10 August 2011 Asia Pacific/Thailand Equity Research Banks
Thailand Banks Sector Research Analysts Thaniya Kevalee 662 614 6219
[email protected] Dan Fineman 662 614 6218
[email protected]
THEME
DPA ... pressure on funding costs manageable Figure 1: Valuation summary
Siriporn Sothikul, CFA 662 614 6217
[email protected]
Rat
Price
EPS
EPS
P/E
P/B
Div.
ROE
(Bt)
(Bt)
grth (%)
(x)
(x)
yld (%)
(%)
Cur
TP
11E
12E 11E 12E 11E 12E 11E 12E 11E 12E 11E 12E
BBL
O
155.0 219.0 16.13 17.34
25
9.6
8.9
1.2
1.1
4.0
KBANK
O
124.5 168.0 12.13 13.91
45
15 10.3
8
9.0
1.9
1.7
3.4
4.0 18.9 19.0
SCB
O
117.0 143.0 9.63 11.17
35
16 12.1 10.5
2.3
2.0
3.4
4.1 18.9 19.4
KTB
O
19.0
21.8 2.16
2.42
62
12
7.9
1.5
1.4
4.6
5.1 17.3 17.4
BAY
N
24.2
31.0 1.97
2.39
36
21 12.3 10.1
1.4
1.3
3.7
4.8 11.4 12.8
8.8
4.4 12.3 12.3
TMB
U
1.8
1.9 0.10
0.13
42
22 17.6 14.4
1.5
1.5
2.8
3.5
TISCO
O
37.5
49.0 4.53
5.19
13
15
8.3
7.2
1.7
1.5
6.4
7.3 20.2 20.7
8.7 10.1
TCAP
N
28.3
37.0 3.54
4.18 -20
18
8.0
6.8
0.9
0.8
3.0
3.6 11.4 12.3
Source: Credit Suisse
The Deposit Protection Agency (DPA) has officially launched its limited insurance scheme this month, with the guaranteed amount being reduced to an eventual limit of Bt1 mn/bank/depositor by August 2012. We see limited risk of panic deposit outflow, and believe any funding cost pressure is manageable. ■ Panic deposit outflow unlikely. Thai banks are operating under a strong regulatory setting, with low NPLs and high capital base. We see limited risk of deposit run even for small banks. ■ Specialised financial institutions are a threat, but only marginal. We estimate that 38% of system deposits will be guaranteed under the DPA scheme. Another 36% can still get full protection through strenuous efforts by all depositors to distribute their deposits across DPA members (which is unlikely). SFIs could be attractive choices for depositors, but with only a 24% deposit market share, we doubt they could accommodate massive deposit inflows. ■ We believe DPA could push up funding cost by 10 bp at the most. Given bills of exchange (B/E) are an effective tool for commercial banks to fight off pressure from SFIs, we estimate that commercial banks’ funding cost will rise by no more than 10 bp, reducing our profit forecast for the sector by just 4%. Meanwhile, we expect the insurance premium of 40 bp to stay for years as DPA builds up high safety margin to increase public confidence. ■ Small banks may gain from deposit movement, although it is unclear now. First, their funding mix is skewed towards B/E and debt instruments— TISCO in particular, with its deposit representing only 20% of total funding. Second, small banks have a combined deposit market share of only 6% compared with 73% enjoyed by the big four banks and 21% by the three mid-sized banks. Therefore, if some depositors spread their deposits across DPA members, we see a potential that small players might see net inflows. DISCLOSURE APPENDIX CONTAINS ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS AND THE STATUS OF NON-US ANALYSTS. FOR OTHER IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES, visit www.credit-suisse.com/ researchdisclosures or call +1 (877) 291-2683. U.S. Disclosure: Credit Suisse does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the Firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.
10 August 2011
Focus table and charts Figure 2: Deposit Protection Agency Act Effective date Supervised by Initial capital Participants
August 2011 Ministry of Finance Bt1 bn (contributed by the government) Private depository institutions including commercial banks, retail banks, foreign bank branches, finance companies and credit fronciers. Specialised banks require enactment of Royal Decree to participate in the scheme; this might happen in the future. To minimise moral hazard by encouraging market force to take part in monitoring financial disciplines employed by depository institutions. Retail depositors with deposit less than Bt1 mn still get full guarantee. Deposit and accrued interest denominated in Thai Baht, excluding non-residence Baht accounts of nonresidence persons. Per bank per depositor: Bt50 mn Bt1 mn 40 bp (flat rate) Government bonds or government guaranteed debt securities.
Key objective Type of deposits covered Guaranteed amount : - August 2011-July 2012 - from August 2012 on Premium charge Investment option
Source : Deposit protection Agency (DPA), Credit Suisse
Figure 3: Healthy total CAR – low risk of panic outflow
Figure 4: Deposit market share – SFIs have too limited capacity to absorb massive inflow
(%) 40
Foreign bank branches 30
5%
Commercial
20
banks
SFIs
71%
24%
10
MIC
ICBCT
LHBANK
BAY
UOBT
TMB
BBL
STC
KK
SCB
TISCO
KBANK
KTB
TCR
TCAP
0
Source: Company data
Source: Bank of Thailand (BOT)
Figure 5: Pressure on funding cost – marginal impact on
Figure 6: With much smaller deposit market share, small
our 2012 profit forecasts
banks may see net inflows from deposit diversification
(%)
TCAP
TMB
KTB
BBL
Total
BAY
TISCO KBANK SCB
0 Medium sized banks
-3.1
-4 -4.5
-3.9
-3.8
-3.1
21%
-2.7
Small banks
-3.6
6% Big banks
-6.2
73%
-8
-9.7
Source: Credit Suisse
Thailand Banks Sector
Source: Company data
2
10 August 2011
DPA … pressure on funding costs manageable The Deposit Protection Agency (DPA) has officially launched its limited insurance scheme this month, with the guaranteed amount being reduced from Bt50 mn/bank/depositor to an eventual limit of Bt1 mn/bank/depositor by August 2012.
Panic deposit outflow unlikely In our view, the DPA scheme is being introduced at a time of relatively strong regulatory environment, implying that the perceived risk of private financial institutions could be low. The sector NPL ratio and coverage ratio now stand at 3% and 95% compared with 38% and 27% in January 2000, respectively. Thai banks also have strong capital base with their total CAR ranging from 12% to 31%. We thus see limited risk of panic outflow from any commercial bank, large or small, which may trigger deposit run at other banks.
Commercial banks have healthy balance sheets, with low NPLs
Deposit outflow to SFIs should be moderate Under the DPA scheme, we estimate that 38% of total deposits at commercial banks would be guaranteed. Another 36% can still get full protection assuming that all depositors are willing to go through painful efforts to spread their deposits across 36 DPA members (although we think this is an unlikely scenario). The remaining 26% would not be covered under any circumstance. Due to the Lehman crisis in late 2008 and with the current economic vulnerability in the US and Europe, we believe Thai depositors will not consider foreign bank branches as safe havens, leaving only specialized financial institutions (SFIs) as logical choices. We believe that part of this 62% (36%+26%) of deposits could be moved to SFIs to enjoy implicit protection from the government. Still, with only 24% market share, we doubt if SFIs have the capacity accommodate massive deposit inflow.
Some deposit outflow to SFIs is possible … but not worrisome
Cost pressure appears manageable Of late, commercial banks have also been issuing more bills of exchange (B/E) in order to minimise deposit flow to SFIs. B/E is a form of deposit instrument without guarantee, allowing the banks to offer higher yields as they do not have to pay 40 bp insurance premium to the regulator. This strategy helps commercial banks retain deposits and lower pressure on their funding costs. We believe commercial banks will continue offering B/E to their depositors in the face of deposit migration to SFIs as a result of the DPA scheme. Overall, we estimate that commercial banks’ funding cost should rise by 10 bp at the most as a result of the DPA scheme, which reduce our 2012 profit estimates by just 4%. Meanwhile, we expect relatively high insurance premium of 40 bp to stay at least until 2017 as the DPA has build up high safety margin to increase public confidence.
Commercial banks can employ B/E tool to retain deposit … We expect upward pressure on funding cost to be 10 bp at the most
Small banks might be the winners Consensus seems to believe that small banks are the likely losers. We disagree. Although it is hard to predict depositor behaviour at this stage, we see a likelihood of small banks seeing net inflows in the scenario that some depositors choose to spread their deposits across DPA members. First, their funding mix is skewed towards B/E and debt instruments; especially TISCO whose deposit only accounts for 20% of the total funding. Second, small banks have a combined deposit market share of only 6%, while the big four banks and three mid-sized banks command aggregate market shares of 73% and 21%, respectively.
Thailand Banks Sector
We see a possibility of even smaller players gaining from deposit diversification
3
10 August 2011
Sector comparison Figure 7: Valuation comparison Recommendation Bloomberg code
BBL
KBANK
SCB
KTB
BAY
TMB
TISCO
TCAP
O
O
O
O
N
U
O
N
BBL/F TB KBANK/F TB
SCB/F TB
KTB TB
BAY TB
TMB TB
TISCO TB
TCAP TB
Target price (Bt)
219.0
168.0
143.0
21.8
31.0
1.9
49.0
37.0
Stock price - foreign (Bt)
155.0
124.5
117.0
19.0
24.2
1.8
37.5
28.3
41.3
34.9
22.2
14.7
28.1
3.8
30.7
31.0
1,909
2,393
3,399
11,185
6,074
43,529
728
1,278
295,871
297,961
397,705
212,520
146,994
79,658
27,297
36,104
9,889
9,959
13,293
7,103
4,913
2,663
912
1,207
2009A
14.4
20.2
19.2
17.4
22.1
41.0
13.5
7.2
2010A
12.0
14.9
16.4
14.2
16.7
24.9
9.3
6.4
2011E
9.6
10.3
12.1
8.8
12.3
17.6
8.3
8.0
2012E
8.9
9.0
10.5
7.9
10.1
14.4
7.2
6.8
2013E
7.9
7.8
9.3
7.3
8.1
17.0
6.3
4.9
2009A 2010A
8.5
10.1
12.5
9.7
9.1
19.9
6.1
7.9
8.1
8.2
11.1
8.5
6.6
14.8
4.6
4.9
2011E
6.1
6.1
8.4
5.5
5.4
10.8
4.5
4.2
2012E
5.6
5.3
7.2
4.9
4.8
10.3
3.8
3.6
2013E
5.0
4.6
6.2
4.4
4.0
8.6
3.3
2.8
2009A
1.5
2.5
2.8
1.9
1.6
1.7
2.2
1.1
2010A
1.3
2.2
2.6
1.7
1.5
1.6
1.8
1.0
2011E
1.2
1.9
2.3
1.5
1.4
1.5
1.7
0.9
2012E
1.1
1.7
2.0
1.4
1.3
1.5
1.5
0.8
2013E
1.0
1.5
1.8
1.2
1.2
1.4
1.3
0.7
2009A 2010A
2.6
2.0
2.1
2.3
1.4
0.0
4.6
3.3
2.6
2.0
2.1
2.3
2.4
0.8
6.0
4.2
2011E
4.0
3.4
3.4
4.6
3.7
2.8
6.4
3.0
2012E
4.4
4.0
4.1
5.1
4.8
3.5
7.3
3.6
2013E
4.8
4.8
4.5
5.5
5.8
2.9
7.9
5.0
2009A 2010A
1.2
1.1
1.6
0.8
0.9
0.3
1.5
1.7
1.3
1.5
1.8
0.9
1.1
0.6
1.9
1.5
2011E
1.5
1.8
2.1
1.3
1.3
0.8
1.8
1.0
2012E
1.5
1.9
2.1
1.3
1.4
0.9
1.8
1.1
2013E
1.6
1.9
2.1
1.3
1.6
0.7
1.9
1.4
2009A
11.2
12.6
15.5
11.3
7.5
4.2
16.7
17.1
2010A
11.6
15.7
16.4
12.5
9.2
6.6
21.2
16.2
2011E
12.8
20.1
20.0
18.2
11.7
8.9
21.2
12.0
2012E
12.8
20.3
20.6
18.3
13.3
10.4
21.9
12.9
2013E
13.3
20.4
20.6
17.6
15.3
8.4
22.4
15.9
Deposits (Bt mn) Customer loans (Bt mn)
1,446,213
1,182,390
1,126,538
1,295,485
572,270
439,364
44,079
481,391
1,305,049
1,083,094
1,127,975
1,301,012
658,148
378,222
166,032
616,795
Total assets (Bt mn)
1,991,326
1,677,862
1,593,063
1,957,829
870,410
638,557
195,657
862,739
Market cap. to deposit (%)
20.5
25.2
35.3
16.4
25.7
18.1
61.9
7.5
Market cap. to loans (%)
22.7
27.5
35.3
16.3
22.3
21.1
16.4
5.9
Market cap. to assets (%)
14.9
17.8
25.0
10.9
16.9
12.5
14.0
4.2
% upside Number of shr (mn shrs) Market cap. (Bt mn) Market cap. (US$ mn) Valuation ratios P/E (x)
P/PPOP (x)
P/adj.BV (x)
Dividend yield (x)
ROA (%)
ROE (%)
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse
Thailand Banks Sector
4
10 August 2011
Operational data Figure 8: Valuation comparison BBL Loan growth (%)
KBANK
SCB
KTB
BAY
TMB
TISCO
TCAP
2009A 2010A
-3.2
4.4
2.5
2.7
8.3
-13.2
9.8
3.7
9.9
14.4
12.6
16.4
7.5
-1.3
32.2
111.9
2011E
13.0
13.0
18.0
13.0
9.3
9.0
11.4
9.2
2012E
11.0
13.0
14.0
11.0
9.0
9.0
9.4
9.2
2013E
10.0
12.0
12.0
10.0
9.1
9.0
9.5
8.0
2009A
79.8
93.1
94.8
85.7
107.4
85.0
102.6
84.6
2010A
84.8
93.0
93.5
94.4
103.6
80.8
121.0
91.3
2011E
87.5
93.0
93.6
94.5
105.0
91.0
115.0
100.0
2012E
87.5
93.0
93.6
94.5
105.0
92.0
115.0
100.0
2013E
87.5
93.0
93.6
94.5
105.0
92.0
115.0
100.0
2009A 2010A
12.6
10.3
12.3
10.0
11.5
12.3
12.5
14.0
12.5
9.4
11.6
9.9
11.5
11.3
9.9
10.2
2011E
12.4
9.7
11.2
9.8
11.3
11.3
10.2
8.0
2012E
12.2
9.8
11.2
9.7
11.0
11.1
10.3
8.3
2013E
12.2
9.8
11.3
9.7
10.9
10.7
10.5
9.0
2009A 2010A
37.1
40.6
40.9
40.4
30.1
0.0
63.6
23.8
31.0
29.8
35.1
33.0
39.4
20.4
56.7
27.2
2011E
38.8
35.0
41.5
40.4
45.6
50.0
53.0
24.0
2012E
38.9
36.0
42.5
40.3
48.2
50.0
53.0
24.4
2013E
38.3
37.7
41.6
40.5
47.1
50.0
49.7
24.3
2009A
4.9
4.0
4.8
7.9
8.7
14.7
2.5
4.2
2010A
3.6
3.1
3.7
6.1
5.9
9.9
1.8
6.5
2011E
2.6
2.4
2.7
5.2
5.7
8.6
1.7
5.9
2012E
1.9
1.9
2.0
4.4
5.4
7.4
1.6
5.6
2013E
1.4
1.5
1.6
3.8
5.2
6.4
1.5
5.3
2009A 2010A
117.1
91.2
95.7
47.3
73.5
57.7
86.4
87.4
158.9
110.5
107.3
58.8
88.7
57.0
156.8
70.7
2011E
175.0
115.0
110.0
67.0
90.9
59.1
163.6
75.1
2012E
175.0
115.0
110.0
67.0
94.2
61.4
173.5
78.8
2013E
175.0
115.0
110.0
67.0
97.5
65.7
191.9
83.3
Credit cost as % of loans 2009A 2010A
0.7
1.0
0.6
0.6
1.8
0.7
1.4
1.0
0.6
0.7
0.5
0.5
2.0
0.5
1.5
0.4
2011E
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.5
1.6
0.7
1.0
0.9
2012E
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.5
1.5
0.5
1.1
0.9
2013E
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.5
1.4
0.6
1.2
0.9
2009A
2.7
3.2
3.2
2.7
3.7
1.9
4.5
3.5
2010A
2.6
3.5
3.2
2.6
4.6
2.0
4.6
3.6
2011E
3.1
3.9
3.5
3.0
4.6
2.3
4.0
3.3
2012E
3.1
3.9
3.4
3.0
4.5
2.3
4.0
3.4
2013E
3.1
3.9
3.4
3.0
4.6
2.4
4.3
3.6
2009A 2010A
-7.3
3.9
-9.8
-15.3
10.7
-33.7
33.6
26.8
4.9
23.0
11.9
14.2
37.8
34.3
34.2
56.7
2011E
32.7
35.8
33.2
52.9
21.7
37.1
2.8
16.3
2012E
8.6
14.6
15.9
12.1
14.1
4.7
17.8
16.5
2013E
11.7
14.5
15.5
11.1
18.0
20.2
17.7
30.0
2009A 2010A
1.6
-3.9
-3.1
-0.7
54.9
359.1
16.0
84.5
19.6
36.1
16.6
22.4
32.0
64.6
45.3
10.4
2011E
25.2
44.8
35.3
62.3
36.2
41.6
14.2
-19.8
2012E
7.5
14.7
15.9
11.8
21.0
21.9
14.6
18.2
2013E
12.9
14.4
12.9
7.3
24.5
-15.2
14.3
37.9
Loans/deposit + BE (%)
Tier 1 as % RWA
Payout ratio (%)
NPLs ratio (%)
NPLs coverage (%)
NIM (%)
PPOP growth (%)
Net profit (%)
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse
Thailand Banks Sector
5
10 August 2011
Deposit Protection Agency Act Implementation starts this month The Deposit Protection Agency Act was enacted in December 2007 and was supposed to take effect from August 2008. Due to the Lehman crisis in late 2008, however, the government had put off the implementation until now. The DPA scheme is replacing the blanket guarantee on deposits provided by the Financial Institution Development Fund (FIDF), which will be eventually closed down.
Blanket guarantee is coming to an end
The key objective of DPA scheme is to encourage market forces (large depositors) to indirectly take part in creating stability in the financial system while small/retail depositors still get full protection. The guaranteed amount first starts at Bt50 mn/bank/depositor but declines to an eventual limit of Bt1 mn/bank/depositor by August 2012. Other key features of DPA are included in Figure 9. As shown in Figure 10, 99% of depositors will continue to get full protection, although in terms of deposit amount, we estimate that only 38% will remain fully covered (Figure 11) We discuss our logic behind these estimates in the latter section of the report.
Guaranteed amount to drop to Bt1 mn/bank/depositor by August 2012
Figure 9: Deposit Protection Agency Act Effective date
August 2011
Supervised by
Ministry of Finance
Initial capital
Bt1 bn (contributed by the government)
Participants
Guaranteed amount :
Private depository institutions including commercial banks, retail banks, foreign bank branches, finance companies and credit fronciers. Specialised banks require enactment of Royal Decree to participate in the scheme; this might happen in the future. To minimise moral hazard by encouraging market force to take part in monitoring financial disciplines employed by depository institutions. Retail depositors with deposit less than Bt1 mn still get full guarantee. Deposit and accrued interest denominated in Thai Baht, excluding non-residence Baht accounts of nonresidence persons. Per bank per depositor :
- August 2011-July 2012
Bt50 mn
- from August 2012 on
Bt1 mn
Premium charge
40 bp (flat rate)
Investment option
Government bonds or government guaranteed debt securities.
Key objective Type of deposits covered
Source : DPA, Credit Suisse
Figure 10: Deposits by no of depositors
Figure 11: Deposits by amount
> Bt 1 mn 38%
Up to Bt1 mn 99%
> Bt 1 mn 1% Up to Bt1 mn 62%
Source: Bank of Thailand (BOT), Credit Suisse
Thailand Banks Sector
Source: BOT, Credit Suisse
6
Thailand Banks Sector
Figure 12: Depository institutions which are DPA members (36 in total) Commercial Banks
Retail banks
Foreign Banks (Full Branch)
1
Bangkok Bank
1
Land and House Retail Bank
1
2
Krung Thai Bank
2
Thai Credit Retail Bank
2
Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank JP Morgan Chase Bank
3
Siam Commercial Bank
3
Citibank
4
Kasikorn Bank
4
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp
5
Bank of Ayudhya *
5
Deutsche Bank AG.
6
Thai Military Bank *
6
BNP Paribars
7
CIMB Thai **
7
Indian Overseas Bank
8
Thanachart Bank *
8
Mizuho Corporate Bank
9
Tisco Bank
9
The Bank of China
10
Kiatnakin Bank
10
11
United Overseas Bank **
11
12
Standard Chartered Bank **
12
13
ICBC Bank **
13
Bank of America, National Association The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking RHB Bank Berhad
14
Royal Bank of Scotland NV
15
Oversea Chinese Banking Corp., Ltd Mega International Commercial Bank #
16
Finance Companies and 1 2
Bangkok First Investment and Trust Advance Finance PCL
Credit Foncier Companies 1 2
Lynn Phillips Mortgage Credit Foncier Sahaviriya Credit Foncier
3
Asia Credit Foncier
Note : * With foreign partners, ** foreign owned, # subsidiary of foreign bank. Source: BOT, Credit Suisse
10 August 2011
7
10 August 2011
There are 36 depository institutions that are DPA members as shown in Figure 12. The protection limit of Bt1 mn/bank/depositor offered by Thailand is one of the highest in the world, translating into 6.6x of per capital GDP (Figure 13). Within Asia, only Malaysia provides better protection than Thailand. Figure 14 compares key features of deposit protection scheme in select countries.
Thailand has one of the highest deposit protection relative to GDP per capita in the world
Figure 13: Deposit guarantee amount to per capita GDP (x ) 12 9.8 9 6.6 5.3
6
3
2.0
2.2
2.2
HK
Canada
KR
5.7
5.8
TW
PH
2.9
0.9 0 SG
JP
USA
TH
MY
Source: DPA, BOT, Credit Suisse
Figure 14: Comparison of deposit protection scheme Guarantee
Premium rate
Target fund size
amount (US$)
(% of total deposits)
(% of total deposit)
Singapore
40,607
0.02-0.07
0.3
Hong Kong
64,267
0.0175-0.049
0.25
USA
250,000
0.12-0.45
1.35
Canada
102,082
0.02135- 0.18519
0.4-0.5
Japan
Has not set the limit
125,172
0.082-0.107
South Korea
46,211
0.18
1.5-2
Malaysia
82,850
0.03-0.24
Has not set the limit
Taiwan
104,548
0.03-0.07
2
Thailand
32,971
0.40
1.5-2 (not finalized yet)
Philippines
11,563
0.20
90,000 mn Peso
Source: DPA, Credit Suisse
Thailand Banks Sector
8
10 August 2011
Panic deposit outflow unlikely Strong regulatory setting with low NPL In our view, the DPA scheme is being introduced at a time of relatively strong regulatory environment, implying that the perceived risk of private financial institutions could be low. The sector NPL ratio has significantly declined from 38% in January 2000 to just 3.0% currently (Figure 15) while the NPL coverage ratio has risen from just 27% to 95% during the same period (Figure 16).
A healthy banking system minimises the risk of bank run
Figure 15: System NPL ratio (Bt trn) 2.5
(%) 40 35
2.0
30 25
1.5
20 1.0
15 10
0.5
5 0
NPLs (Bt tn, LHS)
2Q11
3Q10
4Q09
1Q09
2Q08
3Q07
4Q06
1Q06
2Q05
3Q04
4Q03
1Q03
Oct-02
Jul-02
Apr-02
Jan-02
Oct-01
Jul-01
Apr-01
Jan-01
Jul-00
Oct-00
Apr-00
Jan-00
0.0
NPLs as % of loans (%, RHS)
Source: BOT, Credit Suisse
Figure 16: System NPL coverage (%) 100
80
60
40
20 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* Note: Data for banks under Credit Suisse coverage. Source: Company data, Credit Suisse
Thailand Banks Sector
9
10 August 2011
Individual banks have strong balance sheets Not only the system ratios look healthy, we also found that NPL ratios at individual commercial banks are not worrisome (Figure 17). TMB has the highest NPL ratio (8.6%) but this could be exaggerated by depressed loan growth over the past few years as a result of business restructuring which is still ongoing. Most of TMB’s NPLs are legacy and the bank has already disposed of the weakest NPLs over the past few years. TBANK’s relatively high NPL ratio (6.6%) was mainly from SCIB. The merger between the two have slowed the NPL resolution process.
NPL ratios at individual banks are not worrisome
Finally, commercial banks have healthy capital, with total CAR ranging from 12% to 31% (Figure 18), versus an 8.5% minimum requirement set by the BOT. Therefore, we see limited risk of panic deposit outflow once the guaranteed limit falls to Bt1 mn/bank/depositor even for smaller players. This is a crucial factor, as we believe if one or two banks in the system face deposit run due to low depositor confidence, it could have spill-over effects on other banks.
Banks, big or small, also have adequate capital
Figure 17: NPL ratios – not worrisome
Figure 18: Healthy total CAR
(%) 10.0
(%) 40
8.6
7.5
30
6.6 5.1 5.3
5.0
2.5 0.9
2.0
1.5 1.6
2.5 2.7 2.8
3.1 3.1 3.3
20
3.7
10
MIC
ICBCT
LHBANK
UOBT
BAY
TMB
STC
KK
BBL
TISCO
SCB
KBANK
KTB
TCAP
TMB
TBANK
BAY
KTB
KK
BBL
SCB
UOBT
KBANK
MIC
ICBCT
TCR
TISCO
LHBANK
STC
Source: Company data
TCR
0
0.0
Source: Company data
Figure 19: Sound credit rating Rating
Outlook
Rating agency
TISCO
A
Positive
TRIS
BAY
AA-
Stable
TRIS
KBANK
AA
Stable
FITCH, National credit rating long-term
TMB
A+
Stable
TRIS
TCAP
A+
Positive
TRIS
BBL
AA
Stable
FITCH, National credit rating long-term
KTB
AA+
Stable
FITCH, National credit rating long-term
SCB
AA
Stable
FITCH, National credit rating long-term
KK
A-
Positive
TRIS
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse
Thailand Banks Sector
10
10 August 2011
Deposit outflow to SFIs should be moderate 38% of system deposits to get full coverage Figure 20 and Figure 21 show the structure of deposits, by amount, for commercial banks registered in Thailand and for foreign bank branches, respectively, collated by the BOT. The two combined represents system deposit. As the BOT data provides number of accounts rather than number of depositors, we have adjusted the data in order to minimise distortion caused by possibility that one depositor may have more than one bank accounts. Figure 20: Deposit structure – commercial banks registered in Thailand 1
2
3
4
5
6
Average/
Remain banks
Potential move
No
w/guarantee w/in 35 institutions
guarantee
No. of
Amount
account
Depositors*
(Bt mn)
(Bt)
(Bt mn)
69,065,440
315,045
4,562
315,045
> 50,000-100,000 baht
3,223,862
230,777
71,584
230,777
> 100,000-200,000 baht
2,495,662
347,013
139,046
347,013
> 200,000-500,000 baht
2,085,701
661,828
317,317
661,828
> 500,000-1,000,000 baht
923,517
673,728
729,524
673,728
> 1-10 million baht
585,471
2,258,715
3,857,946
585,471
1,673,244
> 10-25 million baht
23,451
703,673
30,006,098
23,451
680,222
> 25-50 million baht
5,111
446,971
87,456,171
5,111
178,878
262,982
> 50-100 million baht
1,451
332,569
229,278,869
1,451
50,768
280,351
> 100-200 million baht
368
250,351
680,301,630
368
12,880
237,103
> 200-500 million baht
88
266,371
3,030,386,803
88
3,077
263,207
> 500 million baht
39
571,445
14,727,963,918
39
1,358
570,048
78,410,160
7,058,486
90,020
2,844,369
2,600,426
1,613,691
40.3%
36.8%
22.9%
Deposit by size 100,000-200,000 baht
6,144
846
137,695
846
> 200,000-500,000 baht
6,953
2,278
327,628
2,278
> 500,000-1,000,000 baht
5,267
3,796
720,714
3,796
> 1-10 million baht
8,416
43,959
5,223,476
8,416
35,543
> 10-25 million baht
1,282
40,288
31,425,897
1,282
39,006
> 25-50 million baht
550
50,227
91,388,282
550
19,236
30,441
> 50-100 million baht
240
56,462
234,964,628
240
8,411
47,811
> 100-200 million baht
95
66,485
699,842,105
95
3,325
63,065
> 200-500 million baht
30
90,908
3,071,216,216
30
1,036
89,842
> 500 million baht
12
162,539
13,322,868,852
12
427
162,100
85,282
518,526
6,080,108
18,282
106,984
393,260
3.5%
20.6%
75.8%
Total % of total deposit amount
* Adjusted from No. of deposit accounts given by BOT. Source: BOT, Credit Suisse
Thailand Banks Sector
11
10 August 2011
Based on adjusted BOT data, we estimate that only 38% of the total deposit amount (commercial banks registered in Thailand and foreign bank branches combined) falls into the Bt1 mn or below category and thus will continue enjoying full protection from August 2012 (column 4 of Figure 20 and Figure 21).
All retail depositors would continue to be fully protected
Thus, 62% of system deposit would not be covered under the DPA scheme. Still, 36% of this can get the full protection assuming that all depositors take painstaking efforts to place Bt1 mn across all 36 DPA members (column 5). In reality, we find this scenario as unlikely; some may do so and some may spread their deposits among selected rather than across the entire DPA members.
Spreading deposit across DPA members can increase protection substantially but may not be practical to implement
The remaining 26% of system deposit would not get the guarantee under the DPA scheme under any circumstance (column 6).
SFIs could be logical choices for depositors Due to the Lehman crisis in late 2008 and with current economic vulnerability, we doubt if Thai depositors feel more comfortable putting their money with foreign bank branches than with Thai commercial banks. In fact, foreign bank branches have seen their deposit market share falling from 7.4% in 2007 to 5.2% in May 2011 (Figure 22).
Foreign bank branches no longer safe havens
To seek additional protection beyond the DPA scheme, we see a potential that depositors may wish to move the uncovered deposit (including column 6 and part of column 5) to specialised financial institutions (SFIs) owned by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Although there is no explicit deposit guarantee, we view the market SFIs as being safe havens due to the government ownership. As shown in Figure 23, SFIs have raised their deposit market share from 19.4% in 2007 to 24.4% in May 2011; the increase in market share during this period was due to their more aggressive lending targets rather than concerns about the DPA scheme.
SFIs are the only logical choices (to get full government guarantee)
Figure 22: Foreign bank branches deposit market share
Figure 23: SFIs’ deposit market share
(%)
(%)
8.0
25
7.5
7.4
7.4
24.4
24
7.1
7.0
23
6.5
22
6.0
21.9
21
5.7
5.5
23.5
23.6
5.1
5.1
5.0
5.0
20
5.2
19
19.4
19.0
18
4.5 2005
2006
Source: BOT
Thailand Banks Sector
2007
2008
2009
2010
1Q11 May -11
2007
2008
2009
2010
1Q11
May -11
Source: BOT
12
10 August 2011
Figure 24: Deposit market share by institution
Foreign bank branches 5%
Commercial banks 71%
SFIs 24%
Source: BOT
But we expect only moderate impact Still, with only 24.4% market share, we doubt if SFIs have the capacity to accommodate massive inflows from commercial banks and foreign bank branches (Figure 24). As shown in Figure 25, the three leading SFIs – Government Savings Bank (GSB, Not listed), Government Housing Bank (GHB, Not listed) and Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperation (BAAC, Not listed) – command 96% of the total deposit at SFIs. Of the three, only GSB has the real capacity to gain market share from the commercial banking system, in our view. GSB has raised its deposit market share from 42% in 2005 to 48% by 2010, while GHB and BAAC have seen their shares falling from 27% and 31% to 22% and 30%, respectively (Figure 26). We thus believe that among SFIs, only GSB pose the real threat to commercial banks. Figure 25: SFIs’ deposit breakdown
SFIs could not cope with massive inflows in our view
Figure 26: GSB, GHB and BAAC deposit share movements (%) 60 50
BAAC
GHB
28%
21%
48 42
40 Others
31
27
30
30
22
4%
20 GSB 47%
10 0 GSB
GHB 2005
Source: Company data, BOT
Thailand Banks Sector
BAAC 2010
Source: Company data
13
10 August 2011
Cost pressure appears manageable Fighting off SFIs competition with B/E Apart from the relatively small share of SFIs discussed earlier, we believe commercial banks can employ the B/E strategy to help retain deposit. As shown in Figure 27, system B/E as a percentage of total funding has increased from just 2% in January 2007 to 14% in May 2011. Excluding B/E, SFIs’ deposit market share would have been higher at 27%.
Banks have been more aggressive in B/E issuances
Figure 27: B/E as a percentage of commercial banks’ total funding (%) 16
12 8
4
Mar-11
May-11
Jan-11
Sep-10
Nov-10
Jul-10
Mar-10
May-10
Jan-10
Nov-09
Jul-09
All Commercial banks
Sep-09
May-09
Jan-09
Mar-09
Nov-08
Jul-08
Sep-08
May-08
Jan-08
Mar-08
Nov-07
Jul-07
Sep-07
May-07
Jan-07
Mar-07
0
Thai commercial banks
Source: BOT, Credit Suisse estimates
To meet their aggressive government-induced lending targets over the past few years, SFIs have been offering attractive spreads over commercial banks’ deposit rates (Figure 28). To match or beat SFIs’ rates, commercial banks resort to B/E (Figure 29). B/E has no deposit protection from the government and thus banks do not have to pay 40 bp insurance premium. The general practice is that banks give away 25-30 bp to depositors and keep 10-15 bp, but during the period of intensifying competition banks may be willing to give all to depositors. In sum, B/E has helped commercial banks retain some deposit and minimise cost pressure. Figure 28: SFIs have offered more attractive deposit rates (%) Spread 3.0
(bp)
50
14 2.6
Figure 29: Commercial banks’ B/E rates match or beat SFIs’ (%) 3.0
2.5
2.2
2.0
2.4
2.5
2.5
2.6
2.5
2.6
1.7
2.0
1.0
30 2.5
2.5
1.5
28
Without guarantee on principal, B/E yields are more attractive than normal deposits
2.0
1.25
2.0 0.75 1.5
0.5 0.0 Sav ing rate
3-m deposit SFIs
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse
Thailand Banks Sector
6-m deposit CBs
12-m deposit
1.0 3 month
6 month SFI deposit rate
12 month CB B/E rate
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse
14
10 August 2011
We believe that if there is any sign of deposit outflow to SFIs as a result of full implementation of DPA scheme, commercial banks would be more aggressive in B/E offering.
B/E unlikely to come under the DPA scheme Significantly increased B/E offered by commercial banks of late has triggered concerns from the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) whose prime duty is to protect the interests of small and retail investors with investment or deposit amount of Bt1-2 mn. We expect SEC to launch tighter regulation in B/E issuing procedures—more stringent filing and clarifications to investors of B/E with small minimum requirement, i.e., less than Bt2 mn.
SEC may tighten regulation on B/E in a bid to protect small/retail investors
However, we believe that most B/E investors are rich people with relatively big investment amounts. Take TISCO for instance; the amount per depositor for its B/E product is over Bt30 mn compared with Bt6 mn and Bt0.28 mn for its time deposit and current and savings (CASA) products, respectively (Figure 30). Thus, we do not expect SEC’s new regulation to have any impact on commercial banks’ B/E products.
Most B/E investors are rich people with sufficient knowledge on B/E risk
Figure 30: TISCO – deposit amount per depositor (Bt mn) 40 34 30
20
10
6 0
0 CASA
Time
B/E
Source: Company data
The more serious regulatory change that could curb B/E issuance is if the government decided to include B/E in the DPA scheme, practically making it no different than normal deposit. According to our channel checks, we think this is unlikely at least in the next several years. First, we believe the regulators (BOT and DPA) are happy to let depositors have a variety of investment choices. Second, to include B/E requires amendment to the current DPA Act, which could involve a lengthy process.
To include B/E in DPA scheme could produce negative impact on banks
Our sensitivity analysis shows that if the commercial banks were to retain their market shares (implying SFIs’ market share capped at the current 24.8%) by offering more B/E to depositors, B/E as a percentage of their total funding would rise to 29% by 2013, compared with 14% now (Figure 32). Our estimate is based on the assumption that commercial banks’ total funding (deposit + B/E) would grow by 12% p.a. over 2011-13, with deposit growing only at 4% p.a. (in line with the average growth between 2007 and 2010). We believe that B/E, accounting for 30-35% of total banks’ funding, is still acceptable to both DPA and BOT.
But we do not think regulators would implement such policy
Thailand Banks Sector
15
10 August 2011
Figure 31: SFIs’ deposit market share
Figure 32: B/E as % of commercial banks’ total funding (%)
(%) 25.5
24.8
24.8
24.8
35 29.0
30
24.0 23.5
23.6
25
22.5
17.7
20 21.9
11.4
15
21.0 19.4
10
19.5
5
19.0 18.0
7.6
8.8
2008
2009
7.0
0 2007
2008
2009
2010
2011E
2012E
2007
2013E
Source: BOT, Credit Suisse
2010
2011E
2012E
2013E
Source: BOT, Credit Suisse
Funding cost to rise by 10 bp at the most Given the above analysis, we believe that the overall funding cost of commercial banks should rise by no more than 10 bp once the DPA scheme is fully implemented from August 2012. Currently, SFIs offer an average spread of 30 bp above commercial banks’ deposit rates. To account for possibility of some deposit outflow to SFIs, we estimate that the gap should narrow by 20 bp, with 10 bp from SFIs lowering their spread and another 10 bp from commercial banks raising their rates to retain deposits.
We thus expect minimal impact from DPA scheme on banks’ profits
Under this worst-case assumption, our 2012 profit forecast for the sector would decline by about 4%, with TCAP suffering the most (-10%) followed by TMB (6%, Figure 33). Figure 33: Marginal impact on our 2012 profit forecast (%)
TCAP
TMB
KTB
BBL
Total
BAY
TISCO
KBANK
SCB
-3.1
-3.1
-2.7
0
-4 -4.5
-3.9
-3.8
-3.6
-6.2 -8
-9.7 -12 Source: Credit Suisse
Expensive insurance premium likely to stay for years DPA has principally set the target fund size at roughly around 1.5-2% of the total deposits (i.e., 4-5% of deposits covered under the DPA scheme. The key objective is to have sufficient safety margin in order to increase public confidence. Thus, they are likely to maintain a flat insurance premium of 40 bp – this is the highest in Asia (Figure 14)
Thailand Banks Sector
40 bp premium is likely to stay until 2017 at least based upon our estimate
16
10 August 2011
According to DPA, the insurance premium should eventually decline in line with other countries and they could even introduce variable rates based on individual bank risk premium. We believe the flat 40 bp premium is likely to stay at least until 2017 as our analysis suggests this would allow DPA to build up reserves to the target level (Figure 34). Figure 34: Calculation of DPA fund size as a percentage of insured deposit (Bt bn) Total system deposit Premium rate (on total system deposit) (%) Collected premium
Current
2012E
2013E
2014E
7,694
8,001
8,321
8,904
2015E
2016E
2017E
0.40 13
0.40 31
0.40 33
0.40 34
0.40 37
0.40 39
0.40 42
9,527 10,194 10,908
Cumulative premium (fund size)
14
45
78
112
149
189
231
% of total deposit
0.2
0.6
0.9
1.3
1.6
1.9
2.1
% of insured deposit *
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.3
4.1
4.9
5.6
* We estimate that 38% of total deposits are qualified under DPA. Source: BOT, DPA and Credit Suisse
Once the premium rate comes down (which is in too distant future), banks should enjoy higher profitability. TMB is the biggest winner followed by KTB as currently the insurance premium accounts for 30% and 19% of their PPOP, respectively (Figure 35).
TMB, the biggest beneficiary of lower insurance premium
Figure 35: Premium payment as a percentage of PPOP (%) 35 30.0 30 25 19.4
20 15 9.7
10.6
11.1
BAY
SCB
KBANK
13.0
13.5
TCAP
BBL
10 5
4.4
0 TISCO
KTB
TMB
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse
Thailand Banks Sector
17
10 August 2011
Small banks might be the winners We disagree to consensus belief Consensus seems to believe that small banks are definite losers of the DPA scheme. We disagree. Although it is hard to predict depositor behaviour at this stage, we see a likelihood of small banks seeing net benefit in the scenario that some depositors choose to spread their deposits across DPA members.
Small banks are unlikely to lose out
Deposits constitute a smaller part of the total funding than that of big banks First, their funding mix is skewed towards B/E and debt instruments (neither is affected by the DPA scheme); this accounts for 45% of small banks’ total funding, compared with 11% and 25% for big and mid-sized banks, respectively (Figure 36). Among smaller players, TISCO looks to be in the safest position as B/E and debt instruments account for 80% of its total funding (Figure 37). Figure 36: Funding mix by size (%) 100
Figure 37: Funding mix by individuals (%) 100
11
25 45
75
50
Small banks rely less on deposit compared with big banks
75 50
89
75 55
25
25
Deposit
Source: Company data
BE and Debt
BE and Debt
MIC
TCR
LHBANK
ICBCT
TISCO
KK
STC
UOBT
TMB
TCAP
BAY
Small banks
SCB
Medium sized banks
KBANK
BBL
Big banks
KTB
0 0
Deposit
Source: Company data
Small banks have relatively small deposit market shares Second, the eight small commercial banks (and retail banks) have a combined market share of only 6% compared with 73% for the big four (BBL, KTB, SCB and KBANK) and 21% for the three mid-sized players (BAY, TCAP and TMB, Figure 38). Assuming selected big depositors at each bank decide to spread their deposits across DPA members, we believe small banks are likely to gain more than lose. At this stage, it is hard to conclude that this is a definite possibility but we are confident that smaller players would not lose out, as the market expects.
Thailand Banks Sector
With small deposit market share, small players could end up with net inflows from bigger players
18
10 August 2011
Figure 38: Deposit share by size
Figure 39: Deposit share by individuals (%) 25 20
Medium sized banks 21%
15 Small banks 6%
10
Big banks 73%
5
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse
Thailand Banks Sector
MIC
TCR
LHBANK
ICBCT
KK
TISCO
STC
TCAP
UOBT
TMB
BAY
SCB
KTB
KBANK
BBL
0
Source: Company data
19
10 August 2011
Companies Mentioned (Price as of 09 Aug 11) Bangkok Bank (BBLf.BK, Bt155.00, OUTPERFORM, TP Bt219.00) Bank of Ayudhya (BAY.BK, Bt24.20, NEUTRAL, TP Bt31.00) CIMB Thai Bank (CIMBT, Bt2.74, NOT RATED) Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Thai) (ICBCT, NOT LISTED) Kasikornbank (KBANf.BK, Bt124.50, OUTPERFORM, TP Bt168.00) Kiatnakin Bank (KK.BK, Bt32.25, NOT RATED) Krung Thai Bank (KTB.BK, Bt19.00, OUTPERFORM, TP Bt21.80) Land and Houses Retail Bank (LHBANK TB, Bt1.50, NOT RATED) Siam Commercial Bank (SCB.BK, Bt117.00, OUTPERFORM, TP Bt143.00) Thanachart Capital Public Co Ltd (TCAP.BK, Bt28.25, NEUTRAL, TP Bt37.00) Tisco Financial Group (TISCO.BK, Bt37.50, OUTPERFORM, TP Bt49.00) TMB Bank Public Co Ltd (TMB.BK, Bt1.83, UNDERPERFORM, TP Bt1.90) United Oversea Bank (Thai) (UOBT, NOT LISTED)
Disclosure Appendix Important Global Disclosures Dan Fineman & Thaniya Kevalee each certify, with respect to the companies or securities that he or she analyzes, that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his or her personal views about all of the subject companies and securities and (2) no part of his or her compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report. The analyst(s) responsible for preparing this research report received compensation that is based upon various factors including Credit Suisse's total revenues, a portion of which are generated by Credit Suisse's investment banking activities. Analysts’ stock ratings are defined as follows: Outperform (O): The stock’s total return is expected to outperform the relevant benchmark* by at least 10-15% (or more, depending on perceived risk) over the next 12 months. Neutral (N): The stock’s total return is expected to be in line with the relevant benchmark* (range of ±10-15%) over the next 12 months. Underperform (U): The stock’s total return is expected to underperform the relevant benchmark* by 10-15% or more over the next 12 months. *Relevant benchmark by region: As of 29th May 2009, Australia, New Zealand, U.S. and Canadian ratings are based on (1) a stock’s absolute total return potential to its current share price and (2) the relative attractiveness of a stock’s total return potential within an analyst’s coverage universe**, with Outperforms representing the most attractive, Neutrals the less attractive, and Underperforms the least attractive investment opportunities. Some U.S. and Canadian ratings may fall outside the absolute total return ranges defined above, depending on market conditions and industry factors. For Latin American, Japanese, and non-Japan Asia stocks, ratings are based on a stock’s total return relative to the average total return of the relevant country or regional benchmark; for European stocks, ratings are based on a stock’s total return relative to the analyst's coverage universe**. For Australian and New Zealand stocks, 12-month rolling yield is incorporated in the absolute total return calculation and a 15% and a 7.5% threshold replace the 10-15% level in the Outperform and Underperform stock rating definitions, respectively. The 15% and 7.5% thresholds replace the +10-15% and -10-15% levels in the Neutral stock rating definition, respectively. **An analyst's coverage universe consists of all companies covered by the analyst within the relevant sector. Restricted (R): In certain circumstances, Credit Suisse policy and/or applicable law and regulations preclude certain types of communications, including an investment recommendation, during the course of Credit Suisse's engagement in an investment banking transaction and in certain other circumstances. Volatility Indicator [V]: A stock is defined as volatile if the stock price has moved up or down by 20% or more in a month in at least 8 of the past 24 months or the analyst expects significant volatility going forward. Analysts’ coverage universe weightings are distinct from analysts’ stock ratings and are based on the expected performance of an analyst’s coverage universe* versus the relevant broad market benchmark**: Overweight: Industry expected to outperform the relevant broad market benchmark over the next 12 months. Market Weight: Industry expected to perform in-line with the relevant broad market benchmark over the next 12 months. Underweight: Industry expected to underperform the relevant broad market benchmark over the next 12 months. *An analyst’s coverage universe consists of all companies covered by the analyst within the relevant sector. **The broad market benchmark is based on the expected return of the local market index (e.g., the S&P 500 in the U.S.) over the next 12 months. Credit Suisse’s distribution of stock ratings (and banking clients) is: Global Ratings Distribution Outperform/Buy* 48% (61% banking clients) Neutral/Hold* 40% (57% banking clients) Underperform/Sell* 10% (51% banking clients) Restricted 2%
*For purposes of the NYSE and NASD ratings distribution disclosure requirements, our stock ratings of Outperform, Neutral, and Underperform most closely correspond to Buy, Hold, and Sell, respectively; however, the meanings are not the same, as our stock ratings are determined on a relative basis. (Please refer to definitions above.) An investor's decision to buy or sell a security should be based on investment objectives, current holdings, and other individual factors.
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Principal is not guaranteed in the case of equities because equity prices are variable. Commission is the commission rate or the amount agreed with a customer when setting up an account or at anytime after that. For Thai listed companies mentioned in this report, the independent 2008 Corporate Governance Report survey results published by the Thai Institute of Directors Association are being disclosed pursuant to the policy of the Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission: Bangkok Bank(N/A), Bank of Ayudhya(Excellent), Kasikornbank(N/A), Kiatnakin Bank(Very Good), Krung Thai Bank(Excellent), Siam Commercial Bank(Excellent), Thanachart Capital Public Co Ltd(Very Good), Tisco Financial Group(Excellent), TMB Bank Public Co Ltd(Excellent). Taiwanese Disclosures: Reports written by Taiwan-based analysts on non-Taiwan listed companies are not considered recommendations to buy or sell securities under Taiwan Stock Exchange Operational Regulations Governing Securities Firms Recommending Trades in Securities to Customers. To the extent this is a report authored in whole or in part by a non-U.S. analyst and is made available in the U.S., the following are important disclosures regarding any non-U.S. analyst contributors: The non-U.S. research analysts listed below (if any) are not registered/qualified as research analysts with FINRA. The non-U.S. research analysts listed below may not be associated persons of CSSU and therefore may not be subject to the NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 restrictions on communications with a subject company, public appearances and trading securities held by a research analyst account. • Dan Fineman, non-U.S. analyst, is a research analyst employed by Credit Suisse Securities (Thailand) Limited. • Thaniya Kevalee, non-U.S. analyst, is a research analyst employed by Credit Suisse Securities (Thailand) Limited. • Siriporn Sothikul, CFA, non-U.S. analyst, is a research analyst employed by Credit Suisse Securities (Thailand) Limited. For Credit Suisse disclosure information on other companies mentioned in this report, please visit the website at www.creditsuisse.com/researchdisclosures or call +1 (877) 291-2683. Disclaimers continue on next page.
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