strategy of the United States. Unfortunately, some foreign and russian researchers were quick to comment on this nuclear stance in a positive way. A group of leading members of the russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies led by its director came up with upbeat rationales and conclusions in a special publication in the early August issue of russia’s Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie (Independent military review).5 the authors of the analysis unreasonably concluded that “some serious changes have been made” to this strategy “that the pentagon is required to complete within the next year”; they also bypassed the politico-military part of Obama’s berlin speech and the above mentioned White House Fact Sheet with their additional clarifications of the U.S. nuclear strategy that are of practical interest for russia and its military-strategic planning. the publication failed to reflect many of the important elements of the report that have profound implications for the entire military-strategic situation in the world. However, a deeper and more thorough analysis of the nuclear employment Strategy report shows that the American military-political leadership is still firmly committed to the essentially global doctrine of offensive nuclear deterrence, with the strategy of “extended nuclear deterrence” as a component of the latter. One of the important elements of such a “regional” nuclear strategy is the tactical nuclear weapons of the United States, including those placed in europe. the adoption of the military-strategic document “Deterrence and Defense posture review” at the summit of the north Atlantic treaty Organization in Chicago in may 2012 and the announcement there of a fundamentally new combined triad of the alliance in the 21st century in the form of “interlinked” nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities has led to further strengthening of this strategy, which has received a stronger financial footing. Speaking at a nuclear deterrence symposium in August 2012, rose Gottemoeller, U.S. Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, noted that “nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities all contribute to extended deterrence, and they all require constant tending.”6 Although in its report the pentagon reserves the right to use nuclear

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weapons only in “extreme circumstances,” in practical terms it may exercise such right at any time and place in the world “to defend the vital interests of the United States, or its Allies and partners,” both in a first and in a retaliatory strike. that line, alas, is not to be adjusted “over the next year” as the pentagon report says that the U.S. side will pursue it at least throughout “the 21st century.” the June U.S. Department of Defense policy statement on the use of nuclear weapons has retained continuity with respect to previous nuclear doctrines. thus, it is based on a postulate that was reflected in the April 2010 nuclear posture review, which states: “the threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased.” On this basis, far-reaching conclusions have been drawn as to the need for keeping strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for the long term. the guidance affirms that the American “nuclear deterrence” will not be based on “counter-value deterrence” that would allow for large, soft targets like cities, which is a positive element of the “adapted” nuclear strategy. but at the same time, the pentagon document sets forth two other provisions that prove the United States’ willingness to continue to hold on to its offensive nuclear strategy and use nuclear weapons in a first strike at its discretion. First, it is about the “minimum deterrence” strategy which proceeds from the need to maintain such an amount of nuclear weapons at the disposal of the U.S. Strategic Command that wouldn’t deter nuclear attack but would be sufficient to only respond to it with a retaliatory second nuclear strike, as this kind of nuclear deterrence actually does not even include a pre-emptive nuclear strike option. Second, the updated strategy will retain unchanged a “significant counter-force capability” which implies the delivery of nuclear strikes on military targets with a view to minimizing the possibility of nuclear retaliation from a potential adversary.” but this also means the possibility of first-strike use of nuclear weapons against such targets as long as we are talking about “retaliation” on the part of a “potential adversary.” In order to demonstrate the supposed “desire” to move to non-nuclear military capabilities and to prove the alleged existing desire to “reduce reliance on nuclear forces,” the pentagon is directed to ensure a “more efficient” planning of the use of American nuclear forces after expiration of the prague new StArt treaty, as well as to continue planning for non-nuclear strike options against various targets which in the document

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are not classified. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the formulation about “reducing reliance on nuclear forces" applies only to cases of a “potential adversary” using conventional arms, not nuclear weapons. It’s worth noting that the report acknowledges that non-nuclear strike options are not a substitute for nuclear weapons and that “deterrence of nuclear attack” is not the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. this language is quite possible to interpret as providing for the possibility of the U.S. use of nuclear weapons to solve other tasks, for example in regional conflicts, even in circumstances where the warring parties will only use conventional arms. the report mentioned the russian Federation and China. the United States’ intention to retain nuclear weapons indefinitely is explained by russia having a traditional triad of nuclear strategic offensive forces and also a large nonstrategic nuclear force, although the two sides have never exchanged official data on the arsenals of this kind and never negotiated their possible reduction. this approach is used to justify the need to maintain an “effective deterrent posture” with respect to our country. the commitment of U.S. leaders to the nuclear doctrine is at the same time motivated by China’s conventional and nuclear arms modernization efforts, as well as by the lack of transparency surrounding its nuclear programs, specifically their pace and scope. based on the above perceptions, the pentagon will continue the policy of retaining the U.S. strategic nuclear triad, all the components of which will be maintained “in operational condition” and in a way that would allow a parallel solution of two key objectives: to enable the United States to maintain “strategic stability” with both russia and China and also to constrain some more unnamed “regional adversaries.” As stated in previous American strategic force postures, the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (npt), but only if they are “in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” Of course, Washington takes it for granted that the right to identify states that “comply” or “not comply” with the provisions of the said international treaty will belong to only the American side. the report contains provisions relating specifically to tactical nuclear weapons, which have remained outside the process of negotiations through the fault of the United States ever since the nuclear era began.

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the report clearly states that the United States will retain its “forwarddeployed” nuclear weapons to which the pentagon assigns tactical nuclear weapons based in europe and the Asia-pacific region as a lynchpin of extended deterrence. For the russian Federation, for its allies and friends it is of no little importance that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons will remain in europe until an unspecified time – until nAtO decides on the conditions which will become the basis for changing the nuclear policy of the alliance. but the Atlantic Alliance still sees no need to change this policy. nor is it going to decide on such “conditions” in the future, as was documented at the nAtO “transatlantic solidarity summit” in Chicago in may of last year. there is one more very remarkable acknowledgment in the document. According to the guidance, the pentagon will at the same time retain a significant forward deployment of conventional forces and ballistic missile defenses that are becoming an important component of the U.S. strategy of global and regional “extended nuclear deterrence,” which was also reflected in the nAtO Chicago summit’s final documents. this once again proves the correctness and validity of the position of russia, which stands for the removal of the antimissile threat at its borders and for the development of a qualitatively new treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in europe (CFe). As the statements of senior U.S. diplomats show, Washington refuses to elaborate a new CFe treaty instead of the one no longer in force due to its nAtO participants’ refusal to ratify it, as well as to a number of other reasons. the foregoing features of the report on nuclear employment Strategy of the United States show that the American military-political leadership does not introduce qualitatively new and positive adjustments to the U.S. nuclear doctrine. Its small modifications outlined above, such as non-use of nuclear weapons against cities, but against military targets, and “reducing reliance” on nuclear weapons, which will not be subject to inspection checks, do not allow to be optimistic about the pentagon document here analyzed. A comparison of the key elements of the russian and American nuclear doctrines shows that in a substantive sense, they are significantly different from each other, despite the sides’ numerous and long-standing exchanges on their content, conducted mainly at seminars on military doctrines.

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Strategic Offensive Arms Modernization Continues in the U.S. nOtWItHStAnDInG the slight renewal of its nuclear strategy, the United States has not ceased to work on ways of improving its strategic offensive arms and tactical nuclear weapons, which constitute the material basis of its doctrine of offensive nuclear deterrence. the White House’s June 19 Fact Sheet says that president Obama “has supported significant investments” to modernize the nuclear enterprise. to maintain and upgrade the existing strategic nuclear arsenals the pentagon will receive about $200 billion over the next 20 years, as reported by General James Cartwright, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command.7 For decades – at least until 2070-2075 – the United States will retain its strategic nuclear triad, all the elements of which are subject to further improvement and modernization. the pentagon is planning to extend the life of, and to upgrade certain types of strategic nuclear warheads within the following time frames: the W78 SLbm warhead in 2020-2026, the W80-1 ALCm in 2020-2030 and the W88 ICbm in 2026-2030. the land-based ICbm modernization program, on which $6-7 billion can be spent in the coming years, includes developing new fuels for the first and second stages of the minuteman III missiles, as well as improving the technical characteristics of their third stage. Work is underway to increase the motor thrust, improve the accuracy and reliability of the ICbm guidance system, make the flight control centers work more efficiently when changing flight missions, and finally, design a new strategic ICbm by 2018. It is expected that the group of modernized minuteman III ICbms will remain in service with the U.S. nuclear forces at least initially until 2030, then until 2070-2075 and beyond. the SLbm modernization program comprises all 14 Ohio class strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSbns), which originally had up to eight W76 or W88 warheads on each of the 24 SLbms installed on any single submarine of this class. It is planned to improve the trident II SLbm guidance system as well as rocket motor performance. plans are also afoot to complete the development of a W76 life extension program by 2018, as a result of which it will cover about 60% of the total number of strategic nuclear warheads. earlier the U.S. navy expected to extend the service lives of Ohio class SSbns for 30 years. now it contemplates a 42-year life extension for them. the U.S. also plans to build several new strategic submarines that

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have been given the preliminary code name “SSbnX,” that is experimental nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, each to be armed with 16 SLbms. their construction is scheduled to start in 2021and commissioning is slated for 2029. As part of the implementation of the program for the production of Conventional prompt Global Strike weapons, the Americans have already converted four strategic U.S. Ohio class SSbns, the Ohio 726, the michigan 727, the Florida 728, and the Georgia 729, for conventional weapons delivery, claiming to have installed 154 conventionally armed cruise missiles instead of trident II SLbms on each of them. It is not inconceivable that these cruise missiles may be fitted with nuclear warheads too. the conversion poses an additional threat to russia’s security, since, according to the pentagon, two such submarines with 308 SLCms on board are constantly on patrol in areas of “forward deployment.” the USS Florida SSGn 728 visited mediterranean waters in summer 2013. the program for the employment of b-2A, b-52G and b-52H heavy strategic bombers provides for extending the lives of the two types of airlaunched cruise missiles (ALCms) that are installed on them. It refers to the previously developed conventional ALCms and the newer “stealth” Advanced Cruise missiles (ACms) which are invisible to radar. both of these missiles can also carry a W80 nuclear warhead, the life of which is also to be extended, while the missiles themselves will remain in service at least until 2030. the possibility is also being studied of developing a new farther flying ALCm called the Long-range Stand-Off weapon (LrSO) approximately by 2025. the future long-term plans of the pentagon also feature the creation of a new stealth heavy strategic bomber which would have a greater range and could stay aloft longer that its predecessors. It is stated that the new aircraft must have the ability to penetrate the air defenses of a potential enemy and deliver nuclear as well as conventional warheads to targets. the expected production quantity is named: 80-100 bombers. Over $6 billion are targeted for their creation. Such modernization of U.S. strategic offensive weapons will be a major prop for the “edited” nuclear weapons employment strategy. The Improvement of Tactical Nuclear Weapons tHe UnIteD StAteS is continuing to implement its program of improvement of tactical nuclear weapons, which are located on the con-

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tinental part of the country and abroad – in five nAtO european countries (belgium, UK, Italy, the netherlands, and Germany), as well as in the Asian part of turkey. except the United States, no other country keeps its tactical nuclear weapons outside national boundaries. As the pentagon’s long-term plans show, the U.S. tactical nuclear capabilities deployed in europe in the form of b-61 free-fall bombs of various modifications will remain on the continent for an indefinite period of time as a weapon under dual key control of the United States and nAtO. russia withdrew all its own tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of the three respective former Soviet republics 20 years ago. the report of the U.S. Congressional research Service, nonstrategic nuclear Weapons (February 14, 2012), states that in the late 1990s, the pentagon had a total of over 800 nonstrategic nuclear warheads, with the remainder being around air-delivered 500 bombs in europe and some additional air-delivered bombs and around 320 nuclear-armed sealaunched cruise missiles held on U.S. soil. It seems that the pentagon deliberately understates the number of its tactical nuclear arms and overestimates that of russia. this is probably done in order to have in advance a “trump card” in future negotiations, demanding of the russian side more significant tnW reductions. the revised plan of renewal of the American strategic and tactical nuclear stockpile, adopted in June 2011 by the U.S. national nuclear Security Administration, provides for the launching of a life extension program for two types of nuclear warheads deployed on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and for four tactical warhead types for the b-61 nuclear bomb. According to official U.S. documents, the pentagon intends to implement a program of extending the service life of b-61 bombs for another subsequent 30 years. As well-known nuclear arms expert Hans Kristensen, a former Danish defense ministry official currently working at the Federation of American Scientists, notes: “nAtO’s nuclear posture is scheduled to undergo a significant modernization over the next decade that involves upgrading both the nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. the modernization will significantly increase the military capabilities of nAtO’s nuclear posture in europe.”8 the range of potential uses of the b-61 bombs is very broad: they are intended for use against tactical and strategic targets. Some U.S. nuclear gravity bombs that were brought to europe have a yield of up to 360-400 kilotons, which exceeds manifold the yield of the atomic bomb the

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Americans dropped on Hiroshima and nagasaki in 1945, and sometimes are even superior to that of today’s U.S. strategic offensive warheads. Work is in progress on a new version of the bomb – the b61-12 – with lower yield (0.3 to 50 kilotons), but with increased precision guidance, which will allow it to inflict damage comparable to the damage that the b61-7 bomb can cause. the new bomb will be meant to destroy hardened targets, ICbm silos and command and control centers. Judging by American experts’ data, in the coming years the pentagon plans to produce 400 to 930 b61-12 bombs (the first production line will be ready in 2019). According to the information of some Western experts, the U.S. Air Force has completed the construction of new underground storage bunkers at 13 military air bases in six nAtO member countries for the storage of tactical nuclear gravity bombs with enhanced accuracy. two of the nuclear gravity bombs currently in service, namely the b61-7 and b61-11, as well as the prospective b61-12, can be delivered to targets not only by tactical aircraft, but also by strategic, namely b-52H and b-2A heavy bombers, which can cover a distance of up 11,000 kilometers without refueling, and with refueling – more than 18,000 kilometers. Up to 16 such bombs can be mounted on each such bomber. For this reason, pentagon and State Department documents classify these bombs as “strategic.” the same formulation is to be found in the reference material on life extension programs for U.S. nuclear weapons, distributed by the State Department and the national nuclear Security Administration on January 3, 2013, which qualifies the three aforesaid gravity bombs as “strategic.”9 the adoption in 2017-2018 of a new generation fighter-bomber, the F-35A, will increase the possibilities to deliver U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to europe, as the new aircraft will be able to cover distances up to 2500-3000 kilometers with one refueling. each such aircraft is planned to have two b61-12 gravity bombs installed within its fuselage (the former aircraft types have the ability each to carry only a single gravity bomb on an external pod). It is expected that the aircraft will be adopted by the air forces of Italy, the netherlands and turkey. the pentagon plans to equip all the aircraft to be delivered to these nAtO countries with such bombs by 2020.10 thus, the pentagon’s line on life extension and modernization of the U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal, as well as the emergence of new American aviation means to deliver tactical nuclear weapons to europe (in the form

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of the F-35A fighter-bomber), present an additional threat to russia’s security, given that the United States and nAtO are prepared to move ahead with the european bmD system being deployed in close proximity to the borders of the russian Federation, without any restrictions, and in close association with nuclear and conventional weapons. Although the national nuclear Security Administration did not disclose the estimated cost of the life extension and modernization program for tactical nuclear gravity bombs in europe, according to an estimate made by the above-mentioned Hans Kristensen, the total allocations for the implementation of the program could exceed $4 billion by 2022.11 Some other sources even speak of an amount of $10.6 billion. As reported by the authoritative American journal Arms Control today in June this year, the U.S. will spend more than $65 billion on upgrading five warhead types over the next 25 years. It is noteworthy that all of these tactical nuclear weapons under dual key control are operationally deployed, that is ready for use both during potential regional conflicts and in a global nuclear war, the idea of waging which the United States has still not given up. Aircraft of the six nAtO member countries where U.S. tnWs are stationed regularly participate in combat air force exercises using mock b61 bombs (for example, at the Italian Aviano Air base) under the program “SnOWCAt (Support of nuclear Operations with Conventional Air tactics),” and they also take part in Steadfast noon exercises in which tasks are developed to simulate delivery of training bombs with tactical nuclear warheads to targets of a “potential enemy.” Such exercises also involve non-nuclear weapon states of the bloc which do not have U.S. tnWs on their territories, such as Hungary, Greece, Denmark, and norway. nAtO’s leadership intends to more actively invite the non-nuclear weapon member states of the Atlantic Alliance to address tnW-related issues, including those concerning “collective” nuclear planning, the determination of where to deploy U.S. nuclear forces in europe in peacetime, and the functioning of command and staff and consultation mechanisms. the Chicago Summit documents record a provision for wider participation of the non-nuclear weapon member countries of nAtO “in nuclear responsibility sharing.” thus, the U.S. tnWs being upgraded also complement the “renovated” nuclear strategy.

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Prospects for BMD AS ALreADy mentIOneD, the new pentagon report on nuclear weapons employment contains a provision on missile defense. the American military and political leadership is not going to wrap up the european phased Adaptive Approach (epAA) to missile defense, which was proclaimed by barack Obama in September 2009. there are expected no drastic cuts in funds for these purposes. plans remain in place to build large operational U.S. missile defense bases in poland and romania. phase 1 of the epAA may be followed by phase 2. Special “rules of engagement” have been approved for interceptor missiles of the bmD system; that is, an instruction on their use. the bmD infrastructure “reconfiguration” announced in march 2013 will not lead to curtailing this program but, on the contrary, will reinforce it, according to U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, by 50 percent. Its strong missile defense systems are being set up not only on and around the european continent, but also in the Asia pacific, the middle east, the persian Gulf, and the mediterranean. U.S. navy ships equipped with the Aegis combat system have briefly entered the black and barents Seas. the naval component of the U.S. global missile defense infrastructure will, by 2022, account for about 95% of the arsenal of combat strike weapons. the U.S. politico-military leadership believes that a highly mobile sea-based antimissile system can provide not only a higher degree of defense for U.S. territory from almost any direction against the hypothetical ballistic missile threat, but also a cover for its own nuclear missile weapons, which are meanwhile being moved closer to the territories of the “probable adversaries.” As of the end of 2013, the U.S. navy, according to the CrS data, had a total of 29 ships armed with Aegis missiles and other missile interceptors, including five ticonderoga class cruisers and 24 Arleigh burke class destroyers. the above grouping is geographically distributed as follows: 13 ships are assigned to the naval bases on the Atlantic coast of the country, and 16 to naval bases in the pacific (for comparison: in 2012, this ratio was 11:18). the following table indicates how many interceptors of the most modern types the U.S. navy can have.

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U.S. warships with Aegis systems using SM-3 interceptor missiles Number of U.S. Navy Aegis warships

Software

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2012

3.6.1

23

24

23

19

17

16

13

11

?

?

4.0.1

2

4

6

9

9

9

9

9

?

?

5.0

0

1

3

4

6

8

13

15

?

?

5.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

?

?

Total

25

29

32

32

32

33

35

36

?

43

Number of U.S. SM-3 interceptor missiles, by deliveries

Block IA

107

113

113

136

136

136

136

136

136

136

Block IB

1

16

25

61

100

169

251

328

400

472

Block IIA

0

0

0

0

0

0

7

19

31

70

Block IIB

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Total

108

129

138

197

236

305

394

483

567

678

Source: Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, March 14, 2013, p. 7.

All of this is happening against the backdrop of an unequivocal refusal by Washington to support russia’s proposal for a sectoral approach to solving the missile issue, as well as to provide legally binding guarantees that this extensive bmD infrastructure will not be used to target the russian strategic nuclear forces.

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Development of High-Precision Conventional Weapons nOt COntent with the development and upgrading of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, the United States’ politico-military leadership is still set to press ahead with an ambitious program to develop prompt Global Strike conventional weapons that can, with the help of new-generation high-precision and high-speed systems, hit “specifically designated special purpose targets” anywhere on the globe within an hour or even faster. U.S. military experts estimate that such weapons would destroy between ten and thirty percent of the targets identified by the American general plan of conducting a global war. this, in particular, is evidenced by pentagon officials’ statements and the U.S. Congressional research Service’s “Conventional prompt Global Strike and Long-range ballistic missiles: background and Issues” report, prepared in July 2012.12 the current U.S. administration intends to carry on the prompt Global Strike program, approved way back under the administration of George bush Sr. in 2001, putting before the developers of delivery systems for conventional attack weapons under this program the task of cutting the time of deploying them to combat positions and making them fly faster and hit the targets more accurately. the financial problems facing the United States in recent years have led to some reduction in appropriations for implementing the prompt Global Strike program, but have not completely abolished it. nor is the possibility ruled out that some of the deployed minuteman III land-based ICbms and the non-deployed peacekeeper (mX) ICbms may be equipped with conventional explosives, either with a single warhead (respectively with an explosives mass of up to 200-400 kg and up to 600-800 kg each) or with a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (mIrV). the U.S. navy proposes to convert each of the 14 strategic SSbns, originally equipped with trident II nuclear SLbms, to two missiles with four conventional warheads on each (while all the subs will each continue to have 22 nuclear SLbms). It also considers the option to install on each of these subs up to 66 small missiles of “intermediate range” with a flying distance of 3,000-5,500 kilometers and with the usual charge of 50 to 100 kilograms. As part of prompt Global Strike, the U.S. Defense Advanced research projects Agency (DArpA) is going to develop a new combat

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system which has received the name of the ArcLight. Its peculiarity lies in the fact that a hypersonic glider will be delivered to the target at a distance of up to 3,800 kilometers with the help of the Sm-3 interceptor missile, which in the coming years will form the basis of the United States’ global sea-based missile defense system. the hypersonic platform ArcLight can be installed both on U.S. navy submarines and on surface combat ships: ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh burke class destroyers that will not be subject to inspection checks. the U.S. Air Force plans to create a hypersonic glider, the Hypersonic test Vehicle or HtV, having a speed greater than five times the speed of sound and a pinpoint guidance accuracy of up to three meters. It is said to be capable of delivering a conventional warhead weighing up to 400 kilograms at a distance of 5,500 kilometers and of destroying hardened targets with the help of a conventional explosive or by means of a kinetic warhead. In addition, the pentagon is considering the possibility of further expansion of the non-nuclear functions of heavy bombers in the future, for example, when used in regional conflicts. For this purpose it expects to use a Conventional Air-Launched Cruise missile (CALCm). the U.S. ground forces also plan to adopt a similar platform called “Advanced Hypersonic Weapon or AHW,” which should have a slightly lower range than the hypersonic glider of the Air Force. U.S. military experts admit that the prompt Global Strike program has a destabilizing character, since any state against which its combat strike weapons will be used will not be able to determine what is the “stuffing” of the missile or glider – a nuclear or conventional warhead, especially if conventional warheads will be installed on strategic delivery vehicles that earlier were meant to deliver nuclear warheads. naturally, this program can make it difficult for an attacked nation to take timely countermeasures: to determine the composition of pGS warheads by national technical means of verification is virtually impossible, especially if American strategic submarines equipped with both nuclear and conventional warheads are stationed in their traditional areas of combat patrol, including those forward deployed. In this context, one should also take into account the close interrelationship between U.S. strategic offensive weapons and tactical nuclear weapons, and between U.S. ballistic missile defense and prompt Global Strike systems. this is also evidenced by the Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike (JFCC-GS) established within the U.S.

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Strategic Command in 2006, which is charged with planning for the use of nuclear and conventional weapons on a global scale. It should also be noted that the U.S. politico-military leadership does not intend to put under international legal control the combat strike weapons of the prompt Global Strike program, including at negotiations with the russian Federation. *** tHUS, the U.S. nuclear weapons employment strategy “adapted” in the second half of June this year remains in its essence the same. At its core is still the doctrine of offensive nuclear deterrence envisaging delivery of a first nuclear strike against other states which are not members of nAtO and do not belong to the allies and “privileged” partners of Washington. In order to carry it out, a considerable permanently upgraded strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal is being provided. It is also of no little importance that these assets, in turn, are covered by a continually augmented global missile defense system of the United States and nAtO, which is also being steadily improved. the U.S. politico-military leadership is still set to ward off the military threat from the continental part of the country, but seeks, like decades ago, following the concept of “forward deployment,” to create such a threat “at the threshold” of other states. the national security interests of the russian Federation require thorough consideration of all these circumstances in its nuclear and defense policy as a whole, along with new approaches to the problem of reducing armed forces and limiting military activities with the United States. the “pause” in American-russian relations proposed by barack Obama in August 2013 under the pretext of the “Snowden case” should be used with a view to developing such approaches. _______________ nOteS 1 president Obama Speaks to the people of berlin from the brandenburg Gate / the White House, June 19, 2013 // http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/19/president-obamaspeaks-people-berlin-brandenburg-gate 2 report on nuclear employment Strategy of the United States. Specified in Section 491 of 10 USC / US Department of Defense, Washington, June 2013 // http://www.defense.gov/pubs/reporttoCongressonUSnuclearemploymentStrategy_ Section491, pdf 3 nuclear Weapons employment Strategy of the United States (Fact Sheet) / the White House Office of the press Secretary, June 19, 2013 // http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states

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4 Antonov A. Kontrol’ nad vooruzheniyami: istoriya, sostoyaniye, perspektivy. moscow: rossiyskaya politicheskaya entsiklopedia, 2012, p. 52. 5 Director of the Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies, russian Academy of Sciences, Academician S.m. rogov; Candidate of Science (military Sciences), former chief of staff of the russian Strategic missile Forces (1994-1996) Colonel General V.I. yesin; Deputy Director of the Institute major General p.S. Zolotarev, and former Senior military representative of russia’s ministry of Defense to nAtO (2002-2008) Vice Admiral V.S. Kuznetsov. “rossiya i SShA na razvilke. Initsiativy Obamy v yadernoi sfere i reaktsiya na nikh moskvy,” Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye, no. 27, August 2-8, 2013. 6 Gottemoeller r. U.S. Strategic Command 2012 Deterrence Symposium – Remarks, Omaha, ne, August 9, 2012 // http://mail.yandex.ru/neo2/# message/2370000000 177583618 7 U.S. Strategic nuclear Forces: background, Developments and Issues / Congressional research Service, Washington, February 2012, pp. 1-34. 8 Kristensen H. m. “modernizing nAtO’s nuclear Forces: Implications for the Alliance’s Defense posture and Arms Control,” Nuclear Policy Paper, no. 11, november 2012, p. 1. 9 Life extension programs / national nuclear Security Administration, 2013 // http://nnsa.energy.gov/ourmission/managingthestockpile/lifeextensionprograms 10 nuclear posture review report / U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense, may 2010, p. 39 // http://www.defense.gov/npr/ docs/ 010%20 nuclear% 20posture%20review%20report.pdf 11 Kristensen H. m. Op. cit., p. 3. 12 Conventional prompt Global Strike and Long-range ballistic missiles: background and Issues / Congressional research Service, Washington, July 6, 2012, pp. 1-39.

Key words: United States’ “new” nuclear strategy, nuclear weapons, differences between the russian and American nuclear doctrines, modernization of U.S. strategic offensive weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, development of a missile defense system.