THE CLIENTELISTIC PARTY: A Modified Version of a Catch-all Party in the Czech Republic? Michal Klima Abstract Is it feasible to identify a new sub-category of political party within a broader type of catch-all party in the Czech Republic? It is clear from political science literature that political parties are not static entities. Similar to other political institutions, they tend to transform with time, in response to changes in their surrounding environment. If the economic, social, cultural and political parameters in society are to substantially change, it is possible to deduce a change in the role of a political party and its internal organisational structure. The transition from totalitarian to democratic societies in Central, and partially in Eastern Europe, presents a process so unique that one may legitimately question if this has not resulted in a serious modification of the “catch-all party” type. In the region of Central Europe, Czechoslovakia – and after 1993 the Czech Republic – presents a special case, where during political and economic transformation next to general features, specific factors were also enforced, which eventually influenced the set-up and formation of parties in their early stages. It is left to consideration and further scrutiny to decide whether the unrepeatable environment of the Czech-Moravian melting pot, characterised by the political culture of nonideological and unscrupulous pragmatism, has not cultivated the “clientelistic form”of political party. This sub-category may epitomise one of the developing potentials within the scope of a wider concept of the catch-all party.

Adaptation is the basic precondition of evolution. In this context, political science studies the developmental stages of political parties. Generally, the following developmental typology of stages is accepted: elite parties (19th century); mass parties (1880-1960); catch-all parties (after 1945). Elite parties (Weber, 1946)1 represent the early stage in the development of political parties. They are the product of social relations in the 19th century, when the feudal order gave way to the beginnings of industrial society. Mass parties (Duverger, 1954)2 correspond most with industrial society, which saw the introduction of universal suffrage and by the existence of sharp socio-political cleavages. Finally, there are catch-all parties (Kirchheimer, 1966),3 which form during the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial society. These individual types of political parties differ in terms of their relationship to civil society and to the state. Clearly, each of these developmental types of political party are polar categories that in the given reality of one country or another can assume various transitional states or can co-exist at the same time. The political-science discourse surrounding political parties in the Czech Republic at the start of the 21st century generally concurs that the Czech Republic has a standard and stable party system that is fully comparable to those present in advanced Western 1

Weber, M.: ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in Gerth H. H. – Mills, C. W. (eds.): From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford University Press, 1946. 2 Duverger, M.: Political Parties, Methuen, London 1964. 3 Kirchheimer, O.: ‘The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems’, in La Palombara, J. – Weiner, M. (eds.): Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 177-200.

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democracies and as such is one that many in other post-communist countries might envy. Five main parties have been represented in the lower chamber of Parliament with almost no major fluctuations for over a decade. There is one large party on the right, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), and one large party on the left, the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), and in between there is the smaller Christian Democratic Party (KDU-CSL) and the small liberal or environmentally oriented parties. In addition there is the Communist Party (KSCM), representing the extreme left. However, behind the facade of would-be stability and standardisation in the sense of advanced democracies, there are deeper and more fundamental processes that do not testify to the good quality of democracy in the Czech Republic. On the contrary, the current situation is alarming. In an increasingly individualistic and atomised society, Czech political parties are the rare hierarchically organised structures that can function like ‘little armies’. Under certain circumstances they can assume authoritarian traits or they act like an octopus of corruption that penetrates every part of the social order. Particularly exposed to this kind of threat are states in which a political culture where social ties, cohesion, solidarity are diminishing along with a fragile institutional division of power, and a weak civil society. Without these constraining and balancing factors, parties can behave as though they are out of control. The post-communist context, especially in the Czech Republic, is fertile ground for cultivating such clientelistic, aggressive, and pragmatic party groupings. Owing to the privileged position parties have in relation to the division of labour, since they are in charge of decision making institutions, they decide not only whom to appoint to posts in these institutions but also, directly or indirectly, about the distribution of public funds. Among other things, party elites approve budgets, laws, and bye-laws, award public tenders and grants, execute privatisations, sell land and property, and determine rent policies and prices. Hence political parties, given their influence, decide on the allocation of resources and riches into the hands of individuals and groups. The influence of parties determines which individuals and groups are entrusted with considerable amounts of wealth. It was through a symbiosis of the worlds of politics and business by means of lobbyist ties that political parties in post-communist countries successfully adapted to the circumstances of the economic transition. Under certain favourable circumstances, political parties can transform themselves into privileged firms operating in a more or less hidden politico-economic market. Political parties then become business subjects in sui generis respectively clientelistic organisations. This essay will examine whether it is possible to identify the combination of general and specific variables in the Central and Eastern European space and particularly in the Czech Republic which would justify the conclusion that a new kind of political party has emerged. In other words, it will be considered whether a unique social framework has taken shape for political parties to operate, one that is substantially different from the situation in advanced Western democracies. The essay will list some negative examples of political party conduct that in sum could support a hypothesis about the formation of a new kind of ‘clientelistic parties’ within the wider concept of the catch-all party.

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1. The Formation of the Party System in the Czech Republic – More than just an Economic Transformation The standing of political parties and politics in the Czech Republic today has much to do with how its democratic party system was founded and evolved, or in other words, with how politics were done before and after 1989. The inception and formation of political parties after 1989 were significantly influenced by two interconnected factors that, for logical reasons, do not exist in Western Europe: discontinuity and the postcommunist context. Although it possible to see some form of continuity in the Communist Party (KSCM) and the Christian Democratic Party (KDU-CSL), in the sense of their party programmes and voter support, all the other parties emerged from nothing. To some degree or another all the parties in government and even in Parliament on the whole played some role in the political and economic transformation and thus in the course of democratisation and the transition to a market economy. However, the problem is how the economic transformation, how privatisation, proceeded. During the vast transfer of state property into private ownership there were numerous cases of unexplained bankruptcies, asset stripping, and other forms of economic crime, which occurred on a mass scale. The state’s debt consolidation agency was then left with the task of assuming responsibility for milliards of Crowns of bad debts. The entire economic transformation, which was based on a privatisation process on an unprecedented scale, proceeded alongside the formation and functioning of the three main political parties: the right-wing Civic Democrats (ODS), the left-wing Social Democrats (CSSD), and the broad coalition party, the Christian Democrats (KDUCSL). The unique transfer of vast state property into private ownership mainly left its mark on party elites. The post-communist 1990s were truly unique in terms of party formation. In this regard, Marek Dalik, the closet advisor to the former prime minister, Mirek Topolanek and ‘grey eminence’ of Czech politics, remarked: ‘… in this country a generation has become cemented in politics that did not grow up in a good environment in terms of education, opportunities for self-fulfilment, and the overall level of culture. So it was easy to get into politics in the 1990s, but it has now already begun to get harder and harder. But at the same time I can see a huge lack of interest in entering Czech politics. Good-quality people are bothered by the low, uncultivated environment.’4 In this interview he then went on to say that two worlds – politics on the one hand and business people or rather crooks on the other – have become intertwined. And he adds that the difference from politics in Europe or elsewhere in the world is that ‘the majority of people who are in Czech politics would be unable or at least would have a hard time making a living in another field. That’s the main reason why they’re in politics and why they want to remain there at any price.’5 x

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Negative phenomena like clientelism, corruption, and the alienation of political elites from citizens are not the result of just a single factor, in this case the economic 4

An interview with Marek Dalik – see Plavcova, A.: ‘Jiste pane premiere’, Patek - priloha Lidovych novin, 11.7.2008, p. 8. 5 Ibid.

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transformation. These phenomena have deep and complex causes that are directly linked to the parameters of post-communist Czech society and the mutation of political parties into clientelistic organisations. Where do the ideologically impoverished political pragmatism and purely technocratic approach to power that generate clientelism, corruption, and ultimately political alienation draw their strength and energy in Czech society? The sources or factors are the following: 1) The fall of communism and the breakdown of the rigid and all-embracing system of the communist worldview reinforced a tendency towards deideologization and pragmatism. 2) The post-totalitarian economic transformation signified the transfer of vast state property into private hands. While some small errors or losses were to be expected, not corruption and asset stripping on such a vast scope. 3) The post-communist political culture inherited a weak civic sector and servile behaviour on the part of citizens towards those in power. These three factors are present to varying degree in other post-totalitarian states in Central Europe. However, there are three other facts that are essentially specific to the Czech Republic: 1) The normalisation of the Husak era in the 1970s and the 1980s, which marked the final stage of the so called real socialism6 in Czechoslovakia, anticipated the political culture of the post-totalitarian period. In the Husak era of mass distrust in the political regime, ‘sponging off the state’ became a considerably widespread phenomenon, aptly characterized by a familiar saying from that time: ‘who doesn’t rob the state robs his family’. 2) Another particularity is the anti-Catholic tradition, anti-church sentiment, and prevailing atheism in society. The value orientations of citizens are less bound up in the rules of Christianity. Instead, they are dominated by boundless individualism and pragmatism. The country’s political culture is thus strongly pragmatic. 3) And finally, it is possible to note a weakening sense of patriotism and less nationalism. After Czechoslovakia divided into two separate states, namely: the Czech and the Slovak republics in 1993, the majority of Czech citizens became disillusioned, because up until that time they had identified with the unified state. Moreover, the successor state, the Czech Republic, essentially became an ethnically homogeneous territory, so politically significant conflicts with the Slovaks and even the Hungarian minority vanished. The last three factors show that in the Czech Republic, unlike in Slovakia (the Hungarian minority) and Hungary (Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia) and in Poland (with a persistent animosity towards the authoritarian Russian superpower), religious and ethnic cleavages have ceased to be a driving force in politics. There are thus no strong group identities or major political conflicts in the Czech Republic with the exception of the traditional left/right cleavage. There are some advantages to this, as politics is not overly conflicting or polarised. However the 6

The term normalisation refers to the period after the Soviet invasion in 1968, when the secretary general G. Husak ascended to power by leading the the Communist party and consequently the restoration of the original old totalitarian order followed. The period of normalisation is often referred to as real socialism (realny socialismus).

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pragmatic political culture helps shape a conception of politics as a utilitarian or even an exploitative pursuit. It is no accident that in such an environment those who try to promote the moral dimensions of politics are mocked as advocates of ‘false truth and love’7. A political culture based on boundless pragmatism creates an environment in which the conduct of the main players in the political game exhibits a weaker level of ideological grounding and a high potential for corruption.

2. The Quantity and Quality of Party Scandals in the Czech Republic Politics in the Czech Republic, like in other democracies, largely constitutes the continuation of economic interests. What in Czech politics could be identified rather new and particularly alarming is the frequency of political affairs and cases of corruption and the escalating level of political rudeness, arrogance, and cynicism. Top politicians across the party spectrum do not seem at all troubled by various affairs, but paradoxically they try to profit from them in the sense that regardless of the issue what matters is to be at the centre of the media’s attention. Below is a list of the unusually large number of affairs that occurred in top politics and were the focus of media attention within a period of just two months in November and December 2007: 1) In November, the prime minister and the head of ODS - the largest party in government, Mirek Topolanek,8 returned from an official trip to Bulgaria with a detour to Innsbruck. He stopped off there for the private purpose of doing some skiing in the Alps. The unofficial flight detour cost Czech taxpayers an additional 150 000 CZK. The prime minister explained his stopover in Innsbruck as necessary in order to meet with the Czech ambassador to Austria. It should be noted that the prime minister made three trips like this in 2007.9 2) The former prime minister and at this time the main opposition figure, Jiri Paroubek, head of CSSD, was caught travelling along the motorway at the extremely high speed of 200 km an hour, well in excess of the official speed limit of 110 km/h. Such action would have put any ordinary citizen at risk of losing their license for a year and receiving a fine of up to 10 000 CZK. This ‘special citizen / top politician’ gave the excuse that he knew nothing about what was happening as he slept through the trip; it was allegedly the fault of his driver.10 3) The unofficial 2007 champion with the most inadequately explained political affairs, the head of the Christian Democratic Party and the temporarily 7

After the Velvet Revolution in 1989 the former Czech president Vaclav Havel used the term “laska a pravda vitezi nad lzi a nenavisti„ i.e.“The truth and love will always beat the lies and hatred „. 8 In May 2009 the Chamber of Deputies (the lower chamber of Parliament) gave a vote of no confidence in the government and Mirek Topolanek ceased to be the chair of the government. 9 In April 2007 the prime minister went to Innsbruck in Austria while making an official trip to Sweden. In October 2007 he stopped in the Italian town of Bologna during an official trip to France. For more see Machalkova, J. – Reichl, J.: ‘Tajna operace Innsbruck’, Lidove noviny, 21.11.2007, and Machalkova, J.: ‘Tajemny Topolankuv vylet’, Lidove noviny 20.11.2007, p. 1, 4. 10 Svobodova, I.: ‘Audi s sefem CSSD porusovalo predpisy: vysoka rychlost + dvojita plna cara’, Mlada fronta Dnes 19.11.2007, p. A1; Svobodova, I.: ‘Pozor z cesty. Jede zenich Paroubek’, Mlada fronta Dnes 19.11.2007, p. A3, and also Svobodova, I. – Janousek, A.: ‘Jiri Paroubek jezdici a spici’, Mlada fronta Dnes 20.11.2007, p. A3.

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resigned deputy prime minister Jiri Cunek, who announced his intention to rejoin the government with the full support of the top figures in his party, one that bears the word ‘Christian’ in its name.11 4) The media discovered that Pavel Bem, the deputy chair of the ODS and the mayor of Prague, was renting a villa for half of the given market price in the respective locality. The villa is owned by his friend – a developer whose business is dependent on decisions made by the city council authorities.12 5) It came to light that Bohuslav Sobotka, the former minister of finance and currently the deputy chair of CSSD - the largest opposition party, excused a certain businessman from paying income tax and fines owed in the amount 26 million CZK. This is something that can only be done in extremely exceptional circumstances. He made this decision just before the government that he was a part of, left office (in August 2006); this tax break was granted to a hotel operator who is a friend of Jiri Paroubek, the former prime minister.13 6) The media made the scandalous discovery that the uncrowned head of the Czech underworld, Frantisek Mrazek (who was murdered in January 2006), had contacts at every level of politics: the Office of the Government, the Chamber of Deputies, the Ministry of the Interior, the National Security Authority, and among top opposition politicians.14 If these scandals are just the tip of the iceberg, then, in a figurative sense, there are many more peaks in the Czech mountain range of political-corruption affairs and scandals. The following two affairs are among them: the scandal surrounding the exprime minister Stanislav Gross, and the shocking way in which the Presidential elections proceeded. In 2005 Gross resigned from the post of prime minister when he was unable to explain where he obtained the money he used to purchase a flat. In 2007 shares in an energy company were bought and subsequently sold under obscure circumstances at a profit of eighty million crowns.15 Just to illustrate the atmosphere at the time, the wife of this ex-prime minister was a partner in a business with a

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First, J. Cunek never gave a satisfactory explanation for how he was able to deposit 3.5 million CZK in the bank when, according to his recorded income, his family could never have afforded to save that much. Second, he never explained how it was that he was saving millions but at the same time collecting social state benefits. Third, it is not clear where half a million CZK from an alleged bribery affair came from. More than a hundred articles have been published on Cunek’s affairs. Here it is enough to cite just the following two: Capova, J.: ‘Cunek nevysvetlil zdaleka vse’, Lidove noviny 6.12.2007, p. 3; Kopecky, J.: ‘Nevysvetlil uspory, miri do vlady’ Mlada fronta Dnes 5.12.2007, p. A2. 12 For more, see: Sťastny, O.: ‘Vila pro Bema. Zn.: za polovic’, Mlada fronta Dnes 21.11.2007, p. A3. 13 Malecky, J.: ‘Zalobci proveruji Sobotku’, Lidove noviny 12.12.2007, p. 2. See also Mates, J.: ‘Paroubkuv hotelier neplatil dan’, Mlada fronta Dnes 3.12.2007, p. A2. 14 Jaroslav Kmenta described these connections in a series of articles that were published in November and December 2007 in Mlada fronta Dnes. All the facts are summarized in: Kmenta, J. (2007): Kmotr Mrazek, Mlada fronta Dnes, Prague 2007. 15 It remains unexplained why Gross’s friend sold the former prime minister shares in a prospering company at well below market price. Gross bought them for twenty million Crowns, and then almost immediately sold them for five times the price, that is, for 100 million Crowns. It is also unclear where Gross, an articled clerk, acquired the initial ten million in capital. See, for example, the article ‘Hidden Bay. Tady bydli Gross’, Mlada fronta Dnes 14.4.2008, p. A1, A3. For more, see Kubatova, Z. – Havligerova, J.: ‘Grossova investice je podezrele dobry byznys’, Hospodarske noviny 27.-30. September 2007, p. 3; and also the article: Komarek, M.: ‘Trapna volba? Nikoliv. Odpovidajici’, Mlada fronta Dnes 12.2.2008.

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woman who also owned a brothel. Later, information surfaced that Ms. Gross also purchased a flat in Florida for 12 million CZK.16 Another affair was the “wild” Presidential elections held in February 2008, on which occasion high-ranking politicians made it apparent that, in high-stakes political games, they were willing to use any means to achieve their ends, including extortion. Some electors, members of Parliament, received threatening text messages, and others were sent bullets or gunpowder in the mail. x

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As mentioned above, the extent of the corruption and clientelistic affairs and scandals assumes incredible proportions. These affairs affect not just top political circles but every level of the organizational hierarchy of the relevant political parties. The reputable daily newspapers refer to them at length almost every day. The reports read like a newspaper crime segment. Yet it is not clear whether anyone is still interested in these affairs and whether they are ever investigated. The reality is that the quality of the political sphere is a reflection of the overall quality of society. If the wild Presidential elections drew attention to the phenomenon of the undermining of an open and fair political contest by means of extortion and corruption, then this is a phenomenon that can be observed in other areas of social relations, too. Is extortion not a regular occurrence in the economic sphere, too? A study that the Czech Chamber of Commerce conducted among four hundred Czech businesses arrived at some negative findings. An absolute majority of the respondents described extortion as a serious problem, and a full 23 percent of respondents indicated having directly experienced extortion, and another 30 percent of respondents indicated that they were aware of cases of extortion in their surroundings. In addition, 15 percent of the ‘affected’ businesses identified the source of the extortion as political pressure or even politicians directly. Extortion obviously forms a significant part of the competitive environment of the economy.17 In 2004 the biggest football bribery scandal in Czech history struck the country´s most popular sport. In total, 5 clubs, 9 officials, 14 referees, and 5 delegates were punished. Nevertheless, the football union did not show any interest in dealing properly with these affairs. One of the top football officials, J. Kubicek, wrote: ‘All of us who work in football have encountered a bribable referee, delegate, or official. Who here is a saint in a group where everyone knows each other?’18 Acts of extortion, corruption, and clientelism are based on a lack of respect for the rules of the political, economic, and sports competitions in an effort to gain illegitimate advantages. This may seem trivial, but it is no accident that Czechs 16

The flat, 180 m2 in size, was purchased at Hidden Bay residence in Miami. Details, including photographs, see ‘Hidden Bay. Tady bydli Gross’, Mlada fronta DNES 14.4.2008, p. A1, A3. 17 Lunakova, Z. – Beranek, J.: ‘Vydirani v byznysu? V Cesku bezna vec.’, Hospodarske noviny 4.12.2007, p. 1, 17. 18 Saiver, F.: ‘Afera po roce: fotbal amnestuje’, Mlada fronta DNES, 28.4.2005, p. 5. See also Blazkova, J. – Chudara, J. – Saiver, F.: ‘Policie nasla 175 000 Kc. Uplatek?’, Mlada fronta DNES, 3.5.2008, p. 8; Palicka, J. – Chudara, J.: ‘Synot ze dna na spicku. A zpet? SKANDAL ROKU: korupce se vali fotbalovou ligou’, Mlada fronta DNES, 6.5.2004, p. 6.

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abroad rank among the worst drivers. Not because they are technically inept, but because they do not respect traffic regulations.19 x

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Some might say of the various affairs and scandals in the Czech Republic that this is nothing new under the sun. Corruption and scandals are common phenomena in every democracy, including advanced ones. Nevertheless, in the Czech environment, the quantity of these scandals is on the rise to the extent that they affect not just the top political echelons but also the party elite at the regional and communal levels. The quantity of affairs is such that it is possible to speak about a new quality of corruption potential in Czech politics. This quality is becoming a systemic property seriously influencing how the entire political and economic systems work. Political elites in the Czech Republic are not punished for corruption or scandals and the cases often just fade away. This is the direct result of breaching the division of power, where the elites secure impunity for themselves by intervening in the work of the police, the public prosecutor’s office, and that of the courts. In many respects, the Czech party system resembles the situation in Italy during the 1990s before the crisis of political parties and the political system there, resulting from the pervasive corruption of political elites. A similarity to the state of the party system in Belgium was noted by a Czech news correspondent in Brussels, L. Tvaruzkova. She wrote that in the 1990s some politicians in Belgium were implicated as key figures in some dirty business that led to a number of ‘shootings, suicides, and the sentencing of some politicians behind bars. Here, too, it at one time cost twice as much as elsewhere in Europe to build a motorway, and military contracts in the millions were awarded in almost the ‘Czech way”. It is no coincidence that in Flemish politicians are referred to as zakkenvullers, loosely translated that means ‘fillers of their own pockets’. That phrase resonates very familiarly in the Czech Republic. Unlike Belgium, where political parties returned a portion of the illegally obtained money and ‘dozens of politicians ended up with a criminal record and were banned from political activity’,20 in the Czech Republic corruption remains enshrined in the system. An accompaniment to all this is that the public is swamped with scandals of corruption and clientelism, and as the number of scandals grows, so too does the public’s weariness of and apathy towards them. V.Vlk, a lawyer, has written about the ‘inflated number of prosecutions to no effect’.21 Not only is it that political scandals are never subsequently resolved in some way and the public loses trust in the institutional redress mechanisms, but more than a few of them drag on so long that political scientists and journalists cannot keep track of them.

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Petrik, I.: ‘Radary meri kvuli ridicum. A ne obecni kase.’, Lidove noviny, 16.7.2008, p. 1,8. Tvaruzkova, L.: ‘Po usi v Bruselu’, Hospodarske noviny, 21.7.2008, p. 2. 21 Vlk, V.: ‘Justice ma v ocich verejnosti…’, Lidove noviny, 8.8.2008, p. 1,8. 20

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3. Clientelism and the Clientelistic Party - Main Characteristics This part will summarize the main features of clientelism and its agents in the political sphere, i.e. clientelistic parties. Clientelism is a system of continuously expanding and relatively hidden ties and contacts between, mainly, the worlds of politics and business, the purpose of which is the maximization of gains through the concentration of power and wealth. Clientelistic parties play the role of gearshifts, strategically located in the power sphere so that they can use their influence to successfully execute a whole range of transactions and mutual exchanges of services. Here the end justifies the means. Clientelistic parties achieve their aims with the help of a vast arsenal of nonstandard and hidden means. Dishonest practices are the norm. Clientelistically established parties lie at the heart of a complex clientelistic system around which clusters of connected businesses gravitate in orbit. Parties are utterly irreplaceable in their pivotal role of clientelism. The hierarchical and disciplined nature of their organizational networks, spread out relatively evenly throughout the country, predisposes them to this role. Clientelistic parties – in the interest of attaining and defending the maximisation of their gains – ensure that their repertoire includes pursuits aimed at restricting or stamping out all that is independent of their influence. The aim being to eliminate whatever might stand in the way of their uncontrolled accumulation of wealth. They also seek to secure impunity for themselves from prosecution for their actions and at making it possible to level false accusations against the biggest critics of their conduct. Explicitly, a clientelistic party is a special type of party within the broader ‘catch-all’ type of party. The primary focus of a clientelistic party as a whole and of its individual components on the communal, regional, and state levels is immediate economic profit. To this effect, it seeks clients among similarly strong business entities, offering them the use of their influence, i.e. the use of their representative mandates and executive positions in important decision-making institutions and bodies. This relationship is reciprocal. Powerful economic players approach political parties just as they would their clients and offer them extraordinary awards in exchange for services or for securing them exclusive conditions on the business market. Clientelistic parties cater to their clients, and in turn allow themselves to be catered to as clients. A ‘client-client’ relationship thus takes shape between them. Their main clients are economic subjects, which are the source of the initial impulse for contact as they seek political decisions that are to their advantage. The person they contact could be a politician-party member or even a public servant, who does not usually act alone, as he or she is appointed within the wider clientelistic strategy. It could be thus said that the approach here is similar to when a person seeks to order a utility from someone who is a skilled worker or service person. Just as people look for their own plumber, lawyer, or psychologist, in this case they look for their own politician (or public servant). The ‘right one’ can be found at the communal,

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regional,22 or national level, or at every level of politics at once. Rough estimates by Transparency International stating that around 70 percent of public contracts awarded in the Czech Republic are to some extent manipulated, suggest that this approach pays off.23 As parties have gradually become clientelistic, their party structures are being increasingly influenced in recent years by a new factor, which is the intentional recruitment of some of their member base from the ranks of employees of local private businesses. Some businesses dependent on municipal or city contracts instruct their employees and, indirectly, their relatives to join a particular party. They pay their membership fees, and they provide refreshments, like beer and snacks, at party meetings. Not surprisingly, these kinds of members are not usually interested in the party programme or statutes, do not know who the party leaders are, and do not actually even vote for ‘their’ party. Their ‘party task’ is to supply the ‘voting machinery’ that will back a desired politician. These new voting majorities alter the power relations inside the party and secure the election of those politicians preferred by their employer company. This enables business to have an influence, for example, on the appointment of councillors and mayors, regional candidates, and even the election of deputy chairs at party congresses. This happened at the ODS party congress in 2008,24 but similar practices have also been witnessed in the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party. Speculative recruitment from the ranks of local private businesses is a phenomenon that in a sense leads to the partial privatisation of the district and regional branches of the party. This occurs when politicians accept offers from businesses to sponsor them or, newly, to supply them with a voting majority at party meetings. Businesses ‘raise’ their own politicians and can even control the party in a given area. In return business representatives receive services in the form of public contracts and valuable information. Clearly, in this kind of party environment, it is not about the clash of ideas but about immediate profit and power. The main party players are representatives of business interest groups that are usually regional in scope. Clientelism also essentially reveals itself to be non-partisan in nature, showing a tendency forge links even between parties regardless of their political or ideological differences. The epitome of this kind of inter-party co-existence in the Czech Republic occurred in 1998-2002 with the ‘opposition’ or ‘cartel’ agreement” between the left-wing CSSD and the right-wing ODS, which ensured the formation and functioning of the government for the whole four-year term. It is not without interest 22

According to a study by Transparency International, most of the public contract deals that are not transparent are made in the towns and cities. This is one of the reasons why the Ministry of the Interior prepared a new legal amendment designed to prevent a small group of city or town councillors from making decisions in closed-door meetings about leasing lucrative buildings or selling property. The amendment was supposed to make the political decision-making process transparent and limit corruption and conflicts of interest by giving representatives at public meetings the authority to make decisions in these matters. All bids would have to be made public, say, on the Internet and reasons would have to be given for the final decision. However, mayors and regional commissioners opposed the law and in the end none of this will be enacted. For more, see Blazek, V.: ‘Zakon proti korupci radnich bude mirnejsi’, Hospodarske noviny, 7.-9.3.2008, p. 2. 23 David Ondracek of Transparency International drew attention to this fact; see Blazek, V.: ‘Urady objevily korupci. A slibily, ze nebude’, Hospodarske noviny 21.1.2008, p. 3. 24 Kaiserova, Z.: ‘ODS nabira lidi, kteri ji ani nevoli’, Mlada fronta Dnes, 17.4.2009, p. A3.

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that clientelists of every party place particular value on agreements being kept. This is apparent in comments by M. Dalik, a top lobbyist and close colleague of the rightwing former Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek about the well-known left-wing lobbyist M. Slouf. ‘I’m an anti-communist, and I’ll never let the communists forget what they did with this country. Nevertheless, in my view Mr. Slouf is someone … who keeps his word and who can be trusted.’25 x

x

x

The clientelistic behaviour of party elites is not a coincidental phenomenon that affects just coincidental individuals. On the contrary, it is a systemic sign of how political parties function in a given society that is in a specific stage of development. The clientelistic party system unmistakably succeeds at grinding up almost everyone, even the initially most enthusiastic reformers, into a more or less homogeneous mass. An example here is the career path of Pavel Bem, deputy chair of the largest rightwing party, ODS, and also Mayor of Prague. In the beginning, many people had great hope that he would become a leader who would declare war on clientelististic and corrupt conduct. The subsequent disappointment in him is aptly expressed by J. Plesl, a journalist, who refers to him as a ‘former city liberal’ and especially upbraids him for allowing himself to be ‘ground up by all the Prague lobbyists, who are only interested in the billions in the city budget. Today he can serve as a warning example of what politics can do to a person’.26 The clientelistic system does not of course just mould individuals and their behaviour. As already noted, the contagion of clientelism mainly spreads between parties. It generates advantages all around – both for individuals and for parties as a whole. The advantages are twofold: first, better conditions for success in the power game, and second, above-average enrichment. In the case of individuals, anyone who can secure both kinds of profits for his/her party colleagues will have better political career prospects. Whoever cannot do this and instead hopes to practise ‘clean politics’ usually has no chance of successfully competing with the others and becoming the ‘pack leader’. In the worst case, the latter type of individual could wind up falsely accused of something and expelled from politics. With regard to parties as a whole, a prerequisite of success and of being able to obtain and hold onto a share of influence in executive power at the national, regional, and communal levels is being able to maintain special ties with the right, powerful economic player. It is not just at the national level of government that the ability to recruit complicit people from the ranks of the administration, the media, the police, the public prosecutor’s office, and the judiciary is valued. x

x

x

A clientelistic type of party spawns a mutually clientelistic relationship between the worlds of politics and business. The basic function of a political party in a democracy, which is to represent the main social groups reflecting relevant cleavages in society, thus fades into the background. This is accompanied by a corresponding process wherein political and ideological expressions of these divisions are rendered marginal 25

An interview with Marek Dalik – see Plavcova, A.: ‘Jiste pane premiere’, Lidove noviny - priloha Patek, 11.7.2008, p. 8. 26 Plesl, J.: ‘Chce to konkurenci’, Lidove noviny, 2.7.2008, p. 2.

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or even insignificant. These then come across like a populist show in the pre-election carnival. It is interesting that the reciprocal ‘client-client’ relationship between politics and business can even take on the form where the relevant figures switch sides or the two sides can be united in one individual. On the one hand, business representatives usually try to seek the favour of politicians, but occasionally they will even join a party directly and promote their narrow economic interests from within it. On the other hand, politicians usually offer businesses their services on the hidden economicpolitical market, but they can also move directly into the world of business. This occurs in two ways. If they remain in politics, they can sit on the boards of various state, semi-state, and city businesses. If for some reason they are forced out of politics, then an ‘unemployed politician’ may be provided with a social safety net in the form of a job or sinecures or both by a business with clientelistic obligations. A classic example is the fate of the former prime minister, Stanislav Gross, who, after the affair over his flat, resigned from all important functions and then within a relatively short time remarkably came into fabulous wealth. The journalist M. Weiss notes that it is no accident that the public do not trust politicians and suspect that the differences of opinion they profess on the ‘left versus right is for them just a matter of their career outlook at that moment and they are in politics only to collect contacts that they profit from later in business.’27 Clientelistic parties acquire parasitic features, and that gives rise to degenerative processes within the party. Generally, parties cease to respect the rules of the game. If the rules do not suit them, then they regularly try to get around, break, or do away with them. For example, everyone knows what rules apply for awarding public tenders. But everyone also knows that there has perhaps never been a case where a public tender was awarded under fair and square and transparent terms. Clientelistic parties by their nature destroy the rules of open competition in the economic market and that distorts and inhibits economic performance. Clientelistic parties by their nature hence also deform democracy. They can eat away at the quality of democracy or they can even pose a direct threat to democracy itself. The reason is their aggressive action and interventionism aimed at restricting or destroying the mechanism of checks and balances that exists in the division of power. Clientelistic parties inappropriately interfere in the work of the police, the public prosecutor, and the judiciary, and consequently they have a tendency to weaken the independence of these institutions. They only begrudgingly respect the Constitutional Court. They usually ignore the findings of audits by the Supreme Audit Office. They subject critical journalists to harsh verbal attacks. They try to stifle critical voices coming from civic associations combating corruption or even run down their employees publicly in the press. For example, the Ministry of Finance targeted Transparency International with an unusually high number of audits. And because the end justifies the means, clientelistic parties mine the personal contacts they have from the former totalitarian or the current intelligence services. They are not even averse to using bribery or collaborating with the criminal underworld, as is revealed in a recent publication by the journalist J. Kmenta.

27

Weiss, M.: ‘Peklo uprimnosti’, Lidove noviny, 23.8.2008, p. 2.

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4. The Clientelist Party – One Form of the Catch-all Party Where does the clientelisitc party fit in the developmental typology of political parties? In political science it is argued that after the Second World War, during the transition from industrial to post-industrial society, there was an increasing tendency for the ‘mass’ type of party (Duverger, 1954) to transform into a ‘catch-all’ party (Kirchheimer, 1966). Later, at a conference in Manchester, England, in 1995, P. Mair and R. Katz presented their concept of a new type of party. They called it a ‘cartel’ party,28 which in the new conditions of post-industrial society would replace the ‘catch-all’ party. Although opinions varied on whether or not a cartel party is a separate developmental type of party, from a Czech perspective during the late 1990’s, it then seemed that it was a new and developmentally higher type of political party. This opinion was based, among other things, on experiences from the Czech Republic in 1998-2002, when the two largest parliamentary parties from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum signed an agreement on cooperation. The parties’ objective in signing the agreement was to ensure the approval and survival of the government. Such a nonstandard alliance of left-wing CSSD and right-wing ODS was a step towards the cartelization of the political space and in many respects resembles the description of cartel parties. Nevertheless, in the context of further development and with the benefit of time, it is today more feasible to be inclined towards the opinion that it is not possible to regard a cartel party as a new and separate type of party in the development of the party system that would replace the catch-all party. The cartel party thus appears to be one potential form of catch-all party that tends to take shape in the specific circumstances of the simultaneous occurrence of two phenomena: 1) overabundant interconnections between parliamentary parties and the state, and 2) excessive cooperation between these parties respectively. Similarly, the clientelistic party can also be classified within the wider category of the ‘catch-all’ party as potentially being its next developmental stage. It also forms under the specific aforementioned circumstances. In other words, a catch-all party can assume multiple forms, depending on the specific conditions in a given country or group of countries within a given region. The countries in such a group are often territorially close, such as the states in the countries of Central, Eastern, and even Western Europe. Different political, economic, and cultural-historical processes occur in different European regions and to one degree or another have a modifying effect that influences the kind of catch-all party that emerges. It is important to point out that just because a country is part of a particular region does not mean that the conditions in that society cannot be more like those in a country in another region. For example, the Italian party system could perhaps fall into the same clientelistic category as the countries of Central Europe. The Dutch political scientist R. Koole, criticising the concept of the cartel party, also pointed out that party formation depends on the specific conditions in a given country and in a given region of Europe. The relationship between parties and the state is 28

Mair. P. – Katz, R.: ‘The Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics, 1995, 1.

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influenced by numerous variables, among them a country’s overall historical development, the development of the party system, and the way in which the media and the electoral system are organised. Political parties, for example, in countries that have had a dictatorship (Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) can assume specific features.29 But it is equally possible to identify the common and the specific conditions that shaped party formation in countries in the post-communist region. Within this large group of states it is also of course possible to distinguish the regions of Central Europe or the post-Soviet Baltic States. And obviously each particular country has more specific features of its own. And according to this logic it is possible to submit the hypothesis that all post-communist countries possess strong clientelist features, and the Czech Republic, owing to its specific features (discussed above), possesses a model type of clientelistic party. The post-communist environment became the ideal setting for the emergence of the form of clientelistic parties. The following phenomena and processes can be seen as the main reasons for this: 1) The prevailing initial discontinuity of parties and the new emergence of political parties as such within the context of the democratisation after 1989; a lower party membership base, and parties that are shallowly rooted in society; 2) The formation of parties in the conditions of an economic transformation based on the mass transfer of state property into the hands of private owners; 3) An under-developed civil society. The second cause has already been discussed above. With regard to this first of the three, it is worth somewhat elaborating the arguments behind that point here. The first part of the statement, ‘the prevailing initial discontinuity of parties’, refers to the fact that the end of the totalitarian system also marked the end of the era of rule by the communist single state-party (which was complemented by smaller satellite parties in certain countries). The start of the democratisation period also signalled the start of a process in which dozens of new parties emerged and took shape. This signified major discontinuity with the preceding period, as most parties that emerged were new, with no previous history, and the old ones experienced qualitative changes. The fact that the Communist Party continued to exist in the Czech Republic, the Christian Democrats underwent reform, and the Social Democrats tried to pick up after a fortyyear break does not contradict the validity of the overwhelming discontinuity phenomenon prevailing in the Czech party system. That brings us to the second part of the statement in the first point: ‘the small party membership bases and the shallow roots of parties in society’. The small number of members and shallow roots of parties are the result of the discontinuity and general newness of parties. P. Mair and I. Biezen found small membership bases to be a general feature of political parties in post-communist Central Europe.30 For example, in the Czech Republic, both of the two largest parliamentary parties, CSSD and ODS, emerged and each of them till date number only around twenty to thirty thousand party members. This means that the two largest government parties have very small 29

Koole, R.: ‘Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel: A Comment on the Notion of the Cartel Party’, Conference in Manchester, 1995. 30 Mair, P. – Biezen, I.: Party Membership in Twenty Democracies 1980-2000, Party Politics, Vol. 7, January 2001, No. 1, pp. 5-21.

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membership bases in the towns and regions. Each of these parties is in fact run by just several dozen or at most a hundred members, who occupy key positions in the communal, regional, and eventually the national level or key functions as representatives, councillors, mayors, and high-ranking public officials. In this narrow group of individuals everyone usually knows everything about one another, and this binds them together in the sense that they are able to keep each other in check.31 They tend to use their powerful positions of power not to promote ideas but rather to assert their narrow group interests. As the Czech lobbyist M. Dalik says: ‘There are several layers to politics and some are visible and some are not’.32 What is visible, or rather audible, is the vocal articulation of ideas, which actually play second fiddle and are of secondary importance in the Czech political game. What should remain concealed are the clientelistic practices exercised for the benefit of the narrow group of party elites. However, this certainly does not mean that the ideological ‘baggage’ of a party is irrelevant. Parliamentary parties still have ideological conferences and various thinktanks, and ideas and ideologies still have a mobilising function inside the party and a mobilising function on the outside against their ideological opponents. In sum, the following phenomena and activities are typical of clientelistic parties: 1) The unusual quantity and quality of corruption affairs and clientelistic practices; 2) The exercise of political influence becomes a business; parties tend to reconceive themselves as privileged firms operating in a covert politicaleconomic market; 3) The parasitic mode of existence and functioning of parties: the clientelistic function becomes the main function of a party and manifests itself in the ‘client-client’ relationship between the sphere of party politics and the sphere of business; 4) Partial ‘privatisation’ of local, district, and regional branches of the parties as the outcome of the targeted recruitment of part of the membership base from the ranks of employees of local private businesses; 5) The basic function of parties - i.e. their representative function of significant social groups (cleavages) - fades into the background; 6) The political ideology of parties becomes marginal or even insignificant (usually articulated on a formal, ritual level); 7) Standard government parties have the strongest tendency to become clientelistic; 8) The “contagion of clientalism” spreads on an intra-party level (within the party structures) as well as on an inter-party level (from one party to another); 9) The interconnection of clientelistic networks on an inter-party basis; 31

It is certainly no accident that unverified reports that Pavel Bem, deputy prime minister of the ruling ODS and Mayor of Prague, is under investigation in relation to the privatisation of Ruzyne Airport surfaced in a number of newspapers at the same time. However, the police’s corruption division denied information about an investigation. Subsequently Bem called on some journalists to not allow themselves to be ‘drawn into the unfair games of various groups of influence and interests’. It was known that at the time Bem was a critic of ODS chair and at the time prime minister, M. Topolanek, and also a rival within ODS of the then interior minister I. Langer, under whose authority the police fall. For more see ‘Policie: Pavla Bema nevysetrujeme’, Lidove noviny 28.8.2008, p. 4; ‘Policie: Primatora Bema nevysetrujeme’, Mlada fronta DNES, p. A2; ‘Bema nevysetrujeme tvrdi policie’, Hospodarske noviny, 28.8.2008, p. 2. 32 An interview with Marek Dalik – see Plavcova, A.: ‘Jiste pane premiere’, Lidove noviny – priloha Patek, 11.7.2008, p. 8.

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10) Clientelistic activities distort the legal environment in the sense that it becomes difficult to enforce the law; 11) There is a tendency to restrict all that is independent (not only verbal assaults on the independent media and civic associations and organisations); 12) There is a tendency to undermine the principle of the separation of power between the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary branches and to undermine the system of checks and balances; 13) There is a tendency to undermine the rules of fair and open competition in politics and economics. From the above it is apparent that ‘cartel’ and ‘clientelistic’ parties are just two variants or sorts of party within the wider category of the ‘catch-all’ party. However, it is important to note that both forms of party, cartel and clientelistic, represent nonstandard mutations of the catch-all party that occur in negative circumstances. They are in fact deformations of the standard catch-all party. Here mention should be made of the general characteristics of the standard model of the catch-all party according to O. Kirchheimer. In his 1966 essay ‘The Transformation of Party Systems in Western Europe’, he identified five typical signs of a catch-all party: 1) the party’s ‘ideological baggage’ is substantially reduced; 2) party leadership assumes a greater role; 3) the role of individual party members is reduced; 4) less emphasis is placed on the party’s traditional interests; 5) there is a tendency to try to secure access to various interest groups.33 It could be said that these five characteristics are the common denominator, the essence, of all forms of catch-all party, despite the fact that the degree to which each characteristic is present varies individually. The standard form of catch-all party contains more or less all of the above-mentioned characteristics and is not dominated by distorted clientelistic or cartel practices, or they occur only marginally. If clientelistic, cartel, or other distorted practices are dominant, it is possible to speak of a non-standard catch-all party. In this respect it is also possible to include among non-standard catch-all parties the oligarchic party observed in the Ukraine. This party variant forms in the circumstances of a society that is having difficulty democratising, either because there is the tradition of democracy in the country is entirely absent or because democracy has existed for too short a time. The new, powerful business-oligarchs become the main political players and directly found their own political parties. If we look at the situation in the Ukraine after the 2007 elections, we find that politics there are essentially the extension of a process in which the elites parcel out the country’s wealth. Political parties are then the direct tools of business clans.34 The Ukrainian Parliament is dominated by new entrepreneurs –nouveaux riches– who divide up the sphere of influence in the economy and the media among themselves. Although the Ukrainian prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, is viewed as pro-Western 33

Kirchheimer, O. ‘The Transformation of the Western European Party System’, in La Palombara, J. – Weiner, M. (1966) (eds.): Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton University Press, p. 177-200. See also Klima, M. (1998): Volby a politicke strany v modernich demokraciich, Prague, Radix, p. 48. 34 Masa, P.: ‘Juscenkova zrada’, Lidove noviny, 8 October 2007, p. 10.

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and pro-democratic, in reality she is a very controversial politician. She is considered to be the wealthiest woman in Ukraine – an oligarch. She acquired her wealth while

Table: Standard and Non-Standard Forms of the Catch-all Party Forms of catch-all party BASIC (minimum)

Standard/ Non-standard Standard

Social circumstances (period) - After 1945 - Advanced democracies in transition from an industrial to a post-industrial societies

CARTEL

Non-standard

- After 1970 - Mainly identified in advanced democracies

CLIENTELISTIC

Non-standard

- After 1989 - Democratisation - Mass privatisation - Under-developed civil society - Most parties are new - (three additional factors in the Czech Republic – see the text above)

OLIGARCHIC

Non-standard

- After 1991 - The absence of democratic traditions - Oligarchs parcelled out the country’s wealth

HYBRIDS

Standard

- After 1945

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Main characteristics - Substantially reduced ideological ‘baggage’ - A greater role played by party leadership - A smaller role for individual party members - Less emphasis on the party’s traditional narrow interests - Attempts to secure access to various interest groups - Can include some marginal negative characteristics typical for non-standard forms - Excessive close links between parliamentary parties and the state - Non-standard cooperation between these parties - (for other characteristics, see above – Basic form) - The unusual quantity and quality of clientelistic practices and corruption - A ‘client-client’ relationship between parties and business - The partial ‘privatisation’ of local, district, and regional branches of the party - (for other characteristics see above – Basic form) - Oligarchs find and control their own parties - Protection of the economic and other interests of the oligarchs - Basic minimum plus a mix of other forms

Region or country Western Europe, USA, other advanced democracies

Scandinavia, parts of Western Europe (Germany, Austria)

Central Europe (Czech Republic), Italy

Ukraine

Most countries with advanced democracies

she was President of United Energy Systems in Ukraine and later when she was Deputy Prime Minister for fuel and energy.35 The cartel party, clientelistic party, and oligarchic party are all non-standard and thus distorted forms of the catch-all party. Given that they are mutations of the catch-all party, it will come as no surprise that all three forms contain some negative phenomena in common. Nevertheless, they should still be distinguished from each other because, as the table shows, they emerged in somewhat different social and historical circumstances and quite different characteristics are emphasized within each of them. Metamorphoses and partial mutations to the catch-all party occur and vanish in relation to the specific environment and time. The above-discussed forms of catch-all party, whether standard or non-standard, are ideal types and therefore purely theoretical categories. In the complex realities of various societies such crystal-clear variants are found only rarely. Not uncommonly, a catch-all party can suddenly exhibit features that are inherent to more of its forms at once. Thus in reality it is mainly possible to encounter its various transitional stages, respectively its hybrid forms.

5. The Mutations of a Catch-all Party and the Reduced Quality of Democracy The standard and non-standard concepts of the ‘catch-all’ party reflect different levels of democracy. Logically, a democratic environment of higher quality produces a higher-quality ‘catch-all’ party. And conversely, a lower-quality democracy engenders the clientelistic, cartel, or oligarchic mutation of this type of party. From this it can be inferred that if there are clientelistic parties in the Czech Republic the quality of its democracy is not high. This claim is echoed in the conclusions of the sociologist Marek Skovajsa, who over time compared findings from three independent sources: The Economist,36 Freedom House,37 and Transparency International. In comparisons like The Economist’s Democracy Index or Freedom House’s Freedom in the World reports the Czech Republic comes across as a contradictory democracy. On the one hand, while it satisfies very well the minimum criteria of a democracy such as fair elections, political pluralism, freedom of the press, and the observance of human rights, on the other hand, there are serious weaknesses ‘in the attitudes of citizens towards politics, in the public’s participation in political life, and especially in the behaviour of individuals and institutions in the spheres of political, administrative, and economic power’.38 The high level of corruption is generally considered to be a serious problem.

35

In 1996-1997 she was President of United Energy Systems in Ukraine. In 1999-2001 she was Deputy Prime Minister for fuel and energy. For more see Prochazkova, P.: ‘Skorotriumf odepisovane Julie’, Lidove noviny, 2 October 2007. For more on the political situation and the party system in Ukraine, see Klima, M.: ‘Cesko a rozdelena Ukrajina’, Hospodarske noviny, 10. 12. 2007, p. 12. 36 http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf 37 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15 38 Skovajsa, M.: ‘Jak si vlastne stoji ceska demokracie’, Lidove noviny – Orientace, 12.7.2008, p. 21.

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The consultancy firm Ernst & Young conducted a study among top managers in Czech firms on the subject of enforcement of the law in business, also produced negative findings. Although two-fifths of Czech managers believe that enforcement of the law is improving, a full 82% consider it inadequate. This is an alarming situation. While in the Czech Republic only 6% of managers speak favourably about enforcement of the law, the figure in advanced markets is 85% and in developing markets it is 36%.39 Clearly, in an environment where the police and the courts do not provide firms with adequate protection from corruption, corrupt conduct grows. Some firms are restricted in their access to certain markets, their costs go up, and people in leadership positions can be at risk of being penalised. In other words, firms that do not accept the rules of corruption may have difficulty obtaining clients and contracts and ultimately even difficulty surviving or developing. As Ernst & Young also show, while internal company codes or regulations aimed at minimising corruption mainly exist in Czech branches of foreign firms, ‘in the vast majority of Czech firms no such rules exist’.40 The Czech Republic thus exhibits ‘the adjunct signs of insufficient democracy’.41 From an institutional perspective it adequately provides only the minimum framework of democracy. But in terms of the content and conduct of the relevant actors, there are serious failures in the political system and the overall quality of democracy is consequently reduced.

Conclusion A specific type of party has thus been cultivated in the unique environment of the Czech Republic: the ‘clientelistic’ party. What elsewhere develops naturally over many decades or perhaps even centuries occurred there within the space of the first ten to fifteen years after the fall of communism. This refers to the process whereby private property is accumulated and concentrated in the hands of new owners. Simultaneously what was originally a strongly egalitarian society began to stratify. Among others, wealthy, middle, and poorer classes began to emerge. Within a short historical interval it was decided a generation in advance where every individual and his/her family rank in the social hierarchy. It was a period of extraordinary golddigging – a kind of Czech Klondike era – which was mainly directed by the governmental parties. And naturally their core ranks were not comprised solely of philanthropists and saints. On the contrary. In the eyes of many rank and especially elite party members the mass transfer of property represented a unique opportunity to improve their material position and obtain wealth beyond the limits of their wages. It is therefore no coincidence that the principles of the rule of law were violated and clientelism and corruption flourished everywhere. There was no substantial change in this even after the economic transition reached completion. There remained a legacy of clientelistic-corruption networks and within them the special Czech kind of clientelistic party. Such hypertrophied and arrogant 39

Advanced or older markets are those in countries like Austria, Germany, The Netherlands, Switzerland, and developing or new markets include those in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Russia. For more see Maly, O.: ‘Manazeri: Korupce jen kvete’, Lidove noviny, 30.5.2008, p. 14. 40 Ibid. 41 Skovajsa, M.: ‘Jak si vlastne stoji ceska demokracie’, Lidove noviny – Orientace, 12.7.2008, p. 21.

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party structures do not vanish but adapt and reproduce in altered circumstances. While the rise and development of this system in the 1990s fed off the process of mass privatization, in the next decade, when not much remained to privatize, political parasitism focuses on milking ‘tithes’ from taxpayer-funded public resources. On the backs of the first generation of politicians, mid-level and high-ranking party positions came to be occupied by people whom we could call the second, emerging generation of politicians. The first generation produced the leaders who, alongside rapacious and clientelistic practices, also espoused more refined ideas and ideologies. However, the second, younger generation, many of whom came along too late to make money off the economic transition, is comprised of people who are more like ‘politician-entrepreneurs’, who are absolutely ideologically barren. They have a very clear and simple eye on the prize in the sense of unscrupulous dog-eat-dog approach to politics. On the whole, politics in the Czech Republic seems to be an even more vulgar and more expediently practised craft than before. Instead of representing the interests of civil society political parties behave increasingly like representatives of the interests of privileged firms. In this sense they are becoming a kind of intermediary firm that makes above-average profits on the covert political-economic market. If political parties are coming to represent increasingly allied business subjects, it can be deduced that not only is the representative function of political parties undergoing serious modification but so is the very nature of democracy. Democracy can then be defined as government by relevant parties and privileged firms that co-exist in symbiosis and together sponge off public resources provided by taxpayers. This situation can generally be described as clientelistic democracy. In the debate about clientelistic democracy the political scientist J. Mlejnek reflected that the influence of lobbyist groups on politics is so improper and dominant that, in his view, the significance of elections is decreasing. He writes: ‘The influence of various economic-lobbyistic groups in the background of politics, which are generally not far from organized crime, is growing and is so great that it gradually makes less sense to vote. The ‘arms of various octopi’ are trying to ‘influence the election results in their favour’.42 To criticize just politicians and their party organizations means only to touch the surface of the problem. They get their behavioural limits from their surroundings. It is the social environment that produces politicians in the form of clientelistic and corrupt clones. Complicit in the reproduction of these clones is everyone who directly partakes in their activities and even the passive majority that looks on or takes no interest in public affairs. Therefore, criticism of partyism cannot be interpreted as anything else but criticism of the state of society. In this sense, politicians are envoys of the worst in us. Unless the atmosphere in society undergoes a substantial change, no improvement in public affairs can be expected. To summarize, at first glance it might appear that the situation in the Czech Republic in terms of the distribution of political parties along left-right scale is relatively 42

Mlejnek, Josef jr.: ‘Palermo a klid’, Lidove noviny, 13.10.2008, p. 10.

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standard and stable. Nevertheless, the extent of clientelistic and almost mafia-like practices in Czech politics and in the economy can be regarded as alarming. To understand the state of political parties and events in the party and by extension the entire political system a traditional analysis of the standard cleavages in society is not enough. There can be many other variables concealed behind the veil of ‘cleavages’ that have a significant influence on the party system. Therefore, it is necessary to focus attention and examine other sources than just purely political science literature. ‘Compulsory reading’ to understand the party system should include the findings of the Supreme Audit Office, reports of the Security Information Service, studies from the Czech Chamber of Commerce, analyses of anticorruption and anti-clientelistic civic associations and organisations like Transparency International or Regeneration,43 articles by investigative journalists in the daily newspapers (Hospodarske noviny, Mlada fronta DNES, etc.) and in weekly magazines (Respekt, Reflex, Tyden, Ekonom, etc.), interviews with lobbyists, politicians, and their assistants, and finally the book by the journalist; J. Kmenta: Mrazek, The Godfather (Kmotr Mrazek), which reveals the links between politics and the mafia.44

43 44

http://www.oziveni.cz/ Kmenta, J. (2007): Kmotr Mrazek, Mlada fronta Dnes, Prague 2007.

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