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SOCIAL CAPITAL: REDUCING OR INCREASING CORRUPTION OR BOTH? AN EMPIRICAL TEST

Professor RICHARD ROSE Centre for the Study of Public Policy University of Strathclyde Glasgow

POLITICAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE Sheffield 30 March 2015

This paper is part of a five-year British ESRC project ES/13482X/1 on the Global Experience of Corruption.

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CRITICAL DEFINITIONS NETWORKS. Relations between individuals with or without formal institutions (Coleman, 1990; North, 1990)

CAPITAL AS A RESOURCE e.g. physical, natural human capital l (Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000)

PUBLIC SERVICES delivered to individuals–with/without bribery (Rose & Peiffer, 2015).

SOCIAL CAPITAL: Distal: Networks of individuals not directly political e.g., choirs, bowling league (Putnam, 2000)

POLITICAL CAPITAL: Politically proximal. Networks involving political actors, e.g. knows councillor, party member

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EFFECTS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CAPITAL ON BRIBERY

* BENIGN Increases use of public service & reduces payment of bribes

*MALIGN. Increases payment of bribes

*BOTH. Increases contact with public services without increasing bribes function of using a service, not how a service is contacted)

(Bribery a

*SECONDARY: Other influences important, e.g. CONTEXT. Data here from 18 Afrobarometer countries, 24 Latin American countries and 28 postCommunist countries (Rose & Peiffer, 2015 Table 1.1, Appendix Table B)

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MEASURES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

Africa: 3 measures of networks: Voluntary 38%; Traditional 22%, Religious 40%.

Latin America: Voluntary associations: 65% belong

Post-Communist: Voluntary, religious, friends, relatives: 4 indicators

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MEASURES OF POLITICAL CAPITAL

Africa: Contact officials (34%); Has patron (18%); party ID (61%)

Latin Am: Contact with elected, public official: 29%

Post-Communist: Family member, Communist Party (19%)

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EFFECTS OF CAPITAL ON BRIBES APPEAR TO DIFFER

AFRICA Social capital: 2 measures significant MALIGN Political capital: 3 measures significant MALIGN

LATIN AMERICA Social capital: None significant NIL Political capital: None significant NIL

POST-COMMUNIST Social capital: None of 5 measures significant NIL Political capital: Communist Party membership MALIGN

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EFFECTS OF SOCIAL & POLITICAL CAPITAL ON CONTACT

Latin America: 24 LAPOP (2013) countries Social capital significant all 4 services: BENIGN Political capital significant for 3 services: BENIGN

Post-Communist countries (28 EBRD 2010 countries) Social capital: None of 5 significant NIL, not Malign Political: Communist Party membership significant

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CONTACT COMES BEFORE BRIBERY Afrobarometer has no adequate measure of contact

Latin America: two-stage Heckman analysis first accounts for contact: *Social & political capital significant benign effect on contact; nil effect bribe

Post-Comm: Contact not influenced by social, political capital *Politics important–and malign: Legacy of CP networks *Context important: Post-Soviet pay more bribes than new EU or old citizens

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IMPLICATIONS

*Theoretical need to distinguish between a) Politically distal network (social capital) b) Proximal (political)

*Control for contact

*Control for context too: Moscow not Malmo

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CITATIONS Coleman, James S., 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail, eds., 2000. Social Capital: A Multi-faceted Perspective. Washington, DC: The World Bank. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 2011. Life in Transition. London: EBRD. Karklins, Rasma, 2005. The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Post-Communist Societies. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Ledeneva, A. 1998. Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange. New York: Cambridge University Press. North, Douglass, 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Perfromance. New York: Cambridge University Press. Putnam, Robert D., 1993. Making Democracy Work, with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Putnam, Robert D., 2000. Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster Rose, Richard, 2000. “Getting Things Done in an Antimodern Society”. In Dasgupta and Serageldin, eds., q.v., 147-171. Rose, Richard and Peiffer, Caryn, 2014. Why Do Some Africans Pay Bribes While Other Africans Don’t? www.afrobarometer.org: Working Paper No. 148. Rose, Richard and Peiffer, Caryn, 2015. Paying Bribes for Public Services: A Global Guide to Grass-Roots Corruption. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.