THE HUNDRED DAYS

QUATRE BRAS By Gary Kitching

With the anniversary of the Waterloo campaign approaching, Gary Kitching and his compatriots have planned to wargame the major battles of 1815, all of which will be featured in WI. In this article, Gary kicks off by considering the background to the campaign and describing his re-fight of the Battle of Quatre Bras, including details of the mechanisms used to recreate the friction of war and the part chance played in this campaign! THE FATE OF EUROPE HANGS IN THE BALANCE… At 4am on 12 June 1815, Napoleon left the Elysee Palace accompanied by his closest aides. His destination was Laon, within striking distance of the Belgian frontier. Across that border were the armies of Wellington and Blucher, his

implacable enemies. In the next six days the destiny of Napoleon, France and the whole of Europe would hang in the balance. Four bloody battles lay ahead and thousands would die. The Emperor had so often gambled and savoured the fruits of success - now he would stake everything to win…

‘I place the utmost importance on preserving the peace with your Majesty...’ Decisively defeated by the Allies in 1814, Napoleon had been sent into exile. His return in 1815 was greeted with great enthusiasm across much of France, but with trepidation by the rest of Europe. On 13 March, the Allied powers declared him beyond the protection of international law with obvious consequences in the event of his capture. After a triumphal march across France, Napoleon arrived in Paris on 20 March. Napoleon sought to buy time with protestations of peace to his fellow monarchs. But by 25 March a new allied coalition had been forged

Below: Napoleon leaving Paris - ‘he has gone to join the army in a melancholy mood and filled with dark forebodings…’ This photo, and the one of page 33, by Simon MacDowall.

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Napoleonic Wars 1803-1815

Right: The French Army in action at the Battle of Quatre Bras. Photo of Ron Ringrose’s 28mm collection taken from Mega Wargames - big battles, in miniature.

between Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria committing each of them to keep 150,000 men in the field until the usurper was defeated. Napoleon was posed with a strategic dilemma. Should he await the Allied armies within the borders of France? This would give him time to build up the strength of his armies, but equally would allow the Allies to gather their forces and plan their offensive. In 1814 he had fought a short, and at times brilliant, but ultimately futile campaign against the Allies whose numbers overwhelmed him. The alternative was to seek an early decision against the Allies whilst they were still gathering their strength. A fast, decisive campaign would secure his political position in France, gain land and resources for further campaigning and once again establish his military ascendency over his foes. He hesitated, but at heart Napoleon was a gambler who believed in his star - he would strike first. ARROGANT CONFUSION BETWEEN WISH AND DEED… Napoleon chose to strike his first blow at the Allied armies gathered in Belgium. His strategic intentions were simple: 1) Prevent the Allies joining forces; 2) Defeat the Prussians and force them East, back across the Rhine; 3) Defeat the British and their Dutch, Belgian and German allies and force the former to evacuate their forces from the Continent. When these aims were accomplished he would be left in possession of most of Belgium and its capital, Brussels, ‘when things would happen’ according to his statements. (It is not clear what he meant by this.) In addition, defeat would ‘probably’ cause the British Government to sue for peace. Given the determination and grit that the British had shown in their opposition to Republican and Napoleonic France over the previous 25 years this would appear to be wishful thinking! Despite these shortcomings, if Napoleon could achieve an early victory, it would provide a firm platform for future campaigning and send a shiver through the courts of Europe. Whilst Napoleon gathered his forces, the Allies in Belgium were also preparing for an offensive, but this was not planned to begin until early July. By then the fate of Europe had been decided. However, the focus on offensive led to fundamental flaws in Allied preparations - there was no co-ordinated plan for defence or mutual support in the event of a French attack!

THERE IS MADNESS IN THE AIR… When recreating the battles of 1815 it is very important to get a ‘feel’ for the ability of the commanders and armies engaged and then to try to recreate this on the gaming table. On the French side Napoleon is a master of strategic thinking and a proven battlefield commander. The initial French penetration of Belgium is masterly and puts the Allies seriously off-balance. However, throughout the campaign the friction of war appears to combine with Napoleon’s own inconsistent performance and delusion to rob the French of opportunities. In addition to Napoleon’s waning ability, a critical factor at play here is the lack-lustre performance of the French Staff under Marshal Soult. The Marshal was not an effective Chief of Staff and his interpretation of Napoleon’s orders was poor. He produced written orders that were often confused and contradictory. This is well illustrated by

the orders that led D’Erlon’s Corps to march between the battlefields of Quatre Bras and Ligny but not to intervene in either. At Ligny, where every combatant counted for the French, a corps was left to the south of the battlefield and never called upon. At both Quatre Bras and for most of the time at Waterloo, Marshall Ney performed the role of key tactical commander. When reading about the battles, one is struck by the number of times that the ‘Bravest of the brave’ is described leading his men forward. But if Ney was displaying his bravery and skill leading squadrons he was not leading the army. This had significant, if not fatal, consequences for the French campaign. Rules used to replay battles of the Waterloo campaign must have command and control elements that reflect the limitations of the French staff and Marshall Ney’s penchant for leading squadrons rather than commanding the army.

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Left: A British square in action at the Battle of Quatre Bras. Photo of Ron Ringrose’s 28mm collection taken from Mega Wargames big battles, in miniature.

vulnerability, steadying troops where necessary and personally intervening and giving orders to individual units when appropriate. Unlike his French counter parts he maintained command and control as far as the communication systems of the time allowed. This was a high risk leadership style given the amount of metal flying through the air, but it was necessary if he was to effectively command his diverse army. The relatively confined space in which the battles were fought made it possible. For the game Wellington must be given the attributes of leadership and élan to reflect his battlefield performance. But there must also be a risk of him becoming a casualty. The majority of both British and Allied senior officers at divisional level and above put in strong performances on both battlefields. Indeed, the activity of Dutch-Belgian commanders Perponcher, Saxe-Weimar and Bjlandt prevented Quatre Bras from becoming a major setback for the Allies. Many of the British and German officers had previously served with Wellington in the Peninsula. The one major exception to this rule is the Prince of Orange whose orders on a number of occasions directly resulted in Allied units being decimated. Again the rules need to reflect the relative ability of the commanders.

There was clearly a range of ability amongst French Divisional and Corps’ commanders. As we progress through the battles we will explore this. Interestingly it would appear that in organising his Corps Napoleon arranged for those with Peninsular experience to face the British, whilst those with more experience fighting Germans faced the Prussians. Napoleon’s Armee du Nord was a very professional body. It had a core of veterans who had followed the Eagles to many victories and showed great élan on the battlefield. The infantry’s bloody battles for the villages of the Ligny battlefield and the Chateau of Hougomont together with the cavalry’s charges at Waterloo clearly demonstrate their bravery and determination. Throughout the campaign the artillery also played its traditionally dominant role, paving the way for the advance of the other arms. However, a number of writers have commented on the mistrust that the

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average soldier had for some of the senior officers who had served Louis XVIII. As the campaign began one General, Beaumont, deserted with his staff and provided the Allies with Napoleon’s order of battle. This distrust led to a degree of fragility in the French army that resulted in panics and retreats at Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo. Game rules must take account of the élan and solid professionalism of the Armee du Nord but also build in a risk of panic in the event of a reverse - there was indeed madness in the air! AN INFAMOUS ARMY… Caution and a failure of his communication system resulted in Wellington’s strategic handling of the opening of the campaign leaving his army exposed. However, set against this, his battlefield leadership at Quatre Bras and Waterloo were exemplary. He kept his finger on the pulse. He moved about the battlefields constantly, checking for

The Allied army was composed of British, Dutch-Belgians and Germans. Of the British troops many had Peninsula experience, and they were well trained and professional. There was a panic amongst some British foot at Quatre Bras, but this was the exception and not the rule. (Note - the British cavalry did not feature in strength at Quatre Bras and they will be dealt with in a later article.) In British accounts written after the campaign there were many disparaging comments made about their Allies and there were certainly instances of very poor performance, such as the failure of the Dutch-Belgian hussars to charge at Quatre Bras and the premature retreat of the Cumberland Hussars at Waterloo. However, there were also examples of really tough fighting by Dutch-Belgian and German troops. For example, Bjlandt’s Brigade is denigrated for falling back in front of d’Erlon’s attack at Waterloo. However, it is this same brigade that, together with Nassau units, held the line against ferocious French assaults from the start of the Battle of Quatre Bras. In the process it suffered very high casualties that must have impacted on its performance at Waterloo. Again, the

Above: Charleroi - ‘He sank into his chair and dozed, not even the frenzied cheers of his soldiers passing could rouse him’.

losses suffered at Quatre Bras need to be reflected in unit strengths at Waterloo. There really are some excellent accounts of regimental actions for all the battles covered in these articles and it is possible to identify those units that fought exceptionally and those that did not. This can be taken into account when grading the troops for the battles - the grading may even vary between engagements.

Mont St. Jean

To Brussels

THE FRENCH INVASION 15 JUNE 1815

WELLINGTON

Nivelles Quatre Bras

BLUCHER

Frasnes

THE CAMPAIGN OPENS THE FRICTION OF WAR

Sombreffe Ligny

NEY

Early on 15 June 1815 the French Armee du Nord began advancing across the Belgian border covered by a strong cavalry screen. They quickly bumped into the vedettes of Ziethen’s Prussian I Corps and started rolling them back. A series of dogged rear guard actions were fought by the Prussians, but the weight of French numbers made their retreat inevitable. The Prussians, were not caught completely unawares with spies and deserters having warned Ziethen of the attack. Not only did Ziethen fight a commendable retreat back to the main Prussian forces during the day, but he also acted promptly to warn Blucher and Wellington of the invasion. Once alerted, Blucher’s staff immediately acted to start concentrating the three remaining corps of the Prussian Army so as to be in a position to give battle the next day on their chosen ground.

SEIZING THE STRATEGIC INITIATIVE -

Marchienue

N

O

LE

PO

A

N

Fleurus

U

O

R

G Carleroi

Y

H

C

River

re

Samb

Chatelet

Frontier

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As for Wellington, a failure of his communications system resulted in Ziethen’s warning only reaching him in the evening. Despite rumours of the French invasion reaching Wellington, a break-down of his previously very good intelligence system and continued concerns in relation to his vulnerable right flank and line of communications to the coast made him cautious. Initially the dispersed formations of Wellington’s army were only required to concentrate and were not focused on the vulnerable junction with their Prussian allies. As a result it would not be until late on the 16 June that a significant concentration of Wellington’s army would be achieved. By this time two major battles had been fought and a defeated Prussian army was in retreat. If Napoleon believed that he had gained a strategic advantage over his opponents at the end of the first day of the campaign this had not been achieved without disappointments and frustration. Inevitably congestion resulted from the convergence of the French Corps as they breached the border with Belgium in the face of dogged Prussian resistance. Matters were made worse by one corps not getting its marching orders on time. In addition, the defection of General Beaumont, with the details of Napoleon’s plans and the French order of battle, added to delays and the soldiers’ distrust of their officers.

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So the first day ended. Napoleon had achieved his first strategic aim - placing his army in a position to deal with his enemies in detail. The Prussian concentration was well advanced and they would be in a position to fight with three of their corps on the 16th. However, the crucial point of junction between the Allied armies was virtually unguarded and beyond it Wellington’s army was spread over a wide area endeavouring to concentrate at night. Around Ligny the stage was set for a classic Napoleonic pounding match and test of strength between the French and Prussian armies. To the west at the crucial crossroads at Quatre Bras Wellington’s forces would be engaged in a desperate scramble to stop the French advance. THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS - 16 JUNE 1815 The French advance was composed of two wings, the right being commanded by Napoleon and the left by Ney. It was Ney, leading Reille and D’Erlon’s Corps, with support from the reserve cavalry and the light cavalry of the Guard who marched on Quatre Bras. Ney only took up his command on 15 June and had only one staff officer to support him. His late arrival meant that he did not have an opportunity to plan the advance with his corps commanders. Nevertheless, the only resistance offered to Ney’s command came from a small

contingent of Nassauer troops and some Prussian cavalry cut off from their own army. Although his wing was strung out in long columns by the end of the first day the advanced units were only a mile or so south of Quatre Bras. The vital junction of communication between Wellington and Blucher’s armies was weakly guarded and the road to Brussels was open. It was not until 11am on 16 June that Ney’s orders from Napoleon arrived. He was to take the crossroads and push his forces beyond, opening the way for Napoleon’s triumphal march to Brussels that night! The orders were simple in principle, but were appallingly communicated. Ney gained the impression that he would lead the main French effort on the 16th and that the Emperor would join him with the reserve. As the day unfolded this would have profound implications on the course of the battle and campaign. Neither Napoleon nor Ney expected any serious opposition on the road to Brussels. Reille’s Corps, leading the French advance, had still to close up and orders had to be issued for the attack. It was 2pm before the assault began, by which time the Dutch-Belgian Chief of Staff, de Constant Rebeque, on his own initiative had placed a Dutch-Belgian and a Nassau brigade at the junction and other Allied reinforcements were slowly making their way there.

A horseshoe of gently rising ground frames the north, west and south of the battlefield with a stream running east through its centre. Before exiting the battlefield the stream runs through a small lake. To the west was the extensive Boussu Wood. Fields with tall-standing rye covered much of the area. A number of walled farms were located across the battlefield, including at the Quatre Bras junction itself. All of these features played a significant part in the battle. The nature of the ground and the vegetation made reconnaissance difficult and gave rise to a concern on the part of some French generals that Wellington planned to fight one of his ‘Spanish Battles’ with the British troops hidden out of sight until the point of contact. This led to a degree of caution in the French advance. The walled farms also became strongholds which the French only took with difficulty. The initial French advance met with slow but steady progress. Most of the Allied troops, even the Dutch militia, fought stubbornly. There were exceptions to this, however, with Dutch-Belgian hussars refusing to charge. At the point when French numbers looked like they would overwhelm the Allies, reinforcements arrived and the situation was stabilised. This set the pattern for the day until eventually Wellington felt confident enough in his strength to go over to a limited offensive. However, by this time night was drawing in and the battle petered out. The slow but constant arrival of Allied reinforcements must be factored into the game. During the battle, Ney constantly exposed himself to danger by personally leading attacks. During this time he could not have been ‘in command’ of

French forces. Ironically, on a number of occasions, when Ney emerged from the heat of the battle he made command decisions, perhaps influenced by his frustration and tiredness, that had disastrous consequences for the French. Perhaps his most famous decision was the recall of D’Erlon’s Corps at the very point when its intervention may well have turned the Prussian defeat at Ligny from a retreat into a total rout and would have ended any hope of later co-operation with Wellington at Waterloo. But then he believed that he was fighting the decisive battle that day. A second decision that served only to weaken French strength was his command to General Kellerman to charge the unbroken Allied infantry towards the end of the day. Not only were Kellemann’s cavalry beaten, but they panicked and routed back through the French Army causing chaos along many miles of the line of communications. The Ney ‘command’ factor and the propensity of French veterans to panic need a place in the recreation of the battle. On the Allied side, command at the start of the day initially fell on the shoulders of the Prince of Orange while Wellington was away meeting Blucher on the Ligny field. A brave man, but one without personal experience of significant command, during the campaign he personally led a number of charges, but also ordered units into action in circumstances that led to their destruction. On his return Wellington played an excellent game steadying his men and ensuring the vulnerable parts of his line were shored up with the newly arriving reinforcements. The relative abilities of both these personalities need to be reflected in the game.

OF GODS AND MEN… AND GAMING MECHANISMS A wargames table provides a perfect view of a battlefield, but what could the actual French Generals see? Having surveyed the field, the French Generals were uncertain of Wellington’s deployments and suspected a trap. To recreate this dilemma we adopted two simple systems. Firstly, units in the woods and farms were hidden, whilst only small units (some of them dummies) were deployed in the corn fields. Secondly, the French players had to write their orders based on what they could see of the battlefield relayed to a computer screen over Skype - a suitably blurry picture. A mobile phone was placed at figure height and the picture relayed from it to the French. We also allowed the Allied players to place artificial smoke to replicate camp fires across the field to further challenge the French Command. I have been to the battlefield, but found it really useful to visit it again using Google Earth and Street View to refresh my memory of the terrain - especially the contours. The terrain impacted on movement, order and combat. Much fighting took place in Bossu Wood and units there were disordered and slowed down by the vegetation. The stream also impacted on movement and caused units to re-dress their ranks after crossing it. The walled farms all gave bonuses to the defence. All of the key commanders had factors that reflected their historic abilities to send and implement orders. In addition leaders had different capabilities to lead men in combat or rally them.

Right: The author uses modern tech to show the French commanders’ their view of the battlefield.

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To reflect erratic arrival of reinforcements, the risk of a French ‘panic’ and some of the characters’ personal attributes, playing cards were drawn each turn with a result corresponding to each card. I have a pack of Napoleonic playing cards with contemporary pictures on them that were ideal for the game. A set of house rules called Vive l’Empereur are being used to play the games. They have been designed to deliver a big game in a day. The focus of the rules is on command and control at brigade level and above. Commanders do not have to worry about battalion level tactical formations, leaving that to their colonels to decide. Instead their attention needs to be on grand tactics and the ‘pulse of the battle’.

s g n i f e i r B

Left: The French commanders view of the tabletop via Skype. Below left: playing cards were used for random actions. Below right: a (very useful) Google earth view of the landscape.

s d hard and ha es’ has worke der of m or ey H an er le togeth n wants bb eo co ol to ap N ed r. ag ar man terrain ound ars so fa sketch of the Prussian huss w morning a ro d or an m le to tt by ba els for you. to be in Bruss l happen’ – you are at Quatre Bras il w s e ng ht hi ig ‘t n m whe things ce again prov rstand what ur time to on t ror! yo pe no is r m ie E ow e ld N th so a loss to unde you are a loyalty to d en an th y ut er B l av il … your br happen ht march w d Glory! The over-nig ders to Brussels an or n r O ou a politician. Y . ne ng: it can be do gton’s briefi uatre be hard but, IES: Wellin s-roads at Q L os L cr A e th e ue iz g n s t aven are to se Ney’s briefi - Quatre Bra t an importan lish FRENCH: 16 June 1815 which will cu ng s E am ra e 11 B th es n sn ee ra F ve ation betw June 1815 you would ha of communic d provide a screen for 11.30am 16 position that appears a e ft ot le er an e N th th ns en ia of th and Pruss ain line of t on. But command m gh in s fi hi en valry to ts be r en vo h fo ve os pi ch he Nord You ha of Frenc ca the Napoleon as the west for nch Armee du a thin screen re to e ly F m st up e on so ea th ke be d e ta of th ha to g to win rived only you advance from hours! You ar t of you – if r on s. fo fr el pt in ss ce ru B ex less than 24 d march on st them! d in a cart an Reille cavalry to te your comman mes you have no staff! the Corps of ve ha mours u yo ey H e the first ru an’s For the task your trusted l as Kellerm ar! 24 hours sinc el w d you, is w e he It ag as ac w re on to rl t on and d’E d the ligh nch invasi What a way an re F ve a edible er t es ou r… R by ab ro ry pported cr n’s e Empe Heavy Caval but Napoleo e were not su word from th es rd st th ly t ua la us G bu at io e ut th ev B not cavalry of from your pr that you are oult is not information stem. Why ns are clear despatch - S ly io te ct dy ns ia ru or ia ed st w ss m in ru telligence sy ry P Im in . ve e le rs th A ur ab pe at cc th oo tr u pe rd im ua word from yo forms yo om to use the G e divisions fr ld have Berthier. It in early u not received re ou e th yo w th u l ve ve ti yo ha ha un – u t ting ailable yo ntry and t up e? It wasn’ av fa pu nc In ra ve h F are still retrea 9t ha in y & ld ll ts agen u fina ps (5th Blucher wou your force erday that yo ld Reille’s Cor thought old ening of yest ith the rest of dition, it wou French ev w ad e ) th In ry t. al of n av gh in fi C 2nd nfirmatio r of miles es are co more of a be rc ed m fo in s nu ta n’ a e east and ob to th er elling russians to u should P strung out ov yo e th id sa appear that W d you face only light on t e ha advanc certain that it arch. T d an column of m ur initial the u could not be yo by yo still disperse ch ed en upon un th rm la nfi en to ev on y you called this is co be in a positi and have all feint. Initiall opposition – a Nassau a ur r t et ho ei no m e th as ly on t w om on have trate fr attack in abou entrated by 3pm. fact that you d a few rces to concen It was late in the an fo ur en nc re yo sc co h es mis your forc ntonments. infantry skir dispersed ca

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QUATRE BRAS - THE WARGAME gemioncourt stream

pireaumont

m dut ai n ch de -be fe lg nc ia e n li ne

dutchbelgian vedettes

french deployment

gemioncourt

quatre bras

grand peirre pont

bossu Wood

Above: The table at the start of the game, showing the French deployment.

ed sufficient n you receiv evening whe ssians about ru from the P ’s ce en ig ll te in of Bonaparte and direction to on si ci the strength de you took the advance, that re at Quatre your forces he e at tr en nc co face only ing that you Bras. Assum be possible en it should light forces th sufficient strength to e in l to concentrat d – but it wil Blucher ’s ai d ur yo en at be march to ol Blucher is if d an t e… take tim strung ou dangerously army could be and exposed. ided a good erset has prov om S oy zr it F at will be the troops th ncentrating indication of today, but co u yo to e bl availa business. l be no easy il w y m ar e th ested that a ing has sugg fl üf M al er Gen co-ordinate ith Blucher to conference w of benefit and you are be action would now set out e. You must re ag to ed in incl ting. Before fe for the mee to ensure for Sombref you will need , er ev w ho leaving, who will be (of Orange), e nc rs. ri P e th that opriate orde and, has appr m rs) m de co or in ur ft le ntrary to yo co ut (b ly of te Fortuna ed a couple s concentrat be the Prince ha . These will ds e crossroa th rces at fo es ur ad ig yo br for en and anchor have to deal a useful scre l il w entrate. You at a as they conc your orders to ce en di be so ite di e qu th ly h al it w is re riate time - it ! ls more approp ra - foreign gene unacceptable

HOW EVENTS UNFOLDED… 12 noon 16 June 1815 - 2 kilometres south of Quatre Bras Marshall Ney and General Reille (Geoff) carry out a reconnaissance of the enemy position. The reconnaissance is cut short when the Polish émigré, Colonel Skypinski, who is accompanying them, is fired on by a Nassau picket and mortally wounded. For this read “ the internet dropped out”! However, Ney has seen enough and is convinced that nothing more than a screen of infantry stands in front of his advance. He gives orders to Reille to form up his troops and advance with all speed on the cross-roads of Quatre Bras. Reille is to keep his divisions concentrated and avoid being drawn into any costly engagements for the farmhouses scattered across the area. Reille for his part is more wary. A veteran of Spain and fearing a British trap, he favours a broader attack so as to secure the flanks of the advance. In an outburst of Gascon temper, Ney tells him in no uncertain terms to get his troops moving. Reille takes this as assent for his proposal… Reille’s plan of advance will place all three of his divisions in line abreast and will deliver a broad sweep of the ground leading to Quatre Bras and the Nivelle - Namur highway. 2pm 16 June 1815 - Quatre Bras crossroads The Prince of Orange (John DZ) cuts a dashing figure in his hussar uniform, surrounded by his elegant staff. His outward calm belies the butterflies in his stomach as he prepares to lead his troops in his first major battlefield command. General Perponcher’s Division of two brigades is spread across two kilometres of front from Grand Pierre Pont, through Gemioncourt and on to Pireaumont. The two latter places are garrisoned and troops are also stationed on the south-eastern edge of Bossu Wood and behind Gemincourt stream. A skirmish screen has been thrown forward and lots of camp fires lit to give the impression of strength - but will the ruse work? Orange turns to his Chief of Staff, General Constant Rebeque, points at the massed French formations approaching across the valley and comments, ‘Well, our boys will

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Above: The French column’s surge forward.

soon see those chaps off, eh, Rebeque. All over before the Duke returns, eh.’ However, the thought crosses his mind that there does seem to be rather a lot of them. The first card is drawn from the Napoleonic playing pack - it is a spade the dust cloud from Jerome’s marching columns can be seen approaching from the south. Many of the French formations are advancing at the double - no attempt is made to use artillery to soften up the Dutch-Belgian defenders. 2.15pm Bossu Wood/Gemioncourt General Bachelu’s 1st Brigade is doubling up the road to Quatre Bras when it comes under flanking fire from Dutch Militia hidden in Bossu Wood. Surprised, the Brigade turns to face the militia and a fire-fight ensues with neither side gaining the advantage. Across the road at Gemincourt, the initial assault by the 2nd Brigade is held by Belgian line infantry and Dutch chasseurs. The Dutch-Belgian troops have shown their mettle. Gemioncourt Stream General Pire’s light cavalry division and General Foy’s infantry are sweeping forward, but the latter’s troops have entered the area of the rye fields and the crops are taller than a man so visibility is very poor. Enemy skirmishers have been seen retreating into the fields. A second spade is drawn from the pack Jerome’s leading brigade arrives on the field.

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At the crossroads Orange is satisfied with the outcome of the initial engagements but is heard to mutter to an aide, ‘Any news of reinforcements?’ 2.30pm Bossu Wood/Gemioncourt French numbers finally tell against the brave Dutch-Belgian troops. In Bossu Wood the militia are thrown back and simultaneously Gemincourt falls to the French - no formed bodies of troops stand between the French and Quatre Bras. Gemioncourt Stream The Nassuers of General Saxe-Weimar’s Brigade are having more success. Emerging from the rye fields the French columns are surprised to find the stream and the opposite bank lined with the seasoned troops of the Nassau Brigade. Foy’s Division is stopped dead in its tracks. Meanwhile Pire’s cavalry, although suffering casualties from the DutchBelgian artillery, is positioning itself to attack the cross-roads. The first crisis of the battle has been reached. A heart is drawn from the pack - General Merlen’s brigade of Dutch-Belgian Cavalry appears from the direction of Nivelle. Orange is heard to exclaim, ‘I need more than donkey wallopers!’ 2.45pm Bossu Wood/Gemioncourt The victorious French must spend time reforming before they can resume their advance. Jerome’s newly arrived leading formation is taking forever to shake itself out into battle formation. Ney is fuming!

Gemioncourt Stream The two light cavalry brigades of Pire’s command charge isolated Dutch-Belgian batteries. One is overrun, but the brave horse artillery gunners of van Bijleveld’s battery stop the lancers of Wathiez’ Brigade dead in their tracks and cause them to retreat. The Nassauers continue

Above: Dutch Militia take the French columns in the flank.

their tenacious defence of the stream line. A heart is drawn from the pack - General Picton (Andrew) arrives, leading Kempt’s Brigade - just in time! 3pm Quatre Bras/Gemioncourt The French infantry finally begin a cautious advance towards the cross-roads, supported on their right by Hubbert’s

light cavalry brigade. Simultaneously, Picton is rushing his British troops forward to the cross-roads. Gemioncourt Stream Foy hurls three regiments of infantry at the brave Nassauers who finally give way. Except for the Nassau garrison of Pireaumont, which the French have by-

passed, the whole Dutch-Belgian line has been broken and swept back. One British infantry brigade and one Dutch-Belgian light cavalry brigade are the sum total of troops available to hold the cross-roads. A heart is drawn from the pack Pack’s British Brigade arrives… but is it enough?

The brave Nasseurs check the French advance.

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Above: Kempt mortally wounded is carried from the field.

3.15pm Quatre Bras With French cavalry just a few hundred metres from the crossroads, the Prince of Orange personally leads his DutchBelgian cavalry in a charge against them. The outcome is indecisive, but it buys a few more precious minutes for Picton’s brigades to deploy. The French infantry are moments away from seizing the cross-roads. Gemincourt Stream The Nassuers are now streaming back and French infantry columns are approaching the Nivelle Namur highway. The second crisis of the battle has been reached. A heart is drawn and Best’s Hanovarian Brigade of 6th Division arrives. 3.30pm Quatre Bras Wellington returns from his meeting with Blucher. Sensing the crisis he personally takes charge of Pack’s Brigade and leads them forward. On the other side of Quatre Bras, Kempt’s Brigade braces itself for the French onslaught. French columns are converging on the crossroads from both the south and east. A heart is drawn and the Duke of Brunswick arrives with his light cavalry brigade 3.45pm - 4.30pm Quatre Bras Attack after attack is launched by the French on Quatre-Bras and a long sanguinary struggle ensues. Although

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the French attacks are held, the British casualties steadily mount. The Ney chance card is drawn! Ney loses patience with the slow progress of the advance and charges to the front to lead the assault. During a charge by Hubert’s light cavalry, Kempt is caught moving between the squares of his brigade and mortally wounded. Both Wellington and Picton personally take command of the hardpressed British brigades which are fast wilting under the tenacious French assaults. Two spades have been drawn and Kellerman’s entire heavy cavalry corps arrives and begins advancing on the cross-roads. Emerging from the struggle, Ney is convinced that victory is within his grasp - but he needs more men. Ney throws a 1 - sufficient to despatch a messenger recalling d’Erlon. A spent musket ball strikes Wellington’s cheek. Bleeding profusely he is led away from Pack’s wilting Brigade. The third crisis of the battle has been reached. 4.45pm - Quatre Bras Personally led by Ney the French heavy cavalry of l’Heritier’s Division pound across the fields towards Pack’s weakened Brigade. This is the final straw for the brave Highlanders and their English comrades and they are forced to retire. However, to Pack’s right the Prince of Orange and Duke of Brunswick launch their light cavalry against the

now exhausted French infantry and begin to roll up Foy’s tired and scattered regiments. A heart is drawn and the Brunswick light infantry brigade marches onto the field just in time! 5pm - 5.30pm Quatre Bras French cavalry and infantry draw together for their final assault on Quatre Bras. Pack’s Brigade is retiring and Kempt’s is a shadow of its former self. Wellington, dazed from his wound, nevertheless insists on going back into the field. The French heavy cavalry storm into Pack’s retiring Brigade and overthrow it, capturing the regimental colour of the 92nd Foot in the combat. Exalted by their success and with Ney at their head they then bear down on the young soldiers of the Brunswick Light Brigade. But Wellington is there to steady them! The French cavalry are stopped in their tracks by a volley from the young conscripts! A heart is drawn and Halkett’s British Brigade is seen approaching the crossroads. Ney senses that the high water-mark of the French advance has been reached! Three divisions of Reille’s Corps are either retreating or wasted and he can see Wellington’s forces growing steadily stronger. With what is left of Jerome’s Division and the heavy cavalry he will need to go over to the defensive – until d’Erlon’s Corps arrives…. Wellington has held the cross-roads but has not been able to support the

Crisis at the Crossroads - Kempt’s Brigade wilts - Ney senses victory!

Prussians…. A Dutch-Belgian division has been badly knocked about and two British brigades have held the line long enough for reinforcements to arrive, but they too have suffered severe casualties. With more reinforcements arriving a short advance should be possible, but he will have to wait until the 17th to launch a proper offensive. In the meantime how has old Blucher fared at Ligny? GAMING MECHANISMS Below is a summary of mechanisms used to introduce the friction of war and chance into the game:

• Google Earth was used to review geographic features and line of sight on the battlefield.

• A reinforcement schedule was given to Wellington that bore little relation to reality.

• SKYPE was used to bring French players down to earth when preparing their plans. This was combined with the deployment of dummy units and smoke by the Allies. In addition, Gemioncourt Stream was only placed on the table when the French ‘bumped’ into it.

• A deck of cards was used to determine when reinforcements would arrive and included wild cards that would prompt Ney and the Prince of Orange into acting in line with their historic namesakes or cause a French panic.

• Orders of Battle included more troops than actually fought on the day, combined with a chance that they might arrive.

• Dice throws determined the quality of Dutch-Belgian units at the point that they entered into combat. In addition, dice were used to determine whether retiring French troops would panic. The next article will focus on a re-fight of the Battle of Ligny.

The Prince of Orange and the Duke of Brunswick. Regroups after dispersing Foy’s infantry

Below: The end of play. Reille’s infantry stalled before the cossroads

Kellerman’s Cavalry. Regroups after their rebuff by the Brunswickers Kempt’s brigade regroups after its defence of the crossroads

Alten arrives

Brunswick contingent advance

Best’s Hanovarians close the gap in the line

Remnants of Bjlandt’s brigade regroup

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