STRENGTHENING DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE IN THE MALDIVES

JOINT GOVERNMENT AND UNDP MISSION OCTOBER 2005

DRAFT REPORT 9th November 2005

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ADC AHC CHW CFAA CPA CPI DPH EU GDP GEF GNP GOM HIV/AIDS HRC IDA IDC ILO IMF MP MDP MOAD MOHA MOEEW MOFT MOH MOPND NDI NDP NGO NRO NSS PER PRSP PSIP RDP Rf SAARC STELCO SOE TA UN UNDP VPAS WDC

Atoll Development Committee Atoll Health Centre Community Health Worker Country Financial Accountability Assessment Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Consumer Price Index Department of Public Health European Union Gross Domestic Product Global Environment Facility Gross National Product Government of Maldives Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Human Rights Commission International Development Association Island Development Committee International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund Member of Parliament Maldivian Democratic Party Ministry of Atoll Development Ministry of Home Affairs Ministry of Environment, Energy and Water (newly created) Ministry of Finance and Treasury Ministry of Health Ministry of Planning and National Development National Democratic Institute for International Affairs National Development Plan Non-governmental Organization Northern regional Office (of the MAA) National Security Service of the Maldives Public Expenditure Review Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Public Sector Investment Programme Regional Development project Rufiyaa South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation State Electricity Company Ltd State-owned Enterprise Technical Assistance United Nations United Nations Development Program Vulnerability and Poverty Assessment Study Women Development Committee

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1

2.

THE CURRENT LOCAL GOVERANCE SYSTEM .............................................................................. 3 2.1 LEGAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................................ 3 2.2 TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES ........................................................................................... 3 2.3 FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS ............................................................................................. 4 2.4 LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE STRUCTURES (IDC AND ADC) ............................................................................ 5 2.5 LOCAL PERSONNEL ......................................................................................................................... 7 2.6 LOCAL PLANNING PROCESS .............................................................................................................. 8 2.7 LOCAL FINANCE ............................................................................................................................ 9

3.

POPULATION CONSOLIDATION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ............................................ 12 3.1 POLICIES AND STRATEGIES .............................................................................................................. 12 3.2 REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT OFFICES................................................................................ 12

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SECTOR SERVICE DELIVERY ARRANGEMENTS.......................................................................... 14 4.1 HEALTH ..................................................................................................................................... 14 4.2 EDUCATION ................................................................................................................................ 17 4.3 POWER SECTOR ........................................................................................................................... 18 4.4 WATER, SANITATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT .................................................................................. 18 4.5 TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION SECTOR ........................................................................................ 19 4.6 KEY ISSUES RELATED TO LOCAL SERVICE DELIVERY.................................................................................. 19

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SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES TO ADDRESS IN STRATEGY FOR REFORM....................................... 21

6.

REFORM OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS......................................................................... 22 6.1 CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND BROAD POLICY OPTIONS FOR DECENTRALISATION.................................... 22 6.2 THE OVERALL STRUCTURES AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................ 23 6.3 ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS .......................................................................................................... 24 6.4 LOCAL FINANCE ........................................................................................................................... 25 6.5 PERSONNEL ................................................................................................................................ 29 6.6 REPRESENTATIONAL ARRANGEMENT (LOCAL COUNCILS) ........................................................................ 31 6.7 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ................................................................... 37

7.

THE WAY FORWARD ................................................................................................................ 38

ANNEXES......................................................................................................................................... 40 ANNEX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE UNDP DECENTRALIZATION POLICY ADVISORY SUPPORT .......... 40 ANNEX B - PROGRAMME FOR DECENTRALIZATION POLICY ADVISORY MISSION ........................... 43 ANNEX C: DECENTRALISATION CONCEPTS AND THEORY ............................................................... 48 ANNEX D: LOCAL ELECTIONS IN MALDIVES – ISSUES AND OPTIONS............................................... 52 ANNEX E: SELECT REFERENCES FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN SMALL ISLAND STATES ................... 62 ANNEX F: ISLAND AND ATOLL POPULATIONS................................................................................. 65 ANNEX G: DRAFT TOR FOR FURTHER WORK ON LOCAL FINANCE AND SERVICE DELIVERY............. 70 ANNEX H: LOCAL DEMOCRACY IN ASIA - REPRESENTATION IN DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE.... 74 ANNEX I: MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT ........................................................................................... 92 Boxes: Box 1: Criteria for PSIP investment proposals from IDCs Box 2: Basic preconditions for effective decentralisation

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1.

INTRODUCTION

The Government of the Maldives intends to facilitate a sustained policy dialogue among key stakeholders on democratic decentralization, its linkages with the public administration reform initiative (including decentralization) and potential for strengthening participatory processes, and fostering a greater role for the representatives of the people, leading to a local government model applicable to the Maldives. The Government has requested the support of UNDP to prepare a preliminary strategic framework summarizing the recommended strategy and reflecting discussions with all stakeholders. The purpose is to present an initial proposal for broad-based discussions among all stakeholders leading to the endorsement of a national framework in the form of a policy (white) paper. A joint Government-UNDP mission was fielded to advise the Government on the main pillars of a reform to achieve the objective outlined above and provide recommendations for the process, in particular with respect to: (a) The further development of the local representative institutions at Island/Atoll Level and their roles and functions in decentralized governance. (b) Administrative decentralization and establishing a local government ‘set-up’ for islands and atolls of the Maldives. This includes the functions of the Ministry of Atolls Development, the Atoll & Island offices & IDC’s ADCs in order to derive clearer roles & responsibilities to support the decentralization process. (c) Mechanism for fiscal decentralization with emphasis on fiscal relationships and linkages as well as a framework for local revenue collection and mechanisms for budgetary allocations from central to regional, atoll and island levels; (d) The roles and functions of the local governments and the specific nature of services to be delivered by the central government, the regional level institutions and atoll & island level offices. This includes the recommended overall strategy for deconcentration and devolution. (e) The conceptual outline of a proposal for implementation of a community participation and local governance programme, in collaboration between the Government and UNDP. (f) Capacity requirements for the implementation of a broad based local administrative system centering on a fiscal decentralization approach The current mission is undertaken within the overall context of major political reforms towards sustained multi party democracy, but also within the context of a somehow constrained macro-economic outlook for the immediate years due primarily to the impact of the tsunami. A proposal is presently being prepared by Male Municipality for reforms of the local governance system in the capital and this is therefore not covered in the present report. However, as emphasized in the recommendations, there is a need to establish synergies between the two initiatives. Also, a separate process is addressing issues related to decentralization of justice focussing on access at island level, and this is not intended covered by the mission. The mission was carried out in the period 10-24 October 2005 and consisted of the following members: ƒ Ahmed Shareef Neefas, Assistant Director, Ministry of Atoll Development ƒ Mohammed Zahid, National Project Coordinator, Ministry of Atoll Development ƒ Abdul Bari Abdulla, Programme Coordinator, UNDP Maldives ƒ Linda Maguire, Policy Advisor, Electoral Systems and Processes, UNDP ƒ Per Tidemand, Consultant ƒ Henrik Fredborg Larsen (Team Leader), Policy Advisor, Decentralization and Local Governance, UNDP

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The mission met with a large segment of stakeholders and central and local level comprising of the Ministers and their teams; members of parliament, members of the opposition, political parties, civil society, atoll and island chiefs and other staff in the local administration, members of ADCs and IDCs, members of the WDCs, and other individuals. The team gratefully acknowledges the contributions of each of the persons met during the mission as well as the UNDP Country Office and programmes in the Maldives. Field missions were conducted to a representative section of regional and local entities (see programme in annex).

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2.

THE CURRENT LOCAL GOVERANCE SYSTEM

The Republic of Maldives consists of more than 1200 islands of which approximately 200 are officially inhabited islands with a total population of about 280,000 people. While Maldives do not have any local government system1, it has established a two-tier deconcentrated system of local administration that encompasses the twenty Atolls and all inhabited islands, with special arrangements for the capital island of Male. 2.1 Legal Framework The Constitution in chapter VII stipulates that there shall be an Atoll Chief for each Atoll of the Maldives and that he shall be appointed by the President (§ 106). The Constitution outlines the qualifications of the Atoll Chief (§107) but not the specific functions as “every Atoll shall be administered, as may be decreed and directed by the President, by the Atoll Chief” (§109). It is notable that no other mentioning of the local administrative set-up is made in the Constitution. For instance the island administration or Male are not referred to. The functions and procedures of the local administrative set-up is not defined in law, but guided by Presidential decrees and for Atolls and Islands regulations issued by the Ministry of Atoll Development. Male is referred to as a Municipality but is managed directly under the Ministry of Home Affairs. As the functions are not defined in law, it leaves several issues open for interpretation where the partially elected committees are in a weak position compared to the appointed chiefs. In interviews with island and atoll committee members it appeared that some procedures were communicated in an unclear manner or had changed frequently leading to some uncertainties (see further below). 2.2 Territorial administrative structures A specific challenge for local administration in the Maldives is the spatial distribution of the population among the 200 islands. A detailed description of the population distribution among islands and Atolls is provided by the census reports2. Some of the key features are: •

Of the 200 inhabited islands, 76 have a population below 500 people and 130 have a population below 1000 persons whereas approximately 73% of the population lives on islands with a population above 1000 persons3.

•

The Atolls also vary significantly in size. With an average population of 13,000 persons the actual population varies from approximately 1,700 to 87,000 per Atoll.

•

The Population of Male Municipality was according to the latest census 74,000 – some 27% of the population and increasing with an above average growth rate

Any local administrative or local government set-up has to face these challenges. The islands and to some extent the atolls are natural units of any system as they very clearly geographically constitute distinct communities of people. However, the distribution of people among islands and atolls is very 1

See annex for definition of key decentralisation concepts – a LG system will encompass elected councils empowered to deliver certain services with some autonomy for revenue raising, passing of bylaws, planning etc. 2 See Annex with Island and Atoll Populations (1995 and 2000 Census) all date in this section refers to this analysis and the tables provided in Annex.

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uneven, which complicates the assignment of responsibilities among levels of administrations based on islands and atolls, as several islands are bigger than atolls etc. 2.3 Functions of Local Administrations 2.3.1 Atoll Chief The overall management of the Atolls and Islands is under the Presidentially appointed Atoll Chief4. The roles and functions of the chief has traditionally mainly been to maintain law and order but has increasingly been expected also to coordinate sector activities. This change of roles followed in particular the Seventh Conference of the Atoll Chiefs in August 1994, where the roles since have been stipulated as: 1. Atoll chief is the highest authority in the Atoll with respect to implementation of all activities of the Government in the Atoll. 2. Island offices will function under the Atoll office, 3. Enforcement of law and maintenance of peace among the citizen of the Atoll is the responsibility of the Atoll office, 4. Atoll office is responsible for administration and supervision of the Atoll Development Committee, Island Development Committees and the Women Development Committees, 5. Monitoring all activities conducted by government agencies in the Atoll. The Atoll office should suggest changes to the ministries if it feels the need, 6. Upon request from any government agency, keep the funds for any activities conducted in the Atoll; 7. Send any statistics of the Atoll as requested by any Government Agency and 8. Monitor the work of all Government employees in the Atoll. However, although the role of the Atoll Chief is wide ranging, then it is generally noted by people met that no or very limited pro-active planning and coordination is undertaken by the Atoll Office – some Atoll Chiefs met used the term “post-office” to describe the functions as the Atoll Office to a very large extent simply convey messages from various central ministries to islands and vice versa. The Atoll Chief is appointed by the President – the posts are not advertised and it is widely recognised that the appointments are of a political nature rather than merit-based. Most Atoll Chiefs will serve for a limited period in an Atoll and typically be transferred among several Atolls and other public offices. The Island Chief The Island Chief works under the direct control of the Atoll Chief and as such is responsible for the implementation of the above-mentioned duties at island level. The Island Chiefs are normally local residents of the Islands and are appointed upon the recommendation by the Atoll Chief, but usually serve on the same island for extended periods. Interviewees indicated that the office of the Island Chief often was monopolised by one specific family on each island.

4 The description of the role of the Atoll Chief follows the outline of the report: by S.P. Jain: Working Paper on a Framework for Decentralised Governance for Development, UNDP 1998, pages 5-6.

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2.4 Local Representative Structures (IDC and ADC)5 Atoll Development Committees (ADC) and Island Development Committees (IDC) are established according to the 1999 Rules and Regulation issued by the Ministry of Atoll Development6 as institutions for local representative bodies. The ADCs are ‘formed under the Ministry of Atolls Development to work in collaboration with the Atoll Offices’. The IDCs ‘will work under the Island Office, and in consultation with the Atoll Office’. There is no constitutional provision for local representative institutions in the Maldives, nor are the ADCs and IDCs described in law; their status has been described as “quasi legal” and their functions and composition are only regulated by Ministerial regulations and instructions. The Constitution of the Republic of Maldives (1997) makes reference to the administrative structure only and the current proposals for revision of the Constitution – the President’s proposal or the proposal submitted by the Law Society do not suggest any amendments in this area. 2.4.1

Island Development Committees (IDCs)

The IDCs comprise of appointed/ex-officio and elected members and are chaired by the Island Chief. The committees have 5-10 members depending on the size of the population on the island and comprises also of the island leaders, i.e. the assistant island chief(s) and the island chief in cases where the head of the local administration is a senior island chief. A direct reporting line is established to the Atoll level by making the Atoll Chief (or officer-in-charge) the Chairperson. The president is the Island Chief and the members elect the deputy president from among themselves. The number of members in the IDC depends according to regulations upon the population of the island, namely: Population Below 1000 1000 - 3000 Above 3000

Elected Members 5 6 10

Appointed by Atoll Chief 2 3 5

However, in practice, the appointed members of the IDC are often in majority as actual composition of IDCs often differs from what is stipulated in the guidelines - for details see Annex D. 2.4.2

Atoll Development Committees

The Atoll Development Committees (ADC) comprise of 10-20 members (according to population size) appointed by the Ministry of Atoll Development. In most cases, the majority of the members are selected from among the IDC presidents (i.e. the Island Chiefs). The committee is chaired by the Atoll Chief (or officer-in-charge). The Committee is a consultative committee for the Atoll Chief in his undertaking of activities. 2.4.3

Women Development Committees

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Annex D provides a comprehensive discussion of the representative local structures in the Maldives, whereas only a summary of issues is presented here. 6 Regulation on Atoll Development Committees, 11 September 1999, Ministry of Atolls Administration and Rules and Regulation for Island Development Committees, 8 April 1999, Ministry of Atolls Development. No official translation exists and this report is based on the unofficial translation.

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In 1992 the National Women Committee established separate Island Women Development Committees (WDC) in each inhabited island. The WDCs are expected to undertake a wide range of relevant activities considered of specific relevance to women. In reality the WDCs tend mainly to provide cleaning services as an income generating activity and run various training courses in tailoring and similar activities. The president of the WDC is represented in the IDC. In addition to this, there is no requirement to ensure representation of women from among the elected members. For the seats in the ADCs, on the other hand, there is a requirement that 25 percent of the members are women. 2.4.4

Current Local Electoral Procedures

According to the regulations, the elections for the Elected Members of the IDC are to be done through a secret ballot which presents a list of candidates. The voter (all persons registered on the island who are over 18 years of age) can mark his/her preferences but has only as many choices as there are seats to be filled (using what is commonly referred to as a Block Voting electoral system). The candidates winning the most votes win the seats to the committee. The administration of the elections at island level is done by a group called the “Election Committee”. The Election Committee is appointed by the Atoll Chief in consultation with the Island Office and is composed of “senior local government officials and persons other than those competing for membership” as per the IDC rules and regulations. In cases where the number of candidates does not meet the required number of posts, all candidates who applied are granted membership and the number of lacking posts is filled by persons appointed by the Atoll Chief, in consultation with the Island Office. The head of the IDC is the person in charge of the island office, or the Island Chief, therefore the appointed head of the public administration on the island. If a member of the committee resigns or is removed, a new member can be admitted to the IDC without an election. In practice, however, elections for the Elected Members to the IDC appear to have been of a fairly inconsistent nature. Some islands used a process whereby the Island Chief and the Atoll Chief handpicked the representatives to the committee, while other islands ran elections for the spots. However, these elections could include only the number of candidates as seats to be filled and/or an Election Committee partially composed of candidates running for office or individuals who are appointed to the council. Unlike the Island Chiefs, the Atoll Chiefs are referred to in the constitution and are appointed and removed from office by the President. The regulation governing the Atoll Development Committees stipulates that the Atoll Development Committee will include 10 to 20 appointed members (the exact number of which is to be determined on the basis of population within the Atoll), who are appointed by the Ministry of Atolls Development on the advice of the Atoll Chief. There is also a requirement that every Atoll Committee have no less than one quarter of its members as women although this seems to be rarely followed. Interestingly, there was a brief experiment with directly electing the Atoll Councils and Chiefs during the late 1960s into the 1970s. This was done through the same Block Vote electoral system, using the Atoll as the unit of measure. Every eligible voter in the Atoll was given the same list of candidates from which to select the required number of members and the Atoll Chief was the person winning the most votes among these. 2.4.5

Summary observations on existing local representative structures

In summary, •

Only at island level some rudimentary levels of local representation are put in place. However, the ADCs comprise of Island Chiefs and appointed members only, and the IDCs are only partially composed of elected representatives.

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•

The legal status of IDCs is weak and IDCs are mainly of a consultative manner, they cannot effectively hold officials – in particular the chiefs – accountable. IDCs and ADCs appear to have little knowledge which empower them effectively to engage in local administration, e.g. little knowledge on budgets and expenditures.

•

Whereas the WDC is referred to at local levels as “the women’s committee” the IDC is often referred to as “the men’s committee” and women are effectively excluded from the general affairs of IDCs except for the representation of the President of the WDC within the IDC which is essentially a means to ensure that the WDC is aware of tasks which they are expected to complete;

•

Local elections are not managed in a very transparent manner – it is largely controlled by the chiefs and in some cases merely a selection of representatives.

•

The IDCs and ADCs do not communicate issues and resolutions to wider population.

2.5 Local Personnel The personnel within the Island and Atoll offices are all of a general administrative nature for support to the Island and Atoll Chiefs. The average number of staff in Atoll offices is 50, whereas the average staff numbers in island offices is approximately 20 persons – the size of island offices varies more than the size of atoll offices. 7 Details of staff in two selected atoll offices are provided below as illustration of typical Atoll offices. Staff in island offices will generally comprise the following staff categories • • • • • • • • •

Bodu Kaathibu (Senior Island Chief) Kuda Kaathibu (Assistant Island Chief) Island office Assistant Secretary and Assistant Secretary Senior Clerk and clerk (Kaathibu) Walkie Talkie Operator and senior Walkie Talkie Operator Labourer Foreman Driver

In summary the staff is only of a general administrative nature with limited skills in more proactive development planning.

7

Information is based on sample of all islands and atiolls in the northern region – source data provided by MAA, NRO.

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Table 1: Staff in Laamu and Seenu Atoll Offices Name of the Post Atoll chief Senior Assistant to the Atoll Chief Assistant to the Atoll Chief Atoll office Assistant Administrative Officer Senior Secretary Investigator Assistant Budget Officer Secretary Assistant Project Officer Project Officer (T) Assistant Secretary Senior Radio Telephone Operator Radio Telephone Operator Senior Walkie Talkie Operator Senior Clerk Walkie Talkie Operator Foreman Atoll Dhoni Driver Atoll Dhoni Crew Labourer Cook Driver Mechanic Driver Watchman Supervisor (F&B) Peon Total

Laamu Atoll 1 1 6 3 1 1 1 9 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 43

Seenu Atoll 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 5 1 7 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 2 4 2 1 1 3 1 3 53

2.6 Local Planning Process There are no mandatory planning functions of the Island or Atoll offices. Nor is planning referred to as a specific function of the ADC or IDCs in their general regulations. Development planning is generally undertaken through the respective sectors and/or through specific donor funded development projects. However, through some projects, such as the Atoll Development for Sustainable Livelihoods, local planning at island and atoll level has been encouraged. The Ministry of Atoll Development has recently prepared a standard planning guideline for Island and Atoll planning8. Workshops have been undertaken in 17 atolls for initiation of Local Island and Atoll planning, with the participation of sector ministries. 7 Atolls have completed island plans but Atoll plans are yet to be completed. Sector consultations have been done in 2 atolls that constitute the last stage of planning – expected to be completed in 2 months. Fundraising starts after the completion of plans. Thus planning is need based without consideration of hard budget constraints. Funding may be obtained from various donor funded projects or the national development budget. One national window of funding has since 2000 under the PSIP (Public Sector

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The Handbook is developed – not translated or officially issued.

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Investment Programme) been available for development projects9. The amount of funding has been moderate (approximately 2 million Rf allocated annually) and IDCs are not guaranteed any funding or indicative planning figure – planning is kept open ended and meant to be visionary. Funding of projects depend on the approval by the Project Appraisal Committee under the Ministry Planning and National Development (MPND). It is recognised that the approach faces some risks as many plans may end up without funding, as IDC and ADC own revenue is rather limited (see below). Box 1: Criteria for PSIP investment proposals from IDCs10

• • • • •

The government contribution to the project should not exceed 50% of total project costs and should not exceed 300,000 Rf, Construction of boundary walls and TV and cable networking are not eligible for PSIP, Projects that are included in other programmes of the MPND and/or other sector ministries will not be funded under the PSIP, Priority will be given to projects that are included in the Island Development Plans (IDPs), Priority will be given to projects that: o Improve the income of communities, o Are for sustainable infrastructure projects, o Contribute towards environmental protection and conservation, o Contribute towards population and development consolidation.

2.7 Local Finance 2.7.1 Type of local revenue The Islands and Atolls receive funds for salaries of staff and recurrent expenses from Ministry of Atolls development, but also have sources of revenue that to some extent Revenue sharing can be referred to as “own source revenue”. The exact nature of local revenue sources varies locally and is not specified in law. With Islands: 90% of collected land rent returned to islands. Local revenue sources for Islands include the following: • • • • • • • •

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Revenue shared with central government, where various central government institutions collect fees and taxes (see box), Local fees and taxes – for instance in Kulhudhuffushi the IDC collects 5% of income from sand mining Voluntary self-help contributions – the community may for instance organise a fishing trip to finance a specific project, Income from rent of guesthouses Rent from shops, Land rent Various penalty fees Profits from shares in Bank of Maldives

With Atolls: 50% collected from Atoll shops returned to Atolls, 50% collected from vessel licensing returned to Atolls.

For general overview of PSIP procedures see the PER 2002, page 25. Information note from Ministry of Atoll Development n.d.

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For Atolls the income is less based on voluntary contributions and local taxes and to a larger extent returns from investments (Atoll shops) and revenue sharing agreements with central government. 2.7.2 Types of Island and Atoll Expenditure Recurrent expenditures at island and atoll level are directly paid by the MOAD whereas some limited development expenditures are covered from the Island and Atoll accounts. Recurrent expenditures include staff salaries, general operational costs (stationary, transport etc) of the island and atoll offices as well as some allowances for IDC and ADC members. Kulhudhuffushi IDC development expenditure last two years: • • •

Street lights – 280,000 Rf, Park – 84,000 Rf, Preschool – 400,000 Rf (previous year).

It was not possible during the mission to obtain consolidated expenditure reports from island and atoll offices, but field visits gave some examples of the level of development expenditures at island level. The examples from Kulhudhuffushi IDC indicate that the larger IDCs have a potential for delivery of services even with the existing limited revenue sources. However, for smaller islands local development projects are dependent on external funding from NGOs or government.

Most often, a practice is followed of expenditures and projects being approved by the Ministry even when funded from IDC own funds. One IDC (Kulhudhuffushi) reported a recent experience where the central government decided on details of the streetlights funded from their own budget. 2.7.3 Level of Atoll and Island Funding During the mission it was difficult to establish the exact level of own and shared revenue generated at island and atoll levels. At both central and local level it appeared as if no comprehensive accounts were developed which would give a complete overview of atoll and island level. From an analysis of bank statements from a sample of Atolls11 the following conclusions can be drawn: • • • •

By September 2005 the total amount on island and Atoll A/c was 26.9 million Rf or 3.4 million per Atoll on average. The Island accounts showed extreme levels of variation from ranged from 690 Rf to 1,276,817 Rf Atoll Accounts also ranged substantively from 129,484 to 3.5 million Rf From the small sample of accounts received it seemed as if the level of activity was low, as several IDC had no financial transactions for several months. It also seemed as if substantial savings were accumulated, as the level of incomes at least for the period reviewed was substantially beyond expenditure (the sample data indicated a 30% annual increase).

In addition to the above revenue, which is mainly spent on development expenditures, it is also worthwhile briefly to analyse the level of recurrent spending. Islands and Atolls at present do not receive fiscal transfers as local governments would do, but expenditures at Island and Atoll offices form part of the Government budget and is budgeted for under the Ministry of Atoll development. The levels of funding have remained relative stable over the last three years and fairly modest at around 4.4% of the GoM recurrent budget12. 11 The Mission received the bank statements from all Atolls within the Northern regional Office for September 2005 and monthly bank statements from H. DH. Atoll for the period January – September 2005. 12 Figure calculated based on Government of Maldives Budget 2005.

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The size of local offices varies according to populations, but per capita spending in smaller Atolls is still significantly higher than in smaller atolls and seem to range from less than 500 to more than 2000 Rf/capita13. In both cases this is significantly higher than locally generated revenue that for instance in Kulhudhuffushi 43 Rf per capita last year. 2.7.4 Concluding Remarks on Local revenue In summary the current modalities of financing Island and Atoll Offices and Development Committees can be characterised as: •

Atoll and island offices are generally considered as part of the MOAD and all recurrent expenditures are covered through MOAD allocations. These indicate very significant levels of per capita funding due to the significant variations in populations across islands and atolls,

•

Minor development expenditures are funded through IDC and ADCs own accounts and revenues that partly can be termed as “locally generated”.

•

At present it is difficult to get an overview at both local and national levels of locally generated incomes and expenditures – this is partly a problem of lack of local transparency,

•

Local level generated income is substantially less than central transfers, however in some island sufficiently fids can be raised for meaningful local development initiatives,

•

Available data suggests very significant differences in local level resource mobilisation

13

Government of Maldives Budget 2005, data from MOAD and population census, the lowest total allocation is for Felidhu Atholhu Atoll but the population here is very low and the total per capita allocation for administration of the atoll and island offices is still significantly above the national average.

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3.

POPULATION CONSOLIDATION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

3.1 Policies and Strategies Under the Sixth National Development Plan, GOM has in principle embarked on a relocation program called the National Population Consolidation Strategy and Program. Under this strategy, regional focus islands are created serving the Northern and Southern atolls. In addition, 85 atoll focus islands have in principle been selected to receive a high order of services. The other inhabited islands, called primary islands would receive a minimum level of services and population would be encouraged through various forms to move toward the focus islands. The objective of the regional development strategy is to obtain economies of scale in delivering services, in particular health and education but also transport, electricity and telecommunication. It would also aim to lower country vulnerability to sea level rise due to climate change, made even more sensitive with the last event. Islands with a population below 500 are within government widely considered as too small for delivery of services in a cost effective manner and population from these are encouraged to move to focus islands. However, it must be noted that the details of the policy never have been disseminated in details nor widely discussed. For instance no details have been provided to the public regarding which islands are designated as focus islands and which islands’ populations are to be encouraged to move to bigger islands, nor has final decision been made regarding how best to serve the entire country through selected regional centres (see further below). Regarding the specific plans for establishment of regional centres it appears also that no comprehensive cost analyses have been conducted. The Public Expenditure Review in 2002 already cautioned about the costs of establishing regional centres14 and the recent tsunami has further strained public financial resources. Thus while there exist within government a broad agreement on the desirability of having some population consolidation as well as promotion of regional growth centres outside Male a large number of details still remains resolved. During the Mission Cabinet held several meetings to discuss the above issues but during the mission no definite conclusions were reached or communicated. Any future decision and clarification of the Policy will be crucial for advances in in local governance reforms. 3.2 Regional Development Management Offices The attempts made by the MAA to establish regional offices are also of specific interest to the current assignment. In line with the government's regional development policy to facilitate decentralized implementation of development activities, there are plans to establish Regional Development Project Management Offices (RDPMO) in 5 regions of the country. Such offices have already been established in the Northern and Southern Regions. The development regions are divided as follows15: • • • • •

Northern Region: Haa Alif, Haa Dhaal and Shaviyani Atolls (with the Regional Development Project Management Office located in Haa Dhaal Kulhudhuffushi) Southern Region: Gaaf Alif, Gaaf Dhaal, Gnaviyani and Seenu Atolls (with the Regional Development Management Office located in Seenu Atoll Hithadhoo) North Central Region: Noonu, Raa, Baa and Lhaviyani Atolls Central Region: Kaafu, Vaavu, Alif Alif and Alif Dhaal Atolls South Central Region: Meemu, Faafu, Dhaalu, Thaa and Laamu Atolls

14 Government of the Republic of Maldives, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank: Maldives Public Expenditure Review 2002. 15 From website of the ministry http://www.atolls.gov.mv/index.html

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Below is a brief outline the main features of the Southern and Northern Regional Development Management Offices (RDMOs)16. The RDMOs were established by Presidential Decree No. 2002/27 (11 June 2002), in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 2000/60 (29 October 2000). The mandates of these two offices were to monitor and coordinate development projects in these atolls, in accordance with the terms of reference defined by the said decree. According to Presidential Decree No. 2002/27, the roles of the RDMOs are to: • •

Coordinate and monitor development projects and activities implemented by the Government agencies in the area of competence of the RDMO; Assess development projects proposed by the atolls and islands within the area of competence of the RDMO, and to submit such projects through the auspices of MOAD to MPND.

The specific tasks of the RDMOs are to: • • • • • • • •

•

Coordinate, advise and facilitate implementation of development projects undertaken by Government agencies within the region; Assess the developmental status of the region; and in consultation with relevant Government agencies and with their technical assistance, plan, implement, coordinate and monitor further development projects; Assess development projects proposed by the atolls and islands within the area of competence, and facilitate their implementation; Identify land use requirements of government agencies’ activities, economic and industrial uses, residential areas and public services; and prepare land use plans for islands in the area, in accordance with the standards of the Maldives Housing and Urban Development Board; Establish and manage a Geographic Information System (including a database of the natural, human and development resources) for the region; Promote public awareness of the economic and social development issues and environmental issues of the area, in collaboration with Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the Island Development Committees; Manage and administer the Social Development Fund established under the Regional Development Project; Monitor implementation of Government contractual projects in the region, ensure that these projects are implemented in accordance with the contracts and to acceptable standards, provide status reports to relevant government agencies, and in accordance with the guidance from such agencies, facilitate the resolution of any conflicts or issues that may arise; Hold an annual meeting of the Regional Advisory Committee within the first quarter of every year, and seek the committee’s counsel on projects proposed for that year (Presidential Decree 2002/27).

The RDMOs shall be administered by the MOAD (Presidential Decree 2002/27) and a Regional Advisory Committee will be established to advise each RDMO in the performance of their mandates and functions. This committee shall comprise the Atoll Chiefs in the region of the RDMO, the Chief Executive Officer of the RDMO, one representative from each atoll within the region, and one Planner assigned by MPND. The Regional Advisory Committee shall be chaired by the head of the RDMO (Presidential Decree No.2002/27). Finally it should be noted that the attempts of establishing regional development centres to date have been implemented with a rather unclear governance set-up in the sense that no formal structures have 16

This outline is primarily based on ADB TA 3896 Final Report – MLD Regional Development Project-II.

13

been established for regional planning beyond project management structures with some consultation with the Atoll Chiefs and ADCs.

4.

SECTOR SERVICE DELIVERY ARRANGEMENTS

Below we will highlight basic features of service delivery in key sectors of relevance for discussion of local governance issues in service provision. During the mission it was noted that a specific study was undertaken on decentralisation of the administration of justice. As a separate report soon is expected to be issued on this assignment we exclude discussion of justice administration from the below discussion. We also exclude discussion of service delivery arrangements in Male as this also currently is subject to a different study. 4.1 Health17 Health services are organised into a five-tier referral system, comprising the central health services including the referral hospital, the regional hospitals, atoll hospitals, atoll health centres and island health posts. The figure below correlates this system with the geographical zoning of Maldives, the taxonomy of which includes central, regional, atoll and the island levels. It also depicts the lines of authority, descending from the Ministry through the Department of Public Health (DPH) for the preventive services and directly from the Ministry for the curative services. Central institutions functioning under the Ministry include the Department of Public Health (DPH), the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital (IGMH), the National Thalassemia Centre (NTC) and the Maldives Water and Sanitation Authority (MWSA). Their services embody the fifth or highest referral level. Though not central in character, Male' Health Centre and Villingili Health Centre also function directly under the Ministry, providing primary and secondary level health care to the twin-island capital. Ministry of Health is responsible for formulating overall health policy and health development plans and for monitoring and evaluating the health situation. Department of Public Health is responsible for delivering preventive health programmes for the prevention and control of communicable diseases and for the promotion of health and well being of mothers and children. It is also responsible for delivering basic health care (preventive, promotive, curative and rehabilitative) to the islands and atolls. IGMH delivers tertiary curative care, serving as the central referral hospital for the whole country. MWSA is responsible for regulating and setting standards for water and sanitation services throughout the country. At the fourth level is the regional hospital. Numbering five, they each cater to a geographical region of 2 to 5 atolls, providing outreach services. They provide secondary level curative services and, through public health units, they also implement preventive health programmes and supervise third and second level health services. Public health units have dual control, admin support coming from the hospital and technical support coming from DPH. At the third level is the atoll hospital. Numbering 4 at present, they serve high population atolls with difficult access to regional hospitals. Atoll hospitals represent a recent addition to the hierarchy, upgraded from pre-existing health centres, with the aim of handling obstetric and surgical emergencies.

17

The section on the health sector is primarily based on (a) the health policy, (b) the official website of the ministry: http://www.health.gov.mv and (c) mid-term evaluation of the health master plan.

14

Figure 1: Five-Tier Health Delivery System in the Maldives

At the second level is the atoll health centre. Each atoll has 1 to 3 health centres. Their staff includes doctors for the curative services and community health workers (CHWs) for the preventive services. Upgraded with wards and labour rooms, many of them now offer a wide range of secondary care. At the first level is the island health post. Staffed with family health workers (FHWs) and foolhumaas or traditional birth attendants, they provide simple curative and preventive services at the island level. The distribution of key responsibilities within the health sector among levels of government is outlined in the table below.

15

Table 2: Summary Overview of Distribution of Key Health Functions18 Level Government Central Regional

Atoll

Island

of Planning Functions

Curative services

National Strategic Health Plan. Well established. Training of regional health administrators to start regional health planning. Aim to have an integrated annual action plan for each atoll.

Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital (60% of total health budget) Five regional hospitals are established to cater for most curative requirements including general surgeries of the zone. Atoll Hospitals were introduced (in spite of health master Plan 1996-2205) due to high demand from communities. 15 health centres are constructed and 8 ongoing. 4 health centres upgraded to Atoll Hospitals. Currently on rudimentary Health post (with delivery room and trained data collection and community health workers) planning, but each HC encouraged to develop monthly plans.

The role of chiefs in the sector has changed In 1970s at the island level there was one health staff either a traditional birth attendant or family health worker and now there are 3 to 6 staff depending on the population size of the island. A number of functions of the island chief in managing and delivering health services have changed over last five years. Currently the chiefs mainly • • • •

Collect data during an epidemic Facilitate for medical evacuation Where there is no health post report to atoll office to get leave for the health staff Some supervision of staff attendance

Since the establishment of a separate health facility outside the island administration in the island, a number of tasks that the island chiefs carried as an island functionary have been delegated to FHW or CHW. For example, rain water collection and quality control which island chief used to supervise has been delegated to FHW or CHW. The following local governance issues in the health sector should be noted:

18

•

As the health sector services at local level are increasingly becoming more complex it becomes on the one hand impossible to control all details from Male, but traditional ways of local delegation to the local chiefs is also no longer feasible as the technical skills of the chiefs are insufficient,

•

Some overlap in various functions, for instance regarding the management of lower cadre heath staff where staff salary is provided by island office, leave is approved by atoll chief at the atoll office and staff promotion decided by department of public health,

Based on Mid-term evaluation of health master plan.

16

•

Lack of modalities for effective local consultations. Local health committees (task forces) have been established, but they are of a technical rather than local representative nature.

4.2 Education19 As of 2000, all children in the Maldives have access to the first seven years of formal schooling, one of the landmark achievements of the country. Provision of education to over one-third of its population is by no means a minor achievement for the Maldives: Students are scattered over 199 inhabited islands and a school is available in all these islands. Education is tuition-free from pre-school through higher secondary schooling. In 2004, there were 63,300 students enrolled in the primary grades, 26,141 in the lower secondary grades, and 1,622 in the higher secondary grades. Secondary schools are available in atoll capitals and in the larger islands with high population. In 2004, there were 225 schools with primary classes, 117 lower schools with secondary classes, and 15 schools with higher secondary classes. Postsecondary education and skills training is provided mainly by the Maldives College of Higher Education (MCHE) through its various faculties. MCHE has five campuses spread throughout the country. MCHE offers academic programs, long-term training programs, and short-term training programs. MCHE receives requests from atoll chiefs for short-term skills training. Some of the current problems noted by the MOE in delivery of services locally include: • • • • •

Lack of skilled staff – some 30% of the primary teachers are untrained, 80% of secondary teachers are expatriate, Fragmentation of resources as several schools has very few children – e.g. 19 schools with less than 10 children and 30 schools with less than 20 children. Cost efficiency problems in remote islands – e.g. the transport costs for transport of local funds to remote schools may at time exceed the actual funds transferred, Current policy is to provide education at the home island even when very small – it may in some situations be more effective to transport students on a daily basis but currently no budget provisions are made for this.

The MOE currently operates in a centralised manner, which increasingly is recognised as problematic as the services now have expanded so considerably and some basic decentralisation of budgets is considered within the Ministry. If the school is above 1000 students it is currently having its own budget. Other schools are budgeted for within 5 zones. It is now planned over time to introduce more budget discretion at zonal level and also move the current five officers within MOE responsible for the zones to the respective geographical locations. This opens up for some element of financial decentralisation within the sector possibly at regional level. The MOE has also tried some elements of decentralisation to Atoll levels where Atoll schools or Atoll education Centres are supposed to monitor and assist schools within a “cluster”. From the field visits20 it appeared as if the system was not well established. Funds were not provided for local monitoring and supervision, the budgets provided were very earmarked, and the division of roles and responsibilities for supervision of local schools somewhat unclear. Both locally and in MOE it appeared that the cluster system was widely perceived as non-functional.

19

The section is based on interview with MOE, the official website http://www.moe.gov.mv/, and ADB op.cit.

20

Only Atoll school visited was in Vaikaradhoo

17

4.3 Power Sector21 Various organizations are providing electric power in Maldives, with the State Electric Company Limited (STELCO), a government-owned enterprise, as the largest supplier. STELCO is currently responsible for supplying electricity to the capital island of Male and to 25 of the larger outer islands. In other outer islands, electricity is being supplied by the Island Development Committees (IDCs), cooperatives, NGOs and small private companies under various arrangements. Each provider is responsible for both power generation and distribution to the households. Diesel-based generators are used to generate power in all islands. STELCO holds the largest share of power supply with a total installed generating capacity of 49 MW. The power supply in the resort islands is being taken care by the respective private resort operators. IDCs have typically been involved in the establishment of the power supply but left management to various community organisations ranging from community-based formal and registered organizations to informal community clubs using the sale of electricity as a fund-raising activity. The private sector companies are operated and owned by small-scale family entrepreneurs, or by more substantial private companies. In some of the outer islands, more than one electricity provider is operating in one island. The Government has recently sought to regulate local management of power generation and sale by providing amore clear legal status to the small locally operated entities that for some time have operated quasi-legally as partially or fully “owned” by IDCs. The co-operative bill was during the mission just about to be presented to cabinet. The Government recognizes that providing reliable and efficient power supply in the outer islands will contribute to the national development objectives by reducing the disparities in services among the islands and the vulnerability of the outer islands populations. The Government has therefore given high priority to improved electrification in the outer islands, and prepared a Sector Policy on Outer Islands Electrification in June 2001. The aim is to establish the financial viability of the outer islands power providers and place them on a sound footing. The sector policy also highlights the importance of strengthening sector entities including implementing agencies, island power providers, and sector regulators to build their capacity in long-term development planning and management of power supply systems in the outer islands. Based on the policy, the Government has established investment strategies and priorities to improve power supply in the outer islands on an affordable and sustainable basis. Of the 97 focus islands, 75 were identified for improvement of electricity supply. 4.4 Water, Sanitation and waste management Sanitation22 in most islands is partly by pour-flush latrines connected to a sewage system, or to a much lesser extent, by use of pits in backyards. In high-density island environments, the construction and operation and maintenance of septic tanks is complex, and often suffers from poor performance due to a variety of reasons which include absence or limited desludging. Small bore systems are a common alternative but they are generally not well designed, often malfunctioning, and usually convey raw sewage directly into the lagoon. Assets rapidly deteriorate due to deferred maintenance and faulty systems are conducive to marine pollution. Furthermore, a large number of septic tanks are solely associated to a soak-pit, from which sewage can freely migrate through the highly porous island soil, contaminating groundwater sources. Remaining septic tank systems are connected to sewerage systems with a sea outfall. Sewage treatment systems in the Maldives are scarce.

21

This section is primarily based upon Maldives Tsunami: Impact and Recovery: Joint Needs Assessment by World Bank-ADB-UN System 2005, Annex 12.

22

Description of Sanitation follows Op cit annex 7.

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Solid Waste Management. Solid and hazardous waste management has emerged to be one of the greatest challenges in the Maldives. Whilst, the central landfill facility of Thilafushi23 serves Malé, Vilingili, Hulhumale, resorts and industrial islands, no formal waste management systems exist in the atolls, with the exception of Kuldhufushi and Hithadhoo landfill sites. Water supply in the atolls is almost entirely provided through a combination of rainwater tanks (both household and communal), which are the principal source of drinking water and groundwater extraction, mainly through domestic wells. Prior to December 2004, Malé, R. Kadholhudhoo and Kommandhoo (28% of the total population) were the sole inhabited islands with access to desalinated water. For a number of years, population and development pressures have lead to increasing groundwater extraction, resulting in the depletion of the freshwater lens, which in turn, has led to saline intrusion into the ground aquifer. Groundwater resources have also been at risk of bacterial contamination caused by effluent leakage and pollutant migration from poorly constructed and maintained septic tanks.24 4.5 Transport and communication sector Due to the archipelagic nature of its topography, the Maldivian transport sector is maritime and airborne based with few paved roads in Male (60km), on Laamu and Addu Atolls (14 km each) and the rest of unknown lengths of compacted coral village roads including of about 250 km of such roads under maintenance of the Ministry of Construction and Public Works. Aside from the main port in Male, the country has about 90 manmade harbours with quays, basins and breakwaters; several natural harbours; jetties and approach channels to access inner atolls to service the 200 inhabited islands. However, most of the islands are lacking proper facilities. Moreover more than half of the inhabited islands are not always accessible. In most cases harbour related problems are cited as the reason, but also lack of jetties, difficulties with lagoons or entrance channels, as well as problems caused by adverse weather conditions are reported. Some of the entirely centrally managed infrastructures include: 86 nos. “12-miles light beacons”, 209 nos. “2-miles reef markers” and 390 “harbour entrance markers” mark the inter-island shipping routes. The airport sector consists of 2 international airports (Male and the former military airport in Gan for freight) and 3 regional airports in the southern and one in the northern atolls and a number of private airstrips. 4.6 Key issues related to local service delivery Islands and to a lesser extent Atolls still manage a number of services locally – in particular for water, sanitation, local roads, street lights, maintenance of jetties and waste management. However, the resources available at local level do not always match the needs, just as division of labor between the local administrations and the sector ministries often seems unclear with several cases of red tape blockages of local initiatives on the one hand (e.g. extensive delays in approval of local development projects for simple issues such as street lightening, sale of local timber etc) and on the other hand apparently poor central oversight of local administration management of e.g. sanitation, sewerage and waste management. Also, it was noted that while standards exists for which services are to be provided at the different tiers and at various categories of islands, these are not always adhered to. For example, in several cases, communities have funded additional room in a local clinic and the MoH has subsequently agreed to take

23

According to the State of Environment report, more than 103,000 tons of waste is transported yearly from Malé to Thilafushi (Ministry of Environment and Construction. 2004. State of Environment, 2004. Maldives). 24 State of the Environment, Maldives 2004, reported groundwater resources in 54% of islands not to be suitable for drinking due to salt water intrusion and 46% of islands where groundwater was not suitable due to pollution (Ministry of Environment and Construction. 2004. State of Environment, 2004. Maldives).

19

on the costs of a doctor and medical supplies even if this was not intended to be included in the services at the particular island. For health and education, the service levels have significantly improved over the last years and systems become significantly more complex which has led to a relative diminishing role of local administrators in management of both services. Both sectors are currently looking for ways to grant local service units (health units and schools) more local autonomy in budget execution as the problems of overly concentration of all aspects of planning and management is increasingly becoming clearer. The modalities for decentralization within these sectors are still to be worked out but is in generally moving towards some form of deconcentration of budget management to offices at either regional (zonal) or atoll levels. A general issue for all sectors is that the delivery of services in small islands generally is considered to be overly expensive, however as noted by the Public Expenditure Review in 2002 current expenditure data do not allow for a more comprehensive analyses of the local patterns of resource allocations. Future reforms should seek to increase transparency in that regard.

20

5.

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES TO ADDRESS IN STRATEGY FOR REFORM

Resulting from the analysis in the previous chapters, a number of issues can be highlighted which ought to be addressed in a reform of the system for local administration. During the mission, most stakeholders generally agreed on the high priority of these interlinked local governance problems: •

The system of local administration in the Maldives is except for the Constitutional provisions regarding presidential appointments of Atoll Chiefs not based on law but entirely left to interpretation by ministerial or presidential decrees and regulations.

•

The system of local administration has virtual no local accountability of government officials – these are only accountable upwards ultimately to the President. It appears from the consultations that the demand for more democratic local structure is widespread – in particular at island level.

•

There is a need to move towards elected representatives in both IDCs and ADCs with these members constituting the only or the majority of the representatives.

•

In a similar manner the demands for increased local autonomy at island, school, health unit and atoll levels are increasingly forthcoming in response to the frustrations from the current centralised and bureaucratic procedures for even minor decisions. Elected members of IDC, chiefs as well as technical staff express these frustrations.

•

As the level of service delivery in sectors such as education and health is becoming more advanced and complex it is also within the sector ministries at the centre increasingly recognised that planning and budgeting for service delivery cannot be done cost effectively without decentralising some responsibilities,

•

In response to the shortcomings of the centralised planning and service delivery system, the key sector ministries of education and health have started to decentralise both functions and resources according to own needs through deconcentration. However, the approaches for deconcentration are not clearly linked to the existing local administrative set-up or to the envisioned regional centres.

•

The local administrative set-up for Male Municipality is currently under the Ministry of Home Affairs but shares many of the basic shortcomings with the atoll and island administrations such as lack of autonomy and effective representation. The Municipality has initiated its own process for reform including the development of draft legislation for the Municipality regarding its functions, level of autonomy, financing and electoral arrangements for a mayor and councillors. These proposals have to be coordinated with recommendations regarding decentralised island, atoll and regional administrations into an overall reform of local governance.

21

6.

REFORM OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to address the above-mentioned issues in a comprehensive manner it is required to progress work in support of decentralisation in a prioritised, systematic and balanced manner whereby initial agreement first is made on the overall guiding principles for reform and the basic nature of a future decentralised administration in Maldives. Secondly the more specific elements of reforms can be worked upon such as modalities for representation within the local structures, the specific division of responsibilities among different levels of administration and governments, relevant elements of fiscal decentralisation, possible decentralisation of personnel management functions and the implications of the reform for central governments. Sections 7.1 and 7.2 below summarise the mission recommendations on the very basic issues, whereas sections 7.3 – 7.8 elaborate on the more specific elements of reform. 6.1 Clarification of Concepts and Broad Policy Options for Decentralisation During the mission it became clear that the concept of “decentralisation” was interpreted in different ways among different stakeholders. The most common definition of decentralisation among sector ministries was simply the extension of their functions at local level – e.g. establishment of welfare officers of the setting up of health offices at island levels. Within the two key sectors of health and education the term also referred to delegation of increasing responsibilities and some autonomy to the technical management teams of health and educational facilities. However among local residents at atoll and to a greater extent at island level the kind of decentralisation desired was of a different nature and largely in the form of request for (a) enhanced democratic local accountability, (b) transfer of decision making powers to local levels and (c) transfers of resources. While the former interpretation of decentralisation largely can be described as “deconcentration”, the latter may be referred to as “devolution”.

Devolution and Deconcentration The transfer of powers and functions from a central government authority to local institutions can be done in several ways of which two distinct modalities for decentralization stand out: •

Through the transfer of governmental power by a central authority (usually a Ministry) to branch offices (or other agencies) that must act on its behalf and under its complete direction and control; - this is generally referred to as "deconcentration

•

, Through the assignment or transfer of autonomous governmental functions (usually by national legislation) to elected local government bodies that act on their own behalf, subject to minimum direction and control; – this is generally referred to as devolution

In the former, the central authority retains control over the delegated power at all times. The branch offices (or other agencies) remain accountable to the central authority for carrying out the "agency activity". In the latter, the central authority (usually the national government) gives up its control over one or more governmental functions, and transfers them and all the powers that go with them, to an elected local government. This local government is then accountable to its local electorate for carrying out these "own functions".

22

Decentralization and deconcentration are complementary and supplementary activities. Many local governments throughout the world therefore undertake both activities. They have "agency activities" and also their "own functions".

Thus the key reform options are ‘: a) Proceed with deconcentration of functions and resources within key sectors to institutions such as health and education facilities possibly combined with sector specific local democratic institutions for enhanced local participation and accountability (health and school management committees and boards etc) and/or: b) Decentralise through devolution and establish a fully integrated local government system based on relatively autonomous local authorities with significant functional responsibilities, fiscal autonomy and control over personnel. This may either be done within the existing two-tier system of island and Atolls or be based on future envisaged regional centres. As further elaborated below, the mission recommends a mix of the above with a two-tier local government system being established. Initially it will be composed of the Island and Atoll levels but over time it should include the Regional levels possibly replacing the Atoll level (see further below), which would enable a more comprehensive assignment of functions to the local governments in particular regarding health and education. 6.2 The Overall Structures and Legal Framework The basic determinants of the overall structure of a recommended local administrative system for Maldives are •

Government’s policy vision regarding increased democratisation which also should encompass local level democratisation,

•

The special geography and spatial distribution of population among islands and atolls,

•

The specific historical experiences and tradition of local governance – largely based on atolls and islands,

•

Government’s policy vision regarding an equitable and balanced spatial development through its policy of population consolidation and programme for regional development. This in turn requires reflection over the available financial and human resources and need for balancing more effective outreach through decentralisation with the dangers of fragmentation of resources and need for economies of scale.

During the mission it emerged that the above initially would lead to maintenance of the island and atoll levels as the basic units of local administration. However, in a medium term perspective say some 510 years from now it may be relevant to abolish the atoll level of administration in favour of stronger regional units. This development may occur in a phased manner. For instance an option would be earlier to establish regional administrations in the two parts of the country where such initiatives have been advanced further than elsewhere. As discussed earlier, the existing IDCs and ADCs have no firm legal status, limited or no local accountability and are within many sectors only given minimal consultative roles. It was during the mission widely supported to have this situation rectified.

23

Most countries in the world has addressed the above by introduction of local governments25 which within the overall legal framework of the state are given specific functions, powers and resources with established structures to ensure local accountability. Whereas one policy option discussed in the Maldives is to elect Island and Atoll Chiefs (administrators), the mission recommends to maintain a system of professional administrators (with increasingly merit-based appointments) and elected councils. The initial system will include Island Councils and Atoll Councils democratically elected with some elements of own staff and finance as further elaborated in sections below. The establishment of local governments would require a basic local government law to be passed, which at a minimum in broad terms should define the basic units of local governments, the basic functions or purpose and their degree of autonomy. The law should apply to the entire country and thus include Male as well as Atolls and islands. In most countries with local government systems the basic principles of the system or at least the mere existence of local governments is recognised in the Constitution. Some countries that recently have undertaken significant decentralisation reforms (such as Uganda) have within the Constitution described the system in great detail, which on the one hand protects the local governments from sudden usurpation of powers by the central government, but also complicates even minor refinements of system. 6.3 Assignment of Functions The theory suggests that a particular function is well suited for decentralisation if it fulfils certain conditions26: • • • • • •

Local demands for the service differ across localities There are no substantial economies of scale associated with the service There is no significant spill-over of costs or benefits from the service The service is amendable to at least partial local financing through taxes or user fees or other charges Local governments have the capacity to deliver the service The service is not meant to provide substantial redistribution of income or wealth

A distinction should be made between “own” and delegated expenditure responsibilities – for the latter the actual decisions on budgeting and financing are to a large extent carried out at the central level while the LG merely act as an agent. Thus it may be noted that decentralisation is rarely ‘either/or’ and different responsibilities within individual services (e.g. basic health, primary education etc.) will need to be assigned to different levels of government – such that many services will require partnership between two or more levels of government and/or the administrations, elected councils and the executives at these levels. The present situation in the Maldives requires the careful definition of specific roles and responsibilities for the individual functions of managing public resources.

25

It should be emphasized that this would happen within the framework of the unitary state. During the mission, many stakeholders seemed to equate decentralization with federalism. 26 Shah 1994 The Reform of intergovernmental fiscal relations in developing and emerging market economies, Policy and Research Series no 23,World Bank. For a very analytical and practical discussion re roads and health see M. Andrews and L. Schroeder Public Administration and Development 2003.

24

Following from this, the type of functions to be performed will obviously vary significantly according to the respective institutional comparative advantages of the two levels. Island Councils will play on their much greater proximity to people and their greater ability to articulate local needs and problems; Atoll councils on their greater proximity to the resources of the national administration. Island councils will thus have a much greater role in facilitating community dialogue and input for plans and strategies, and ensuring that government is responsive to community needs and preferences; Atoll councils instead to sub-national heads responsible for deconcentrated service delivery and their budgets. The table only provides a very basic outline of division of responsibilities, which for each sector needs to be further refined based on further analysis (see proposed TOR in Annex G). It should also be mentioned that the size of island differs tremendously and functions will differ according to size – in particular health and education services differ substantially as discussed in section 5.1 and 5.2.

Local Government Island Council

Responsibilities Government • • • • • •

Atoll Council

• • •

2nd Phase of reform: Regional council

•

•

mainly

with

Local Mainly Central responsibilities

Development of local plans with own revenue for very basic developments, Waste management Water and sanitation, Environment Roads, streetlights, markets and other traditional municipal services, Basic oversight of education and health facilities General coordination of development activities Consultations on health plans and oversight of health sector expenditures, Consultation on education plans and oversight of education sector responsibilities Planning and budgeting for local health and education services, Medium sized capital expenditures

• • •

•

Government

Financing of larger capital expenditures, Integration of local plans into national plans and budgets, Within all sectors: oversight of and capacity building for LGs adherence to basic standards and policies for waste, environment, water and sanitation Provision of education and health services (except

As above but with less direct responsibility for education and health except tertiary education and referral hospitals.

The future framework for decentralized governance in the Maldives should also clearly define the roles and functions of the local councils vis-à-vis the administrations addressing the current problem of IDCs/ADCs not having any formal powers. The following are examples of areas in which the councils should be empowered: ƒ Discuss and approve plans/budgets for devolved funds/responsibilities; take lead in coordinating with other actors. ƒ Convene broad-based dialogue on development challenges and sectoral priorities and provide recommendations for formulation of development policy and strategies. ƒ Assist government service providers in making arrangement for implementation ƒ Review financial accounts and infrastructure/service delivery performance and facilitate participation of communities ƒ Approve/participate in appointment of island/atoll chief ƒ Review plans for land management and island/atoll development and ensure public participation

25

As mentioned above, one key area is the degree of control given to councils with respect to the appointment of the Island and Atoll Chiefs (and other staff members in the administration). The countries in the region which have recently embarked on decentralisation reforms have very significant variations in the degree of power of the councils in appointment evaluation of performance of the head of the administration. In e.g. Iran and Pakistan, the councils are empowered to appoint/approve and the legislations have defined means for them to dismiss poorly performing administrators. In countries such as Bangladesh and Nepal, a system of ‘dual supervision’ is applied giving the councils a say through an annual performance evaluation but the local administrators remain seconded/recruited by central government. In Afghanistan where Provincial Councils were recently established, it was considered premature to empower the councils with hiring/firing powers (see insert). Appointment and Performance of Local Administrators - Degree of Council Control: Examples from South and West Asia Degree of Council Control

Country Examples Example – Afghanistan* Provincial Councils (Art. 4) ƒ No formal power in appointment or performance evaluation of local Low administrators except a provision to mandating the councils to ‘acquire information on the proceedings and work plan of the provincial administration and related branches’. Example – Nepal** Village Development Committees (art. 28) Medium ƒ ‘Evaluate the performance of the Secretary and forward it with recommendation to the authority’ Example – Pakistan*** District Councils (art. 39) : ƒ ‘Approve the proposals of the District Government in the number of posts of officials and employees of the decentralized offices of District Administration, Tehsil Municipal Administration, or, as the case may be, Town Municipal Administration, as part of the budget statement’; ƒ ‘Except during the first two years after election of the Zilla Council, High approve posts for the office staff of Zilla Nazim and staff of Zilla Council subject to the restriction imposed under sub-section (8) of section 109. Tehsil Councils’ (art. 67): ƒ ‘Approve post of personal staff for the office of Tehsil Nazim and the terms and conditions of their service: provided that no post of advisor, special assistant, press or political secretary to the Tehsil Nazim shall be sanctioned or approved’. * Presidential Degree on Law on Provincial Councils 2005 (unofficial translation) **See http://www.addcn.org.np/ *** See Local Government Ordinance (2001, 2005 amendments). Union Councils (lowest tier) are not similarly empowered (see chapter VIII). See http://www.nrb.gov.pk/

6.4 Local Finance Fiscal decentralisation generally lies at the core of decentralisation programmes. A rich literature provides guidance on the building blocks for successful fiscal decentralisation. The classical literature generally emphasises three elements27: 27

See Primer on Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty Reduction, UNDP 2005 (forthcoming) for an overview. The classical literature includes Roy Bahl (2000), “Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Developing

26

1. The first element is the clear assignment of expenditure responsibilities – this follows from the legal assignment of functions but the costs of providing these responsibilities needs to be estimated 2. The second element in the assignment of own revenue sources to LGs – essentially local taxes 3. In many cases a “fiscal gap” will arise: the costs of providing assigned responsibilities cannot be funded only from own LG revenue sources and the gap needs to be closed by fiscal transfers from central government to LGs or measures for LG Borrowing In the case of the Maldives it will not be possible to follow the approach strictly as the assignment of functions to LGs only to a minor extent will be a full assignment of expenditure responsibilities – it will to a much larger degree be a sharing of responsibilities between the LGs and central government. Furthermore it is realised that the scope for assignment of local taxes to LGs also will be relatively moderate. Additionally it is recommended that the reform of LG financing in the Maldives be implemented in a gradual manner based on improvements of the existing arrangements and with gradual introduction of new financing modalities according to progress of reforms and the fiscal constraints of Government. The main objectives for the initial reforms of financing of LGs can be summarised as: 1. Enhance local resource mobilisation for development activities, 2. Increase the level of autonomy for resource allocations in a manner that would ensure local compliance to overall national policies but better suited local conditions and priorities, 3. Maintain or improve overall macro-economic performance through more rational allocation of public funding for service delivery. In chapter 3.7 of this report we briefly discussed the existing modalities for financing island and atoll administration. From the chapter it is evident that further analysis of the current system, its problems and potentials is required before more concrete steps can be undertaken for its improvement. Thus initially it is recommended to undertake further analysis of the existing sector service delivery systems and their related financing modalities as well as local revenue generation modalities. Proposed TOR for such a study is included as annex G.

Countries: Principles and Practice,” Urban and Local Government Background Series, No. 2 (World Bank, 2000). Smoke, P. (2001), “Fiscal Decentralisation in Developing Countries: A Review of Current Concepts and Practice,” United Nations Research institute for Social Development: Geneva. (www.unrisd.org) Shah, A. (1994), “The Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Developing and Transitional Economies” Policy and Research Series, No. 23. World Bank: Washington D.C.(www.worldbank.org). It must be realised that some of this literature is based on more comprehensive devolution or even federalism than what is envisaged it Maldives and care should be taken in the application of the general principles.

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While the specific reform recommendations are to guided by this further analysis, the mission finds that, given the existing information, the following may include realistic initial steps for improvement of modalities for financing of local service delivery: 1. Increased transparency and local prioritisation of sector funding within education and health services through gradual adjustments of current sector funding. Both sectors are facing problems with the current very centralised management of budgets. It is recommended initially to introduce budget allocations for clusters or individual service units (schools and health units) in a less earmarked and more transparent manner. The respective ministries already initiate these kind of minor reforms. This may gradually evolve into real sector grants for education and health managed by LGs. However, initially it is recommended to improve local sector planning and budgeting further by a. Introducing a medium term (3 years) budget frame for clusters and units, b. Enhance local level discretion regarding use of local budgets including budget readjustments during the year, increased threshold for local procurement etc and c. Introducing local democratic participation in budgeting and planning. At present there is no element of democratic control and oversight with health and education facilities. This could be introduced by having designated representatives from the elected Island and Atoll Councils to in the respective school and health committees rather than for instance introduce separate health and education boards. 2. Improvements of local revenue systems. Analysis of existing local revenues is required: the amounts collected from different sources and in different localities for the last 3 years. The Ministry of Finance has considered the introduction of some form of matching grants to LGs to encourage further collection. However it is important that LGs are rewarded according to their level of effort and thus in relation to their achievements compared to revenue potential. This in turn is likely to differ substantially among LGs and needs to be established. It may be considered to introduce some new elements of local taxes but this needs to be considered only as part of a wider tax reform. It is likely that local taxes only will form a marginal part of total public revenue. Nuisance taxes – that may be more costly to collect than what is gained in collection should obviously be avoided. 3. Increased transparency and local prioritisation of general and administrative funding of the councils. At present the island and atoll offices receive funding for salaries and recurrent costs in the form of annual detailed budgets. This may be transformed into a simple general block grant for which the island councils and atoll councils would be responsible. The extent of local autonomy may gradually be increased in accordance to capacities and experiences. Initially it would for instance probably be unwise to leave too much discretion at the local level for additional recruitment of staff etc (see further below for discussion of issues related to decentralisation of personnel management). The block grant may initially be largely based on the existing allocation, but may over time be based on objective criteria and shared among LGs according to a formula. 4. Introduction of a development block grant. At present development planning is rather centralised but MOAD has introduced procedures for local planning. International experiences indicate that local level planning without clear budget framework tend to become wish-lists without clear priorities and it is highly recommended to introduce a hard budget constraint locally for more realistic development planning. It may not be appropriate to implement this at island level as funds may be very fragmented, thus Atoll level and later possibly the regions would be the most relevant administrative level for introduction of such as development grant. Further analyses are required to determine appropriate level of funding, the type of eligible

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investments, possible access conditions to be fulfilled by the LGs as well as the details for LG planning, procurement, implementation and M&E. The current fiscal constraints of Government will not allow for introduction of a substantial local development grant in the short term, but future plans for regional development programmes may be redesigned into such local grants for enhanced local participation in planning and greater local accountability. 6.5 Personnel 6.5.1 general theory on devolution of personnel functions The literature on Local Government personnel systems is not as developed as the literature on fiscal aspects of decentralisation. However, it is well recognized that an efficient and professional cadre of LG staff is essential for LG delivery of quality services. Furthermore, it is evident that some level of local control of executive staff is essential for the local accountability of staff and thus autonomous and responsive LGs – which, in turn, is assumed to lead to more effective services. However, local level control of staff has some risks including: • • • •

Bias in selection of staff according to local preferences without due consideration of professional competencies and rather, an emphasis on e.g. ethnicity or relationship with a specific politicians) Stronger local political pressure on LG staff – including pressure on them to undertake illegal payments to councillors or other financial mismanagement Limitations on career prospect for the higher level cadres, as possibilities for promotion within a specific LG are limited Excessive local recruitment drives and/or non-payment of staff salaries or pension contributions, which leads to accumulated debts that ultimately may have to be carried out by the central government

On the other hand, the above weaknesses can arguably also be found in central government managed systems, and the weaknesses in LG administration of personnel can likewise be argued to be results of e.g. the low level of financial resources available to LGs, insufficient capacities for HR management, inappropriate regulations or lack of incentives for proper LG management of personnel – all probably to be resolved by improved support to LGs rather than centralization of responsibilities. Decentralized administration means that local government has the means to effectively deliver its functional responsibilities. To do so it must be able to: • • • •

Hold staff to account Allocate staff where need is greatest Manage its financial resources Attract and retain skilled staff

The following table identifies the various employer functions that contribute to these objectives28

28

Seminar presentation by Evans 2004, World Bank.

29

Devolving the Employer Function Impact on Administrative Autonomy:

Dimensions of the employer function: Budget Transparency ƒ Paying staff from its own budget Budget & Establishment Control ƒ Controlling overall staff numbers ƒ Controlling staff no’s in local offices & fac’s ƒ Authority to dismiss surplus staff Recruitment ƒ Recognition as the formal employer ƒ Authority to hire ƒ Ind. merit-based recruitment mech. Career Management ƒ Transfers within local government ƒ Horizontal mobility ƒ Promotion Performance Management ƒ Directing & supervising activities & tasks ƒ Conducting evaluations ƒ Ability to discipline/fire Pay Policy ƒ Setting local hardship/remote allowances ƒ Setting overall wage rates

6.5.2

Hold staff accountable

Ability to: Manage Allocate financial staff resources

9

Attract & retain skilled staff

9 9 9 9

9 9 9

9

9

9 9

9

9 9 9 9

9 9

9 9

Application in the Maldives

In the Maldives at present, the key concerns are foremost regarding the first objective – i.e. how to have staff more accountable to local communities. The relevant functions possibly to devolve to LGs may then include: • • • • • •

Recruitment Recognition as formal employer, Staff supervision Staff discipline and ability to fire, Promotions Payment of salaries from own budget

While considering the devolution of the above functions it is important to recognise the need for a professional service with merit-based recruitment. Reforms of personnel must be done as part of an overall reform of the civil service, which is being contemplated. If for instance a central public service commission is being created it may act as the responsible body for introduction of professional standards and ensure through oversight their application. Staff may thus most appropriately continue to be centrally appointed and part of a national service, but local checks and balances be introduced. The island council could for instance be given the right to propose candidates for certain posts and also be given right of no-objection to any appointments. The current staff of Island and Atoll offices may over time be largely devolved to the LGs. However, it is unlikely that benefits would accrue from devolution of functions related to pay scales and size of

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establishment since LGs will depend largely on transfers – rather than own taxes - for their budgets. If the existing system of financing recurrent expenditures over time is transformed to a block grant it may however be possible also to have some elements of local control over these functions. 6.5.3

Chiefs

In the case of the Maldives particular focus has been on the position of the chiefs who at present have a dual status at local levels of being the highest ranking civil servant but simultaneously also the local political head representative. With the introduction of local councils at island and Atoll level, the local political head would be the locally elected head of council. The elected head of council may undertake some of the functions currently undertaken by the chiefs, whereas a large part of his present roles better can be undertaken by a full time salaried professional. Since this will constitute a major break with the past it may be necessary completely to abolish the title of “chief” and instead have “Island Administrative officers” and “Atoll Administrative Officers” reporting to their respective island and atoll councils. Since local service delivery arrangements are becoming increasingly complex and since it is foreseen that the island and atolls in future also are to play a more proactive role in development planning including within the sectors of education and health, it would probably be necessary to expand the formal training and induction of the “Island Administrative officers” and “Atoll Administrative Officers2 (the former chiefs) and have a national cadre within which to recruit from rather than largely rely on locally recruited personnel (as present for the island chiefs). 6.6 Representational Arrangement (Local Councils) At the outset it should be noted that any recommendations in terms of policy options and recommendations will be contingent on the model for decentralized local governance that is ultimately adopted by the Government of the Maldives and that some national-level changes will be necessary in terms of revisions to the constitution, introduction of a law (or at least regulations) on local elections that include multi-party dimensions and, eventually it is hoped, the institutionalization of an independent electoral management authority. The success of any electoral and political party reform is very much tied to sustained political will at the highest levels to democratize representational arrangements in the Maldives. It is also important to realize that simply holding local elections will not alone instil confidence in the democratic process in the Maldives. This step needs to be part of a broader agenda of reform that is reflected in the representational arrangements and electoral processes at the national level. The current reform agenda in the Maldives includes a policy decision to create local councils at the island level and elect the members of the councils directly by the population of the island. The question which will be addresses is this section are: (i) Island Councils; (ii) Atoll Councils; (iii) direct vs. in-direct election of the head of the councils; (iv) electoral system to be applied; (v) the functioning of political parties at the local level; (vi) representation of women; and (vii) representation of youth. 6.6.1

Island Councils

At issue in the Maldives is the creation of Local Councils and how the members and leaders of these bodies should be elected. As discussed in the main text, the lowest level of local governance in the Maldives could conceivably be the Atoll level. For example, if local councils did not exist at the island level, wards could still be maintained at this level but with no representational arrangements. It is recommended, however, based on practice and the perceived reality of the island being the natural unit of communal life in the Maldives, to establish Local Councils at the island level. These Local Councils

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would then take the place of the Island Development Committees and need clearly delineated functions vis-à-vis the public administration for the island as embodied in the Island Office and its head. For the Local Councils at island level, it is recommended that these bodies remain more or less the same size as they are now (5 to 10 members based on population); that they are directly elected by the eligible voters of the islands; and that the elections be open to contest by political parties (see further in section 7.6.5). 6.6.2

Atoll Councils

The representational arrangements at the Atoll level—i.e., for Atoll Councils—need to be reconsidered as well, but the policy options are less clear both because of the constitutional changes required for revision at this level and because of the status of the regionalization initiative and how this will affect the Atoll level. Again, conceivably, each level of local administration would not need to have elected councils. Sri Lanka, for example, maintains such a system whereby there is no representation at the district level. However, it is recommended that a representational arrangements should at present continue to exist at the Atoll level. However, more flexibility needs to be retained for the Atolls, to allow for potential change in their status in the move towards regionalization and how this would affect the second tier of local governance. Hence, the main choice is between Atoll Councils comprising of members from the Island Councils (indirect election) or direct election for this level. Certainly an argument could be made that directly elected Atoll Councils would be more accountable to their constituents than indirectly elected members. If eventually Atoll Councils are to be directly elected by the population of the Atolls, it would make sense to hold these elections at the same time as Local Council elections in order to maximize the results of the administrative effort and reduce the costs involved. This would mean voters would be presented with either two ballots or a split ballot, giving them one option for the Atoll level (the same across all voters in the Atoll) and another one that is specific to their Island constituency. The same considerations in terms of electoral system choice apply as well to the Atoll level, although because each Atoll usually contains more than one island, the question becomes how to ensure adequate representation. These bodies could be composed and elected in a variety of ways. One option would be that the Atoll Councils comprise members representing and elected from each island on the basis of population—for example, at least one representative for the smallest island in the Atoll and more for the larger islands, on a proportional basis. Any of the preferred electoral systems discussed above could be used in this scenario (e.g., Block Vote, List PR, other) with the exception of the single-member constituencies that would be created in the very small islands. These would be elected most logically in a first-past-the-post manner. The downside of this approach is Atoll Councils could end up being rather large and unwieldy. Another option would be to cluster islands together on the basis of population and have them elect members together to the Atoll Council. Again, the same variety of electoral systems could be used considering that the cluster of islands would be a multi-member constituency. Like the above example, this would mean that for some Atolls there would be a number of districts. The downside of this approach is that it may result in the larger islands in the cluster “capturing” all of the votes if a pluralitymajority system is used and the smaller islands not having any of ‘their’ people represented on the Atoll Council. Therefore, this option would make the most sense if some kind of proportional representation formula applied. Similarly, another option is to use the system that was used in the brief experiment with elected Atoll Councils—that is, using the entire Atoll as a multi-member district and having the population of the Atoll

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vote via a Block Vote system and whichever candidates win a majority win election. This has the advantage of being quite simple to use and understand, however it would also result in the larger islands dominating the Council seats unless some kind of proportionality could be injected into the system. For this reason, elections at the Atoll level should consider using a proportional or semi-proportional or mixed system, such as one where the Atoll is the district but political parties put forward lists comprising candidates taken from all the islands or as many as possible. Because the district magnitude would be greater for the Atoll Councils (if the current 10 to 20 members were to be retained), PR would lend itself better to the Atoll level than the Island level. If the Atoll Councils were to be indirectly elected, an Electoral College system could be used whereby the Local Council members select the members and/or compose the membership of the Atoll Councils from among their ranks. Such systems are in place in a number of countries, including the Philippines and Nepal. However, the trend is more and more in the direction of the upper tier of local government also being directly elected. For the Maldives, this decision would need to take into consideration the likely lifetime of the Atoll administration within a system or regionalization and population concentration and the experience with Local Council elections at the Island level. 6.6.3

Head of the Local Councils

In addition to the voting method to be used to determine the members of elected Local Councils is the issue of how the leaders of these Councils—the Chairs—are to be selected. The options include either direct elections—whereby candidates either stand specifically for the post of Chair and are directly elected by the Island population on that basis, or the candidate winning the most votes among the elected members to the council automatically becomes the chair—and indirect elections—whereby the Chair is selected by the elected members of the council from among their ranks. There is a good level of consensus that all the members of the Local Councils as well as the Chairs of these Councils should be elected by the people. This being said, each of the direct and indirect options listed above entail the Chairs being elected by the people. In other words, even the indirect election scenario requires the Chairs to have been directly elected by the Island population somewhere along the way. The decision then comes down to a trade off between representation, accountability, leadership and legitimacy. How the heads (chairs, executives or mayors) and deputy heads of local councils are elected varies from country to country and in many cases also between the different levels of local government within a country. The arguments put forward in favour of direct elections are typically that they give greater legitimacy to the local leader because this person is more clearly the preferred individual choice of local citizens than one who has been indirectly elected by a limited number of councillors. It is also argued that direct elections of chairs provides for clearer separation of powers and functions between executive and the legislative branches at the local level – enabling heads to operate more independently of the partisan interests of their councils. It is also argued that direct elections strengthen accountability to local citizens at large. Direct elections are also supposed to allow for local leadership and a more effective local government. Finally, direct systems are probably more likely to result in a more equitable gender representation since indirect elections can tend to favour greater male and elite representation. However, almost all of the above positives for direct elections can be turned into potential negatives if the elected Chair is undemocratic or simply not competent or well intentioned. If it is true that a ‘good’ directly elected chair is likely to be more effective than a ‘good’ indirectly elected chair, it is equally true that a ‘bad’ directly elected chair is likely to be much worse than their indirectly elected counterparts due to the greater freedom and stronger leadership invested in them. Indirectly elected council leaders may be more accountable to their immediate constituency (i.e. the electoral college that has selected them such as the council members) but this also tends to make them more conciliatory, and the fact that the council members at large elected the Chair would in turn make them more inclined to work with this

33

person and have confidence in him/her. This would enhance harmony on the Councils and maximize the chances that it works together as a unit without the leader ‘going his own way.’ In small constituencies as these will most likely be in the Maldives, even indirectly elected Chairs would have a strong tie to the community and thus a representation and accountability link, having been elected on their own as well and being readily identifiable by the Island population. As with the Chairs of the Local Councils, elections at the Atoll level prompt the question of how the Atoll Chiefs should be elected or selected. All of the same pros and cons apply here as they did in the analysis of Local Council Chairs, with the additional consideration that in the brief experiment with directly elected Atoll Councils, the Atoll Chief was determined to be the person who won the most votes from among those running for Atoll Council. While this system had the merit of ensuring that the Atoll Chief was a popular figure, it did not always identify the most suitable or motivated person for the job and for this reason is not considered as favourable as the Atoll Council itself selecting the Atoll Chief from among its members. Although, the history of the Atoll Chief position and how this person is expected to work with the public administration at the Atoll level will also have a large impact on the decision between direct and indirect election of this person. For these reasons, it is recommended that the Chairs of the Local Councils be indirectly elected by and from among the elected members of the Local Council in the Maldives. 6.6.4

Local Council Elections

Typically, an electoral system is embodied in the electoral law of a country, which would also include a description of who can vote and run for office and a description of electoral operations. Thus, an electoral law governing Local Council elections could be drafted in the Maldives which stipulates such things as who can run, who can vote, what system will be used and how the elections will be administered and by whom. This would most likely need to be passed by the People’s Majlis in order to attain the status of more codified law rather than passed by presidential decree, although the merits of each approach (time versus legitimacy) would need to be explored. The recommended options for electoral systems29 for Local Council elections in the Maldives translate into three: 1. Retain the Block Vote, or At Large, system currently in place and use it to elect members to the council in multi-member districts; 2. Introduce a Party List Proportional Representation system or a variation thereon or a combination with a plurality-majority system to infuse more representation into the system, still using multimember districts; or 3. Explore the use of alternative voting methods such as the Single Non-Transferable Vote or the Single Transferable Vote for their applicability in the Maldives. All of the above options use multi-member districts, as it is not recommended that a shift be made at this time to a system requiring single-member constituencies, as this would require a boundary delimitation process. The decision between these options (and any others identified) will need to be based on further analysis of the factors described in the first section above, including ease of use for the voters, whether parties will be encouraged or discouraged from forming, and how women and other under-represented groups might fare. More on these aspects is also included below.

29

For the purposes of this report, the definition of an electoral system is the composite rules and procedures through which votes cast are translated into seats won or offices held.

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6.6.5

Political Parties

The strengthening of democratic governance in a country requires more than well-functioning elections. It calls for a strong democratic culture and robust, transparent, internally democratic and accountable political parties, without which the right to choose is pre-empted by the elites that own the political process, including the political organizations. And, the absence of strong, accountable and competent political parties that can represent positions and negotiate change upsets the democratic equilibrium. As discussed in some detail above, different electoral systems can have quite different effects on political parties—from encouraging the formation of a plethora of different parties, to encouraging candidates to run as individuals rather than affiliated with any party. Certainly, as a principle, an electoral system should encourage the formation of political parties that are democratic and that have ideologies that appeal to a fairly broad cross-section of the electorate rather than its more extremist tendencies. It is likely that political parties will contest the local level elections either de jure or de facto (see e.g. the experiences from Pakistan and Philippines), and therefore this needs to be taken into consideration when designing an electoral system for the local level. See annex D for more on the various electoral systems and possible effects on political parties in the Maldives. 6.6.6

Representation of Women

Among the most important issues in crafting electoral systems is how women are affected by the ultimate representational arrangements at the local level and how the electoral system used either favours or hinders their participation and representation. In the Maldives, there is a history of Island Women’s Development Committees (IWDCs) with a purported role in local governance which in reality was of little significance in getting women’s issues on the agenda or in highlighting women’s roles as community leaders. Therefore, when considering the design of new representational arrangements in the form of Local Councils, women’s role on these bodies should be of primary concern. While the tendency might be to launch the new system and hope that women will be able to ‘fend for themselves’ in open competition, experience has shown that gender balance in political representation has progressed slowly in the main, despite some notable advances, and this unequal sharing of power has led to unequal sharing of resources. Some societies have therefore sought to balance the gender composition of their institutions and, thereby, establish a gender-equal agenda within them. A range approaches has been tried, including a rights-based one that advocates women’s right to equal participation and their attainment, with measures that institute gender balance. Some believe that quotas and reserved seats must be introduced to create such balance; others believe that affirmative action measures are artificial and unfair in a process where women should have to qualify in open competition. It has been shown that quotas make a difference in women's political participation, largely because they give women a temporary leg up. Certainly, these mechanisms have succeeded in getting more women to the table in some contexts. At the same time, such measures, while valuable, are short-term efforts that must go hand-in-hand with societal mechanisms and capacity/leadership development for women. Finally, in many cases the introduction of quotas is too little, too late, with the overall design of representational arrangements having produced a long-standing pattern of exclusion. For this reason, affirmative action is in itself not a panacea for addressing under-representation. It cannot replace the existence of a carefully designed electoral system in the first place. Yet, as discussed above, while the electoral system in itself plays a role in representational outcomes it may not be sufficient to ensure equitable representation. In Indonesia for example, under the previous (pre-2004 electoral system), closed list Proportional Representation did remarkably little to ensure adequate or equitable representation of women in local governance. Thus, Proportional Representation

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as an electoral system is no guarantee of adequate representation if political parties remain elitedominated or patriarchal. In the case of the Maldives, it is recommended that the Island Women’s Development Committees be merged with the Local Councils or otherwise cease to exist as a separate and unequal body. Rather, the focus should shift to how to inject adequate gender balance into the Local Councils at the design stage. To begin and to ensure a minimum level of women’s participation, it is recommended that: •

•

• 6.6.7

If a Plurality-Majority system such as the Block Vote is retained for Local Council elections, that a quota be introduced to the institution of the Local Councils per se. This would mean that a certain percentage—for example, 30% of the seats to the extent feasible or a certain number of seats (1 out of 5, 2 out of 6, etc.)—Should be reserved for women to contest in women-only elections, notwithstanding that women can also stand in the ‘regular’ elections for Local Council seats in open competition with men. If a Proportional Representation electoral system is introduced for Local Council elections, that a mandatory quota be applied to political parties presenting candidate lists to the voters. This would mean that political parties would need to include a certain percentage—for example, 30% of their lists or a certain number of candidates—to be women and place them in viable positions on the list so that if the party does well, more women are elected to office. If another type of system is introduced that does not fall within either family—e.g., SNTV, the options for quotas on the institution or the parties be explored more fully. Representation of youth

Another issue very relevant to local elections in the Maldives is the issue of young voters and soon to be voters. Currently, the voting age in the Maldives for legislative and presidential elections and referenda, as reflected in the constitution, is 21 (although the regulations on the Island Development Committee elections stipulate the age for participation in those elections as 18 years or older). Yet, the demographics of the country indicate that approximately 42% of the population is 15 years or younger (UNDP HDR 2005, quoting 2003 figures), meaning that there is an enormous potential to increase the electorate by lowering the voting age by the three years. Research has also shown that voting patterns—either to participate or not to participate—are established quite early in a voter’s “career”, pointing to the need to get young voters participating early so that they establish a trend of participation that will tend to last a lifetime. Conversely, if young people do not vote or are prevented from voting until they are older, the risk is of disenfranchising large portions of the population for years to come. In most countries, the trend has been to lower the voting age and in the vast majority of countries it is now 18. Also, in some countries the age for voting in local elections is lower than in national elections and, in some countries (such as India), local level elections produce much higher voter turnout than national elections. The recommendation is that the Maldives strongly consider lowering the voting age to 18, not simply for Local Council elections but across the board. This too will require a change to the constitution for national-level elections, however, as Article 134 defines a voter as someone who has attained 21 years of age. Notwithstanding the above, it appears that there is an emerging consensus that reflects many of the findings in this section vis-à-vis the direct election of local councils at the island level and an indirect election of their chairs from within the members of the council. There also seems to be emerging consensus that the head of the local administration will not have membership on the local council but rather appear ex officio to attend the meetings, answer requests for information and update council members on administrative matters.

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6.7 Central Government Support to Local Governments Once agreement has been reached on the introduction of a local government system in the Maldives this will change the role of central government ministries with respect to decentralized services from one of directly implementing to more emphasis on oversight and backstopping. This will partially encompass monitoring, coordination, capacity building but also legal compliance inspection. Thus within each sector further work will be required more precisely to define the new ministerial roles. In most decentralising countries one specific ministry responsible for local governments is created. In the case of the Maldives this would incorporate several of the functions currently undertaken by the two ministries of Atoll Development and Internal Affairs. Experiences from other countries indicate the need for a very strong inter-ministerial coordination of reforms in order to ensure that all relevant sector ministries rearrange working procedures in accordance with generic guidelines. The way such inter-sectoral coordination is done differs among countries: it may include the creation of special reform secretariats, the direct involvement of the Presidents office or other higher-level bodies. To assign this type of function to e.g. MOAD is likely to create shortcomings.

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7.

THE WAY FORWARD

In order to move the process of reform forward the following general activities are recommended: a) Changes announced immediately for IDCs and ADCs to be formed with elected chair and members only. Chairs to be indirectly elected. b) Further analysis needed to support elements of the reform, in particular further work on i) representational arrangement with focus on accountability issues, and ii) sector service delivery arrangements and related financing modalities under the proposed decentralised framework. Draft TORs are attached as annex. c) Cabinet and wider policy discussions on broader principles of reform. This will include the presentation of key recommendations of this report and their coherence with ongoing discussions for reform of Male municipality as well as between decentralization and regionalisation strategies. This should result in an endorsed national framework (white paper or policy paper) on decentralisation (see below) d) Inclusion of relevant aspects of local governance reform in the Constitutional reform process. e) Work on required legal reform: development of a local government act and subsequent review of other legislation (including electoral) f)

Inclusion of all of the above into an updated national decentralisation framework and Implementation plan for decentralisation which also would include required resources for policy work, including consultancy work, study tours etc. and required capacity building for the implementation of the plan.

g) Alignment of government and donor financing of infrastructure and services to the decentralisation policy. The formulation and implementation of a national framework for decentralization and local democratic governance should be created. This programme would streamline existing donor resource in support of the decentralization and local democratic governance objectives. The steps are illustrated in figure 1. The national programme would thus support the implementation of the reforms and the development of capacity for decentralization and local democratic governance at all levels. Furthermore, the implementation of the national programme would also imply the need for existing donor programmes/project for support to local development to be reformulated, in order for them to function as vehicles for: (i) capacity development for local governance (not limited to local government); (ii) policy development; and (iii) actual implementation of the local development plans. The Government would mobilise resources for the core support to the national Atoll Development Programme. Core support would include capacity development, policy support and pilot funds for development/recovery at Atoll level. Whereas one or two donors would support institutional development (see figure 1 above), the national programme should be designed so as to also allow for other donors to provide funds for recovery and development.

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Figure 1 – National Policy and Programme Support

National Policy on Decentralization

Decentralization Implementation Plan

National Programme for Support to Decentralized Governance Core Support for Nat. Programme

Donor X funding for local dev’t/recovery

Donor Y funding for local dev’t/recovery

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ANNEXES ANNEX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE UNDP DECENTRALIZATION POLICY ADVISORY SUPPORT 1.

Background

The Republic of Maldives consists of approximately 200 islands and a population of about 280,000 people. To address the development challenges, a two-tier system of local administration encompasses the twenty Atolls and all inhabited islands, and the capital island of Male has a separate status as an urban local government. The Government is committed to a policy of decentralization and to further strengthening service delivery at the Atoll and Island level. The Government of Maldives takes a people-centred approach to development with macro policy orientation towards reducing poverty and achieving better quality of life30. Development challenges include (i) empowering disadvantaged people including women and youth especially to strengthen national and local governance through institutional capacity building; (ii) strengthening human development by overcoming shortage of skilled Maldivians; (iii) improving policy environment and infrastructure for private sector participation; (iv) creating space for civil society participation; and (v) protecting fragile eco systems of island economies through environmental management31. A cornerstone of the Government strategy is thus the empowerment of people through representative institutions at the Atoll and Island level, notably the Atoll Development Committees (ADC), Island Development Committees (IDC) and Women Development Committees (WDC), and participation in decision-making at all levels. The Government of the Maldives has requested the support of UNDP to assist in a further development of the institutional framework for local governance. A preliminary mission was conducted by the UNDP policy advisor on decentralization and local governance for Asia in the period 8-10 August 2005 and a tentative work plan for the reform process was agreed with the Minister of Atoll Development32. It was also agreed that support would be provided by UNDP for the development of a strategic framework from decentralization by a multi-member team in October 2005. The strategic framework will outline the main pillars of a proposed reform as tentative outlined in the work plan cited above and it will suggest a process for preparing the individual, more detailed, components. The present TOR covers the support for the preparation of the strategic framework through the two-week mission in October 2005. The mission will review the the work that has so far being undertaken by the Ministry on the administrative reform of the existing institutional arrangements and suggested a review of these documentations including but not limited to the following 1) role and responsibilities of sectoral ministries in the implementation of Island Development Plans and Atoll Development Plans 2) Draft for establishing of community councils and 3)social mobilization recommendations from the national workshop. 2.

Purpose

The purpose of the UNDP policy advisory mission is as follows: •

To facilitate a sustained policy dialogue among key stakeholders on democratic decentralization, its linkages with the public administration reform initiative (including decentralization) and potential for strengthening participatory processes, and fostering a greater role for the representatives of the people, leading to a local government model applicable to the Maldives.

See the Vision 2020 statement of the President of the Maldives www.planning.gov.mv/vision. See UNDP, Regional Development Policy Framework: Discussion Paper, November 2002 32 See Decentralization and Local Governance in the Maldives: Workplan for Reform Process (August 2005). 30 31

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3.

Tasks

In support of the implementation of the government policy on decentralization, the mission will prepare a preliminary strategic framework (15-20 pages + annexes) summarizing the recommended strategy and reflecting discussions with all stakeholders. The main duties of the UNDP policy advisory mission are to advise the Government on the main pillars of a reform to achieve the objective outlined above and provide recommendations for the process, in particular with respect to: (a) the further development of the local representative institutions at Island/Atoll Level and their roles and functions in decentralized governance. (b) administrative decentralization and establishing a local government ‘set-up’ for islands and atolls of the Maldives. This includes the functions of the Ministry of Atolls Development, the Atoll & Island offices & IDC’s ADCs in order to derive clearer roles & responsibilities to support the decentralization process. (c) mechanism for fiscal decentralization with emphasis on fiscal relationships and linkages as well as a framework for local revenue collection and mechanisms for budgetary allocations from central to regional, atoll and island levels; (d) the roles and functions of the local governments and the specific nature of services to be delivered by the central government, the regional level institutions and atoll & island level offices. This includes the recommended overall strategy for deconcentration and devolution.

4.

(e)

The conceptual outline of a proposal for implementation of a community participation and local governance programme, in collaboration between the Government and UNDP. This proposal should draw on experiences from, and incorporate elements from, the existing Livelihood Recovery and ADSL II programmes, and should include proposed approaches to community mobilization, local administration reform, arrangements for collaboration between the local community and the local administration, and arrangements for a community fund. The conceptual note/outline shall provide a time bound framework for key areas for UNDP support in the short and medium term and linkages of local governance support to the ongoing broader governance programme supported by UNDP

(f)

Capacity requirements for the implementation of a broad based local administrative system centering on fiscal decentralization approach

Composition of the Team and Timing/Duration of the Mission

The UNDP policy advisory team will have the following members: i. ii. iii.

UNDP Policy Advisor on Decentralization and Local Governance, Regional Centre in Bangkok (team leader) UNDP Policy Advisor on Electoral Systems and Processes, BDP NY Independent specialist on decentralization and local governance with a strong background in administrative and fiscal decentralization.

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The mission will be conducted in the period 9-21 October 2005 with a total number of working days as follows: i.

UNDP Policy Advisor: 10 working day, 9-21 October 2005 (+ preparation and write-up)

ii. UNDP Policy Advisor: 7 working days 13-21 October 2005 (+ preparation and write-up). iii. Independent specialist on decentralization and local governance: 10 working days, 9October 2005 (+ 2 days preparation and 6 days write-up) The remuneration of consultants will be in accordance with UNDP rules and regulation. The Travel Cost Equalization Scheme will apply for the UNDP RCB policy advisor. Travel costs and DSA will be paid for the Policy Advisor based in UNDP New York.

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ANNEX B - PROGRAMME FOR DECENTRALIZATION POLICY ADVISORY MISSION Mr. Henrik Larsen, Team Leader, 10-21 October 2005 Mr. Per Jakob Tidemand, Decentralization Specialist, 10-21 October 2005 Ms. Linda, Electoral Specialist, 15-21 October 2005 Mission Coordinators: Mr. Sofvan at MOAD: 7784966 Ms. Shahla Ali at UNDP: 7761385 Monday, 10 October 2005 TIME 11.00 12.30 13.30-15.30

TIME 9.30-10.30

10.30-11.30 11.30-12.30

16.00

Person Briefing to UNDP, RR Briefing to Minister of Atolls Development Back ground discussion on decentralization Meeting with Mr. Hamid Yoosuf and Mr. Azeez and MOAD senior executives Tuesday, 11 October Person Hon. Hamdun Hameed Minister of Planning and National Development

Hon. Ilyas Ibrahim Minister of Health Ms. Azim Shukooru, Deputy Minister Mr. Hameed, Executive Director Hon. Ahmed Abdulla Minister of Environment, Energy and Water Mr. Razzak, Deputy Minister Mr. Farook, Director General Meeting with Adaalat Party Imran

LOCATION UN Building MOAD MOAD UNDP/MOAD 7786198

NOTES Completed Completed Completed Completed

LOCATION Ministry of Planning and National Development Ghazee Building, top floor Ministry of Health

NOTES Completed

Ministry of Home Affairs Huravee Building

Completed

Completed

Completed

Adalat Party Office 7758997

completed

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TIME 9.30 10.30

Wednesday, 12 October Person LOCATION Ministry of Education Hon. Zahiya Zareer, Minister of Education Ghazee Building Mr. Muhsin, Deputy Minister Mr. Jihad, State Minister Mr. Nafa Naseem, Executive Director Ministry of Finance Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aminath Mohamed Didi

12.00

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NOTES Completed Completed

Completed

Thursday, Friday, and Saturday 13-15 OCTOBER Field visit Haa Dhaal Departure to Hanimadhoo on Thursday at 10.00hrs and return to Male’ on Saturday 14.40 hrs Thursday 900 hrs Depart to Hulhule from Atolls Ministry Jetty 1040 hrs depart to Hanimadhoo 1300 hrs Meeting with Kulhudhufushi IDC, WDC 1600 hrs Meeting with Kulhudhufushi NGOs 2100 hrs Meeting with Haa Dhaal ADC Friday 1345 hrs Meeting with officials of Jalaaluddin School 1445 hrs Meeting officials of the Faculty of Engineering Kulhudhufushi campus 1630 hrs Meeting with officials of the Regional Hospital in Kulhudhufushi 2100 hrs Meeting with officials of the State Electric Company (STELCO) based in Kulhudhufushi 2200 hrs Meeting with officials from the Bank of Maldives, Branch Saturday 0900 Depart to Vaikaradhoo 1000 Meeting with Vaikaradhoo IDC, IWDC, NGOs 1230 Depart to Hanimadhoo 1440 Depart to Male’

Participants 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Mr. Henrik Larsen, Team Leader Mr. Per Jakob Tidemand, Fiscal Decentralization Specialist Mr. Abdul Bari Abdulla, Programme Coordinator, UNDP Mr. Mohamed Zahid, National Project Coordinator Mr. Ahmed Shareef Neefas, MOAD Ms. Shahla Ali, Programme Assistant, UNDP

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Sunday, 16 October 2005 TIME 8.30

9.30 10.30

Person TTF Meeting Kari Blindheim, Naashida Sattar Abdul Bari Abdulla, Linda Maguire Election Commissioner Election Commission Dr. Hassan Saeed Attorney General

13.00 hrs

Meeting with Male’ Municipality

15.00

Meeting with MDP Ali Hasim Abdulla Saeed, Secretary General

TIME 9.30

13.00

14.30

20.00

Monday, 17 October Person

LOCATION

NOTES completed

Completed Attorney General’s Office Huravee Building Male’, Maldives 786500 Office : 323809 Home: 315929

Completed

Completed

MDP Office 7772331 7784588

LOCATION

Completed

NOTES

Aishath Mohamed Didi Minister of Gender and Family Welfare

Ministry of Gender and Family Welfare

completed

Mr. Ibrahim Shareef Majlis Member

775022 MOAD/UNDP

No contact

Media Haveeru Daily Law Society of Maldives Shaheen Hameed and Mueez Maldives Law Commission Lubna Zahir Hussain Meeting with DRP Saleem Nazim Lubna Zahir Meeting Law Society of Maldives Shaheen Hameed, Mueez, Mazlan Mazlan Meeting with Adalat Party Mr. Mohammed Didi

Cancelled UNDP

Completed

Law Commission

Cancelled

DRP Office 7775848 786789

Completed

UNDP 7777590 Mazlan

Completed

Completed

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Chairman Mr. Mustafa Tuesday 18 OCTOBER Field visit to Male’ Atoll: Departure to Himmafushi Island at 09.30hrs and to Huraa Island at 12.30hrs. Return to Male’ at 14.30hrs

Himmafushi Island 10.00hrs Meeting with Himmafushi IDC, WDC along with representatives from line ministeries 12.30hrs Depart to Huraa Island Huraa Island 13.00hrs Meeting with Huraa IDC, WDC 14.30hrs Depart to Male’

Participants 1. 2. 3. 4.

Mr. Henrik Larsen, Team Leader Ms. Linda Maguire, Electoral Specialist Mr. Soalih, MOAD Ms. Shahla Ali, Programme Assistant, UNDP

TIME 10.00

Wednesday, 19 October Person Meeting with Ministry of Health

12.30

De-briefing with Team

MOAD

confirmed

15.00

Meeting with Mr. Patrice Coeur-Bizot, UNDP RR

UNDP

confirmed

TIME

Thursday, 20 October Person

LOCATION

LOCATION

NOTES

NOTES

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20.30

Mr. Mohamed Zuhair, Ms. Fathimath Afiya

9.30-12.30

De-briefing with Minister of Atolls Development

13.00 – 13.30

De-briefing with Minister of Atolls Development

TIME 13.30 –15.00

774922 Home: 312760 776530 Home: 325161 MOAD

Send a request

MOAD

confirmed

Friday, 21 October LOCATION Person Bandos Island Resort De-briefing with Minister of Atolls Development Continued) Discussion on follow-up and implementation strategy Finalize Report 21-22 October 2005

cancelled

NOTES confirme d

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ANNEX C: DECENTRALISATION CONCEPTS AND THEORY This annex contains a further elaboration on some of the key concepts within decentralisation theory introduced in the main text and also provide some key references for further reading as input to the continued work on local governance reforms in the Maldives. Definitions "Decentralisation" can take on very different meanings. In this paper we use the term to describe a broad range of public sector reorganisations: and generally refers to the transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to intermediate and local governments or quasiindependent government organizations and/or the private. In this paper emphasis is on decentralisation which “seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government” – thus we largely exclude the discussion of privatisation here. A distinction is furthermore normally made between three major forms of decentralisation -- deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. Deconcentration is often considered to be the weakest form of decentralisation and is used most frequently in unitary states-- redistributes decision making authority and financial and management responsibilities among different levels of the central government. It can merely shift responsibilities from central government officials in the capital city to those working in regions, provinces or districts, or it can create strong field administration or local administrative capacity under the supervision of central government ministries. Delegation is a more extensive form of decentralisation. Through delegation central governments transfer responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central government, but ultimately accountable to it. Governments delegate responsibilities to local governments or when they create public enterprises or corporations, housing authorities, transportation authorities, special service districts, semi-autonomous school districts, regional development corporations, or special project implementation units. Usually these organizations have a great deal of discretion in decision-making. They may be exempt from constraints on regular civil service personnel and may be able to charge users directly for services. Devolution a third type of administrative decentralisation is devolution. When governments devolve functions, they transfer authority for decision-making, finance, and management to quasi-autonomous units of local government with corporate status. Devolution usually transfers responsibilities for services to municipalities that elect their own mayors and councils, raise their own revenues and have independent authority to make investment decisions. In a devolved system local governments have clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and within which they perform public functions. It is this type of administrative decentralisation that underlies most political decentralisation. In reality different forms may co-exist and systems of service delivery may in reality represent a mix of some of the above forms. In addition several countries currently undertake forms of decentralisation that do not exactly fit into the above framework – the decentralisation of some elements of resources and decision making down to very low levels of community structures (e.g. school committees and water user committees) is now rather common and may broadly be referred to as “user participation”. Decentralisation is not in itself good or bad. However, when well designed and implemented it is widely expected to lead to more effective or efficient delivery of services. In particular in the case of devolution

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the reorganisation of public service is also expected to lead to broader public participation and democratisation of state structures. Devolution – democratic decentralisation Devolution – the transfer of powers/functions and resources to elected local governments responsible for a range of services – is in many ways the most radical form of decentralisation as it involves substantial reallocations of powers from central governments to local governments accountable to local residents. The two main characteristics of devolution that distinguish it from other forms of decentralisation are the transfer of powers – functions and resources – to local governments e.g.: •

Accountable to local residents: A fully-fledged local government will be accountable to local residents through elected councillors. The councillors will have full or some degree of authority over local staff and finances and in return be accountable to a local electorate who may even be able to recall elected councillors. Deconcentration will not signify any shift towards local accountability, but delegation may. As further elaborated below this downward accountability is in many countries constrained or moderated by: central government appointment of some councillors, central government control over staff and finances, just as the degree to which local residents effectively can hold elected leaders accountable is constrained by low levels of information and patronage politics.

•

Responsible for a range of services: Local governments would therefore seek to coordinate various sectors through area based/horizontal planning in a manner different from many other forms of decentralisation - such as delegation to autonomous single purpose bodies or sector deconcentration.

Devolution is considered the more radical form of decentralisation and only recently has it become a more widespread phenomenon in developing countries. However, today the vast majority of developing countries undertakes – or a policy to undertake – decentralisation reforms with substantial elements of devolution. The World Bank has more specifically estimated that decentralisation of the public sector is currently taking place in more than 60 out of the 70 major developing and transitional countries in the World33”.

33

World Bank: Decentralisation Briefing Notes (www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/urban/decent/decent.htm).

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Box 2: Basic preconditions for effective decentralisation

Although there is no universal international consensus we suggest that five basic preconditions can be identified: 1.

A legal framework, which clearly stipulates the division of roles and responsibilities between different layers of government. Only if significant responsibilities are assigned to local governments can they play a role in poverty alleviation. Assignments of responsibilities should be in accordance with local capacities – however, without accepting some interim gaps it will in most countries be impossible to transfer functions.

2.

Effective mechanisms for local level accountability – local election of local government councillors is the most basic precondition. Effective local accountability will also require citizens and politicians’ access to information, institutional arrangements for politicians oversight of planning, finances, staff; and be influenced by political structures, civil society organisations among others. Especially in an interim reform period it will be important to ensure some elements of effective upward accountability, but as a long-term measure only legal compliance by LGs need to be overseen centrally.

3.

Financial resources adequate to undertake functions. Finances to be provided by local revenue sources, fiscal transfers (more or less conditional) or borrowing. Fiscal autonomy is required to ensure that potential benefits of decentralisation can materialise. Recently negative poverty effects of LG taxation have featured prominently in literature and measures should be put in place to avoid this.

4.

Human resources (staff numbers, qualifications, motivation etc) adequate to undertake functions. Some degree of local control of staff is required to ensure local level autonomy and thus benefit from decentralisation. Finally all of the above needs to be supported by relevant central institutional arrangements – for instance a reform secretariat, a strong Ministry of Local Government, an Association of Local Authorities, a Local Government Finance Commission. An effective decentralisation of the public service will require significant coordination across sectors and a substantial overhaul of most line ministries and other central institutions – this part of reform is often the most challenging – especially when compared to required changes at the local level.

5.

Further Readings United Nations Development Programme is the UN’s global development network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life. We are on the ground in 166 countries, working with them on their own solutions to global and national development challenges. As they develop local capacity, they draw on the people of UNDP and our wide range of partners. UNDP supports more than 90 countries in the efforts to strengthen decentralized governance. See the Practice Note on Decentralization and Local Governance (http://www.undp.org/governance/sl-dlgud.htm) and the Practice Note on Electoral Systems and Processes (http://www.undp.org/governance/sl-elections.htm). Of specific relevance to the Maldives would be the recent paper on Local Democracy: Representation in Decentralized Governance and Primer on Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty Reduction. (www.undp.org/governance/decentralization.htm) GRC Exchange hosted by the Governance Resource Centre (GRC) of the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and compiled by leading international experts, the GRC Exchange provides a focal point for sharing ideas in governance. The site below present a brood introduction to the topic and various suggested reading. www.grc-exchange.org/g_themes/cc_decentralisation.html

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World Bank has a very comprehensive range of papers on decentralisation with analytical approaches, case studies, and country analyses – three sites are worth checking: www.decentralization.org and www.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization and (http://www1.worldbank.org/prem United Nations Capital Development Fund www.uncdf.org UNCDF has substantive practical experiences with piloting modalities for decentralised financing for local governments as well as for emerging LG structures. The site contains several useful documents with policy documents, various case studies, analytical work as well as project documentation. IDEA: Democracy at the local level - This handbook offers practical advice on designing systems of local governance, promoting representative local democracy and fostering citizen participation. The handbook defines key concepts and includes case studies, checklists and lists of options for policymakers in particular settings. http://www.idea.int/publications/democracy_at_local_level/index.htm

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ANNEX D: LOCAL ELECTIONS IN MALDIVES – ISSUES AND OPTIONS

This Annex further addresses the issue of local elections and political parties within the context of local representational arrangements in the Maldives. It touches on situational analysis, policy options and implementation. I.

Elections and Accountability a. Electoral system considerations

The selection of an electoral system is contingent on a number of factors, not least of which is the history of a country, its political, demographic, geographical and other considerations, and whether there is an electoral system in place at another level that is either working or not working, and a determination of why it is or is not. Among the most important factors to take into account are the balance between representation and accountability. Representation ensures that those who are elected reflect the choice of the electorate in terms of who will speak for it and the extent to which they actually do so. Concerns for representation focus on proportionality—that is, ensuring that political, gender, minority, regional, population and other concentrations are equitably represented. Accountability ensures that voters can call their representatives to account for decisions made in their name. In a democratic society, representation should be inclusive and accountability vertical and horizontal, however the selection of electoral system usually involves a degree of trade offs between these and the other considerations. It is generally thought that proportional representation electoral systems favour representation because they tend to produce electoral results that are more reflective of actual voting patterns, whereas plurality-majority systems are thought to enhance accountability because they give voters a representative with which to identify. This may not always be true, however, as proportional systems can concentrate power in parties rather than voters’ hands, and having an identifiable representative in a plurality-majority system may not always translate into greater accountability from this person to the electorate. Other considerations in selecting an electoral system include the effect on political parties. Some electoral systems encourage the development of a wide range of political parties—most notably, proportional systems—while some suppress the formation of strong political parties or favour the emergence of a few strong parties—i.e., some forms of plurality-majority systems. Other systems encourage political party coalition building because parties have to appeal to a wide range of voters to get elected, while still others promote fragmentation within parties because the system gives voters choices within a given party, meaning parties have to carefully prioritize their candidates. And, some systems, such as those in the plurality-majority family, make it easy for independent candidates not necessarily tied to any particular political ideology to stand for elections while others, such as those in the proportional representation family, make it more difficult. Also to be considered in the selection of an electoral system, are the cost and administration implications of the choice. For example, the selection of any system that ties constituents to a given representative, in other words, any requiring the designation of single-member constituencies, requires drawing of district boundaries. This is a lengthy process that can be highly political and open to charges of “gerrymandering” wherein districts are drawn to include or exclude or otherwise split the voting power of certain groups such as ethnic minorities. In proportional systems, the question becomes one of district magnitude (the number of seats to be filled), because the larger the district the more proportional the outcome will tend to be. In addition, different electoral systems would give rise to different voting methodologies. For example, the use of plurality-majority systems such as first-past-the-post, or single-

52

member district races where the person with the most votes wins, can include quite simple ballots and choices by the voters and lend themselves to the quick and easy tabulation of results. Other systems, such as those of the preferential variety, which allow voters to rank their candidates in order of preference, or those that require multiple rounds of voting such as the Two-Round System, can result in a heavier administrative burden and cost on the electoral administration authority. Another consideration in selecting an electoral system is the level at which it will operate. For example, if a new electoral system is being contemplated at the sub-national level, the system at the national level should be used as a frame of reference. In some cases, it will make the most sense to use the prevailing system—for example, because voters are familiar with it and trust it, because it is perceived to produce acceptable results, or because no significant defect is detected. In other cases, however, the introduction of a new electoral system at the national or the sub-national level can provide an opportunity for balance or correction of perceived defects at other levels. For example, if the system used at the national level is thought to produce results that are too disproportional where the winner takes all, policy makers may well decide to use a more proportional or mixed system at the local level to ensure balanced representation somewhere in the governance chain. Finally, some electoral systems are easier to use for the voters, make more use of second and other choices, and minimize the number of “wasted” votes, than others. Systems that make use of voters’ second preferences or attempt to ensure that winning candidates poll an absolute (50%+1) majority one way or another reduce the number of wasted votes while first-past-the-post systems where the winning candidate may only receive a plurality of the vote (less than 50%) can give rise to a high number of wasted votes. A high number of wasted votes matters because it can discourage voters who may feel their vote does not count and that they do not benefit from participating. b. Caveats As many considerations as there are in selecting an electoral system, the choice is never a purely technical one. The system through which votes cast are translated into seats or offices won, is an inherently political one because it goes to the core of who will win and exercise power. It is also important to underscore that there is no perfect electoral system that will ensure total representation and accountability, maximize voters’ preferences, reduce costs and the administrative burden and promote the healthy development of a multi-party system. The selection of an electoral system entails a series of trade offs that must take into consideration the local context, needs, geography and history. II.

Comparative Analysis of the Different Electoral Systems in the Maldives at Local Level

The discussion of electoral systems in the Maldives takes place within the overall planning for new local government arrangements and thus concerns the method(s) by which the planned Local Councils and their heads will be elected, as well as what the other representational arrangements will be at the local level. It also encompasses the Atoll level insofar as this will be a level of local government under the planned decentralized system and thus a discussion needs to take place around whether and how the members of an Atoll Council and its head would be directly or indirectly elected.34 The factors that will affect the choice in the Maldives include the state of progress of the transition to a multiparty democracy; the geography of having hundreds of islands—some having relatively few people—which serve as the natural unit of communal life; the demand by people to have a greater say in the selection of local representatives; and the tendency to combine in the same institution civil servants and appointees on the one hand, with political leaders selected by the people on the other.

34

Direct elections would be open and competitive election of members directly by the voters; indirect elections entail a body being selected by another group that stands between the voters and the body to be composed (e.g., the concept of an electoral college).

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There are three major “families” of electoral systems: Plurality-Majority; Proportional Representation; and Mixed. Plurality-Majority systems focus on the person or persons who won the most votes—if the margin of victory is 50 + 1%, it is an absolute majority and if the victory is simply based on the most votes but not a majority, it is a plurality (for example, candidate A wins 30% of the vote, candidate B 30% and candidate C 40%, candidate C wins despite not securing an absolute majority of the votes. In this scenario, 60% of the votes can likewise be thought of as “wasted”. Plurality-majority systems tend to be candidate focused and often geographically specific. Proportional representation systems tend to be more party focused and normally establish a threshold of some kind under which parties or candidates cannot be elected. They are designed to reflect in the newly elected institution, to the extent possible, the percentages in which the electorate voted. Mixed systems are a combination of plurality-majority with proportional representation, usually with the intention of correcting some of the disproportionality that can result from plurality-majority systems. The two most popular electorall systems used for local level elections are First-Past-the-Post (FPTP), which is in the plurality-majority family and based on single-member constituencies where the person with the most votes wins (used in India, for example, for all elecgtions); and Proportional Representation (PR) List where parties put forward lists of candidates that are then voted into office based on their “vote share”. In the Maldives, the electoral system used at the national level to elect the People’s Majlis and at the local level to elect the Island Development Committees’ elected members (and the system used during the brief experiment with electing the Atoll Chiefs) is the Block Vote, or “at large”, system. This system falls within the plurality-majority family and is used to elect several members from the same constituency (in this case meaning a group of people or a geographical area that a particular elected representative or group of elected representatives represents). Districts are multi-member and voters are given as many votes as there are open seats in a legislative chamber or local body; voters can cast the full number of votes or as few votes as they like; and the candidates with the most votes overall win election. This system is used at the national level in approximately 15 countries, many of which are in the Arab States because the Block Vote is candidate centred and often used where there are weak or non-existent political parties. It is also used more frequently at the local level to elect local councillors—for example, in the Philippines to Barangay council elections and in England and Wales where it is used to elect local councillors. Although the charge against Block Voting is that it can produce unrepresentative results because it can lead to complete landslide majorities for the group of candidates with the highest level of support, this result also has the benefit of leading to greater agreement among those elected and less gridlock. There are ways to make Block Voting slightly more representative by, for example, limiting the number of votes that voters have (i.e., less than the number to be elected to the body). If this number is limited to only one, it becomes a Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system. Or, Block Vote can be made more representative by injecting an element of preference into the system whereby voters rank the candidates in order of preference and those receiving the lowest are eliminated and their votes transferred until the required number of candidates is elected. Other options for local council elections within the plurality-majority family include “first-past-the-post” (FPTP), two-round system (TRS), Party Block Vote (PBV) and alternative voting (AV). See Table 1 for a more complete discussion of these systems, each of which does not, for various reasons, appear to be suitable to introduce at the local level in the Maldives. Among perhaps the most viable alternatives to continuing with the Block Voting system for local council elections in the Maldives would be to introduce a Proportional Representation (PR) system, most likely based on lists of candidates put forward by political parties. This has the twin advantage of fostering the development of a multi-party system while also maximizing the chances of representational outcomes. Political parties would prepare lists of candidates for election to the local councils and voters would be given the choice between these lists, casting only one vote. Based on a threshold for representation and then, above this, on the share of the vote, candidates are voted in from the lists. A list PR system can be

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tailored to give more or less discretion to the voter vis-à-vis the political parties in deciding who is elected from the lists by making them closed (full party discretion); open (voters can select candidates from the party list) or free (voters can selected candidates between party lists). List PR systems are used to elected local councils in a number of countries, including Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Cambodia and others. The main challenge with introducing PR in the Maldives at the local level would be how to address the issue of district magnitude. Typically, the higher the number of seats in a constituency and the larger the voting population, the more representative the results. If the new Local Councils remain more or less the same size, based on proportion, as the current Island Development Committees, the district magnitude will range from 5 to 10 members. A PR list system could work for a district of five but would be more problematic for a smaller one, should the decision be made to reduce the size of the Local Councils. Alternatives to using List PR across the board would be to employ a Mixed system, the third family of electoral systems, which could incorporate elements of plurality-majority with proportional representation, or pooling islands to create larger constituencies. Although, this latter option does not appear desirable as the island remains the central unit of local governance in the Maldives. Of course, using List Proportional Representation also requires that political parties have or develop a certain level of organization and identity at the local level to contest elections and present enough candidates. Finally, beyond continuing with the Block Vote or converting to Party List Proportional Representation, there are at least two other electoral systems that bear scrutiny for their representation and accountability effects at the local level in the Maldives. These are the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV), often referred to as a “semi-proportional system” and the Single Transferable Vote (STV), a proportional system. SNTV, used most recently at the national level in Afghanistan, is candidate centered and can be used with or without political parties. It gives voters one vote only for a multi-member district, meaning that where political parties contest elections it places a burden on them to strategically select the right candidates and in the right numbers. Otherwise, their support risks being split among their candidates if they field too many and not being maximized if they field too few. Likewise, it means that candidates are running against all other candidates up for election, including those within their own party. Thus the disadvantage can be party fragmentation. On the other hand, SNTV can result in more proportional results than Block Voting provided parties have accurately judged their support. STV is a preferential voting system designed to minimize wasted votes. It attempts to balance proportional representation with the idea that the voters are voting for candidates rather than party lists. STV systems achieve this by initially allocating an individual's vote to their most preferred candidate and then subsequently transferring unneeded or unused votes after candidates are either elected or eliminated according to the voter's stated preferences. It has been used at the local level with success in Ireland where it has given rise to inter-party coalition building and it could be used in the Maldives. However, the tabulation system involved in STV presents an issue for the Maldives because it requires the votes to be counted at counting centers rather than at the polling station, something that can be problematic where there could be a high level of distrust in the tabulation process. STV would also require a strongly capacitated, independent and transparent electoral authority.

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Table 1. How Electoral Systems might work in Maldives Local Elections35 Plurality Majority

System

FPTP36

BV37

PBV38

TRS

Strengths

Weaknesses

Implications for Maldives

Simple; most popular form of PM; uses singlemember districts and candidate-centred voting. Enhances links between elected and constituents by giving the latter one clearly identified representative. Results can be counted and announced quickly.

Excludes minorities and women; tends to consolidate power in a few parties, making it difficult for new parties to gain a foothold; large number of wasted votes and can give rise to extreme results; can lead to vote splitting.

Simple; uses multimember districts. Voters have as many votes as seats and can vote for candidates regardless of party affiliation. Voter retains a bit more choice. Uses reasonably sized geographic districts.

Can lead to disproportionately skewed results even more extreme than FPTP, if parties “pack” the candidate lists and encourage supporters to use all their votes on the party. Alternatively, it can pit candidates from the same party against each other and encourage fragmentation.

Simple; uses BV with parties and in multimember districts. Parties can present mixed lists that encourage minority representation. Voters get one vote. Makes use of voters’ second choices and ensures that the winner gains a majority using either FPTP or BV. Less unfair than FPTP. Encourages coalition building. Can be used in single or multi-member districts with FPTP, BV or PBV.

Used in few countries. Again, parties win all of the seats in a given district without winning a proportionate share of the vote.

FPTP requires single-member districts. If implemented for the local councils, boundaries would need to be drawn so that the unit is a subdivision of the island (or islands for Atolls) and each member of the local council would represent a geographic area. Boundary delimitation can be a lengthy and politically charged process. Reserved seats would probably need to be introduced to offset exclusionary aspects. If political parties are new and emerging, it can stunt or fragment the emergence of diverse elements. Does not make sense for very small populations and almost half of the islands would be in this position, although this does not represent a majority of the population. This is the method currently used to elect members of the People’s Majlis and intended to be used for those elected to the Island Development Councils (in practice, elections have not always taken place for those members who should be). It is a system common in countries with weak or non-existent political parties and may not be applicable for long in the Maldives. Used by only 15 countries in the world at the national level, it is used by some for local elections. The Philippines, for example, uses BV to elect the Barangay Council. Could be introduced relatively easily at the local council election level but would give rise to disproportionate results—the party that wins the most votes would have all the members of their list elected. No minority representation unless quotas or requirement on lists. This is most commonly used to elect a head of state and is rarely used at the local level. It would impose a heavy electoral administration and cost burden in the Maldives with no real value added at the local level.

Takes more time and cost, placing more burden on electoral authorities and the voter. Uncertainty and potential instability between the two elections. Still relatively unfair when considering proportionality and research shows it can fragment party systems in new democracies.

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Adapted from the International IDEA Handbook on Electoral System Design, 2005. First Past The Post 37 Block Vote 38 Party Block Vote 36

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AV39

List PR40

Makes use of voters’ other choices; usually held in single-member districts; voters rank all the candidates in order to make their choice count. Absolute majority winners are immediately elected, but plurality winners count and redistribute second, third, etc. preferences until they win a majority. Most popular form of PR; uses open or closed (or “free”) lists for multimember districts. Most effective at getting women and minorities elected; most faithful in translating votes cast into seats won. Typically enjoys high level of confidence of electorate.

Used in very few countries. Lengthy and laborious counting process that does not happen at the polling station level. Not widely used and the demographics of a country greatly impact on its results.

Uses multi-member districts, like all PR systems. Particularly effective at the local level. Works the same as Alternative Vote, except optional to rank all. Surplus votes of elected and losing candidates are redistributed until the required number of people is elected. Allows for choice within parties and between candidates within parties. Uses two types of elections (one PM, the other List PR), the results of which are not linked. Voters may get one or two choices. Retains some proportionality but still has voter-rep link.

Highly complex; requires a series of counts over and over again to weed out losers and determine winners. Can lead to competition within parties between candidates and fragmentation of parties.

PR

STV41

Mixed

Parallel

Can give voters no choice over candidates if lists are closed; puts decision making power for who ultimately takes the seats in the hands of the party. Can lead to gridlock in decision making if too many parties represented but none with critical enough mass. Link between elected and their constituents can be quite weak, especially with closed lists. Does not accommodate independent candidates.

Can create two distinct cadres of legislators: one seen as more linked and accountable to constituents and the other less so. Does not always correct disproportionate results to the extent desired.

Usually single-member districts, therefore if implemented for the local councils, boundaries would need to be redrawn so that the unit is a subdivision of the island or atoll and each member of the local council would represent a geographic area. Need to count the votes away from the polling station level might leave open the perception of interference in the results tabulation, based on previous elections at local level in Maldives. Requires high degree of literacy and numeracy, which Maldives has. List PR would be relatively easy to introduce for local council elections, particularly the larger islands. The natural multi-member district already exists as the island (or groups of islands), which would require political parties (or an independent presenting him/herself on a list of one) to present lists in one of three ways: open (with names and allowing voters to indicate their preference) or closed (with only the party name and the party makes the final decision on who goes to the council) or free (where voters can indicate their preferences even across party lists). A formula would need to be devised to establish a threshold, above which party lists would win some minimum representation on the local council. Requires the establishment of a quota to immediately elect some members. Requires high level of competence by election administration and a literate population. Votes would have to be tallied at counting centers rather than polling stations, therefore if credibility of the tabulation process is at issue in the Maldives, this may not be the most appropriate system.

The PM election is usually a single-member constituency one, giving rise to the same issues as outlined above. While a parallel system might be effective at balancing representation at a national level, it would be heavy for such small elections as the local council in the Maldives, where some electorates will have in the 100s of people.

39

Alternative Vote Proportional Representation 41 Single Transferable Vote 40

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MMP42

SNTV43

Other

III.

Uses two types of elections (one PM, the other List PR), the results of which are linked. PR seats are allocated to compensate for disproportionality that arises in the PM election. Voters may get one or two choices. Retains some proportionality but still has voter-rep link. Works in multi-member districts but voters have only one vote. Candidates with the highest vote totals win. Can help the election of women and minorities. Can be used with or without parties, but voters are voting for candidates not parties. Easy to use and understand, and where parties are involved it can promote party organization—forces a strategic choice of number and selection of candidates.

Same as above.

Same as above.

Rarely used and complex; can lead to vote splitting, meaning parties have to select nominees judiciously. Sometimes used as the system where political parties are deliberately kept out of the process (e.g., Afghanistan). Penalizes small parties. Gives rise to a high number of wasted votes.

SNTV works well in districts of about 20 members or fewer and thus could work for the Local Councils. But giving voters only one vote for the Local Councils, when they are used to voting for the full number of councillors, might give rise to the feeling that choice is being diminished. Incentive to present relatively few candidates forward could fit in the Maldivian context. The candidate-centered nature of the election might ease Maldivian concerns about political parties increasing conflict on the islands. At the same time, it may stunt the growth of a dynamic multi-party system.

Consequences of Electoral System Selection a. Legal Framework

As noted above, preparation and passage of an electoral law for Local Council elections would need to be completed as soon as possible to codify the electoral system and other arrangements for elections at the local level. This law should include a provision for political parties to contest elections (consistent with any other national legislation on the topic), the criteria by which candidates can stand and voters can vote, and the method for addressing electoral disputes. With respect to the administration of the elections, there would need to be considerable thought given to how the elections should be conducted and under what body’s supervision. Currently, the constitution provides for a Commissioner of Elections who is to organize and conduct the general votes for President, the People’s Majlis, the People’s Special Majlis and any public referenda required by the President to obtain the public’s option. At the same time, it appears that the Commissioner of Elections has been asked by the President to conduct the upcoming Municipal Council in Malé, implying that it could likewise be asked by the President to supervise the Local Council elections should these be scheduled, without a change to the constitution or other legal measures. If eventually another body were to be created to supervise and organize elections—for example, an independent electoral commission—this would need to legislation behind it and could also be included in an electoral law. b. Administration and Cost 42 43

Multi-Member Proportional Single Non-Transferable Vote

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There are important implications of possibly using the Commissioner of Elections for Local Councils elections. First and foremost, the administration of elections in the Maldives suffers from a low level of confidence and familiarity on the part of political parties and “average” voters. The Commissioner of Elections sits physically within the Ministry of Interior, which makes its independence problematic both in perception and in fact. If the Commissioner of Elections were to be asked to organize and supervise elections of Local Councils, there would need to be other checks and balances put in place to instil a degree of confidence in the electorate. The issue for the Maldives, or for any country, is that elections must be run well and perceived as being run well. The administration of elections can be done by local Island authorities or by the Commissioner of Elections or by an independent national election commission if one existed, so long as whichever body selected has the capacity, credibility and transparency necessary for the task. The history of elections in the Maldives might argue in favour of instituting—either prior to the Local Council elections or prior to the next national-level elections—an independent electoral management body with a national mandate for supervision and organization of all elections. Such a body would have an independent budget which is voted by Parliament and the body would be accountable for its use to Parliament. It would have a certain level of staff at the national and local levels, and the head of the electoral management body would be selected with some role by the Parliament, invested with a long mandate to transcend election periods and removable only for cause. But creation of such a body would require a constitutional change and would therefore need to be included in the package of reforms currently under discussion or a separate amendment. In the short-term, there are measures that can be taken to build public confidence in the process and improve its transparency and integrity. For example, vote counting should be done, as a principle, at the polling station on the Islands or as close to it as possible. As discussed above, some electoral systems lend themselves to counts at the polling station while others—such as preferential voting systems—require counts and recounts that need to be done at a smaller number of counting centres. Secondly, accredited political party delegates, NGO observers, media, international observers and others should be allowed to observe the voter registration process, the campaign period, voting day, the counting process and the transportation of results to the Atolls and capital. Typically, political party delegates and others should be allowed to retain a signed copy of the results as counted and certified at the polling station in order to compare it with the results ultimately announced. Currently, the Commissioner of Elections also maintains the voter’s list, based on periodic updates from information received from the Atoll and Island levels. Eventually, the list is to be completely computerized, making it easier to update on a rolling basis based on Island registration information. Computerization of the electoral register/voting list is among the most effective cost-savings techniques and is therefore expected to reduce the cost of elections in the Maldives. Other technological innovations could be made to enhance confidence in elections and reduce costs, including the introduction of electronic voting. However, it should be noted that no voting method is a complete solution to fraud or low confidence. All systems can be manipulated and even those least susceptible to fraud will be of little use if the electorate does not believe in them. Similarly, for a country as dispersed as the Maldives, elections costs are on the low side compared to similar countries (based on rough calculations, they cost an average of US$3.50 per voter). This cost is expected to go up, of course, as more and more elections take place in the Maldives and because some of the highest costs are associated with voting operations—getting the materials and infrastructure in place over distances and in places where it is expensive to access by boat or by air—and can thus be considered fixed for the time being. c. Representation of Women A number of countries in recent years have experimented with the use of quotas to boost women’s representation. Quotas, which are still a debated issue, focus either on the institution per se (e.g., setting

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a certain number of reserved seats for women in an assembly or council) or to the candidates running for office (e.g., legislated or voluntary quotas applied to political parties for women candidates). Quotas can be constitutionally mandated, legislated or voluntary. Examples of various techniques include: • • • •

•

In Uganda, a parliamentary seat from each of the 39 districts is reserved for women, resulting in an increase in women's political representation. Other women are elected to parliament on the non-gender specific reserved seats. In Argentina, the electoral law establishes a compulsory 30 per cent quota for women candidates for elective posts. This rule has increased women's representation in the Argentinean Chamber of Deputies considerably. In India, the 74th amendment to the Constitution requires 33 percent of seats in local municipal bodies to be reserved for women. In France, a law passed in 2000 requires that each party have at least 50 percent women candidates in certain races, like municipal elections, otherwise they will not be registered. In other cases, like parliamentary elections, the law does not enforce non-registration for failing to comply but instead reduces state subsidies to parties with fewer than 50 percent women candidates (obviously, some parties prefer to "take the penalty" rather than meet the 50% threshold in these elections). Other countries to mandate some form of parliamentary representation for women within the institution include Bangladesh (30 seats out of 330), Eritrea (10 seats out of 105), and Tanzania (15 seats out of 255).

There are considerable differences in outcomes depending on the form of affirmative action put in place. In Namibia, where the Local Authorities Act of 1992 requires that party list include a certain number of women, this has lead to women holding 45 % of seats at the local level (International IDEA 2004). When affirmative action takes the form of reserved seats, emerging evidence suggests that when women and representatives of other disadvantaged group are directly elected they tend to be more empowered and representative of ‘their’ constituencies than those who are appointed by the elected councils, local administrators or others. However, even when reserved seats are filled by direct elections equitable representation may suffer if elections to higher tiers of local government are indirect, as has been the case in Nepal. Further, when affirmative action measures at the local level are not replicated at the national level they may prove to be less effective. Thus evidence suggests that more inclusive local governance may ultimately depend on choosing the most suitable affirmative action measures for the specific political context as well as the existence of a conducive legislative framework and electoral system. d. Political Parties Further to the section on political parties in the main report, below is slightly more specific analysis on how some of the electoral systems discussed earlier (and those relevant to the discussion in the Maldives) affect political party development. First Past the Post—Tends to give rise to two strong parties, often embodying the “left” and the “right” and alternating power with each other. Parties need to have fairly wide appeal in this system and for this reason it can be quite stable. Because voters can vote for candidates as individuals, it is often preferred in systems that are new to multi-party democracy where political parties may not yet be strong. It minimizes the chances that other parties and alternative viewpoints will form and be elected to office. Block Vote—Tends to result either in political parties receiving a disproportionate vote share or in internal party fractionalization, because voters can select from among candidates from the same party. In either case, it is generally not thought to be very favourable of party development over the long term but could be continued at the introduction of multi-party politics or at the local level where the

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constituencies and district magnitudes are quite small. Use of the Party Block Vote variety can encourage the emergence of strong parties, however it can also give rise to strikingly disproportionate results. Proportional Representation—Thought to be among the best systems for encouraging the formation of political parties, particularly in societies where political parties are a new phenomenon. In its List variety, PR encourages parties to think through their ideology and strategy in contesting elections because it is the party rather than individuals on the list that the voter is passing judgment on (unless the lists are entirely open or free). At the same time, PR can minimize the ‘penalty’ that parties would otherwise need to take for poor performance, in that poorly performing parties can be returned to office time and again because they achieve the threshold of representation. PR can therefore artificially sustain poorly performing or otherwise fringe ethnic or regionally based parties that would disappear under a more ruthless system. To try to ensure that parties are national in nature, some countries place a requirement on parties in order to contest elections. For example, in Indonesia parties must have offices in at least nine provinces in order to contest elections. Single Transferable Vote—Because it balances candidate and party voting, STV can encourage interparty cooperation. However, it can also promote intra-party fragmentation for the same reason: political party representatives are in competition not just with other political party representatives but also with candidates from their own party who are also on the ballot. Single Non-Transferable Vote—Thought to be good at ensuring representation of minority parties as well as independents and therefore may be particularly useful in new multi-party democracies. Does not lead to parties being particularly broad in their appeal or conciliatory with each other, however. Seems to lead to less party fragmentation than some proportional systems because parties can instruct voters to cast their one vote in a way that maximizes the party’s winning potential. Mixed Systems (Parallel and Mixed Member Proportional)—Tend to balance the effects of pluralitymajority and proportional representation on the formation of parties. Can result in less party fragmentation than “pure” list PR.

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ANNEX E: SELECT REFERENCES FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN SMALL ISLAND STATES The establishment of an appropriate local government system is a complex undertaking that need to consider the specific economic, institutional, cultural and political of the particular national government in question. Nevertheless, certain general lessons and “best practices” are emerging and described in the general literature. However, for a small island state as the Maldives it is in addition to looking at the general international lessons and practices also relevant to pay particular attention to experiences of other small (island) states. The particular problems of small island states are foremost due to their size (population and economy). Nation states with small populations face particular problems in designing a cost-effective public sector in general. In small economies, the overall costs for government administration tend to take a higher share of the economy. Thus in small and poor states, some general problems associated with poorly designed local governance systems such as fragmentation of skill base and co-ordination problems tend to become more aggravated. Risks associated with kinship relations and patronage can also more easily be aggravated in small states. The Table below gives a rapid overview of the extent to which local government systems are in existence or not in a select number of small states. State

Population (Thousands)

Comoros

560

Per capita GDP/GNI (US$)44 380

Mauritius

1,200

3,800

Seychelles Madagascar

80 15,500

7,310 250

Cape Verde Maldives

440

1,330

Local Government System45

Unclear: following a constitutional crisis where 2 of the 3 major islands in 1997 claimed autonomy – a new constitution is under development, which may grant substantial regional autonomy. Yes: 9 local governments (4 District Councils and 5 urban councils) 46. 124 Village Councils – all on one Island) 115 Islands. 25 Districts. Recent Constitution emphasises decentralization. Elections for municipalities took place for the first time in 1992. WB Programme in progress. 17 Districts/Municipalities47. No elected local governments: the 200 inhabited islands administered through deconcentrated structures in 20 clusters through Atoll Chiefs

Caribbean48

44

Indicative figures as the data are not strictly comparable (different sources, different years). Figures for pacific economies are referring to GDP, the rest of the figures refer to GNI. 45 Defined as relatively autonomous lower level of local government with fully elected (or substantive measures for local representation) leadership. 46 Port Louis, Pamplemousses, Riviere du Rempart, Flacq, Grand Port, Savanne, Riviere Noire, Plaines Wilhelm and Moka. 47 Republic of Cap Verde/UNDP: Local Governance in the perspective of Poverty Reduction – paper for AGF V Maputo May 2002.

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State

Bahamas Belize Dominica Guyana Jamaica

Population (Thousands)

Per capita GDP/GNI (US$)44

Local Government System45

Yes, Yes, three tier-system. Yes, Yes, Yes, 12 parishes and one urban Corporation49 Yes, Yes – entire island defined as the single local government authority. As above As above No No No

2,606

Trinidad Barbuda Nevis Tobago Barbados Grenada St Kitts Pacific50 Fiji

790

2,440

Solomon

375

910

Vanuatu FSM51

169 107

1,200 2,010

Tonga Marshall Is Kiribati Samoa

104 56 80 165

1,630 1,670 920 1,120

Yes – 2 city councils, 9 town councils, 12 rural local authorities and 14 provincial councils. Yes – two levels of sub-national governance. Yes, Yes, two levels of sub-national local governance. No, but “traditional local leaders” Yes Yes No, but “traditional local leaders”

As can be seen from the table, even small and poor states have most commonly some form of local government system in place. However, some states have no recognisable local government systems and rely on deconcentrated systems instead. In general, small states follow the international trends, whereby central governments increasingly within the last decade decentralise to democratically elected local governments and/or outsource functions to the private sector. For a further policy discussion of local governance issues in the Maldives it may be useful in addition to the more general international experiences and literature referred to in Annex C also to consult some of the limited international experiences on local governance structures in small (island) states such as: 1. The International Symposium on Local Government and Civic Society in Small and Island Developing States, Malta 16-19 March 1999 organised by the Commonwealth Local Government Forum in collaboration with Malta and UN. (www.clgf.demon.co.uk.research)

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Summary of Caribbean local governance arrangements derived from the overview provided in Bishnu Ragoonath, University of West Indies: participatory Grassroots Democracy in the Caribbean – Prospects and Challenges for Local government in facilitating Governance”. 49 For details see Commonwealth local Government Forum: Country profile of the Local Government System in Jamaica (www.clgf.demon.co.uk.research) 50 All data from World Bank: Enhancing the Role of Government in the Pacific Island Economies, Washington DC 51 Federated States of Micronesia

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2. Various workshops under the OAS UPD (Organisation of American States – Unit for Promotion of Democracy) Programme of Cooperation in Decentralisation, Local Government and Citizen Participation. Particularly workshops for Caribbean policy makers involved with local government issues (www.upd.oas.org/Decentralisation/English). Particular useful overviews are found in: •

Proceedings from The International Symposium on Local Government and Civic Society in Small and Island Developing States, Malta 16-19 March 1999,

•

Bishnu Ragoonath 2001a: Civil Society, Good Governance and decentralization: An overview of Contemporary Issues and Policy Concerns for Local Governments in Small States (paper delivered in above mentioned conference)

•

Bishnu Ragoonath 2001b: Participatory Grassroots Democracy in the Caribbean – Prospects and Challenges for Local Government in facilitating Governance”, University of West Indies, paper presented at the Conference on Governance in the Contemporary Caribbean – the way forward.

•

World Bank 2001: Enhancing the Role of Government in the Pacific island Economies, Washington D.C.

It may also be worthwhile to conduct a study tour to some of the above mentioned small island states – for instance the Seychelles.

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ANNEX F: ISLAND AND ATOLL POPULATIONS

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66

67

68

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ANNEX G: DRAFT TOR FOR FURTHER WORK ON LOCAL FINANCE AND SERVICE DELIVERY Background The Government of Maldives takes a people-centred approach to development with macro policy orientation towards reducing poverty and achieving better quality of life52. As part this overall development strategy the Government has explored ways for further democratisation and decentralisation of its local administration and requested late 2005 support from the UNDP to assist in a further development of the institutional framework for local governance. A preliminary mission was conducted by the UNDP policy advisor on decentralization and local governance for Asia in the period 8-10 August 2005 and a tentative work plan for the reform process was agreed with the Minister of Atoll Development53. It was also agreed that support would be provided by UNDP for the development of a strategic framework from decentralization by a multi-member team in October 2005. The October Mission in its report recommended for a gradual decentralisation process based on 1. Introduction of formal systems of democratic governance at the local level, initially by introduction of Local Governments at island and atoll levels, 2. Recommended procedures for election of island and atoll councils within a multi-party system, 3. Gradual transfer of more extensive functions to islands and atolls later possibly to be followed by the introduction of more comprehensive LG system at regional level as substitution for the atolls, 4. Gradual introduction of elements of fiscal autonomy through: a. Increased transparency and local prioritisation of sector funding within education and health services through gradual adjustments of current sector funding. b. Improvements of local revenue systems, c. Increased transparency and local prioritisation of general and administrative funding of the councils, d. Introduction of a development block grant. 5. Gradual devolution of personnel management responsibilities to island and atoll councils with abolishment of the post of chiefs and contract recruitment of professional administrators accountable to their councils.

These TOR describe the further work needed for operationalisation of a decentralisation strategy once the broad recommendations of the October mission have been reviewed and endorsed.

52 53

See the Vision 2020 statement of the President of the Maldives www.planning.gov.mv/vision. See Decentralization and Local Governance in the Maldives: Workplan for Reform Process (August 2005).

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Study Objectives The overall objective of the study is to operationalise the decentralisation strategy along the broad recommendations of the October 2005 Mission. The specific objectives are to explore and recommend specific reform measures within the field of: : • • •

Institutional roles and accountability mechanisms Financing (covering both the general admin and the dev grant) The planning/budgeting (PEM) procedures for prioritisation of expenditures.

Scope of Work The three main subjects will be analysed through the following work and activities: A) Institutional arrangements for Sector service delivery; the study should with a special focus on education and health sectors: i. Assess in detail the current system for delivery of selected public services which are typically local in nature and whose provision responsibility might therefore be devolved or delegated to Local (island, atoll and regional) Councils through sector decentralization reforms. ii. Review the strategies adopted by sector to improve the delivery of the local public services that fall under their authority with a particular focus on the financing and budget modalities, but also other delivery functions (procurement, personnel, supervision, ..) iii. Analyse the arrangements for personnel management, in particular regarding recruitment, discipline, performance monitoring, promotion and firing. iv. Recommend on the appropriate division of work among island councils, atoll councils and central ministries, v. Recommend on appropriate financing and budget procedures – this should include draft proposals for annual allocations at island and atoll levels in a medium term perspective, idem vi. Recommend on the specific personnel management rules for separate type of health and educational staff. vii. Address issues related to accountability of local service providers/administration and representative institutions for the access to, and quality of, services. B) Financing. Increased transparency and local prioritisation of general and administrative and funding of the councils. The study should i. Review the existing arrangements for funding salaries and recurrent budgets of island and atoll offices. This should include calculation of the allocations made to all office within the last three years, calculation of per capita expenditures and analysis of any inequalities within the system. ii. In view of the changed roles of councils and island and atoll office recommend on budget allocation procedures with recommended budget allocations for each island/atoll the next three years (or at least develop the principles that easily can be applied by GOM) preferably in the form of a formula based administrative block grant.

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ii. Introduction of a development block grant. The study should iii. Analyse experiences of the PSIP (Public Sector Investment Programme) and in particular the window for island/atoll funding, iv. Analyse experiences of relevant pilots for island and atoll development funding, v. Identify relevant types of capital investment that would be eligible for funding through a development block grant, vi. Develop relevant access conditions for islands/atolls to fulfil prior to allocation of funding, vii. Recommend on size of grant and formula for its distribution among atolls and islands, C.. Planning & Budgeting arrangements viii.

Analyse the practical arrangements for budgeting and financing for service delivery, including detailed analysis of selected cluster, zone and service unit budgets. Idem and issues of co-provision/coordination between levels/agencies ix. Analyse a sample of atoll and island budgets and expenditures in order to identify scope for more effective delivery of functions of the offices. x. Analyse the budgeting process and the extent to which increased local autonomy in specific areas are likely to lead to efficiency gains, xi. Recommend on planning, budgeting, procurement, project implementation and M&E arrangements. Finally the study should make recommendations on appropriate capacity building activities for implementation of all of the above. A minimum of 4 atolls and two islands within each atoll shall be visited in order to analyse existing practices as well as for consultation of proposed reforms.

Required inputs A joint government-consultancy team will undertake this assignment. The Ministries of Education, Health and MOAD will each assign one full time person for the entire period of work. 2 international consultants with extensive expertise in administrative and fiscal decentralisation will work on this assignment in two phases (division of roles among consultants will depend on their respective expertise, but tentatively one will be responsible for A and the other B+C), of which the first will include: • • •

2 days of preparation, 3 weeks of field work and consultation with ministries and other service delivery provider, producer and user stakeholders, 7 days of report writing.

A second phase of work is expected with less fieldwork and more emphasis on refinement of proposals. The level of input is likely to include: • •

2 days of preparation, 1 week of field work and consultations with ministries, and other stakeholders

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•

5 days of report writing

Details of the second phase will be prepared as part of the first phase.

Outputs • • •

One debriefing note circulated one day prior to debriefing meeting with main finding and recommendations for all the elements of the assignment, A draft report one week after the end of assignment, A final report that incorporate all comments.

Reporting Arrangements The joint consultant – government team should report to a reference group established under MOAD, MOPND, MOH, and MOFT (or any other government committee given responsibility for oversight of the decentralisation process).

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ANNEX H: LOCAL DEMOCRACY IN ASIA - REPRESENTATION IN DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE

Research Proposal

Final Draft for Internal Discussion 13 July 2005

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................... 76

2

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE .................................................................................................................... 77

3

BACKGROUND: DECENTRALIZED LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN ASIA................................................ 78

4

THE CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE RESEARCH.................................. 78 4.1 4.2 4.3

5

FACTORS SHAPING REPRESENTATIONAL INFLUENCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT BODIES .............................................78 CONCEPTUALISING ACCOUNTABILITY ..........................................................................................................................80 THE FIELD OF STUDY ......................................................................................................................................................81

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH .................................................................................................... 83 5.1 DESK STUDY OF ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS IN DECENTRALIZED LOCAL GOVERNANCE ...................................85 5.2 THE CASE STUDIES .........................................................................................................................................................85 5.2.1 Study of accountability mechanisms in local representative bodies ..............................................86 5.2.2 Study of local governance responsiveness ............................................................................................87 5.2.3 Study of citizens’ relations to local government and other institutions of local governance....88

6

RESEARCH OUTPUTS ...................................................................................................................... 88 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4

7

COUNTRY STUDIES.........................................................................................................................................................88 REGIONAL STUDY ...........................................................................................................................................................88 A ‘POLICY BRIEF’............................................................................................................................................................89 A COUNTRY AND REGIONAL ‘DATA BASE’ ....................................................................................................................89

DISSEMINATION OF OUTPUTS ....................................................................................................... 89

Annexes: I

Outline of work time allocation and time schedule

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INTRODUCTION In the Asian region, local representative institutions constitute for many citizens one of the most important avenues for participation in governance and for influencing decision-making of direct relevance and consequence to their livelihoods. The fairness and adequacy of the representation has long been an issue of some concern, but it is only in more recent years that studies have been undertaken to investigate the degree to which different groups have been able to secure representation and the extent to which their representation is reflected in local government decision-making. The majority of countries in the region are developing countries possessing quite different experiences of decentralized local government with considerable variations in the state of local government reforms and not least the degree to which powers, responsibilities and resources have been devolved to local government. In so far as participation in local government has been addressed in policies and programmes, the focus has tended to be on the participation of citizens in local agencies responsible for service provision and resource management and not so much on the need to secure greater citizen influence in decision-making in the elected local government bodies. There is some evidence in the Asia region that changes to the type of electoral system in place and the nature and state of a country’s political parties have had positive consequences for the form and degree of representation for groups accustomed to social exclusion and economic marginalisation. These improvements have also been supported by affirmative action targeting such groups to increase their representation in elected local government bodies. How representation translates into influence and then into positive outcomes from local government is less clear. While research on electoral systems and affirmative actions has studied the legislation and the representative nature of the local government bodies that it gives rise to, less work has been undertaken into how that representation can secure influence in decision-making in these bodies. In the broader community of research institutions and donor agencies a number of studies undertaken in individual countries have documented the ways in which institutional and structural factors prevent or hinder the ability of socially excluded and economically marginalized groups to influence decisionmaking in elected local government bodies. However these tend to have been isolated studies, often based on a detailed analysis of local government bodies in one locality, identifying the factors influencing representation and the degree to which representation has shaped outcomes including those of social exclusion and economic marginalisation. A comparative study of specific mechanisms that can secure improvements in and from representation in local elected authorities across Asia and the Pacific region would make a significant contribution to knowledge and policy on decentralized local governance in the region. The UNDP Regional Centre in Bangkok has taken an important step in this direction with the drafting of a background paper: Local Democracy in Asia: Representation in Decentralized Governance (June 2005). This paper documents the current state of the electoral systems in place in six countries of South Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and five countries in Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Timor-Leste and Vietnam. The study also explores the situation with respect to different forms of party political engagement in local elections as well as the outcomes that different electoral systems and affirmative actions can have in terms of improving participation and representation. The Background Paper provided the basis for a two day workshop on Representation in Decentralized Local Governance held at Hua Hin, Thailand June 22-23. At the workshop the country evidence that laid the basis for the Background Paper was taken up and discussed in greater detail. It was agreed that the combination of election modalities opted for in a country’s electoral system could influence considerably the representative nature of local government bodies. So too could the state of political parties and the

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‘party-basis’ of the elections held at different levels of local government (village, district etc.). The ways in which representation secured through election could also be secured in the regular functioning of local government bodies were not so clear. While a range of mechanisms could be identified, how they worked in practice was less apparent, not least due to the role of many other factors that shape the context for local government in the different countries. A common theme that emerged during the discussions was the important role that improved representation can have on the accountability of local government bodies to those traditionally denied influence on the one hand and the ways that accountability might facilitate and secure improved influence over representatives on the other. For example, the presence of a set of different types of accountability mechanisms, designed to support the objective of securing more inclusive and representative local governance, was seen to be a necessary condition for more effective, responsive and equitable local government. The workshop pointed to the need for a more systematic collection and appraisal of the evidence in order to study the links between representation and accountability, both the ways that electoral modalities can improve representation and the types of accountability mechanisms that can secure adequate representation. Building on the work undertaken for the Background Paper, this would require studying the ways in which representation has been made more accountable through electoral reforms and affirmative actions in the different countries and an analysis of the types of accountability mechanisms in place and asking what works to secure better representation where, when and how.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE The objective of the research is to explore the different types of mechanisms that can affect the

degree of accountability present in local governance and with respect to local government in particular. The analysis of these mechanisms in the different country contexts will contribute significantly to policies that aim to develop inclusive system of representation. The overall research question is: ™ In what ways can representation be made more accountable in decentralized local governance? The research will seek to achieve its objective initially through a set of country studies conducted by the country offices of UNDP and their partners in the Asia region and coordinated by the Regional Centre in Bangkok. Guiding questions for these country studies are: o o o o o o

Which groups face particular difficulties in gaining representation in local governance, and what mechanisms exist to create accountability for such groups? Which actors can hold local government to account? What mechanisms can they individual citizens and disadvantaged groups draw upon? Under which conditions do these mechanisms work best and when are they un/underutilised? Which mechanisms have lead to a greater responsiveness on the part of local government to citizens/disadvantaged groups? What other actors, mechanisms and measures could increase local government’s accountability and responsiveness in the future?

The country studies will provide the basis for a comparative analysis of the ways in which different systems of representation in local government affect its accountability and as to how accountability instruments might be used to achieve a more effective and equitable system of decentralized local governance.

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BACKGROUND: DECENTRALIZED LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN ASIA Developments with respect to governance in the countries of the Asia and Pacific region have mirrored the more general trends amongst poorer countries in the world, namely that state-centered and market approaches to social provision and to support pro-poor development have gradually been replaced with strategies that aim at strengthening decentralized local governance and the role of local government in particular. Today decentralization is seen to be an integral element in programmes seeking improved poverty reduction and for making progress towards poverty reduction in general and the Millennium Development Goals in particular. Decentralized government reforms have been implemented in the majority of poor countries in the region. Also service provision across a number of key sectors such as education, health and agriculture is increasingly being provided through local government institutions supported by the active engagement of non-government organizations, user groups, self-help groups, and other organizations. However a tendency remains for these reforms to focus more upon the technical needs of securing effective service provision through participation of beneficiaries than on a more fundamental change in local government – citizen relations. In addition, there remain in some countries and some areas significant differences between access for citizens generally and access for specific disadvantaged groups such as indigenous peoples, religious and ethnic minorities, women, refugees/IDPs and others. Most recently the development strategies of a number of donor agencies and national governments in the region have turned towards approaches that stress the need to strengthen citizens’ rights as part of a broader strategy for nationally owned and sustainable pro-poor development and economic growth. Whether this will lead to a more substantive change in the nature and process of local governance with local government bodies becoming sites of citizen influence over policy and programme implementation is not certain. Experiments with local government designed to strengthen the status of clients as citizens are currently being pursued in several countries in the region in attempts to implement a more citizencentered approach, for example the introduction of Gram Unnayan Samitis in West Bengal54. As yet these remain experiments and the requirements for achieving greater accountability and responsiveness in local government cannot as yet be said to be fully understood.

THE CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE RESEARCH The proposed study is looking at ways and means by which the functioning of a system of decentralized local governance can better meet the needs and aspirations of those it represents and those it serves. The particular focus of the study is on the instruments available for making elected and administrative officials in local government accountable to those they represent and serve. An assumption underlying the study is that better representation can improve accountability and that greater accountability can encourage responsiveness to citizens’ voices and thereby enhance the capability of individuals to make choices and to influence local government decisions towards desired actions and outcomes on the basis of those choices. For the socially excluded and marginalized amongst today’s polities, this would represent a fundamental change in their political status. Factors shaping representational influence in local government bodies

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Gram Unnayan Samitis (GUS) are constituted by election and nomination at a level beneath the previous lowest elected council –the Gram Panchayat (GP). The primary role of the GUS is to identify specific needs and problems with the onus being on the GP to ensure technical and other services are delivered to meet these wherever possible.

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Factors that influence an individual’s capacity to engage in and influence collective decision-making in local government can be discussed in terms of three dimensions: the structural, the institutional and the individual citizen. Not only do these provide a framework for analysing factors that shape the nature and degree of representation in decentralized local governance in a particular context, they also provide a means for assessing the impact of measures designed to improve representation. Structural factors are those that affect the capacity to participate or to be adequately represented in local governance. Included amongst these are factors of gender, ethnicity, caste, religion, class and age. Factors impacting on the capacity of disadvantaged groups to participate include education levels, social biases etc. Institutional factors are those that can be seen in the institutional configurations that enable or disenable individuals from influencing decision-making in local governance. These are not just mechanisms that affect the degree of representation in the daily functioning of local government, but also access to other institutions that help to secure a fairer and more adequate representation. Public hearings, councillor surgeries, representation on sub-committees, quotas, recall supported by means of public, political and legal recourse managed through other institutions are examples of the elements found in many developed countries, but not necessarily a part of the institutional configuration present for citizens in many poorer countries. Individual citizen factors are those that address the agency of individuals and social groups as citizens possessing rights. They influence the degree to which these actors can express agency through their actions both within local governments and upon local government from without. Structural and institutional factors provide the opportunities for such agency, but can by no means ensure it. Taking up this dimension is to go beyond the notion of citizens as rights holders and to stress the importance of the decision to assert agency, to pursue their interests through the channel of representation in the institutions of local governance. These factors are presented in the diagram 1 below. The arrows denote influences that different types of factors have on the working of institutions in decentralized local governance and the capacities of citizens to assert influence over decision-making and its outcomes:

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Diagram 1: the factors of change Field of local governance

Institutional factors

o o o o

Structural factors

Individual citizens’ agency in local

Local government reform in the region has tended to focus on measures directed at changing the institutional factors affecting participation and representation in local government including the heads of elected bodies, through adjustments of the electoral system, the political party system, and measures designed to bring civil society organisations and other non-government actors into the framework of decentralized local governance. Some measures have sought to compensate for structural factors; for example affirmative actions targeting specific groups have been quite widely used. As yet it remains inconclusive as to whether such positive discrimination can in the longer term weaken the structural causes that give rise to social exclusion and marginalisation and their consequences for representation. Recent attempts to place greater emphasis on the agency of the poor in local governance include citizencentred and rights-based approaches that aim not just to empower poor and marginalised groups, but also to change fundamentally the relationship between local government and citizens. Not least this involves a major shift in the disposition of local government officials responsible for providing social and technical services. Such a shift is as much a question of personal attitudes as of institutional requirements. To date such measures have not moved substantially beyond a focus on local government service delivery however, and the aim of the research is also to point at entry points for changing more fundamentally the relationship between local government and citizens. Conceptualising accountability The analysis of accountability in the proposed study needs to address accountability as a means by which to secure fairer and more adequate representation in local government bodies. In its strict form accountability denotes a relationship between a bearer of a right or a legitimate claim on the one hand and a duty holder responsible for fulfilling or respecting that right on the other. The most basic form of accountability relation is that between a person or agency (i.e. local governance institution in this study) entrusted with a particular task or certain powers or resources, and the ‘principal’ (i.e. citizen) on whose

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behalf the task is undertaken, on the other. As outlined above, the study works with the hypothesis that accountability mechanisms can strengthen the impact of measures designed to secure better representation in local governance institutions. In developing a conceptual framework for the study a number of other dimensions of accountability need to be taken into account. These include the following: Answerability and enforcement: those who are held to account are required to explain and inform on actions taken and the processes that lie behind these. They are not the same actors as those who enforce accountability, adjudicating as to whether the government agents have met their obligations to the principal (e.g. service recipient) and applying sanctions where they have not. It is important therefore that any study captures the broader institutional configuration that accountability mechanisms encompass, not least if the capacity for recourse is to be included. Accountability and capacity: failure to undertake measures designed to secure greater accountability or failure to respond to a specific claim to a ‘right’ might not be rooted in a lack of motivation or concern, but a lack of capacity. For example, failure to consult relevant groups before taking a decision in a council or a committee might be rooted in a lack of human resources and time constraints rather than from a lack of commitment. Therefore a study of accountability must take into account a range of factors that shape actions between rights holders and duty bearers. Systemic accountability: Other agents than the principal can expect and demand accountability as part of a broader commitment to a system of good governance. This broadens the frame beyond the local government - citizen relationship and introduces a range of instruments that can also seek greater accountability on the part of government. Several distinctions can be made here including that between formal and informal accountability relationships, the latter often being de facto relationships rooted in informal social institutions as opposed to de jure relationships between local government and citizens. Accountability and responsiveness: Administrative officials are accountable to their managers who in turn account to higher levels including to the legislature, to the executive, to financial auditors, to higher court judges. They are expected to be responsive to members of the public. For their part politicians are accountable in a narrow sense to those who elect them, but many expect them to be responsive to the concerns of all those within the constituency that they represent. This is not least an important strategy for re-election. The instruments for demanding better accountability are not necessarily the same as those for securing greater responsiveness. In assessing the form and functioning of accountability relationships, it will be useful to broaden the analysis to include responsiveness as a separate dimension. The distinction is useful for looking at a broader range of formal and informal mechanisms that can affect accountability and responsiveness of local government. The field of study The following diagram seeks to summarize the field of study. The actors are grouped in three different levels with the principal focus being on the local level where decentralized local governance functions. The study focuses upon the accountability flows and relations that link elected and administrative local government bodies with other institutional actors at the same level, citizens below and national government and national organizations above.

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Diagram 2: The analytical field of study

Accountability mechanisms and relations

Individuals as citizens

Representation by election and other means

Local Level

National Level

Local govt. administrative depts

Representatives constituting the local council and its committees

National govt. Civil society International agencies etc.

Individual l ti Other govt. and civil society institutions

Citizen agency

Institutional change

Structural change

In Diagram 2, the three possible sources of change raised in are also indicated: citizen agency, institutional change and structural change in order to illustrate the ways in which different types of reform can have an impact. For example affirmative action that changes the representation of women can encourage women to stand for election, change the orientation of councils and departments in areas such as natural resource management or health provision and push national policy making towards being generally more gender sensitive. It might begin as a set of institutional measures, but their effective implementation over a longer period can lead to more fundamental socio-economic and cultural changes that are structural in nature. The sustainability of this dynamic rests on such factors as the motivation for reform at the national level, the willingness to assert agency at the individual level and not least the types of accountabilities that sustain the momentum for change on the institutions present at the level of local governance. The accountability mechanisms that secure representation and influence can be divided into two main forms: formal accountability mechanisms rooted mainly in institutional rules and guidelines framed in legislation and informal mechanisms rooted in many things ranging from good management practices that facilitate citizens’ voices to be heard at the decision-making table through to patron-client relations that ensure some elements of the clients’ problems are represented. A second set of characteristics concerns the direction of accountability: upward, downward and horizontal. Upward accountability is classically found in local government bodies implementing

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programmes to meet targets set by national departments and ministries or in individual in cases where individual officials are merely striving to meet the expectations of higher level party of administrative functionaries to secure personal promotion. There can also be strong upward accountability within a political party with a strong centralised structure. Downward accountability is central to participation and representation, not least in a requirement to be responsive to one’s constituencies, whether these are constituted through democratic processes or by factors of ethnicity, gender, location etc. Finally horizontal accountability can be seen in the ways that different institutional actors shape and influence the workings of local government within its administrative area; for example other government institutions such as the local judiciary, the local media or civil society organisations including local NGOs.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH The research will be undertaken in a selected sample of countries in the region and in selected localities within each of the countries. The country studies consist of a desk study and a three-prong research strategy at the local level. Hence, the methodology for the research will center upon five activities: 1. A desk study of the existing legislation, rules and guidelines with respect to local governance 2. Case studies in 2 or more localities (districts) in selected countries to study a. The ways in which representation in the local governance institutions is accountable to local citizens, the different roles played by the institutional actors with respect to local government bodies and the accountability mechanisms that they utilize. b. The capacity for local government responsiveness to citizens’ voices c. Citizens’ perceptions and experiences of local government 3. A comparative analysis of the country studies’ findings The five tasks covered in the desk and case studies are summarized in the table 1 below: Selection of countries Country selection will be based upon a number of criteria that enable possible explanatory variables in the functioning of decentralized local governance to be explored in the comparative analysis. These would include: ƒ the type of electoral system in place (in particular majoritarian vs. proportional representation, modality for election to upper level of local government and direct vs. indirect election of chairs)

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Table 1: Summary of Research activities and methodology Activity

Methodology

Desk study of local governance representation and accountability mechanisms

Review of local government legislation, guidelines and rules Review of the same with respect to 1 – 2 decentralised sectors located with local government (education, health, water supply and sanitation, housing etc.)

2a Study of local institutions in

Selection of two or more field study sites Identification of public – civil society – market institutional actors Interviews with local officials and representatives from these three groups Possible focus on 1 – 2 sector programmes located with local government (education, health, water supply and sanitation, housing etc.) Focus group discussions with ‘front-line workers’ from the previously selected sectors - perceptions of relationship to higher levels of government/administration and to citizens - experiences of administrative (formal) forms of accountability - experiences of informal forms of accountability (political, social, customary etc.) - identification of problems with and obstacles for responsiveness faced in their work in local government Focus groups possibly supplemented by a local survey - experiences of accessing elected representatives (actors, resources, institutions, networks etc. utilised) - experiences of access failure/denial - perceptions of local governance institutions’ accountability and responsiveness Senior researcher to support the RCB policy advisor in analysing the country studies and draft the comparative analysis, and prepare a paper of max 25-30 pages.

1

decentralized governance and the accountability mechanisms utilised with respect to local government bodies

2b Study of local government ‘responsiveness’

2c Study of citizens’ relations to local government and other institutions of local governance

3

A comparative analysis of the country studies covered in 1, 2a -2c

Time Schedule August 2005

Sep-Oct 2005

Sep-Oct 2005

Oct 2005

Jan-Feb 2006

ƒ the status of political parties in local government (i.e. covering countries with no political parties in local governance, 1 or 2 with ‘one party’ systems, and countries with multi-party local governance systems) ƒ Additional considerations with respect to the representational arrangement (e.g. the possibility of studying the ongoing shift towards direct election of chairs in Pakistan and Thailand; analyzing the impact of the legal requirement of national parties in local governance in Indonesia etc.) To the extent possible, the selection of countries takes into account: ƒ the level of human development and economic growth (i.e. LDCs and non-LDCs) ƒ the history and devolved status of local government in the country (e.g. ‘beginners’ countries with traditions of local government but little real devolution, and countries with substantial devolution of responsibilities and resources) ƒ the social and cultural constitution of the electorate (i.e. selecting to capture the influence of factors of religion, ethnicity and other minorities on politics through political parties and other forms of associational activity). It is envisaged that eight countries are selected from across the region.

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Desk study of accountability mechanisms in decentralized local governance As outlined in Table 1, the first research activity or study is based upon existing legislation, rules and guidelines for local government bodies and other local institutions involved in decentralized local governance. Core areas of responsibility will be identified in order to explore the links between representation and accountability through specific examples. Possible areas include the preparation of local development plans, conflict resolution, service delivery, natural resource management. Their selection would be dependent upon the responsibilities of local government, the need for cross country comparison and possible relevance for the Millennium Development Goals and for poverty reduction. The legislation and rules and guidelines for local government activities in the selected areas would also provide important data on coordination and harmonisation between actors and sectors and as to how this impacts on the functioning of local government with respect to accountability and responsiveness. One important output from the case study should be the identification of the actors at different levels that possess a capability to seek accountability from local government through representative bodies. Given the secondary sources of data drawn upon, these will be primarily formal in nature. However there may be documentation pointing to informal accountability mechanisms used by various actors. Table 2 below provides a format that a country study can use to categorize the main actors involved. Table 2: Sample analysis - actors with a capability to seek accountability in decentralized local governance institutions: Public

Market

Civil society

International

UNDP ………..

International media …….

Foreign investors

National

Legislative assembly ……

Business and organisations ….

National media, NGOs …………..

Local

Local political parties, local government & administration….

Local traders’ Local banks Cooperatives

labour

associations,

national

Community based organisations, local media ….. Family, caste and similar networks and associations …… Local elites Customary authorities

The case studies The selection of the localities should be guided by contextual criteria that will permit different dimensions of the country’s local political contexts to be explored. These include social and cultural factors in the country’s demographic make-up; different local combinations of electoral modalities present; the status of political parties in local governance, different levels of economic and human development; rural and urban contexts. The size of locality will be dependent upon the structure of local government in the country, but will primarily be based upon geographic area of administration and type and extent of responsibilities and resources devolved. An example of a country case study would be: (i) 2 districts (or equivalent) selected on the basis of the following criteria: ƒ urbanisation (1 high, 1low),

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ƒ ƒ ƒ

level of economic growth and human development (1 high, 1 low) political party control (1 with the same party as in national government, 1 not) different electoral modalities if these are present e.g. specific affirmative measures due to ethnic or regional factors

(ii) 2 localities in each district covering the lowest tier of effective local government (based on devolution of responsibilities and resources) selected on the basis of the following criteria: ƒ One locality with a closely balanced political party representation, 1 with a clear dominant political party ƒ One locality with a well integrated economy closely linked into market structures including urban employment, 1 economically less developed and more isolated ƒ in addition, to the extent possible, the two localities should capture different social and cultural demographic factors. The case studies in the selected localities will comprise of three steps. The first step is to identify the different actors that play a significant role in decentralized governance in the locality, their representative nature and what formal or informal capabilities they possess to secure accountability in the functioning of local elected and administrative government bodies. The subsequent steps will permit a closer examination as to how accountability is practiced, by whom and to what effect. An important element will be the actors’ perceptions of local government accountability. For these narratives centring on specific experiences will be an important source of information. Study of accountability mechanisms in local representative bodies As outlined above, the first step is a mapping exercise of the institutional actors in the system of decentralised governance present in the selected case study localities. The representative nature of decentralized local governance institutions will be assessed on the basis of their legal constitution supplemented by evidence from sources such as electoral data, minutes from meetings, interviews with key informants. A second element for this part of the study will be the identification of the formal and informal forms of accountability practised by the different institutional actors with respect to (a) local elected and administrative government bodies and (b) citizens. The accountability mechanisms identified will then be categorised according to a set of general types. As discussed in 4.2 above, the mechanisms linking or influencing local representatives’ accountability to citizens can be grouped into three types: upward, downward and horizontal. Each of these can in turn be categorised as formal or informal. When identifying these mechanisms it is important to include those that might not strictly be termed mechanisms of accountability, but are actions or activities that nevertheless require local government to consult and in some way include the voices of some or all citizens. In intention they aim to increase the responsiveness of the local governance institutions to citizens and to the socially excluded and marginalised in particular. Examples of ‘mechanisms of responsiveness’ would be the obligation to present publicly a budget for the forthcoming year or to permit members of the public to attend council meetings. These are not strictly speaking accountability mechanisms as they do not require an action beyond the requirement. However as their intention is to influence the way representatives behave and relate to the public they should be included in the mapping exercise. . Table 3 indicates how such accountability mechanisms could be categorized with examples that include requirements that seek to institutionalise responsiveness on the part of decentralized local governance institutions.

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Table 3: Mapping types of accountability mechanisms affecting local governance institutions Direction of accountability Type of accountability Formal

Upward

-

-

Informal

-

Review by the Ombudsman Auditing of accounts Civil service performance through incentives and sanctions including HFTP human rights and electoral commissions anti-corruption agencies requirement to present needs based plans requirement to facilitate PRSP and other policy planning processes training mandates Political party control Naming & blaming in the national media Monitoring from NGOs Campaigning NGOs

Downward

-

-

Horizontal

Participatory budgetary planning Public meetings (budgets and accounts) Recall Freedom of association and organisation Voter registration Formulation of needs based plan Re-election Nomination processes and criteria (affirmative actions) Training Information Legal aid schemes

-

Peer group pressure Local patron-client reciprocities Social group mobilisation Obligation to give information Obligation to give justification

-

-

-

-

Civil society with representation in LG Customary authorities with formal roles in conflict management & resolution, resource management etc. Coordinating mechanisms between sector departments Budgetary planning and allocation systems

-

-

Local media Local civil society Customary authorities with informal roles Peer group pressures

-

Study of local governance responsiveness Responsiveness goes beyond the requirement to listen, as it includes the capacity to listen (and comprehend) and the desire to listen. It is behavioural in its manifestation - both on the part of the duty bearer and the rights holder, but is structurally and institutionally driven in its nature. While the study outlined in 5.2.1 will capture requirements that aim to secure responsiveness through rules, guidelines and expected norms on the part of local governance institutions and their elected members and administrative officials, it will not capture the responsiveness as practised and experienced by these persons. To this end, a study of the perceptions and experiences of those at the interface of local governancecitizen relations will bring considerable explanatory value to the other findings in the country studies. It is proposed that focus group discussions be held with local representatives and with local government staff to explore their perceptions and experiences in meeting with and responding to the needs, problems and demands of local citizens. The focus group discussions, held separately for the two categories, would take up perceptions of their relationship to higher levels of government and administration; their experiences of administrative (formal) forms of accountability; their experiences of informal forms of accountability (political, social, customary etc.); the identification of problems with and

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obstacles for responsiveness faced in their work as elected and administrative officials. Two central issues to be pursued through these discussions are (i) the extent to which they have flexibility to adjust their actions to meet demands from below, i.e. their ‘room for manoeuvre’, and (ii) their perception of citizens as rights holders. The latter will need to explore social and cultural attitudes as well as perceptions based on more formal obligations. Study of citizens’ relations to local government and other institutions of local governance The third element of the local study is to capture the ways in which individuals and social groups within the locality experience the functioning of local governance institutions and thereby to explore their relationship to local government in particular. The approach will be to focus on areas of local government responsibility and to identify the ways and means through which individuals have sought to access advice, support, resources, etc. with respect to these. Possible areas upon which to focus could be conflict resolution, education, health, housing, water supply and sanitation, agricultural or veterinary services. They should reflect any previous selection made in the study, for example in the desk study. The study would focus upon experiences of access to local government officials (elected and administrative) and other representatives in decentralized local governance bodies, perceptions of local government’s accountability and responsiveness to needs, and the possibilities for recourse when experiencing problems and failures with respect to local government. The methodologies used would include structured focus group discussions supplemented by local sample-based surveys, time and resources permitting. Focal group discussions will be designed with mixed groups and/or separate groups made up by specific disadvantaged groups according to the topic addressed and the context.

RESEARCH OUTPUTS Country Studies Country studies will provide an improved knowledge basis as to the functioning of local government with possibilities for policy advice including ƒ measures that could make the present representation more accountable to citizens ƒ proposals for the introduction of other possible agents and agencies into these or similar accountability mechanisms and practices ƒ improved linkages between measures directed at accountability and measures aimed at increased responsiveness to citizens’ voices ƒ improved linkages to measures directed more generally at the electoral system, political parties’ roles and the use of affirmative actions to improve representation in local government Regional study The Regional study will be drafted by the international/regional partner in close collaboration with the regional and country offices, and local partners. This comparative analysis of the country studies will draw conclusions on a regional level as to the status of representation and of accountability mechanisms in decentralized local governance and local government bodies in particular, the trends and developments found to be present and the policy recommendations that can be drawn from these. The purpose will not be to identify a single set of best practices for promoting good governance centering on representative local government, but rather to focus on the nature of the processes behind the present status of representation in decentralized local governance (i.e. in relation to structural,

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institutional and citizen dimensions) and the ways in which accountability mechanisms have enhanced the representative nature of local government in the different country contexts. The aim is to identify good practices that have facilitated fairer and more responsive representation in different contexts and that can serve to inform future policy discussions in the individual countries. As with the country studies, one of the important purposes of the comparative analysis is to be able to be able to link measures directed at changing structural and institutional factors for more representative decentralized local governance to specific measures directed at securing the accountability of local government to its citizens. A ‘Policy Brief’ The Regional Study will provide the material for a short Policy Brief that can serve as an input to future policy discussions at a country level. A country and regional ‘data base’ The country studies/regional analysis will provide a bench mark study for subsequent work on local government accountability and responsiveness at the regional level. In addition it will provide an invaluable input into international research and policy debates on the ways in which decentralized governance can better promote poverty reduction including pro-poor economic growth and service delivery.

DISSEMINATION OF OUTPUTS The country studies will be presented at a country workshop for relevant stakeholders. This will be supported with a presentation of the regional study. The regional study will be presented at a regional workshop with key stakeholders. Subsequent dissemination could include a regional seminar at which related studies from inside and outside the region can be introduced. This could be structured around a set of core issues on local government and decentralized local governance emerging from the Regional Study. Wider dissemination would be through publications including articles published in international journals.

REFERENCES/BIBLIOGRAPHY A consolidated bibliography is included in the Background Paper on Local Democracy in Asia: Representation in Decentralized Governance (UNDP Regional Centre in Bangkok, June 2005)

ANNEX 1 - OUTLINE OF WORK TIME ALLOCATION AND TIME SCHEDULE

1

Activity

Time Schedule

Work allocation

Desk study of local governance representation and accountability mechanisms

Max. 15 workdays i.e. three weeks August, 2005

One Senior Researcher 15 days assuming - researcher is a competent researcher with several years of research experience and report writing - researcher is well versed in the field of decentralized local governance in the country - has ready access to legislation, rules, guidelines on local government and other documentation Report will be maximum 20 pages plus annexes

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2a Study of local institutions in decentralized governance and the accountability mechanisms utilised with respect to local government bodies

28 days , i.e. approximately 6 weeks of research Six weeks in September-October, 2005

TOTAL 15 Senior Researcher workdays Team of 2-3 researchers. 28 Senior Researcher workdays Per country - 2 days preparation - 4 days for drafting final report (14-18 pages plus annexes) Per district - district level (or equivalent) 3 workdays - 2 sub-district localities 4 workdays each Assumptions: - the senior researcher undertakes the ‘field work’ - that s/he a competent senior researcher with several years of research experience including field work and report writing - senior researcher is well versed in the field of decentralized local governance in the country and has a network of contacts to facilitate entry to district and local government institutions.

2b Study of local government ‘responsiveness’

TOTAL 28 Senior Researcher work days District and sub-district localities. Location of focus groups will depend upon the delegation of responsibilities in the areas of governance practise selected for the case studies

Work will be spread over 21 work days in total, sequenced to commence some 10 days after 2a has commenced in order to draw upon and follow It is envisaged that in each district there will be 2 up on the information FGDs with elected officials, 2 FGDs with generated in 2a. administrative officials and 2 FGDs with representatives from other local decentralized Five weeks in governance institutions in the district and/or local Mid-September – October level involved in the fields of governance e.g. local 2005 NGOs, local ‘traditional’ leaders, relevant local associations etc. FGDs will require both a Senior Researcher plus a research assistant for note taking and transcribing recordings

Per Country (2 district localities, 4 sub-district localities): - 5 senior researcher work days for general preparation of FGD materials, arranging meetings/Focus Groups etc. - Additional 4 senior researcher days for writing the summary report (12 -14 pages plus annexes for tables etc) Per FGD - 1 senior researcher day and one research assistant day for FGD (3 hours) and collating the

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findings Assumptions: - the senior researcher is a competent researcher with several years of research experience including work with FGDs and report writing. - the senior researcher is well versed in the field of decentralized local governance in the country

2c Study of citizens’ relations to local government and other institutions of local governance

Work will be spread over 16 work days in total, sequenced to commence some 20 days after 2a and has commenced and 10 days after 2b has commenced in order to draw upon and follow up on the information generated in 2a. and 2b Two + weeks in October 2005

3

A comparative analysis of the country studies covered in 1, 2a -2c

Approx four weeks in November.

TOTAL 21 Senior researcher workdays 12 Research assistant work days Maximum of 4 FGD per district (2 in each subdistrict locality) These will be based on male – female separate structured groups. Per Country (2 districts and 4 sub-district localities) - 4 senior researcher work days for preparation - 4 senior researcher work days for writing the summary report (12-14 pages plus annexes for tables etc.) Per FGD 1 senior researcher day and one research assistant day for FGD (3 hours) and collating the findings TOTAL 16 Senior Researcher workdays 4 Research assistant workdays 25 Senior researcher work days to analyse the country studies draft the comparative analysis and prepare a paper of max 25-30 pages. TOTAL 25 Senior Researcher work days

Notes: ƒ each report will contain an executive summary and conclusion addressing policy implications ƒ Senior researcher denotes a researcher with considerable experience in field working, a working knowledge of local government in the country, a knowledge of more general issues of decentralized local governance, and a strong track record in preparing research-based reports and other forms of publications ƒ It is possible that activities 2a – 2c can be undertaken by a group of researchers working in close collaboration with one another. This could reduce the number of total work days, but not significantly.

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ANNEX I: MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT Overall impressive economic growth and development The economic performance of the Maldives has been strong in recent years. Real GDP growth has been at a high average of 8 percent annually over the last three years driven mainly by tourism and fisheries. Within a longer time perspective the performance has been even more impressive with a 300% increase of per capita income and average real growth of GDP of 9% since the late 1970s55 During the two decades to 1997/98, life expectancy at birth increased by 16 years, reaching 62 years; infant mortality was halved to around 62 and the crude death rate fell from 38 to 5 per thousand; the net primary school enrollment rate increased from 38 to 93 percent of the age group, and the adult literacy rate reached 98 percent. Over the same period, the country has also experienced a significant fall in its very high population growth rate, which fell from over 3 percent per annum in the 1980s to 1.9 percent in the second half of the 1990s. Notwithstanding the economic and social progress achieved so far and the current per capita GDP of more than $2,40056, there is still substantial incidence of income poverty in the Maldives. The findings of a recent, comprehensive vulnerability and poverty assessment study indicate that the incidence of income poverty was over 40 percent of the entire population in the late 1990s. It was 50 percent in the outer atolls, where three quarters of the population live on 199 highly dispersed, small, and sparsely populated islands, some of which have less than 150 people. These unique geographic and population density features pose major structural challenges for the Maldives. Transportation costs are naturally high and constrain the mobility of people and goods; there is limited room to benefit from scale economies, which also hinder efforts aimed at creating employment and income opportunities in the outer atolls. As a result, the Government faces relatively higher unit costs in providing social and infrastructure services in the outer atolls. Some structural issues of public sector financing Although the overall economic performance has been impressive, then several concerns have been raised over the years regarding three inter-related issues of public sector financing: •

Not surprisingly, as in other small island economies with dispersed populations, public expenditures are sizable, averaging around 40 percent of GDP recently.

•

The high level of public expenditure is mainly explained by the very high level of public sector employment – it has been estimated that one out of every 13 Maldivians are employed in the public sector. Large parts of the civil service are furthermore considered mainly as political appointees. A civil service reform has for some years been called for57

•

The revenue base of the Government is rather narrow; mainly composed of import duties and levies on tourism industry with resort lease rents and dividends from state owned enterprises as major non- tax revenues. No income tax system is being applied in the Maldives. The revenue sources have been inadequate for some years and a budget deficit has been accumulated.

The recent impact of the Tsunami and hiked oil prices The Maldives was seriously affected by the Tsunami which, in addition to immediate human deaths and suffering, also has put a tremendous burden on government for reconstruction and substantially reduced the income from the tourism industry. It is estimated the budget shortfall for Maldives this year will be

55

For details see Public Expenditure Review 2002. IMF country report no 05/145 April 2005 – the figures quoted in this report are from 2003. 57 See e.g. PER 2002. 56

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about US$95 million, with a similar amount next year58. The situation is further worsened by the increase in fuel prices which has hit Maldives particularly hard as it entirely relies on imports and as it generally has a rather high level of energy consumption (fuel intensive transport, water desalinisation etc being particular features of the Maldivian fuel economy). In summary the government will over the next years be more constrained that earlier, which may prevent extensive investments in e.g. regionalisation or immediate further expansion of public sector employment.

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Government of Maldives and World Bank estimates – see http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20668908~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~th eSitePK:4607,00.html

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