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THE CATCH 22 OF LICENSING POLICY: SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA'S COMMERCIAL OCEAN FISHERIES 1 Danielle N. Edwards 2 PO Box 586, Ucluelet, BC, V0R 3A0

Astrid Scholz Ecotrust, 721 NW 9th Avenue, Suite 200, Portland, OR 97209

Eric Enno Tamm Ecotrust Canada, 200 - 1238 Homer Street, Vancouver, BC V6B 2Y5

Charles Steinback Ecotrust, 721 NW 9th Avenue, Suite 200, Portland, OR 97209

ABSTRACT Fisheries policy and the privatization of the fish resources in BC have netted a catch 22. Policies intended to improve the economic, social and ecological effects of fisheries often have had the opposite effect from the stated goals. Recent fishing policy, namely the salmon licence buybacks and quota implementation, have negatively impacted the fishing dependent coastal communities of BC. Licences have been disproportionately lost from rural coastal communities as the purchase price of licences has increased and licences are consolidated into fewer and fewer hands in urban centres. Hampered by reduced access to financial capital, rural communities, First Nations and the next generation of fishermen have been shut out, seriously undermining the long term viability of BC's fisheries, small coastal communities and small boat fishing fleet.

INTRODUCTION The current landscape of fisheries licensing and policy can be traced to the implementation of limited licensing in 1969. The plan intended to promote the conservation of salmon stocks and provide a better income for the remaining boats (Meggs 1991). This constituted the first move from public to private property rights in the BC ocean fisheries. Licences were issued by the government of Canada and could be sold and transferred between individuals and boats. Unlike on the east coast of Canada, no comprehensive owner operator policy was established. During this period it was the aim of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) to actively promote regional development in small, fishing dependent coastal communities (DFO 1989), by making the fishing fleets more economically viable. From 1967 to 1984 there was a gradual decentralization of the BC fishing industry away from the metropolitan region, and the number of active vessels in the coastal region shifted from 42% of all active fishing vessels in BC to 50% (DFO 1989). In response to increasing utilization of non-salmon species and growing stewardship concerns, the 1970s saw the start of the "alphabet soup" of licences in BC, with fisheries taken off the base licence and given their own separate licence, beginning with abalone (E), herring (H), trawl (T) and halibut (L) licences. This continued through the 1980s and 1990s, resulting in more than 20 different fisheries licences in BC. Edwards, Danielle N., Scholz, Astrid, Tamm, Eric Enno, Steinback, Charles. 2006. The catch 22 of licensing policy: socio-economic impacts in British Columbia's commercial ocean fisheries., p. 65-76. In: Sumaila, U. Rashid and Marsden, A. Dale (eds.) 2005 North American Association of Fisheries Economists Forum Proceedings. Fisheries Centre Research Reports 14(1). Fisheries Centre, the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. 2 Email: [email protected] 1

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Following licence limitations and the increasing use of area and time closures, individual transferable quotas began to be utilized beginning with the abalone fishery in 1979. The late 1980s and 1990s saw the introduction of quotas in a number of groundfish and shellfish fisheries, citing inefficiencies and overcapacity with the fleets and high catches over short periods of time that negatively impacted markets and led to unsafe work conditions (CIC 2005, CSA 2005, UHA 2005). Licence buybacks and area licensing regimes were implemented in the salmon industry in 1996 with the stated rationale that it would revitalize the industry and increase earnings for fishermen (DFO 1996). The current period is marked by proposed expansion of the quota program (McRae and Pearse 2004), despite many concerns about the impact of quotas and other fisheries policies on communities (FN Panel on Fisheries 2004). There are now proposals for quota systems in four more groundfish fisheries (CIC 2005), the prawn fishery (CPIC 2004) and efforts to move salmon and all other commercial ocean fisheries in BC to quotas (McRae and Pearse 2004, BC Seafood Alliance 2005). Pilot quota projects began in the north coast troll salmon fishery in 2005 despite strong opposition from many licence holders (The Fisherman 2005) and the long recognized difficulties implementing quotas in the salmon fishery (Senate Report 2005, Sproat 1996, FRC 1982). In addition to the socio-economic impacts of recent policy, including an aging fleet, aging participants and widespread leasing activity – the average age of licence owners is 55 years (CCPFH 2005) and temporary transfers of halibut quota increased from 19% in 1993 to 74% in 2003 (DFO 1994, DFO 2003) – ecological concerns continue to exist. It has been recognized that quotas are not a conservation tool, but an economic one (NRC 1999). While quotas can be used to effectively keep landings within total allowable catch levels, bycatch discard, highgrading and poaching problems can be exacerbated (Copes 1999, 1986) and habitat issues remain unaddressed. To address the ecological concerns increased by quota, fishermen-funded comprehensive dockside and vessel monitoring is being implemented (CIC 2005). There has been little done to address the combined fee and debt effects of additional costs associated with quota fisheries in BC, but the increasing debt load due to fees has been recognized as an issue that could threaten the viability of certain fleets given that the DFO-mandated user fees are not tied to the ability of a fleet to pay (GPCEL et al. 1999), unlike in Australia where there is a link between fees paid and benefits received (Industry Commission 1992). The multitude of issues threatening the viability of BC fisheries and coastal communities, arising from previous policy initiatives, are a caution that we must consider all impacts of policy: social, economic and ecological.

METHODOLOGY Our primary mode of research was the collection and analysis of DFO licence records for 1994 and 2002. These years corresponded to the period just prior to major shifts in licensing, most notably the Mifflin Plan, and to the current period. We compiled market values of licences and quota over a fifteen year period ending with 2004 from prices advertised in local trade magazines. The landed value of select fisheries during that same time period was obtained from DFO. Landed catch assigned to statistical areas was obtained from DFO for salmon and shellfish species and derived from International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) documents for the halibut fishery (IPHC 2005). To analyze the spatial distribution of licence ownership we used the contact city for the licence on record with DFO. The contact city represents the region of ownership and refers to the business address for the primary owner of record. For the majority of licences owned by individuals, business address is synonymous with residential address. Of the 4,939 licences considered, 39% had a company listed as the primary or contact owner, 9% were First Nation communal licences and the remainder had an individual listed as primary owner. The spatial analysis of licence ownership was limited to vessel based licences or vessel associated licences. Party based licences without attached vessels did not have contact city data available and were excluded from the analysis for this reason. This included herring gillnet, intertidal clam, smelt and a number of small and experimental licences such as goose barnacles, eulachon and herring bait. For the vessel based licences, a small percentage of licences (3.3% in 1994, 6.3% in 2002) did not have contact city available due to difficulties accessing the data from DFO. For a portion of the analysis, only major fisheries for which full data was available were considered, namely: salmon (AG, AS, AT), schedule II (C), geoduck (G), halibut (L), sablefish (K), crab (R), prawn (S), sea cucumber (ZD), urchins (ZA, ZC), hook and line rockfish (ZN) and trawl groundfish (T).

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We divided areas into rural and urban based on the population size of census consolidated subdivisions (du Plessis et al. 2001) and into coastal, interior and outside of BC. Subdivisions with populations less than 10,000 were designated rural and all others were designated urban. All subdivisions within 80 km of a marine port were designated coastal. Coastal BC was further divided into 5 regions corresponding to political, ecological and licensing boundaries, consisting of Northern and Central BC, Northern Vancouver Island, West Coast Vancouver Island, Central East Coast Vancouver Island, and Metropolitan Vancouver Island and the Lower Mainland. All values are reported in Canadian dollars and were corrected to real value using the Consumer Price Index (Statistics Canada Cansim II table 326-0002) for all items Canada-wide.

THE RESULTS Coastal rural communities have lost 45% of major fishery licences, 28% when salmon is excluded. The coastal urban areas have lost 30% of major fishery licences, 5% when salmon is excluded. The overall loss in licences from the coast has been due to licence retirement and the movement of licences to areas in the interior of BC and outside of BC. The loss of licences during this time period has been more pronounced in some of the small fishing dependent coastal communities than in others, but all have experienced loss of licences (Fig. 1).

Number of Licences

200

185

1994 2002

150 115 81

100 50

80 58 45 28 13

56 26

25 8

5

80

81 66

49 36

32 24 15

23

Ah ou Al sa er t t Ba Bay m Be fie lla ld Be Ky lla uq u M ot a Po ss rt et Po Ha r rt M dy cN So eill in tu l To a f U ino cl ue le t

0

Figure 1. The number of major fishing licences owned in rural fishing dependent coastal communities in 1994 and in 2002.

Most licences are now owned in the metropolitan regions of BC — Vancouver, Victoria and the central East Coast Vancouver Island region (Fig. 2). The regions with the fewest licences, especially quota licences, are the north coast of BC and the north and west coast regions of Vancouver Island. Concurrent with the loss of licences from remote regions has been the increase in the purchase price of licences irrespective of the landed value of the licence. In the salmon gillnet and troll licences over the last 10 years there has been a continuous rise in market values despite a drastic drop in the average landed values (Fig. 3). In halibut and sablefish quota, the market values for quota have risen sharply over the last fifteen years, from $9-36 and $8-45 respectively. For halibut, when compared to the ex-vessel price per pound, the increases in the market value of the quota are clearly increasing irrespective of the actual ex-vessel price which has been relatively stable (Fig. 4). The purchase price for quota has steadily increased from twice the landed value per pound to ten times the landed value from the time quota was implemented to 2004. With the movement of licences out of the region, there is a corresponding loss of adjacency between where the resource is harvested and where ownership resides. For the Area G (west coast Vancouver Island) salmon troll licences, despite large losses from the coastal communities, 21% ownership still resides in

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Figure 2. Ownership of the major commercial fishing licences, quota and non-quota licences, in the coastal regions of BC in 2002.

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value per licence .

$120,000

AG $140,000 Sale Value

$120,000

Catch Value

value per licence

AT $140,000

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$100,000 $80,000 $60,000

Sale Valu e Catch Valu e

$100,000 $80,000 $60,000

$40,000

$40,000

$20,000

$20,000 $0

$0 1994

1998

1994

2002

1998

2002

Figure 3. The difference between the purchase price (sale value) of a licence and the average landed catch value per licence for gillnet (AG) and troll (AT) salmon fisheries for the years 1994, 1998 and 2002. In 1994, salmon troll and gillnet licences were the same licence, but were split into separate licence types and licence areas in 1996. The sale values per licence were calculated using advertised licence prices per foot multiplied by the average licence length in each year. The catch value was taken from DFO catch statistics, from the overall landed catch value divided by the number of licences in each year. The overall number of licences dropped by half between 1994 and 2002.

Price per pound (real Canadian dollars) .

40

30

Landed Value per lb Quota Price Limited Entry IVQ's

20

10

0 1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Figure 4. The landed value of halibut for the years 1951-2004 represented as real value per lb dressed weight and the purchase price of halibut quota for the years 1990-2004 represented as real value per lb round weight.

areas adjacent to harvest areas on the west coast of Vancouver Island (Fig. 5). For the salmon gillnet in the north and central coast, ownership resides in the region for 50% of the licences (Fig. 6), with the Northern Native Fishing Corporation owning 254 of the 351 gillnet licences in the region. By contrast, the majority of the catch in the geoduck fishery comes out of the north coast, but licence ownership is centred on the east coast of Vancouver Island and the Lower Mainland (Fig. 7). For the quota halibut fishery which has 84% of catch coming from the north and central coast, only 8.7% of quota holdings are owned in the adjacent region (Table 1).

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Table 1. The 2002 commercial BC halibut licence ownership and adjacent landings by region. Licence and quota ownership is based on primary owner contact city, excluding First Nation communal licences totalling 26 licences (6% of licences) and 5% of quota. The landings are based on the IPHC recorded landings for regulatory area 2B (British Columbia) based on IPHC statistical areas. The statistical areas are aligned with regional boundaries with the exception of the division between the North Vancouver Island and the Central Coast boundary, for which statistical areas 091 and 092 cross over. The landings for these areas represent a small portion of total landings and were assigned to the North Vancouver Island region.

Region Metro Vancouver Island/Mainland Central Vancouver Island/Mainland North Vancouver Island/Mainland West Coast Vancouver Island North/Central Coast Interior BC Outside BC Unknown

# of Licences 176 148 17 4 52 12 1 2

% of All Licences 42.72 35.92 4.13 0.97 12.62 2.91 0.24 0.49

% Quota Holdings 44.21 35.21 3.06 0.64 8.69 2.31 0.13 0.15

% of landings caught in adjacent waters 0 0 3.9 12.1 84.0 0 0

The trawl industry is in a similar position with nearly 40% of its 2002 catch in the north/central coast and over 40% off the west coast Vancouver Island, totalling over 80% of the trawl catch. Ownership of trawl licences resides in these regions totalling 6.3% and 1.4% respectively. The trawl fishery is the only major fishery currently with comprehensive, though not 100%, catch discard data. Discard of non-directed catch in the trawl fishery varied from 7,800 up to 10,900 tonnes per year in the 8 years (1996-2003) for which on-board observer data was available, as determined using DFO obtained landed and on-board observer catch data. Discard ranged from 8% to 20% of total catch by weight.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS There has been little consideration of the effects of licensing policy and quota on coastal communities in BC that have long depended on the fishing resource. With a clear direction for moving all of BC's fisheries to quota (McRae and Pearse 2004), most fisheries are experiencing increasing licence capitalization. There are few limits on concentration, no owner operator provisions and leasing is common. The problem with open access and limited entry fisheries management approaches has been summed up to be the "race for the fish", coupled with "overcapitalization" in boats and equipment as fishermen try to obtain a competitive advantage. While we have seen a drop in the number of vessels participating in fisheries, capitalization in boats, equipment, licences and quota continues. Two large trawl boats from Europe have been added to the BC fleet in the 2004/2005 season. These are two of the largest boats to be brought into the BC fleet. We have also seen a shift in capitalization as the competitive advantage is now gained through licence holdings. The more holdings an individual or company has, the greater ability they have to execute their fishery. This has led to a "race for the fish" before the fish have even come out of the water. The race is for quota, for the ownership of the fish in perpetuity as they swim about in the ocean. Prices for a licence and quota often exceed a million dollars in today's market. This suggests that there is now too much money chasing too few fish. As prices climb, access in rural coastal communities falls. To explain this loss in licences we need only look at who has access to the capital needed to buy these licences to see why there is this shift towards the urban centres. Lower annual incomes compared to urban communities (Alessandro et al. 2003), fewer job opportunities and housing values often less than half that of metro Vancouver (Statistics Canada 2001) all contribute. For aboriginal communities, the situation is even worse, with 35% lower annual incomes in rural regions, unemployment rates double that of the general population (Armstrong 1999) and no home equity for those living on reserve. This has considerable impacts on access to capital, diminishing the ability to weather bad fishing seasons and hold on to existing licences, as well as to be able to invest in additional licences to diversify fishing opportunities.

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Figure 5. Ownership of salmon troll licences and landed catch in the coastal regions of BC in 2002.

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Figure 6. Ownership of salmon gillnet licences and landed catch in the coastal regions of BC in 2002.

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Figure 7. Ownership of geoduck licences and landed catch in the coastal regions of BC in 2002.

While the high market value of quota is often attributed to improved financial performance of the fishery, this clearly is not the main determining factor of market value. Windfall profits have been an important factor for licence holders. Quota can quickly gain in value and provide a significant source of ongoing income from leasing, sold for profit or used as collateral. This puts more money in the hands of those granted quota to further capitalize in the industry. This is compounded by the tax system. There are tax incentives for reinvesting in the fishing industry, promoting the accumulation of licences into the hands of wealthy licence and quota holders who already are heavily invested and profiting from the fishing industry. Furthermore, there are few licensing rules in BC fisheries. Halibut quota is typically leased with 70% of the landed value going to the licence holders in the absence of owner operator provisions. Most of the existing rules actually encourage consolidation, including licence stacking provisions and the development of

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multi-species fishery culminating in the current groundfish integration discussions. In addition to this, there is increased demand. Speculation in fishing licences prior to quota implementation and First Nation's treaty settlements have driven demand and consequently prices higher. Crewmen, often the children of fishermen, have traditionally been the ones that are mentored into the industry and who eventually buy a boat and licence, but the price of a licence today is far out of reach of the average deckhand. A number of First Nations communities have acquired communal licences in recent years as part of pre-treaty settlements through a federal licence buyback program. This has brought back a small number of quota licences, accounting for ~15% of the rural held licences and ~2.5% of the urban held licences. This has offset some of the losses of licences, but only partially and has not had a significant impact on the centralization and consolidation of licences. In competitive fisheries, the picture is somewhat better in the north coast where the Northern Native Fishing Corporation provided considerable protection to this region against licence loss that other regions on the coast did not have through communal, dedicated First Nation salmon gillnet licence ownership. These benefits do not extend to other fisheries or to the non-First Nation residents of the rural north coast. Efforts to examine the ecological consequences of fisheries policy have been hampered by DFO's data sharing policy, especially with regard to quota fisheries, but some work has been completed with the trawl fishery. A recently completed analysis of discard rates in the trawl fishery found that fishermen were able to influence their discard species and amounts and that there was a noticeable change in catches of rockfish species for which the fishery was limited by individual quotas and total allowable catch (Branch 2004). Quotas are cited as promoting the reduction of discard by introducing individual incentive to fish cleanly (Branch et al. 2005), but this is only effective when there is enforcement and actual individual incentive to reduce or eliminate discard (Clucas 1997). There is 100% on board observer coverage for the outside bottom trawl fleet, but only 10% coverage for the mid-water trawl and inside (Queen Charlotte Strait, Johnston Strait, Strait of Georgia, and Juan de Fuca Strait) bottom trawl fisheries (FOC 2004). The individual incentive only applies to those species which have limiting total allowable catches. Many species do not have any catch limits including sponges and corals and traditional area closures (FOC 2004) have been used to control for high rates of discard of these species (Ardron 2005). Juveniles and sub-adults of many species are not counted against quota including sablefish and dogfish, resulting in no incentive to avoid. Other species have catch limits which are never reached or have low assessed mortality on discard that does not take into account mortality due to large tow size, all reducing the incentive to avoid discard and the effectiveness of using quota to accomplish ecological goals. The health of the fisheries resource is being compromised by the large capitalization of the industry resulting in undue pressure by investors to keep catches high regardless of fish health and using industry funded science to back up claims of healthy stocks. Those who purchase licences in today's market must pay off the debt, this leads to increased pressure to keep catch levels high. Science is increasingly being funded by industry and the data consequently owned by industry. Data from science and from landings is becoming harder to obtain. The health of the resource is expressed in terms of maintaining existing catch levels with little recognition of the overall health of our ocean environment separate from fisheries. There is increasing recognition of the role of communities in the stewardship of the resource to not only maximize local benefits from resource use but also to ensure sustainable, long term and respectful use of adjacent resources. The negative impacts of quota allocations on fishing dependent coastal communities are increasing recognized (US GAO 2004). Alternatives are being put forward to the standard approach to allocating quotas to reverse the practice of hampering community involvement in fisheries as they move to quota (Macinko 2005) and to address problems from existing quota systems. The policies as they have been implemented by DFO have led to community and intergenerational disenfranchisement and the loss of adjacency to harvested resources. We must consider which problems must be solved before deciding on the solution. Privatization of the fisheries resource with no owner operator provisions, no corporate concentration restrictions and no adjacency principles creates problems that will not be solved with further entrenchment of private rights.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank Don Hall, Peter Fricke, and Chris Newton for their invaluable comments on an early draft of this report, and several colleagues who provided a stimulating discussion at the NAAFE conference in Vancouver, BC, in May 2005. Special thanks go to Jeff Ardron, formerly of the

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Living Oceans Society, for providing data, and to the Oak Foundation for providing financial support for this research.

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National Research Council, 1999. Sharing the Fish: Toward a National Policy on Individual Fishing Quotas. Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, 2005. Interim Report on Canada's New and Evolving Policy Framework For Managing Fisheries and Oceans. Sproat, P., 1996. What management issues need to be resolved for quotas to work in the B.C. salmon fishery? Managing a Wasting Resource: Would quotas solve the problems facing the west coast salmon fishery? Fraser Institute Conference, May 30-31 1996, Vancouver, BC, Canada. Statistics Canada, 2001. 2001 Census Community Profiles. Available at: http://www12.statcan.ca/english/profil01/PlaceSearchForm1.cfm The Fisherman, 2005. Fishermen object to quota proposal: Area G, F troll fleets target of back door deal. May 1, 2005. Underwater Harvesters Association, 2005. History of the Geoduck Clam Fishery in British Columbia Available at: http://www.geoduck.org/Go_files/GO_history.html. U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004. Individual Fishing Quotas: Methods for Community Protection and New Entry Require Periodic Evaluation. Washington, D.C.