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However, there is one important difference between automobiles and humans. In the first case, a quick visual inspection suffices to confirm the duality of the driving systems. With humans, in contrast, their operation must be inferred from manifestations of thinking, feeling, and acting. Thus, models of duality in psychology do not hinge on the identification of distinct anatomical structures, although such structures have been suggested (Bechara, 2005). Instead, they are conceptual models that afford a better and deeper understanding of psychological phenomena. Of course, not all attempts at explaining human thinking, feeling, and behavior include notions of duality. In general, at least three types of psychological theories exist. The first type tries to identify the external and internal cues as causal determinants. For example, the doctrine of behaviorism suggests that behavior can be best explained by identifying the links between stimulus and response (e.g., Skinner, 1938). In a somewhat similar vein, the theories on judgment and decision making often focus on identifying the cues that drive people’s decisions and the resulting deviance from normative prescriptions (Connolly, Arkes, & Hammond, 2000). The second type of theorizing focuses on the psychological processes that mediate between the external events and the phenomena in question. Most prominently, the paradigm of information processing (Lachmann, Lachmann, & Butterfield, 1979; Neisser, 1967) has exerted an enormous influence on various domains
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One of the recent breakthroughs in the engineering of automobiles has been the hybrid vehicle, also called the dual-mode vehicle (e.g., Hantuala, 2010). Engineers have supplied automobiles with two drives that differ fundamentally in their operating principles. Specifically, hybrid vehicles have a conventional internal combustion engine that affords uninterrupted, high-speed long-distance driving. At the same time, they have an electric engine for lowspeed, short-distance driving in the cities. This division of labor improves the consumption of resources without compromising the most important amenities of automobile transportation. Although these vehicles do not differ from conventional cars in their basic driving function, taking their duality into account is crucial to understanding their operation. The theories and models presented in this chapter adopt a similar stance in arguing that the psychological functioning of humans shares some characteristics with that of hybrid vehicles. Specifically, it serves conflicting, sometimes incompatible goals with a limited supply of resources. As a consequence, these theories suggest different mental processes or systems with diverging operating principles that are active under different conditions. Like the dual-mode vehicles, the two processes or systems may operate in parallel and jointly contribute to the outcome or function in a serial fashion such that only one system is active at a time.
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We thank Anand Krishna for his editorial suggestions. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14341-028 APA Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology: Vol. 1. Attitudes and Social Cognition, M. Mikulincer and P. R. Shaver (Editors-in-Chief) Copyright © 2015 by the American Psychological Association. All rights reserved.
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in which Plato vividly depicts the soul as divided into two horses and a charioteer. One horse was depicted as white, upright, cleanly made, and being guided by word and admonition only. The other horse was described as dark,1 crooked, shag eared, and deaf, hardly yielding to whip and spur. However, even if the white horse operates in a temperate, reliable, and predictable fashion, there exist occasions when the dark horse must take the upper hand to reach the goal. Plato identified love as such a situation, when the obedient white horse may be restrained by shame, whereas the dark horse may give “all manner of trouble to his companion and the charioteer, whom he forces to approach the beloved” (Dickinson, 1915, p. 147). Plato’s account implies that the soul (symbolized as the chariot) can be moved forward by following two sets of operating principles that are either rule based and calm or emotional and impulsive. Although the two horses that incorporate these principles may pull the chariot in different directions, he leaves no doubt that even the “bad” dark horse is necessary to accomplish certain basic human functions, such as love. In a more systematic treatment of the dual determination of human action, Aristotle used the term akrasia to describe behaviors that are not controlled by willful decision but by passion (Davidson, 1980). In his more detailed analysis, akrasia may be caused either by a weakness of executing the behavioral consequences of reasoning and thereby yielding to the influences of passion or by acting impetuously without ever considering the consequences. In the first case, people may experience a conflict between rational evaluation and their own behavior; in the second case, no such conflict is assumed to arise during the execution of the behavior. Subsequently, however, the person may experience guilt or regret. Aristotle’s version of akrasia subtly deviates from Socrates’s account, which blames judgmental distortion for weakness of will. This view does not imply a conflict that is experienced as a discrepancy of two forces, such as reason and emotion.
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of psychology. Specifically, the idea that investigating psychological processes such as the encoding and retrieval of information as well as the mechanisms of drawing inferences may contribute to a better understanding has greatly stimulated research in many areas of psychology. As a consequence, many psychological theories have focused on the operation of these internal processes and their structural underpinnings, such as memory (e.g., Anderson & Bower, 1973), and shared the tacit assumption that, in principle, all psychology can be reduced to the basic dynamics of information processing. This chapter deals with a third class of psychological theories, which can be seen as a special case of information-processing theories. Specifically, we examine theories claiming that different psychological processes may operate under different conditions. Under the name of dual-process theories (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999), such models have been invoked to account for a broad range of judgments and behaviors. Although these models differ on various dimensions, they share the tenet that to understand the way humans think, feel, and behave, one must take more than one psychological process into account. As a consequence, one and the same judgment or behavior may be generated by different psychological mechanisms. However, they may also cause conflicts between incompatible judgments and behaviors.
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This state of affairs has long been noted by philosophers, poets, and founders of religions. Well known is a quote from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, who went so far as to have his protagonist Faust (Williams, 1987) lament about two souls that resided within his breast and instigated conflicting behavioral tendencies. Accounts of this conflict, however, go far back in time and can be traced to the Greek philosophers. One of the earliest examples comes from ancient Greek philosophy. It is an allegory named “Phaedrus”
It is both ironic and saddening to note that a dark shade of the skin has been linked to degrading psychological stereotypes across centuries (see Dixon & Maddox, 2005).
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be recognized in psychological attempts at integrating the dual nature of the mind.
Precursors in Psychology
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Duality models in modern psychology have conceptual precursors whose validity, however, has not been systematically tested. Within the domain of social psychology, Gustave Le Bon’s (1895) book on crowd psychology attempted to explain the dynamics of groups and masses by invoking a mind that is governed by different principles under the appropriate conditions. That is, individuals who have been “transformed into a crowd” possess “a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation” (p. 29). Specifically, their conscious intellectual abilities are weakened and emotional impulses, a reduced sense of responsibility, and a susceptibility to contagion and suggestion gain the upper hand, similar to the state of being hypnotized. Although Le Bon did not equally elaborate on the noncollective mind, it follows by implication that people’s actions are normally determined by conscious and rational deliberation and the evaluation of the anticipated consequences. Thus, the social context activates a preexisting mental system that determines behavior according to principles that fundamentally differ from those that belong to the mental system that is active in nonsocial situations. Such a conflict, however, is also characteristic of Freud’s psychodynamic theory (e.g., Freud, 1933/1949) that describes human behavior as being controlled by a “psychic apparatus.” It consists of three operating principles: a superego that is composed of a person’s norms and values, an id that is controlled by fundamental drives, and an ego that is supposed to integrate and frequently reconcile the forces from the id and the superego. Therefore, Freudian theory focuses on the interaction of three different mental faculties. In addition, Freud has emphasized the importance of unconscious influences on behavior. However, his evidence was mainly anecdotal or relied on clinical case studies. Thus, it is difficult to establish the validity of the postulated dynamics.
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Although for Aristotle, the nonrational influences on behavior were a disposition and predetermined, Christianity focuses on the existential fate that causes all humans to deviate from what they have recognized to be good. Specifically, human behavior is seen to be either virtuous or sinful, depending on whether actors yield (or do not yield) to temptations. However, through inherited sinfulness (original sin), all humans are prone to fall prey to tempting influences that prevent them from acting virtuously (Babcock, 1988). This dichotomy and the resulting conflict run in parallel with the distinction of mind and body, such that the spirit, like Plato’s white horse, leads humans on the path of virtue, whereas the body, like the dark horse, tempts them into sinning (“The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak”; Matthew 26:41). Because the benefits of leading a virtuous life are considered as being tremendous, the various Christian churches offer their faithful various recommendations about how to resist temptations (e.g., heightened introspective awareness, asceticism, praying). Perhaps more important, it helps sinners to return to the path of virtue if they make use of specific clerical institutions (e.g., confession and communion). Thus far, the described operating principles that served as criteria to differentiate between two psychological processes have been those of reason versus passion, thought versus emotion. Whether in conflict or not, the behavioral consequences have been assumed to differ depending on which principle has the upper hand. A second dividing line is that between “higher” and “lower” mental processes. Without necessarily focusing on behavior, inferential reasoning is seen to cause different mental results than pure associative mechanisms. Another duality has been discussed by more recent philosophers (e.g., Schopenhauer, 1819/1969). It refers to the possible coexistence of unconscious and conscious psychological phenomena, which may not be revealed by mere self-reports. Such unconscious mental operations are not confined to motivational states but are assumed to also apply to inferential thinking (see Helmholtz, 1867). Although these analyses have not resulted in comprehensive theories of cognition, their elements can
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A SYSTEMATIC OF DUALITY MODELS
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There are multiple ways to systemize the variety of duality models. For example, previous reviews have organized models according to their generality (Gawronski & Creighton, 2013), the nature of the duality on which the model is based (Evans, 2008), or how the dual processes are theorized to interact (Gilbert, 1999; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). For this chapter, we use a two-feature schema to order existing models, with two of the three features being binary (see Figure 28.1). The first binary feature is the type of representation that feeds into or results from psychological processes. On one hand, processes may be based on or generate subjective experiences in various forms (e.g., Strack, 1992; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Such experiences may include perceptions, affective feelings (moods, emotions), or nonaffective feelings such as bodily experiences (e.g., hunger). On the other hand, processes may be based on or generate cold representations such as semantic, episodic, or procedural representations. The second binary feature is the type of information processing that is applied to or generates feelings or knowledge. On one hand, information
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In modern social psychology, duality models of various levels of abstraction have started to become more and more frequent and popular since the 1980s. As argued by Payne and Gawronski (2010), two types of duality from cognitive psychology have had a particularly strong impact on theory formation in social-cognitive research: that between automatic versus controlled processes (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) and that between implicit versus explicit memory (Schacter, 1987). Whereas the automatic– controlled dichotomy highlights differences in ease, intentionality, and controllability of processes, the implicit–explicit distinction highlights the fact that some psychological processes operate outside of people’s awareness. As we show later, both aspects are part of many current duality models. A third important input to many duality models of today is the fundamental distinction among short-term memory, central executive, and long-term memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Broadbent, 1958). Basic concepts derived from these early theories reoccur in the form of (a) the notion that one system has the power to control and coordinate the other and (b) the distinction between activation of knowledge structures in long-term memory versus the further processing of activated information by other mental systems. By now, quite a large number of different duality theories exist that are often treated as though they were alike in their basic assumptions. And although the latter assumption is true for some features, existing models differ substantially in many regards (for general discussions, see Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Evans, 2008; Gawronski & Creighton, 2013; Kruglanski & Orehek, 2007; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). As a consequence, an overly inclusive treatment of duality models is problematic and may contribute to theoretical and empirical confusion. At the same time, ignoring similarities between models would hinder abstraction and prevent parsimony. Therefore, it is necessary to find ways to group existing models according to their similarities and differences in basic features. As a starting point, it is useful to take a look at the condition of their operation and to examine the results. Just as the two engines in a dual-mode
v ehicle operate best under specific circumstances, the same is true for the psychological processes. In the psychological domain, there exists broad agreement that processes may differ in the cognitive effort or capacity they require. Thus, any reduction in these parameters will impede the process that requires more of it. Such suboptimal conditions may be caused by external determinants, such as the complexity of the task or distracting circumstances, or by internal conditions, such as lack of expertise or low motivation. All models of duality predict that under these circumstances, one type of processing will be favored over the other, which will result in a greater ease of processing that may manifest itself in higher speed, independence from intentions, or added residual attention to engage in a secondary activity. At the same time, this facilitation has its price because it may result in reduced accuracy or temporal stability. Although all models agree on the antecedents and consequences, they differ in their psychological architecture.
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describes the phenomenon that a comparative judgment typically leads a subsequent absolute judgment to be assimilated toward the standard of the comparison. In an attempt to identify the underlying mechanisms, Mussweiler and Strack (1999a) observed that the comparative judgment alters the accessibility of relevant information such that the absolute judgment is more likely to be based on information that is consistent with the previous standard of comparison, thus showing that the information that is retrieved for a syllogistic or rule-based operation, such as generating a comparative judgment, may alter the determinants of associative processing. Given the structure of the associative store, activation may spread along semantic and episodic links and may also affect related concepts. Subjective experiences may also be processed in an associative and propositional fashion. On the one hand, their hedonic quality and intensity may be directly linked to both nonexperiential contents and behaviors. For example, the fear that is triggered by seeing (or imagining) an object that resembles a spider may activate thoughts of threat and elicit a tendency to withdraw, even if the person knows that there is no real danger. Specific behavioral patterns are directly linked to specific emotions (Frijda, 1986), and unspecific tendencies of approach and avoidance were found to be connected with positive versus negative hedonic valence (Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993). Moreover, compatible affect may facilitate evaluative judgments (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). Alternatively, subjective experiences may enter into judgments in a propositional way. That is, feelings may be categorized and transformed into propositional knowledge and attributed to a specific elicitor (“I have a bad feeling about this chair”). Then they may provide a basis for inferences and behavioral decisions (“Because it does not provide a good feeling, I am not going to buy it”). As has been demonstrated, subjective experiences may operate like information and can be discounted if their origin is not representative for the judgment (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Just as propositional processes may alter the state of semantic associative representations, a wealth of evidence has suggested that such “top-down”
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processing may be associative; on the other hand, it may be rule based or propositional (Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The dual way of processing semantic information is consistent with basic findings in cognitive psychology. For instance, concepts may be retrieved from associative memory and “propositionalized” in the act of categorization. For this process, factors such as the frequency and recency of prior use determine the accessibility of the concepts (Higgins, 1996) and thereby the likelihood with which the same or a related concept is used. Once the representation is propositionalized by assigning a truth value to the relationship between an object and the category, syllogistic reasoning may be applied. For example, an ambiguous object may be more likely to be categorized as a chair if the concept chair has previously been activated. The categorization affords inferences about the object that do not depend on personal experiences. For example, it affords the conclusion that the object is stable enough to sit on. It is important to note that the influence of associative mechanisms on propositional processes (e.g., categorization) is matched by the reverse influence. That is, syllogistic reasoning may change the accessibility of information in the associative store. An example is the selective accessibility account (e.g., Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) of the so-called anchoring heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), which
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Figure 28.1. Features underlying common duality models in social psychology. Content/representation refers to the input or output of processes. The numbers refer to the quadrants of this schema.
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Efficiency refers to the degree to which a process draws on central resources and hence is more or less easily undermined in the presence of competing tasks. Controllability refers to the degree to which a process can be stopped or changed when a decision is made to stop or change it. Finally, awareness broadly refers to the degree to which a person can report that a process took place. As has been argued elsewhere (Moors & De Houwer, 2006b; Uleman, 1999), these facets represent continuous dimensions rather than binary dualities, and although they may correlate in many situations, in principle they are independent. For example, a process may be unintentional but aware (such as muscular reflex) or intentional and efficient (e.g., a highly practiced skill). Given its heterogeneous nature, automaticity cannot convincingly serve as a core feature to ground a duality. Still, automaticity features play a crucial role in most duality models such that differences in information processing are linked to differences in automaticity. Theories often assume correlations between these features, such as that associative processes are more automatic than rulebased processes (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) or contrast more or less efficient rule-based processes (S. Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Kahneman, 2003). We therefore review which automaticity features are addressed by different duality models and how these models associate these features with representations and processes. In the next section, we describe and discuss a selection of those duality models that, in our view, have exerted a particularly strong influence on the field of social psychology. At the same time, we focus on characteristics of process, representation, and automaticity to highlight the commonalities and differences between the models.
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influences also occur for automatic affective and motivational responses. For example, evidence has suggested that adopting goals may immediately change automatic evaluations of goal-relevant objects (e.g., Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Moors, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004) as well as motivational responses to such objects (e.g., Fishbach & Shah, 2006). Likewise, fast approach–avoidance responses were found not to occur as a function of the perceptual properties of situations but to at least partially depend on how the situation or the behavior is categorized (e.g., Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2013; Markman & Brendl, 2005; Seibt, Neumann, Nussinson, & Strack, 2008). On a related note, evidence for substantial interactions between need states and automatic affect is now growing, broadly suggesting that being deprived automatically renders objects that are capable of reducing the need state more positive (e.g., Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Höfling et al., 2009; Seibt, Häfner, & Deutsch, 2007). Although most dual-process models focus on the two types of processing that are always based on information and may also include subjective experiences, models differ in how successive versus simultaneous operations generate the output. Gilbert (1999) has identified four types of designs that he named selective, competitive, consolidative, and corrective. They differ in (a) whether the systems are activated jointly (in the competitive and the consolidative design) or separately (in the selective design) and (b) joint (in the consolidative design) or separate (in the selective and competitive design) control of the output. The hybrid corrective design allows for all combinations under different circumstances. In all cases, however, conditions exist under which one of the two systems plays a dominant role.
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Another aspect that plays a prominent role in almost every duality model is the automaticity of processes. Automaticity is a heterogeneous construct that has various facets (Moors & De Houwer, 2006a), among them intentionality, efficiency, controllability, and awareness (Bargh, 1994; Bargh, Schwader, Hailey, Dyer, & Boothby, 2012). Intentionality refers to the degree to which a process occurs as a function of the presence of an intention to instigate this process. 896
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Focus on Attitudes Elaboration likelihood model. The elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) “is a dual-route but multiprocess theory” (Petty, Wheeler, & Bizer, 1999, p. 157) that models attitude change as a function of input variables (e.g., message features such as length or argument quality,
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The ELM does, however, also cover affect in at least three roles (Petty, Gleicher, & Baker, 1991). Affect may serve as input to central elaboration, affect may serve as input to heuristic shortcuts, and affect may moderate the intensity of elaboration. Moreover, the ELM also contains processes that are considered independent of reasoning processes, such as mere exposure (Zajonc, 1980), or processes that are considered associative, such as evaluative conditioning (Staats & Staats, 1958), although there has been a recent debate on the validity of this assumption (De Houwer, 2009). Therefore, the ELM broadly covers Quadrants 1, 2, and 4 of the schema outline in Figure 28.1.
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Heuristic–systematic model. Just like the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), the heuristic–systematic model of persuasion (HSM; Chaiken, 1980) is focused on the processing of persuasive messages and concurrent attitude change. The central duality contrasts two modes of information processing. Heuristic processing draws on easy-to-process cues on the side of the message or the communicator and on associated heuristic rules of reasoning in memory. For example, a message may be communicated by an expert (heuristic cue), and the application of the rule that experts can be trusted will promote adopting the message’s position. Systematic processing, however, “entails a relatively analytic and comprehensive treatment of judgment-relevant information. Judgments formed on the basis of systematic processing are thus responsive to the actual content of this information” (S. Chen & Chaiken, 1999, p. 74). Typically, systematic processing will be focused on concrete arguments provided in a message. The model associates the two modes of information processing with different degrees of automaticity. Systematic processes are assumed to be largely nonautomatic with respect to all automaticity facets, whereas heuristic processes are assumed to be more efficient and partially less aware than systematic processing. Heuristic processing will therefore dominate if accuracy motives are low or the ability to process systematically is low. In addition to these basic assumptions, the HSM also specifies possible interactions of heuristic and systematic processes. In particular, the effects of
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communicator features such as attractiveness or expertise) and receiver features (e.g., processing capacity, mood). The ELM contains multiple processes that may occur in persuasion settings and that vary in their level of automaticity. The ELM further contains the notion of an elaboration likelihood continuum that is affected by motivational and capacity variables. The higher motivation and capacity are, the higher is the likelihood that high-effort processes will occur. The model mainly focuses on the efficiency aspect of automaticity in that the cognitive effort associated with processing attituderelevant information is a primary marker of the central versus peripheral route. Yet, intentionality, awareness, and controllability are relevant for some subprocesses that are part of the ELM, such as evaluative conditioning or bias correction. One central duality that is part of the ELM is the distinction between the use of heuristic shortcuts versus central elaboration. One way to respond to persuasive messages is by analyzing whether input variables allow inferences regarding the message’s position on the basis of their topic-specific relation to the position. For example, the message position “physical exercise is good” may be supported by the argument “physical exercise increases heart health” or by argument-independent variables such as the healthy look of the communicator (because communicator health may be recognized as living proof of his or her conclusion). Another way to respond to persuasive messages is by analyzing whether input variables allow inferences on the messages’ position because of their general, topic-independent relevance for the messages’ position. A number of general variables may serve as input to such heuristic shortcuts. For example, one may infer that the message “physical exercise is good” is true just because it is communicated by an expert, and experts can generally be trusted. Though both types of reasoning may qualify as rule based (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999), they differ in the generality or topic specificity and processing efficiency of the rules that are involved and may have varying outcomes with regard to the stability of attitude change (Petty & Wegener, 1999; Petty et al., 1999). We therefore locate the elaboration versus heuristic shortcut distinction within Quadrant 1 of our schema.
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in which attitudes may guide behavior is intimately tied to the assumption that the former process is less automatic than the latter. In particular, “the critical distinction between the spontaneous-process and deliberative-process models centers upon the extent to which the behavioral decision involves effortful reasoning as opposed to flowing spontaneously from individuals’ appraisals in the immediate situation” (Fazio & Towels-Schwen, 1999, pp. 99–100). The MODE model contains a similar distinction with respect to attitudes proper. On one hand, some attitudes are highly accessible in memory and can be activated automatically on the perception of the attitude object (Fazio et al., 1986). Attitudes are assumed to link objects and evaluations associatively in memory (Fazio, 2001; Fazio & Olson, 2003a), which may be more or less accessible. On the other hand, evaluations of objects or actions may follow from the less automatic, online integration of features of the attitude objects. The MODE model does not explicitly specify which aspects of automaticity (Moors & De Houwer, 2006a) discriminate between spontaneous and deliberate processes. A second core tenet of the MODE model is the assumption that two moderators determine whether spontaneous versus deliberate attitude-to-behavior processes will occur. On the basis of the notion that deliberate processes are less automatic than spontaneous processes, the motivation and the opportunity to deliberate are proposed as moderators that may operate in a broadly multiplicative fashion. With motivation and capacity to process present, further information processing regarding the attitude object may occur, including judgmental corrections based on social motives such as fairness. Without sufficient motivation and/or opportunity, spontaneous attitude-to-behavior processes will prevail. The MODE model relates to the distinction between associations and rule-based processing. Whereas attitudes are conceptualized as evaluative associations, deliberate processes are meant to represent a collection of more complex computations that may, among other things, assess the probability and value of action consequences. As such, deliberation rather resembles rule-based processes rather than simple associations. The processes described in the MODE model are largely of a cognitive nature;
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both processes may add up, heuristic cues may bias systematic processing, and, if the outcomes of heuristic and systematic processes are in opposition, the results of systematic processes will likely dominate responding. Moreover, a more recent version of the HSM (S. Chen & Chaiken, 1999) specifies three motives that may simultaneously determine effort, the selection of information, and the selection of heuristics. While processing persuasive messages, perceivers may be motivated by the goal of holding correct worldviews (accuracy motivation), by the goal of holding attitudes consistent with one’s personal material or immaterial interests (defense motivation), or by the goal of holding attitudes that conform to social expectations (impression motivation). These motives may operate in both isolation and concert. Subjective experiences, such as affect, familiarity, and ease of processing, may serve as cues to corresponding heuristic rules that capture the likely implication of the cues (S. Chen & Chaiken, 1999). The main processes of the HSM most appropriately fit Quadrants 1 and 2 of our schema. Heuristics are conceptualized as simple rules of thought that connect cue information with specific conclusions. Cues may be semantic in nature (Quadrant 1) or represent subjective experiences (Quadrant 2).
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Motivation and opportunity as determinants model. A focus of the motivation and opportunity as determinants (MODE) model (e.g., Fazio & Towels-Schwen, 1999) is to explain how attitudes influence judgments and ultimately behavior. A first core tenet is the assumption that attitudes may influence behavior in two ways. On one hand, attitudes may feed into outcome-based decision-making processes. Attitudes may, for example, define what would be desirable versus undesirable as an outcome of a behavior. On the other hand, attitudes may influence behavior by shaping how a situation and parts thereof are attended to, perceived, and construed (e.g., Deutsch & Fazio, 2008; Fazio & Dunton, 1997; Fazio, Ledbetter, & Towles-Schwen, 2000). Depending on what the situation means to a person (e.g., an attack vs. a mishap), different behaviors follow (e.g., aggression vs. helping behavior). The distinction between these two ways 898
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subjective feelings play a minor role. Therefore, the MODE model maps well onto Quadrants 1 and 3.
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Associative and propositional processes in evaluation model. An application of the reflective– impulsive model (see Reflective–Impulsive Model section) to the domain of attitudes is the associative and propositional processes in evaluation model (APE; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). Specifically, this model describes the relation of implicit and explicit evaluations as an interaction between propositional and associative processing and the concomitant representations. From this perspective, explicit evaluations are understood as evaluative judgments that are generated as a result of propositional reasoning and may serve as bases for subsequent inferences. That is, explicit attitudes can be understood as beliefs that have subjective truth values. Implicit attitudes, in contrast, are associative clusters without truth values that differ in the degree of their cognitive accessibility. Both explicit and implicit attitudes may have behavioral consequences. As evaluative decisions, they may be transformed into goals and into intentional behaviors. As associative concepts, they may be linked to habitual behaviors that reflect the attitude. For example, a greater physical distance may result from negative contents associated with members of a particular ethnic minority, although people may not be aware of their own discriminative behavior and may even report not holding corresponding evaluative beliefs. In addition, cognitive processes
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Dual attitudes model. The dual attitudes model (DAM; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) focuses on explaining the presence of more than one disposition to evaluate and to respond to attitude objects. The model particularly contrasts implicit and explicit attitudes. Implicit attitudes are characterized as attitudes of unknown origin (to the attitude holder), which can be activated automatically, preferably influence implicit responses, and change slowly. Explicit attitudes, however, change quickly and can override implicit attitudes when it comes to judgments and behavior, but this requires capacity and motivation. Why might dissociations between implicit and explicit attitudes occur? The DAM suggests four different mechanisms that might result in dual representations. First, attitudes might be anxiety provoking for the attitude holder and hence might be constantly inhibited and replaced by an alternative evaluation, the explicit attitude. Wilson et al. (2000) referred to this as repression, and it is assumed to result in unawareness of the implicit attitude with it still being present in memory. Second, the DAM suggests that evaluations might result from different independent mental systems, which therefore might dissociate. At the same time, the model makes few assumptions about what kind of systems these might be. Third, the DAM suggests that people who are aware of socially or ethically undesired implicit attitudes might knowingly replace them with a more legitimate explicit attitude. Finally, this process might become automatic when practiced frequently (Amodio, Kubota, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2006; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). Still, the undesired implicit attitude might remain in consciousness. The DAM makes little reference to the representations or processes that underlie the attitudes themselves. That is, it defines implicit attitudes as more stable and automatic than explicit ones, with a main reason for this being that the implicit attitude might be learned more intensely. This, however, does not suggest that one or the other type of attitude is based on associations versus rules or propositions. Both could, in theory, profit from practice and
o perate automatically. Moreover, the DAM does not associate implicit or explicit attitudes with affective versus cognitive processes. Instead, both types of attitudes are conceptualized as potentially relying on either affective or cognitive representations or both (Wilson et al., 2000). In summary, the duality that comes with the DAM reflects (a) highly learned evaluations versus newly acquired evaluations, (b) social norms versus stored evaluations, and (c) independent evaluative systems without further specification. As such, the model cannot be clearly mapped onto our 2 × 2 schema. With regard to automaticity, the DAM emphasizes (un)awareness (of the implicit attitude) and recognizes motivation and opportunity as moderators of whether explicit attitudes dominate responding.
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A second prediction is the differential susceptibility of explicit versus implicit attitudes to the effects of inconsistency. Although explicit and implicit attitudes were found to be highly correlated (Gawronski & Strack, 2004), counterattitudinal behavior that was induced without obvious external pressure led to change only for explicit evaluations. This finding suggests that inconsistencies and the resulting pressure toward their resolution require propositional representations and concomitant truth values that may be incompatible with a propositional representation of a behavior that has attitudinal implications. Such an immediate attitude change may only result in concomitant implicit evaluations if the changed attitude will yield corresponding associations through repeated coactivation. The processes and contents of the associative and propositional processes in evaluation model are exclusively allocated in Quadrants 1 and 3.
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An important domain in which dual processes have been proposed to explain judgmental phenomena is the domain of person perception. Biases in the attribution of causality, effects of stereotyping, and divergent judgments of in-group versus out-group members are phenomena that were seen to be linked to different psychological processes.
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may be facilitated if they are based on preactivated concepts, which affords testing the strength of implicit attitudes using cognitive measures such as reaction time or error rate (Fazio et al., 1986; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The interaction between propositional and associative processes as described in the APE suggests different routes to attitude change. In line with traditional research on attitude change (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), syllogistic reasoning may result in evaluative judgments or explicit attitudes. Attempts at achieving and maintaining consistency operate as motivational forces. Similarly, associative mechanisms may exert a direct influence on implicit evaluations both by creating new associative links through frequent co-occurrence and by contextual activation of existing associations (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977). However, such contextual elicitation of evaluative associations may cause affective reactions. Depending on their consistency with the information that is currently considered, they may or may not be used as a basis for the evaluative judgment (Gawronski & Sritharan, 2010). In reverse, propositional reasoning may selectively alter the accessibility of evaluative associations and thereby affect associative influences. Both propositional and associative processes are seen to have automatic components (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). There are several empirical consequences pertaining to the application of the propositional– associative distinction to the domain of attitudes. One is the finding that negations may have affirmative consequences if the cognitive capacity necessary to perform the propositional transformation of the truth value is lacking (e.g., Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, 2006; Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009). It was found (Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008), as applied to attitudes, that implicit stereotypes were reduced only if the counterstereotypic associations were learned, but not if the training consisted of learning the mere negations of the stereotype. Such training led to an increase in stereotypic responses because associative learning does not afford transformations of truth values (i.e., negations) but instead strengthens the link to the affirmative content (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 900
Attribution. Notions of dual processes are particularly prevalent in theories explaining the attribution of causality. Perceivers’ attempts at finding the determinants of behavior have been found to be biased toward dispositional explanations at the expense of situational accounts. This fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977) or correspondence bias (Gilbert & Jones, 1986) has led to conceptual endeavors to identify different processes in attribution. Identification and inference: Trope’s model of attributional judgments. In his process account of causal attribution, Trope differentiates two mechanisms that operate in temporal succession (Trope & Gaunt, 1999). First, a behavior is identified using categories that are contextually activated. Second, contextual information is used to evaluate the causal impact of the situation that would attenuate the dispositional implications of
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the preceding identification of the behavior. For example, the context may increase the chances that a person’s angry behavior will be identified as angry but, at the same time, decrease the probability that the behavior will be attributed to the actor’s dispositional anger (Trope & Gaunt, 1999). The primary identification process is assumed to operate automatically. It has a strong associative component that determines the accessibility of the category. In contrast, the secondary process is inferential in nature and requires cognitive capacity to evaluate the preceding identification as a hypothesis. As a consequence, suboptimal conditions will attenuate qualifying inferences and strengthen a dispositional attribution. Thus, the model combines the different psychological processes of categorization and inference with the assumption of the existence of two stages and generates predictions that can be localized in Quadrants 1 and 3.
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Dissociation model. The dissociation model of prejudice and stereotyping (Devine, 1989; Devine & Monteith, 1999) focuses on automatic mechanisms in the activation and application of stereotypes in person perception. A core tenet of the dissociation model is that knowledge of culturally shared stereotypes and personal beliefs about the validity of such stereotypes can coexist in memory and might dissociate in their content: “Although they may have some overlapping features, it is argued that stereotypes and personal beliefs are conceptually distinct cognitive structures” (Devine, 1989, p. 5). Knowledge about stereotypes and beliefs about the stereotypes’ validity are assumed to operate under different levels of automaticity. Whereas knowledge of culturally shared stereotypes is assumed to be activated automatically by the processing of appropriate trigger stimuli, the activation and application of beliefs about the validity of what is activated are assumed to require cognitive control. The dissociation model explains these differences in automaticity by assuming different degrees of practice or learning for stereotypes and validity beliefs:
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Gilbert’s three-stage model. A similar account of the attribution process has been suggested by Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull (1988). Specifically, they suggested that person perception consists of a sequence of three distinct mental operations that pertain to cognitive tasks that are necessary for person perception. Specifically, they involve identifying the actions (categorization), drawing dispositional inferences about the actor (characterization), and adjusting those inferences with information about situational constraints (correction). Although categorization is assumed to operate at very high levels of automaticity, characterization and correction require deliberate inferences. However, because characterization may be simplified by using the semantic content of the behavioral categorization, it uses fewer cognitive resources then the subsequent correction. From this, it follows that a secondary task that absorbs part of the perceiver’s cognitive capacity will prevent corrective endeavors and cause the attribution to be based on the characterization of the target. As a result, dispositional attributions are more likely under suboptimal conditions, which explains the mechanisms underlying the pervasive correspondence bias.
Trope’s and Gilbert’s models are similar in many respects. In particular, they agree in the assumption that categorizing (or identifying) a behavior requires fewer cognitive resources than the remaining operations. However, the models differ in the exact cognitive mechanics that follow the first step. Whereas Trope proposed that the contextual information in integrated in the formation of a dispositional judgment, Gilbert assumed a third step in which the accuracy of the previously formed dispositional attribution is examined and, if necessary, a correction of the attributional judgment is performed. Although the finding that salient contextual information influences attributions even under high cognitive load may be more in line with Trope’s notion of contextual integration, one can argue that the intensity of a stimulus may always override a given distraction.
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inhibition of the automatically activated stereotype and activation of the newer personal belief structure. (Devine, 1989, p. 6)
Although the model is not explicit about the underlying cognitive mechanisms, piecemeal and categorical operations include both associative and rule-based elements and can therefore be assumed to be similar in their basic representational and procedural components. Although the continuum model is not based on a duality of psychological processes, the ease of processing and the concomitant efficiency determine its dynamics. Specifically, the least effortful operation occurs if a target person is of minimal interest or relevance to the perceiver. Then the impression is solely based on an initial categorization that is primarily driven by cues that are perceivable in the situation. The distinction between piecemeal and categorical processes reflects an important duality from a person-perception perspective in which propositional and associative processes contribute to both operations. Because experiential components play no role in the generation of the judgments, the continuum model is allocated in Quadrants 1 and 3 of our schema. Automaticity in the sense of efficiency is the basis of the proposed duality.
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Brewer’s dual-process model of impression formation. Brewer’s (1988) model is similar to that of Fiske and Neuberg (1990) in that it shares the basic assumption that impressions of other people may be formed by categorizing, by individuating, or both. Brewer’s perspective is closely linked to research on stereotyping in which impressions of members from out-groups (intergroup impressions) are more likely to be formed on categorical bases, whereas impressions of members who belong to the perceiver’s own group (interpersonal impressions) are more likely to be individualized. It is the social requirements (e.g., interdependence) that are seen to determine the mode of processing, whereas the effort (level of processing) is seen to be a function of motivational factors, such as importance. On a cognitive level, categorizing is seen to be a top-down, and individuation a bottom-up, operation. The two processes resemble to some degree the Aristotelian distinction between genus and differentia. Specifically, category-based impression formation attempts to assign the target to a social category (e.g., from an out-group) and to derive attributes
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Fiske and Neuberg’s continuum model. To achieve a better understanding of impression formation, Fiske and Neuberg (1990) proposed a continuum model. The model proposes judgments of people to result from unique combinations of piecemeal and category-based operations. The central distinction between these operations is the amount of attention and cognitive effort that they require. That is, categorizations can be performed relatively effortlessly, whereas piecemeal operations consume more cognitive energy. Attention and cognitive effort are allocated to attributes of the target only if personal relevance and interest for the target person exceed a certain threshold. In such cases, the target is “individuated” by focusing on available person-specific information. First, perceivers will attempt to interpret these characteristics in the light of the initial categorization and, if successful, exit the procedure with the impression they had at the outset. However, if the attributes do not fit or cannot be reconciled with the initial categorization, the perceivers will attempt to invoke a new category that allows the attended characteristics to be accommodated. If such a category is not accessible, piecemeal integration is assumed to set in. The target person is then represented on the basis of those more concrete attributes, of which the original category may just be one.
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Thus, as in other models, motivation and o pportunity for controlled processing are the main moderators that decide whether one of the two processes will prevail. The duality captured in the dissociation model has, at least implicitly, a strong overlap with the distinction between propositions versus associations. Automatically activated cultural knowledge is conceptualized as group–feature associations. Validity beliefs, however, capture an essential feature of what we defined as propositions. At the same time, representations in the dissociation model are primarily nonexperiential. Thus, the dissociation model maps well onto Quadrants 1 and 3 of our 2 × 2 schema.
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bodily experiences. Although the original version of the SIM makes no explicit reference to the concept of mental associations, its reference to pattern matching and parallel distributed processing, which are contrasted with symbolic, propositional processes in moral reasoning, suggests that the SIM may at least partially map onto our distinction between associative and rule-based processes. From this perspective, the SIM seems to cover Quadrants 1 and 3 while confounding rule-based versus associative processing with automaticity features. Although emotions are not a central part of the concept of moral intuition in the SIM,2 empirical evidence in favor of the model often is based on demonstrations of how emotional experiences shape moral judgments. Moral emotions and moral intuition are discussed in parallel, and it remains unclear whether they are considered independent or interdependent phenomena. If emotions were integrated as being part of moral intuitions, the SIM would cover all four quadrants of our schema.
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until a sufficient fit between the category and the target is reached. In contrast, person-based processing takes the categorical assignment (e.g., the ingroup) for granted and focuses on attributes that make the person distinct. In contrast to other models, Brewer and her colleagues (e.g., Brewer & Harasty-Feinstein, 1999) did not propose a necessary integration of the two modes. Instead, they entertained the possibility that person- and category-based processing may operate in parallel and result in two separate representations. Both category- and person-based processing modes may be subject to more or less efficient modes of processing. Thus, the automaticity of the processing depends on the accessibility of the information and the judges’ motivations. In both cases, both inferential and associative mechanisms may be involved. They are primarily defined by the two types of contents (from Quadrants 1 and 3) and the concomitant judgmental operations (typicality vs. distinctiveness). It is important to note that the model makes specific predictions about the cognitive consequences of the two modes of processing. They result in different types of representations and determine encoding and retrieval of person information, resembling some characteristics of the dualattitude model (see also Wilson et al., 2000).
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The social intuitionist model (SIM; Haidt, 2001) explains moral judgments as a function of automatically generated moral intuitions that are associated with affect, and moral reasoning that is defined as being nonautomatic in terms of efficiency, awareness, intentionality, and controllability (Haidt, 2001). Although the SIM does not equate intuition with emotion or affect, it suggests that moral intuition is a judgment that spontaneously brings to mind an affective valence (good–bad, like–dislike) without awareness of the process that led to this judgment. The mechanisms generating moral judgments automatically are proposed to be based on innate and learned moral concepts. They are interconnected in memory and often contain metaphors or traces of
Models of duality not only have been invoked to explain thought and judgment but also have been harnessed to account for human behavior. In particular, the distinction between effortful control and effortless automaticity has been used to identify different variants of behavior. Specifically, it has been argued that human behavior may be both habitual and goal directed or intentional in nature. Whereas the first type of behavior is based on associated links, the second involves propositional knowledge and rule-based reasoning. These two types of behavior were in focus to various degrees during different phases in the history of psychology. Under the paradigm of behaviorism, habits were seen as the building blocks of all complex behaviors and even higher mental processes (e.g., Skinner, 1957). Subsequently, cognitive psychology denounced the positions as “reductionist and mechanical” (Mandler, 2002, p. 334) and emphasized top-down, reasoning-based processes that led to purposive actions. More recently, both
According to Haidt (2001), “It must be stressed that the contrast of intuition and reasoning is not the contrast of emotion and cognition. Intuition, reasoning, and the appraisals contained in emotions . . . are all forms of cognition” (p. 818).
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o perate on more abstract levels, thus releasing attention for other operations. For example, a novice car driver may have to intend to press the clutch before shifting the gear. With frequent repetition under the same conditions, the motor sequence is executed without intentional control because the execution of the behavior is delegated to the context. Once a goal-directed behavior has become a habit, it may take special efforts to break the habit (Verplanken & Wood, 2006). Many dual-systems theories emphasize the effort that is necessary for the nonhabitual system to determine behavior. Recently, the metaphor of a muscle has been offered to account for the ebb and flow of the available energy (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Specifically, it has been argued that the success of behavioral self-control depends on the amount of strength that is available at the time. Although this limited resource will be depleted by extensive use, it needs to be exercised to be put to use. This muscular model of ego depletion (Baumeister, 2002; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010) was believed to be metabolically grounded (e.g., Gailliot et al., 2007). However, more recent research has cast some doubt on the proposed evidence (Molden et al., 2012). Independent of metabolic mechanisms, the conflict between the two systems and the effort that is necessary to overcome automatic responses is shared by many models. Moreover, there is agreement that the strength is primarily needed to counteract an emotional force that drives the behavior in an incompatible direction. This conflict stands in the center of the model proposed by Janet Metcalfe and Walter Mischel (1999).
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types of behavior have been integrated in different perspectives of duality. In a related vain, it has been argued that goals can be pursued in different ways. Although there exist no elaborate duality models, it has been suggested that the pursuit of desired end states may not only occur as an anticipation of the consequences of an action but also in an unconscious and automatic fashion (e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, 2005; Hassin, Aarts, Eitam, Custers, & Kleiman, 2009). Moreover, it has been claimed that this uncontrolled type of goal pursuit is not constrained by rigid associative patterns but shares flexibility with its conscious counterpart. Evidence comes from subtle contextual influences and from the subliminal priming of goals (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). However, the claim of nonconscious goal pursuit has some methodological and conceptual problems. First, subliminal priming may increase the accessibility of associatively linked information and thereby the probability that this information enters into controlled or conscious goal pursuit, even if the person is entirely unaware of such an influence. Second, identifying the nonconscious pursuit of goals from the fact that the occurrence of a behavior contributes to a desired end state is problematic. Such teleological accounts are informative but do not necessarily establish a causal determination or identify underlying mechanisms. In fact, different contents of subliminal priming may elicit different mediating processes (Schröder & Thagard, 2013; Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007; Wheeler & Petty, 2001). To be sure, goal-directed behavior may eventually become automatized, regardless of whether its contribution to a remote end state is used as a characteristic.
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Habit versus intention. Responses that have been repeated frequently in stable contexts are defined as habits (e.g., Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Wood & Neal, 2007). As a consequence of this repetition, habits can be elicited by recurring contextual features without much effort or attention. In contrast, behaviors may be controlled by intentions that may be represented at different levels of abstraction (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Through repetitive practice, habits are formed and intentions may 904
Hot–cool system. One of the best known experimental demonstrations of a conflict between incompatible behavioral tendencies is Mischel’s studies on delay of gratification. The findings from a series of studies with young children revealed that a substantial number of them failed to muster the self-control that was necessary to obtain a more desirable outcome (for reviews, see Mischel, 1996; Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1972). This led the authors to construct a theoretical framework based on the duality of a hot system and a cool system and their
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has been applied to many areas of psychological functioning. The CEST contrasts two systems of information processing. The experiential system is conceptualized as being driven by past experiences, emotions, and the pleasure principle. The rational system is conceptualized as being driven by appraisals of current events, logical analysis, and assessments of what is reasonable. More important, emotions and associated basic needs are assumed to govern the experiential system. Different relations connect contents in the two systems. Although associations prevail in the experiential system, logical rules govern the rational system (Epstein & Pacini, 1999). Furthermore, the systems are construed as operating in parallel and interactively. The CEST associates the two systems with different levels of automaticity, with the experiential system largely operating automatically, whereas the rational system does not (e.g., Epstein & Pacini, 1999). The CEST also contains assumptions about how the two systems develop and change with experience. By postulating the operation of two systems, the CEST can explain why various dissociations of judgmental and action tendencies occur in various experimental and real-life settings. One area of application has been decision making, in which people often report experiencing an inner conflict between what is perceived to be the rational choice and what feels right intuitively (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). The CEST makes explicit use of the opposition of associations versus abstract, propositional knowledge, and it also contains the opposition of affective feelings versus semantic representations. As such, it covers all four quadrants of our schema.
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characteristics. Specifically, Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) proposed that the hot system is emotional in nature and activates the organism to go without much thinking. In contrast, the cool system requires actors to know what they are doing. For self-control and volitional, goal-directed behavior, the cool system must gain the upper hand in behavioral regulation. The interaction of “hot spots” and “cool nodes” is assumed to be connected in associative networks, whereas the dominance of one system or the other is seen to be determined by various factors, such as individual development, stress, environmental factors, personality differences, and pharmacological factors. To account for the phenomenon of delay of gratification, Metcalfe and Mischel invoked the dominance of the hot system and suggested self- regulatory strategies to counteract its impact. Depending on the origin of the influence, these strategies are classified as internal (e.g., cool selfgenerated ideation) or as external (e.g., exposure to picture of the object instead to the object itself). Although the hot–cool model was primarily meant to account for children’s failure to delay immediate gratification, it also serves as conceptual integration of mechanisms of self-control. The idea that the different determinants of human behavior may be integrated into a dual-systems model is an important contribution to the understanding of behavioral conflict in general. More important, the systems are primarily defined by two processes that differ in behavioral immediacy versus cognitive mediation, which resembles associative versus rule-based processing. Moreover, the systems match different types of contents, such that the hot system is more likely to be based on affective representations and the cool system operates predominantly with semantic contents. Thus, the contrast between the two systems can be allocated mainly in Quadrants 1 and 4. GENERAL THEORIES
Cognitive Experiential Self Theory The cognitive experiential self-theory (CEST; Epstein, 1990, 1994; Epstein & Pacini, 1999) is a general theory of personality (Epstein, 1994) that
Memory Systems Theory Smith and DeCoster’s (2000) memory systems theory (MST) was developed to integrate theory and research in the realm of multiple domain-specific dual-process models. In particular, the MST seeks to explain numerous phenomena involving the dissociation between response tendencies by invoking a small set of general principles. To do so, Smith and DeCoster drew on memory research suggesting the existence of two long-term memory systems with 905
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The basis of Sloman’s (1996) theory is the assumption that there exist two forms of computation that go along with different types of internal representations. On one hand is an associative system whose computations are based on similarity and temporal contiguity. On the other and in parallel is the rule-based system, which computes its outcomes on the basis of general rules that may be descriptive or normative in nature. Descriptive rules may be both synthetic (natural laws) and analytic (logical, mathematical, or statistical principles) in nature. Examples for normative rules are instructions, recipes, and prescriptions of all kinds. The range of application for the rules is restricted only by the type of variables to which they apply, whereas the two associative mechanisms may apply to all contents. In reverse, the same contents may be processed in both associative and rule-based fashions. The two systems complement one another because they are specialized for different tasks of reasoning. In detail, the associative system is best at reasoning that is based on intuition, whereas the rule-based system specializes in tasks that require deliberation. Although both systems are not seen to interact, they may operate simultaneously and generate representations that may differ in their concrete– perceptual versus abstract–symbolic nature. At times, beliefs that are based on representations from the two systems may contradict one another. As one example, Sloman (1996) invokes the Müller–Lyer illusion, in which the associative and the rule-based systems suggest different lengths of the line between the arrows (cf. Strack, 1992). Other examples are judgmental heuristics, errors of reasoning, and categorization. Sloman’s (1996) systems are defined by processes that operate in either a rule-based or an associative fashion and belong to Quadrants 1 and 3. Although the model does not elaborate aspects of automaticity, they are linked to associative processing. Moreover, the processes are assumed to operate simultaneously and may produce different outcomes that may be in conflict. Although the rule-based system can suppress the associative system to some degree, the model does not describe an interaction between the systems.
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differing operating characteristics. On one hand, a slow-learning system is responsible for extracting general regularities of the environment, which requires a relatively low learning rate. On the other hand, a fast-binding system is responsible for quickly storing “episodic records of the details of specific experiences, including the context” (Smith & DeCoster, 2000, p. 109), which requires a relatively high learning rate. Besides the learning rate, the MST also makes distinct assumptions about the type of representations and processes that go along with the two memory systems. Specifically, the slow-memory system is assumed to operate according to associative principles of pattern completion. In this system, representations will activate contents that were previously associated with the representation. The output of associative processes is defined as “intuitive and affective responses to objects or events” (Smith & DeCoster, 2000, p. 111). The fast-binding system, however, is assumed to operate on the basis of symbolically represented rules and other symbolic knowledge. The MST links the memory systems with automaticity features, with the slow-learning system and its associative processing being automatic and the fast-binding system and its rule-based processing being optional and depending on motivation and capacity. The systems are construed as interacting in several ways and potentially operating in parallel. In general, the MST can explain various phenomena in the realm of persuasion, attitude access, stereotyping, person perception, attribution, and judgment formation and correction in nonsocial domains. Given that it contains assumptions regarding associations versus rules as well as a distinction between experiential outputs (associative processing) and symbolic knowledge (rule-based processing), the MST covers all four quadrants of the 2 × 2 schema.
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To account for the apparent violations of norms of rationality in judgments and reasoning (Evans & Over, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), Stanovich and colleagues (Stanovich, 2012; Stanovich & West, 2000) have suggested a dual-process account of human reasoning. Specifically, they have suggested two systems named System 1 and System 2. The two systems serve different epistemic purposes and are linked to different construals of the task. System 1 operates automatically, executing its functions largely unconsciously and without much cognitive effort. At the same time, System 1 is seen to be highly contextualized in taking the conversational demands of social situation into account. An example is the Linda paradox (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), in which the incorrect categorization of Linda as a bank teller and active in the feminist movement is easily generated on the basis of similarity and is conversationally correct because the judge can assume that for the recipient, the alternative is bank teller but not active in the feminist movement (Mellers, Hertwig, & Kahneman, 2001). Thus, differences in responses generated by System 1 reflect differences in social intelligence. In contrast, System 2 has characteristics that afford controlled, conscious, and effortful processing while attempting to phase out contextual and interactional influences. If System 2 is in operation, the judges infer that for logical reasons, “bank teller” is the only correct answer. Thus, differences produced by this system are reflected in differences in people’s analytic intelligence. Stanovich and West’s (2000) duality model can be seen as another precursor of Kahneman and Frederick’s (2002, 2004) attribute substitution model. Although the characteristics of the systems are basically the same, Stanovich and West have mainly applied their model to various issues of judgment generation, whereas Kahneman and Frederick have extended their reasoning by introducing some aspects of systemic interaction, such as attribute substitution and monitoring.
program of research. Together with Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman identified various cognitive procedures that were shown to simplify judgments under uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Although these heuristics are capable of reducing procedural complexity in various judgmental domains, their psychological diversity made it difficult to include them in a unifying theory. The present model (Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) is meant to achieve this integration by formulating a more general dual-system theory of human judgment. This theory is based on the assumption that judgments can be generated in a fashion that is based either on an intuitive (System 1) or on a reflective (System 2) system. These two systems are characterized both by features of the underlying processes and by the contents that they process. Most important, System 1 operates in a “fast, automatic, effortless, associative, implicit (not available to introspection), and often emotionally charged” (Kahneman, 2003, p. 698) fashion, whereas the operations of System 2 are slow, serial, and effortful, partly because the contents that are processed by System 1 come to mind more easily (accessibility). With increasing practice, complex cognitive operations may become automatized and migrate from System 2 to System 1. A second type of interaction between the systems is a monitoring of outcomes. In detail, System 1 proposes intuitive answers, and System 2 monitors their quality with the option to correct or override the outcome of System 1. A central mechanism that explains judgment by heuristic is that of attribute substitution. As Kahneman (2003) has put it, “[A] judgment is said to be mediated by a heuristic when the individual assesses a specified target attribute of a judgment object by substituting a related heuristic attribute that comes more readily to mind” (p. 707). More recently, however, Kahneman (2011) postulated that the substitution may occur on the question level, in that judges may substitute a question to which they have already generated an answer for the question they had been asked. One example is the operation of the so-called affect heuristic (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). Here, judges are assumed to
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Attribute Substitution Theory Kahneman and Frederick’s (2002, 2004) theory of duality is the conceptual integration of an earlier
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substitute a target attribute (e.g., the quality of a product) that requires a more effortful assessment by System 2 with the heuristic attribute of affect that is automatically linked to a positive or a negative valence and affords more effortless processing by System 1. However, System 2 may question the validity of the judgment and examine the representativeness of the affect as a valid source of the judgment (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). These two modes of thought operate in an independent fashion. Specifically, if cognitive capacity is otherwise absorbed, effortless mental processes that belong to System 1 may still be operating and the effortful operations of System 2 are impeded. Kahneman’s (2003) attribute-substitution model of duality has elements from all quadrants of our schema. At the same time, it is not clear whether all judgmental simplifications can be assumed to be exclusively based on associative processes (System 1). That they are simpler and faster does not imply that they are grounded in qualitatively different cognitive mechanisms.
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anner. The RRM also includes assumptions about m the brain (sub)systems that underlie the X and C systems. The RRM is based on a relatively large number of oppositions (Lieberman, 2007), so mapping this theory to our schema is not a simple task. Clearly, the two systems are distinguished by different levels of automaticity, with the X system being more automatic than the C system. Moreover, the distinction between propositions versus associations matches some of the features ascribed to the X system (parallel processing, symmetric relations) and to the C system (linguistic, abstract concepts, asymmetric relations). The RRM also, however, makes reference to the distinction between semantic versus experiential representations: Automatic processes (as primarily ascribed to the X system) are “usually experienced as perceptions or feelings” (Lieberman, 2003, p. 44). As such, the RRM covers all four quadrants of our schema.
Reflective–Impulsive Model
Reflexive–Reflective Model
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The reflexive–reflective model (RRM; Lieberman, 2003, 2007) is a general model of social cognition that evolved from an earlier model specialized to explain attributional inferences (Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002). In its generalized form, it aimed to explain phenomena in the realm of social judgment and decision making, covering various topics such as attributional inference, theory of mind, stereotypes, attitudes, and hedonic preferences. The RRM postulates the existence of two systems of information processing, each consisting of a number of subsystems: the reflexive system (X system) and the reflective system (C system). The X system is conceptualized as a default system that is primarily based on sensory input, stores symmetric relations (e.g., mutual association), and retrieves well- practiced solutions to problems. It operates in a parallel and in an automatic fashion. The C system is an “alarm” or troubleshooting system that is particularly active when standard solutions provided by the X system fail. It is based primarily on linguistic input, stores asymmetric relations (e.g., cause–effect), and operates in a nonautomatic
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The reflective–impulsive model (RIM; Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) was formulated to integrate cognitive, emotional, motivational, and behavioral elements and to describe their interactions along the temporal dimension of information processing. Specifically, the RIM connects stimulus and response in different ways that are linked to a reflective system and an impulsive system, each one being specified by different principles of representation and information processing. The two systems are assumed to operate in parallel, although the impulsive system is always engaged, whereas the engagement of the reflective system depends on cognitive capacity and motivation. Moreover, the systems differ in how they represent information. The impulsive system represents information as relations whose links are associative in nature, based on contiguity and similarity. In contrast, the reflective system connects elements in a semantic or episodic fashion and assigns a truth value to the relation. In short, the reflective system consists of propositional representations, and the impulsive system consists of associative representations.
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Of course, categorizations and behavioral decisions (the setting of a goal) are equally affected by the accessibility of the information. Because the activated information is semantically and episodically connected with other concepts in the associative store, their activation potential will also be increased and judgments may gradually become automatized. Similarly, through their links to behavioral schemata, intentional behaviors become habitualized. Affect may become relevant in two ways. First, it may enter the reflective system much as any other perceptual input. That is, it needs to be categorized and become the basis of inferences (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Second, it may operate in the impulsive system by exerting an influence on behavior in a more direct fashion. This may be the result of action tendencies that are elicited by specific emotions (Frijda, 1986) or by a more general motivational orientation that facilitates or inhibits approach versus avoidance, depending on the valence of the processed content. Moreover, the influence of both action tendencies and motivational orientation is bidirectional, such that the behaviors may also affect thoughts and feelings (Förster & Strack, 1997; Stepper & Strack, 1993).
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The reflective system is made up of propositional operations. In a prototypical fashion, the first operation is the categorization of a stimulus in which the assignment of a truth value is the result of a deictic act. Then, operations of syllogistic reasoning may generate judgments and set goals that may eventually be transformed into behavior through the activation of a behavioral schema. Thus, the reflective link between stimulus and response can be understood as reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). In contrast, the impulsive link between perception and behavior is associative in nature and does not require any reasoning. Associative links may be genetically predetermined (Over & Carpenter, 2009) or formed by frequent and recent co-occurrence (e.g., De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Olson, Kendrick, & Fazio, 2009). Thus, concepts, procedures, and habits may be elicited by contextual cues (Wood & Neal, 2007), and motivational and emotional preconditioning may facilitate or inhibit specific responses. The links are stored in associative memory, assumed to be part of the impulsive system. Most important, both systems are assumed to interact at all stages of reflective processing. Specifically, the operations of the reflective system require information from the associative store. However, the result of retrieval depends to a large degree on the accessibility of the information, which is a function of the recency and frequency of previous activation (Higgins, 1996). As a consequence, the operations of the reflective system are determined by the preexisting accessibility of information in the associative store of the impulsive system, whereas the reflective operation changes the accessibility for subsequent retrieval. How this interaction may cause judgmental biases has been demonstrated in studies of the anchoring heuristic (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999b; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). That is, the distorting influence of a standard of a comparative judgment that is generated shortly before an absolute judgment was shown to be mediated by selective accessibility. Specifically, the biased search for confirmatory information that is triggered by a comparative judgment leads to a higher accessibility of this information for the subsequent absolute judgment.
APPLICATION OF DUALITY MODELS In a recent treatise on criteria to evaluate theories in social psychology, Paul Van Lange (2013) emphasized their applicability as an important dimension. Paraphrasing Lewin’s (1945) famous dictum, models of duality may serve as good examples for the practicability of good theories. Early duality models in social psychology and beyond were typically attempts to explain phenomena in specific areas of social cognition such as persuasion (Chaiken, 1987) or attitude-to-behavior processes (Fazio, Powell, & Herr, 1983). Later models often represent abstractions and generalizations of core ideas that are part of domain-specific models, promising even more explanatory power. In what follows, we present the types of phenomena that often resulted in the development of duality models. Although duality models have clearly emerged from basic research, the past decade showed a remarkable increase in attempts to 909
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use duality models in applied psychological science such as clinical, health, and economic psychology. In a later part of this section, we give a brief overview of typical applications of duality models.
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Duality models were developed for a variety of reasons. One of the most important reasons, however, is their power to integrate and ultimately explain a number of psychological phenomena that imply dissociations between response tendencies (Deutsch & Strack, 2006), including any overt or inner changes of mental representations or behaviors. Such dissociations may occur across situational or internal contexts (e.g., liking cigarettes when deprived but despising cigarettes when satiated), over time (e.g., preferring spending instead of saving right now, but regretting this later), and even simultaneously in one context and at one time (e.g., affectively liking a stimulus but cognitively rejecting it). Duality models are particularly suited to explain the moderating influence of situational and internal conditions that relate to the motivation and the opportunity for thorough processing. For example, heuristic cues in persuasive settings affect attitudes more strongly when motivation or opportunity is low, whereas message arguments have a stronger impact when motivation and opportunity are high (e.g., Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981; Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976). Similarly, implicit attitudes are more likely to influence behavior when motivation or opportunity is low, whereas explicit attitudes have a stronger influence when they are high (Fazio & Towels-Schwen, 1999; Friese, Hofmann, & Schmitt, 2008). A final example is the observation that internal attributions are more frequent when participants are low in motivation or opportunity, whereas situational corrections occur more often under high motivation and opportunity (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1988). The vast majority of duality models—whether specific or general— contain strong assumptions regarding the processing requirements of the two processes or systems that
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are part of the theory. Typically, one of the two processes or systems is associated with lower requirements than the other. For example, the HSM (Chaiken, 1980) suggests that heuristic processing depends on motivation and opportunity to a lesser degree than systematic processing. As another example, the MST (Smith & DeCoster, 2000) suggests that associative processing comes with a higher degree of efficiency than rule-based processing. These theoretical notions have the potential to explain the moderating effect of motivation and opportunity. Specifying the characteristics of highversus low-demand processes allows prediction of diverging responses under conditions that do versus do not favor high-effort processing. A second class of phenomena that can be readily explained by duality models is simultaneous conflicts between psychological response tendencies. In such conflicts, stimuli evoke two inner or outer responses that are incompatible. A prominent example of such conflicts are perceptual illusions, such as the Müller–Lyer illusion, in which participants have a perceptual experience of one of two lines being longer although they know at the same time that these two lines are of identical length (cf. Sloman, 1996). Sloman (1996) characterized such simultaneous contradictory responses as key evidence for the operation of two systems of reasoning.3 To the degree that the two systems operate in parallel and follow different processing rules, they can be predicted to create diverging outputs in some situations. Phenomena indicating simultaneous contradictory responses occur in various social-cognitive settings. One important field is the study of stereotypes and prejudice. When participants’ evaluative responses toward social groups are measured by questionnaires versus indirect measures, the two measurements often do not correlate (e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). Likewise, participants may differ in their affective feelings toward and cognitive beliefs about a social group (e.g., Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999). Duality models explain dissociations between
Because Sloman’s (1996) theory concentrates on reasoning, he used the term simultaneous contradictory beliefs (or Criterion S). We prefer, however, to use the broader term simultaneous contradictory responses to include inner or outer responses beyond beliefs in reasoning settings, such as emotional responses or overt behavioral tendencies. Although experimental dissociations have a high face validity for diagnosing process distinctiveness, they are open to alternative interpretations (Dunn & Kirsner, 1988).
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Clinical psychology. One important field of application is clinical psychology, in which duality models have been harnessed to understand phenomena such as addiction, eating disorders, phobia, and compulsion (e.g., de Wit, Barker, Dickinson, & Cools, 2011; Roefs et al., 2011; Wiers, Teachman, & De Houwer, 2007). Within these areas, notions of duality were used to inspire etiological models, to derive measures for basic research or clinical studies, and to develop or improve intervention strategies. We use addiction research as an example, in which the general distinction between automatic versus controlled processes has a long tradition (Tiffany, 1990) and is particularly useful to explain continuing abuse or relapse in the face of known negative long-term consequences. Those duality models that emphasize the dissociation of responses that spring from different response systems may be especially well able to explain such phenomena (e.g., Fazio, 1990; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). These models suggest that internal or external cues may activate consumptionpromoting behavioral, evaluative, or semantic representations in a processing system that operates automatically. At the same time, consumption- preventing representations may be coactivated in a second processing system but fail to override triggered impulses to consume (Deutsch & Strack, 2005; Stacy & Wiers, 2010; Tiffany, 1990). In a related fashion, the strength metaphor of self-control can be used to predict variations in the intensity to override impulses and therefore the likelihood of drug consumption (e.g., Christiansen, Cole, & Field, 2012). Developing valid and reliable measures of explanatory constructs contained in duality theories, such as impulses, automatic evaluations, or motivational orientations, has been a challenge and largely a success in basic research (e.g., De Houwer, 2006; De Houwer & Moors, 2007; Fazio & Olson, 2003b; Gawronski & Payne, 2010; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). It comes as no surprise that these measurement procedures have also been applied to research questions originating from clinical psychology (for a review, see Roefs et al., 2011). Indirect measures are often theorized to assess the underlying construct in an automatic fashion and hence to be less
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automatic (affective) versus controlled (cognitive) aspects of prejudice by reconstructing the two dissociating response tendencies as originating from separate mental systems (Epstein, 1990; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) or separate mental representations or processes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Wilson et al., 2000) that respond differentially to the same situational input. Simultaneous contradictory responses also occur in situations of self-control, in which impulses and cravings to act or consume in a certain way may coexist with knowledge that such behavior is actually dysfunctional for achieving important goals (e.g., Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel & DeSmet, 2000; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Again, duality models explain such motivational conflicts as being a result of separable mental systems responding differentially to the same situation (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2009; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Existing duality models differ in their assumptions about how exactly processes differ. However, as we have argued in our systematic review, theoretical notions about how processes and systems differ often involve the presence versus absence of propositional processes as well as the presence versus absence of affective experiences. For example, simultaneous contradictory responses or moderation by motivation and opportunity can be predicted to occur because one system is capable of representing the future or what is not the case whereas the other is less capable of such (e.g., Deutsch et al., 2006), because representations in one system change quickly whereas representations in the other change slowly (Rydell & McConnell, 2006), or because one system is more sensitive to perceptual information whereas the other is more sensitive to linguistic or verbal information (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994).
Understanding and Solving Practical Problems Various applied branches of psychology have drawn on duality models developed in social, cognitive, and personality psychology to advance the understanding and solution of practical problems.
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whereas negative stimuli facilitate behaviors that increase the distance between the subject and the stimulus (for an exception to this rule, see Wilkowski & Meier, 2010). Evidence has suggested that approach versus avoidance behavior can also help in changing the evaluative and motivational meaning of those stimuli that have served as behavioral targets (e.g., Huijding et al., 2009; Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011; Wiers, Rinck, Kordts, Houben, & Strack, 2010). For example, participants in a study by Wiers et al. (2010) developed more negative associations toward alcohol as well as more avoidance motivation if they had to practice avoiding alcohol-related stimuli.
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Health psychology. Health psychology is focused on strengthening health-promoting behaviors and weakening health-damaging behaviors. Toward this end, health psychologists try to better understand why and how the two types of behavior occur and to develop strategies to influence those psychological processes that drive the health-relevant behaviors (HRB;4 Leventhal, Weinman, Leventhal, & Phillips, 2008). Most frequently, the variability in HRB has been accounted for by invoking constructs derived from psychological models of rational choice and planned behavior (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Bandura, 1977). Specifically, influential theories of health behavior have focused on the probability and severity of adverse health effects, normative beliefs, self-efficacy, and behavioral intentions (e.g., Becker, 1974; Conner & Sparks, 2005; Schwarzer, 1992, 2008). Although these variables are important to explain HRB (McEachan, Conner, Taylor, & Lawton, 2011), more recent research has included the variables that moderate the relationship among beliefs, intentions, and HRB (e.g., Conner et al., 2002; Skår, Sniehotta, Araujo-Soares, & Molloy, 2008; Trafimow, 2000). Duality models help identify the conditions under which subjective beliefs and intentions succeed or fail to actually influence HRB. Indeed, HRB often involve motivational conflicts in which positive, hedonic short-term consequences are in conflict with negative long-term consequences and vice
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s usceptible to self-presentational concerns (De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). Empirical evidence has resulted in a mixed picture, with some evidence suggesting that participants can fake indirect measures to a considerable degree (e.g., De Houwer, Beckers, & Moors, 2007), and other evidence supporting the original notion of these measures being unaffected by self-presentational concerns (e.g., Nock et al., 2010; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), at least to some degree (Degner, 2009). The latter property makes them particularly valuable for clinical research, in which self-presentational concerns play an important role and may undermine the validity of questionnaires (Roefs et al., 2011). For example, such measures have been successfully applied in addiction research (e.g., Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003; Stacy & Wiers, 2010; Wiers, Houben, & de Kraker, 2007) and in research on specific phobias (de Jong, van den Hout, Rietbroek, & Huijding, 2003; Rinck & Becker, 2007; Teachman, Gregg, & Woody, 2001), demonstrating incremental validity over the standard direct assessments (Roefs et al., 2011). The methodologies of indirect measures of affect and motivation (for a collection of reviews, see Gawronski & Payne, 2010) have also inspired strategies for clinical intervention. One important construct in some duality models is motivational orientation toward approach and avoidance (e.g., Fazio, 1990; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Indirect measures based on simple behaviors that resemble genuine approach versus avoidance behaviors (e.g., joystick movements) are now widely used to assess such motivations in basic research (e.g., M. Chen & Bargh, 1999; De Houwer, Crombez, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2001; Krieglmeyer, De Houwer, & Deutsch, 2011; Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010; Krieglmeyer, Deutsch, De Houwer, & De Raedt, 2010; Neumann, Hülsenbeck, & Seibt, 2004) or clinical settings (e.g., Mogg, Bradley, Field, & De Houwer, 2003; Rinck & Becker, 2007; Schoenmakers, Wiers, & Field, 2008). More important, these measures are based on the effect that positive stimuli facilitate behaviors that decrease the distance between the subject and the stimulus,
By health-relevant behaviors, we mean both health-promoting and health-damaging behaviors.
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strategies may be directed at processes in the impulsive system and try to change these processes in a way that facilitates healthy behaviors. For example, evidence suggests that the way people categorize tempting stimuli (e.g., mentally transforming food into nonconsummatory objects) can influence automatic evaluative reactions toward these stimuli (Hofmann, Deutsch, Lancaster, & Banaji, 2010). Alternatively, the tempting object may be associatively linked to stop signals (Veling, Aarts, & Papies, 2011) or aversive stimuli (Veling, Aarts, & Stroebe, 2011) that elicit incompatible impulses. A second fruitful application of duality models to the issue of HRB draws on the distinction between intention and habit (Wood & Neal, 2007). Specifically, negative HRB have often been practiced for a long time (e.g., unhealthy eating, inactivity, smoking) and thus might have become habitual (Orbell & Verplanken, 2010). On the basis of the notion of the coexistence of habit- versus goal-driven action control (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wood & Neal, 2007), duality models help explain why health- damaging behaviors may persist in the face of better knowledge (e.g., Hill & Durante, 2011). A viable strategy to strengthen the impact of intentions on health behavior in the face of incompatible habits is to form implementation intentions (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Martin, Sheeran, Slade, Wright, & Dibble, 2011), although recent evidence has suggested that implementation intentions may have limited impact on very strong habits, especially in the realm of nicotine addiction (Webb, Sheeran, & Luszczynska, 2009). A third application of duality models to health psychology concerns persuasive attempts to change health behavior. Ever since Janis and Feshbach’s (1953) observation that fear-arousing appeals may have paradoxical effects on health-relevant beliefs, social psychologists have tried to optimize health communication to promote optimal attitude change. It soon became clear that an understanding of motivation–cognition interactions is crucial to
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versa (Hofmann, Friese, & Wiers, 2011). Duality models that allow explanation of the occurrence and resolution of conflicts between shortsighted impulses versus far-sighted beliefs (e.g., Epstein, 1990; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) are well applicable to some types of HRB. Specifically, these duality models suggest that propositional beliefs and rule-based intentions operate in a system that is separate from one that is driven by habits and basic motivational orientations. More important, these duality models suggest that observable HRB depends on the operating conditions of the two systems. As a consequence, the relation among beliefs, intentions, and HRB is determined by the situational and personal factors that promote or prevent the operation of one of the two systems (Hofmann et al., 2011). On the basis of the notion that indirect measures of attitude and motivation capture motivationally relevant responses of the impulsive system,5 numerous studies observed evidence suggesting that implicit evaluations of health-related objects differ from their explicit counterparts in the conditions under which they predict HRB. Specifically, under conditions that increase the relative strength of impulsive processing (e.g., cognitive load, alcohol consumption, low working-memory capacity, beliefincompatible emotions), implicit judgments are the better predictors, whereas under conditions that increase the relative strength of reflective processing (e.g., no cognitive load, soberness, high workingmemory capacity, no or belief-compatible emotions), explicit beliefs about what behavior is healthy and desirable are better predictors (for a review, see Hofmann et al., 2011). These observations can be used to improve interventions geared toward facilitating health-promoting behavior. On one hand, strategies may focus on situational conditions that moderate the relative strength of impulsive versus reflective determinants. On the other hand, in addition to traditional intervention strategies focused on changing beliefs and intentions,
Although this assumption is often made, some evidence has suggested that the relation between indirect measures of evaluation and motivational responses is less clear than previously thought. On one hand, evidence has suggested that indirect valence measures indeed capture the motivational properties of stimuli, such as their palatability (Ayres, Conner, Prestwich, & Smith, 2012). On the other hand, evidence has suggested that measures of evaluation and measures of “wanting” or approach–avoidance may sometimes dissociate (e.g., Finlayson, King, & Blundell, 2008). Further research is needed to clarify the relation between automatic evaluations and motivational impulses.
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heuristics described alternative ways of arriving at judgments that were seen to be crucial as precursors of economic behaviors. Although this way of thinking was not yet a full-blown model of duality, it can be understood as a precursor because it suggested different ways to generate values and expectancies. We describe some of these influences in the context of consumer decisions (Thaler, 1980). Subsequently, we focus on impulse buying as a behavioral duality that stands in stark contrast to rational choice. Finally, we outline a full-blown dual-systems model that was formulated in economics to offer a unified explanation for several aspects of economic behavior.
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Consumer decisions. To understand people’s buying decisions, the model of rational choice would seek assessments of the value of the product and of the likelihood with which this outcome would be achieved. Whereas evaluations were believed to be the result of stable preferences, expectations were assumed to follow the Bayesian laws of probability (Thaler, 1980). Because these parameters seemed psychologically unrealistic and incompatible with the results from many studies, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested the heuristics of representativeness and availability as judgmental shortcuts. Subsequently, Kahneman (2011; see also Slovic et al., 2002) suggested adding an affect heuristic. Most central is the idea that attribute substitution may ease and accelerate decisions that are economically relevant. This has been demonstrated for probability judgments, which were found to be influenced less by the Bayesian axioms than by the degree to which an outcome resembled a prototype, that is, the representativeness of the outcome (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975). Representativeness has also been shown to influence whether feelings become the basis of evaluative decisions (Pham, 1998), which has become a major area of research in consumer choice. On the basis of the notion that complicated assessments of value can be simplified by using one’s current mood (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), the idea that affect and subjective experiences may influence economic choices has generated a broad variety of findings for a great number of judgments. For example, specific emotions were found
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s ucceed in this task (Rogers, 1983). Dual-process theories of persuasion (S. Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Wegener, 1999) provide a framework for better understanding the effects of health communication. Drawing on the HSM (S. Chen & Chaiken, 1999) in particular, Stroebe and colleagues (Das, de Wit, & Stroebe, 2003; de Hoog, Stroebe, & de Wit, 2005; Stroebe, 2000) argued that fear-arousing communications may affect different motives in persuasion settings and hence result in complex patterns of attitude change. The HSM distinguishes accuracy motivation, defense motivation, and self-presentation motivation. Whereas the first type of motivation promotes systematic, unbiased processing of messages, the latter two introduce bias that favors certain conclusions. According to Stroebe and colleagues’ stage model (Das et al., 2003; de Hoog et al., 2005; Stroebe, 2000), the level of threat and the level of perceived personal vulnerability that is communicated in health messages have a differential impact on accuracy and defense motivation. Specifically, increases in both personal vulnerability and threat are predicted to go hand in hand with an increase in accuracy motivation and thus to promote systematic message processing. At the same time, when both threat and vulnerability are high, selfprotective motives in the form of defense motivation are predicted to dominate, resulting in biased systematic processing. Biased processing is predicted to favorably process coping strategies (if offered in the message) and to downplay risks that are communicated (de Hoog et al., 2005).
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Duality models have had some of their origins in the attempts at explaining deviations from the rational model in economics. Specifically, value and expectancy were long believed to be the sole determinants of people’s decisions and subsequent behavior (Edwards, 1961). Although it soon became obvious that actual behavior deviated from the assumptions of rational choice, this model was still believed to be the best approximation to reality. In 1974, however, Tversky and Kahneman dramatically changed the scene by identifying psychological procedures that accounted for some behavioral anomalies. These judgmental 914
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component. For example, the importance of the purchase and the need to justify one’s decision may increase the reflective influence. In turn, habits, motivational orientation, and homeostatic dysregulation are expected to strengthen the impulsive influence. Of course, buyers may also find themselves in a conflict if reflective and impulsive forces are equally strong but incompatible in their consequences. Under such conditions of temptation, the implications of the RIM to deal with self-regulation become applicable (Hofmann et al., 2009).
Impulse buying. Although these simplifications are based on differences in the contents but not necessarily in the psychological operations, consumer behavior has also been described in qualitatively different mechanisms. Specifically, the concept of impulse buying has been proposed to account for uncontrolled (Faber, Vohs, Baumeister, & Vohs, 2004) or unplanned (Kalla & Arora, 2011) consumer behavior. In addition, an overwhelming urge has also been identified as characteristic of impulsive buying (Beatty & Ferrell, 1998). Although the duality of the heuristics approach is primarily based on the substituted contents, impulse buying differs from rational choice by the nature of the process itself. The lack of planning suggests that this type of consumer behavior is not a function of judgment and is not a matter of choice, be it systematic or heuristic. Instead, it is the expression of a behavioral impulse in which affect does not serve as a source of information but as a direct behavioral facilitator. Thus, duality models that include a more direct behavioral component might be capable of explaining impulse buying. This applies to the hot–cool model (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) in which the “go”- oriented hot system is contrasted to the “know”based cool counterpart. It also applies to the RIM (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Strack, Werth, & Deutsch, 2006), for which the interaction of the two systems is constitutive. From this perspective, consumer behaviors have both impulsive and reflective components that contribute to different degrees. Situational and contextual factors may strengthen one or the other
Dual-self model of impulse control. To account for a broad range of regularities and irregularities in economic behavior, Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (2006) have formulated a dual-self model. This model attempts to explain certain anomalies in behavioral economics, in particular intertemporal choice and risk aversion. Specifically, the model assumes two selves that differ in their preferences. There is a patient long-term self and an impulsive and myopic short-term self that have different preferences over time. That is, the myopic self puts higher value on smaller but immediate rewards, whereas the long-term self is willing to wait for higher rewards. Most important, it is assumed that for the long-term self, the self-control that is necessary to forgo the immediate reward will be affected by cognitive load. As a consequence, depletion of cognitive resources will put the long-term self at a disadvantage and give its impulsive short-term counterpart the upper hand. It is interesting to note that this highly formalized duality model from economics is primarily based on a psychological characteristic, namely, the efficiency component of automaticity. Although the mechanisms are not further developed, this theory demonstrates how psychological principles of duality may be harnessed to solve problems in other areas.
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to determine assessments of risk and monetary value (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007). Derived from the availability heuristic (Schwarz et al., 1991), feelings of ease and fluency were identified as pervasive substitutes to influence a great variety of economic choices, among them consumer decisions (Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson, 2007) and the acquisition of industrial equities (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2006; Topolinski & Strack, 2010), as well as judgments of risk in different domains (i.e., high fluency reduces risk assessments; Song & Schwarz, 2009).
CRITICISMS OF DUALITY MODELS The development of duality models has been accompanied by several criticisms that have focused on different issues. 915
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As a consequence, they propose a more parsimonious unimodel whose operations merely differ in the ease of processing. In other words, Kruglanski and Thompson argued that simplifying a judgment does not necessarily imply the operation of psychologically different mechanisms. Specifically, heuristic cues and message arguments are functionally equivalent, although they differ in the ease with which they can be performed and the cognitive effort that is necessary. Thus, the unimodel implies variations in efficiency as a component of automaticity and emphasizes that a simplification of judgments does not necessarily imply the adoption of psychologically different mechanisms. Although the original presentation of the unimodel (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999) was predominantly based on dual models of attitude change, its more recent version (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011) extends the implications of the model to the distinction between intuitive and deliberate judgments in general and thereby to most duality models in social psychology. Specifically, it is claimed that all judgments can be based on the same rules and that the selection of the rule depends on cognitive, motivational, and ecological constraints. Automatization in the sense of increased efficiency is seen as a mere routinization of rules. Other criticisms concern the empirical antecedents and the consequences for falsifiability. Specifically, Keren and Schul (2009) have argued that the vagueness of most duality models and the lack of parsimony make it difficult to derive testable predictions. Similarly, associative processes may be hard to distinguish from rule-based processes on empirical grounds (Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996; Moors & De Houwer, 2006b). However, even if a model may not be falsifiable as a whole, the amount of empirical research that has been stimulated and the enormous applied potential highlighted in this chapter shed some doubt on the cogency of these objections. Moreover, to assess the costs of lower parsimony, one must consider the integrative power of these models (Van Lange, 2013). It is difficult to evaluate some of these criticisms because they are not sufficiently focused on a specific model. Conceptually, Keren and Schul (2009) may be right in pointing at some weaknesses that
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Most important, perhaps, it has been claimed that in reality, the two processes are not as distinct as they are described in the models. For example, the conceptual distinction between associative and rule-based reasoning in Sloman’s (1996) model has been criticized as ambiguous, empirically indistinguishable, and not applicable to many examples of reasoning (Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996; Moors & De Houwer, 2006b). From a more epistemic vantage point, it has been argued that because of their complexity, higher order mental phenomena cannot be reduced to distinct systems because (a) they cannot be isolated and (b) they are unlikely to be complete (Keren & Schul, 2009). Moreover, Keren and Schul (2009) pointed out that no neuronal substrate in the brain can be identified that would match the two underlying systems. However, some models of duality imply that external or internal determinants of judgmental facilitation may result in the use of contents that simplify syllogistic reasoning. Most prominently, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have invoked the concept of heuristics as simplifying rules of thumb that are based on attribute substitution (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Other models, particularly in the domain of attitude change–persuasive communication (ELM, HSM), have adopted a similar perspective. Although this substitution may include semantic–episodic information or subjective experiences that may enter into the judgment as information (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), that it facilitates the inferences is crucial. Obviously, this type of simplification cannot be described by a unique way of processing but by the amount of necessary effort. In fact, this type of duality has been criticized by pointing out that the substitutes involve the same inferential processes and that, under certain circumstances, they may require even more cognitive capacity (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). As a consequence, the proposal has been to deal with the apparent duality in a more parsimonious unimodel. In an alternative conceptualization, Kruglanski and Thompson (1999) argued that in some duality models (e.g., the ELM), operations from both the heuristic and the systematic system are based on underlying mechanisms that are reflective in nature. 916
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contiguity (e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2004). Most important, perhaps, the retrieval of contents from memory and the resulting probability of their use in syllogistic inferences is determined less by rules and more by their frequent and recent prior activation (Higgins, 1996). Thus, the unimodel raises the issue of whether an increase in automaticity is sufficient to postulate duality. Obviously, efficiency may be increased by substituting (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) contents that are easier to process, which may not imply differences in the underlying psychological mechanisms. This criticism, however, does not seem to apply to duality models that are based on qualitative differences in the psychological processes that are involved in generating the responses. This particularly seems to be the case if two systems are claimed to interact.
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On the basis of the described models of duality and in the light of the reported criticisms, it seems appropriate to ask whether these conceptual approaches are good theories of social psychology. To engage in this assessment, we have adopted the ideals that have recently been proposed by Paul Van Lange (2013). In what he called TAPAS, Van Lange invoked the ideas of truth, abstraction, progress, and applicability as standards. The first ideal of truth crucially hinges on the testability of the hypotheses that are derived from a theory. Suggesting the operation of different processes or systems is not unique to duality models. For example, memory researchers have proposed the existence of distinct memory systems (e.g., Tulving, 1985), emotion researchers have distinguished between several appraisal processes (Grandjean & Scherer, 2008), and cognitive neuroscientists have differentiated subsystems involved in emotion control (Pessoa, 2009). In these and other areas as well as in the field of duality models in social psychology, researchers face the challenge of providing convincing evidence for process distinctiveness. Indeed, this is a daunting task (Dunn & Kirsner, 1988). But abandoning theoretical constructs referring to distinct inner processes as in behaviorism creates new and
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prevent some duality models from being awarded the status of full-blown theories and cause them to remain theoretical frameworks. This criticism, however, may apply equally to a large number of other conceptual models in psychology. A more targeted criticism is implied in the unimodel in that Kruglanski and Thompson’s (1999) unified approach sheds light on some weaknesses of duality models. In detail, the unimodel implies that all judgments have a truth value and are therefore propositional in nature. To arrive at a judgment, rule-based reasoning is therefore necessary because truth is not a characteristic of associative contents. Even if a judgment is based on feelings, its endorsement requires an inference in which the feeling serves as an antecedent. Thus, even intuitive judgments require some genuinely reflective components. However, the unimodel is less convincing in its claim that automatization is merely the routinization of syllogistic rules. Instead, research has suggested that to understand automatic operations, it is necessary to consider genuine associative mechanisms that replace the syllogistic rules. For example, a child may learn to multiply by repeatedly applying the rules of addition. Thus, the product of 6 × 6 may be generated by repeatedly adding the number 6. However, automatization of the multiplication is not achieved by routinizing the repeated additions but by the emergence of an immediate link between characteristics of the operation and the result. Described by Logan (1988) as the instance theory of automaticity, it is the frequent and recent co- occurrence of properties that affords the transition from controlled to automatic operations. In other words, a new, different process sets in that is driven by psychologically distinct mechanisms. Although syllogistic reasoning and associative mechanisms often lead to the same outcomes, diagnostic cases have demonstrated that they are not identical. Thus, it has been demonstrated that negations cannot be facilitated by practice unless they pertain to the same content (Deutsch et al., 2006). Another example is the finding that the most common mistake in syllogistic reasoning is people’s mistaking simple conditionals as biconditionals, which corresponds to the associative principle of
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vehicles, people’s behavior can best be changed if the interventions match the mechanisms that drive the behavior.
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perhaps more severe problems (e.g., Fodor, Bever, & Garrett, 1974). Even if the ultimate tenet of duality cannot be subjected to a definite examination, the specific predictions that have been generated have received remarkable empirical support. One might argue that the assumption of duality makes the models more complicated and less parsimonious. However, this standard cannot be evaluated on an absolute level but must be seen in relation to what a theory is able to achieve compared with more parsimonious models. We would like to argue that giving up a bit of simplicity was worth it. The second ideal is that of abstraction. Here, the capability of reducing seemingly diverse phenomena to a common psychological denominator is the criterion for evaluating a theory. On this dimension, models of duality have been particularly successful in integrating phenomena such as high versus low accessibility, explicit versus implicit attitudes, systematic versus heuristic judgments, reflective versus impulsive determination of behavior, and so forth into one framework and identifying basic conditions under which one or the other would be more likely to occur. Many phenomena (e.g., that of anchoring) can now be seen as a special case of more general mechanisms. Progress or innovation is the third ideal, and no doubt exists that many new insights have been generated in the context of duality models. Examples are the role of negations in attitude change (Deutsch et al., 2006) and the role of cognitive load in the fundamental attribution error (Gilbert et al., 1988), both of which were discovered from the vantage point of dual-process models. Finally, Van Lange (2013) turned Lewin’s (1945) insight that nothing is as practical as a good theory into a criterion of a good theory. That is, its applicability serves as a characteristic to judge its value. Duality models fare particularly well on this criterion. Their insights have been readily adopted by neighboring disciplines such as clinical and health psychology on one side and economic psychology (including judgment and decision making, behavioral economics, and consumer psychology) on the other. Moreover, duality models have served to design interventions that work best under specific conditions. Just like the different engines in hybrid 918
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