The merits and pitfalls of defensive nationalism

The aim of this paper is to discuss some theoretical aspects of democratic transformation as exemplified by Poland’s and Taiwan’s peaceful revolutions of 1980s and 1990s, with the special emphasis on the role of defensive nationalism in the parallel processes of nationbuilding and democratisation. It is not my intention, however, to provide a detailed account of the recent historical developments in these two countries, in particular the circumstances leading to the gradual unravelling of authoritarian regimes and the establishment of democratic rule. A sketchy, let alone exhaustive presentation of these events would necessarily entail a lengthy study of their causes, decisive factors and the most prominent protagonists, with inevitable references to the economic, political and international situation, that would exceed not only the scope of this paper but also the competence of its author, not to mention the patience of the listeners. Rather, what I would like to propose here is a theoretical model of the political transformation from autocracy to democracy by route of defensive nationalism construed on the basis of the Taiwanese and Polish experiences in this respect. I hope that such a model will, in the first place, help to grasp the seemingly chaotic and not always transparent structure of the Polish and Taiwanese politics and thereby facilitate the understanding of their perplexing dynamics. On a more general level, I would like the argument elaborated below to be interpreted as a voice in the discussion on the interrelation of democracy, nationalism and modernity, that with varied intensity has been raging in Western social sciences since the end of the World War I. To this end, I will begin by giving a short outline of the evolution of scholarship on nationalism in Western social and political sciences. This should help to elucidate the relationship between nationalism and democracy from the theoretical point of view and thus supply some clues as to their most successful and mutually beneficial cooperation in political practice. Subsequently, I am going to sketch out the concept of defensive nationalism contrasted with its main opponent - the ideal of empire. In closing, I will present some possible disadvantages of a democratic system built upon the foundation of defensive nationalism.

As I mentioned above, the discussion on the role of nationalism in the political modernization, which is commonly identified with liberalisation and democratisation, has already engaged several generations of social and political scientists. Despite their efforts, an extensive or even preliminary consensus on the matter is still far from appearing, on the contrary, every new generation seems to resume the controversy from the very beginning. Differences in 1

argumentation and methodology notwithstanding, the essence of the debate revolves around the question of whether nationalism is or is not compatible with democracy. Undeniably, part of the problem is the vagueness of the term “nationalism” itself, evinced in the treacherous easiness with which it fits into conceptual apparatuses of various academic disciplines, from political science and sociology to economics, cultural studies and international relations. Consequently, there are almost as many “nationalisms” as there are books on it, each year bringing new publications and new definitions compounding rather than dispelling the existing state of confusion. However, this terminological chaos, which became the norm rather than an exception, might be but a symptom of a real difficulty, namely the equivocal nature of nationalism which throughout its long or short history (which is also subject to discussion) has proved to be as efficient as an agent of progress and as a stronghold of tradition, a movement for individual liberation and a mechanism for social discipline, an instrument of unification and inclusion or of division and exclusion. Admittedly, the only group conspicuously immune to the former and susceptible to the latter quality seems to be the scholars who deal with nationalism professionally. A lively debate among them is still going on and I do not pretend to bring it to a close by offering a universally applicable matrix for understanding the role of nationalism in the process of democratisation. Quite the opposite, the validity of my model is deliberately limited to two countries only, Taiwan and Poland, each operating within a specific historical context. Though this context, as I said before, is relegated to the margin of the argument, it should none the less be constantly born in mind. The fate of the once unchallenged and now scornfully discarded modernisation theory proves that no theoretical model can boast to supply a satisfactory explanation for any country’s success or failure in joining modern, democratic world if it neglects to account for historical circumstances fostering or impeding such a development. Conversely, I do not intend to ignore the background provided by the existing scholarship. As a point of reference it is indispensable, particularly in the case of peripheral or semi-peripheral nationalisms like the Polish and the Taiwanese, which despite the historical peculiarities of their genesis, from the onset were analysed within the framework developed by Western academic discourse. Inevitably, the character of this discourse played a crucial role in conceptualising and interpreting the so-called late nationalisms, but as I intend to show, they were at least as significant in shaping the paradigms of this discourse as it was effective in giving them their often bad image.1 1

I consciously refrain from defining the three concepts I repeatedly refer to in this paper, namely “nation”, “democracy” and “modernity”. Their content is fluid and open to interpretation, and so is the relation between

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More often than not the beginnings of a new scientific discipline are muddled and obscure, there are, however, exceptions to this rule. Nationalism might be one of them. It can well be argued that the origin of the academic discourse on this subject happened to be linked to the appearance of marginal nationalisms in Eastern Europe and with some precision can be traced back to the reaction of Western Europeans to the outburst of national insurrection in the eastern part of the continent after the World War I. This early confrontation opened a new vista of research, established its general orientation and outlook and thereby determined not only the perception of Eastern European nationalism, but also that of all non-Western national movements which emerged later on.2 Admittedly, nationalism had been known in the West long before the outbreak of the nationalistically inspired insurgence in the post-war Europe, none the less, as a social and political phenomenon it had failed to attract much attention from the side of professional scholars. The reason for it was a prompt and on the whole overlooked immersion of “nation” and “nationality” within the broader analytical categories of people and society. The founding fathers of sociology, Max Weber and Emile Durckheim, for instance, though by no means impervious to the nationalist rhetoric of their times and milieus, never made it a subject of the serious, scientific reflection, quite the opposite, they inadvertently obscured its influence on their thought by referring to the allegedly universal terms of “civilisation” and “culture”. Consequently, the first nationalisms which became the topic of systematic studies in their own right were the obtrusive, inexplicable, divisive ideologies of Eastern Europe. In spite of the fresh memory of the nationalistic euphoria of the summer of 1914, the similar eruption of ethnic intransigence which four years later tore down the ancient empires of Austria and Russia was greeted with general incomprehension and appal in the West, soon to be followed by accusations of obscurantism, tribalism and barbarity. This initial, partly justified, partly hypocritical indignation, quickly covered by a thick layer of conceptualisations, classifications and interpretations was to determine the perception of

them , therefore instead of giving definitions which are definite only within a context provided by the rest of a theory, I will outline the theoretical perspectives on the basis of which particular definitions of nationalism, democratisation and modernisation have been worked out. 2 According to some recent theories, Eastern Europe was the original subject of colonial discourse, even before this term was coined and applied to former colonies of Western European empires. Paradoxically, Eastern Europeans are quite reluctant to see themselves in the same category as other colonized peoples, despite some striking similarities this experience has left in their self-perception and consciousness. Therefore, it is only lately that some scholars started to interpret the national cultures of Eastern Europe using the concepts and instruments worked out by the post-colonial discourse. See: Ewa M. Thompson, „Saramatyzm i postkolonializm” (Sarmatism and Post-Colonialism), in: Europa, 137/2006.

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nationalism for the years to come. Accordingly, the discourse on nationalism, developing as it was in reaction to the bizarre fanatism of others and not the familiar feeling one has for his or her own country and people took an unmistakably polemical stance towards its subject matter routinely allowing its premises to be informed by strong though hardly ever clearly stated moral and political convictions. Thus for instance Hans Kohn’s highly influential and for a long time universally accepted theory divided European nationalisms into two basically contradictive types.3 The Western brand, supposedly civic, democratic, liberal and inclusive was positively contrasted with its Eastern equivalent which was to be characterized by its ethnic, authoritarian, collective and exclusivist qualities. The former, not really nationalism at all, but rather a modern form of the noble patriotism known since time immemorial was clearly superior to the latter whose immaturity, aggressiveness and obsession with ethnic purity was indicated as the source of interminable conflicts among minor nations of Eastern Europe. By implication, the Western nationalism was perfectly suited to co-exist with liberal democracy, while its Eastern counterpart, notorious as it was for its emphasis on collective identity and ethnic rather than civic affiliations practically excluded democratic rule. From there it was only a small step to fit nationalism into the broader discourse which placed political modernisation, i.e. democratisation and liberalization on the one side and traditionalism and authoritarianism on the other. As a result, nationalism came to be perceived as the opposite of modernization or at best its badly distorted, so to speak derailed version.

Being a phenomenon ascribed to backward societies, till late 1970s nationalism was a marginal category in Western social sciences, hardly ever used as an instrument of social, political and cultural analysis.4 The gradual change of the paradigm was initiated in the 1980s, this being an outcome of several interlinked processes. Decolonisation, but in particular the fledging performance of the newly established democracies in Africa and Asia exposed the insufficiencies of modernisation theory which had promised an almost automatic transplantation of Western institutions into non-Western environments. Looking for possible explanations for this fact, scientists turned to the “soft” components of democracy - values, customs and traditions, and by this way got interested in the category of nation which, though narrower than society, was still preferable to the politically-sensitive concepts like culture or 3

H.Kohn, The idea of nationalism, 2nd edn, New York, 1967. Nationality was not perceived as a source of meaningful difference in stark contrast to the concepts of class, and later gender, race, sexual orientation, etc. Interestingly, this fact can be interpreted as an indicative of inwardness of these societies. Apparently tired with the bloody confrontations of the previous period, in the post war era they chose to be divert their attention to internal problems.

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race. The other reason for the gradual revival of nationalist studies was the reappearance of ethnic tensions in Europe that found their expression in simmering conflicts with the quickly growing immigrant communities. These two parallel processes explain in part the newly awakened interest in nationalism of the Western nations that was to lead to a rediscovery of the nationalistic roots of Western Europeans democracies. Thus, in the course of 1980s nationalism was acknowledged as something not so much marginal to or separate from Western democracy but, on the contrary, its very foundation and a necessary precondition for its subsequent development. Quite unexpectedly, from the worst enemy of democracy it became its best ally. Besides the reasons mentioned above, this change of heart was also a sign of a partial withdrawal on the part of European academia from the claims to universality, scientific objectivity and, by implication, political neutrality. On theoretical plane these developments were assisted by a gradual dissolution of two so far dominating paradigms, namely functionalism and Marxism.5 It should be observed that researchers like Ernst Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm, prior to becoming the most frequently quoted authorities on nationalism, were proponents of historical materialism. It can well be argued that they never really severed their ties to it as its traces are easy to discover in their theories of nationalism. Particularly, in the case of Hobsbawm one might assume that nationalism was but a means to revive Marxism by freeing it from dependence on the discredited category of class and purging it from aversion towards other forms of group affiliation which classical doctrine thought obsolete. Hence, by putting forward what became to be called the modernist theories of nationalism these scholars tried to modernise not only nationalism but Marxism as well. As a result, for a short time in the 1980s nationalism was not only fashionable but also respectable, the reason being its theoretical identification with industrialisation, urbanisation, mass education and eventually also democratisation, in short socio-economic and political modernisation. To a extent this tendency was reinforced by the appearance of the so-called primordial and perennial schools of nationalism, both clearly postmodernist in origin, that with their interest in and appreciation of ethnic identities helped to further boost the positive reputation of nationalism. 6 5

On the genensis of the new modernisation paradigm in the studies on nationalism, see: Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, Routledge, London-New York, 2001. 6 See: Walker Connor, Ethno-Nationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1994, Joshua Fishman, Language and Nationalism: Two integrative essays, Newbury House, Rowley MA 1972. The culturalist bias, the sole preoccupation with the issues of identity made primordialists and perennialists less interested in the political dimensions of nationalism, or to be precise, with its institutional underpinnings, therefore I will leave them aside. By the same token, I will refrain from discussing the cultural aspects of the debate on Polish and Taiwanese nationalism concentrating instead on their political dimensions. Admittedly, the culturalist argument plays an important role, especially in the case of Taiwanese nationality,

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The theses of the modernist school had not yet been fully assimilated into the Western academic discourse when a fresh wave of nationalisms crashed against the borders of Europe culminating in the Autumn of Nations in 1989. Again it was greeted with mixed feelings partly due to ignorance and prejudice and partly to justified misgivings, made even more acute by a peculiar dissynchronisation of political and scientific discourses in the West and East. While Eastern Europeans celebrated and rejoiced, happily flaunting their newly regained sovereignty and communal identity, Westerners could not help to turn their heads with disapproval, having already assimilated the postmodernist lesson of suspicion towards all strong, homogeneous narratives. Admittedly, there were some grounds for satisfaction because despite the irritating nationalistic phraseology the regimes emerging in Eastern Europe were on the whole democratic. None the less, some Western commentators were quick to point and criticize the fact that in general it was nationalism rather than the belief in human rights and civil liberties which made people reject communism. With disappointment they stated that for a vast majority of Eastern Europeans the old regime was illegitimate because of its foreign origin and not its authoritarianism.7 Built on this foundation, the new democratic institutions seemed shaky and fragile, hence there resurfaced again the old fears about their stability and benevolence which seemingly found their worst confirmation in the bloody confrontation in the former Yugoslavia and the post-Soviet republics. These sentiments were reflected in the publications on nationalism which appeared at the beginning of 1990s.8 In some of them a recycled version of Kohn’s dichotomy triumphed its revival. Liah Greenfeld for instance once more distinguished two types of nationalism: the good one Anglo-Saxon, liberal and democratic and the evil - Eastern European, violent, intolerant of minorities and aggressive towards neighbours. The new generation of scholars stopped short of questioning the modernity of nationalism. Instead they argued that modernisation might fail in confrontation with pre-existent traditions, particularly if they lacked deeply rooted proto-

there are however reasons for questioning its usefulness in the context of this paper. Firstly, the primordial and perennial schools were greatly influenced by post-modernism. Consequently, they inherited its predilection for fragmented discourses aimed at deconstruction of dominating narratives, nation being one of them. Hence, they tend to focus on issues concerning national minorities rather than majorities. Secondly, it might be viewed as a paradox at the very core of postmodernism that though it claims to liberate individuals from the oppressive narratives of modernity, it purports to do so by emphasising exactly these aspects of human condition which are hardly subject to individual choice: race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity. In this sense, it is anti-political, politics being a space of freedom. 7 Compare the similar sentiments expressed in relation to Taiwanese democratization: Ian Buruma, Bad Elements. Chinese Rebels from Los Angeles to Beijing, Random House, New York 2001, Guy Sorman, L’Annee du Coq. Chinois et rebelles, Paris 2006. 8 See: Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1992.

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democratic institutions. To summarize the discussion so far, it seems that nationalism has achieved a conditional acceptance for its limited political usefulness, its essence, however, in other words the communal feeling it strives to elicit and sustain is still treated with much suspicion.

This lengthy theoretical introduction was necessary because, hopefully, it helps to explain some of the comments and not always unbiased judgements made by observers from Western Europe in reference to democratisation processes in Poland and Taiwan. Much attention was devoted to analysing the Polish and Taiwanese nationalism. The naïve pride of its proponents, their incomprehensible intransigence, historical oversensitivity, irritating preoccupation with the past grievances and ideological inflexibility bordering on stubbornness and inanity were critically discussed and usually interpreted in terms of political immaturity and insufficient democratic competence. I am not going to defend these sentiments especially when they degenerate into xenophobia or intolerance. Still, I will argue that the reaction they encounter in Europe is to an extent unfair. During the last half a century Europe has grown more and more suspicious of nationalism. Arguably, there are good and bad reasons for this development. The good reasons are naturally the long history of national conflicts that nearly brought about the destruction of the continent and throughout the last century claimed lives of millions of Europeans. Consequently, Europe entrusted its future to the project that clearly if not officially purposes to supersede nation states. The bad reason, on the other hand, is the sometimes excessive distrust or even hostility towards any forms of collective, emotional and irrational involvement that in contemporary Europe is deemed appropriate only at football matches. There seems to be a silent consensus concerning their existence, accompanied by a strong reluctance to acknowledge their importance and political legitimacy. Presumably, European elites still feel that they can not fully trust the maturity, responsibility and common sense of the citizens and therefore prefer to keep these sentiments under control by pushing them on the margin of an acceptable political discourse. The recent increase of support for populist movements suggests, however, that this policy might have an adverse effect on the stability of democratic systems. Banned from appearing in public these sentiments tend to find their sudden and violent release in aggression directed against the immigrants or supranational institutions like the EU or World Bank. Also from a scientific point of view, these reservations might pose a problem, since at times they impede the proper understanding of other societies which for whatever reasons, not all of them necessarily evil, do not share European sensibilities. 7

As I believe that the theoretical discourse on nationalism, which I tried to outline in the preceding paragraph, due to its genesis and evolution has left some questions in the field under-researched, in the following part of this paper I intend to discuss the relationship between democracy and nationalism so as to present it as at least potentially beneficial for both sides. Unlike some theoreticians I do not wish to make this cooperation dependent on the pre-existence of the so called democratic traditions and values.9 Tradition is clearly not the best way to explain the successful democratisations of almost all societies now perceived as paragons of democracy, because very few among them can boast of truly democratic heritage. Instead of tradition I would speak of experience which evokes the idea of knowledge that is more recent, more tangible and more concrete. Furthermore, I will try to go beyond the hypothesis of compatibility of democracy and nationalism and show that in some cases, arguably these of Poland and Taiwan, they are as good as indispensable to each other if political modernisation is to be achieved. I intend to present the conditions of such modernisation and in this context will point to the special role of defensive nationalism. My intention is not to glorify nationalism, on the contrary, in closing I will try to point to the distortions and shortcomings of the political systems established on the basis of this kind of nationalism. What I want to do is to treat nationalism fairly and to give it exactly as much credit in democratic transformation as it justly deserves.

II

The idea to discuss Taiwan and Poland in the same context might appear immediately understandable only to somebody who like me is Polish and happens to be interested in Taiwan. The differences between these two countries must be stated clearly and constantly born in mind if the real and not merely superficial similarities are to emerge. First of all, a substantial geographical distance separating Eastern Europe and Far East have resulted in few direct links spanning the two societies. Therefore one should speak of parallels rather than relations between them. Furthermore, a clear divergence of history, both ancient and modern, cultural background, heritage and political traditions makes it doubly hard to draw legitimate and scientifically useful comparisons between them. Even if one is to focus on a basic category of state and discuss its three fundamental aspects, i.e. the government, the population, 9

See: L. Greenfeld, Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity (1992) and by the same author: The Spirit of Capitalism. Nationalism and Economic Growth, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 2001.

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and the territory, stark disparities are bound to appear. Evidently, the most obvious is linked to the issue of international recognition and sovereignty. In this respect, Polish and Taiwanese experiences are exactly reverse. In the last fifty years Poland was a sovereign state only in name but not in reality, whereas Taiwan, though de facto independent, could not achieve de iure confirmation of its status. Moving on to the second determinant i.e. the population, while historically Polish nationality was recognized, even by those who denied Poles the right to their own state, the phenomenon of Taiwanese nationality is still subject to fierce disputes both on the island and abroad. In contrast to nationality, whose outlines were relatively clear and fixed, Poland’s territory was more difficult to define, for several ages making it a country on the move. On the face of it, being an island Taiwan is more privileged in this respect but then again the relation to the PRC has turned the issue of territory into a political and legal minefield. This short enumeration of the most evident differences between Taiwan and Poland should suffice to prevent one from drawing presumptuous conclusions about possible similarities concerning their political evolution and perspectives for the future. There are, however, some parallels between them that seem solid enough to function as a foundation for constructing a uniform model of democratic transformation. The one I would like to concentrate on is nationalism.

Despite their long history, Poland and Taiwan are routinely classified as “late nations”. What all national latecomers seem to have in common is the experience of semi-existence, in other words, an existence which in spite of being sensed as real by a particular group of individuals, fails to be recognized as such by others. If prolonged, this ambiguous status tends to result in a heightened need for acceptance made doubly urgent by the deeply ingrained memory of being denied it. Even if eventually granted such an acceptance is never taken for granted, on the contrary, its preservation and amelioration becomes a subject of constant preoccupation and exertion. In the case of Poland and Taiwan the ambiguity of ontological status referred to three fundamental aspects of collective existence. The first concerned the statehood, in the sense of the right and ability of a particular community to set up and maintain independent state. Going one step further, there was the issue of contested nationality, in other words, cultural distinctiveness, cohesion, self-sufficiency and political maturity. Finally, there were doubts about the democratic credentials, i.e. the actual ability of these two nations to establish and sustain democratic institutions. These three aspects of the deficient collective existence jointly shaped the national consciousness of Poles and the Taiwanese resulting in the formation of a partly protective, partly expansive ideology that I call defensive nationalism. 9

Paradoxically, this ideology though indisputably stemming from deficiencies of statehood, nationality, and political modernization came to play a crucial role in their gradual elimination, by initiating and steering the process of democratisation, which so far has proved successful beyond expectations of both its participants and outside observers.10 In order to understand how it actually happened, it seems indispensable to examine the political merits of nationalism in general and then these of defensive nationalism in particular.

In the first place nationalism can be perceived as a political liberator. Whether we understand it as a modern ideology, mass movement or a new type of collective and individual identity, it constitutes an alternative to pre-existent modes of cultural and political affiliation. On the one hand, nationalism severs the ties to family, clan, tribe, occupational group or estate and thus extricates individuals from the net of attributive, inherited forms of affiliation. On the other, it helps to decrease the dependence on territorially determined types of identity that firmly and irrevocably bound people to the place where they were born. Arguably, territory plays an important role in any national ideology, non the less, it is not a fundamental constituent of national identity. This role is taken over by a group of people who think of themselves as a distinct entity whose existence exceeds the trivial circumstance that they happen to live in geographical proximity or are subject to the same government. In this sense, nationalism is not only the liberator but also the emancipator, i.e. the forger of demos. As mentioned above, “the people” is something substantially different from the sum of inhabitants of a given territory who obey the single ruler, and naturally neither is it an extended familial or local group. Rather, it is a community held together by a specific kind of obligations which in essence are voluntary, horizontal and equal to all members. In the absence of these type of community, in other words, in the absence of the people, the democratic rule, i.e. the rule by the people is hardly possible. However, it is not only a matter of terminological consistency. Nationalism or more specifically the sense of communality it creates is indispensable to secure a prolonged existence of a polity in the situation of interminable conflict that is characteristic of democratic systems. All to often it has been forgotten that the centrifugal tendencies of the partisan politics demand a powerful counterbalance capable of overcoming the social, economic and ideological divisions which are bound to appear in modern societies. 10

Moreover the mechanism of this transformation was very similar, consisting basically in the compromise between the old and new elites. This guaranteed relative peaceful transfer of power but also left great many people disappointed as the old regime was not unequivocally condemned. The recent actions towards the ex Communists and the KMT can be viewed as a reversal of the agreement and pending on the perspective an act of historical justice or revenge.

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Nationalism has not so far found any real competitors for its role as a guarantor of internal cohesion and by implication a protector of the demos.

If the role of nationalism in sustaining democratic rule is hard to overestimate it is at least as essential in establishing it. First to all, the mere fact of standing up to the authoritarian regime, which usually constitutes the beginning of the democratisation process, is extremely difficult socially and psychologically. The necessary courage and determination, found among the leaders of democratic movements all over the world, is unlikely to be deduced from rational calculation of interests, which constitutes the foundation of democratic politics. Frequently, it is nationalism (or religion) that caters for the indispensable fervour and readiness to accept sacrifices without which people are not likely to risk a full-scale confrontation with the government. Secondly, on the basis of the Taiwanese and Polish experiences in this respect it can be argued that nationalism is also a precondition for a successful completion of the next stage of democratisation, namely the peaceful transfer of power. The point here is not only the resignation of violence and revenge but quite as importantly the gradual reconciliation and incorporation of the old elites into a new system.

All these merits notwithstanding, it can well be pointed out that the reputation of nationalism as an opponent of democracy cannot be so easily discarded since on numerous occasions it was confirmed by historical evidence. The overwhelming feeling of being one with the nation was often turned against the others, either minority groups or neighbouring countries resulting in persecution, bloodshed and wars. Moreover, despite its liberating and emancipating potential, nationalism was frequently used as a means of closing up the community and eliminating divergent elements thus thwarting rights and freedoms of individuals. Last but not least, there seems to be something deeply incompatible between the democratic opposition of friends and foes and the nationalistic differentiation between “us” and “them”. At the foundation of democratic theory lies the idea that virtually any individual, although basically a stranger with an unbreakable will of his or her own, might become a friend pending favourable conditions. Conversely, the boundary implicated by the division of “us” versus “them” is much less flexible and porous, therefore crossing it is not a matter of a spontaneous decision or a temporary preference.

It was observed that nationalism is most likely to part ways with democracy in the early stages of modernisation. Therefore, the question arises how, at this critical junction, to avoid 11

the degeneration of nationalism into xenophobia and at the same time evade the subjugation of minorities and individuals? In other words, how to combine the cause of nationalism and democracy? One possible answer has recently been suggested by Eric Foner who argues that freedom is not an autonomous idea, but rather a relative structure which in order to develop fully needs its contradiction in the form of a clear, undisputable representation of enslavement.11 By the same token, also nationalism needs a rival epitomising all the opposite qualities. In other words, if it is to survive as a liberalising and emancipating force nationalism has to become a defensive ideology.

It can well be argued that at least as far as rhetoric goes all nationalisms are defensive. They claim to protect the “we” group against the aggression of others. Defensiveness as such does not exclude active hostility, quite the opposite, more often than not it is likely to result in hatred and violence. The defensive nationalism I have in mind is a fully fledged ideology developed with a single opponent in mind – the empire. Let me now specify the main thesis of this paper: I will argue that nationalism can be fully compatible and even beneficial for democracy provided that in principle it is directed against the rival ideology of empire. Like nation, empire is a modern myth, though arguably they both have their roots in the premodern era. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to identify empires with traditional forms of government and state organisation. The ideal of empire has managed to cross the threshold to modernity where it unchangeably retains its attractiveness and actuality. What constitutes the empire as a polity? Empire is not an exceptionally powerful or aggressive state because as such it would merely incite counter aggression and xenophobia, least of all democratic zeal. More to the point, empire, like nation state, is a way of organising polity and of constituting relations between the rulers and the ruled. What are then the differences between the two polities?

1. Nationalism is primarily founded on the idea of real, indelible, and principally desired differences between human beings. Despite these differences, people and their political groupings are viewed as equal and sovereign. Their sovereignty and independence is guaranteed by the existence of borders, the actual scaffolding for their identity. Philosophically, nationalism is a collective emanation of the modern individual.

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Eric Foner, Forever Free: The Story of Emancipation and Reconstruction, Vintage 2006.

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2. Imperialism emphasises similarities between individuals, it refers to what all people have in common, their humanity understood as a potentiality of virtually anyone becoming like everybody else. This potentiality might be realized by education and culture that can eliminate all differences in language, custom and background. As long as the uniform, imperial culture does not become universal, the imperial society must be organized in accordance with the hierarchical principle. Imperialism excludes conflict based on indelible differences, it epitomises the idea of harmony. The borders of empires are not clearly defined and neither are the characteristics of their subjects – empire presupposes a plasticity of human beings, fluidity of their identities, constant adaptation and an all-encompassing social nature. Poland and Taiwan were confronted with the imperial idea in its two versions: the 19th century’s traditional imperialism of Japan, Prussia, Russia and Austria and the imperialism of 20th century exemplified by the official ideology of the PRC and the Soviet Union. Arguably, this confrontation was not direct. It took place at the outskirts of the imperial sphere of influence and was aimed at the local elites. At first sight the opponents of the Polish and Taiwanese nationalist movements seemed to have hardly anything in common. In terms of ideology Communist Party of Poland and KMT were worlds apart, their attitude towards particular issues of both domestic and international politics could not have been more different. However, they can be both perceived as local exponents of imperial idea, that in the case of Poland stemmed from Communism or Russian Empire, and in the case of Taiwan came from China and epitomised both its ancient and modern aspirations. I will argue that it was nationalism that provided the necessary material to contradict the imperial idea. If it then managed to develop into a fully-fledged democratic ideology inclusive enough to unite various groups within the society, it was because it was competing with the its constantly present rival – the universalistic imperialism.

Before I move to enumerate at least some of the pitfalls of defensive nationalism, a few merits of imperialism must be pointed at. First of all, the idea of empire is not devoid of its particular charms. Empire offers freedom from politics, banishes conflict from public sphere and for loyal subjects opens vast routes for development. It enables people to easily combine and move between various, non mutually exclusive identities. It also endows them with an identity built upon the foundation of culture, which is broader, more diversified and in result richer in

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opportunities than its national equivalent. No wonder people who used to remember the empires of the pre-world period found the subsequent nation states parochial.

As I already stated, defensive nationalism is not free from its drawbacks. It turns its exponents into rebels who have an irritating tendency to overstress their independence. At the same time, the same people are quite reluctant to give up their status of victims because it is combined with substantial benefits. The status of victims is interpreted as this of moral superiority and used in controversies with opponents and also as an excuse for any misdeeds on their own part. This results in a certain kind of innocence which is really a camouflaged irresponsibility characteristic of immature communities. The defensive nationalists remember and tend to remind all the others of their misfortunes hence their boring preoccupation with the past and the tendency to turn history into a material for present politics. See the examples of historical politics from both countries. The final result is the predilection for the confrontational style in politics, which is the reason why they find it hard to develop harmonious contacts with opposing parties. Furthermore, they have the tendency to be respond to the challenges coming from the outside and thus to overemphasise the importance of internal unity instead of properly and accurately addressing the interests of various groups within the society.

The recent developments in the countries mark a second stage of democratic transformation, namely unravelling of the great compromise that led to the peaceful transition of power at the beginning of the 1990s. It takes the form of settling the political accounts from the past which has been greeted with much apprehension from the outside observers and commentators. Provided it will not end with witch hunting and branding of political opponents as traitors it can actually be beneficial and might strengthen the democracy in these countries. Dealing with the past will help them to free themselves from history.

Both countries’ future is uncertain and depend on the development of their partners. Poland’s prospects look brighter because the Russian Empire collapsed and even if it manages to reestablish some of its former influence it is not likely to engulf Poland. The perspectives of Taiwan are not so clear due to the uncertainty about the direction the PRC will choose for its further development.

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