SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Conference Report – 28 / 29 November 2007 Stefan Liebig 21 January – 2008

21 J anuar y 2008 Stefan Liebig

Table of contents Table of contents .................................................................................................................................................... 2 List of Abbreviations.............................................................................................................................................. 3 Introduction............................................................................................................................................................. 4 The context.............................................................................................................................................................. 4 The security and development nexus .............................................................................................................. 4 The concept of SSR ........................................................................................................................................... 6 Context............................................................................................................................................................ 6 Local ownership............................................................................................................................................. 6 Policy Coordination and Coherence........................................................................................................... 7 Definition of ODA........................................................................................................................................ 7 SSR in practice......................................................................................................................................................... 7 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).................................................................................................. 7 Armed forces (FARDC) ............................................................................................................................... 8 Status of SSR process ............................................................................................................................... 8 Assessment................................................................................................................................................. 9 At the level of the international community................................................................................................. 9 At the level of the Congolese government................................................................................................... 10 Additional challenges............................................................................................................................... 10 Police ............................................................................................................................................................. 10 South Sudan ...................................................................................................................................................... 11 The need for ‘operational effectiveness’.............................................................................................. 12 What goes wrong?................................................................................................................................... 12 Key challenges in South Sudan ............................................................................................................. 13 Policy recommendations...................................................................................................................................... 15 Mission Statement ................................................................................................................................................ 16 Associated Members ............................................................................................................................................ 16

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List of Abbreviations AU

African Union

CONADER

Commission Nationale de la Demobilisation et Reinsertion

CPA

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DAC

Development Assistance Committee

DDR

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

DRC

Democratic Republic of Congo

EU

European Union

FARDC

Forces Armées de la République Démocratiquer du Congo

MONUC

UN Mission in the DRC

ODA

Official Development Assistance

OECD

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PNC

Police Nationale Congolaise / Congolese National Police

SPLA

Sudan People’s Liberation Army

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

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Introduction

The context

On 27-28 November the ‘Observatoire de l’Afrique’ held its first seminar on Security Sector Reform (SSR) with the objective to stimulate debate on a subject of pivotal importance to any peace-building activities. During the two days, about 60 participants discussed the security and development nexus and the concept of SSR which was followed by two case studies on the DRC and South Sudan. The seminar concluded with policy recommendations for stakeholders involved in SSR.

The security and development nexus

The main message of the seminar is that the generic approach to SSR has to be scrutinized given the particular nature of the specific country situation and that SSR needs to be constructed based on the reality on the ground rather than on theoretical concepts. A wide gap exists between SSR theory and the facts on the ground. In those situations where there is an immediate need for security, governance issues, although important, are placed too high on the SSR agenda to the detriment of establishing operationally effective security forces. In addition, supposed groups such as civil society are often very weak, especially in post-conflict situations and the need for local ownership is inhibited by a lack of understanding of the highly sophisticated SSR concepts.

Much of the debate on SSR, as a key component of peace-building activities centres on the current discussion on the inextricable link between security and development. In recent years, the discussion about the connection of development and security has become ubiquitous. The outbreak of conflicts in Africa after the end of the Cold War has initially led to the nexus but experienced a real boost after 9/11. However, the link between development and security is far from being clear and to some extent polemic. Various interpretations exist, and approaches taken by the development and security communities differ which makes the exact nature of the link highly -controversial. While, in theory, some argue that synergies between development and security exist and that the two should ideally go hand in hand, problems in putting the concept into practice persist. In this light, several questions can be asked. Why does the development and security nexus not translate into practice? How do they relate to each other? Should we reconcile development and security? What can the development community bring to security? What are the advantages of promoting security? One of the key arguments put forward during the first panel was that it might be worthwhile to keep development and security distinct, while at the same time ensuring that development assistance would become more security sensitive and security would become more development sensitive. In fact, efforts to separate the two have been long and arduous. After World War II, development assistance was very much seen in

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security terms. It was not until the late 1960s that the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD was created which established a clear definition on what constitutes ODA in an effort to move away from tied and military aid. In recent years, however, development assistance has moved away from its core objective, which is the promotion of development and the alleviation of poverty. Instead, an increase in humanitarian aid and debt relief is witnessed. Geopolitical considerations have also reappeared as is clear in the significant increase in aid to Afghanistan and Iraq. More and more, ODA is justified in security terms. If, however, we do not resist a slide towards justifying ODA in security terms, there is a real risk of subsuming the development agenda to the politics of a hegemonic power. Nevertheless, the more we understand that development is about ‘state making’ the more we need to recognize the importance of development assistance becoming conflict sensitive. As was pointed out during the presentations, development donors are increasingly using a toolbox consisting of conflict analysis and country strategy papers. While trying to find more flexible mechanisms for long term approaches, development donors also put an emphasis on short term crisis management. Yet, more effort is needed to address the particular situation on the ground. Firstly, in trying to have better macro-economic management that is conflict sensitive, the development community should reconsider fiscal discipline. For instance, the failure to pay salaries to soldiers can have dire consequences for stability. Equally, budget cuts can hit people of the region indifferently which causes ‘horizontal inequalities’ that are conflict provoking. Secondly, the development community must recast its thinking about issues of governance. A tendency to focus on competitive elections tends to neglect the fact these may not always be an adequate answer for dealing with the

challenges of development and stability. In addition, campaigning against corruption can make effective state-building very difficult since it doesn’t guarantee the buy-in of elites without whom effective ‘state-making’ is difficult. At the same time, the security community needs to focus on the core of SSR which is the reestablishment of the “nuts and bolts” of the different security actors while being development sensitive. Specific attention needs to be paid to recruitment by region or ethnicity, the effects of DDR implementation, especially the ‘Reintegration’ aspect when there is no economic development. In trying to explain the problems of bridging the security and development divide in practice several arguments were put forward. Firstly, cultural differences persist in the institutions involved. Secondly, discrepancies in mandate exist in that the development community focuses on the long term while the security community tends to focus on short term security. Finally, there are tensions between development goals and foreign policy. In overcoming the institutional divide, the various institutions involved need to engage with each other more often and cooperate at an early stage. Moreover, a lack of common vision and understanding exists among different donors which often leads to competition on the ground and defies the principle of “do no harm”. Coherence and coordination remain key weaknesses of the international community in dealing with fragile situations. The cultural divide between the development community and the military was seen as one of the main challenges. The development community, in particular, fears that the military will subvert budgets. As the key questions of SSR relate to questions of defence, police, intelligence and justice it can

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be questioned to what extent the development community can contribute meaningful to SSR.

The concept of SSR The second panel focused on the challenges for implementation of SSR. These derive from the fact that the concept of SSR is both mature in theory and contested in practice. It is mature because there is an emerging consensus towards a holistic approach, moving from state centred security to the broader concept of human security. The relation between SSR and DDR in post-conflict situations is also widely recognized. However, the concept of SSR is contested in terms of its operationalisation and a vastly different understanding exists among donors. In this light, some challenges for implementation such as the need to consider the context, local ownership, coordination, cultural differences and the definition of ODA were discussed:

Local ownership It is widely acknowledged that local ownership is central to any successful SSR. Firstly, it is central because it is needed for sustainability and secondly, because it raises the acceptance of the SSR process. In much of the developing world SSR is seen as a “Trojan horse” planted into their countries by the donor community. If local ownership is not ensured, SSR is likely to be regarded as an imposition from external actors. Therefore, it is fundamental that donors grasp the idea of “donors don’t do SSR, donors support SSR”. However, there are particular challenges to local ownership which were raised during the discussion: •

Donors will sometimes hesitate to incorporate local ownership when there is an immediate need for a functioning security structure on the ground.

•

Local ownership requires donors to have a firm understanding of what is happening on the ground in order to identify the “right” locals. This would also mean that donors need to empower those institutions already on the ground.

•

While local ownership is necessary, many African countries lack the technical capacity needed.

•

Ensuring local ownership does not only require the political will of donors to allow it but also requires the political will in the country to implement SSR.

•

What do you do if you ask locals what they think and you do not like the answer?

Context When implementing SSR it is of paramount importance to consider the context of each specific case. Since each context is highly specific it requires SSR programmes to be tailored accordingly. Both the national and the regional context have to be analysed. In many cases, borders have become meaningless which causes specific challenges. DDR, for instance, is unlikely to be efficient if the constant flow of weapons into the conflict area is not curbed. Hence, if SSR does not look with great depth into the context of each specific case there is a great risk of creating parallel universes where policies are informed by theories that are not grounded in the framing conditions on the ground.

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Policy Coordination and Coherence Due to the different understanding of donors of SSR and sometimes contrary activities on the ground, cooperation among donors proves difficult. Donors need to set priorities and ensure a division of labour. For instance, if multiple donors with different priorities and models are engaged in the training of the police in a noncoordinated manner, police reform is doomed to fail. In addition, donors need to make use of existing regional organisations which have an important role to play and could improve the efficiency of SSR related programmes, for instance in the area of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Definition of ODA A final challenge to the implementation of SSR relates to the definition of ODA by the OECD/DAC. A number of SSR programmes do not fit within the ODA definition. Reforms are vital but they have to be conducted outside of ODA funding, i.e. the ODA criteria must be respected. There is a fear within the development community on the securitization of development (as is reflected in the discussion on the security/development nexus), thereby endangering development objectives, such as the Millennium Development Goals. Hence, there is a need to think imaginatively on how to find additional funding for vital reforms. As one participant put it, “there is no sense to do demobilisation and reintegration if we don’t do disarmament which is not eligible for ODA”.

SSR in practice “If the theory and facts do not fit together, do we change the theory or try to ignore the facts?” After having looked at some of the theories underpinning SSR, the second part of the seminar focused on two case studies: the DRC and South Sudan. Both case studies enable us to critically examine the concept of SSR.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) As was highlighted during the first session, it is fundamental to consider the context in which SSR has to take place. In the case of the DRC, three important factors influenced the context in which SSR had to be implemented: 1. Following a decade of conflict the DRC was a state in total ruins. Rather than talking about ‘reform’ a complete reconstruction of the security forces, in conjunction with state reconstruction was necessary. 2. Pervasive corruption exists throughout the country. While, as argued before, corruption reflects a social phenomenon in many African countries, it affects all sectors throughout the country and thus greatly inhibits any reform of the security sector. 3. The position of the DRC in Central Africa. Due to its history, size, geography, resources, potential and its recent events many countries and potential partners have their own political objectives as well as strategic and economic interests. It is an essential factor that has to be taken into account especially with regard to the coordination of SSR activities.

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The embryonic approach to SSR in the DRC that has been conducted between 2003 and the elections has in fact been limited. It focused mainly on army and police reform, in preparation of the 2006 elections. Some attention was given to the justice sector but it was never really included into SSR. Armed forces (FARDC) If SSR in the DRC is judged on the basis of the reform of the army, it was argued that it had to be considered as unsuccessful up to today. The national army is not capable to defend the country nor is it capable of keeping the peace in the Eastern Provinces. In addition, the FARDC are widely considered as a menace to the population and an additional factor of instability, especially in the East, where it is massively deployed. Status of SSR process When looking at the SSR process in the DRC it is interesting to consider the key challenges that were identified in January 2003: •

• • • •

The definition of a national strategic plan determining the role, structure and size of the defence forces; Regularly payment of salaries; Screening and rationalising of personnel; Adequate reintegration programmes; Closing the resource gap (equipment, communication and infrastructure).

In December 2003, the Congolese government assisted by Belgium conducted a workshop on SSR which was the first SSR effort in Congo and focused specifically on the reform of the defence force. It was decided to put in place 19 territorial brigades, a Rapid Reaction Force with the size of two to three brigades and main

defence forces of two to three divisions. The principal idea was to have the structures in place in 2005 in order to protect the elections. However, until today this process has not been completed Throughout the SSR process the international community supported the DRC in many ways. One of the programmes focused on the payment of salaries to soldiers. Yet, it was not successful as the exact number of soldiers remained unknown (problem of ghost soldiers) and a considerable part of the payment did not reach the troops. It was not until the EU set up EUSEC that small salaries started to be paid to soldiers. A second effort supported by the international community was the brassage process. That regulated the entry of the former combatants in the armed forces, ensuring for a certain mix between the different armed groups. In September 2007, the international contact group responded positively to a request of the DRC government to establish five commissions to support the FADRC in their SSR efforts. Unfortunately, the DRC government has not yet responded favourably and a coordination meeting with the contact group, initially scheduled for 15 October has been postponed to 2008. This is a demonstration of the current challenges to coordinate SSR efforts with the DRC government. The government is clearly pursuing an approach based on bilateral exchanges rather than on well developed coordination between the different players and the DRC government. With regard to the training of soldiers, the Congolese Minister of Defence stated that 44.000 soldiers have been trained. However, the training these soldiers received in the brassage was little more than a “six weeks team-building

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exercise”. While there was bilateral follow-up training of these forces, none of the brigades have been properly retrained. In addition, over a 100.000 troops are still not in the brassage process.

approach and to support the integrated brigades through funding on a tactical level.

Both the government of the DRC in the socalled ‘governance compact’ and the Congolese Ministry of Defence in its “vision” have spelt out the priorities in relation to SSR. Some of the priorities for the armed forces listed in the governance compact included the establishment of a chain of payment of salaries, support to the creation of integrated brigades, and the drafting of a white paper. So, while the government of the DRC and the FARDC have spelled out clearly what they want to achieve, little progress has been made so far. The drafting of a white paper, for instance, which was decided in 2003, has still not materialized.

Assessing SSR in the DRC with regard to the army, several issues were brought up. What has become clear during the session is that the responsibility for the problems and to some extent the failure of SSR in the DRC is shared between the international community and the government of the DRC. The following problems were highlighted:

Assessment

At the level of the international community •

Lack of coordination and coherence between donor countries Until today, the various multilateral and bilateral programmes that exist are not coordinated which enables the Congolese government to play different donors against each other. However, coordination is crucial if SSR is to be successful. It was also pointed out that it is essential for international stakeholders to clearly define tasks in order to ensure better coordination. In addition, the problem of coordination does not only reflect a lack of appropriate mechanisms but seems to reflect political differences within the donor community. In addition, the lack of coherence is damaging the credibility of the international community visà-vis national partners. For instance, some donors involved in army reform conclude that salaries have to be augmented while the IFIs absolutely refuse an increase of the defence budget.

•

Lack of engagement From the outset of the SSR process, the international community focused almost exclusively on the immediate securitisation of the elections and demonstrated neglect for

One of the main reasons that the process in the DRC has not yet been completed is due to political constraints: •

Some units such as the Garde Républicaine have not yet entered the brassage process, while some armed groups continue to pose a security risk, such as the Nkunda group and Mayi-Mayi militias.

•

The MDRP funding of $200 million to ongoing projects activities is not sufficient for demobilisation of all troops.

•

The Congolese government body CONADER (Commission Nationale de la Demobilization et Reinsertion), which coordinates the disarmament process, has closed down but the government of the DRC has not yet provided a new structure that is acceptable to the World Bank, for the follow-up mission.

In the meantime, to deal with the stalemate, UNDP and MONUC have developed a plan to consolidate brassage, to give advice to the Congolese authorities through a conceptual

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long term solutions. After the transition period, however, there is an absolute need for continued engagement. The biggest threat to SSR in the DRC today is the non-completion of the DDR process. The lack of a concerted international position has in fact allowed the Congolese authorities to implement flawed policies such as the idea of mixage that failed and resulted in massive human rights violations and mass displacements. Engagement is also vital in the form of continued funding.

•

Additional challenges •

There is an absolute need for a solution to the ongoing crisis in the Eastern part of Congo as the ongoing conflict prevents the implementation of SSR programmes.

•

The risk of regional instability can have negative consequences on SSR: the ongoing FDLR issue has an impact on relations between the DRC and Rwanda and the presence of the LRA affects the relations with Uganda.

•

As mentioned above, corruption in the DRC is pervasive. Nevertheless, it was remarked that no one was vetted during the mixage process and that decisions on vetting processes were desperately needed. This is important since donors are reluctant to continue funding when corruption issues persist but in return, it also requires donors to deal with corruption issues.

At the level of the Congolese government •

•

Lack of capacity and technical knowledge While it is common knowledge that local ownership is needed for any successful SSR programme it is conditioned by the capacity and technical knowledge on the ground. People in the DRC are still long away in understanding the concept of SSR and the lack of technical knowledge has for instance limited the capabilities of CONADER. Lack of political will In addition, local ownership is also conditioned by the amount of political will. In the case of the DRC, the national authorities show little commitment. The lack of political will was particularly apparent during the transition period where the transitional government lacked any vision for the long term. This leads to a very slow-decision making process with regard to vital reforms that might take months if not years. While it was decided to develop a white paper on defence in 2003, no progress has been made as of today. As one participant noted, “the Congolese are a bit absent, as if it did not interest them. You never find someone responsible”.

Conflicting loyalties between military personnel During the Transition, but also since, it is clear that parallel structures are maintained within the armed forces, hampering both operational effectiveness as well as attempts for reform.

Police Police reform in the DRC was launched one and a half years ago with the establishment of a reflection group under the authority of the Congolese Ministry of Interior that consisted of partners of the national police, MONUC, France, Angola, the UK, EU, and South Africa. The mandate of the group was to establish the state of play, to propose recommendations for the reorganisation of the police force, to draft

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an organic law and to establish a coordination plan for bilateral cooperation programmes. The reflection group established a process of broad consultation with many different stakeholders including civil society in order to guarantee the broadest buy-in possible. It also paved the way for the establishment of the forthcoming follow-up committee on the reform of the police. This committee will be an interministerial organ with the aim to conceptualise the reform agenda and to coordinate the envisaged actions in this framework. The list of actions could then be presented to the donor community for financing. On the practical level, however, the reform of the police poses a number of challenges. •

•

After the peace agreement and during the transition period, the Congolese authorities have looked for partners to be engaged in police reform on a bilateral basis. The large amount of different bilateral and multilateral partners poses a real challenge because they all bring a different understanding, different systems and different models to the reform process. If good coordination cannot be achieved, the differences among the international stakeholders will constitute a big handicap in putting a coherent and standardised national police force in place. In fact, wild bilateral coordination has already led to situations where different units have been trained differently by different bilateral partner with the result that they had different equipment and were not able to communicate. As police reform hurts some vested private and national interests, there is a real need for strong political will. Unfortunately, as mentioned already with regard to the army,

political will at the highest level is seemingly lacking. •

Given the lack of clear delineation of competences, reform could also be endangered by a conflict of competences within the government.

•

Police reform must be framed within a holistic approach to SSR that incorporates the reform of the army and the police. However, implementation of any coordination between the various reforms proves difficult as everyone is keeping his own prerogatives. Police reform, for instance cannot be successful if the justice sector does not work.

•

Finally, the initiative for reform must be given to the Congolese with assistance form the donor community. Local ownership must be ensured but is sometimes made impossible by the financial rigidity of donors and the conditionality of their support.

In summary, it is a utopia to have reform in the short to medium term. The agenda of reform can only be implemented in the long term but it requires real political will from national and local stakeholders as well as continued engagement form the international community. The final objective of police reform in the DRC is to change the structure that was protecting the state into a structure that defends the rule of law.

South Sudan Comparing theory with practice, the case of South Sudan offers valuable insights for SSR. There was widespread agreement that, in the case of South Sudan, an absolute need for security exists, not at least because it is the absence of security which has brought about the absence of development. As a result, the Page 11 – SSR Report

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key challenge in South Sudan is to create an effective security structure first. If peace is to be maintained in South Sudan it requires strong engagement and commitment of the international community as well as the permanent presence of effective armed forces. Without these two conditions the possibility of unravelling the peace becomes very high. This is particularly important with regard to the current fragility of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the upcoming referendum in 2011. The need for ‘operational effectiveness’ South Sudan, like any other post-conflict situation, provides a favourable but challenging environment for SSR programmes because it demands a complete overhaul of the security structure to reflect new political arrangements and power relationships. To be successful, SSR must consider: •

the need for operational effectiveness

• the need for improved governance While both objectives are not identical they need to be developed at the same time. The need for improved governance creates a conducive environment for increasing operational effectiveness of the security structure because it lends legitimacy to the whole process. Secondly, it is important because it brings unity of purpose and unity of command to the army through a clear vision that reaches the lowest level of command. Such a vision could be developed in the form of (national) security and defence policies and military strategies. However, good governance does not automatically translate into operational effectiveness. It only creates the basis by lending legitimacy and by establishing a unity of purpose and command. An effective army is more likely to be well-governed and to adhere to good governance standards.

What goes wrong? Until now, SSR in post conflict situations appears to be mainly donor driven and does not take into account the most important elements on the ground that need to be incorporated into SSR programmes. In addition, it has also become an agenda of civil society to the detriment of the main actor in the security sector, i.e. the state. The principal focus tends to be on downsizing the army, accountability, transparency and budget cuts rather than operational effectiveness. In return, this creates mistrust and a lack of confidence from state structures where SSR is seen as a foreign agenda supported by civil society that aims at “taming” security structures to make them “acceptable”. As was pointed out during the seminar there appears to be a strong willingness on part of the international community to support the governance side of SSR but no willingness to make the Sudan’s People Liberation Army (SPLA) an effective fighting force on the ground. If SSR programmes are to succeed, however, a rebalancing in favour of an effectively and properly functioning security structure on the ground has to take place. The role and importance of civil society in SSR sparked some discussion among the participants. Central was the question whether civil society is actually worth involving. While it was noted that there are some examples of African countries (notably Ghana and the Republic of South Africa, where civil society has played an important role) attention was drawn to the fact that civil society does not exist in South Sudan and in many other African countries. Subsequently, there is a real danger of trying to create civil society in order to distribute funds. Two problems with this approach were highlighted. Firstly, in trying to establish civil society we risk creating a quasi-

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colonial cast that thinks and talks in a donor oriented way. Secondly, by strengthening civil society we risk taking away capacity from the government. At the end of the day, however, it is the task of the government to protect its people. If civil society is to be engaged, it has to be on the basis of full knowledge and understanding. It shall not be involved in situations where their knowledge is limited simply for the purpose of getting money from donors and without taking the realities on the ground into account.

developments towards integrating those forces animosities persist. In addition to being organised along ethnic lines, the SPLA was not organised in form of organic fighting units nor was it maintained at strength permanently. Thus, the challenge of creating a conventional army against this historical and cultural background is immense. •

Due to the existence of multiple armed groups and the total lack of a police force the monopoly of force of the government is constantly challenged. In fact, the SPLA is currently not capable of conducting military operations which would have dire consequences for South Sudan if war is to resume between the government in Khartoum and the South. This is not simply a question about fighting the war but a question of having a military apparatus that is capable of supporting the political objectives of the government of South Sudan whether for independence or for unity.

•

Complete lack of functionally differentiated groups. It is common in writing about SSR to divide these into ‘peer groups’ that are supposed to be distinct form each other (the military, civil society, parliament, police, etc.). In South Sudan, however, there is no such distinction but only the SPLA in all its manifestations. This leads to the fact that much of the architectural design of SSR is currently irrelevant to the situation on the ground.

•

Similar to the DRC and many other African countries but in particular in South Sudan, the gap between theory and local understanding is huge. SSR deals with highly sophisticated concepts that are difficult to translate to local communities. There is a substantial gap between the appreciations from people on the ground who have been fighting all their

Key challenges in South Sudan In general, the challenge to SSR in a post-conflict situation is the establishment of a legitimate governance structure on the ground based on the political agenda that has been agreed upon. These ‘ideas’ then have to be pushed through the appropriate decision-making structures. This requires for instance the development of (national) security policies, Defence White Papers, military strategy, defence acts and DDR programmes while at the same time it requires the establishment of security governance and oversight structures (ministry of defence, interior, defence staff, parliamentary committees,…). It is fundamental that all structures created have clear roles and responsibilities. In a case where a clear package of ideas and structures are missing, SSR becomes highly problematic. With particular regard to South Sudan the following additional key challenges were presented: •

Southern Sudan is ethnically diverse with historical animosities between the various ethnic groups. The armed groups have been organised along ethnic lines with the SPLA mainly representing the Dinka and the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) mainly representing the Nuer. Despite various positive

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life. The SPLA, unlike many other liberation movements has never really controlled large territory and thus has not learned about civil administration nor has it sent its people abroad to be trained. •

Finally, the situation in South Sudan creates the opportunity to infuse some of the internationally accepted standards of SSR into the process of transformation of the SPLA. Nevertheless, they have to be balanced in such a way that they take into account the pace of the transformation process and the need for operational effectiveness that are dictated by the situation on the ground.

Whereas the SSR process in South Sudan remains relatively rudimentary and the challenges on the ground are immense it was noted that some progress has recently been made. A White Paper committee has been established, a workshop on the development of a White Paper for South Sudan has been organised and a second workshop will discuss the defence act.

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Policy recommendations As both case studies have shown, various difficulties exist in implementing SSR in practice. The following recommendations attempt to remedy some of the difficulties: •

•

Construct theory on the basis of reality: before any SSR programme is conducted the particular context of the country has to be carefully considered. SSR guidelines may be helpful but they have to be tailored in accordance to the specificities in each individual case. Rather than trying to find a European consensus on SSR, the EU should focus on finding a consensus on what is wrong with the security sector in a specific country. Pay attention to conflict-sensitive economic management: Donors need to carefully consider the effects of their decisions. Specific attention must be paid to ensuring salaries of soldiers and policemen, to support communities where soldiers reside and to the impact budget cuts can have in causing regional inequalities that might exacerbate conflict.

•

Refocus on the core of SSR: Donors should balance the establishment of operationally effective security forces with minimal governance requirements at the core of SSR processes.

•

Ensure better coordination of EU instruments: Good coordination is key to any successful SSR. In trying to avoid competing structures, the EU should establish double-hatted chief coordinators for countries in which they are engaged in SSR programmes.

•

Avoid bilateral competition and lack of coordination in training: Too many bilateral partners in training the police or armed forces

will lead to dysfunctional units and badly managed programs. •

Be aware of cutting defence and security budgets: An ideal functioning of any security sector requires sustained resources. Cutting defence budgets at times when salaries must be paid and new equipment needs to be procured undermines the credibility of international stakeholders.

•

Shift imbalance between security and development: The ambition of the EU in the field of SSR outweighs its capacity. More funding is needed for the security side if the EU is to play a central role. Similarly, regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) need serious funding if it is to take on new security roles.

•

Enhance South-South cooperation: Advantage should be taken of African countries that have experienced and managed processes of transformation which would increase acceptance of vital reforms. Additionally, regional organisations should be more involved in the SSR process.

•

Ensure local ownership: Donors should convince countries to take ownership by including them into the SSR process through regular meetings. While it takes time to create local ownership, local knowledge is central to effective SSR programmes.

•

Engage civil society for the right purposes: Civil society has to be engaged with full knowledge of what they can bring to SSR. Civil society can be instrumental in raising awareness and bringing the debate to the public. Making SSR happen, however, is not the role of civil society but of state structures. If used for political purposes it will aggravate mistrust and exclude the main actor in the security sector, i.e. the state.

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Mission Statement The 'Observatoire de l'Afrique' is a network of independent experts and institutes coordinated by the Central Africa Programme of the Brussels based EGMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations. The network aims at encouraging discussion between African and European experts on African security and political issues. This project was initiated to remedy the non-existence of a comprehensive forum for academic and professional exchanges on African issues of relevance for CFSP1 and ESDP2, including a wide range of African stakeholders. The overall aim is to create a forum for open, constructive dialogue and debate, and provide useful conclusions to a wide range of policy makers. This project is based on an Internet platform www.obsafrique.eu providing permanent debate, publications and relevant information and on three policy-relevant conferences per year. Of these seminars, one is to be held in an EU capital, another in Africa and the third in Brussels. The target audience for these debates include: policy makers at different levels, including the EU institutions, the AU, diplomatic staff, MFA and MOD officials and representatives of key think tanks and academia. In addition, a number of punctual meetings (Africa Briefings) will be organized that aim at providing insights into relevant political and security issues in Africa. The Observatoire is developed in association with the ‘Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques’ (DAS, Ministry of Defence – France). EGMONT is an independent think-tank based in Brussels.

Associated Members The Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos et Internacionais (IEEI, Lisbon), the Conflict Research Unit (Clingendael Institute, The Hague), Chatham House, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS, Pretoria), the University of Bologna, the Conflict Research Group (Ghent University), the Center for Policy Research and Dialogue (CPRD, Addis Ababa) and the Pole Institute (Goma, DRC).

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Common Foreign and Security Policy European Security and Defence Policy