Tourism Geographies Vol. 7, No. 2, 138–164, May 2005

State-Planned Tourism Destinations: The Case of Huatulco, Mexico LUDGER BRENNER Centro de Estudios de Geograf´ıa Humana, El Colegio de Michoac´an, M´exico

ABSTRACT Despite the intense debate on sustainable tourism, little attention has been paid to attempts by national authorities to mitigate the social impacts of mass tourism destinations in Third World countries. As the example of the state-planned resort of Huatulco on Mexico’s southern Pacific coast shows, negative experiences during the 1970s have, indeed, led to modifications in planning strategies and tools. On the basis of structured and semistructured interviews with tourism business owners and managers, government officials and other key informants, this paper analyses the measures that have been taken by the Mexican government and evaluates their results. It concludes that the problems typical of previous development projects, especially social segregation, burgeoning shantytowns and the formation of economic enclaves, could not be solved. Therefore, not even small-scale and technically well-planned luxury resorts can be considered as a means of initiating socially sustainable regional development, which suggests the need for a more radical re-orientation of tourism policy. KEY WORDS: Resort planning, social impact mitigation, Mexico

Introduction In the 1960s and 1970s, tourism promotion policies in developing countries focused primarily on providing infrastructural support for large-scale, enclave-like projects in order to meet the demand of an ever-wealthier international clientele that was anxious to spend its leisure time abroad. Development banks granted financial aid to foster investment of tourist consortia, especially hotel chains. Due to these conditions, numerous coastal resorts showed high growth rates and have come to constitute an important segment in the economy of many countries. However, tourism development was rarely based on planning designed to lead to controlled development. Rather, it caused a rapid urbanization of the major beach resorts that resulted in severe socio-economic and environmental problems (de Kadt 1979; Hall 1994; Burns and Holden 1995; Broman 1996; Gormsen 1997). In the early 1980s, authorities in Correspondence Address: Ludger Brenner, El Colegio de Michoac´an, Centro de Estudios de Geograf´ıa Humana, Hidalgo 95, Col. Centro, C.P. 59300 La Piedad, Michoac´an, M´exico. Tel./Fax: (+)352-52-26-798; Email: [email protected] C 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd ISSN 1461-6688 Print/1470-1340 Online /05/02/00138–27
DOI: 10.1080/14616680500072349

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some countries began to take measures to control urbanization processes (Gormsen 1995: 230–231). The results, however, have been limited as policy (ironically) continued promoting fast-growing beach destinations (Brenner and Aguilar 2002). Most countries will probably continue to foster large-scale development projects as mass tourism still promises the greatest and fastest benefits in economic terms. Therefore, it is important to ask if, and how, adequate planning can lead to more sustainable regional development. As Hunter (1997) points out, conventional tourism might even present a sounder way of making use of natural resources in developing countries, compared to other land uses such as agriculture or aquaculture. The Mexican case is ideal for analysing this question. By the beginning of the 1970s, four major luxury resorts had been developed with considerable governmental support. Today, all these destinations, especially Canc´un, are important international tourist resorts. Nevertheless, they soon began to show clear signs of social marginalization, the formation of enclaves, the development of shantytowns and environmental deterioration. In the case of Huatulco, the most recent large-scale tourism project on the southern Pacific coast (initiated in 1984), the authorities attempted to take a different approach. A modified planning strategy and tools were supposed to ensure development that was both socially sound and economically efficient. Though federal institutions took some measures to mitigate the impact of rapid tourism development on the local population (learning from the case of Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo) they turned out to be just isolated actions that lacked integrated planning. This article seeks to identify the factors that have led to this innovative approach and the precise strategy that was applied, before turning to an evaluation of its results. The paper is structured in four parts: after these introductory comments, section two briefly discusses the factors that have influenced tourism policy in developing countries during the past four decades. In section three, attention is given to the factors that have caused modifications to an otherwise consistent tourism policy in Mexico. Finally, the fourth section highlights the ambivalent impact of that policy on national and regional development. The case study of Huatulco reveals which planning strategy was applied and what measures were taken and also evaluates their outcomes. Tourism and Development: Looking Back at Four Decades of Controversial Debate The discussion on tourism as a factor in regional and national development has passed through three different stages in the course of the past 35 years (Vorlaufer 1996a). The first phase, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, was dominated by euphoria due to continuous economic growth and technological advances in the field of transport and communication. In line with the ideas of modernization theory, the rapidly growing demand for sun-and-sea tourism in the North was to trigger economic development in the South (de Kadt 1979; Hall 1994, ch. 5; Burns and Holden 1995, ch. 3; Broman 1996). Expectations, focused on both economic growth and the alleviation

140 L. Brenner of regional disparities (Broman 1996; Clancy 1999), assumed that: (a) direct foreign investment would solve the bottleneck-problem of scarce domestic capital; (b) foreign exchange earnings would help to reduce notorious balance-of-payment deficits; (c) employment generation would mitigate social inequalities; and (d) multiplier effects in peripheral areas would lessen regional disparities. The lack of infrastructure and domestic capital were considered obstacles to tourism-based economic growth (Vorlaufer 1996a: 171–200). In order to overcome these limitations, authorities provided infrastructure and other supportive measures to prompt international hotel chains to invest in projects that were otherwise too risky or expensive due to the inadequate nature of their infrastructure and their lack of ‘image’ as tourist destinations (Clancy 1999: 9–14). This strategy was applied from the 1970s onward in Mexico (Vorlaufer 1996b; Gormsen 1997), Indonesia (Vorlaufer 1996a), Sri Lanka (Vorlaufer 1979), Turkey (G¨oymen 2000) and other countries. During the second stage, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, the dependency paradigm gained ground and increased investments by transnational companies in Third World destinations were seen as a strategy by the North to take advantage of the natural and cultural resources of the South (Britton 1982; Hills and Lundgren 1977; Matthews 1977; Burns and Holden 1995, ch. 3). It was argued that: (a) leakages and repatriation of profits reduced the net benefits; (b) many tourist destinations depended exclusively on a few countries of origin and/or a handful of consortia; (c) due to low income and skill levels, as well as considerable seasonal fluctuations in its capacity to generate jobs, tourism’s potential benefits were overestimated; (d) the tourism sector was only barely integrated into regional and local economies; and (e) the spatial concentration of tourism activities caused severe environmental damage and social tensions. Despite criticisms supported by numerous case studies, most developing countries did not change their tourism policies (Vorlaufer 1996a: 175–184). This inertia can be explained by a continuous increase in tourist arrivals, foreign exchange earnings and employment generation (WTO 1997a, 1997b; Clancy 2001: 43). Moreover, due to national pride, international liabilities and institutional rigidity, abandoning largescale development projects often turned out to be politically inopportune. The third phase is linked closely to the burgeoning discourse on sustainable development after 1987. This change in paradigm was integrated quickly into tourism research and policy. Social and ecological dimensions were added to the, until then, economic approach to development (Becker et al. 1996; Job 1996; Hall and Lew 1998; Mowforth and Munt 1998: 105–115; Brenner 1999). In economic terms, the objective of sustainable tourism was to improve the living conditions of the local population and to prevent an exclusive dependence on tourism. In addition, forward and backward linkages with other economic sectors, such as the construction industry and agriculture, had to be strengthened. Social aims were focused on the material and political participation of the local population. Tourism-based growth may not lead to irreversible environmental deterioration or loss of biodiversity.

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The influence of the two preceding mainstream paradigms (i.e. modernization and dependency theory), is apparent in sustainable tourism: economic benefits must be balanced socially and should not have negative social and ecological impacts. This concept, however, faces serious challenges. First, it has proven difficult to identify indicators according to the objectives of sustainable development. Quantifiable as well as applicable indicators are necessary to evaluate the effects and monitor the development of tourism (Nelson 1993; McLaren 1994; Cater 1995a, 1995b; Archer 1996; Job 1996; Mowforth and Munt 1998; Brenner 1999). The challenge is to identify a pool of indicators that covers the complexity of all relevant factors, while at the same time allowing a fast and cost-effective data survey (Becker et al. 1996: 127). Despite these limitations, several methods have been developed, among which, carrying capacities, checklists and ‘certificates of environmental compatibility’ – which tourism enterprises can apply for on the basis of a set of indicators that measure the ecological impacts of tourist activities – are the most popular. Few of these have been applied on a large scale, due to the aforementioned methodological constraints and the heterogeneity of the stakeholders involved, which include private enterprises, public authorities, tourists and different members of the local community, among others (Goodall 1995; Becker et al. 1996: 100–128). Moreover, the highly variable natural and socio-economic conditions make a standardized set of indicators difficult to apply. A further core problem lies in the incompatibility of economic efficiency and local participation. As many case studies have indicated, tourism development based exclusively on local initiative is unlikely to lead to considerable economic growth (BMZ 1995; Lindberg et al. 1996; Wallace 1996; Sjoholt 1999; Strasdas 2000). Because the locals lack experience, capital and market access, the most profitable lines of business (marketing, distribution, transport) tend to be controlled by nonlocal entrepreneurs. Finally, the functional logic inherent in public administration impedes the implementation of sustainable tourism development (de Kadt 1992: 65–70; Nelson 1993: 9). Authorities devoted to promoting tourism development tend to defend their power realm rather persistently. In the past, this led to a sectorial focus of tourism politics that often concentrated on solving technical infrastructural problems (de Kadt 1992: 65–70). Therefore, tourism policy continues to focus mainly on large-scale projects, such as providing infrastructure support to the construction of luxury resorts. Mexican Tourism Policy Since the early 1970s, Mexican tourism policy has been characterized by a notable continuity in terms of institutions, instruments and strategy, whose pivotal goals were to increase foreign exchange earnings, generate employment and integrate peripheral coastal regions into the national economy (Brenner and Aguilar 2002: 509). Nevertheless, shifts in political and economic systems at the national and international

142 L. Brenner levels, the highly problematical development of important tourist destinations and the increasingly saturated market of sun-and-beach tourism led to a number of modifications. From 1974 until the debt crisis in 1982/83, tourism development was institutionalized at the highest governmental level, as institutions promoting tourism such as the National Tourism Fund (Spanish abbreviation: FONATUR) and the Ministry of Tourism (Spanish abbreviation: SECTUR) were established and most of the public investment in tourism infrastructure was made. The economic and political situation favoured an intensification of the, until then, marginal level of state intervention (Jim´enez 1992: 51–65): (a) reduced air fares made Mexico a relatively cheap destination for North American tourists; (b) the country’s enormous tourist potential had been tapped only to a minor extent; (c) tourism promotion was considered an instrument to reduce the notorious balance-of-payment deficit (J´ımenez 1992: 106–107); (d) international development and commercial banks began to grant loans for largescale tourism projects that held the promise of high revenues (Clancy 2001: 38); (e) the discovery of oil fields in the late 1970s allowed large-scale public investment; and, finally, (f) there was no reason to expect major political resistance against governmental intervention as the domestic tourism sector still lacked corporative organization (Clancy 2001: 58). In 1974, Mexico City-based FONATUR was founded (Jim´enez 1992: 126–130). FONATUR is responsible for constructing and maintaining infrastructure, granting loans, attracting investors and selling property, as well as various administrative duties (FONATUR 1999a). The authority enjoys extensive powers in declared development areas, including control of land use. One of its main tasks is to create socalled ‘State-Planned Tourism Destinations’ (SPTDs). Up to the present, FONATUR, with significant financial support from the Inter-American Development Bank, has managed to build five SPTDs in formerly undeveloped costal areas: Canc´un (begun in 1970), Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo (1972), Los Cabos (1974), Loreto (1975) and, finally, Huatulco (1984). In addition, FONATUR has invested considerable amounts in other destinations along the Mexican Pacific and Caribbean coasts, such as Acapulco, Puerto Vallarta, Manzanillo and Cozumel, as well as in Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey. Between 1974 and 1989, FONATUR subsidized the construction and renovation of more than 100,000 hotel rooms, equal to about a third of all the accommodation facilities that existed in 1989 (SECTUR 2002). Figure 1 shows the focus of public financial support on luxury-class hotels and accommodation facilities. According to the development pole theory, the dominate paradigm in tourism development policies since the 1970s (Aguilar et al. 1997: 258–259), the demand of the hotel industry for food, furniture, building materials and so on, forges forward and backward linkages at the local and regional levels. After the debt crisis in 1983, FONATUR gradually retreated from offering direct financial support, as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund began

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Figure 1. FONATUR-supported construction of accommodation facilities, 1974–1997 (number of rooms according to categories). Source: FONATUR (1999a).

to impose structural adjustment programmes to the nation. In addition, most stateowned enterprises were privatized (Jim´enez 1992: 239–246). None the less, the state continued to foster the destinations mentioned above, albeit with reduced financial means. However, in an attempt to decentralize tourist flows, the Mexican government began to focus on cultural tourism, due to: (a) rising competition, especially with countries in the Greater Caribbean area (Brenner and Aguilar 2002: 504–505); and (b) over-development in several tourist centres. Examples of this include the MundoMaya-project in the southeastern area of the country and the promotion of colonial cities in central Mexico (FONATUR 1999a). After 1995, noteworthy policy modifications in tourism development took place. Centralized state-interventionism continued, but the concept of sustainable and nature-based tourism gained a certain importance. For the first time, federal authorities addressed social, economic and ecological problems (see below). The goal of developing tourist destinations along the Pacific and Caribbean coasts had been completed ‘officially’ and their further evolution was to be accompanied by supportive measures only (SECTUR 2001). In this spirit, FONATUR initiated four new projects in the mid-1990s, in an attempt to decentralize national tourist development, set lower limits on carrying-capacity and promote nature-based tourism, especially in Natural Protected Areas: (a) a system of 20 marinas in the Gulf of California for yachting and deep-sea-fishing; (b) two tourism centres in the northern Mexican Copper Canyon,

144 L. Brenner to promote hiking, rafting and similar activities; (c) two projects close to the Mayan ruins of Palenque designed to foster cultural and adventure tourism in Mexico’s remaining tropical rainforests; and, finally, (d) the development of a 45 km stretch along the Caribbean coast, north of the border with Belize that offers a combination of sun and beach, culture and adventure tourism. There, building regulations that stipulate a maximum height of three storeys are supposed to ensure ecological sustainability (SECTUR 2001: 145–148). The Results of State-Sponsored Tourism Development The development of luxury tourism resorts in naturally-favoured locations proved to be an adequate strategy for integrating Mexico into the global tourism market. With 20.6 million international tourist arrivals in 2000 (c. 3.5% of international tourist arrivals world-wide), Mexico is ranked second only to China (31.2 million) among developing countries, and far ahead of Malaysia (10 million) and Thailand (9.6 million) (WTO 2001). Undoubtedly, this outstanding position is a result of governmental promotion. Between 1975 and 2000, the number of hotel rooms increased from 182,000 to 442,000 (Jim´enez 1992: 342–343), of which 40 percent are luxury class. Another reason for this extraordinary growth lies in the proximity to the USA, whose citizens account for about 80 percent of all international tourist arrivals in Mexico (SECTUR 1991; 2002). As a result, tourism nowadays is an important sector in the national economy. Between 1993 and 1998, tourism provided an average of 8.2 percent of the GDP and 6 percent of all national employment (INEGI 2000a). Up to the early 1970s, Mexico faced a bottleneck problem with respect to the accommodation facilities available to meet the demand of international tourists, as only Mexico City, Acapulco, Guadalajara, Mazatl´an, Monterrey and Veracruz provided a considerable number of four- and five-star hotels (Jim´enez 1992: 79). Today, in contrast, 57.6 percent of the 230,000 hotel rooms located in the 52 most important tourist destinations meet international standards (SECTUR 2002). However, luxury accommodation is concentrated in the SPTDs, some traditional resorts, such as Acapulco and Puerto Vallarta, and in the country’s three largest cities. In most other coastal resorts and the cultural (e.g. Oaxaca, Taxco, San Crist´obal de las Casas and Guanajuato) and recreational (e.g. Valle de Barvo, Ixtapan de la Sal and Cuautla) destinations, middleclass and basic accommodation predominate (SECTUR 2002). Figure 2 shows the outstanding importance of the SPTDs for incoming tourism, which together account for more than 50 percent of all overnight stays of international tourists (SECTUR 2002). About a third of all foreign exchange generated through tourism derives from activities in the SPTDs (FONATUR 1999a). In contrast, domestic tourism is less spatially concentrated (Figure 3). Another striking fact is the growth in the capacity of the SPTDs and in the number of arrivals, especially in Canc´un (Figure 4). In 2000, these coastal resorts offered 35,000 hotel rooms (6% of the national total), while in the same period they received

Figure 2. Overnight stays of international tourists in Mexican tourist destinations by category, 2000.

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Figure 3. Overnight stays of national tourists in Mexican tourist destinations by category, 2000.

146 L. Brenner

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Figure 4. Foreign tourist arrivals in SPTDs (in thousands), 1975–2000. Source: FONATUR (1999a), SECTUR (2002).

4.3 million international visitors, equal to 42 percent of all Mexican incoming tourism (SECTUR 2000). None of the other SPTDs has been able to expand and grow as fast as Canc´un, due to a combination of three factors: Canc´un was the first resort to be developed and received far more subsidies than any other coastal destination (Brenner and Aguilar 2002: 512); it is located close to the American market; and it offers tourist attractions both natural (the Caribbean Sea) and cultural (ruins of the Mayan culture). However, the spatial concentration of tourism activities and the subsequent population growth and rapid urbanization have led to a wide array of social and ecological problems. First, internal migration to these coastal resorts has resulted in accelerated population growth. Between 1970 and 1995 for instance, Canc´un experienced an annual population increase of 21 percent. Los Cabos (14%), Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo (12%) and Huatulco (12%) (Brenner and Aguilar 2002: 516) have also developed into medium-sized cities, though they lack adequate infrastructural facilities (Bravo 1994; Aguilar et al. 1997; Jim´enez 1998: 24–30). From the very start, shantytowns with no connection to water and sewage systems developed on the outskirts of these urban zones (Bravo 1994). Secondly, the local population receives only marginal benefits from tourism (Gormsen 1997; Brenner and Aguilar 2002). Communities previously based on subsistence agriculture and fishing have proven incapable of coping with the social and economic shifts initiated by tourist activities. A rapid increase in property values, real estate speculation, expropriations and evictions from their lands have forced local populations to give up their traditional activities (Vorlaufer 1996a, 1999; Pi-Sunger

148 L. Brenner 2001). Their lack of capital and of the necessary experience in tourism activities have forced former fishermen and farmers to work in informal activities in order to make a living (Arriaga 2000), while employers have made use of more experienced non-local workforces (Bravo 1994). Third, large-scale tourist development projects tend to form enclaves that are neither economically nor socially linked to their hinterland. Studies in Puerto Vallarta (M¨uller 1983), Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo (Bravo 1994; Brenner 1999), Canc´un (Aguilar et al. 1997) and Los Cabos (L´opez 2002) have detected very limited linkages of the tourism sector to other locally- and regionally-based businesses that cannot meet the demands of large chain hotels. Moreover, most tourism-related jobs are characterized by skill and income levels that are low, even by national standards (Bravo 1994: 160–180; Sernau 1994: 93– 105; Brenner 1999). During the off-season, employment can decrease by as much as 40 percent (Aguilar et al. 1997: 299). Although there are no official data, research has indicated a high proportion of informal employment that lacks job security (Arraiga 2000; Madsen Camacho 1996; Sernau 1994: 102–105). Finally, the impact of the uncontrolled construction of tourism facilities and urban settlements has led to severe environmental deterioration. In Acapulco and Canc´un, for instance, sewage water and intensive marine traffic continue to pollute ground and sea water (Gormsen 1995: 235–236). The expansion of settlement areas has led to the destruction of mangrove forests which has already altered the extremely fragile coastal ecosystems (Merino et al. 1993; Gormsen 1997). These problems have also had a negative effect on the competitiveness of Mexico’s major resorts, forcing FONATUR and local authorities to act. They developed land for settlements, initiated housing programmes and provided tap water, electricity and sewage systems in order to improve the living conditions of the migrants. In the early 1980s, the district of Renacimiento, located on the outskirts of Acapulco, was developed, where migrants could acquire house lots at a comparatively low price (Gormsen 1995: 231). However, observations by the author in the field have shown that the lack of building regulations has resulted in chaotic suburbanization. In 1970, FONATUR developed a settlement area in Canc´un that was located 10 km from the hotel zone. This area, with a size of only 67 ha (FONATUR 1979) and designed to house some 16,000 inhabitants, proved to be too small. Subsequent measures focused on providing piped water and electricity, as well as additional housing programmes in the rapidly growing shantytowns. Yet, recent research has shown that these problems remain unresolved (Jim´enez 1998: 23–27). Huatulco: Applying a New Planning Strategy Physical Geography and Socio-Economic Conditions The tourism development area (TDA) of Huatulco (21,000 ha) extends along a coastal stretch of 35 km on the Pacific coast of the state of Oaxaca (Figure 5). Its climate is

Figure 5. Huatulco tourist development area.

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150 L. Brenner subtropical, with a rainy season from June to October (FONATUR 1982). The panorama of the Sierra Madre, with elevations of up to 3,000 m, the dry tropical forest in the foothills and the rough coastal landscape alternating with sandy beaches make this area one of the most attractive tourist destinations in Mexico. The ten largest bays offer locations for hotels and club resorts, while the valleys behind the coastline allow for the construction of larger settlements. Up to the 1980s, this area was characterized by its peripheral location, low population density and high level of marginalization (FONATUR 1982; Orozco 1992). Prior to the construction of the coastal highway in 1982, the bays could only be accessed by boat or unpaved roads. In addition, until the 1940s, the TDA was almost uninhabited due to the incidence of tropical diseases. Driven by the increasing scarcity of arable land caused by population growth in the Sierra Madre del Sur, the first settlers arrived in the early 1950s. The largest settlements, Santa Cruz Huatulco and Coyula, were founded ten years later (Long 1992: 190). At the beginning of the construction phase of the tourism resort in 1984, locals numbered around 2,500 inhabitants, of which 735 lived in Santa Cruz Huatulco. The remaining population was spread out over several smaller settlements (FONATUR 1999b; Orozco 1992: 96). Their dwellings were built with locally available materials, such as wood, bamboo and palm leaves. The use of untreated drinking-water caused gastrointestinal diseases, while malaria and dengue fever were also common (Long 1992, 1993). The locals depended on subsistence agriculture and fishing. Small shops offered a limited range of daily necessities. The arrival of backpacker tourists in the mid-1970s initiated the construction of beach shacks and food stalls that provided a minimum of income. In 1982, a presidential decree led to the expropriation of 21,000 ha, which were conveyed to FONATUR. The indigenous and mestizo population had previously used these lands according to their ancient traditions. Plots of arable land were handed over to recognized members of the community (comuneros) for individual use, while the remaining land (beaches, forests, lagoons, etc.) was reserved for common use. Though FONATUR assured compensation payments to all 1,523 comuneros for the loss of their houses and properties, the process of expropriation and resettlement proved to be conflict-ridden (Orozco 1992; FONATUR 1998, 1999b). The main point of contention was the amount of compensation, which depended on the amount of individual holdings of each comunero. In 1987, after a long negotiation process, representatives of the comuneros and FONATUR came to an agreement and the local population was finally resettled in the new residential area La Crucesita, located 2 km further inland. So far, only half of the cases have been dealt with fully, as many comuneros are demanding additional compensation. In addition, most former farmers and fishermen found it difficult to cope with the new living environment in detached houses made of concrete, unsuitable for the tropical climate (Long 1993).

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The Development Process In October 1984, construction began on the beaches of Santa Cruz, Chahu´e and Tangolunda, which had been designated as sites for luxury tourism infrastructure projects (Figure 5). By December 1987, when the international airport was opened, the first phase of construction was completed. At the same time, the residential area La Crucesita was divided into lots for 15,000 new settlers. Colonial-style architecture inspired the town centre, where restaurants, souvenir shops, several middle-class hotels, the market and smaller retail shops are located. Moreover, FONATUR offered investors lots in a fully developed industrial park. By December 2001, only the bays at Santa Cruz, Chahu´e and Tangolunda as well as La Crucesita had been built-up. The other zones remained either undeveloped (San August´ın, Cacaluta and Chahacual) or unconstructed (Conejos) or were being ´ used by local people who had built beach shacks (Organo and Maguey) (Figure 5). It is important to mention that more than half of the original TDA (a total of 11,891 ha) was declared a National Park in 1998 (www.conanp.gob.mx [accessed 11 June 2003]), and has been administered since that date by the Mexico City-based National Commission of Natural Protected Areas (Spanish abbreviation: CONANP), a situation that constrains FONATUR’s manoeuvering room considerably, as strict landuse regulations (including a building ban on luxury tourism infrastructure) must be observed. After rather intensive construction activities from 1988 to 1993, accommodation capacity stagnated (SECTUR 2002) and the number of overnight stays lagged behind those in other SPTDs (Figure 4). In contrast to these destinations, Huatulco is dominated by national investment and domestic tourism. Only two international hotel chains (Club Med and Barcel´o) have established businesses there and more than three-quarters of all tourists who go to Huatulco are Mexicans. Moreover, the average occupation rate of 50 percent lags far behind other SPTDs (c. 70%) (SECTUR 2002). The initial expectations of creating a second Canc´un, with a capacity of 22,000 rooms and 300,000 inhabitants by the year 2018 (FONATUR 1982; Bosselman et al. 1999), turned out to be unrealistic. Unofficially, FONATUR is now striving to achieve a final capacity of 12,000 rooms (Jorge Arturo L´opez, FONATUR, Huatulco, interview with the author, 19 October 2000). Semi-structured interviews with four FONATUR officials, ten managers and owners of high-class tourism businesses and three heads of department of the municipal government of Santa Mar´ıa Huatulco suggest that the stagnating development is the result of several interrelated factors. Due to budget cutbacks after 1983, Huatulco has received less public investment than the other SPTDs (Brenner and Aguilar 2002: 512). Furthermore, the resort entered quite late into the global tourism market, so its lack of image as a destination meant that it never had a chance to compete with other, better-established national resorts. Widely ignored by the e´ lite of the state of Oaxaca, Huatulco never received major political support at the regional and local levels.

152 L. Brenner Finally, charter flight companies preferred to serve other, more popular destinations, and this has led to comparatively high-priced fares. Planning Strategy and its Results In order to avoid the development problems mentioned above, FONATUR strove to (a) foster the participation of the local population; (b) create and support economic linkages between the tourism sector and other branches of the regional economy; and (c) control urban development in physical and social terms (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 1984: 152–154; Orozco 1992; Convenio del 23 de Mayo de 1984). The uniqueness and novelty of this planning approach stem from its highly ambitious attempt to control simultaneously the processes of social, economic and urban development right from the start, instead of applying belated ‘corrective measures’, as was the case in Nuevo Vallarta (a luxury resort north of Puerto Vallarta) and in Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo, where FONTUR created new spaces for fishermen in a fruitless attempt to improve their living conditions (Orozco 1992). In order to evaluate the outcome of these programmes, a set of quantitative and qualitative survey methods was applied that included: (a) structured and standardized interviews with managers and owners of accommodation facilities (41 of the 42 existing enterprises were covered) and restaurants and beach-shacks (51 of the 92 existing enterprises were included by applying a random sample stratified by business type: luxury, mid-range and bottom-end restaurants, as well as beach-shacks) and tourist retail shops (75 of the 133 existing enterprises were contacted by applying a random sample stratified by two business types: shops with own premises and market-stalls); (b) semi-structured, intensive, in-depth interviews with four senior FONATUR officials in Huatulco and Mexico City, three heads of department of the municipality of Santa Mar´ıa Huatulco and two representatives of local non-governmental organizations; and (c) fieldwork-based observation. In addition, the research area was mapped in order to obtain a complete, up-to-date list of tourism businesses. Fieldwork was conducted during a 15-month period from October 2000 to December 2001, during which the author lived permanently in La Crucesita. Choosing different kinds of research methods proved to be an appropriate measure. As there was clarity at the outset concerning the data in the case of tourism-related enterprises, structured and standardized questionnaires turned out to be suitable. On the other hand, in-depth interviews with key informants required a flexible, semistructured approach since the kind and range of the available information was not known beforehand. Field-based observations and supplementary conversations with La Crucesita residents helped to cross-check the statements given by the interviewees. The Marginalization of the Local Population During the construction phase (1984–1987), a broadly-based educational programme was implemented. Though it had been designed by professional sociologists and was

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supposed to meet the specific needs of the local population (Long 1992, 1993; Orozco 1992; FONATUR 1998), locals were never consulted before or during the planning process. The aim of more than a hundred educational courses was to improve the literacy rate and to qualify local people for tourism-related jobs such as construction methods and commercial fisheries, so as to ensure local participation from the beginning of tourism development. Later, follow-up courses on jobs in hotels and catering businesses were offered. Apart from that, FONATUR provided facilities to operate beach shacks (run by the wives of former fishermen) and stalls located in two covered markets in order give the locals the opportunity to sell Oaxacan handicrafts (Patricia Orozco, FONATUR, Mexico City, interview with the author, 28 June 2002). Despite these measures, social marginalization could not be prevented. Local economic participation is limited to the less profitable beach shacks and retail sales with crafts and souvenirs sold at the FONATUR-provided stalls (Figure 6 and Table 1). In both cases, revenues are minimal because seasonal fluctuations are high and also because restaurant owners are obliged to purchase products at retail prices at the relatively expensive local food market as there are no food wholesalers in La Crucesita. As craft production within the coastal area is limited to carved coconuts, stall owners usually buy commercial souvenirs such as shirts, sombreros, pottery and other airport-art at relatively high prices from intermediaries based in Oaxaca City and

Figure 6. Restaurant ownership in Huatulco (excluding hotel restaurants). ‘High standard’ refers to those that are mainly air conditioned, with upper price-level dishes (main course >$US10); ‘medium standard’ to those mainly without air conditioning but with fans; midrange dishes (main course $US6–10); ‘simple’, mainly without fans; budget dishes (main course $US3–6). Source: Author’s data (2001).

154 L. Brenner Table 1. Ownership in tourist retail shops in Huatulco Owners Type of business

Number of businesses

Non-locals living outside Huatulco

Immigrants living in Huatulco

Locals living in Huatulco

44 31

0 2

16 21

28 8

75 133

2 —

37 —

36 —

Market stalls Shops with officially registered premises Sample size Huatulco total Source: Author’s data (2001).

Acapulco. Mid-level and luxury-class restaurants, as well as the souvenir shops that cater to international and well-off domestic tourists are owned and run almost exclusively by immigrants from outside of the region. The hotel sector is controlled by several national and two international hotel chains and, to a lesser extent, by wealthy immigrants (Figure 7). This applies especially to hotels in the luxury class (4 and 5 stars) that, together, make up 80 percent of the total capacity. Less than 20 percent of the total accommodation capacity is owned by middle-class immigrants or entrepreneurs based in Oaxaca City. Former fishermen and farmers possess only two percent of all hotel rooms. Asked about the reasons for the lack of local participation, the key informants interviewed emphasized the following factors: first, in less than 20 years, the region experienced a radical economic and demographic transformation with which the local

Figure 7. Hotel ownership in Bah´ıas de Huatulco. Source: Author’s data (2000).

State-Planned Tourism, Mexico

155

population was unable to cope. Within the TDA, only 8 percent of the population that had previously worked as farmers or fishermen continued to do so in the year 2000, while 73 percent of the population is now employed in the service sector (INEGI 2002). In the same period, the population increased from 2,500 (FONATUR 1999b) to 14,000 (INEGI 2002), which meant that immigrants quickly outnumbered locals. Secondly, due to financial cutbacks during the administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994), educational programmes were suspended after achieving only a minimal transfer of knowledge (Long 1993). Locals have never been able to compete with the better educated or sometimes more desperate immigrants and were therefore ´ forced to accept almost any salary to earn a living (Elder Ju´arez, FONATUR, Huatulco, interview with the author, 11 September 2001). Thirdly, apart from the beach shacks and souvenir stands, local people failed to start up businesses (FONATUR 1999b). With little or no previous experience and lacking capital, they were unable to take advantage of the opportunities that arose at least during the initial phase (Long 1992: 199), whereas immigrants were able to do so. Finally, compensation payments were spent quickly on goods which before had been unaffordable (e.g. automobiles, satellite TVs and video and audio equipment) (Patricia Orzoco, FONATUR, Mexico City, interview with the author, 28 June 2002). Limited Support for Regional Development In order to avoid the formation of enclaves, FONATUR expressed the intention to use ‘locally available raw materials and products as much as possible in order to raise the standard of living of the local population’ (Convenio del 23 de Mayo de 1984). Therefore, three fishery co-operatives received financial aid and the authorities promised financial support for the irrigation of agricultural land to meet the coming demand for fruits and vegetables (FONATUR 1999b). These measures, however, proved to be equally unsatisfactory, given the low level of economic development. Due to the lack of major construction firms in the state of Oaxaca (INEGI 2000b), FONATUR had to commission firms based in Mexico City and Puebla to construct the entire urban and tourist infrastructure (Jorge Arturo L´opez, FONATUR, Huatulco, interview with the author, 19 October 2000). Businesses from Oaxaca and Huatulco were contracted only in the case of smaller hotels (see Table 2). The demand for building materials had very little effect on the regional economy, as nearly all goods had to be delivered from Oaxaca or Mexico City. The only locally available raw material is sand, which is gathered in nearby riverbeds (H´ector Ibarra, freelance architect, Huatulco, interview with the author, 8 January 2002). The economy of the state of Oaxaca is highly dependent on primary sector activities. Therefore, FONATUR banked on stimulating linkages between the tourist sector and agriculture and fishing (Patricia Orzoco, FONATUR, Mexico City, interview with the author, 28 June 2002). Yet, as Table 3 shows, problems similar to those of other tourist destinations, such as Canc´un (Torres 2002, 2003), can be observed:

156 L. Brenner Table 2. Origin of construction companies in charge of building accommodation facilities in Huatulco (categories and percents of total capacity) Mexico Other Oaxaca Self Data City major cities City Huatulco construction unavailable 5-star hotels Number of hotels Number of rooms Share of total hotel capacity (%) 4-star hotels Number of hotels Number of rooms Share of total hotel capacity (%) 3-star hotels Number of hotels Number of rooms Share of total hotel capacity (%) 1- and 2-star hotels Number of hotels Number of rooms Share of total hotel capacity (%) Total Number of hotels Number of rooms Share of total hotel capacity (%)

7 1.469 62.3

1 27 1.1

3 228 9.7

3 136 5.8

3 75 3.2

5 79 3.4

15 1.776 75.4

1 13 0.6

1 112 4.8

2 20 0.8

3 53 2.2

1 18 0.8

2 17 0.7

6 53 2.2

2 28 1.2

2 29 1.2

5 181 7.7

2 17 0.7

9 128 5.4

5 61 2.6

6 194 8.2

Source: Author’s data (2000).

most of the food consumed in hotel restaurants of a higher standard is purchased directly from non-local sources; soft drinks and alcoholic beverages are supplied by large consortia with supply depots in Huatulco; and only perishables such as fish, crustaceans, poultry and eggs are bought at local markets (see Table 3). However, only fish are caught and delivered by local co-operatives, as nearly all other foodstuffs (perishable and non-perishable) available in Huatulco are delivered from other parts of the country. For this reason, the demand of the over 90 independently managed restaurants and food-stalls failed to have a positive impact upon regional agriculture. Considering these circumstances, it is doubtful whether the irrigation of only 500 ha of land as planned by FONATUR can actually increase agricultural production in a way that would satisfy the needs of tourists and the immigrant population alike. In fact, FONATUR is holding back the financial aid for the irrigation project because the comuneros have not come to an agreement on how to distribute properties (FONATUR 1999b).

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Table 3. Huatulco: volume of food products purchased according to place of origina (percents of supplied hotel capacities) Product Beef and pork Seafood Dairy products Poultry Vegetables Fruits Eggs Beer Wine and liquors Soft drinks

Mexico Other large Oaxaca Other cities in the City cities in Mexico City State of Oaxaca Huatulco 1.4 7.8 23.2 — — — — 46.2 —

43.9 — 28.6 — — — 6.5 — 13.4 —

23.2 — — — 82.3 82.3 20.7 — 5.8 —

— — 33.0 — — — — — — —

31.5 92.2 38.4 76.8 17.7 17.7 72.8 100.0 34.6 100.0

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0b 100.0 100.0b

Source: Author’s data (2000); other data. a Suppliers delivering at least 50 percent of each kind of product. b Consortia with supply depots in Huatulco.

Polarized Urban Development From 1984 to 1987, La Crucesita was divided into lots and supplied with infrastructure such as roads, electricity, water and sewage system in attempt by FONATUR to control the rapid population growth that was predicted for the region. Properties were sold to settlers at prices far below those asked for lots designated for commercial purposes (Jorge Arturo L´opez, FONATUR, Huatulco, interview with the author, 19 October 2000). At the same time, FONATUR began a housing programme in coordination with other authorities: about 70 percent of the 3,600 apartments in Huatulco have been built through this programme and can be purchased on favourable condi´ tions by employees entitled to the national social security system (Elder S´anchez, FONATUR, Huatulco, interview with the author, 11 September 2001). However, 65 percent of Huatulco’s population either does not have rights to social security or an income level low enough to apply for a loan (INEGI 2000b). Thus, many ´ apartments remain vacant or have been purchased as objects of speculation (Elder S´anchez, FONATUR, Huatulco, interview with the author, 11 September 2001). Private investors constructed inter alia three housing areas with more than 100 mid-price flats that together resulted in a comparatively large supply in the higher and middle price ranges. Still, there is a shortage of cheap housing for poorer immigrants, as FONATUR has imposed strict building regulations. High construction costs have also led to higher rents (Jorge Arturo L´opez, FONATUR, Huatulco, interview with the author, 19 October 2000). Thus, despite its relatively slow population growth, Huatulco is facing marginal urbanization. Social disparities are striking when one compares the upper- and middleclass dominated La Crucesita with the shantytowns outside the areas developed by

331 20.4 18,068 21.6

1,626 83,716

5.8 8.5

8.7

%

%

%

32

102

831 18

983

Total

2.0

6.2

14.5 1.6

9.7

%

48,070

3,201

53

97

349 57

556

Total

4.5

3.8

3.3

5.9

6.1 5.2

5.5

%

More than 5 LMW Data unavailable

5.1

17,380 20.8

216 13.3

519 31.4

2,270 39.6 240 21.8

3,245 32.1

Total

2–5 LMW

1,066,558 300,977 28.2 210,526 19.7 255,636 24.0 197,065 18.5 54,287

28,633 34.2

735 45.2

642 38.8

1,827 31.9 526 47.8

3,730 36.9

Total

1–2 LMW

4.7

12,472 14.9

259 15.9

193 11.7

335 93

880

Total

Below 1 LMW

3,962

6.1

101

1,654

7.1

118 2.1 166 15.1

716

%

5,730 1,100

10,110

Total

No income

Multiple of legal minimum wage. LMW, legal minimum wage, c. $US100 per month in 2000; TDA, tourist development area; La Crucesita, residential area for high-end workers and employees; Santa Mar´ıa Huatulco, headquarters of municipal administration, different social classes; settlements within the TDA, low-end workers and native population; settlements outside the TDA, low-end workers and native population. Source: INEGI (2002).

Santa Mar´ıa Huatulco (within TDA) La Crucesita Other settlements within the TDA Santa Mar´ıa Huatulco (outside TDA) Other settlements outside the TDA 15 municipalities in coastal area (total) State of Oaxaca (total)

Municipality

Employed population

Table 4. Huatulco and Oaxaca coast: income level of employed population, 2000

158 L. Brenner

State-Planned Tourism, Mexico

159

FONATUR. La Crucesita has come to be the living space for the better educated immigrants from the urban centres in Mexico, while migrants from the rural areas in the state of Oaxaca are forced to settle in shantytowns such as El Crucero, El Zapote and El Faisan, along the coastal highway between the airport and La Crucesita (Figure 5). Statistical data provide proof of this spatial and social segregation: in La Crucesita, the share of employed population with incomes below the legal minimum wage is far lower than in other villages and towns inside and outside the TDA. A striking fact is the high percentage of employees earning more than two minimum wages in La Crucesita (see Table 4). There are also noticeable differences with respect to the level of education: adults living in La Crucesita went to school for 7.9 years on average, compared to about only four years in other parts of the TDA (INEGI 2002). Moreover, the inequalities regarding access to basic infrastructure are significant. In La Crucesita, nearly all housing units are connected to running water and the sewage system, while percentages in other parts of the TDA are much lower (see Table 5). The obvious consequences of such disparities have taken the form of conflicts between the squatters and FONATUR. For example, shantytowns have recently been erected in areas designated for the construction of luxury holiday homes adjacent to La Crucesita (FONATUR 1998, 1999b). In an attempt to force FONATUR to make more concessions, squatters have organized protests that have sometimes ended violently. So far, authorities have refused to use force and have reacted by supplying drinking water and improving the roads in the ‘most rebellious’ settlements. However, Table 5. Huatulco and Oaxaca coast: housing infrastructure (2000)

Location Santa Mar´ıa Huatulco (within TDA) La Crucesita Other settlements within the TDA Santa Mar´ıa Huatulco (outside TDA) Other settlements outside the TDA 15 municipalities in coastal area (total) State of Oaxaca (total)

Housing units total

With piped water With sewage system With electricity Total

%

Total

%

Total

%

6,759

5,281

78.1

4,763

70.5

5,826 86.2

3,576 864

3,456 128

96.6 14.8

3,321 284

92.9 32.9

3,351 93.7 644 74.5

1,150

909

79.0

809

70.3

1,027 89.3

1,169

425

36.4

349

29.9

804 68.8

58,288

30,183

51.8

25,316

43.4

50,722 87.0

741,005

483,240

65.2

336,513

45.4

644,576 87.0

Share of total number of housing units. TDA, tourist development area; La Crucesita, residential area for high-end workers and employees; Santa Mar´ıa Huatulco, headquarters of municipal administration, different social classes; settlements within the TDA, low-end workers and native population; settlements outside the TDA, low-end workers and native population. Source: INEGI (2002).

160 L. Brenner FONATUR officials admit that a solution to these problems is unlikely to be found in the near future (Jorge Arturo L´opez, FONATUR, Huatulco, interview with the author, 19 October 2000). Conclusions Little attention has been paid to planning strategies designed to avoid or mitigate the negative social impacts of mass tourist destinations. In this context, Huatulco is a unique example as national authorities have taken a series of apparently well-planned measures to foster socially sound regional economic development. However, this attempt cannot be considered successful: First, sustainable economic development based on luxury tourism requires a minimum of regional-based capital, know-how and entrepreneurial initiative. Secondly, authorities expected the local population to be able to cope with the radical social and economic changes involved and to become integrated into tourist development within a short period of time. Thirdly, FONATUR strove to reason with local people about the long-term economic benefits, while all the time applying coercive measures and excluding them from the planning process. Moreover, the programme lacked steady financial support and monitoring which could have helped to develop adequate planning tools. Thus, the question arises as to which strategies and measures could enhance both local and regional participation and ensure viability in economic terms, in the face of the state’s diminishing capacity to act. First of all, it is essential to foster small-scale tourism development projects and to focus not only on technical and legal factors, but also on the interests and action-strategies of the stakeholders involved at the local, regional, national and international levels (local population, regional e´ lites, government institutions, tourism companies, tourists and others). In this regard, existing participant planning approaches which are aimed at ‘the locals’ (often considered a socially homogeneous group) have to be improved in terms of their economic, social and cultural feasibility and be flexible enough to allow adjustments during the process of tourism development. In addition, there is a need to both integrate the existing coastal resorts more deeply into regional economic production systems and to make the most of Mexico’s enormous natural and cultural potential. In this sense, sun and beach tourism has to be linked more resolutely with other emerging types of tourism, such as nature-based and cultural tourism, in order to take full commercial advantage of the country’s unique combination of fully-equipped, modern beach resorts, enormous biodiversity and extraordinary cultural heritage. While recognizing the severe problems of development at Canc´un, there is no doubt that today it is an important hub of the entire cultural and ecotourism industry in northern Central America, which has fostered economic development in at least some localities in the region. Therefore, other SPTD and traditional resorts such as Huatulco, Los Cabos or Puerto Vallarta could serve as a starting point for trips to their largely unknown but highly attractive hinterlands.

State-Planned Tourism, Mexico

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Notes on Contributor Ludger Brenner is a Professor at the Research Center in Human Geography at the Colegio de Michoac´an in La Piedad, Mexico. His current research interests include tourism and regional development and ecotourism in Mexico.

164 L. Brenner R´esum´e: Destinations touristiques planifi´ees par l’´etat: Le cas de Huatulco au Mexique Malgr´e un d´ebat intense sur le tourisme durable, on fait peu attention aux efforts qu’ont entrepris les autorit´es nationales pour r´eduire les impacts sociaux des destinations de tourisme de masse dans des pays du tiers monde. Ainsi que le d´emontre la station baln´eaire planifi´ee par l’´etat de Huatulco sur la cˆote Pacifique sud du Mexique, des exp´eriences n´egatives au cours des ann´ees 1970 ont effectivement entraˆın´e des modifications dans les strat´egies et les outils de planification. Les auteurs de cet article analysent, sur la base d’interviews structur´ees et semi structur´ees avec des propri´etaires et des gestionnaires d’entreprises de tourisme, des membres du gouvernement et autres informateurs cl´e, les mesures que le gouvernement du Mexique a prises et e´ valuent leurs r´esultats. Ils en concluent que les probl`emes tels que la s´egr´egation sociale, la naissance de taudis et la formation d’enclaves e´ conomiques, qui avaient afflig´e les projets de d´eveloppement ant´erieurs, ne pouvaient eˆ tre r´esolus. On ne peut donc pas consid´erer mˆeme les stations de luxe, de taille r´eduite et techniquement bien planifi´ees, comme un moyen de cr´eer un d´eveloppement r´egional socialement durable. Ceci sugg`ere la n´ecessit´e de r´eorienter la politique du tourisme de fa¸con plus radicale.

Mots-cl´es: Planification de destinations, r´eduction des impacts sociaux, Mexique

¨ Zusammenfassung: Offentlich geplante Tourismusziele: Die Fallstudie des mexikanischen Huatulco Trotz der intensiven Debatte uber ¨ nachhaltigen Tourismus wurde bislang den Versuchen der o¨ ffentlichen Hand, in Staaten der Dritten Welt die sozialen Auswirkungen des Massentourismus abzumildern, nur wenig Aufmerksamkeit zuteil. Wie das Beispiel des staatlich geplanten Resort Huatulco an der sudlichen ¨ Pazifikkuste ¨ von Mexiko zeigt, haben negative Erfahrungen in den 1970er Jahren durchaus zu Anpassungen in den Strategien und Mitteln der Planung gefuhrt. ¨ Auf der Grundlage von halb und ganz strukturierten Interviews mit Besitzern und Managern von Tourismusbetrieben, Regierungsbeamten und anderen Schlusselpersonen ¨ untersucht dieser Beitrag die von der mexikanischen Regierung ergriffenen Maßnahmen und beurteilt deren Ergebnisse. Der Beitrag kommt dabei zu dem Schluss, dass die fur ¨ die vorherige Entwicklung charakteristischen Probleme, insbesondere die soziale Segregation, wuchernde Slums und die Bildung wirtschaftlich bluhender ¨ Enklaven, nicht beseitigt werden konnten. Deshalb k¨onnen nicht einmal klein gehaltene und technisch gut geplante Luxusresorts als Mittel zum Anstoß einer sozial nachhaltigen Regionalplanung betrachtet werden. Dies legt nahe, dass es einer radikaleren Umstrukturierung der Tourismusplanung bedarf.

Stichw¨orter: Resortplanung, Milderung sozialer Auswirkungen, Mexiko