Teaching and Learning Guide for: Cognitive Phenomenology
Declan Smithies The Ohio State University This guide accompanies the following articles: Declan Smithies, ‘The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology.’ Philosophy Compass X/X (2013): XXX-‐XXX. Declan Smithies, ‘The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology.’ Philosophy Compass X/X (2013): XXX-‐XXX. Author’s Introduction Cognitive phenomenology can be defined as the experience that is associated with cognitive activities, such as thinking, reasoning, and understanding. What is at issue in contemporary debates is not the existence of cognitive phenomenology, so defined, but rather its nature and theoretical significance. Debated questions about the nature of cognitive phenomenology include the following: What is the relationship between the phenomenology of cognition and the intentionality of cognition? And what is the relationship between the phenomenology of cognition and the phenomenology of perception? Debated questions about the significance of cognitive phenomenology concern its role in theories of intentionality, introspective self-‐knowledge, and knowledge of the external world. Author Recommends Bayne, T. and M. Montague, eds. Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. This recent volume of essays represents the current state of the art in debates about cognitive phenomenology. The introduction also provides useful background and an overview of contemporary debates. Chalmers, D. ‘The Representational Character of Experience.’ Ed. B. Leiter, The Future for Philosophy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004. This paper provides an overview of representationalist or intentionalist theories of experience, although the discussion is primarily focused on perceptual experience, rather than cognitive experience.
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Horgan, T. and J. Tienson. ‘The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.’ Ed. D. Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2002. This paper argues for the interdependence of phenomenology and intentionality in the case of perceptual experience and cognitive experience alike. Kriegel, U, ed. Phenomenal Intentionality. New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2013. This is a new volume of essays on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality, including several chapters specifically focused on conscious thought. The introduction also provides a useful overview of what Kriegel has dubbed the “phenomenal intentionality program”. Pitt, D. ‘The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What is it Like to Think that P?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 1-‐36. This paper argues that the phenomenology of conscious thought explains how it is that we can know what we are consciously thinking. Prinz, J. ‘All Consciousness is Perceptual.’ Eds. B. McLaughlin and J. Cohen, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007. This paper gives a very clear statement and defence of the reductionist view that all consciousness is perceptual in nature and hence that all cognitive experience is ultimately reducible to perceptual experience. Siewert, C. The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1998. This is an extended discussion of the relationship between consciousness and intentionality that includes chapters on the nature of perceptual experience (Ch.7) and the nature of conscious thought (Ch.8). Strawson, G. Mental Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994. This book argues for the centrality of consciousness in the study of the mind. The introduction (Ch. 1) provides many vivid examples of cognitive experience, including what Strawson calls “understanding experience”. Online Materials Galen Strawson, ‘What is Cognitive Phenomenology?’ Interview from the Conference “Emergence and Panpsychism” in Munich 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cYBsrziW1pE
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Charles Siewert, ‘Consciousness and Intentionality.’ Ed. E. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-‐intentionality/ PhilPapers: Conscious Thought. http://philpapers.org/browse/conscious-‐thought PhilPapers: Consciousness and Intentionality. http://philpapers.org/browse/consciousness-‐and-‐intentionality PhilPapers: Phenomenal Intentionality. http://philpapers.org/browse/phenomenal-‐intentionality Sample Syllabus Background Reading Declan Smithies, ‘The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology.’ Philosophy Compass X/X (2013): XXX-‐XXX. Declan Smithies, ‘The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology.’ Philosophy Compass X/X (2013): XXX-‐XXX. Week I: What is Cognitive Phenomenology? Horgan, T. and J. Tienson. ‘The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.’ Ed. D. Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2002. Prinz, J. ‘All Consciousness is Perceptual.’ Eds. B. McLaughlin and J. Cohen, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007. OR: ‘The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology.’ Eds. Bayne, T. and M. Montague, Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Siewert, C. The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1998: Ch.8. OR: ‘Phenomenal Thought.’ Eds. Bayne, T. and M. Montague, Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Strawson, G. Mental Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994: Ch.1. OR: ‘Cognitive Phenomenology: Real Life.’ Eds. Bayne, T. and M. Montague, Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Wilson, R. ‘Intentionality and Phenomenology.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003): 413-‐31.
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Week II: Cognitive Phenomenology and Intentionality Horgan, T., and G. Graham. ‘Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy.’ Ed. R. Schantz, Prospects for Meaning. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012. Kriegel, U. ‘Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content.’ Eds. Bayne, T. and M. Montague, Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pautz, A. ‘Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?’ Ed. U. Kriegel, Phenomenal Intentionality. New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2013. Smithies, D. ‘The Mental Lives of Zombies.’ Philosophical Perspectives 26 (2012): 343-‐72. Week III: Cognitive Phenomenology and Self-‐Knowledge Goldman, A. ‘The Psychology of Folk Psychology.’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993): 15-‐28. Peacocke, C. ‘Conscious Attitudes, Attention and Self-‐Knowledge.’ Eds. C. Wright, B. Smith and C. MacDonald, Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Pitt, D. ‘The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What is it Like to Think that P?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 1-‐36. Smithies, D. ‘A Simple Theory of Introspection.’ Ed. D. Smithies and D. Stoljar, Introspection and Consciousness. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012. Week IV: Cognitive Phenomenology and Epistemology Bealer, G. ‘A Theory of the A Priori.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81.1 (2000): 1-‐30. Chudnoff, E. ‘The Nature of Intuitive Justification.’ Philosophical Studies 153.2 (2011): 313-‐33. Huemer, M. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001: Ch.5. Smithies, D. ‘The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification.’ Ed. J. Kallestrup and M. Sprevak, New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming. Week V: Cognitive Phenomenology and Methodology Bayne, T. and M. Spener. ‘Introspective Humility.’ Ed. E. Sosa and E. Villanueva, Philosophical Issues 20 (2010): 1-‐22.
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Horgan, T. ‘Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence.’ Eds. D. Smithies and D. Stoljar, Introspection and Consciousness, New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2012. Schwitzgebel, E. ‘The Unreliability of Naïve Introspection.’ Philosophical Review 117.2 (2008): 245-‐73. Spener, M. ‘Disagreement About Cognitive Phenomenology.’ Eds. T. Bayne and M. Montague. Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford UP, 2011. Focus Questions 1. The Existence Question: are there experiences associated with instances of cognition, such as thinking, reasoning, and understanding? 2. The Reduction Question: what is the relationship between the phenomenology of cognition and the phenomenology of perception? 3. The Intentionality Question: what is the relationship between the phenomenology of cognition and the intentionality of cognition? 4. A Question about Self-‐Knowledge: what is the role of cognitive phenomenology in explaining our introspective knowledge of cognition? 5. A Question about External World Knowledge: what is the role of cognitive phenomenology in explaining our knowledge of the external world? 6. A Methodological Question: what are the methodological implications of widespread disagreements about the nature of cognitive phenomenology?
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